Government Policy Biases and Ecuadorian

Agricultural Change
Victoria A. Lawson

Department of Geography, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195

Abstract. This paper examines links between Richardson 1981), but not much attention fo-
national policy, agricultural production re- cuses o n impacts o n t h e agricultural sector (Lip-
gimes, and regional economic change in Ec- ton 1976). This study addresses directly t h e role
uador. Social and spatial policy biases relate of state intervention in generating uneven ag-
to the presence of qualitatively different pro- ricultural growth in Ecuador.
duction structures in Ecuadorian agriculture- This inquiry parallels broader concerns for a
distinguished by their social relations of pro- better understanding of interactions between
duction and articulation into t h e capitalist macro-processes and micro-contexts in geo-
economy. I investigate links between policy, graphic research (Sayer 1984; Fincher 1987). The
agricultural production regime, and regional debate focuses theoretically o n questions of
economic change through a nationwide em- structure and human agency, attempting t o ex-
pirical analysis of price and credit policy im- plain how individual actions a r e mediated by,
pacts on Ecuadorian agriculture. These anal- and also serve t o restructure, their larger social
yses employ data drawn from the 1974 and context (Giddens 1984; Fincher 1987). M o r e ex-
1982 Population Censuses and the 1974 Ag- plicitly geographical is t h e recognition of t h e
ricultural Census. Radically different agricul- spatiality of social and economic processes and
tural production regimes in Ecuador enable/ of t h e need t o incorporate t h e spatial organi-
constrain farmers' access t o political and eco- zation of society into explanations of t h e con-
nomic resources and so influence agrarian crete outcomes of these processes (Clark and
change. Specifically Sierran minifundistas, Dear 1984,6-8; Gore 1984; Massey 1984,1985).
without land title and engaged in subsistence This has led t o calls for,
production, are excluded from price and credit
programs whereas Costeiio export crop pro- Two major elements (in geographic research), . . . :
ducers, employing wage-labor and capital in- (1) a theoretical appreciation of the general pro-
tensive production techniques, benefit from cessesof the capitalist mode of production (or oth-
er modes where relevant); and (2) an empirical ap-
price supports and credit due (in part) to wide- preciation of the particular social formations
spread literacy and legal land ownership. Such (Johnston 1985, 336, emphasis in original).
policy outcomes are only understood through
investigating social production structures Fincher (1987,12)advocates empirical work that
embedded in their economic and spatial con- "tries t o explain t h e selectively causal nature of
text. any given social context." This focus requires
Key Words: national policy, Ecuador, agriculture, research identifying contextual structures that
production structure. mediate t h e operation of broader social and
economic processes.
1 address t h e latter t h e m e by examining t h e
LTHOUGH t h e understanding of re- interrelationships between production struc-
gional economic change is central t o tures that are e m b e d d e d in localities and larger
geographic research, w e know rela- economic processes operating through nation-
tively little about how different production al policies. It should b e noted that human agen-
structures mediate growth impacts of national cy (the micro-scale) is not defined here as in-
policies in less developed settings. Previous dividuals, but rather key groups of producers
work examines t h e "urban bias" of national identified by their production structures. To
policy in developing nations (Lentnek 1980; this end, I lay groundwork for understanding
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 78(3), 1988, pp. 433-452
0 Copyright 1988 by Association of American Geographers
434 Lawson

farmer/policy interactions by providing evi- ducing export crops, and small farm providing
dence of the existence and nature of distinctly subsistence for peasant farmers (for detailed
different production regimes in Ecuadorian ag- descriptions see Blakemore and Smith 1983;
riculture. Furthermore, the differential oper- Brea 1986; Commander and Peek 1986). Each
ation of policy across production regimes na- of these production forms interfaces very dif-
tionwide demonstrates empirically that the ferently with policy. Illustrative of this assertion
farmers’ production structures enable or con- is work indicating that the form and underlying
strain their potential t o benefit from policy. assumptions of national policies cause them t o
Previous work on spatial impacts of national interact more or less effectively with various
policy shows that there are broad sectoral di- regional production structures. For example,
visions of the space-economy and urban/rural subsistence farmers and sharecroppers not
(implying industriaVagricultura1) differences in producing for commercial markets are unaf-
policy effects. Particular attention has been paid fected by price and marketing programs de-
to increasing urban polarization as a result of signed t o equalize regional incomes (Thirsk
“leading sector” development strategies which 1976,33; Tolley, Thomas, and Wong 1982). Sim-
promote trade protectionism, pricing pro- ilarly, tenant farmers cannot benefit from pro-
grams, and infrastructural provision policies grams spreading production credit t o the small
(Lentnek 1980; Renuad 1981; Richardson 1981; farm sector since ownership of land i s typically
Ruane 1983). Programs admitting multination- a prerequisite t o obtaining a loan (Ramos 1984).
als into developing nations (with their strong Research in Africa suggests that national policy
preference for a core location), policies such impacts vary considerably across ethnic groups,
as price controls on food which subsidize urban by degree of peasant activism, strength of local
consumers at the expense of farmers, and lack elites, and variety of production structures
of government decentralization, all exacerbate (Bates 1981; Bassett 1984). Although idiosyn-
metropolitan growth (Richardson 1980). cratic observations such as these are relatively
While the above programs draw attention t o common, studies are needed that identify par-
urban/industrial (sectoral) biases in policy ef- ticular aspects of production regimes which
fects, it i s also important t o recognize that im- enable/constrain farmers embedded in them,
pacts vary within economic sectors (Lawson t o benefit from national policy.
1986; Brown 1987). Forms of production vary This study responds t o the above specific
considerably within industry and agriculture, themes and also t o more general calls for em-
hence poiicy impacts may not be determined pirical work o n the interrelationships between
purely by “membership” in the leading eco- macro-processes and local-level spatial struc-
nomic sector. Rather, place-specific combi- tures. Specifically, links between national pol-
nations of production structures, human and icy, agricultural production regimes, and re-
natural resources, infrastructures, and the like gional economic change are examined through
combine t o determine how broader processes a nationwide empirical analysis of price and
operate. Understanding spatially varied policy credit policy impacts on Ecuadorian agricul-
impacts requires the clear identification of par- ture.’ First, I will illustrate the socially and spa-
ticular production structures in their economic tially selective impacts of national policy and
and spatial context, and then in their interface relate them t o the presence of different agri-
with national policy. In Ecuador, Import Sub- cultural production regimes. Attention then
stitution Industrialization (ISI) i s the dominant turns t o identifying varied policy impacts for
policy strategy so that uneven development of groups of farmers by documenting patterns of
the urban sector vis-a-vis the rural would be economic change across Ecuadorian cantones
anticipated. However, this study argues that during the 1970s and grouping cantones ac-
policies intended t o offset disequilibrating ten- cording t o these change performances. A final
dencies associated with IS1 exhibit considerable section establishes the link between policy
social and spatial biases in their operation with- measures, production structures, and benefi-
in the agricultural sector. cial/deleterious policy impacts (measured by
Agriculture in Latin America has several dis- regional change patterns) by identifying which
tinct forms of production: the hacienda estates aspects of production are the most important
run by sharecroppers or tenant farmers for ab- discriminators between more and less dynamic
sentee landlords, commercial plantations pro- agricultural groups.
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 435

National Policies Influencing cluding rice, hard corn, sugar, wheat, and soy-
Regional Change beans. Empresa Nacional de Productos Vitales
(National Board for Basic Foodstuffs, ENPROV-
National policies played an immense role in IT) sets maximum consumer prices ensuring
Ecuadorian regional change during the 1970s cheap food prices for low-income consumers.
i n part facilitated by massive inflows of foreign Also during the 1970s ENPROVIT retail outlets
exchange from petroleum exports. The general carried as many as 800 product lines, many of
policy context is an import-substitution indus- which had controlled consumer prices. These
trialization strategy intended t o reduce imports included rice, meat, legumes, bread, flour, but-
of manufactured goods and replace them with ter, corn, potatoes, sugar, milk, coffee, soy-
domestic production (Gibson 1971; Zuvekas beans, cotton, lint, and cotton seed.
1975; Meier 1976). Associated with this partic- Both components of pricing policy (ENAC
ular strategy i s a complex set of policies af- and ENPROVIT) have socially and spatially se-
fecting exchange rates, import and export lective impacts that contribute t o uneven
growth in the Ecuadorian space-economy. Ex-
composition, prices, and credit availability
(Meier 1976). Their combined effects have re- amples of these biases and distortions exist for
sulted i n a net transfer of resources from ag- ENAC and ENPROVIT programs respectively.
riculture t o industry (Gibson 1971; Zuvekas ENAC’s guaranteed prices on domestically pro-
1975). While these measures combine t o influ- duced food crops are intended t o stabilize
ence the entire economy, agriculture remains farmers’ incomes and provide incentives t o in-
the most pervasive sector (in terms of propor- crease production (Tolley, Thomas, Wong 1982).
tion of labor force employed and territory cov- In reality, however, these objectives are not
ered); therefore examination of policies influ- being achieved u n i f o r m l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e
encing agriculture best demonstrates space-economy. ENAC official (nominal) prices
differential regional impacts of policy inter- often have not matched production costs (real
vention. prices) and thus have failed t o provide ade-
quate incentives t o stimulate production (Eco-
Agricultural price and credit policies illus-
nomic Perspectives 1985; Cleaver 1985).’ This
trate the socially and spatially selective impacts
situation occurred because official prices were
of national policy. This section first provides a
seldom reviewed or adjusted and did not ac-
qualitative account of the structure and per-
count for supply/demand shifts or seasonal fac-
formance of these policies across agricultural
tors (World Bank 1984). Marked differentials
production regimes during the 1970s, thus
between real and official prices for rice, soy-
identifying mechanisms of uneven regional
beans, and hard corn are the result (Table 1).
change. Second, patterns of variation in policy
At best, increases in official prices were only
performance affect the presence of distinct
sufficient t o keep pace with inflation and
production structures, as illustrated by a set of
variables representing key aspects of these pro- t o match, not surpass, real prices by the 1980s.
ENAC also had a destabilizing effect upon
duction regimes.
agricultural p r o d u c t i o n due t o inadequate
planning and storage facilities. This effect i s il-
lustrated by the corn sector. Ecuador i s almost
Price Policy self-sufficient in corn, which is used as livestock
and poultry feed. In 1981, a record harvest,
Agricultural price policy in Ecuador has two ENAC purchased 57 thousand tons of corn, far
components: guaranteed minimum prices for more than could be resold within the year with-
agricultural commodities and guaranteed max- out severely lowering the market price. When
imum food prices for consumers. Minimum the 1982 harvest proved even larger than the
producer prices are enforced through Empresa preceding year, ENAC had no available storage
Nacional de Almacenimiento y Commerciali- facilities and could not absorb the surplus to
zacion (National Board for Commercialization maintain price levels. This situation caused a
of Foodstuffs, ENAC) which buys crops at of- corn glut and prices plummeted, well below
ficial prices and sells at levels covering storage official minimum prices. During 1982 ENAC sold
and handling. During the 1970s ENAC inter- abroad large quantities of the surplus a t a loss
vention was limited t o domestic food crops in- and was left with insufficient stocks t o cover
436 Lawson

Table 1. Minimum Producer Prices, Ecuador, 1970-80

Rice ($/gg) Hard corn ($/gg) Soybeans ($/gg)
Year Nominala Realb Nominal Real Nominal Real
1970 75 245 - - - -
1971 75 227 - - - -
1972 81 227 70 196 - -
1973 93 231 90 223 - -
1974 110 221 120 241 280 563
1975 150 261 120 209 420 731
1976 160 251 195 306 420 659
1977 170 236 203 282 420 584
1978 180 225 203 254 420 525
1979 200 226 203 229 420 475
1980 240 240 240 240 460 460
Source: Economic Perspectives, 1985.
Nominal prices are legislated by the Government of Ecuador.
Real prices reflect the cost of wages, rents, and profits accrued in producing a specific commodity, in 1980 sucres.

the devastation of corn supplies by the E l Niiio For rice, ENAC has not participated enough to ac-
floods of 1983. tually enforce the announced price. It buys the
great majority of i t s rice from farmers with larger
This series of events, although exceptional, rice operations and almost none from small pro-
signals a broader problem; ducers (Franklin and Penn 1985, 2).
This inability t o support prices for traditional
The problems caused by ENAC’s resale policy were
not limited to isolated instances in 1982. Over the producers also has crop-specific, and hence a
entire period 1974-1984, the variability of annual spatial, expression. Crops produced predomi-
corn supplies was amplified by ENAC intervention nantly o n small farms throughout the Sierra,
(Economic Perspectives 1985, 60) such as potatoes and kidney beans, are not ef-
fectively served by this policy. By contrast, pro-
The regions producing corn were negatively duction of soybeans i s concentrated geograph-
affected by price policy, since planting deci- ically in Los Rios province, produced in large
sions were made on the basis of prices that were volumes by modern sector farmers, sold t o few
not maintained in the market place. Given that processors, and has been successfully price-
60 percent of corn is produced in three coastal supported (Economic Perspectives 1985).
provinces, Manabi, Los Rios, and Guayas, neg- ENPROVIT maintained official maximum
ative growth effects of price policy were re- prices on staple foodstuffs and, as indicated
gionally concentrated in the Costa. clearly in Table 2, the consumers received con-
Destabilizing impacts of ENAC intervention siderable subsidies by paying well below the
were further compounded by selective pur- market price for ENPROVIT products. While of
chasing practices, with a clear pro-modern sec- obvious benefit t o consumers, this policy had
tor bias.’ Official support prices were not ef- deleterious effects upon domestic food pro-
fectively maintained for traditional farmers due ducers, particularly in the face of ineffective
t o poor provision of information regarding price ENAC producer price protection. In providing
supports and ineffective purchasing from nu- cheap urban food, continuation of low urban
merous, spatially dispersed small farmers, many wages is facilitated, which in turn permits high
of whom use informal market outlets. By con- levels of capital accumulation in urban enter-
trast, modern-sector farmers, with a greater prises (Meier 1976; Thirsk 1976). ENPROVI’T
volume t o sell, superior information regarding food policies constituted an implicit taxation
price support levels and ENAC outlets, and bet- whereby the urban sector i s favored at the ex-
ter transportation t o those locales had access pense of the agricultural, causing stagnation in
t o ENAC-supported prices. the latter.
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 437

Table 2. Maximum Consumer Prices, Ecuador, 1970-80

Rice (dkg)” Milk (dliter) Edible oil ( d i t e r ) Shortening (s/lb)
Year Officialb Realc Official Real Official Real Official Real
1970 4.8 15.7 1.8 5.9 - - - -
1971 5.0 15.2 2.1 6.4 - - - -
1972 5.6 15.7 2.3 6.4 - - - -
1973 6.8 16.9 2.6 6.5 - - - -
1974 8.6 17.3 3.6 7.2 - - - -
1975 10.4 18.1 4.0 7.0 31.0 54.0 - -
1976 10.3 16.2 5.2 8.2 31.0 48.7 - -
1977 9.6 13.3 5.4 7.5 31.0 43.1 12.2 17.0
1978 12.1 15.1 6.0 7.5 31.0 38.8 12.2 15.3
1979 13.8 15.6 7.4 8.4 31.0 35.0 12.2 13.8
1980 13.8 13.8 7.8 7.8 38.2 38.2 12.2 12.2
~~

Source: Grain Pricing Policy in fcuador, Economic Perspectives, 1985.

a s refers to sucres.
)’Official (nominal) prices are those legislated by the Government of Ecuador.
‘ Real prices reflect the costs of wages, rents, and profits employed in producing a specific commodity, in 1980 sucres.

Evidence of this stagnation is provided by semi-subsistence p r o d u c t i o n are such that

production of potatoes, a staple food crop time/money spent organizing, or lobbying i n
throughout the Sierra, for which output has Quito, would mean foregone production and
diminished dramatically during the 1970s. The family hardship. Further, the campesinos are
total area planted declined from 47,220 hect- often unaware of coherent political strategies
ares in 1970 t o 30,380 in 1980, a 37 percent per se and only suffer spin-off effects of policy
decline, while total output decreased from through lower commodity prices on market day.
541,749 t o 323,222 metric tons, a 45.7 percent Many small farmers assume that the price levels
decline during the same period (Table 3). This are purely a result of market conditions, rather
downturn of a price-controlled product has than of policy or their disadvantaged structural
distinct geographical impacts since 99 percent position within agriculture.
of potato production occurs in the Sierra and
fully 24 percent of that in Chimborazo province
(Simmons and Ramos 1985). Similar declines Credit Policy
were evident for both barley and kidney beans,
also produced widely throughout the Sierra Disburse ment of agr icu I t ural p r o d u c t i o n
(Table 3). credit in Ecuador provides similar evidence of
The uneven policy impacts identified above social and spatial biases and distortions. Credit
emerge from several causes. Poor administra- i s disbursed almost entirely by one institution,
tion and management (as with inadequate price Banco Nacional de Foment0 (National Devel-
revisions or storage capacity) are one element, opment Bank, BNF). This institution had a man-
but a more fundamental theme also emerges. date t o provide the bulk of i t s credit t o small
The modern-sector bias in policy benefits re- farmers (those holding less than five hectares),
sults (in part) from the privileged position held during the 1970s in an attempt t o redistribute
by wealthy farmers in Ecuadorian society. Land capital within the agricultural sector. The actual
ownership i s the historical basis for social/eco- disbursement of credit presents a different pic-
nomic/political power, and this access t o eco- ture. While 77 percent of agricultural produc-
nomic, educational, and infrastructural re- ers aie on small farms, they received an annual
sources has effectively targeted policies t o this average of 28 percent of production credit,
group. By contrast, the historically disenfran- while the majority went t o medium and large-
chised and currently marginal socioeconomic scale agriculturalists (Ramos 1984; BNF 1985).
position of small peasant farmers prevents them The reasonsfor this bias relate t o several aspects
from exerting political power. The realities of of traditional production, including high illit-
438 Lawson

Table 3. Estimated Area Harvested, Production, and Growth Rate of Potatoes, Barley, and
Kidney Beans, Ecuador, 1970-80
Potatoes Barley Kidney Beans
Harvested Production Harvested Production Harvested Production
Year (hectares) (M.T.) (hectares) (M.T.) (hectares) (M.T.)
1970 47,220 541,794 133,920 79,087 81,635 41,331
1971 53,452 680,740 119,971 68,691 67,140 30,148
1972 37,729 4 73,348 118,957 73,387 62,139 26,038
1973 43,576 539,198 93,178 79,383 66,339 31,961
1974 39,138 503,340 60,844 56,148 66,181 28,001
1975 39,499 499,371 71,558 62,801 62,553 26,103
1976 41,223 499,000 71,600 62,872 67,924 32,000
1977 36,000 417,000 60,000 40,776 59,000 26,000
1978 29,843 343,195 32,000 21,760 39,118 18,760
1979 26,894 254,507 30,774 20,718 44,386 23,196
1980 30,380 323,222 26,244 24,350 48,156 26,275
YOgrowtha 1970-80 - 37.1 -45.7 -76.2 -69.8 -37.6 -30.1
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Canaderia, MAG.
Y o growth of each crop, area harvested and production, was calculated from an average of the first and last three years in
a

the series.

eracy, widespread tenancy, and minimal polit- c o m e tax payment, production report for t h e
ical influence. Evidence for these assertions is loan period, and legal title t o t h e land. Dis-
presented below. trustful of these written procedures, which have
Interest-rate policies in rural financial mar- little meaning in their culture, illiterate small
kets contribute to this anti-small farm bias in farmers avoid formal credit channels. Among
credit disbursement. Low nominal interest rates, these regulations, t h e greatest impediment t o
coupled with rapid inflation, combine t o re- obtaining credit is proof of land ownership.
d u c e real rates of interest t o negative level^.^ Renters and those without title are automati-
Inflation rates between 8-23 percent during cally excluded from obtaining credit; they are
t h e 1970s coupled with a legal ceiling o n lend- overwhelmingly small peasant farmers.
ing rates of 12 percent, cheapened credit for
borrowers as intended, but also reduced in- Land ownership as a requisite, or rather collateral,
centives to savers. This policy has implications seems to be a v e r y important impediment to credit
delivery to a very large group of farmers, especially
for credit disbursement, since less is saved, thus small ones. (Ramos 1984,l)
shrinking credit supplies and leading t o credit
rationing. The latter encourages political pa- These aspects of credit disbursement lead to
tronage with a disproportionate amount going distinct social and spatial biases, given that small
to larger farmers. As Ramos (1984,47) observes: farms and traditional agricultural practices are
concentrated in t h e Sierra. That region con-
Interest rates kept low by government policy have
tended to have effects that discriminate against tains 62 percent of all farm unitsand 39 percent
small farmers. Due to a lack of large amounts of of farm hectarage, but averaged only 34 per-
resources, cheap credit must be rationed. The pro- cent of B N F credit, much of which went to large
cedures usually are politically determined and pro- farms (Table 4). By contrast, t h e Costa contains
vide opportunities for corruption, cronyism, and 33 percent of farms and 47 percent of t h e hec-
favoritism.
tarage, but received 60 percent of available B N F
Poor access t o credit for small farmers is also credit (Table 4). Since credit must b e obtained
related to complex and costly borrowing pro- e l s e w h e r e a n d non-institutional c h a n n e l s
cedures within BNF. Extensive documentation charge considerably higher rates, t h e cost of
is required t o obtain a loan, including an iden- borrowing also varies regionally, again t o t h e
tification card, voting certificate, proof of in- disadvantage of t h e traditional sector.
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 439

Table 4. Percentage of Agricultural Credit Disbursed by Region, 1970-80

YO
YO total
total farm
farm acre-
Region 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 units age
Sierra 30.8 38.4 42.6 35.7 30.8 29.7 30.1 32.8 35.8 33.7 34.8 62.1 38.7
Costa 65.5 56.2 51.7 59.1 64.4 65.2 64.7 59.5 55.3 61.2 59.6 33.1 47.3
Oriente 3.6 5.4 5.7 5.1 4.6 5.0 5.1 7.6 8.7 5.1 5.4 4.8 13.8
Source: BNF "Cerencia Tecnica, Boletin Estadistico," 1970-1984.

ronmental factors. Three land tenure forms

Agrarian Production Structures dominate Ecuadorian agriculture, estatedha-
and Policy Performance ciendas, small farms/minifundias, and industrial
plantations, and provide a basis for identifying
Evidence presented above suggests that so- distinct regional production structures.6
ciaVspatial policy biases are related to the ex- Haciendas or estates are located primarily in
istence of qualitatively distinct production struc- the Sierra where they produce largely for do-
tures. Such social biases may be explained by mestic markets, often employing labor inten-
examining the role and relative importance of sive methods (Fig. 1). The hacienda system is
farmers embedded in each production regime characterized both by landed elites, with social,
to the modern socioeconomic system, and economic, and political access to productive
hence, their importance to the state and econ- resources, and by widespread tenancy that as-
omy overall (De Janvry1981; Massey 1984). This sumes several forms. Aparceria, for example, i s
regime entails identifying both their contribu- a sharecropping arrangement wherein the
tion to the commercial economy (i.e., supplying aparcero works for the landlord, or pays rent
exports earning foreign exchange, domestic in kind, in return for a small plot. This form,
foodstuffs needed for urban labor, or a semi- and arrendamiento (renting for cash) are re-
proletarianized labor force) and those social re- placing a more traditional feudalistic tenancy
lations of production which constraidenable system wherein the huasipungos were more de-
farmers in gaining access to political,economic, pendent on landlords and worked four to six
and infrastructural resources. The latter in- days a week throughout the year on the ha-
clude whether farmers have direcdindirect ac- cienda in return for a plot and assistance from
cess to productive land, type of tenancy, their the hacendado (Redclift and Preston 1980;
labor source (family or waged), and whether Blakemore and Smith 1983; Commander and
they control disbursement of their surplus Peek 1986). Such tenancy systems generate a
prod~ct.~ group of renters who have some autonomy in
This subsection identifies different produc- terms of what they produce, but yet precarious
tion structures based on their contribution to access to the land and dependence on the ha-
the commercial economy and those social re- cendado for additional paid work and/or as-
lations of production influencing policy per- sistance during times of family hardship. Private
formance. In addition, key aspects of these pro- production i s on tiny marginal plots and these
duction regimes are represented by structural farmers fail to generate a surplus for commer-
variables which will be incorporated into sub- cial sale on a regular basis.
sequent statistical analyses distinguishing the Minifundias or small farms are the most nu-
more and less dynamic regions of the agricul- merous landholding form throughout the Sier-
tural space-economy. ra (Fig. 1); they have evolved in tandem with
The social policy biases alluded to above also haciendas (Odell and Preston 1978). These pro-
take on a spatial dimension because these pro- duce food crops primarily for subsistence con-
duction regimes are clearly regionalized due to sumption with any surplus being sold in do-
a combination of historical, social, and envi- mestic markets. Various tenancy forms prevail,
440 Lawson

Figure 1. Ecological zones of Ecuador.

including renting under sharecropping or cash plies a labor force free of reproduction costs
arrangements (discussed above) or ownership t o capitalist farmers and urban employers
with, but frequently without land title. The lat- (Commander and Peek 1986; Llovet 1986). The
ter represents the marginal position of mini- system, distinguished by its marginal socioeco-
fundistas within agriculture and the contem- nomic position, is closely articulated into the
porary economy, a reality which severely limits capitalist modern sector, but without political
their access to productive resources (for ex- or economic power to influence or benefit from
ample credit). that system.
The minifundistas are the most marginalized, industrial plantations dominate the Costa
disenfranchised group in Ecuadorian agricul- where commercial production of bananas, cof-
ture (Commander and Peek 1986; Llovet 1986). fee, cacao, and sugar for export i s widespread
Having neither land ownership, sufficient land, (Fig. 1; Delavaud 1980; Blakemore and Smith
nor adequate inputs to consistently produce a 1983). Land owners frequently occupy and
commercial surplus, they have not become an manage their medium-size farms (between 50-
influential political voice on policies designed 500 hectares) which are capitalist in organiza-
to increase farmers’ incomes or production. tion. Wage labor is typically employed as are
Their lack of financial resources further re- modern capital and technology-intensive pro-
quires them to rely on family labor and sup- duction practices. Plantation owners are mem-
plemental jobs to survive so that possibilities bers of the former landlord class, business peo-
for increasing the scale or technological so- ple, or foreign investorswho have considerable
phistication of production are minimal. As a government support and influence both for ac-
result the minifundia production system sup- quiring and developing land (Delavaud 1980).
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 44 1

IMPACTS
MDEAEXPORTCSUPS

4. PWPS3TKMOFFARMAUEA

VARRIOVS SlZE CLASSES

I I I

Figure 2. Structural variables mediating local policy impacts.

This support (in part) reflects t h e importance crops; and by an export c r o p bias in credit dis-
of agricultural exports within t h e economy, bursement. Given that export and domestic
representing a considerable proportion of total production a r e concentrated geographically in
exports until t h e ”petroleum seventies.” The Costa and Sierra respectively, distinct uneven
result is that Costa agriculture has evolved as a regional growth outcomes of these policies are
progressive capitalist system for which policy likely. To distinguish regions producing export
is relatively effective d u e t o t h e importance of from domestic crops, t h e variables proportion
Costa producers and t h e output t o t h e overall of area under export crops and proportion of area
health of t h e Ecuadorian economy and polity. under domestic food crops a r e used (Fig. 2 , Box-
es 3 and 4).
Various forms of agricultural tenancy also in-
fluence local policy impacts. As stated above,
Summary of Policy Performance and proof of land ownership is a prerequisite t o
Production Regimes obtaining production credit. Those farmers not
holding official title or renting land are auto-
Attention now turns to identifying key as- matically excluded from benefits of credit. In
pects of these production regimes and provid- addition, producers renting land by sharecrop-
ing examples of their interface with policy ping are excluded from price supports de-
mechanisms. These variables are incorporated signed t o raise farmers’ incomes, since they d o
into subsequent statistical analyses linking pol- not produce for commercial markets. These
icy impacts, local production structures, and aspects of production a r e captured by t h e vari-
regional change in t h e Ecuadorian space-econ- ables form of landholding and proportion own-
omy. ing land without title (Fig. 2, Boxes 6 and 7).
O n e important feature of production me- The proportion of illiterate producers in a
diating policy impacts,and reflecting its relative region also influences price and credit policy
importance in t h e economy, is t h e market t o impacts. Demanding loan application proce-
which crops are directed, that is, export o r do- dures screen out illiterate producers unable to
mestic. Domestic food producers have been complete t h e necessary forms. Also illiterate
penalized by maximum consumer prices o n farmers have limited access to printed infor-
food; ineffective ENAC producer price protec- mation o n interest rates, guarantees, and refi-
tion o n potatoes, rice, and beans, all principal nancing procedures which make credit appear
442 Lawson

less risky. Timely disbursement of information variables identified above in a discriminant

on price supports, which influence production analysis t o distinguish between t h e more and
decisions, is hindered by illiteracy. The small less dynamic agricultural groups.
farm sector, where illiteracy is most wide-
spread, is partially excluded from both price
and credit policies designed t o raise incomes Regional Change in Ecuador, 1974-82
in this sector. This facet is represented by t h e
variable proportion of agricultural producers lit- Economic change performance across can-
erate (Fig. 2, Box 8). tones during t h e 1970s is summarized by em-
A recurrent theme throughout this analysis ploying 27 socioeconomic variables from Ec-
is that policy impacts depend upon degree of uador’s 1974 and 1982 published Population
articulation into t h e modern capitalist sector. Censuses and subjecting them t o principal
That is, export crop producers o n medium and components analysis.8 These variables repre-
large farms comprise t h e modern sector, e m - sent both absolute and relative changes in eco-
ploying capital intensive inputs, machinery, and nomic and human resource attributes across
wage-labor. Policies directed towards agricul- cantones. The principal components analysis
ture, including ENAC price supports, low wages yields four dimensions which account for 66
d u e to cheap consumer food programs, and percent of total variance (Table 5).
access t o production credit d u e t o widespread The first principal component represents ab-
land ownership, all benefit these producers. solute employment change. Populous and highly
The traditional sector, by contrast, is charac- urbanized cantones score positively on this
terized by small farms, low incomes, subsis- component; they are experiencing absolute
tence production, high tenancy, and illiteracy. employment increases in manufacturing, com-
In producing t h e bulk of domestic food, this mercial, and service sectors, and in profession-
sector has been penalized by ineffective ENAC al, clerk, and vendor occupations. They also
producer price protection, loan application increased their proportion of college-educat-
procedures which screen out illiterate appli- e d persons. Places exhibiting high positive
cants, and cheap urban food, all which have led scores on this dimension include Quito (+6.12)
t o a stagnation of domestic production. Al- and Guayaquil (+7.39), t h e nation’s capital and
though difficult t o measure directly, these as- largest port respectively. At t h e opposite ex-
pects of production are captured in t h e afore- treme are thinly populated, remote rural can-
mentioned variables and in proportion of farms tones, for example Muisne of Esmeraldas prov-
in various size classes (Fig. 2, Box 5). ince in t h e Costa, and in t h e Sierra, Celica
(-0.65) in Loja and Paute (-0.73) in A z ~ a y . ~
Principal component two portrays economic
Regional Change Performance and structure shifts. Positive scores o n this dimen-
Local Production Structures sion are recorded by cantones experiencing
considerable economic change with large rel-
The preceding section demonstrated quali- ative increases in total population, in agricul-
tatively that national policies have socially and turelmining, manufacturing, commerce, and
spatially selective impacts within agriculture transportation sector employment, and in ven-
which relate t o distinct production regimes. dor, clerk, and farmer occupations. Places scor-
Attention now turns to demonstrating this as- ing positively include t h e Oriente cantones of
sertion statistically for t h e entire country. First Orellana(+5.10)and Putumayo(+6.27) in Nap0
the patterns of economic change between 1974 province, a region of recent oil exploitation,
and 1982 are identified, and cantones are and Morona (+2.28) and Cualaquiza (+1.19) in
grouped accordingly. These groupings of can- Morona Santiago province, an area of consid-
tones with similar growth experiences are erable agricultural colonization. Negative scores
viewed as resulting (in part) from t h e consid- are found for cantones with relatively stable or
erable impact of national policies upon various slowly transforming economies, having long-
producers across t h e space-economy.’ A link established urban or agricultural structures, such
is established between agricultural change and as Riobamba (-0.318) and Macara (-1.48) in
policy measures by employing t h e structural Loja province.
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 443

The third principal component represents To summarize these regional changes, Caset-
subsistence versus commercial economy shifts. ti’s (1964, 1965) discriminant iterations group-
Places scoring positively experienced increases ing algorithm was applied t o component scores.
in agricultural employment and losses of valu- A fourfold classification of cantones results: (1)
able human resources (represented by high e d - major cities, (2) regional centers, (3) export ag-
ucational and occupational status levels of out- riculture areas, and (4) domestic food produc-
migrants). The latter variable may b e related t o ing areas. Average component scores for each
greater mobility brought about by land reform group are shown in Table 6 and their spatial
which eradicated feudal landholding practices distributions in Figure 3. The cantones are not
during t h e 1960s. This practice intensified t h e always continguous as they reflect spatial frag-
minifundio system and t h e need for circulation mentation of economic development in Ec-
t o supplement meager subsistence incomes. uador.
Increased agricultural employment results from Major cities include Ecuador’s two largest,
a growing workforce without parallel increases Quito and Cuayaquil, where historically pop-
in employment opportunities throughout tra- ulation, commerce, service provision, political
ditional Sierran economies, for example An- power, and wealth have been concentrated
tonio Ante (+1.56) t o t h e North t o Azogues (Blakemore and Smith 1983). These cantones
(+1.47) and Biblian ($1.35) of Canar province have predominantly urban populations, large
in t h e South. absolute increases in secondary and tertiary
Negative scores o n this dimension are re- employment, and improvements in average
corded primarily by Costa cantones with in- educational levels; they score highest o n di-
creased numbers seeking first work and grow- mension o n e (Table 6). These large increases in
ing service and manufacturing sectors. The more employment and improvements in human re-
urbanized and commercial orientation of t h e source base reflect urban/industrial policy
Costa economy is apparent in this component. biases during t h e 1970s which caused agricul-
The presence of widespread cash-cropping and tural stagnation and established a net outflow
abundant wage-labor, supplemented by land of productive resources from rural areas.
reform, have promoted urban expansion t o Regional centers include Ecuador‘s third larg-
service this dynamic export economy. Such est city, Cuenca, and t h e majority of interme-
growth is exemplified by 24 d e Mayo (-2.48) diate-size cities (Fig. 3). Components three and
and Santo Doming0 d e 10s Colorados (-1.15), four best represent these cantones which have
t h e fastest growing Ecuadorian city. dynamic urban economies, attracting valuable
Principal component four depicts labor force human resources, and stagnant traditional ag-
shifts. Places with positive scores attract pri- ricultural sectors (Table 6). This economic pro-
marily male and economically active in-mi- file reflects t h e importance of both land reform
grants and are of two types. First, Southern bor- and urban-biased policies in restructuring rural
der cantones draw migrants from economically and urban sectors. Especially in t h e Sierra, t h e
depressed Northern Peru, for example, Calvas reforms changed social relations between ha-
(+1.65),Celica(+1.23),and Macara(2.24)in Loja cienda owners and campesinos by eradicating
province. Second, shifts are evident for can- feudal ties. This change led both to t h e creation
tones containing Ecuador’s rapidly growing of numerous minifundias (too small for profit-
secondary cities, which, d u e t o investment of able commercial production) and an obligation
oil revenues and resultant multiplier effects, for campesinos t o seek waged work (often in
grew and diversified during t h e 1970s. Exam- t h e regional centers) in order to supplement
ples include Ambato (+0.99)in Tungurahua, insufficient farm output and so maintain their
Riobamba (+1.79) in Chimborazo, Loja (f2.46) families.
in Loja province, Portoviejo ( t 1 . 4 1 ) in Manabi, Export agriculturalareas located entirely in t h e
and Machala(f2.12) in El Oro. Negative scores, Costa are dominated by capital intensive export
indicating net out-migration of laborers, are agriculture and employ wage labor and modern
found throughout rural Ecuador in traditional production practices (Fig. 3). A high negative
areas of relative stagnation, particularly in t h e mean score o n component three indicates
Sierran provinces of Chimborazo, Canar, and considerable growth in service employment in
Azuay. rapidly expanding Costa cities which support
444 Lawson

Table 5. Principal Components Analysis of Socioeconomic Variables Characterizing Growth

across Ecuadorian Cantones, 1974-82, Varimax Rotation

Variable name Mean

Percentage change in: total population 17.66
persons employed in agriculture -5.77
persons employed in manufacturing 19.08
persons employed in commerce 38.06
persons employed in transportation 141.56
persons employed in services 109.57
persons seeking first work 193.18
in number of vendors and clerks 34.65
in number of farmers -6.13
Absolute change in: persons employed in agriculture -917.45
persons employed in manufacturing 549.89
persons employed in commerce 764.13
persons employed in services 2051.94
in number of professionals 882.70
in number of vendors and clerks 526.16
in number of farmers -957.99
+
Dependency ratio (population < 14 population >65)/(population between 15 and 65) 1.00
Total population in 1974 58,701.01
Percentage of canton population urban in 1974 21.77
Mean years of education for out-migrants 1.92
Mean years of education for in-migrants 1.93
Mean occupational status of out-migrants 34.68
Mean occupational status of in-migrants 37.81
Percentage of in-migrants minus percentage of out-migrants economically active 3.11
Percentage of in-migrants minus percentage of out-migrants who are male 0.33
Change in percentage of persons who are college-educated 1.30
Change in percentage of persons with no education -8.54
OO
/ of variance explained-by each factor
-cumulative
n = 109

commercial agriculture and large numbers of e n t e (Fig. 3) and were dramatically restructured
first-time job seekers attracted t o this dynamic by land reforms which disbanded hacienda/
region (Table 6). These cantones experienced huasipungo relationships and created numer-
little change in economic structure, or eco- ous minifundias. Despite structural changes
nomic dynamism, d u e to t h e continued im- transferring land ownership t o campesinos, t h e
portance of agricultural exports to t h e econ- nature of employment or quantity of com-
omy as a whole. Land reform had much less mercial production did not change d u e t o t h e
impact in t h e Costa since productive, capitalist small size of plots and inadequate access t o cap-
farming was already established by t h e 1960s as ital and technological resources. Peasant/sub-
evidenced by t h e predominance of owner-oc- sistence production persists as economic se-
cupied, middle-sized farms employing wage la- curity against t h e minimal wages in t h e capitalist
bor rather than large estates with feudalistic sector.
labor relations.
Domestic food producing areas exhibit stag-
nating traditional agriculture, small farms, high Production Regimes and Agricultural
tenancy, and net out-migration of human re- Dynamism
sources (mean score of -0.722 o n dimension
four, Table 6). These predominantly agricultural These economic change patterns, and groups
cantones are spread throughout Sierra and Ori- representing them, correspond broadly t o t h e
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 445

Table 5. Continued

Component Component Component Component

Standard deviation 1 2 3 4 Communality
31.05 0.121 0.871 0.060 -0.023 0.777
26.69 -0.080 0.830 0.303 -0.280 0.866
54.45 0.169 0.640 -0.328 0.211 0.590
54.85 0.052 0.854 -0.162 0.057 0.761
132.08 -0.143 0.439 -0.268 0.061 0.289
76.28 -0.100 0.323 -0.655 -0.086 0.550
174.45 0.035 0.093 -0.693 -0.051 0.492
63.49 0.038 0.888 -0.023 0.047 0.793
26.75 -0.081 0.799 0.362 -0.306 0.869
1782.09 -0.085 0.537 0.579 -0.268 0.703
3509.45 0.948 0.057 0.013 -0.078 0.908
3534.00 0.962 0.048 0.006 -0.115 0.941
6078.89 0.980 0.030 -0.009 -0.058 0.964
2891.45 0.961 0.081 0.057 -0.087 0.940
2259.47 0.970 0.056 0.014 -0.100 0.953
1858.86 -0.073 0.468 0.675 -0.309 0.776
0.11 -0.375 -0.356 -0.314 -0.203 0.408
114,836.57 0.973 -0.035 -0.034 -0.077 0.956
18.34 0.679 -0.067 0.115 0.408 0.646
0.37 0.096 -0.016 0.644 0.144 0.445
0.56 0.079 0.023 0.492 0.090 0.257
2.34 0.056 0.111 0.454 0.260 0.573
4.26 -0.141 -0.387 0.304 -0.166 0.289
16.13 -0.176 0.059 0.111 0.681 0.511
12.52 -0.168 0.060 -0.005 0.790 0.657
1.05 0.663 -0.106 0.092 0.455 0.667
3.59 0.283 -0.140 0.111 0.445 0.310
27.1 19.7 11.4 8.0
27.1 46.8 58.2 66.3

regional distribution of production structures 7). These results are then subject t o discrimi-
discussed in t h e previous section. The canton nant analysis.
groups are dichotomized into economically di- The average values of structural variables for
versified, urbanhndustrial places versus those each canton group are listed in Table 7.1° These
primarily agricultural in orientation. The latter data provide an initial picture of t h e complexity
are divided according t o domestic or export of production regimes. Broad patterns e m e r g e
production, a division mirroring traditional substantiating t h e modern capitalist/traditional
peasantlmodern capitalist production regimes non-capitalist distinction of production sys-
and t h e differential operation of agricultural tems. For example, market orientation of pro-
policies across them. It is important t o identify duction and thus relative contribution to t h e
which aspects of production are most impor- overall economy (commerciaVexport versus
tant in distinguishing t h e more and less dynam- traditionaVdomestic foodstuffs) clearly differ
ic agricultural regions. The structural charac- systematically, with export production more
teristics across t h e agricultural g r o u p s , important in group three and domestic foods
specifically groups (3) commercial agriculture in group four. Similarly, a dominance of com-
areas and (4) domestic food producing areas, mercial/capitalist farming in group three is also
which represent t h e dynamic and stagnant ag- evidenced by proportions of commercially vi-
ricultural performance respectively, are first able medium and large enterprises, owner-oc-
compared employing summary statistics (Table cupation or renting by cash (rather than share-
446 Lawson

Figure 3. Ecuadorian cantones classified by socioeconomic change.

cropping), a n d h i g h levels of a g r i c u l t u r a l and persistence of haciendas engaged in cattle

employment. Group four places, by contrast, production, as evidenced by farm sizes and
exhibit non-capitalist production systems w i t h proportion of area under grass.
sharecropping, low literacy levels, minifundias, Results of the stepwise discriminant analysis

Table 6 . Average Principal Component Score by Canton Groupa on Analysis

of Socioeconomic Change, 1974-82
Average component score
Absolute Subsistence vs.
employment Economic commercial Human resource
Canton group change structure shifts economy change base shifts
Major cities 6.758 0.260 0.349 - 1.276
Regional centers 0.026 0.326 0.433 1.035
Export agricultural areas 0.014 -0.295 -1.560 0.029
Domestic food producing areas -0.321 -0.117 0.368 -0.722
a For definitions of canton groups s e e text
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 447

Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Structural Variables For Canton Groupsa
Regional Export ag Domestic
Structural variables Major cities centers areas areas
Market orientation of production
Percentage of: farm area under annuals 8.47 12.37 9.97 20.87
(3.40) (15.35) (8.16) (9.90)
farm area under perennials 5.06 8.03 21.17 5.98
(2.41) (8.36) (15.93) (11.66)
farm area under grass 28.15 37.01 32.80 41.46
(4.88) (15.09) (10.02) (16.90)
Tenancy characteristics
Farms owned with title 53.06 50.82 52.00 56.61
(9.46) (22.64) (19.70) (24.84)
Farms rented with cash 3.66 2.54 4.94 2.27
(2.83) (4.82) (5.78) (3.08)
Farms rented by sharecropping 4.01 2.17 2.48 5.38
(4.49) (5.45) (3.13) (3.12)
Farms held without title 4.86 17.12 12.22 10.48
(2.61) (19.17) (12.91) (25.57)
Size of agricultural holdings
Small farms ( > 5 hect) 66.37 53.43 48.39 64.71
(6.70) (27.40) (18.77) (30.79)
Medium farms (5-50 hect) 24.71 31.31 42.84 27.64
(5.29) (18.66) (13.54) (17.13)
Large farms (51-500 hect) 7.57 14.92 8.26 7.40
(0.41) (12.49) (6.53) (20.76)
Very large farms (501 + hect) 1.35 0.34 0.50 0.26
(1.46) (0.26) (0.62) (0.37)
Importance of agricultural production
Working force who are farmers 8.30 54.80 73.17 70.26
(3.47) (16.59) (12.76) (19.01)
Working force in agriculture 8.33 54.37 72.41 70.56
(3.47) (16.61) (15.31) 18.47
Working force in urban activitiesb 67.54 33.11 17.16 21.76
(2.30) (14.56) (9.22) (13.45)
Working force in mining 0.43 0.84 0.23 0.21
(0.31) (0.43) (0.81) (1.96)
Working force literate 77.28 74.71 73.94 71.83
(0.10) (2.09) (12.76) (2.93)
n=2 n = 36 n = 22 n = 49
a Group 1 = The two primate cities, Quito (the capital) and Guayaquil. Dynamic diversified economies, attracting valuable
human resources during the seventies.
Group 2 = Cantones containing intermediate cities which are attracting human resources. Many places also have relatively
slow-growing agricultural sectors. Oriente cantones with rapid increases in agricultural colonization are also in this group.
Group 3 = Dynamic, urbanizing cantones, dominated by export agricultural production, and economic diversification during
the seventies.
Group 4 = Predominantly agricultural cantones, dominated by domestic food production; slow growing economies which lost
valuable human resources during the seventies.
Urban activities include manufacturing, commerce, services and finance.

provide a more precise assessment of which ficients), demonstrating that aspects of tenancy
structural variables distinguish more and less and commercial production are important dis-
dynamic groups (Table 8). A moderdtraditional criminators between groups.’’ Negative coef-
agriculture function emerges (which is inter- ficients e m e r g e for medium-sized farms, ex-
preted employing discriminant function coef- port c r o p cultivation, and farms rented with
448 Lawson

Table 8. Stepwise Discriminant Analysis of Canton Groups (3 and 4) by Structural Variables,

1974 Canton Data
Discriminant function
Structural variables Final F statistic coefficients
Percentage of:
Small farms ( < 5 hect) 0.120
Medium farms (5-50 hect) 6.018 -0.737
Larger farms (51-500) 0.145
Very large farms (501+ hect) 0.517
Farm area under annuals 0.156
Farm area under perennials 6.353 -0.476
Farm area under grass 0.140
Farms owned without title 0.514
Farms rented with cash 3.165 -0.362
Farms rented with sharecropping 3.528 0.364
Farms held without title 13.827 0.945
Working force literate 3.750 -0.432
Working force who are farmers 6.052 1.624
Working force in agriculture 0.152
Working force in urban activities 4.180 1.314
Working force in mining 1.621 -0.260
Wilks lambda 0.452
Overall F statistic 7.82

cash, again depicting modern capitalist pro- ity t o produce surplus commodities for sale in
duction. Positive coefficients appear for farms the commercial economy. Each of these char-
sharecropped or held without title, a large acteristics influences patterns of policy impact
proportion employed as farmers, and many and agrarian change, as illustrated by the mini-
engaged in non-farm activities; they depict fundia sector. Proof of land ownership i s a pre-
subsistence/traditional farming systems. Sig- requisite t o acquiring agricultural credit, thus
nificance of this LDF is supported by correct excluding sharecroppers, renters, and those
classification of 83 percent of cantones into ac- without title from improving production prac-
tual membership groups (Table 9). The mean tices. Similarly, price supports, designed to raise
discriminant scores indicate which aspects of farmers’ incomes, fail t o benefit subsistence
the LDF relate t o each group of cantones. The producers or those with insufficient land t o
modern capitalist farming aspects are strongly regularly produce a commercial surplus. Fur-
related t o the Export Agriculture group (- 1.62) ther, illiterate producers, abundant in the tra-
while Sierra and Oriente cantones relate closely ditional sector, have limited access t o loan ap-
to Domestic Food Producing cantones (0.73; plication procedures, and printed information
Table 10). about credit and price programs. These char-
This discriminant analysis sought t o identify acteristics are symptomatic of the marginalized
those aspects of production which distinguish position of peasant producers in Ecuadorian ag-
the more and less dynamic agricultural can- riculture. Campesinos have neither land nor
tones. The results substantiate two key themes inputs t o consistently produce a commercial
of this research. A first theme is that radically surplus; therefore they do not represent a
different production regimes exist in Ecuadorian strong political voice influencing agricultural
agriculture, that is, capitalist and peasant farm- policy. The minifundistas’ most important con-
ing, which determine access t o political and tribution t o the capitalist economy is a labor
economic resources and also influence agrarian force free of reproduction costs, rather than
change. These production regimes are defined the domestic food supply, or representation of
in terms of tenancy form, land ownership or a “progressive” agrarian future. Their persis-
renting; the type of labor employed, family or tence i s not due t o but in spite of agricultural
waged; direcdindirect access t o productive re- policy which does little t o improve their eco-
sources, land, inputs, knowledge; and the abil- nomic or social position.
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 449

Table 9. Predictive Ability of Discriminant Table 10. Mean Discriminant Scores for
Functions for Canton Groups 3 and 4“ Canton Groups 3 and 4”
Predicted classification Mean
discriminant
Export Domestic
GrOUDS score
Num- agricul- food
ber of tural produc- Export agricultural areas - 1.623
Actual classification cases areas ing areas Domestic food-producing areas 0.725
Export agricultural 22 14 8 = For definitions of groups 3 and 4, see text.
areas (63.6%)
(36.4%)
Domestic food-pro- 49 4 45
ducing areas (8.2%) (91.8%)
Percentage of cases correctly classified = 83.1% change. Social biases are identified through an
examination of policy impacts o n farmers that
= For definitions of groups 3 and 4, see text.
are embedded in different production re-
gimes. The results substantiate three major foci
of this investigation. First, radically different pro-
duction regimes exist in Ecuador, peasant and
capitalist farming, as defined by social relations
A second theme is that the importance/con- of production, such as whether farmers have
tribution of agricultural producers to the overall direcdindirect access t o productive resources,
economy influences the extent t o which they type of tenancy, their labor source (family or
benefit from development policies. For ex- waged), and whether farmers control disburse-
ample, export crop producers of the Costa ment of their surplus product. These aspects
generate foreign revenue, wage employment of production are considered since, in the Ec-
in rural areas, and represent a progressive, cap- uadorian context, they facilitate/constrain
itaVtechnology intensive future for Ecuadorian farmers’ access t o political and economic re-
agriculture, again one that is nurtured by pol- sources and thereby influence economic
icy. Policies directed toward agriculture, such change. As an example the domestic food pro-
as ENAC price supports, low wages due to con- ducers(primari1y minifundistas) have been pen-
sumer food programs, and easy, often prefer- alized by cheap urban food programs, ineffec-
ential, access t o production credit, have all tive producer price protection on their principal
benefited this sector with concomitant growth crops, and an export crop bias in credit dis-
enhancing impacts o n the regional economy. bursement. By contrast, the export crop pro-
ducers, employing wage-labor and capital in-
tensive production techniques, benefit from
Concluding Observations low wages due t o cheap consumer food poli-
cies, ENAC price supports for export crops, and
Thq existence and nature of different pro- access t o production credit due t o widespread
duction structures in Ecuadorian agriculture are literacy and land ownership.
distinguished by their social relations of pro- A related focus i s that articulation or contri-
duction and position i n the capitalist economy. bution of groups of producers t o the modern
The differential performance of policy across capitalist system also influences the extent t o
these production regimes i s illustrated, and which policies operate effectively for them.
those aspects of production most important in Specifically, the policies designed by the Ec-
mediating policy outcomes are elaborated. uadorian government and international aid or-
These uneven economic change impacts of na- ganizations operate on (and hence are targeted
tional policy are demonstrated through a na- t o producers who fulfill) a set of assumptions
tionwide empirical analysis of the performance that are not equally relevant for all farmers. Ec-
of agricultural price and credit policies o n Ec- uadorian price and credit policies are con-
uadorian farmers. ceived by, and designed to operate in, a cap-
Qualitative and quantitative findings indicate italist economic system with effective operation
that national policy i s both socially and spatially of price incentives, a literate and informed pro-
selective, thus producing uneven economic ductive population, factor mobility through ef-
450 Lawson

ficient marketing and communications chan- defined, constrained, and/or enabled by mem-
nels, and ready access to capital, labor, and bership of these production regimes? What are
technology. Such assumptions systematically the group dynamics in response t o policy and
discriminate against non-capitalist producers h o w do these vary for peasant versus capitalist
(in all economic sectors). farmers? Which farmers, by virtue of group
A t h i r d focus i s that policy outcomes are membership and individual attributes, are more
closely related t o social and structural attributes effective in modifying or bypassing policy ac-
of regional production systems. The result i s cording t o their needs? Pursuing these themes
that spatial outcomes are not merely chaotic, or will facilitate a greater understanding of t h e
solely related t o type of economic activity in interplay between social processes and spatial
any locale, but rather are systematically related structures, an important issue in contemporary
t o the social organization of production. Social geography.
relations of production determine farmers’ po-
tential t o produce commercially, through ac-
cess t o sufficient productive land, credit, and Acknowledgments
information, and access t o political power such
that they may benefit from, or transform, pol- I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Lawrence
icy. A. Brown, David C. Hodge, Elizabeth Kohlenberg,
and anonymous Annals reviewers in preparing this
Production systems are embedded in locali- manuscript.
ties and exhibit considerable temporal and spa-
tial inertia so that policies attempting t o change
regional economic performance will need t o
address the interaction between macro-pro-
Notes
cesses and the spatial fixity of such structures.
Historical, social, ethnic, and environmental
I. Agriculture i s the focus of this research because
it is the most pervasive sector of the Ecuadorian
characteristics of the Sierra have defied land economy. During the 1970s, agriculture em-
reform‘s efforts t o modernize this agricultural ployed 48 percent of the labor force and con-
region. Indeed, even in the face of land reform, tributed up to 76 percent of total exports. Policy
Ecuador has experienced continued margin- impacts upon this sector have production, in-
come, and consumption effects which allow re-
alization of Sierran campesinos (Commander lationships between policy and uneven devel-
and Peek 1986). opment to be explored.
In summary, state intervention must b e seen 2. Real prices reflect the cost of wages, rent, and
as a significant cause of uneven regional change. profit employed in producing a commodity.
Nominal prices, on the other hand, are those
These uneven impacts must b e related n o t appearing in the market place due to forces of
merely t o economic sector (industriaVagricu1- supply and demand, or official price setting. The
tural) biases, b u t also t o biases within economic difference between the prices measures the ex-
sectors (in this case agriculture). This study as- tent to which official (nominal) prices actually
represent costs of producing specific commod-
serts that uneven economic change impacts of
ities which rise with inflation over time.
national policies are only fully understood 3. The rnoderdtraditional dichotomy is employed
through an investigation of production struc- here cautiously. In this context, “modern” refers
tures embedded in their economic and spatial to capitalist agricultural production, distin-
context. This attention t o spatial variations in guished by wage-labor, commercial production,
and frequently (but not necessarily), capital in-
forms of production responds m o r e generally
tensive production techniques. ”Traditional,” by
t o calls for geographical w o r k demonstrating contrast, refers to noncapitalist production which
h o w macro-economic and social processes o p - is characterized by use of family labor, subsis-
erate over space and h o w their differential per- tence production wherein only a small surplus
formance relates t o regionally differentiated may be sold commercially, and labor intensive
production on small plots of land.
structures. 4. The nominal interest rate is that specified on the
W e need additional research t o provide a loan contract, whereas the real rate is the nom-
greater d e p t h of understanding o n the inter- inal rate adjusted for changes in prices over the
play of production regimes, individual human loan period. Inflation rates exceeding the nom-
inal interest rate result in zero or negative real
agency w i t h i n these, and the operation and
rates of interest (Adams, Graham, Von Pischke
transformation of national policy. Important 1984).
questions include, h o w i s human agency per se 5. These ideas on the importance of social relations
 Ecuadorian Agricultural Change 451

of production, such as renting for cash, forms of and personal attributes upon labor mobility in
tenancy, and control over surplus product as in- Ecuador. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Ge-
dicative of a capitalist transition in agriculture, ography, Ohio State University.
are drawn from the work of Marx, Lenin, Kautsky, Brown, 1. A. 1987. Development, geography, and
and Chyanov, when discussing the “agrarian societal process. In Studies on the interrelation-
question” i n Europe during the industrial revo-
ships between development and migration in Third
lution. For a review and extension of these ideas
t o the Latin American context, see Goodman and World settings, Discussion Paper Series, No. 35,
Redclift (1981) and De Janvry (1981). pp. 1-222, Department of Geography, Ohio State
6. The historical antecedents, role of government University.
intervention, and contemporary changes in Casetti, E. 1965. Classificatory and regional analysis
agrarian structure are addressed in detail in Pro- by discriminant iterations, TechnicalReport 12, ONR
grama Nacional de Regionalizacion Agraria (1979) Task 389-135, Contract Nonr 1228(26). Washing-
and Brea (1986). ton: Office of Naval Research, Geography Branch.
7. Although not an ideal surrogate, regional eco-
nomic change i s employed to reflect the differ-
. 1964. Multiple discriminant functions, Tech-
ential operation of policy. That regional change nicalReport 17, ONR Task 389-135, Contract Nonr
is largely policy-induced, either at sub-national, 1228(26). Washington: Office of Naval Research,
national or international levels, is a major un- Geography Branch.
derlying theme of this analysis and one more Clark, G. L., and Dear, M. 1984. State apparatus.
explicitly discussed in Brown (1987). Structures and language o f legitimacy. London: Al-
8. The 115 cantones in Ecuador i n 1974 increased len and Unwin.
to 126 by 1982. For the purposes of comparing Cleaver, K. M. 1985. The impact of price and ex-
growth during this period, “new” cantones were change rate policies on agriculture in sub-Saharan
collapsed into the ”originals.” In addition, the Africa. World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 728.
three cantones of Galapagos province were ex-
Washington: World Bank.
cluded from these analyses because geographi-
cally, environmentally, economically, and social- Commander, S., and Peek, P. 1986. Oil exports,
ly they are distinct from mainland Ecuador. agrarian change and the rural labor process: The
9. These component scores are available on request Ecuadorian Sierra in the 1970s. World Develop-
from the author and are also published in Lawson ment 14(1):79-96.
(1986). De Janvry, A. 1981. The agrarian question and re-
10. Variables are drawn from Ecuador’s 1974 Agri- formism in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
cultural Census t o depict economic structure at kins Press.
the beginning of the study period. It is argued Delavaud, A. C. 1980. From colonization t o agri-
that such features change slowly and thus, for
cultural development: The case of coastal Ec-
the most part, represent productive systems with
which policy interacted throughout the 1970s. uador. In Environment, society, and rural change
11. Standardized discriminant function coefficients in Latin America, ed. D. A. Preston, Chapter 5:67-
denote the relative importance of independent 81. New York: John Wiley.
variables t o the linear discriminant function and Economic Perspectives. 1985. Grain pricing policy
thus permit substantive interpretation of the dif- in Ecuador. Quito: Ministerio de Agricultura y
ferences between the two canton groups. Canaderia.
Fincher, R. 1987. Social theory and the future of
urban geography. The Professional Geographer
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