Doty, R. L. (1993) - Foreign Policy As Social Construction

Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S.
Counterinsurgency
Policy in the Philippines
Author(s): Roxanne Lynn Doty
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 297-320
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International Studies Quarterly (1993) 37, 297-320
Foreign Policy as Social Construction:

A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S.
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines
ROXANNE LYNN DoTy
Arizona State University
Much of the criticism directed at post-positivist international relations

has called for more detailed exploration of its implications for specific
areas of investigation. At the same time, the study of foreign policy has
been largely unaffected by the critical insights offered by post-positivism.
This paper attempts to bridge this gap by examining three approaches to
foreign policy analysis and the metatheoretical issues underlying each of
them. It is suggested that an approach informed by post-positivist
insights can provide a useful alternative to traditional ways of studying
foreign policy and can facilitate a more critical interpretation of foreign
policy practices. The first two approaches, the Cognitive Decision-
making Approach and the Social Performance Approach, were chosen as
a way of differentiating and highlighting the ontological and theoretical
issues that are relevant to understanding and situating the Discursive
Practices Approach. After examining the three approaches, I use the
Discursive Practices Approach to analyze United States' counterinsur-
gency policy in the Philippines circa 1950.
On July 4, 1946, for the first time in history, an imperial nation voluntarily
relinquished possession of its colonial conquest (Karnow, 1989:323). As the United
States granted independence to the Philippines the new relationship between the
two was widely heralded as one of partnership and equality. The Filipino people, it
was said, had demonstrated their capacity for democratic self-government and had
earned the right of independence (MacArthur, 1946). The emergence of the
Philippines as a sovereign nation was hailed as conclusive proof that the United
States stood for fair play, liberty and freedom, and progress and prosperity for
other peoples (McDonough, 1946).
Despite this optimistic beginning, the United States was soon to embark on an
interventionist course that displayed little respect for Philippine sovereignty. The
question arises as to how this interventionist policy came to be deemed necessary
and nonintervention unthinkable. How, amidst all the profession of sovereign
Author's note: I would like to thank the following individuals for their comments on various drafts of this paper:
Richard Ashley, Francis Beer, Jack Crittenen, Raymond Duvall, David Sylvan, Stephen Walker, Cynthia Weber, and
Alexander Wendt. I would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers and the editors at ISQ especially Richard
Herrmann.
? 1993 International Studies Association.

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4
1JF, UK.
298 Foreign Policy as Social Construction
equality, did the post-colonial United States-Philippine relationship come to be

constructed in so hierarchical a manner that the U.S. was licensed to diagnose and
judge the internal situation of the Philippines? How, indeed, did it come to be
constructed such that, upon judging the situation, United States' policy makers
could regard counterinsurgency measures as the only reasonable course of action?
Conventional approaches to foreign policy analysis do not pose this kind of how-
question. Foreign policy analysis is generally concerned with explaining why partic-
ular decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made. Depending on the
approach, explanation might focus on the relative position of a state in the
international power hierarchy, infighting among various government agencies, or
the perceptions of decision makers. What is common to alt of these kinds of
explanations is that they seek an answer to a particular category of question, a why-
question. The problem for analysis is to show that a certain policy decision was
predictable given a particular set of circumstances. While the attempt is made to
identify sufficient conditions, in most cases analysts can only suggest that outcomes
will occur with a certain amount of probability (Little, 1991:4).
Explanations for why-questions are incomplete in an important sense. They
generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of
action could happen.1 They presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of
being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make
possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves. In contrast to more
conventional approaches to the analysis of foreign policy, the approach I take in
this article poses a how-possible question. In posing such a question, I examine how
meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus
constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities
and preclude others. What is explained is not why a particular outcome obtained,
but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially
constructed such that certain practices were made possible. The claims of
sovereign equality would seem to have made a policy of intervention on the part of
the United States impossible. This suggests that other constructions were being
produced that were not those heralded at the time of Philippine independence.
The difference between why- and how-questions is important in judging a
successful explanation. This difference can be illustrated with a brief example. One
could pose the question "Why did the United States invade Panama?" Some
possible explanations might point to the U.S. desire to stop the drug trafficking of
Noriega, Bush's desire to overcome his "wimp" image, or the U.S. desire to
overcome the Vietnam "syndrome." All of these explanations are incomplete in
that they take as unproblematic the possibility that the invasion could take place.
One could point to U.S. military capabilities as an explanation for the how-possible
question. Still, this is incomplete in that the U.S. does not imagine invading every
country to which it is militarily superior and with which it has a serious grievance.
The possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain
courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and
relationships, must already be in place.
lUseful discussions of why- and how-questions can be found in Little (1991:chap. 1) and Cross (1991). Also see
Wendt (1987:362-363) for a discussion of the distinction between why- and how-questions as they pertain to
structural vs. historical explanations. Also relevant is Sylvan and Glassner's (1985:7-9) discussion of possibilism, an
explanation that should be familiar to students of international relations. George (1979:103) suggests that an
individual's operational code introduces propensities, not determinants, of decision making. This is consistent with an
explanation that focuses on possibilities. Similarly, Sprout and Sprout's (1965) "environmentai possibilism" suggests
that the environment does not deternine behavior, but rather permits, supports, or resists certain behaviors.
ROXANNE LYNN DOTY 299
How-possible questions are concerned with explaining how these meanings,

subjects, and interpretive dispositions are constructed. To address the question of
how the U.S. invasion of Panama was made possible, an adequate explanation
would have to inquire into the production of these things. In the Panama case one
might examine the discursive construction of Manuel Noriega himself, noting the
shift from "anti-communist leader" to "drug trafficker."
How-questions, so posed, go to an important aspect of power that why-questions
too often neglect. They go to the way in which power works to constitute particular
modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositions. Indeed, the kind of how-
question I pose in this article is implicitly a question of power. This is not the kind
of power that works through social agents, a power that social actors possess and use.
Rather, it is a kind of power that is productive of meanings, subject identities, their
interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct. Power as productive is central
to the kind of how-question raised in this study.2 Why-questions, by taking subjects
as given, as the ontological foundation of their analysis, preclude investigation into
power as constitutive of subjects.
Moving from why-questions to how-possible questions has important implica-
tions for foreign policy analysis. By making more elements of policy making
problematic and taking less as given, an approach that poses how-questions is more
critical than an approach confined to the question of why. When we ask why states
or decision makers engage in certain practices with other states, we assume the
existence of those states and decision makers. When we pose a how-possible
question, we can still ask why, but we must in addition inquire into the practices
that enable social actors to act, to frame policy as they do, and to wield the
capabilities they do. Perforce more critical, this mode of questioning takes us to
relations of power-power in its productive aspect that why-questions neglect.
This study takes up two how-possible questions. (1) How were particular subjects
and modes of subjectivity constituted so as to make possible United States'
interventionist policy in the Philippines circa 1950? and, equally important, (2)
How did the practices involved in this specific instance of policy making further
the construction and hierarchical positioning of subjects, thus locating some
"sovereign" equals as the rightful interpreters and judgers of others?
To address these questions I take a Discursive Practices Approach, an approach that
perhaps needs to be situated and clarified. Toward that end, I shall briefly juxta-
pose it alongside two alternative approaches to foreign policy analysis, using the
contrast to draw out some of the issues that need to be appreciated in
understanding my approach. The purpose of this juxtaposition is not to prepare
the way for an application of each approach in a causal analysis of this case, then to
determine which offers the best explanation. Rather, my purpose is simply to
highlight the ontological and theoretical issues that are relevant to understanding
and situating the Discursive Practices Approach. The first two approaches, the
Cognitive Decision-making Approach and the Social Performance Approach, were chosen
because they do this nicely.
The Cognitive Decision-making Approach
International relations scholars who have been influenced by the "cognitive

revolution" in psychology and other fields have long been sensitive to the
2The conceptualization of power being suggested here is that offered by Michel Foucault. (Original works include
those published in 1977, 1979, 1980, and 1983). Useful secondary sources are Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) and Clegg
(1989:chap. 7).
importance of the cognitive aspects of individuals involved in the formulation of

foreign policy. Notwithstanding the methodological problems, conventional
scholars continue to integrate insights gleaned from a focus on individual
cognition with theories of international relations. Of significance for my
immediate purposes is what the cognitive revolution problematized that had
previously been left unexamined. The cognitive revolution made problematic the
subjective environment of individuals and in doing so called our attention to the
world as perceived and represented by those actors involved in foreign policy decision-
making processes (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985:228-32, 247-48).3
In directing our attention to the importance of "worlds" as they are perceived
and constructed by individual decision makers, the cognitive approach suggests
that "objective" reality is not the locus of meaning and therefore not the key to
understanding political behavior and practices. Rather, individuals are the source
of meaning.
Such a suggestion implicitly opens up for further scrutiny three important issues
which scholars working within this approach have not addressed. (1) In order to
have anything to perceive, subjects must be situated within the social order. This
calls our attention to the construction of that social order (the environment) itself.
(2) The privileging of the subject's perceptions renders vulnerable the very con-
cept of an "objective" reality. This vulnerability is exhibited in the literature itself by
suggestions that analysts "disregard the so-called 'real world' external to the
environed individual or decisional group" (Sprout and Sprout, 1965:119). (3) The
subject itself becomes problematic. The decision-making literature itself has
highlighted this issue through its focus on modal actors and shared images.
Moving toward a construction of reality which is not necessarily the product of a
particular individual suggests that the subject may be a social collective, i.e., a
group of decision makers, a bureaucracy, or the state. This raises the possibility
that the source of meaning, the social register of value, and agent of action may
not be the individual. Perhaps subjects in general, whether individual or collective,
are themselves constructed.
To so regard the subject is to render that subject a problem in need of an
accounting. Such a problematization is not possible within the cognitive decision-
making framework because it would destabilize the very ground upon which this
framework stands, i.e., the individual or collective subject. The consequence of this
is that the kind of how-possible question discussed earlier and the question of
power that it implies cannot be raised.
The Social Performance Approach
While this approach has not had extensive impact on international relations, its
implications would be to move analyses, in significant ways, beyond the cognitive
decision-making framework and toward issues that are further explored in the so-
called post-positivist literature.4 Arguing against the predisposition to identify cogni-
tive process solely with individuals, analytic philosopher Rom Harre (1981:212)
suggests that cognitive processes are not inner and private but public and collective.
Social cognition thus becomes important. The way that this term is understood in the
3The concern with in-dividual cognition has been particularly evident in the operational code and cognitive
mapping approaches to foreign policy decision making (George, 1979; Bonham and Shapiro, 1973; Holsti, 1976;
Walker, 1977). These approaches illustrate how scholars attempt to get at individual world views and how individuals
define their immediate decision-making situation(s). Approaches more directly reflecting the cognitive revolution
include those ofJervis (1976), Larson (1985), Rosati (1987), Herrmann (1985, 1988), and Cottam (1977).
4An exception is Walker (1990), who draws upon Harre in developing a theory of self-and-other in foreign policy.
Social Performance Approach differs significantly from the way it is understood in

the North American cognitive psychology literature, where it refers to how
individuals organize their knowledge of their world. The concept of "schema" gets
at this organization. In the North American literature, however, the origins of
schema are not themselves the object of analysis.
The Social Performance Approach suggests that there is a large degree of
intersubjective understanding present in social practices which is manifested in
social scripts that actors follow. An analysis of statement making can explain how
these scripts are produced by revealing an overall structure generated from
preformed mental templates (Harre, 1980:130). Socially competent people contain
shared template structures which are manifested in their cognitive resources.
One of the implications of this approach for foreign policy analysis is that it
would shift our focus to the inextricable link between individuals and their social
context(s). Meaning, as both cognitively and culturally mediated, has a distinctly
social dimension. This moves in the direction of addressing the construction of
subjects themselves by recognizing the mutually constitutive relationship between
individuals and their social order (Harre, 1980:7).5
Another implication of this approach would be to broaden our understanding
of what foreign policy making is. What policy makers are doing in any particular
situation goes beyond merely making choices among various policy options. They
are also performing according to a social script which is itself part of a larger social
order. By virtue of this performance they are involved in a ritual reproduction (or
repudiation) of that social order. Foreign policy thus becomes a practice that
produces a social order as well as one through which individual and collective
subjects themselves are produced and reproduced. This moves toward addressing
the how-question discussed above. Finally, it is important to note the significance
this approach places on statement making, thus calling our attention to language
and signifying practices in the more general sense. While cognitive decision-
making approaches often use documents as data and thus also focus on statement
making, the implicit theory of language is referential. Language is transparent in
that it reflects perceptions, motivations, and belief systems. Language merely gives
names to the meanings already possessed by actors and is not itself constitutive of
meaning. By contrast, statement making for the Social Performance Approach is
productive, involving the shared interpretations of members of society and, in turn,
the reproduction of that society.
It should be noted, however, that this approach does not fundamentally
challenge the concept of a unitary, pre-given subject (albeit a collective subject)
(Henriques et al., 1984:24). It remains wedded to the notion that templates are sus-
ceptible of a unique determinative reading, as if they were monologically produced
by a single "author"; this "author" being a preexisting interpretive community. The
question of how these shared templates themselves get constructed is deferred and
with it the question of the productive role of power in such a construction.
This point has important implications for the way that language enters into
analysis. While this approach understands language to be productive, it is only so by
virtue of its connection with preformed templates. No autonomy is granted to
language itself. Signifiers (i.e., words, images) must ultimately refer back to signified
(i.e., shared templates). This is in contrast to the Discursive Practices Approach
which suggests that words, language, and discourse (signifiers) have a force which is
not reducible to either structures or cognitive attributes (signifieds) of social actors.
5Harre's social psychological approach is very much influenced by structurationist social theory which recognizes
the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures. See Giddens (1979). The works of Kratochwill
and Ruggie (1986), Wendt (1987, 1992), and Dessler (1989) link this approach to international relations.
The Discursive Practices Approach
A Discursive Practices Approach emphasizes the linguistic construction of reality.6 The

productive nature of language does not depend on nor necessarily coincide with
the motivations, perceptions, intentions, or understandings of social actors.
Language is seen as a set of signs which are part of a system for generating subjects,
objects, and worlds (Shapiro, 1984:222). The Discursive Practices Approach thus
obviates the need for recourse to the interiority of a conscious, meaning-giving
subject, either in terms of psychological and cognitive characteristics of individuals
or shared mental templates of social collectivities. Whether or not these exist is
somewhat beside the point because the Discursive Practices Approach is not tied to
them.7
This kind of approach addresses the how-question discussed earlier because it
does not presuppose that particular subjects are already in place. It thus does not
look to individual or collective subjects as the loci of meaning. Regarding language
practices themselves as relatively autonomous admits the question of a kind of
power that constitutes subjects, modes of subjectivity, and "reality." In contrast to
the Social Performance Approach in which signifiers (words, images) ultimately
refer back to signifieds (shared templates), in the Discursive Practices Approach
signifiers refer only to other signifiers, hence the notion of intertextuality, i.e., a
complex and infinitely expanding web of possible meanings. That meaning does
often appear to be fixed and decideable rather than an infinite play of signifiers is
indicative of the workings of power. This presents us with a radically new con-
ception of power which is inherent in the linguistic practices by which agents are
constructed and become articulated within particular discourses.
This approach, like any approach, has its analytic form. The form of this
approach is a "discursive practice." A discursive practice is not traceable to a fixed
and stable center, e.g., individual consciousness or a social collective. Discursive
practices that constitute subjects and modes of subjectivity are dispersed, scattered
throughout various locales. This is why the notion of intertextuality is important.
Texts always refer back to other texts which themselves refer to still other texts.
The power that is inherent in language is thus not something that is centralized,
emanating from a pre-given subject. Rather, like the discursive practices in which it
inheres, power is dispersed and, most important, is productive of subjects and their
worlds.
A discourse, i.e., a system of statements in which each individual statement
makes sense, produces interpretive possibilities by making it virtually impossible to
think outside of it. A discourse provides discursive spaces, i.e., concepts, categories,
metaphors, models, and analogies by which meanings are created. The production
of discourses and of subjectivity and sociality is indissoluble (Henriques et al.,
6My understanding of the Discursive Practices Approach is drawn primarily from the works of Michel Foucault
(1972, 1981) andJacques Derrida (1978, 1981, 1982) and from discussions in Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983). See also
Shapiro, Bonham, and Heradstveit (1988), Der Derian (1987), Shapiro (1989), Campbell (1990, 1992), Chaloupka
(1992), Ashley and Walker (1990), and Weber (1990, 1992).
7To accept that it is ultimately the speaking and writing individual subject that produces the documents and texts
that give rise to social discourse does not lead to the conclusion that analysis must rest with the individual. A parallel
can be made here with one scholar's criticism of methodological individualism. Even if one accepts the ontological
thesis that social entities are nothing but ensembles of individuals in various relations to one another, it does not
follow that all social facts must ultimately be explicable in terms of facts about individuals (the explanatory thesis)
(Little, 1991:183-200). It is commonly accepted by international relations scholars who approach analysis from a
systemic level that social actions have unintended consequences which escape control of individuals actually
performing those actions. It is not such a big leap from this to the notion that language escapes the control of
individuals and has a force of its own.
1984:106). This is because discourses create various kinds of subjects and simulta-
neously position these subjects vis-a-vis one another. For example, a traditional
discourse on the family would contain spaces for a subject with traits con-
ventionally defined as "male" and another kind of subject with traits conventionally
defined as "female." These subjects would be positioned vis-a-vis one another in a
particular way, e.g., female subservient to male. Within the traditional discourse on
the family it is impossible to think outside of these categories except in terms of
deviance or abnormality. Within this discourse, there is no discursive space for the
single mother by choice or the gay or lesbian couple with children except as
departures from the "normal" family or as deviants. Subjects, then, can be thought
of as positions within particular discourses, intelligible only with reference to a
specific set of categories, concepts, and practices.
Policy makers also function within a discursive space that imposes meanings on
their world and thus creates reality (Shapiro, 1988:100, 116). An approach that
focuses on discursive practices as a unit of analysis can get at how this "reality" is
produced and maintained and how it makes various practices possible. The analytic
question addressed is not why particular decisions are made; the policy decision in
itself becomes a secondary concern. What is central is the discourse(s) which
construct a particular "reality." An analysis of discourses can reveal the necessary
but not sufficient conditions of various practices.
Applying this approach to the study of foreign policy, not only do we broaden
our conception of what foreign policy is, the sites of foreign policy, i.e., where
foreign policy takes place, also become much more extensive. This approach
suggests that what foreign policy is need not be limited to the actual making of
specific decisions nor the analysis of temporally and spatially bounded "events."
Similarly, "foreign policy makers" need not be limited to prominent decision
makers, but could also include those rather anonymous members of the various
bureaucracies who write the numerous memorandums, intelligence reports, and
research papers that circulate within policy circles. The discourse (s) instantiated in
these various documents produce meanings and in doing so actively construct the
"reality" upon which foreign policy is based.
Moreover, foreign policy making can also extend beyond the realm of official
government institutions. The reception as meaningful of statements revolving
around policy situations depends on how well they fit into the general system of
representation in a given society. Even speeches and press conference statements
produced for specific purposes, in order to be taken seriously, must make sense
and fit with what the general public takes as "reality." Thus, the analysis of
statements can entail the examination of what was said and written within broad
policy-making contexts as well as statements made in society more generally.8
Below I employ the Discursive Practices Approach in an analysis of U.S. coun-
terinsurgency policy in the Philippines circa 1950. In doing so, I intend to show
how foreign policy practices constructed an important aspect of international rela-
tions. The aspect of international relations that is of concern to me is its hierar-
chical nature.
In international relations, hierarchy has been more of a background condition
from which analyses proceed rather than something which is itself in need of
examination. For example, classical realism tacitly accepted the right of Great
8In a sense this is why "public opinion" becomes relevant to policy makers. When the public strongly objects to
U.S. policy, it is often, at least in part, because official representations do not fit well with society's representations.
The example that most readily comes to mind is Vietnam. As the war dragged on different representation(s) of the
situation began to compete with the official one, thus making it increasingly difficult for U.S. officials to portray the
situation as a simple one of communism versus democracy or good versus evil.
Powers to special privileges within the international community. Neorealism,

despite its conception of the international realm as anarchical, sees states linked to
one another hierarchically based upon power differentials. Marxist-oriented
approaches to international relations begin with the assumption that capitalist
relations of production and/or exchange result in a hierarchical world consisting
of both classes and nation-states.9 All of these approaches exhibit an unspoken
agreement not to problematize the construction of the subjects that constitute the
world and the categories through which these subjects and objects are constructed. I
suggest that we need to denaturalize hierarchy. We need to examine the
content(s) of hierarchy, or, more accurately, of specific hierarchies, the practices
that produced them, and the practices they make possible.
The second how-possible question posed earlier is implied here. How is
international hierarchy itself made possible? As the title of this article is meant to
suggest, conceptualizing foreign policy as social construction seeks to place foreign
policy practices within the larger context of constructing a particular kind of inter-
national order consisting of various kinds of international identities. The second
how-possible question addresses this concern. Addressing this question, however,
can only be accomplished by examining particular instances of foreign policy. In
examining a particular case we also find that the discursive practices surrounding
that case made possible the more immediate, case-specific practices, thus address-
ing the first how-possible question.
Two important aspects to this analysis follow from the above discussion. One
aspect is the detailed explication of the discourse itself. This consists of examining
various textual mechanisms at work in the discourse that construct identities for
subjects and position these subjects vis-a-vis one another. The second aspect entails
an examination of how, from this construction and positioning, various possibilities
of practice emerge.
The following example is helpful in clarifying the distinction between my
approach, which examines what linguistic practices do, and an approach which
seeks to reveal what linguistic practices tell us about the beliefs and understandings
of decision makers.
Shafer (1988) analyzed U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines using a
"cognitive content approach" which is consistent with the first approach discussed
above. He used this approach to explain why U.S. assessment and prescriptions for
various insurgencies (including the Philippines) have been so inaccurate and yet
despite this have remained virtually unchanged. He examined the statements
contained in various foreign policy documents as a way of getting at the shared
ideas and analytic frameworks with which policy makers analyzed the international
situation, generated policy options, and chose among those options (Shafer,
1988:32-34). The statements contained in the documents were signifiers for, i.e.,
referred back to, the misunderstandings of policy makers regarding the situation
in the Philippines. Decision makers acted upon these misunderstandings and
proceeded to analyze the success of counterinsurgency policy in terms of these
same misunderstandings, judging it a success and a model for future policy.
A Discursive Practices Approach would not necessarily dispute such an analysis
or argue against its utility. Rather, it suggests that this was not all that was going on
in this particular foreign policy discourse. What this discourse was doing was
constructing particular subject identities, positioning these subjects vis-a-vis one
9An exception to the more well known conceptions of hierarchy in international relations is Onuf and Klink
(1989), who suggest that a paradigm based on Weber's three ideal types of rule can facilitate an understanding of
international hierarchical relations.
another and thereby constructing a particular "reality" in which this policy became
possible, as well as a larger "reality" in which future policies would be justified in
advance. In the one case language reveals and is at least potentially neutral. In the
other case language does things and is inherently powerful.
There is another important and related difference between the two kinds of
analyses. Shafer is asking a why-question. The question I am posing is a howpossi
question. Garfinkel (1981:22) points out that what aspect of a given state of affairs is
taken to be problematic radically alters the success or failure of potential
explanations. Shafer is taking the shared ideas and analytical framework of policy
makers to be problematic. Thus, a successful explanation must focus on these things
and explain why they led to or increased the probability of particular policies.
What I take to be problematic is the existence of subjects themselves, their
positioning vis-a-vis one another, and the "reality" that made certain structures and
meanings possible. How we know what these arrangements and meanings are is
through the categories, concepts, metaphors, and analogies provided by language.
Since, for the Discursive Practices Approach, subjects do not exist prior to their
production in particular discourses, and the constitutive role of language is not
tied to perceptions and other cognitive features, I cannot draw upon such features
of preexisting subjects to explain how those subjects themselves and their practices
are made possible. A successful explanation must focus on how language works to
produce subjects and their relationships.
In one sense my how-possible explanation is a structural one and is consistent
with Little's (1991:4-5) suggestion that how-possible questions are associated with
the behavior of complex systems, structures, and social organizations. However, it is
important to distinguish my explanation from those that tend to subordinate
specific content and practices to abstract and a priori structural needs. I am not a
priori positing a structure with certain needs and then suggesting how it determines
meanings and practices. Rather, in emphasizing discursive practices, I am suggest-
ing that structure itself is constructed along with the meanings which simultaneously
produce subject's identities and their positions vis-a-vis one another. Possibilities are
not explained by the prior existence of structures or social actors, but rather by the
continual and simultaneous production of subjects and structures.10
Research Design
Discourse analytic methods facilitate the examination of the various mechanisms at

work in texts. This said, however, it would be misleading to suggest that
interpretation is not an important part of my analysis. Interpretation, on the part
of the analyst, is an important aspect of all three of the approaches discussed in
this article. The difference with the Discursive Practices Approach is that I am not
providing an interpretation of the consciously motivated, self-serving images
constructed by the participants. Rather, I am providing an interpretation of what
the discursive practices do, which does not necessarily coincide with individual
motivations, perceptions, and intentions.
IOA notable contrast can be made here with two of the dominant structural theories of international relations.
The neorealist conception of structure is individualist, reducible to the properties of states (or agents) (Ashley, 1984;
Wendt, 1987). World-system theory's conception of structure is of a "deep structure" that generates both state and
class actors. As Wendt (1987) correctly points out, each of these two approaches treats its "primitive units" as given
and unproblematic. The Discursive Practices Approach permits me to address the simultaneous construction of both
subjects and structures without bringing analysis to rest with either, and without holding one constant while
addressing the production of the other, or "bracketing." On the notion of "bracketing" see Wendt (1987:364-365)
and Giddens (1979:80-81).
The concepts of presupposition, predication, and subject positioning provide analytic

categories that enable me to get at how discursive practices constitute subjects and
objects and organize them into a "grid of intelligibility." These concepts can be
thought of as textual mechanisms.
Statements rarely speak for themselves. Even the most straightforward and
ostensibly clear statements bring with them all sorts of presuppositions or
background knowledge that is taken to be true. When one uses language, one is
implying something about the existence of subjects, objects, and their relation to
one another. To use a perhaps too-simplistic example, the question, "Have you
stopped beating your dog?" presupposes several things: something called a dog
exists; you have one; and you engage in the practice of beating it. Further, the pre-
supposition is made that the questioner has the presumptive right of interrogation.
To use another example, the statement, "The logic of realpolitik retains lasting
relevance because it captures best the essential nature of the international political
system" creates the background knowledge that there is something called
"realpolitik," it has a logic, there exists an international political system that has an
essential nature, and the author is in the position to assert this as fact. In the
absence of the "truth" of the background knowledge and the world it presupposes,
the above statements would make no sense. Presupposition, therefore, is an
important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so
constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true.
Another way in which texts construct worlds is by attaching various labels to
subjects through predication. Predication involves the linking of certain qualities to
particular subjects through the use of predicates and the adverbs and adjectives
that modify them (Milliken, 1990). A predicate affirms a quality, attribute, or
property of a person or thing. For example, to state that the United States "has
stood for fair play, for aid to the weak, for liberty, and freedom" establishes the
United States as a particular kind of subject with these qualities. Attributes attached
to subjects are important for constructing identities for those subjects and for
telling us what subjects can do.
Texts also work to create a "reality" by linking particular subjects and objects to
one another. The production of subjects and objects is always vis-a-vis other
subjects and objects. What defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the
relationships that subject is positioned in relative to other kinds of subjects.
Presupposition and predication, in addition to constructing subjects and objects,
establish various kinds of relationships between subjects and between subjects and
objects. We can think of this as subject positioning. Some of the important kinds of
relationships that position subjects are those of opposition, identity, similarity, and
complementarity.
One can deconstruct texts in order to locate some of these relationships. One
way that deconstruction works is by identifying the oppositional structuring in a
text which results in the hierarchization of one term in relation to another (Culler,
1982:86). The dominant term is highlighted by the subordinate term which is
deemed the "other," the deviant, or the inferior, to the first term. Relations of
identity, similarity, and complementarity can also be located in the rhetorical
operations of texts. Barthes uses the term cultural code for the conceptual system
organized around key oppositions and other relations. For example, the term
woman is defined in opposition to the term man. Each of these terms is aligned with
a cluster of attributes, e.g., emotional, weak, pliant, sensitive, nurturing are
clustered around "woman" while rational, strong, firm are clustered around "man"
(Silverman, 1983:36; Barthes, 1974).
Taken together, these textual mechanisms, predication, presupposition, and subject
positioning produce a "world" by providing positions for various kinds of subjects
and endowing them with particular attributes. While for analytic purposes it is
useful to discuss these mechanisms separately, in actuality, all three work together
and simultaneously. The discussion of this framework can perhaps be made clearer
with an illustration that is more related to the Philippines. This example illustrates
the "methods" I have used to analyze and compare the texts in this study.,, The
following excerpt is from John Foreman, a British travel writer, who wrote during
the time of the Spanish-American War. His writings on the Philippines were widely
read, and he was cited as an authority at the Paris Peace Conference, at which it
was decided that the Philippines would be annexed by the United States-without,
it might be added, consultation with the Filipino people. In this passage he is
discussing the Filipino "native."
The whole time he treats you with the deference due to the superiority which he
recognizes. He knows the duties of no occupations with efficiency and he is
perfectly willing to be a 'jack of all trades." So long as he gets his food and fair
treatment, and his stipulated wages paid in advance, he is content to act as a
general-utility man. If not pressed too hard, he will follow his superior like a
faithful dog. If treated with kindness, according to European notions, he is lost.
The native never looks ahead; he is never anxious about the future; but if left to
himself, he will do all sorts of imprudent things, from sheer want of reflection on
the consequences. The native has no idea of organization on a large scale, hence a
successful revolution is not possible if confined to the pure indigenous population
unaided by others, such as creoles and foreigners. Under good European officers
they make excellent soldiers. There is nothing they delight in more than pillage,
destruction and bloodshed, and when once they become masters of the situation
in an affray, there is no limit to their greed and savage cruelty.
Predication
In the above excerpt the "native" is endowed with the following qualities: ineffi-
ciency, content and doglike follower, never looks ahead, does not reflect upon
consequences, has no idea of organization on a large scale, naturally delights in
pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, naturally greedy and cruel, and does
imprudent things if left to himself.
Together these qualities, or cluster of predicates, constitute the native as a
particular kind of subject. In contrast, the European, here the speaking subject, is
inscribed with quite different qualities. This is often implicit rather than explicit. In
the first sentence "you" refers to the European, thus creating a relation of identity
among the reader, the author, and the European and a relation of opposition
between these subjects and the Filipino native, here the object of discussion. The
reader, author, and European as speaking, writing, and knowledgeable subjects are
"self" to the Filipino "other" who is the object of their knowledge. The European is
established as a subject who can "know" the Filipino, is able to accurately describe
the true nature of the Filipino, and from that nature derive various practices that
are appropriate.
Presupposition
What background knowledge is created in the above excerpt? The superiority of

the European is taken for granted, a "fact" not open to question. The construction
"lThe particular "methods" I use here are by no means the only way to engage in a post-positivist analysis. Nor do
I mean to suggest that they are superior to other possible "methods." I merely wish to suggest that this is one way to
examine the implications of post-positivism for a specific area of investigation.
of the European as a superior kind of subject is repeated throughout, e.g., in the

statement that the native will "follow his superior like a faithful dog." It is
presupposed here that there exist superior and inferior kinds of subjects. The
sentence "Under good European officers . . ." presupposes the existence of one
kind of subject (a superior one) that can be a good officer and another kind of
subject that can only be a soldier.
Subject Positioning
In constituting particular kinds of subjects, the excerpt also positions these subjects
vis-a-vis one another by assigning them varying degrees of agency. For example,
a subject who does not reflect upon consequences and is a content and doglike
follower has a much simpler degree of agency than a subject who has the qualities
it takes to be an officer. The very fact that the European is the speaking subject
and the "native" the subject/object of this discourse positions these subjects vis-a-vis
one another. Here, the qualities that define the two kinds of subjects are opposi-
tional ones.
We do find other relations, however, in this excerpt. The "native" is positioned
in a relation of similarity with a dog. Like a dog, the "native" requires food and fair
treatment. If treated properly, he will be faithful to his master. "Proper" treatment,
however, must not be kindness, "according to European notions." The "native"
would be lost if this was done. The "fair" treatment to be accorded to "natives" is
more akin to the treatment a European would give to a dog than to another
European.
The above passage, as part of a larger discourse, creates a "world" in the sense
that a particular "reality" must be accepted in order for the statements to make
sense. Certain practices were made possible, because in the world instantiated by
these texts they seemed reasonable and probably quite unremarkable. As noted
above, there were to be different standards of "fair" treatment for the "native" and
for the European. Since the "native" was the kind of subject who was naturally
prone to pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, then discipline and control on the
part of the European would be justified. If the "natives" did not understand
kindness, then force and violence would be justified. Colonization thus became
thinkable.
This example, in large part due to its transparency, nicely illustrates how predi-
cation, presupposition, and subject positioning work. From this illustration one
might infer that these methods would not take us very far analytically simply
because the "findings" are so obvious. There are three important points to be
made in response to this possible inference: (1) Granted, we often do not have to
look very far to find these textual mechanisms at work. They are frequently right
there on the surface. (2) More important though, my approach permits me to
track these mechanisms in less transparent cases. (3) Finally, this approach permits
one to explain how, despite such obviousness, these constructions can become
widely circulated and constitutive of an attitude of "self" toward "other," thus mak-
ing particular practices possible.
This last point implies that individual texts do not exist in a vacuum. Rather,
they are intertwined with other texts forming a complex web of intertextuality.
Different texts within the same arena (i.e., site) and texts from different arenas
may share the same logic according to which meaning is created and subjects
constructed. If the same kinds of subjects, objects, and relations are found to exist
in different texts, this is indicative of a particular logic at work. We can think of
texts that illustrate the same kind of logic as constituting a controlling or dominant
discourse. For example, a number of different and distinct discourses may function
to constitute gender difference according to the same logic. We can imagine a

discourse on the family, a discourse on workplace regulations, and a discourse on
women in the military. It is possible that an examination would show that although
the discourses deal with quite different issues, the same logic regarding gender
division might be found in all of them. If that were the case, we could reasonably
suggest that underlying the diverse discourses was a dominant discourse on gender
that constructed "male" and "female" as particular kinds of subjects. The same
thing applies to foreign policy discourse. If differences are constructed according
to the same logic in a variety of texts, we can reasonably suggest that there is a
dominant discourse.
Language, Counterinsurgency, Practice
Counterinsurgency policies have been a major element of post World War II foreign
policy toward the countries collectively referred to as the "Third World." Such
policies were considered essential within the context of a world divided along the
geopolitical lines of East versus West with each side seeking to win the hearts and
minds of those not yet fully committed to either camp. Many "conversations" have
taken place and documents have been generated within the context of specific
counterinsurgency operations. Adhering to the understanding of language outlined
in the Discursive Practices Approach, these texts provide a useful source of "data"
from which to examine the way linguistic practices actively construct world(s).
Counterinsurgency generally occurs within the context of profound military and
economic power differentials. The hierarchy of military and economic power that
exists between the U.S. and the Third World is for the most part indisputable.
What has not been previously examined, however, is the way in which language
works to construct a kind of hierarchy that may or may not coincide with military
and/or economic hierarchies. When these hierarchies do coincide important
implications follow for the kinds of practices made possible.
One of the earliest and paradigmatic instances of U.S. counterinsurgency policy
occurred in the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion of the early 1950s.12 After
independence, the Philippines became an important symbol of United States'
benevolence regarding its position as a former colonial power. They were an
important source of both prestige and identity for the U.S.13 The Huk Rebellion,
therefore, presented the U.S. with a dilemma. On the one hand, overt intervention
would call into question the sovereignty and independence of the Philippines,
which in turn would call into question the success of the U.S. effort to "civilize" a
people and cultivate a democracy. On the other hand, the "loss" of the Philippines
to communism would also mean a failure on the part of the U.S. The discourse
instantiated in response to this dilemma worked to simultaneously construct
identities and position subjects vis-a-vis one another.
Subjects of a discourse should not be confused with individuals. An individual
may have multiple subjectivities. Similarly, there may be multiple physical individ-
'20ne of the best studies on the Huk Rebellion is Kerkvliet (1977). Also see Schirmer and Shalom (1987), Welch
(1984), Karnow (1989), Shalom (1976, 1977), and Bonner (1987). It is noteworthy that Edward Lansdale, the "hero"
of the U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines, was a major figure in U.S. Vietnam policy. Lansdale was also
brought in by Ronald Reagan to offer advice on how to get rid of the Sandinistas.
'3The Philippines were also important for geopolitical and economic reasons. The reconstruction ofJapan and its
reintegration into the regional economy meant that Southeast Asia would become an important source of raw
materials and markets because Japan would be free of dependence on U.S. aid. It was deemed essential to U.S.
security thatJapan become an alternative anchor for U.S. power in Asia as China had ceased to play that role.
uals that constitute a single subject. The state, as an international subject, is con-
structed by the discursive practices of those who speak about, write about, and act
on its behalf. U.S. foreign policy practices are important elements in the production
and reproduction of the self-identity of the U.S. At the same time this identity is
created against the "other," i.e., other states. The qualities that are linked to a
"people," e.g., the "Filipinos," can become attached to a geographical location and
thereby serve as the basis for constructing the Philippines.
Analysis
I begin this analysis in a purely empiricist manner. My data is the ensemble of

statements found in the documents surrounding this particular site of U.S. foreign
policy.14 All of these documents were read with an eye toward the textual
mechanisms discussed above: predication, presupposition, and subject positioning.
Predication
Table 1 shows the predicates and practices that were linked to the different subjects.
These predicates and practices were compiled by extracting from the documents
the descriptive characteristics, adjectives, adverbs, and capabilities attributed to the
various subjects. The numbers in brackets refer to the textual source of the state-
ments. These sources are listed in the Appendix. Consistent with the epistemology
of the Discursive Practices Approach, I do not want to claim that the data in Table 1
represents the social cognitions of the participants to this discourse. Recall that it is
language itself that is productive rather than the individuals who use language.
While the predicates and practices for each subject are not identical from
document to document, there is evidence of a coherence among them. The
predicates and practices listed under Philippines and Filipinos "hang together" in a
certain way. None seem radically out of place. For example, "inept and wasteful,"
"precocious children," and "a very hard people to deal with" are certainly not
identical terms and indeed could imply very different kinds of subjects. Yet, in this
discourse there is a family resemblance among them that is indicative of a
particular kind of subject, i.e., a subject that can simultaneously be a source of
pride over progress thus far made, concern with shortcomings, fear of eventual
failure, and desire to protect and guide. The identity of the Philippines was
constructed by the tension that existed among these terms. The kind of subject
that embodies these terms is the "child." The "child" by virtue of the kind of
subject it inherently is resists closure. The "child" identity is incomplete, often
ambiguous and contradictory. To borrow from Althusser, one might say that the
"child" as a kind of subject resists complete interpellation.
The predicates and practices attached to the U.S. also exhibit a coherence. "Has
moral obligations," "a world citizen," "has credit and influence," "has benign
intentions" share a certain family resemblance. They are indicative of a very
different kind of subject from the Philippines. The United States has a firmly
established, relatively fixed, and stable identity. This identity permits the U.S. to
'4Empirical data for this study was collected from searches for relevant material from the following sources:
Foreign Relations of the United States 1946-1954, U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS)/State Department intelligence
research reports 1941-1961, National Security Council reports and correspondence 1946-1953, reports and records
of thejoint Chiefs of Staff 1946-1953, Central Intelligence Agency/Department of Defense reports 1946-1953. Other
sources include the Department of State Bulletin 1948-1954 and the Congressional Record 1948-1954. The major arena of
discourse for this study were official government texts. This was not determined a priori, but rather after a thorough
search for relevant texts.
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engage in certain practices, e.g., "noble causes," and precludes others, e.g.,
"aggression" or "coercion."
In contrast, a different cluster of attributes was linked to the U.S.S.R. While
some of the elements were the same as the U.S., e.g., "has an orbit," the cluster of
predicates that defined the U.S. was not identical with the cluster that defined the
U.S.S.R. The practices that the U.S.S.R. could engage in, then, were different from
those of the U.S. The U.S.S.R. could "spread propaganda" while the U.S. could
"build a world order." The U.S.S.R. could "coerce" while the U.S. could "protect."
The actual behavior or physical content of these practices, e.g., providing economic
or military aid and training troops, might be identical, but what the practice was was
determined by the kind of subject engaging in it. How we "know" what a practice is
and the kind of subject engaging in it is through language.
The coherence among the attributes and practices shown in Table 1 is indicative
of a dominant discourse. Similar or complementary attributes were attached to the
subjects in multiple texts. Whether the texts dealt with economic, security, or other
issues, there was a particular logic at work according to which subjects were divided
from one another. This logic was based upon a series of binary oppositions and was
operative across texts.
Since this study does not examine texts generated by Filipinos themselves or
other non-Western political actors, I can make no claims regarding other possible
discourses. It is possible and likely that other discourses existed that would resist
the kind of constructions shown in Table 1. The important point is that there did
exist a dominant discourse in United States policy circles and this was the discourse
that set the parameters for U.S. practices.
Presupposition
In analyzing these documents, one finds that meanings are dependent upon binary
oppositions. The specific content of these oppositions indicates the dimensions
along which the construction of subjects takes place. Underlying the attributes and
practices shown in Table 1, one can locate metaphysical presuppositions based
upon such binary oppositions. These binaries were the operative principles, the
logic, constituting the "deep structure" of the discourse. By operative principle, I
mean the principle according to which things are given meaning and simul-
taneously positioned vis-a-vis other things. The conceptual system upon which U.S.
foreign policy was based was organized around two guiding or core oppositions,
which structured the discourse and served as a frame of thinking, a disciplined and
economical way in which to divide self from other(s). Several other oppositions can
be subsumed under the core oppositions. These are discussed below.
Reason/Passion. The presupposition was made that there existed different kinds
of mentalities. "Asian thinking" differed fundamentally from non-Asian thinking
and was characterized by the prevalence of passion and emotion, in contrast to
reason and rationality. The existence of this rather primitive kind of mentality
made it imperative that U.S. influence be brought to bear in the Philippines. The
"theory" of two types of mentality is, of course, not unique to this particular case. It
was prevalent among anthropologists in the 1920s and 1930s and was applied to
the "west" and its others, e.g., "negroes," "American Indians," "Melanesians," and
"Australian Blackfellows" (Mudimbe, 1988:136). This is also a concrete and con-
temporaneous manifestation of the phenomenon described by Said (1978). This
opposition has historically facilitated various practices of interference, ranging
from formal colonization to more subtle forms of domination.
As noted above, several of the orienting oppositions that were prevalent
throughout the texts can be grouped under this core opposition. The most
recurring one rested on the parental metaphor discussed earlier. Filipinos were
regarded as precocious children who had assimilated the superficial aspects of the
U.S. culture but had failed to grasp its more fundamental implications (FR51, Part
2: 1561). The U.S. had to be patient and sympathetic, yet firm, in using its
constructive and guiding influence on its former ward. The ostensibly nurturing
relationship invoked by the parent/child opposition obscured and justified
practices of domination. Past practices of domination, e.g., colonialism itself, were
justified by pointing to the "progress" that had already been made. Future
intervention was justified by the promise of even greater "progress."
Complementary to the childlike attributes attached to Filipinos was that of
ineptitude and inefficiency which characterized Philippine leadership. The
inferiority of leadership was extended to non-Communist Asian countries more
generally. It remained a task of the United States to consider "means to encourage
the development of competent leadership and to stimulate its rise in the countries
of Asia" (FR51, Part 1:45). The development of the competent leadership required
of world citizens would take place under guidance of the U.S. through its "firm
patience and sympathetic understanding" (FR51, Part 2:1561).
Another set of oppositions encompassed by the reason/passion core opposition
was that of order/chaos. The Philippines was constructed as a place threatened by
disorder, whose very definition as well as the strategy by which it should be
managed was established by the U.S. For example, "management" of disorder
could not move away from policies consistent with U.S. strategic and economic
interests. Such management would itself be defined as a source of instability. U.S.
policies themselves could not be regarded as sources of disorder.
Good/Evil. Good vs. evil was the second core opposition that structured this
discourse. This core opposition formed an important element in the Cold War
discourse of which this particular case was inextricably linked. This battle for hearts
and minds involved "the most basic conceptions of good and evil" (Secretary of
State Acheson, 3/16/1950). This Manichean opposition which served to orient
U.S. foreign policy discourse worked at two levels. At one level it served to
construct the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as two distinct kinds of subjects; free
world/Communist world, moral/totalitarian, good/evil. Filipinos could then be
divided according to where they fell along this division. When it came to Filipino
subjects, evil mixed with irrationality. This particularly dangerous combination
could not just be "contained," it had to be eliminated. The Huk leaders were thus
regarded as an evil that had to be eliminated.
At a second level, this opposition worked to objectify the Philippines as objects at
stake in the worldwide struggle between good and evil. They were an essential
"part" of the Asian off-shore island chain of bases, a possible "key" to Soviet control
of the Far East, a "show window" of democracy, and "testing ground" for American
leadership.
Subject Positioning
The construction of subjects along the oppositional dimensions discussed above

simultaneously positioned these subjects in a hierarchical arrangement. This
hierarchical positioning is evident in the kind and degree of agency assigned to the
subjects of these texts. The United States, as speaking, writing, and knowledgeable
subject, implied an extensive and complex kind of subjectivity that encompassed a
whole array of interconnected ideas, values, and goals which amounted to a "world
view." The U.S. was an initiator of action, a formulator of policy, an assessor of
situations, and a definer of problems. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were endowed
with a significant degree of agency. Both were complicated kinds of subjects who
had world views, and accompanying rational and coherent ideologies. Along the
dimension of good vs. evil the U.S. occupied a higher position than the U.S.S.R.
However, when juxtaposed with the Philippines, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
became similar kinds of subjects.
In contrast, the subject position (s) available for Filipinos and the Philippines
were much less complex. Filipino subjectivity did not include a rational, coherent
world view. Support for, as well as nonsupport of, communism was based on
passion and emotion rather than on a reasonable assessment and understanding of
its tenets. This was due to the basic intellectual simplicity of the Filipino, as
illustrated in Table 1.
If we accept the premise that the attributes linked to human beings can become
attached to geographical space, then these texts illustrate the discursive
construction of a particular kind of nation-state, i.e., the "Third World state." This
kind of state is characterized by disorder, chaos, corruption, and general
ineptitude.15 At the same time, for economic and/or geopolitical reasons, this state
is needed by the U.S. or the West more generally. The "good guys," the precocious
children, must therefore be found, constructed as "the people," guided, and
cultivated to become mature "world citizens. "16
The intertextual nature of these texts becomes important here. To borrow a
phrase from Barthes (1987:135), these texts were "plugged in" to each other as well
as to other texts; other foreign policy texts, social science texts, and nonacademic
texts. Though not included in this study, even a cursory examination of social
science literature dealing with the Third World reveals that it contains many of the
oppositions shown here. This is most evident in the area of development studies,
and particularly in the body of literature known as "modernization theory."17 At
the same time, we see the reproduction of a particular U.S. identity, i.e., moral,
rational, efficient, honest.
Finally, at a more general level, these texts constructed a hierarchical structure
which consisted of various subject positions. I do not claim to have uncovered a
"deep structure" existing prior to practice, that then made possible or constrained
the practices of preexisting subjects. What I do claim to have shown is how
discursive practices themselves constructed both the subjects (with varying degrees
of agency) and the relations among them. The "deep structure," then, is no more
or less than these practices. Their significance and power is to be found in their
ability to frame interpretive possibilities, create meanings, and thereby naturalize a
particular state of affairs.
The state of affairs that was naturalized in this discourse consisted of three
subject-positions, or kinds of identities; the imminently rational, moral, and
powerful U.S., the equally rational and powerful but morally lacking U.S.S.R., and
the third kind of subject guided by emotion and passion, yet full of potential with
the proper guidance. The Huks were an example of what could happen without
the proper influence and control.
'5The theme of corruption, inefficiency, and ineptitude in Third World governments is prevalent in North
American social science literature. Jackson and Rosberg have described the "fundamental predicament of statehood
in Africa" as "its existence almost exclusively as an exploitable treasure trove devoid of moral value" (1987:527).
Gunnar Myrdal used the term "soft state" to describe all underdeveloped countries. "The underdeveloped countries
are all, though in varying degrees, 'soft states"' (1970:208). "The term 'soft state' is understood to comprise all the
various types of social indiscipline . . . (1970:208). The point here is not to say whether corruption and inefficiency
are or are not "facts of life" in "underdeveloped" countries. The point is to highlight a particular representation of
"underdeveloped" countries. Corruption and inefficiency are attributes that become elements in the identity of
"underdeveloped" countries' governments, but not "developed" countries' governments. It is significant to note, in
contrast, that corruption in American politics, e.g., Tammany Hall and big-city politics, as well as more current
incidents, e.g., Watergate and Iran--Contra, are contained within the domestic boundaries of the U.S. They are not
constitutive of the identity of the United States in international relations.
60n constructing "the people" see Weber (1992).
'7For other studies that make similar suggestions see Escobar (1984),Johnston (1991), Shafer (1988:chap. 6), and
Doty (1991).
Given this configuration of subject positions and the resultant "reality," we can
ask what courses of action would seem natural? To "do nothing" would hardly be a
reasonable option. If the Philippines were a "show window of democracy," a "testing
ground for American leadership," a "key to Soviet control," it would hardly make
sense for the U.S. to do nothing when they (the Philippines) were faced with a
"threat to internal security" and were "incapable of understanding" their own prob-
lems and solutions. In such a situation, to do nothing would mean the U.S. would
abrogate its "moral position" in the world. Thus, doing nothing was not a possibility.
".... to do nothing would result in disaster" (NSC84/1). ". . . in the context of the
present world situation there is no acceptable alternative" (FR51, Part 1:57).
For an interesting counterfactual we can try to imagine a discourse in which the
identity of the Philippines was similar to that of the U.S. We can ask ourselves if
that were the case, would "do nothing" have been a reasonable policy option? It
would, at least, have been a possibility. A subject who understood the nature of the
problems and solutions and was guided by rationality rather than passion and
emotion might not have necessitated U.S. intervention.
Shafer's (1988) study is quite telling in this regard. Shafer suggests that U.S.
counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines was largely irrelevant and the success-
ful defeat of the Huks was basically attributable to the Philippines' own policies
and good indigenous leadership. This suggestion raises the possibility that, while
not examined in this study, the indigenous Philippine discourse was quite different
from that examined here and in all likelihood created different interpretive possi-
bilities and made possible practices precluded by the U.S. foreign policy discourse.
We can pose another question regarding possible practices. In this particular
discourse, was it possible for the U.S. to intervene through the direct use of its
military might to crush the Huks? It seems doubtful. This would call into question
the "sovereignty" and "independence" of the Philippines. It would also call into
question the success of the American "experiment" that was the Philippines. As
suggested by a 1950 military report, ". . . the use of U.S. leadership should be
clothed in every manner possible with the pretense of local action and
responsibility" (Craig, 1950:4). Thus, the direct and overt use of U.S. military might
was not a possibility, either.
If "do nothing" and direct use of military power were not possibilities, then this
suggests that some other kind of intervention was imperative. The key was for the
U.S. to find just the right kind of intervention to deal with Third World insurgen-
cies and revolutions. That "masterkey" was counterinsurgency (Shafer, 1988:11).
From the approach taken in this study counterinsurgency discourses cannot be
viewed solely or even primarily as discussions about a particular situation and
options for coping with it. Rather, these discourses were productive of the situations
themselves, the Third World, and the individual countries that are part of it.
Counterinsurgency discourse is also an example of power in its productive
aspect. After World War II, with the delegitimation of colonialism and subsequent
decolonization of the Third World, modernity became a truly global project. U.S.
foreign policy in the Third World was closely tied with these modernist aspirations
and with the social and other sciences that sought to promote them. U.S.
counterinsurgency policies were in large part attempts to gain influence and
control over "development" processes in the Third World within the context of
containing the "Communist threat."'18
Power, in the Foucaultian sense discussed earlier, involves the construction of
categories of normalcy and deviance. The group of countries classified as the
"Third World" were the international deviants, the problem children that posed a
'8See Shafer (1988:chap. 5) for a discussion of the links between development policies, academic theories and
prescriptions, and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.
threat to a modern and stable international order. Counterinsurgency and other

"development" policies, while failures in the sense of defeating insurgency and
"developing" Third World countries, were successful in the sense of providing the
U.S. with a set of categories through which these countries could be known,
understood, and at least partially controlled.
In light of this, the importance of this study is not solely or even primarily to be
found in what it can tell us about this case per se, but rather in what it can tell us
about the interpretive orientations at work that created a "reality" that gave rise to
certain possibilities. In this sense counterinsurgency discourse is a productive,
political practice that socially constructs the subjects and objects that it is ostensibly
about. It thus participates in the construction of a "north/south," "first world/Third
World," "core/periphery" hierarchy. These interpretive possibilities would not have
gained the power and acceptance they did were they peculiar to this case. It is
reasonable to suggest that they are at work more generally in international relations
theory and practice that deals with the Third World.
It is important to not regard these constructions as based upon an unproblematic
foundation that simply reflects "reality." For example, if the successful defeat of the
Huks was due predominantly to indigenous Philippine policy, as Shafer suggests,
then perhaps the attributes attached to the subjects of this discourse are not
reflections of "reality" but rather illustrations of the inextricable linkages between
the discursive production of "knowledge" and the power inherent in that
production. Perhaps, in a different discourse, Philippine policy was guided by a
rational assessment of the problem and an accurate and reasoned understanding of
the situation facing them, while U.S. policy was guided by an emotional and
impassioned opposition to and irrational fear of communism.
Conclusion
I have attempted to show how a foreign policy discourse created spaces for certain
kinds of subjects. Through representational practices that relied upon a series of
oppositions and other relations a hierarchy of subjects was created which, in turn,
made certain practices possible and precluded others. I have tried to show that
given the world constructed in these policy discourses some kind of intervention
would be imperative.
I have also attempted to broaden our conception of what foreign policy making
is. The "foreign," the "exotic," the "other," with whom foreign policy makers deal,
are always being created at various sites. To the extent that similar kinds of subjects
are reproduced in various sites and over periods of time, this result tells us
something about the prevalence of particular representations that construct a
hierarchical world. Since this study has only dealt with one particular site of foreign
policy in a relatively narrow time frame, I can only claim to have shown that in this
particular case, a hierarchical world was constructed.19 What needs to be done is to
analyze other discourses in other settings and during different time periods.
19In this regard see Doty (1991) and Milliken and Sylvan (1991). Here I would also call attention to Herrmann
(1988), who examined the cognitive representations of the Third World employed by Soviet elites. He came up with
constructions of "reality" that are consistent with what I found in this study. Herrmann's study is significant for two
reasons. First, he examines a different case involving different documents, different subject matter, and different
actors. Second, the framework he used is quite different from mine. Although he makes use of documents,
Herrmann's focus is on the perceptions of elites. His study, although it did not address international hierarchy,
nonetheless supports my findings and adds credence to the notion that international hierarchy is based on more
than differentials in military and economic power. His study also presupposes a particular discourse, i.e., a social
context within which elite stereotypes are meaningful.
By ignoring the textual mechanisms at work in discourse and thereby discounting

any role they might play in foreign policy, scholars lose the opportunity to take a
more critical stance. Said (1978) poses the crucial question, "Can we divide human
beings into certain types and not suffer the consequences?" While the consequences
in the particular case I have examined in this study were not so severe as in other
cases, this does not detract from the argument being made. In light of the fact that
"realities" often give rise to policies that result in the deaths of both "us" and
"them," a more critical approach to the analysis of foreign policy practices, one that
examines the social construction of "us" and "them," is warranted.
Appendix
[1] National Security Council. A Report to the National Security Council by

Executive Secretary on "The Position of the United States with Respect to the
Philippines," November 6, 1950. (84/1)
[2] National Security Council. A Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary on "The Position of the United States with Respect to the
Philippines," November 6, 1950. (84/2)
[3] Review of the World Situation 1949-1950.
[4] Memo from Secretary of State to President, April 20, 1950. Regarding: Recent
Developments in the Philippine Situation.
[5] Memo from Secretary of State to President, February 2, 1950. Regarding:
Recent Developments in the Philippine Situation.
[6] Office of Intelligence Research Report, Survey of the Philippines,
Department of State, April 15, 1952.
[7] Glenn Craig, Military Group, Joint MDAP Survey Mission to Southeast Asia,
September 25, 1950.
[8] Semi-annual Appraisal of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to the
Republic of the Philippines. Written byJ. W. Anderson, Major General, U.S.
Army, Chief Advisor to Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 1950.
[9] Charles Ogburn, Policy Information Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, to
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Rusk, 1951. Foreign
Relations 6 (1) :7.
[10] Appraisal of the Philippine Situation by the American Embassy, August 1951.
Foreign Relations 6 (2):1561.
[11] Memo from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to
Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), January 31, 1951. Foreign
Relations 6 (1) :24.
[12] MacArthur Address to Congress, April 14, 1951, page 1114.
[13] Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 25, 1950.
[14] Far Eastern Survey, American Institute of Pacific Relations, by Russell H.
Fifield, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, January 30,
1951.
[15] U.S. News and World Report, "Philippines: Waste vs. U.S. Aid,"January 27, 1950.
[16] Memo from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, to Secretary of Defense,
Johnson, September 6, 1950. Foreign Relations 1:1485-1489.
[17] Memo from Officer in charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Philippine and
Southeast Asian Affairs, Shohan, 1951. Foreign Relations 1:1494.
[18] Memo from Charles Ogburn, Policy Information Officer, Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs, to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Rusk.
1951. Foreign Relations 6 (1) :7.
[19] Harold C. Hagan, U.S. House of Representatives,June 15, 1953.
[20] William 0. Douglas. 1953. North from Malaya-Adventure on Five Fronts. New
York: Doubleday.
[21] Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (1):46. 1951.

[22] Secretary of State Dean Acheson. "Crisis in Asia-An Examination of U.S.
Policy." Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950.
[23] Memo from J. T. Forbes, State Group, Joint MDAP Survey Mission, to
Chairman of the Mission, September 27, 1950.
[24] "The New Republic of the Philippines." Department of State Bulletin 15(376),
September 15, 1946.
[25] President Truman, United States Department of State Bulletin, July 14, 1946.
[26] Current Intelligence Weekly. Central Intelligence Agency, Official Current
Intelligence, November 20, 1953.
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Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S.

Foreign Policy as Social Construction:

ROXANNE LYNN DoTy

Arizona State University

Much of the criticism directed at post-positivist international relations

? 1993 International Studies Association.

equality, did the post-colonial United States-Philippine relationship come to be

How-possible questions are concerned with explaining how these meanings,

The Cognitive Decision-making Approach

International relations scholars who have been influenced by the "cognitive

importance of the cognitive aspects of individuals involved in the formulation of

The Social Performance Approach

Social Performance Approach differs significantly from the way it is understood in

The Discursive Practices Approach

A Discursive Practices Approach emphasizes the linguistic construction of reality.6 The

Powers to special privileges within the international community. Neorealism,

Discourse analytic methods facilitate the examination of the various mechanisms at

The concepts of presupposition, predication, and subject positioning provide analytic

What background knowledge is created in the above excerpt? The superiority of

of the European as a superior kind of subject is repeated throughout, e.g., in the

to constitute gender difference according to the same logic. We can imagine a

Language, Counterinsurgency, Practice

I begin this analysis in a purely empiricist manner. My data is the ensemble of

t biD cli 4_4

The construction of subjects along the oppositional dimensions discussed above

threat to a modern and stable international order. Counterinsurgency and other

By ignoring the textual mechanisms at work in discourse and thereby discounting

[1] National Security Council. A Report to the National Security Council by

[21] Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (1):46. 1951.

SHALOM, S. R. (1977) Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines. Journal of Contemporary Asia

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