Decolonisation in Indochina 1945-1954

 the impact of French imperialism on Indochina

 the rise of Vietnamese nationalism and war against the
French
 the growth of Vietnamese nationalism/communism
 the defeat of France

DVD ‘Indochine’

How useful would Indochine be for an historian studying the life of the
French colonisers in Vietnam in the 1930s?

In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by the Source and the
reliability of the Source.

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Background

Fascination with the Exotic

In 1787 Monsignor Pierre Joseph Georges Pigneau de Behaine, bishop of Adran,

returned to France after two decades of extraordinary adventures in a remote
Asian land – Vietnam, then known to Europe as Cochinchina.

He was upstaged by a child, a seven year old son of a pretender to the throne of
Vietnam. Dressed in red and gold brocade and in incongruous Hindu turban the
little prince exuded exotic charm. Queen Marie Antoinette bestowed her
patronage on the boy by permitting him to play with the Dauphin.

Pigneau had wanted the King and Queen to agree to his idea of establishing a
Christian empire in Asia. Other Europeans went to Asia and had been doing so
since the fifteenth century. By the late fourteenth century the dynamic city-state
of Venice had cornered the European spice market through shrewd deals with
the Muslim powers that controlled the land routes to and from Asia, i.e. the Silk
Road.

The enticements to go to Asia included pepper, nutmeg, clove and other spices –
all of which were in universal demand.

Trade and trade routes

Europeans sought to bypass the Venetians, not to mention the Muslims by

finding another route by sea. Along with spices religious fervour also obsessed
the Europeans – memories of the aborted Crusades still stimulated Europeans as
well and they dreamed of outflanking Muslim influence which extended beyond
the Indian Ocean to the Indonesian archipelago.

Prince Henry the Navigator - eventually after Columbus discovered America the
Portuguese reconfirmed their Asian domain in a treaty with Spain recognising
Spain’s prerogative to exploit the Western Hemisphere and Portugal the East.
Eventually Lisbon supplanted Venice as Europe’s main center for Asian products.
Eventually the Portuguese power diminished, partly due to their own avarice,
corruption and mismanagement and also because in Europe they were losing
power to the more dynamic Protestants in the north.

In the late seventeenth century Vietnam was beset by civil war between the
Trinh in the north and the Nguyen in the south.

On the whole Vietnamese hated all foreigners and their sophisticated

administrative structure, which was modelled on China’s could effectively
mobilize resistance against western intruders. To a large extent the Europeans
were too interested in fighting amongst themselves to wage a campaign that
could conquer the whole country.

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The Catholic Church

By the end of the seventeenth century trade with Vietnam seemed pointless and
the English and the Dutch closed their offices in Hanoi and the French shut down
their post as well. The Catholic Church remained – ‘The Catholic Church left a
deeper imprint on Vietnam than on any other country apart from the Philippines
….’1

For peasants Christianity represented an escape from the rigidly hierarchical

Confucian system and in areas which were impoverished the Catholic priests
who became community leaders were especially popular.

The Vietnamese Emperors pursued contradictory and unpredictable policies

toward Christianity. They welcomed the missionaries technical advice as well as
connections to European suppliers of modern arms but they feared Western
religion ( with its accent on individual salvation ) would undermine their society.

French Interest in Vietnam

In the eighteenth century in France the idea of acquiring foreign territory had
little appeal neither for the public nor for government officials. They were more
interested in affairs in Europe and in North America. The imperial dream was
kept alive by a handful of determined individuals.

In 1802 Nguyen Anh crowned himself emperor at Hue and adopted the title Gia
Long. He revived the name of Vietnam, which the French later discarded in an
effort to efface the country’s national cohesion. The dynasty lasted until 1954,
ending with the last Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, a French protégé.

In 1819 following the Napoleonic wars the European merchants again

contemplated commerce with Asia. Nguyen’s successor, Minh Mang, spurned
both France and then North America. He feared disruptive ideas and practices,
and punished Buddhists, Taoists as well as Christians. A rebellion against him,
with Catholic encouragement, proved his suspicions right. French and
Vietnamese priests were arrested – Francois Isidore Gagelin was captured and
brought to Hue in irons and condemned for ‘preaching the religion of Jesus’ and
slowly strangled to death by six soldiers. Three days later the Emperor dug up
his body to see, if like Jesus, he had risen from the dead.

Minh Mang’s successor, Thieu Tri, tried to curb missionary influence as well but
by this stage this only provoked French intervention. The imprisonment of the
young missionary Lefebvre sparked a chain of events which lead to the first
direct French assault against Vietnam in 1847.

1856 Napoleon III endorsed proposals which involved military plans to

subjugate Vietnam. These failed but missionaries and their supporters were still

1
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam A History 1983

3
enthusiastic to try again and this time they appealed to French business groups
with inflated accounts of Vietnamese wealth in silver, gold, coal and timber.

In 1857 a French armada of 14 vessels and 2,500 men set forth for Tourane and
the fleet reached Tourane in 1858 and easily subdued the port’s defenders but
then they had problems. The French wilted in their heavy uniforms, many died
from dysentery, scurvy, cholera and fevers.

A second campaign arrived in Saigon in 1859 and managed to dominate the city
within two weeks. Local Catholics were unwilling to help and the southerners
were fought aggressively – their guerrilla units prevented the French from
gaining control of the nearby countryside. The French position in Tourane
deteriorated and for every French soldier killed in battle twenty died from
disease.

In 1860 there was renewed interest in Paris to spread French influence in

Vietnam. Manufacturers and merchants sought overseas markets, offices and
officials wanted adventure and there was also a new group of nationalistic
intellectuals who dreamt of spreading French culture to ‘backward’ peoples.
1861 Saigon was claimed by the French and a year later the Vietnamese
Emperor, Tu Duc surrendered provinces to France in return for peace.

Vietnam’s archaic feudal structure had by this time so decayed that Tu Duc had
lost the moral authority to rally his people against the French.

Napoleon III did not want a protracted war in Vietnam, by they 1860s he was
hoping to install Maximilian, the Austrian archduke, on the throne of Mexico.
Napoleon III fell in 1870, defeated by Prussia and nationalist demands were
more interested in recovering Alsace Lorraine than further provinces in Vietnam.
It was the soldiers already in Vietnam who continued to pursue dreams of
expanding north in Vietnam.

By the end of 1883 the French had more than 20,000 men in Tonkin. Despite
realisation that they had few friends in Vietnam the French were able to tighten
their hold, assigning civilian agents and soldiers everywhere and in 1887 they
created the Indochinese Union – composed of Cochinchina, Annam, Tonkin and
Cambodia, adding Laos six years later.

Even so there remained a prolonged task of ‘pacification’ a term that would be

used to describe similar French and American endeavours decades later. This
pacification would be accompanied by acts of incredible brutality.

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Definitions –

What do the terms imperialism and colony mean?

Source skills

1. Using the source above, describe the impact of imperialism on Africa by the
beginning of the twentieth century.

As far as imperialism was concerned there were similar developments in Asia.

2. What similarities and differences might there have been in the acquisition and
consolidation of colonies in Asia and Africa.

France as a colonial power.

1. Outline the reasons why France was interested in becoming an imperial

power.
2. What other countries could be classified as imperial powers in the late
nineteenth century?
3. Analyse the role industrialization played in encouraging imperialism.

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 4. Why will a colonial power rarely encourage industrialization in one of
their colonies?

Research –
What other colonies did France have by the end of the nineteenth century?

 The impact of French Imperialism on Indochina

Considering the motives behind the phenomenon of imperialism make a

generalization about the impact imperialism might have on a colony.

Is it more likely to be positive or negative?

What facts might you want to look at in order to draw a conclusion about the
impact of imperialism on a colony?

Research -
All questions relevant to the nineteenth century –

What was Indochina like prior to the arrival of the French? In your answer you
need to differentiate between the different countries that make up Indochina.

What was the relationship between those countries?

What were the main staples of the economy?
To what extent could you call their economies developed? Is there any indication
that these countries are starting to industrialize?
Why can they be described as agrarian economies?

Disunity

1. What policy did the French have which in effect helped to undermine the
country’s sense of unity?

French Attitudes and Influence in Indochina

 French imperialism in Indochina was accompanied by acts of brutality and

repression but at the same time the French colonial experience would also open
Vietnam to Western ideas that, along with the violence and humiliation, also
served to rekindle Vietnamese nationalism.

Administration

 The French could have employed a policy of association, as the British did in
India, governing indirectly through native institutions. In this way the French

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 would have been respecting Vietnamese national history and ethnic identity,
which was older than France’s. Other French officials advocated for assimilation,
believing it to be an honour for the Vietnamese to be incorporated into France
and to absorb French ideas and culture.
 The French adopted a combination of both – by 1925 they had five thousand
bureaucrats governing Vietnam, the same number of British bureaucrats
governed India which was ten times the size. Even in the 1950s the French
weren’t keen to delegate authority to the Vietnamese.

 Initially the French assigned French officers to direct administration and

recruited Vietnamese collaborators as intermediaries. Mostly the French
administrators were unfamiliar with the language and they introduced Western
methods, which were alien to Vietnam’s needs. In 1903 the highest ranking
Vietnamese official earned less than the lowest ranking French official.

 In the provinces the French relied on village chiefs to collect taxes, mobilize
labor for public projects and undertake other tasks. These officials used their
position to embezzle funds and oppress peasants. The French also participated
in this corruption.
 The structure was basically weak and therefore when there was rebellion the
French had no alternative but to repress.

Law and Order

 The French brought their legal code to Vietnam. Vietnamese beheaded thieves
and adulterous women were trampled to death by elephants. French legal code
was confusing for the Vietnamese and it did not become viable alternative i.e. it
could not deal with subtleties such as not naming the defendant in court for fear
that he may ‘lose face.’

 French legal code also contributed to the erosion of Vietnamese society for
normally the father arbitrated family altercations or called a respected dignitary
in to mediate formally.

 French legal code lost credibility when colonial police abused it and often put
political suspects in jail with no trial.

Education

 80% of Vietnamese population was literate in the Chinese ideographs used for
written Vietnamese.
 French banned the Chinese characters as part of their aim to disunite
Vietnamese people.
 Young people resisted French educational reform, by the eve of WWII fewer than
one fifth of all school-age boys in Vietnam were attending classes.
 Many wealthy Vietnamese studied in Paris but once home had their newspapers
and books confiscated. They rarely found employment to match their skills and
often minor French officials, not as well educated as them, would humiliate
them. This kind of treatment turned many of them into revolutionaries.

Economic Impact

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  Rather than the French taxpayer supporting Vietnam the Vietnamese soon paid
for their own subjugation as well as providing for a profit for the French. Paul
Doumer, the French governor-general, 1897-1902, who did the most to make
this economic change, claimed in 1902 Vietnam’s ‘strong organization, its
financial and economic structures and its great power are being used for the
benefit for French prestige.’
What does the following quote reveal about Doumer’s intentions –
‘When France arrived in Indochina, the Annamites ( the Vietnamese) were ripe
for servitude.’
Referring to the movie Indochine what examples are shown which reveal this
French attitude that the Vietnamese are to be used as servants? What else is
revealed in Indochine about the relationship between the French and the
Vietnamese?
 Doumer funnelled customs duties and direct taxes into the French treasury in
Vietnam.
 His most lucrative policy was to monopolize production and marketing of
alcohol, salt and opium – set his own price – which would financially advantage
the French.
 His land policy dislocated rural Vietnamese society – which in effect broke up
the rural infrastructure in Vietnam. What role would this also play in influencing
or changing Vietnamese unity? Include in your answer short-term/long-term
impact.
 By World War II Vietnam had become the world’s largest exporter of rice after
Burma and Thailand. They expanded cultivated acreage to stimulate production
and the French encouraged land grabbing by French speculators and prominent
Vietnamese families. What impact might this have on the disparity of wealth in
Vietnam? In many ways Vietnamese history under the French ensured that for
some Vietnamese communist ideology would become increasingly attractive –
an equal distribution of wealth being vastly preferable to the great disparity
which many put up with in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
 Cheap labour was mobilized for mining, rubber, construction and other
industries. All were these industries were linked to the Bank of Indochina – a
financial colossus owned by Paris banks and the French govt.
 Conditions in some sectors of industry were very poor. Rubber was produced by
workers who often suffered malaria, dysentery and malnutrition – at one
Michelin plantation 12,000 out of 45, 000 died between 1917 and 1944.
 French also built – opera houses, roads, railways and bridges.

3. Read the information on page 87 of your text and explain the impact racism
( include a definition here of racism ) would have had on the political, economic
and social relationships between the French and the indigenous people of
Indochina.

Pervasive, comprehensive, important influence, changed over time, vary from

place to place depending on circumstances and the people involved but
fundamentally it is possible to say that racism was a constant in French
colonialism and the belief that enable the French to continue to exploit the
Vietnamese as ruthlessly as they did.

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4. What impact would the French mission to civilize the indigenous people have
had on traditional culture? Dislocates, detrimental impact, decimates, discuss the
strength and resilience of traditional culture

5. Using the information on page 87 how might the French mission of civilizing
the Indochinese have also served to undermine the country’s sense of unity?

‘He gave his hand to my husband and then to me. It was the first time I had
shaken hands with an Annamese, and a shudder went through me when I
felt in my own the uncanny dry-skinned fingers with their long nails. This
simple and natural action brought home to me more strongly than ever the
natural antipathy ( aversion or dislike ) that exists between white and
yellow races. In theory, I do not mind shaking hands with any of the
mandarins who will do me that honour, but I can never do this without
consciousness.’
A French woman in Indochina describing a meeting with a local Annamese
man. On and Off Duty in Annam, London, 1910

How (3) useful is this source to an historian researching the relationship

between the French and the Vietnamese during the time the French
colonized Vietnam?

In your answer refer to (1) perspective and (2) reliability of the source.

1) What is the perspective of the source/point of view of the author? Is she

typical of the French in this regard? Does her perspective change the
content of the source? According to this source what is the relationship
between the French and Vietnamese?

2) To what extent does the perspective of the author lessen the reliability
of the source? Does the fact that she is prejudiced/racist mean we can’t
trust the source? Is this a reliable source on the relationship between the
French and Vietnamese? Considering the nature of the source ….. You
should say something about the fact that it is a primary source…..

3) Is the source useful?

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Source skills

The Presidential Palace, in Saigon, built in 1868. It initially served as the home of
the French governor of Cochin China but later became the home to the President
of South Vietnam, Diem. It was bombed in 1962 in an attempt to kill Diem and
rebuilt in the nineteen sixties.

6. Using the above source how did the French use architecture to impose their
civilization and their supposed superiority over the Vietnamese?

7. Answer the question on p.88 which refer to Sources 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6

8. Use the information on pp. 88-89 to show the different ways in which French
exploitation of Indochina kept the peasantry poor and the country dependent on
France. In your answer use statistics to make your response more specific.

 the rise of Vietnamese nationalism and war against the

French
In all countries of Indochina the indigenous people fought against French rule.
The French responded by repression, violence and censorship, all of which only
further encouraged the growth of nationalism and resistance to French rule.

9. Using page 89 in your text which class did the French attempt to win over in
order to stay in power?

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10. Using page 90 in your text who were the two most prominent activists of the
anti-French group. Makes notes from page 90 on each of these men and the work
they did to rid Vietnam of the French.

11. Using page 90 how did the creation of a national script aid Vietnamese
nationalism?

Up until WWI resistance and insurrection had persisted particularly in the wild
hill country of the Sino-Vietnamese border. The forces of nationalism however
were weak and it was clear that at this time not organized enough to put
together a national resistance.

‘Scholar patriots’ helped to awaken national consciousness.

Nationalism between the Wars

 In 1919 when President Woodrow Wilson arrived at Versailles for the

conference – to officially punish Germany for starting the war – the
Vietnamese political activists Ho Chi Minh had drafted a statement to
hand to him.
 He was inspired by Wilson’s famous doctrine of self-determination and he
wrote ‘ all subject peoples are filled with hope by the prospect that an era
of right and justice is opening to them … in the struggle of civilization
against barbarism.’
 Ho modestly requested – constitutional government, democratic
freedoms, but omitted any question of independence. Ho never saw
Wilson. Ho did meet French socialists such Jean Longuet and Leon Blum
who were critics of colonialism.
 Ho and other Vietnamese nationalists were motivated to ask for French
concessions on account of the fact that the Vietnamese had fought for the
French in World War I.
 Vietnamese who studied in Paris also learnt what lessons there which
were relevant to the ideas of political independence? ( Use the
information on p.90 )

12. What were the two radical revolutionary groups that emerged in Vietnam
by the 1930s? (Use the information on page 91)

13. Read the source on page 91 and answer questions 1, 2 and 3.

14. What was the impact of the Great Depression on Vietnam? (Refer to page
92)

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 15. In what ways did Ho Chi Minh’s ideas differ from Russian Communism?
( Refer to page 92)

The Growth of Vietnamese Nationalism/Communism

The progressive impoverishment of the countryside had ominous consequences

for Vietnam. Indebtedness rose from 31 m piastres in 1900 to 134 m, piastres in
1934. Favouritism shown to French squatters and the pressures of population
meant a decrease in food production.

Both Japan and China played a role in influencing Vietnamese nationalism. China
played the more dominant role mainly because they had similar circumstances
i.e. modernization and foreign domination.

The Kuomintang in China which exerted the greatest influence on the

development of Vietnamese nationalism – the KMT included both communists
and nationalists.

1920s communism was not all that well understood in Vietnam. Also clear in the
1920s that France was determined not to give Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia any
independence.

1917 Revolution in Russia became an inspiring example for revolutionaries –

whether they were nationalists or communists.

Ho Chi Minh was a founding member of the French Communist Party – from
1920 onwards Ho Chi Minh can be categorized as a communist. He had been a
Vietnamese nationalist for far longer.

1925 the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League was formed by Ho Chi Minh.
He published ‘The Road to Revolution’ in 1926, which outlined his thoughts on
revolution – liberation first, communism later. Ho’s approach to Communism
was two-track: town and country. It also emphasized both communism and
nationalism.

The principle rival of Ho Chi Minh’s party was the Nationalist Party, or the
Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) created in 1927.

Both parties were able to take advantage of the economic decline resulting from
the Depression.

The Yen-Bay mutiny was a disaster for the VNQDD – French repression including
aerial bombardment was unsparing and as result of the arrests and executions
the Party was practically wiped out.

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What might be the short-term and long-term consequences of this harsh
repression? Long-term consequences should be looked at from a political
perspective i.e. what are the long-term consequences for politics in Vietnam?
Think about the political nature of the two main parties that existed in
Vietnam....where on the political spectrum was the VNQDD?

Ultimately who can you say played a role in the success of ICP?

The French Communist Party was responsible for the Vietnamese Communist
Party –

‘If they ( the Vietnamese comrades ) find that certain points in the programme do
not fit the concrete situation in the country, they can ask the Comintern to add or
subtract something. But if they allow themselves to correct the Party programme
of action elaborate by the Comintern without asking its opinion, such action is
incompatible with the principle of democratic centralism, with iron discipline,
and with the Comintern.’

I. Milton Sacks, ‘Marxism in Vietnam’ in Frank N. Traeger (ed) Marxism in South-

east Asia, (Stanford, 1959)

There was little evidence from the 1920s and 1930s that indicated communism
would be successful. However the VNQDD never recovered from ruthless French
repression and the ICP ( Indochina Communist Party ) would benefit from this

Their resilience and in part fortuitous revival may have been due to the slightly
permissive policies of the Popular Front govt. in Paris. It was also due to the
ability of the ICP to rebuild an organization from the bottom up.

Since 1938 Ho Chi Minh had been in China. Finally two members of the ICP were
in contact with Ho Chi Minh – Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong.

Now the ICP determined how they would take advantage of ‘the moment of great
opportunity’ (ie the outbreak of war in Europe)

Instead of focusing on obvious communist objectives the Party was to advance a

the dominant power of the League for the Independence of Vietnam – the Viet
Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh or the Vietminh.

Ho’s appeal –

‘rich people, soldiers, workers, peasants, intellectuals, employees, traders, youth

and women who warmly love your country!’ National liberation was the most
important problem and the opportunity had come. It was time ‘to follow the
historic example set by our forefathers in the glorious task of national salvation.’

Read Source 5.9, on page 93 and answer the three questions underneath.

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‘If the patriotic appeal was designed to be all-embracing, the platform of support
was obviously narrower…. The Party had, if only inadvertently, operationalized
its interest in the peasantry: if only for the fact that, in leaving the towns, they
were now living amongst them.’ 2

The Peasant Question (1937-1938) written by two of the Party’s foremost

members, Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Their idea was that land
reform/land redistribution was the critical factor in the peasant problem. The
French had banned the work and had no interest in introducing any land reform.

Members of the ICP clearly had a natural distaste for many of the customs and
superstitions of peasant society the most important discovery was of their
revolutionary potential –

‘Whenever they become conscious, or organized and have leadership, they are an
invincible force. When they are ready they will flatten any obstacle to their
progress and that of the nation. The whole problem is consciousness, organization
and leadership.’

Giap and Chinh. The Peasant Question, 1938

‘Essentially, the long-term problem of mobilizing the peasantry, as of mobilizing

Vietnam with its 90% peasant population, was one on which the success of the
Vietnamese revolution would eventually turn.’3

‘In the shorter term the kaleidoscope of the Second World War was going to
accelerate the process and would present opportunities both for independence
and revolution.’4 ( ‘War is the locomotive of change’ – Lenin)

Japan took advantage of the French defeat in 1940 – closed China’s last link with
the outside world, the Haiphong-Yunnan railway and then began her advance
into Southeast Asia. The majority of the French, those who co-operated with
Vichy France, were prepared to co-operate with the Japanese. The French were
determined, no matter what happened in France, to preserve the French position
in Indochina.

Initially the French were collaborators with the Japanese. The Japanese
maintained the superstructure of the French but ultimately it was the Japanese
who had the power.

The American President Roosevelt felt that France was not worthy to return to
Indochina after the war – on account of Roosevelt’s opposition to colonialism.
Churchill, English Prime Minister, said the following about Roosevelt’s aims here
–‘I imagine it is one of his principal war aims to liberate Indochina from France.’
2
Anthony Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War, 1989
3
ibid, p.35
4
ibid, p.35

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Ho Chi Minh gained China’s support ( Kuomintang – Ho had convinced the
Chinese that although he was a communist it would take at least fifty years
before Vietnam was ready for communism ) and was accepted as a nationalist
rather than a communist.

1944 Ho crossed the border back into Vietnam and made contact with Vietminh
forces.

Once Paris was liberated the French, under de Gaulle, started to plan for war
against the Japanese in Indochina. A Japanese coup on 9 March, 1945 finished
any remaining claims the French had to sovereignty in Indochina and 11 March,
1945 Emperor Bao Dai proclaimed ‘That from today the protectorate treaty with
France is abrogated and that the country reassumes its rights to independence.’

1. What is the significance of the following dates – 17 August, 1945, 25

August, 1945 and 2 September 1945? ( use page 94 in your text )

2. Answer questions 1 and 2 on page 95 – referring to Source 5.11.

The War against the French

French soldiers in Vietnam during the French Indochina War – 1946-1954

After 1946 French and Vietminh troops skirmished against the other. Using page
95 in your text when did the war between the Vietnamese and the French begin?

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( 1946 ) The rising tension in Haiphong offered the French an excuse to punish
the Vietminh. Admiral d’Argenlieu asking ‘Can we even use artillery?’ and the
French prime minister replying ‘Even that.’ At the time the French prime
minister needed a patriotic boost to prevent being ousted from power back
home.

French infantry and armoured units raced through Haiphong fighting house to
house against Vietminh squads. French aircraft was used as well. The Vietnamese
claimed 20,000 deaths but the French claimed it was no more than 6,000.

Incidents of violence increased in Hanoi in December, 1946. Giap deployed

30,000 men at three locations in the suburbs, planning to invade Hanoi if trouble
started. Vietminh militia struck first – sabotaging the municipal power plant,
breaking into French homes to murder or abduct occupants.

 French would not negotiate with the Vietnamese unless they capitulated
which of course they wouldn’t do.
 Another familiar pattern was the way in which the war in Vietnam had
consequences for French politics at home.

March 1949 Vietnam’s figurehead emperor, Bao Dai and France’s figurehead
president Auriol signed the Elysee Agrement – named for the presidential palace
in Paris in which the ceremony took place. The French confirmed Vietnam’s
independence and outlined measures to incorporate Cochinchina in a unified
Vietnamese state. But the French were still to retain control of Vietnam’s
defence, diplomacy and finances.

Bao Dai ‘ What they call a Bao Dai solution turns out to be just a French solution.’
( In reality he was right as the French never gave him more than a thin veneer of
independence, for the most part what power Bao Dai had he delegated to his
prime minister. By 1952 the Americans were paying Bao Dai an official stipend of
more than $5 million a year. Apparently he was not a big spender – he only had
four private aeroplanes and his wife and children lived in relative modesty on
the Cote d’Azur. Bao Dai transferred most of his money to French and Swiss
banks accounts and invested heavily in real estate in France and Morocco )

Ho Chi Minh issued an appeal for compromise and promised that in the growing
conflict between the West and the Communist bloc he would guarantee
Vietnam’s neutrality.

There was no response to Ho’s appeal and early 1950 Ho instead asked the
Russians and the recently communist Chinese to recognize his regime in

16
Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and now the West viewed Ho’s
govt. ( See page 96 in your text ) as a satellite in a monolithic Soviet Empire.

What role did the Cold War play in influencing events in Vietnam? How was it
that the French were able to gain the support of the USA? In your answer
consider the quote made by American President Roosevelt about what the future
of Vietnam should be.

The US recognised the Bao Dai govt., in early 1950, although some American
officials believed Bao Dai to be a figure ‘ deserving the ridicule and contempt
with which he is generally regarded by the Vietnamese, and any supposition that
he could succeed or that a French army in Indochina could possibly be an asset to
us could be entertained only by one totally ignorant of Asian realities.’

What do the US think of Bao Dai and why then do they support him??

Another American official said – ‘Whether the French like it or not, independence
is coming to Indochina. Why, therefore, do we tie ourselves to the tail of their
battered kite?’

French casualties since 1945 exceeded 50,000. “ Officers are being lost … at a
faster rate than they are being graduated from officer schools in France.’

The Defeat of France

‘The battlefield would be the ultimate test.’ Karnow

Advantages for the Vietminh:

1. Ho Chi Minh saw it as a conflict ‘between the elephant and the grasshopper’.
The image however was not entirely accurate – the French were better armed
than the Vietminh but did not have enough aircraft. The Vietminh although
originally a guerrilla force had by the 1940s grown into a large military unit –
which meant they could confront the French in bigger military engagements – in
the dense jungle of northern Vietnam.

17
2. The area favoured the Vietminh. The terrain offered them places where they
could recuperate and rest and they had safe sanctuaries in communist China. The
Chinese also supplied them with military advisers and modern American
weapons.

3. Time was also on their side. A long struggle would exhaust the French and the
French public would eventually lose patience with the war.

4. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap decided to wage the war in the three phases
–
1. Hit-and-run guerrilla tactics
1946-47 the French expanded along the Red River valley, the region’s
principal rice growing area. Here they constructed towers and
blockhouses, they skirmished and the Vietminh only emerged at night to
assault the posts and then went back to the hills.
2. Larger actions
3. Finally conventional battles
The plan however was flexible. Giap went ahead too fast but then regrouped and
waited for his next chance.

5. The French were denied victories, which they could use to boost morale at
home.

6. The Vietminh were more prepared to bear sacrifices – they were ready to
sustain heavy casualties – because this is what they had been trained to do. ‘You
can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours. But even at those odds, you
will lose and I will win.’ Ho Chi Minh

7. Their basic unit was the cell which consisted of three to five men. The idea
here was to ensure the respect of the other members of the cell. Officers shared
the hardships of the infantrymen – they ate the same food, wore the same clothes
and carried the same weight packs. The villagers were most co-operative – as
Mao said the villages were the sea in which the fish could swim.

8. Vietminh were motivated. They had a strong nationalistic culture, which was
nearly xenophobic in intensity – Karnow says this makes it almost a holy war
against the foreign invaders. Women were recruited and served as couriers or
collected intelligence against the French.

Progress against the French

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1949-1950 Giap ( Vietminh general, mastermind behind their success ) enlarged
his forces, promoted local guerrillas to regional units and assigned regional
officers and noncoms to bigger detachments. He quadrupled the number of
regular Vietminh. Giap’s army was never more than 300,000 men, whereas the
French had more than a 100,000, plus 300,000 Vietnamese.

1949 – was the year Chinese Communists reached the Vietnamese border. The
Chinese provided Vietminh with automatic weapons, mortars, howitzers – most
of it captured US material. Chinese advisers joined the Vietminh and Vietminh
trained in China. “ It was a significant moment. We were no longer isolated from
the Communist camp.” 5

Giap expanded his battalions into regiments, soon he had mobilized six divisions,
each numbering 10,000 men – one of them a ‘heavy division’ which was made up
of artillery and engineering regiments. The idea of the Vietminh only being
guerrilla units was just that – only an idea.

40,000 coolies were needed to deliver supplies moving through jungle trails and
over mountain passes.

1949 Giap started to harass the most isolated French garrisons – and ensuring
the countryside was open to the Vietminh. And then he directed his offensive
against larger French garrisons.

1950 he defeated some important French garrisons in the north, and when the
French withdrew they abandoned artillery, mortars, 8,000 rifles and more than a
thousand tons of ammunition. In the next battle some 6,000 French soldiers
were killed or captured. And France lost the crucial Chinese frontier section and
really any chance of winning against the Vietminh.

Using the above information assess the strengths of Giap’s new strategy ( upscale
from guerrilla to more conventional warfare ) against the French? What other
factors may have played a role in this result? Why might losing the Chinese
frontier section be a crucial development?

Bernard Fall said it was the most significant colonial defeat that the French
had suffered since losing Quebec to the British in 1759.

In Paris a new command was found for the French troops in Vietnam – General
Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. He was handsome, stylish and wore uniforms
fashioned by a Parisian couturier. He could be egocentric to the point of
megalomania. His only son was to die in Vietnam and he died of cancer a year
after his appointment.

5
Vietminh officer, quoted in S. Karnow, V ietnam A History, p.200

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January, 1951 - Under Chinese guidance Giap mistakenly tried to escalate the
war. De Lattre was prepared and he had strengthened the Red River valley with
hundreds of cement blockhouses and new airfields. Every available aircraft was
used to bomb the Vietminh attacking forces and Giap retreated after three days
of fierce fighting – leaving 6,000 Vietminh dead and 8,000 wounded.

Reasons for French success here ( albeit short-lived ) – military intelligence, new
commander ....

March, 1951 Giap made another mistake in trying to take Haiphong, a port which
kept the French supplied but he underestimated the strength of the French.

A third Vietminh attack in May was also a failure.

De Lattre was now keen to go on the offensive and requested US aid but the US
could only partially help and the French were deadlocked in Vietnam for the next
two years.

By late 1952 French dead, wounded, missing and captured totally more than
90,000 since the war had begun in 1946 and France had also spent a large
amount of money. Public enthusiasm for the war had decreased in France and it
was clear really that the Vietminh had outlasted the French even though Giap
had lost thousands of lives.

Giap was now contemplating a major offensive – he considered Laos reckoning

that the French would not want to lose Laos. ( the Laotian King hated the
Vietnamese ) He used Laos however as a feint attack designed to distract the
French.

In October, 1952 he started considering the area around Dienbienphu and the
French saw it as a crucial area which they needed to defend to stop the Vietminh
getting into Laos.

The new French commander was General Henri Lavarre – he was a cold and
solitary commander, exuded optimism. Lavarre’s idea was to have ‘mooring
points’ from which the French troops and their native auxiliaries could strike at
the Vietminh’s rear areas. Dienbienphu was proposed as a ‘mooring point’.

In Paris they were hoping for the kind of truce that had been signed in Korea but
Navarre wanted victory. In October, 1953 the French agreed with the Laotian
King that they would protect his land.

November, 1953 the French started planning for Operation Castor – five French
battalions would retake Dienbienphu.

The chief of France’s air transport unit disagreed, believing that Dienbienphu
would become a ‘meat grinder’ of French troops – but Navarre disagreed as he
believed that Giap could not respond in strength – which was an impression that

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Giap had wanted to create. Giap instinctively felt Dienbienphu was the place for
the Vietminh to make a stand.

Dienbienphu

The French were completely isolated in the valley and totally dependent on
airlifted supplies.

Vietminh dominated the surrounding mountains, which gave the Vietminh the
advantage of height for their cannon and a way to bring food and equipment in
from the rear.

November, 1953 Giap moved 33 infantry battalions, six artillery regiments and a
regiment of engineers into the region. Giap always believed ( or so he said )

‘ In war there are two factors – human beings and weapons. Ultimately, though,
human beings are the decisive factor. Human beings! Human beings!’

‘ We had to cross mountains and jungles, marching at night and sleeping by day
to avoid enemy bombing. We slept in foxholes, or simply alongside the trail. We
each carried a rifle, ammunition and hand grenades, and our packs contained a
blanket, a mosquito net and a change of clothes. We each had a week’s supply of
rice, which we refilled at depots along the way. We ate greens and bamboo
shoots, picked in the jungle, and occasionally villagers would give us a bit of
meat. By then I had been in the Vietminh for nine years, and I was accustomed to
it.’6

3. Assess how useful the above source would be for an historian studying the
nature of warfare between the Vietnamese and the French?

In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by the source and the
reliability of each source.

Giap thought at least 50,000 troops would be needed to annihilate the French
garrison. Ho told Giap -

‘This engagement must be won. But don’t begin it unless you are sure of
winning.’

The French by this time were tired of war and at home were calling for
negotiations. Prime Minister Laniel - ‘ If an honourable settlement were in sight,
6
Cao Xuan Nghia, a Vietminh veteran, interviewed and quoted by Karnow, 1994,
p.206

21
on either the local or the international level, France would be happy to accept a
diplomatic solution to the conflict.’

Laniel also said ‘(France) has no reason to prolong its sacrifices if the very people
for whom they are being made disdain those sacrifices and betray them.’

What does this statement mean? Who are the ‘very people’ that Laniel is
referring to here?

The USSR thought the conflict should be ended as well. The Chinese Communists
were eager to play a role too - which would give them a higher profile
internationally and less reliance on the USSR. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai felt that
France would soon leave Indochina although he thought USA would step in
instead, therefore he favoured a solution which would favor the French to some
extent and prevent the US coming in.

Bao Dai and his anti-communist Vietnamese supporters were frightened they
would lose out in a deal between the French and Ho Chi Minh. Diem, the future
prime minister of the future South Vietnam ( 1956 ) also had an interest in the
outcome between the French and Indochina.

Ho Chi Minh was suspicious of negotiations – France had betrayed them in the
past. Ho’s strategy was to continue fighting until he had worn down French
opinion to the point he could dictate an armistice. Both Moscow and Beijing
wanted him to negotiate.

Ho was pressured into negotiating – the negotiations would include the US,
Britain, France and the Soviet Union but the reality still was ‘You don’t win at the
conference table what you’ve lost on the battlefield.’ ( General Walter Bedell
Smith)

The French lost Dienbienphu in the headquarters of General Navarre – it was

here that he miscalculated Giap’s intentions and capabilities.

Navarre’s mistakes –

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 1. He and his staff had wrongly disregarded intelligence that did not fit their
prejudices and instead substituted their preconceived idea of the
Vietminh for the facts.
2. Navarre declined to credit Giap with plans for a major test at Dienbienphu
and committed large units to central Vietnam and even refused to move
them once the bigger encounter took place.
3. He misread Giap’s ability to move a huge force rapidly and then his own
troops were outnumbered by a ratio of more than five to one.
4. He rejected the idea that the Vietminh could devastate his men with
artillery deployed on the hills above Dienbienphu nor did he foresee that
that the enemy emplacements would be protected by camouflage and
antiaircraft guns against bombing from the air.
5. Failed to anticipate Giap’s howitzers would be able to cut off flights in and
out of the valley – making it difficult to receive supplies and fly out the
wounded not to mention retreat.
6. He expected he would be able to use tanks.
7. He chose a cavalry officer – Colonel Christian Marie Ferdinand de La Croix
de Castries ( whose ancestors fought in the Crusades ) who expected a
direct Vietminh assault against his garrisons in the middle of the valley
and had built three artillery bases there – reputably named after his three
mistresses – Gabrielle, Beatrice and Isabelle.

Giap – wrote the following analysis of his strategy in 1961,

‘By launching a big offensive with fresh troops, we could have foreshortened the
duration of the campaign, and avoided the wear and tear of a long operation ...
(But) these tactics had a very great, basic disadvantage. Our troops lacked
experience in attacking fortified entrenched camps. If we sought to win quickly,
success could not be assured ... Consequently, we resolutely chose to strike and
advance surely .... surely to win only when success is certain.’

 Assess how useful the above source is to an historian studying the

reasons for the Vietminh’s success against the French in the First
Indochina War.
In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by the source and the
reliability of the source.

What is the perspective? Reliability – who, when, why, tone of source. Is is

reliable? Make a judgment and assess usefulness .....

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