Badge: Adoption Laws

Spouses Lee v. Judge Liwanag

Syllabus:

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration; hence every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Facts:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time, and the
Resolution, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Finally, the instant Petition prays
that the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for continuation of the adoption
proceedings.

Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee (petitioners) are American citizens
residing in the Philippines, particularly in Makati City.

They are the petitioners in the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor
"Mayca Alegado" a.k.a. "Innah A1egado" (Innah) before the RTC of Makati City.

Petitioners have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park)
and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee). They have been gainfully employed in the
Philippines for almost the same length of time that they have been residing in the country.

They have also adopted another girl, Hannah, through domestic adoption. The RTC of
Makati City, Branch 144, granted Hannah's adoption on August 30, 2016. Hannah is now 10 years
old, and Innah considers her as her older sister.

The DSWD processed petitioners' application for adoption of Innah, and issued on May 30,
2016 its Affidavit of Consent. The DSWD's Affidavit of Consent instructed petitioners to file a
petition for domestic adoption, stating that the prospective adoptive parent shall initiate judicial
proceeding by filing the petition to adopt not later than 30 days from date of receipt of the
DSWD's written consent to adoption.

However, respondent Judge found that since petitioners are both foreigners, then the
Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor Innah presented a proper case of inter-
country adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately filed under the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Thus, pursuant to Section 32 of the Rule on Adoption and Section
30 of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inter-Country Adoption, the trial court
directed the transmittal of a copy of the petition and its annexes to the Inter-Country Adoption
Board (ICAB) for appropriate action.

Hence a petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals which was also denied
by the latter. Hence the petition.

Issue/s:

1. Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in referring the petition for adoption to the ICAB since the petition was
appropriately filed under the domestic adoption act of 1998? Hence, the case be remanded to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for continuation of the adoption proceedings?
Ruling:

Yes.

We resolve to GRANT the instant petition. Thus, the instant case should be remanded to the
RTC for continuation of the adoption proceedings.

The Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the
Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take cognizance
thereof.

We note that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have
been gainfully employed in the Philippines since the year 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and
since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee). And are thus living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filling of the petition for adoption, as required by the domestic
adoption act.

Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must
be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. As held in Sta. Ana v.
Spouses Carpo:

Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within
our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even
the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical
infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities,
we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare
cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In view of this, We hold that since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act,
it is for the best interest of the child that the instant case be speedily disposed by continuing the
proceedings in the trial court for the determination of whether petitioners are indeed qualified to
adopt the child, instead of inappropriately referring the instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB
where the proceedings may have to start anew and might be referred back to the trial court for the
continuation of the domestic adoption proceedings. Settled is the rule that in adoption
proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest. The Supreme Court's pronouncement
in In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is instructive:

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration; hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the

Page | 2
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way
of interpreting the law." (Citations omitted)

Accordingly, we find that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 which the appropriate Family Court or RTC can properly take
cognizance of.

Fallo:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated November 21, 2018 and June 19, 2019 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 157452 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, which is DIRECTED to continue with DISPATCH
the adoption proceedings with change of name involving the minor "Mayca Alegado" a.k.a. "Innah
Alegado."

SO ORDERED.

Page | 3