UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE EDUCATION

THE PRACTICE OF VOTE BUYING DURING ELECTIONS IN GHANA: A CASE STUDY

BY

ATWAM-ARTHUR ANITA

202108373

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 BACKGROUND

Ghana's democratic system is often hailed as a successful model for Africa, having smoothly

transitioned between the two major political parties and conducted multiple presidential and

legislative elections since the establishment of the Fourth Republic. However, despite the

projected benefits of democracy, the country has faced challenges in realizing its democratic

ideals. One such challenge is the growing influence of money in electoral politics and

governance, which undermines the principles of multiparty representative democracy. This

concerning trend has become more pronounced in Ghana since the 2004 presidential and

parliamentary elections. The use of money to sway elections not only undermines the integrity of

the electoral process but also poses a threat to the stability and sustainability of Ghana's

democracy. Moreover, it raises doubts about the accuracy of election results as a true reflection

of popular will.

Vote buying refers to the act of offering rewards, typically of monetary value, to

individuals in exchange for their vote or their decision not to vote in a certain way. It is

considered a form of bribery and is discouraged in many democratic societies due to its

detrimental effects on the integrity of elections and the overall democratic system. Engaging in

vote buying is illegal. Examples of vote buying include direct payments made to voters,

campaign contributions from special interest groups to legislators, promises of specific projects,

or payments contingent upon the victory of a particular politician. Different societies may exhibit

various manifestations of vote buying. One approach involves direct payments to voters,

resembling a marketplace where candidates "buy" votes and residents "sell" them, much like the

exchange of goods such as apples, shoes, or televisions. Vote buying can also take the form of a

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contractual arrangement or even an auction, where individuals sell their votes to the highest

bidder. This practice aligns with the concept of market exchange, wherein parties and politicians

offer tangible benefits to voters in exchange for their political support at the polls (Schaffer &

Schedler, 2005).

In industrialized democracies, the financing of political parties and candidates is a

prominent form of monetization. However, in developing democracies like Ghana, the

coexistence of funding for influence and power with the practice of buying votes is more

prevalent. Monetization occurs in two main stages: within political parties during primary

elections and across parties during general elections. This phenomenon of monetizing electoral

politics and governance is not unique to a particular region but is observed worldwide (Onah &

Nwali, 2018). However, its impact on African politics has been particularly significant compared

to other continents (Bryan and Baer, 2005).

Political parties encounter conflicting expenses related to meetings, congresses,

transportation, training, salaries, benefits, rent, utilities, and other operational costs (International

IDEA, 2006; IDEG, 2018). In order to address these financial demands, election candidates and

political parties often seek unconventional individuals or groups to mobilize financial support

and generate the necessary funds to cover these expenses. Managing a diverse array of costs,

including those associated with meetings, congresses, transportation, training, salaries and

benefits, rent, utilities, and other operational aspects, presents an ongoing challenge for political

parties (International IDEA, 2006; IDEG, 2018). Consequently, election candidates and political

parties frequently resort to non-traditional sources or groups to facilitate financial assistance and

ensure sufficient resources are available to meet their financial obligations (Strauss, 1994).

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 Monetization poses severe consequences for representative governments and

accountability systems. In a representative democracy, the ideal scenario is for voters to have the

opportunity to select candidates through a fair competition based on their ideas and programs.

According to Diamond (2004), a transparent electoral mechanism that ensures free and fair

elections is a fundamental aspect of democracy. However, monetization undermines the

autonomy of voters and manipulates election outcomes by providing an unfair advantage to

wealthy politicians (NIF, 2001).

Monetization impacts the government in two significant ways.

Firstly, it creates favorable conditions for financially well-off but inexperienced candidates to

secure electoral victories, while simultaneously marginalizing competent incumbents who lack

the financial means to compete. Consequently, state institutions suffer a loss in capacity,

depriving them of the expertise and knowledge required for effective functioning. This, in turn,

hampers the parliament's ability to fulfill its legislative responsibilities and hold the executive

branch accountable for promoting developmental benefits, leading to suboptimal performance.

Second, commercialization endangers democracy by promoting corruption and

downplaying the value of morality and integrity in politics. Politicians that spend money on

buying votes nearly always recover their investment and have money left over for future

elections (Ojo, 2008). Financially supported candidates follow the directives of their backers by

promoting jobs and contracts that will be advantageous to them and their cronies (Bedi, 2017).

They sacrifice their integrity and responsibility as a result, to the benefit of financiers (Bryan &

Baer, 2005). According to NIF (2001), monetization corrupts the democratic premise of "one

person, one vote" into "one donor, much power." However, people who are self-financed might

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put their interests ahead of national interests to repay their debts or make up for their lost

savings.

Furthermore, Political vigilante justice and election violence are unintended

consequences of monetization because financiers who have heavily invested in elections may use

any strategy to win (Adetula, 2015). As a result, the main negative effects of monetization on

governance are the persistence of rising levels of violence, high unemployment rates, poverty,

and income inequality, as well as the poor quality of public service delivery and less accountable

governments. Election results that are influenced by money politics do not reflect public

sentiment, and as a result, democracy, accountability, or efficient government cannot be ensured

(Egwu, 2009, p. 41; International IDEA, 2001).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The practice of vote purchasing has played a significant role in promoting democratic

development in developing and transitional nations, as highlighted by Cheeseman (2015). In the

aftermath of the Cold War, Africa experienced a notable political transformation, particularly in

terms of democratization. Secret balloting is now widely employed by the majority of

governments across the continent, and efforts are made to provide civic education to the

electorate. Electoral regulations have been enacted to outlaw vote buying, resulting in elections

that are perceived as fair and free. This, in turn, has contributed to the strengthening of electoral

institutions and procedures over time. Scholars like Cheeseman (2015) and Adejumobi (2007)

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emphasize the positive impact of these developments. Consequently, patriarchal and

authoritarian regimes have gradually embraced certain democratic practices, marking a gradual

shift towards the adoption of democratic procedures.

Vote buying, also known as electoral clientelism, is a severe danger to the consolidation

of such democracies since it is widely recorded and documented during elections in developing

democracies. The concept of vote buying is well represented in the growing corpus of study on

democracy, but current scholarly discussions have neglected to address certain emerging

contemporary tendencies that also strongly encourage the culture of vote buying in intra-party,

municipal, and national elections. Many people consider vote buying to be a particular form of

clientelism. Patrons who wish to maintain their position of power and customers who desire

protection, access to benefits and services, or risk insurance are the two groups of characteristics

that define clientelist interactions (Piattoni, 2001). It is a very flexible political tactic that is used

frequently in both traditional and contemporary contexts. (Lemarchand,1972) and in both

democratic and autocratic regimes (Blaydes, 2010). The trade of a citizen's vote in exchange for

money directly or continued access to jobs, products, and services is known as clientelist

accountability. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007)

According to political economy models of democracy, elections can serve two general

purposes: first, they can provide voters with a means of punishing ineffective incumbents and, in

turn, create incentives for better performance (see, for instance, Ferejohn, 1986); and second,

they can enable them to select high-caliber leaders (e.g. Besley, 2005). Regarding the latter, it is

confusing that cash is frequently given to voters during elections given that many voters

associate it with corruption. This raises the intriguing question of how democratic election

winners who openly participate in corruption may continue to do so.

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Why do people support politicians who are blatantly corrupt? This issue is more generally

connected to the question of why "bad politicians" win elections in democracies (Caselli and

Morelli, 2004). Elections are regularly won by people who are known criminals in various

democracies (Aidt et al., 2011; Vaishnav, 2010), as well as candidates who are linked to

corruption scandals (Chang et al., 2010). These results highlight a problem with an unfavorable

selection that many developing democracies face.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Most nations consider vote buying to be an electoral crime. Vote buying is prohibited

by law in Ghana. The majority of voters do not understand the concept of vote buying and are

unaware that buying or selling votes is considered electoral fraud and is therefore prohibited.

Even the small number of electorates who are aware of vote buying are unaware that it is an

unethical and prohibited practice. Many Ghanaians also believe that buying votes is a widespread

practice. The illegality of buying votes is addressed both directly and indirectly by a number of

laws in Ghana, including election laws. All of these rules prohibit asking for votes or exerting

other forms of pressure.

According to a 2016 statement made by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development

(CDD-Ghana) in partnership with the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO),

buying and selling votes in any way is illegal under the Political Parties Law of 2000, Act 574,

and the Representation of the Peoples Law of 1992, PNDC Law 284. 32 CDD-Ghana/CODEO

constituency educators and monitors (16 each) reported their findings and observations on

possible instances of vote buying and/or inducement in the 16 constituencies in 2016.;

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 Most electors are not aware that "vote buying or selling" is regarded as electoral fraud

and is thus forbidden. They also don't really comprehend the idea of buying votes.

 The few electorates that were aware of the notion that vote buying is a corrupt and

unlawful practice were ignorant of it.

 Some electorates declared they would never allow money or other gifts from politicians

to sway their votes, while others were open to doing so.

 Vote buying could have an effect on some electorates because of poverty, while other

voters thought it was a good practice because it might alleviate short-term financial

problems.

 Most of the young people who took part in the education programs stated that they

would be open to receiving any political favors and that they would be prepared to sell

their votes to any politician who was willing to pay for them.

 Some electorates consider vote buying as a standard and an open, competitive market

where the winner is always the highest bidder (the politician who offers the most

goodies).

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PURPOSE OF STUDY

This phenomenological study's primary goal was to investigate the effects of the threat

of vote-buying among legitimate voters in the Suame constituency.;

 to ascertain the consequences of vote buying in the Suame constituency

 to examine into the restrictions that Suame constituency politicians have on incentives for

purchasing votes.

 To determine how widespread vote-buying is in the Suame constituency

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

 To understand what vote buying is.

 To understand what voting fraud implies

 To determine whether voting for a politician is influenced by money

 To determine whether citizens or politicians are behind the idea of monetizing votes.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To achieve the objectives of this study, the following research questions would be explored;

 Does the perception of vote buying get worse because of incumbent advantage?

 What is the legal position on buying votes?

 What is the Civil Society's stance on the matter?

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  What effect does vote buying have on the Suame constituency's electorate?

 What restrictions do politicians place on the sale of votes?

 Does the Suame constituency electoral system have a violent component?

SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION

The risk of vote buying among electorates in the Suame seat is investigated in this

study. Vote buying does not always take place; on occasion, voters demand incentives from

elected officials, and on occasion, officials provide incentives to voters against their better

judgment. The study will help decision-makers and the Independent National Electoral

Commission create effective plans to stop vote-buying among Suame constituency voters.

METHODOLOGY

STUDY DESIGN

This study will employ cross-sectional analysis. The information from respondents will be

acquired via a careful random sampling (constituents).

STUDY AREA

Suame is one of the parliamentary districts of Ghana. To elect one Member of

Parliament, it applies the first-past-the-post election system (MP). Suame is a municipal

assembly in Ghana's Ashanti Region and was once a component of the Kumasi Metropolitan

District. Before the 2004 Ghanaian parliamentary election, this seat was established when the

Old Tafo-Suame constituency was split into the Old Tafo and Suame seats, respectively. Hon

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Osei Kyei Mensah Bonsu, the majority leader in parliament and member of the new patriotic

party, has represented the seat ever since it was established. The seat, which is a component of

the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, shares boundaries with Tafo, Nhyiaso, Afigya Kwabre

South, and Bantama.

STUDY POPULATION

The sample population will be the valid and eligible correspondents of the Suame constituency

who cast votes.

INCLUSIVE CRITERIA

All eligible, cognizant, and conscientious Suame voters over the age of 18 will be enrolled in the

study.

EXCLUSIVE CRITERIA

The survey will not include any respondents who are under the age of 18 or who are not entitled

to vote in the Suame constituency.

DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

 Questionnaire

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DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE

Those who sign up for this study will receive a questionnaire to complete, and those who are

illiterate will receive assistance.

DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

The data will be analyzed, and frequency tables, pie charts, and graphs will be made to show the

data acquired from the study using Microsoft Word 2016 and Excel 2016. The outcomes will be

thoroughly analyzed and summarized.

ETHICAL ISSUES

On whether to approve the research, the constituency's representative in parliament

would be contacted. The confidentiality of the information gathered from respondents will be

guaranteed, and they will be asked for their informed consent before collecting it. The

respondents will be told about the objective and significance of the study and given the assurance

that the data gathered will only be utilized for academic reasons in order to foster confidence and

increase involvement from customers. Additionally, guarantees will be offered throughout the

research along with our regrets for any inconvenience.

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