NKS-461

ISBN 978-87-7893-554-0

Source Term And Timing Uncertainty in Severe

Accidents

Sergey Galushin1, Anders Riber Marklund1

Dmitry Grischenko2, Pavel Kudinov2

Tuomo Sevón3, Sara Ojalehto3, Ilona Lindholm3

Patrick Isaksson4, Elisabeth Tengborn4

Naeem Ul-Syed5

1 Vysus Sweden AB
2 KTH Royal Institute of Technology
3
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd
4 SSM Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
5 DSA Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

July 2022
Abstract
One set of representative accident scenarios and one set of relevant
deterministic modelling parameters that can affect Nordic boiling water reactor
(BWR) severe accident progression and the magnitude of the source term
released to the environment were identified. To achieve this, a set of activities
was performed, including review of the safety design of the Swedish and Finnish
BWRs; review of the PSA L2 for a typical Nordic BWR and identification of risk
significant accident sequences; review of severe accident phenomena and
respective modelling in the MELCOR code as well as identification of epistemic
modelling parameters that can affect severe accident progression and the source
term.
The scenario set was based on review of PSA L2 for a typical Nordic BWR
design, as well as insights from the emergency preparedness and response and
national regulators, including accident scenarios that lead to acceptable release
(diffuse leakage from the intact containment, filtered containment venting in case
of transient or LOCA), as well as scenarios that lead to unacceptable release
(either due to containment rupture due to ex-vessel phenomena or unfiltered
containment venting in case of failed containment isolation, or containment
bypass sequences).
In total, 50 MELCOR code parameters were selected for further analysis based
on the review of the MELCOR modelling of severe accident phenomena and
uncertain epistemic (phenomenological) modelling parameters that can affect
severe accident progression and the source term released to the environment.
These parameters involved in the modelling of core degradation and relocation,
fission products release from fuel, debris behaviour in the core region and vessel
lower head, vessel lower head failure, fission products behaviour in the RCS and
the containment, as well as modelling of the filter trapping, containment sprays
and pool scrubbing.
Best-estimate and bounding assessments of the magnitude of fission products
released to the environment were performed for the set of selected scenarios and
parameters using MELCOR simulations performed at KTH, VTT and Vysus
Group. A preliminary screening of the parameters and scenarios was performed
using the obtained results and proposals for further study in phase two of the
project were made.

Key words
Severe accident, Source term, PSA L2, Boiling Water Reactor, MELCOR,
Uncertainty analysis

NKS-461
ISBN 978-87-7893-554-0
Electronic report, July 2022
NKS Secretariat
P.O. Box 49
DK - 4000 Roskilde, Denmark
Phone +45 4677 4041
www.nks.org
e-mail [email protected]
 Source Term And Timing Uncertainty in Severe accidents

Final Report from the NKS-R STATUS activity

(Contract: AFT/NKS-R(21)133/5)

Sergey Galushin1, Anders Riber Marklund1

Dmitry Grischenko2, Pavel Kudinov2
Tuomo Sevón3, Sara Ojalehto3, Ilona Lindholm3
Patrick Isaksson4, Elisabeth Tengborn4
Naeem Ul-Syed5

1
Vysus Sweden AB
2
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
3
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd
4
SSM Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
5
DSA Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

The views expressed in this document remain the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect those of NKS. In particular, neither NKS nor any other organisation or body supporting NKS
activities can be held responsible for the material presented in this report.

NKS conveys its gratitude to all organizations and persons who by means of financial support or
contributions in kind have made the work presented in this report possible.

1
Table of contents

1. Introduction 4
2. Project scope and goals 6
3. Background on Nordic Boiling Water Reactors 7
3.1. Safety design 7
3.2. MELCOR models 10
3.2.1. Swedish MELCOR modelling of NBWR 10
3.2.2. Finnish MELCOR modelling of NBWR 13

4. Selection of accident sequences of interest 18

4.1. Accident sequence categorization in PSA 18
4.2. Level 2 PSA overview for NBWR 20
4.3. Release categories and sequences 21
4.3.1. Acceptable releases - Diffuse leakage & basemat melt-through (RC8 & RC9) 21
4.3.2. Acceptable releases - Filtered containment venting (RC7) 22
4.3.3. Large releases (RC1, RC2, RC3, RC4, RC5, RC6) 24
4.4. Views of national regulators 27
4.4.1. DSA 27
4.4.2. SSM 27
4.5. Summary of selection of accident sequences 30
4.5.1. KTH 30
4.5.2. VTT 30
4.5.3. Vysus Group 31

5. Identification of uncertainties of interest 33

5.1. Initial inventory and decay heat 33
5.1.1. Swedish NBWR model 35
5.1.2. Finnish NBWR model 35
5.2. Gap release 36
5.3. Early in-vessel release 36
5.3.1. FP release kinetics from the fuel before the onset of fuel rod collapse 36
5.3.2. Fuel rod collapse 39
5.3.3. Material interactions 40
5.3.4. Oxidation kinetics. 41
5.3.5. Radiative heat transfer 42
5.4. Fission products aerosol dynamics. 42
5.4.1. Agglomeration and dynamic shape factors. 43
5.4.2. Particle sticking probability 44
5.4.3. Particle density 44
5.4.4. Number of sections 44
5.4.5. Turbulence dissipation rate 44
5.4.6. Chemisorption 45
5.4.7. Condensation, evaporation and hygroscopic behavior 45
5.5. Late in-vessel release 46
5.5.1. Debris formation 46
5.5.2. Debris and molten material relocation 47
5.5.3. Material relocation in the lower plenum 48
5.6. Vessel failure modelling 48

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5.7. Melt & debris ejection modelling 50
5.8. Fuel Dispersal Interactions (FDI) package 51
5.9. Ex-vessel release 51
5.9.1. Fuel Coolant Interactions 52
5.9.2. Debris Bed Coolability 55
5.9.3. Molten Corium Concrete Interaction 59
5.9.4. Effect of ex-vessel phenomena on the containment and environmental source term 60
5.10. In-containment and environmental source term 61
5.10.1. Containment sprays scrubbing 61
5.10.2. Pool scrubbing and filters trapping 61
5.11. Summary of uncertainties of interest 66
6. Analysis specification 69
7. Results 70
7.1. KTH results 70
7.1.1. RC4A – Large Break LOCA leading to containment failure due to ex-vessel phenomena at RPV melt-
through. 70
7.1.2. RC4B – SBO leading to containment failure due to ex-vessel phenomena at RPV melt-through 76
7.2. VTT results 81
7.3. VG results 89
7.3.1. RC7A – Station blackout leading to filtered venting 89
7.3.2. RC8 – Recovered station blackout leading to diffuse leakage 97
7.3.3. RC7B – Feedwater line LOCA and station blackout, leading to filtered venting 102
7.3.4. RC5A – LOCA with failing PS function and failure to close unfiltered containment venting line 110
7.3.5. Summary 115

8. Discussion and conclusions. 117

9. Outlook 120
Acknowledgements 121
Disclaimer 121
References 122

3
 1. Introduction
Analyzing and estimating risks is an integral part of both the industrial use and the public
debate on nuclear power. At the same time, global climate change is increasing the demand
for low-carbon sources of electricity, and the nuclear industry strives to maintain and expand
its share of the global energy production. With these observations in mind it is reasonable to
expect that the need for technological advances and reduction of uncertainties in both
financial and radiological risks related to nuclear power will be as big as ever in the coming
decades.
An important part of the risk profile of nuclear power relates to so-called severe accidents –
i.e. events leading to a partly or fully damaged (melted) reactor core. State-of-the-art
assessments of radiological risks related to such events relies on estimations of two
fundamental quantities; their frequency and their consequence. As simple as these notions
may seem, their quantification depends heavily on input data as well as on scope and
complexity in the mathematical modelling used.
In so-called level 2 probabilistic safety assessments (L2 PSA), the main frequency estimate of
interest is the large release frequency, (LRF), or sometimes the large early release frequency,
(LERF). Assessing these frequencies based on summation over a large number of possible
event sequences implies, among other things, that radioactive releases (the source term) need
to be calculated for a set of representative scenario classes and compared to a pre-defined
threshold to classify them as large or not large. These assessments are typically performed
with integral plant response codes, such as ASTEC, MAAP or MELCOR, and are in
themselves subject to uncertainty, both regarding the accident scenarios (aleatory uncertainty)
and in the modelling of phenomena (epistemic uncertainty). Aleatory uncertainty arises from
the natural variability of stochastic processes and cannot be reduced beyond this level, while
epistemic uncertainty relates to our knowledge on systems, processes or parameters and can
therefore be reduced by gathering more knowledge.
Typically, the source term evaluation is performed for a limited set of accident scenarios,
using point-estimate values of epistemic uncertain parameters in the code used. Furthermore,
such analyses typically do not consider the effect of epistemic uncertainty on interactions
between physical phenomena or processes and transient accident scenarios, i.e. when different
samples on the epistemic uncertainty range can significantly affect the course of the accident
progression.
For some accident sequences, the standard practice, for the sake of conservatism, is to define
the source term as everything escaping the containment. This creates a situation where a
potentially very diverse family of realistic scenarios is represented by a set of assumed
sequences that may contribute substantially to the LRF in a typical PSA L2. In this case, the
uncertainty lies in the level of applied conservatism.
In both cases described above, source term uncertainty presents a challenge for any attempt to
develop, use or increase the level of detail in L2 PSA results and merits targeted research
solely on the basis of this.
Within the field of nuclear emergency preparedness towards severe accidents, the main goal is
ultimately to be able to perform relevant and efficient actions to protect the public. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) states on the one hand that decisions on these
actions should be based on observations of plant conditions, and on the other hand that
decisions or protective actions should not be delayed by attempts to perform detailed source

4
term estimates [1][2]. It is acknowledged that performing source term assessments with
integral plant response codes is sufficiently complicated outside of accident conditions, which
creates a need for simpler and faster tools for assessment of plant condition and source term
estimation. One such tool is the Rapid Source Term Prediction (RASTEP) methodology,
developed by Vysus Group. This method relies on a database on pre-calculated source term
scenarios together with a probabilistic Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model. The tool has
the ability to take observed plant conditions and rescale results from L1-L2 PSA using
conditional probabilities, logical relations and expert judgements. The output is a complete
list of scenarios ranked by likelihoods, which is continuously updated with any new
observations. In this way, current plant conditions can always be mapped to a representative
class of scenarios. A problem arises if a RASTEP model (or any approach based on pre-
calculated source terms) is used with overly conservative or uncertain data. Within emergency
preparedness planning, source term uncertainties therefore also come with an operational
aspect, directly impacting decisions taken in a stressful situation.
Within this project, the analysis of severe accident progression and fission products release to
the environment are performed using MELCOR. MELCOR is a fully integrated, engineering-
level computer code that models the progression of severe accidents in light water reactor
nuclear power plants. A broad spectrum of severe accident phenomena in both boiling and
pressurized water reactors is treated in MELCOR in a unified framework. These include
thermal-hydraulic response in the reactor coolant system, reactor cavity, containment, and
confinement buildings; core heatup, degradation, and relocation; core-concrete attack;
hydrogen production, transport, and combustion; fission product release and transport
behavior. Current uses of MELCOR include estimation of severe accident source terms and
their sensitivities and uncertainties in a variety of applications [10][11].
It is our hope that this project will be able to shine some light on all of the abovementioned
aspects of the source term uncertainty, for the first year of the project limited to nordic
Boiling Water Reactors (BWR).

5
 2. Project scope and goals
The overall goal of the project is to generate a body of knowledge regarding the uncertainty in
the magnitude of fission products release in case of a potential severe accident in Nordic
nuclear power plants. The work aims to provide insights into the effect of various types of
uncertainty on the source term predictions. Results of the work will be useful both for
probabilistic and deterministic safety assessments as well as for emergency response
applications.
The work is planned to be performed in two phases, where the first phase corresponds to the
work performed in the 2021-2022 period, as presented in this report.
The goal of the first phase of the project has been to identify, for the Nordic BWR, a set of
representative accident scenarios as well as relevant deterministic modelling parameters that
can affect accident progression, phenomena and the magnitude of the fission products release.
The selection is based on the state-of-the-art review of the major contributors to the
uncertainty in source term prediction and include the following tasks:
Task 1. Review of the safety design of Nordic BWR. This work is described in section 3.
Task 2. Identification of accident sequences for study. This work combines information
from PSA with additional insights related to the views of national regulators, in
particular with respect to offsite consequence analysis, emergency preparedness
and response. This work is described in section 4.
Task 3. Identification of epistemic (phenomenological) modelling uncertainties in different
stages of severe accident progression that can affect severe accident progression,
release paths and magnitude of the release. This work is described in section 5.
Task 4. Preliminary assessment of release magnitude spans using MELCOR code
simulations of the set of accident scenarios identified in Task 2, assuming best-
estimate and bounding assumptions regarding the values of epistemic uncertain
parameters identified in Task 3. This work is described in section 7. The results of
this analysis can be used to screen-out parameters that have negligible impact on
the results.
The main outcome of the above is a set of accident scenarios that are of interest from both
frequency and consequence standpoints, as well as a set of deterministic modelling parameters
that can have a major effect on the magnitude of the fission products release and offsite
consequences, including preliminary assessments of the effect of epistemic uncertain
parameters on the magnitude of the fission products in various accident scenarios.
The goal of phase 2 of the project will be evaluation of the sensitivity of the magnitude of the
fission products release in different accident scenarios to the variability in deterministic
modelling parameters (epistemic uncertainty), identification of the major contributors to the
uncertainty, as well as quantification of the uncertainty in the results.

6
 3. Background on Nordic Boiling Water Reactors
Designed by ASEA/ABB Atom, a total of 10 BWRs have been commissioned in Sweden and
Finland since the first unit, Oskarshamn 1, was brought online in 1972. Two of the original
design families, BWR69 and BWR75, are in operation today, distributed as four units in
Sweden and two units in Finland, all with planned lifetimes extending to around 2040.
Over time, these reactors have evolved in partly different directions. The configurations of the
sister reactors Forsmark 1/2 as well as Olkiluoto 1/2 are still more or less identical within the
sites, while the differences between the sites are more marked.
3.1.Safety design
The Nordic Boiling Water Reactor (NBWR) will hereby be used as a common name for
~3300 MWth BWRs designed by ASEA/ABB Atom. A summary of main technical data for
the currently operational NBWRs is given in [3].
Table 3-1. Main technical data for operating NBWRs, some numbers rounded.

O3/F3 F1/2 OL1/2

(BWR75) (BWR69) (BWR69)
Thermal power [MW] 3900/3300 3000/3250 2500
Reactor operating pressure [MPa] 7.0 7.0 7.0
Number of fuel elements [-] 700 676 500
Number of control rods [-] 169 161 121
Gas volume in containment [m3] 8300/8500 6800 7600
Capacity of system [kg/s]:
Containment drywell spray 300 360 250
Containment wetwell spray 400 N/A 120

Containment design pressure [MPa] 0.6 0.5 0.5

Containment operating pressure
[MPa] <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
Filtered containment venting
pressure setpoint [MPa] 0.5 0.57 0.2/0.5-0.6*
Unfiltered containment venting
pressure setpoint [MPa] 0.65
Containment rupture pressure
[MPa] ~1 ~1 ~1
*For wetwell venting in OL1/2, the drywell pressure needs to exceed the defined overpressure that depends on
drywell gas temperature (total pressure 0.5-0.6 MPa). The drywell venting takes place if the water level in the
wetwell is too high to allow venting from there, and the drywell pressure is higher than 0.2 MPa.

7
The safety design of the NBWRs is described further in the following.
The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) consists of carbon steel clad by stainless steel on the inside.
The reactor containment is of the pressure suppression (PS) type with vertical blowdown
pipes, and its outer cylindrical shell is made of pre-stressed concrete. It is sealed at the top by
a large steel cupola which sits at the bottom of the reactor service pool. The containment also
functions as a radiological shield to the environment. During normal operation, the
containment gas volume is filled with nitrogen to prevent ignition of hydrogen if generated
during a severe accident.
Details on the NBWR safety systems relevant for severe accident progression (and source
term) are provided below:
• Hydraulic control rod insertion: The hydraulic actuating power shut-off system gives
full insertion of all control rods within a few seconds after initiation. Should this
system fail, an electromechanic system inserts the rods within a few minutes. If this
also fails, boric acid can be added to the reactor vessel via a dedicated injection
system.
• Pressure control and relief system: This system has several operating modes and can
operate with battery backup only:
o TA Function: The spring-operated part of the overpressure protection system
will open valves stepwise, starting at slightly above 7 MPa to release steam
and protect the RPV from catastrophic failure. After a properly controlled
pressure transient, the system will continue to control the pressure to around 7
MPa.
o TB Function (ADS): Activation of TB initiates steam discharge into the
wetwell (WW) on setpoint 1 m below top of active fuel (TAF). The pressure is
reduced to a level sufficient for water injection by the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) or the independent core cooling system. The TB function is at
the same time leading to coolant being lost from the primary system quite
rapidly, which leads to core uncover.
• Emergency core cooling system (ECCS): This is an AC power driven, low-pressure
coolant injection system comprised of four independent trains, which can pump water
to the reactor from the suppression pool. The system has activation setpoints on water
level 2 m above TAF and low reactor pressure. Actual water injection will not occur
unless the pressure difference between WW and downcomer (DC) is less than 1.25
MPa and the injection capacity is, in general, dependent on this pressure difference.
• Independent core cooling system: This is, in the Swedish configuration, an AC power
driven injection system comprised of one independent train with one or several
separate water sources as well as a dedicated diesel generator. In the Finnish
configuration, this is a separate steam turbine driven injection system, taking suction
from water storage tanks in the system for distribution of demineralised water.
• Auxiliary feedwater system (AFW): This is an AC power driven high-pressure coolant
injection system comprised of four independent trains, which provides water to the
reactor from the wetwell or from a separate storage tank into the downcomer. The
system activation logics includes several different setpoints. Water injection is more or
less independent of reactor pressure.

8
• Drywell flooding system: Flooding of drywell from the wetwell is initiated to provide
cooling of melt fragmentation and debris in case of melt release from the reactor
pressure vessel. . The system is typically actuated on downcomer water level 2 m
below the TAF for more than 10 minutes, or 30 minutes after containment isolation,
depending on plant.
• Non-filtered containment venting system: This is a pressure relief directly to the
ambient atmosphere designed for LOCA events with failing PS function. It is
activated by the opening of a rupture disc at around 0.65 MPa containment
pressure. The line is automatically closed by a shut-off valve 20 minutes after
containment isolation signal. It should be noted that this containment isolation signal
is triggered individually by any of the typical conditions that are indicative of a serious
event e.g. low reactor water level, high containment temperature, high containment
pressure or triggered TB function.
• Filtered containment venting system: In the Swedish configuration, this is achieved
from the upper drywell to the atmosphere via a multi-venturi scrubbing system
situated in a separate building, equipped with a dedicated stack. Venting is activated
by a rupture disc opening around 0.55 MPa containment pressure. In parallel with this
rupture disc, two valves for manual depressurization are also installed for cases where
additional capacity is required, e.g. when manual operation of the filtered venting is an
option due to for instance favourable weather conditions.

In the Finnish configuration, filtered venting can be done both from the wetwell and
drywell to the atmosphere via a SAM-scrubber placed inside the reactor building.
Wetwell venting is possible if the water level is below 14.5 m. The drywell pressure
needs to exceed the defined overpressure that depends on drywell gas temperature. At
a drywell temperature of 293 K, the threshold overpressure is 0.5 MPa.
The drywell venting through a rupture disk takes place if the water level in the wetwell
has been higher than 14.5 m for longer than a specified time (which precludes
possibility of venting from wetwell) and the drywell pressure is higher than 0.2 MPa.

• Suppression pool: The suppression pool, located in the wetwell, is an inherently

passive system designed to limit the containment pressure by use of the so-called PS
function; Steam leaking or blown out from the primary system to the drywell will be
pushed through blowdown pipes ending in the wetwell pool where the steam is
condensed. Vacuum valves in large pipes between wetwell and lower drywell ensure
that the wetwell pressure will not be higher than that of the drywell.
• Residual heat removal and containment spray system (RHR and CSS): This is an AC
power driven system, comprised of four independent trains with heat exchangers, all
recirculating water from the suppression pool. All four loops are connected to feed
spray nozzles located in the containment. The safety functions of the system are to
reduce the containment pressure by condensing steam in case of a LOCA, to remove
heat from the suppression pool through a series of heat exchangers and to provide
scrubbing of airborne fission products from the containment atmosphere in case of
core damage.
• Independent containment heat removal and spray system: This is an EOP/SAMG spray
system in the upper drywell (UDW) that takes water from an independent external

9
 water source. It can be used to reduce pressure in the containment as well as to provide
scrubbing of airborne fission products. Water level control is provided in order to not
damage the containment.
3.2.MELCOR models

3.2.1. Swedish MELCOR modelling of NBWR

The MELCOR model of the NBWR used in this project is the further development of the
input deck originally developed for the analysis of accidents in power uprated plants [4],
mainly maintained by KTH. In this model, the core is represented by five non-uniform radial
rings and eight axial levels. The 6th ring represents the downcomer region (Figure 3-1).
The reactor pressure vessel (Figure 3-2) and the containment (Figure 3-3) are represented by
27 control volumes (CV), connected with 45 flow paths (FL) and 73 heat structures (HS). The
vessel is represented by 6 rings and 19 axial levels, with the first 10 axial levels representing
the lower plenum; the 11th axial level represents the core support plate; levels 12 and 19
represent the core inlet and outlet regions and structures; and levels 13-18 represent the active
core region. Lower head penetrations for 66 instrumentation guide tubes (IGTs) are
distributed between rings 1-5 proportionally to the cross-sectional area of these rings.
Containment leakage is modelled from the drywell directly to the environment.
The containment is subdivided into control volumes for upper and lower drywell, wetwell,
blowdown pipes and overflow pipes from lower drywell to wetwell.

Figure 3-1. Swedish NBWR model COR nodalization.

10
Figure 3-2. Swedish NBWR model CVH nodalization of the core.

Figure 3-3. Swedish NBWR model containment nodalization.

11
The following safety systems are implemented in the model:
• Hydraulic control rod insertion
o The effect of this system is modeled in MELCOR by fission power decrease
(during 3.5 s) according to a tabular function at time zero.
• Pressure control and relief system
o Both TA and TB valves as well as pipelines are implemented as a single flow path
(FL314) from the steamlines to the wetwell, controlled by a set of control and
tabular functions. SPARC pool scrubbing model is activated at the pool discharge
end of the 314-pipes.
• Emergency core cooling system
o All 4 trains are modeled by a single flow path (FL323) to the downcomer, with the
number of trains and flow managed by a set of control functions. Flow rate vs.
back pressure is controlled by a tabular function. The wetwell is used as water
source for the system in the model and the injection is stopped on high suppression
pool temperature.
• Auxiliary feedwater system.
o All 4 trains are modeled by a single flow path (FL171) to the downcomer, with the
number of trains and flow managed by a set of control functions. It is assumed that
the system injects water with constant flow rate of 26 kg/s regardless of the
pressure difference between DW and WW. The wetwell is used as water source
for the system in the model and the injection is stopped on high suppression pool
temperature.
• Drywell flooding system.
o The system is implemented as a single flow path (FL205) from the wetwell to the
lower drywell; the valves are controlled by a set of control functions. Together
with the drywell flooding system an overflow pipe is modelled connecting the
lower drywell and the wetwell to prevent lower drywell overfilling.
• Drywell blowdown pipes
o A total of 24 drywell blowdown pipes are modelled from the drywell floor to
the suppression pool. The diameter of the pipes is about 60 cm. The SPARC
pool scrubbing model is activated at wetwell discharge at the end of the
blowdown pipe. The blowdown pipes are purposed for the LOCA situations,
when rapid and large steam release is able to clear the water in the pipes, and
steam is driven into the suppression pool for condensation.
• Vacuum breakers
o Vacuum breakers are modelled as a single flow path (FL204) that connects
wetwell gas space with upper drywell to prevent wetwell pressure exceeding
the drywell pressure.
• Non-filtered containment venting system.

12
 o Implemented as a single flow path (FL361) from the upper drywell to the
environment, the rupture disk and shut-off valves are modelled as a set of control
functions.
• Filtered containment venting system.
o Implemented by a set of flow paths and control volumes (c.f. Figure 3-3). The
rupture disk and valves are controlled by a set of control functions. The actual
filtering of substances containing radionuclides is modelled by simple filter
factors based on system requirements.
• Residual heat removal and containment spray system.
o Currently modelled as two sprays (SPR2 in the wetwell and SPR3 in the drywell).
The wetwell spray (SPR2) represents up to 4 trains of the containment spray
system with 100 kg/s per train, with a possibility to reroute up to 3 spray trains to
the upper drywell. Control volume CV251 represents the heat exchangers in the
residual heat removal system and used as a water (and temperature) source by the
containment spray system and enthalpy source for the residual heat removal
system.
• Independent containment spray system
o Implemented as a single train system with flow path (SPR1) ending in the upper
drywell. The capacity is 100 kg/s assuming a constant water source temperature at
293.15 K.
The MELCOR model does not include the newly implemented independent core cooling
system. As the aim is to study source terms of severe accidents, i.e. cases where all core
cooling fails, this is judged to be acceptable.
The MELCOR model is not built to treat cases with failing hydraulic control rod insertion, as
sequences with failing reactor shutdown also require the electromechanical insertion and the
boron injection to fail, thereby rendering this core damage mode a very small contributor in
the PSA.
Note that steam lines, condenser and turbine plant are not modelled, as is also the case for the
reactor building and its ventilation system. This implies that containment rupture or bypass
cases will be conservative in terms of the source term, as any retention and delay in the
turbine system or building structures will not be taken into account.
In the last few years, KTH has developed and demonstrated a systematic approach to
quantification of uncertainty in severe accident scenarios and phenomena based on the Risk
Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology framework (ROAAM+). The approach combines
the most recent development in the areas of sensitivity analysis, uncertainty quantification and
surrogate modeling approaches. In the previous ROAAM+ work the focus was on the
quantification of uncertainty in containment failure probability. The next step in the
ROAAM+ development is application to quantification of uncertainty in the source term.
3.2.2. Finnish MELCOR modelling of NBWR
VTT's MELCOR model of Olkiluoto 1&2 was developed for code version 1.8.2 in 1994. The
model has been updated several times when new code versions have been taken into use. The
latest update was made in 2017 by Magnus Strandberg who converted the model to MELCOR
2.1 with funding from the SAFIR2018 research program [5]. Systematic checking of the input

13
deck or comparisons to current plant configuration have not been made for at least 19 years.
The model is somewhat outdated because it does not follow current best modelling practices,
and plant modifications are not included in the model.
The core nodalization is presented in Figure 3-4 (left). The core is modelled with five uniform
radial rings; the sixth ring represents the downcomer region. The first three axial levels
represent the lower plenum; the fourth axial level represents the core support plate; levels 5–
14 represent the active core region; and level 15 represents the core outlet region.
The reactor thermal-hydraulic nodalization is presented in Figure 3-4 (right). There are 7
control volumes and 10 flow paths, plus one flow path from the core to the bypass that is
opened upon failure of the channel boxes. The steam lines are not modelled as a separate
volume. Instead, the steam to the safety relief valves is taken directly from the downcomer
volume. The instrument guide tube penetrations in the lower head were added to the model
during the current project.

Dome

Separator

UP
Bypass

D Core
C

LP

Figure 3-4. Finnish NBWR core model COR (left) and CVH (right) nodalization.
The containment is modelled with four control volumes, see Figure 3-5. The biological shield
volume represents the space between the RPV and the concrete wall around it. The RPV
lower head is interfaced with the biological shield volume. In addition, the model has six
volumes representing rooms in the reactor building and a time-independent volume
representing the environment. The control volumes of the reactor building represent major
potential leakage routes from the containment to the reactor building and were purposed for
hydrogen spreading and combustion analyses. The reactor building model is not purposed to
model the entire complex RB configuration. Containment leakage is modelled from the
drywell to the reactor building.

14
 Drywell

Wetwell
Biol. shield

Pedestal

Figure 3-5. Finnish NBWR model containment nodalization.

The following systems are implemented in the Finnish NBWR MELCOR model:
• Hydraulic control rod insertion
o Reactor scram is assumed to take place at time zero.
• Containment isolation
o Closure of the main steam isolation valves (system 311) is activated by I-isolation
or at a predefined time.
• Reactor main recirculation,
o Modelled as a coast-down curve during the first 9.1 s of the calculation
• Pressure control and relief system
o Relief valves controlled by downcomer pressure are modelled to discharge from
the RPV downcomer to the suppression pool in the wetwell as four different
groups: Group 1 opens when the downcomer pressure exceeds 8 MPa and closes
when the pressure decreases below 7.4 MPa. The second group opens at 7.4 MPa
and close at 7.1 MPa, the third group of valves opens at 8.5 MPa and closes at 7.6
MPa and the fourth group is open at pressure higher than 7.0 MPa and otherwise
closed. The vertical discharge lines are submerged 4.5 meters in the suppression
pool. SPARC pool scrubbing model is activated at the pool discharge end of the
314-pipes.
o Automatic depressurization system of the reactor (314-ADS)
Automatic depressurization is initiated on any of the following three signals:
1) automatic TB signal
2) manual TB signal
3) on L4 signal lasting for the delay of 906 s.
The automatic TB signal is generated if L4 signal is obtained and
drywell pressure simultaneously exceeds 95 kPa and the drywell pressure
increases faster than 130 Pa/s. The valve opening generates a delay of 15 s. The

15
 ADS blowdown takes place from the downcomer to the suppression pool at water
submergence of 4.5 m. SPARC model is activated at the pool discharge end of the
314 pipes by input parameter.
• Emergency core cooling system
o The system 323 injects water to the Upper Plenum (UP node) and takes suction
from the suppression pool. The injection starts when L4 signal is obtained
(downcomer water level goes below 28.25 m (0.5 meters above TAF)) and the 323
pumps run until the water level in the downcomer reaches 32.25 m (= 4.5 meters
above TAF). There are four (4) pumps with each having the capacity ranging from
a maximum of 115 kg/s to zero at respective downcomer counter pressure range
from 0.1 MPa to 1.0 MPa. The initiation of 323 injection to core spray requires
also that suppression pool heat removal recirculation mode (system 322) is first
locked-off.
• Auxiliary feedwater system
o System 327 injects coolant to downcomer (50%) and to upper plenum via core
spray spargers (50%). The system incorporates four (4) piston-driven pumps that
produce constant water flow rate of 25 kg/s per pump independently of counter-
pressure up to the pressure 2.0 MPa. The signals L2 and L3 are received when the
collapsed water level in the downcomer becomes less than 2.9 m and less than 1.8
m above the top of active fuel (TAF), respectively (i.e. DC water height is less
than 30.65 m and 29.55 m). Two 327 pumps start to inject water to downcomer
when L2 signal is reached and a 10-s pump delay has elapsed. The DC injection
continues until the collapsed water height in the DC reaches 4.0 meters above
TAF. The 327 injection with two pumps through core spray spargers initiates from
L3 signal with a 10-s pump delay and continues until the DC collapsed level
reaches 4.5 meters above TAF.
• Failure of reactor lower head
o A flow path from the reactor lower plenum to the pedestal is opened when
MELCOR calculates lower head failure. The flow area is determined by
MELCOR.
• Vacuum breaker between wetwell and drywell
o Vacuum breakers are modelled as valves between the wetwell and the drywell near
the ceiling of the wetwell. The vacuum breakers are purposed to relief wetwell
pressure in situations where non-condensable gases accumulate in the wetwell thus
diminishing steam suppression in the wetwell pool. The valves open when the
pressure in 10 kPa higher in the wetwell than in the drywell. After pressure
balancing to the level 1000 Pa the valves are fully closed.
• Drywell-wetwell leak
o A small leakage between the wetwell and drywell is modelled, the leak area is
assumed to increase with drywell pressure being at least 0.01 m2 at drywell
pressure higher than 0.5 MPa.
• Drywell blowdown pipes

16
 o A total of 16 drywell blowdown pipes are modelled from the drywell floor to the
suppression pool with a submergence depth of 6.5 m. The diameter of the pipes is
about 60 cm. The SPARC pool scrubbing model is activated at wetwell discharge
at the end of the blowdown pipe. The 316 pipes are purposed for the LOCA
situations, when rapid and large steam release is able to clear the water in the
pipes, and steam is driven into the suppression pool for condensation.
• Containment heat removal and spray system
o Drywell spray starts on I-isolation signal or by manual activation of the operator.
The 322 system is also used for wetwell pool cooling in recirculation mode. A heat
exchanger aligned in the 322 recirculation loop removes 172 kJ/K/kg from the
pool water with flow capacity of 45 kg/s. The cut-off pool temperature for
recirculation cooling is 291 K. Manual starting of spray requires that the water
level in the drywell is lower than 2.5 m. The drywell spray flow rate is 60 kg/s.
o The 322 spray can also be aligned to sprinkle wetwell airspace. The flow rate is
then 30 kg/s. The initiation signal is I-isolation or manual start.
• Drywell flooding.
o Assumed within 30 minutes in a station blackout situation.
• Filtered containment venting system
o Wetwell venting is possible if the water level is below 14.5 m. The vent line
elevation in the wetwell is 17.5 m. The drywell pressure needs to exceed the
defined overpressure (to ambient pressure) that depends on drywell gas
temperature in the following way: at a drywell temperature of 293 K, the threshold
overpressure is 0.5 MPa and at 453 K the threshold is 0.4 MPa. The actual filtering
of substances containing radionuclides is modelled by simple filter factors based on
system requirements.
o The drywell venting through a rupture disk takes place if the water level in the
wetwell has been higher than 14.5 m for longer than a specified time (which
precludes possibility of venting from wetwell) and the drywell pressure is higher
than 0.2 MPa.
• Reactor building blow-off panel
o opening at a pressure difference of 2.5 kPa to the environment.

17
 4. Selection of accident sequences of interest
The PSA represents the state-of-the-art methodology to systematically identify and evaluate
the effect of failure combinations in the safety functions and barriers of a nuclear power plant.
To this end, Level 1 (L1) PSA focuses on core damage, while Level 2 (L2) PSA is focused on
releases to the environment. In L2 PSA, the identified set of accident sequences is used as
analysis specifications for integral response codes, such as MAAP or MELCOR, typically to
qualify releases as acceptable or unacceptable with regards to some pre-defined threshold.
In this way, the L2 PSA will create a categorization of accident sequences with qualitatively
similar behaviour, so-called release categories, which can be used as a starting point to assess
source terms and their uncertainties. It should however be noted that, when simulations over
the uncertainty ranges of the modelling parameters are performed, it is possible that extreme
values of these parameters may trigger threshold effects, or simply surpass an absolute
criterion on release magnitude, leading to the simulation ending up in another release
category. Identifying occurrences of such effects would in itself be an important result of this
study.
PSA results are generally plant specific. As the NBWR plants are relatively similar in design,
and since reviewing several PSA models would be time consuming, it has been judged
acceptable for this project to base the selection of accident sequences on one single example
of an NBWR PSA model. The release categorization should be more or less equal for
different NBWR plants, while frequency results may differ.
The selection of qualitatively different NBWR accident sequences is described further in the
following. The present work is limited to sequences starting from power operation, i.e. outage
events are excluded from the scope.
4.1.Accident sequence categorization in PSA
The output of L1 PSA is typically core damage frequency and the sequences of events that
lead to core damage are then divided into a number of sub-categories representing important
features for L2 PSA accident progression, the so-called plant damage states (PDS). These
describe, not only the reason of core damage, but also the conditions of the primary system
and the containment. The main attributes that are considered relevant for modelling of the
continued accident progression in L2 PSA are:
• Core damage cause (failure of shutdown, core cooling or residual heat removal).
• Initiating event (transient or LOCA).
• Time of core melt (early, late).
• Reactor pressure (low, high).
• Containment atmosphere (inert, air).
• Containment spray system status.
• Unfiltered containment venting status (activated, not activated).
• Filtered containment venting status (activated, not yet activated, failed).
• Bypass of containment (bypass, intact).
• Suppression pool temperature (warm if pool cooling fails, else cool).

The events that are represented in L2 PSA are those that may change the conditions for
retaining/mitigating of releases within the RPV or the containment. For each of the PDSs, a
subsequent containment event tree (CET) is defined, modelling the continued accident

18
progression. The accident progression sequences are influenced both by manual actions and
by various physical phenomena that can affect containment integrity and magnitude of the
release to the environment. Their end-states are named release categories (RC).
The RCs can be defined in different ways, for example by release size or type of sequence.
The usual approach is to use the sequence type, because then only a limited amount of
verifying deterministic calculations needs to be considered in the underlying deterministic
analysis. For the sequence type approach, the characterization is typically based on:
• Release path (containment bypass, containment rupture, filtered release, leakage).
• Timing of release (early, late).
• Initiator (pipe rupture, transient).
• Containment spray established (yes/no).

The main outcomes of L2 PSA analysis are the estimates of the frequencies and magnitudes
of different types of releases of radioactive materials to the environment for each release
category. Typical NBWR release categories are summarized in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Summary of release categories for the Nordic BWR.
Release Category Description
RC1 Severe accident initiated by a transient. Containment sprays. Early
containment failure.
RC2 Containment bypass due to IS-LOCA.
RC3 Containment bypass due to unisolated RPV (failure to close main
steam or main feedwater isolation valves).
RC4 Severe accident initiated by a transient or LOCA. Containment failure
due to a containment phenomenon.
RC5 Severe accident initiated by a LOCA. Early containment failure 1. No
containment sprays.
RC6 Severe accident initiated by a transient. Early containment failure 2. No
containment sprays.
RC7 Intact containment. Release through FCV
RC8 Diffuse leakage.
RC9 Containment melt-through.
It should be noted that RC7 and RC8 together make up the vast majority of typical PSA L2
outcomes.
Furthermore, the L2 PSA provides insight into severe accident progression and plant specific
vulnerabilities in the safety design, i.e. it determines how severe accidents can challenge the
containment and identify major containment failure mechanisms.

1
Containment failure due to overpressurization or failure to isolate the containment.
2
Containment failure due to overpressurization or failure to isolate the containment.

19
 4.2.Level 2 PSA overview for NBWR
In a typical NBWR power operation L2 PSA, there are mainly 6 release categories that
contribute to the unacceptable release frequency - URF3, see Figure 4-1. Furthermore, 5 out of
6 URF RCs also have significant contribution to the large early release frequency - LERF4,
see Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-1. NBWR unacceptable release frequency distribution example.

Figure 4-2. NBWR LERF distribution example.

From these pie charts, it is clear that these results for both URF and LERF are majorly
represented by the sequences where containment is bypassed, either due to an interfacing
system LOCA (IS-LOCA) or due to an unisolated reactor pressure vessel (e.g. transients or
LOCAs with open MSIVs).
It should be noted that for the bypass sequences, a standard practice is to define the source
terms as everything escaping the containment. This creates a situation where a potentially
very diverse family of realistic containment bypass scenarios is represented by a set of
assumed sequences that contribute substantially to LERF in a typical PSA L2.

3
Releases over 0,1 % of the inventory of the caesium isotopes Cs-134 and Cs-137 in a core of 1800 MWTh,
excluding noble gases, which corresponds to a release of 160 TBq of Cs-134 and of 103 TBq of Cs-137 [6].
4
Unmitigated releases from the containment in such a time frame prior to effective evacuation of the close-in
population such that there is a potential for early health effects [7]Error! Reference source not found..

20
The RCs that have significant contribution to the acceptable release frequency are represented
in Figure 4-3. The major contributors to acceptable releases are the sequences where release
of radioactive materials will occur through the filtered containment venting system (FCV) or
via diffuse leakage. It should be noted that the identification of these RCs as acceptable
releases is dependent on integral response code and other modelling assumptions, e.g.
regarding the extent of diffuse leakage and the efficiency of the filtered containment venting
system.

Figure 4-3. NBWR acceptable release frequency example.

4.3. Release categories and sequences

The studied release categories and their typical accident sequence progressions are described
in detail in the following. Sequence specific areas of interest regarding source term
uncertainty are identified. Also, it is stated whether typical integral plant response codes
model the full release path to the environment or not.
4.3.1. Acceptable releases - Diffuse leakage & basemat melt-through (RC8 & RC9)
RC8 – Diffuse leakage. Typical sequence: Station blackout with recovery of water
injection.
The accident is initiated by a station blackout that results in complete loss of all safety
equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual heat
removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor shutdown,
containment isolation, safety relief valves and automatic depressurization systems are
assumed to work, activated according to the control logic. Flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wet well for ex-vessel debris coolability is initiated according to the control
logic. Water injection to the core is recovered early enough to prevent the need for
containment depressurization.
Uncertainties of interest:
Uncertainties relating to timings and margin to onset of phenomena and/or need for
containment depressurization are of interest.
Typical PSA supporting integral plant response code models do not represent the full release
path to the atmosphere, since retention in the reactor building or building ventilation systems
are not explicitly modelled.

21
RC9 – Basemat melt-through. Typical sequence: Station blackout with non-coolable
debris in lower drywell.
The accident is initiated by a station blackout that results in complete loss of all safety
equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual heat
removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor shutdown,
containment isolation, safety relief valves and automatic depressurization systems are
assumed to work, activated according to the control logic. Flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wet well for ex-vessel debris coolability fails or is insufficient. Independent
containment sprays can be credited in the sequence.
In principle, any sequence with RPV melt-through where flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wet well fails or ex-vessel debris coolability is not achieved will ultimately
lead to the melt penetrating the containment floor.
Uncertainties of interest:
Uncertainties relating to timing and possible need for containment depressurization are of
interest. Uncertainties related to FCI phenomena at RPV melt through. Debris behaviour in
the lower drywell. Effect of water pool temperature at RPV melt through (e.g. delayed SBO
sequences).
Typical PSA supporting simulations do not represent the full release path to the atmosphere,
since retention in the reactor building or building ventilation systems after basemat melt-
through are not explicitly modelled.
4.3.2. Acceptable releases - Filtered containment venting (RC7)
RC7. Typical sequence A: Station blackout with filtered containment venting.
The accident is initiated by a station blackout that results in complete loss of all safety
equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual heat
removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor shutdown,
containment isolation, safety relief valves and automatic depressurization systems are
assumed to work, activated according to the control logic. Flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wet well for ex-vessel debris coolability is initiated according to the control
logic. No containment failure due to FCI phenomena at RPV melt-through. The filtered
containment venting system (FCV) rupture disc will burst around 0.55 MPa pressure in the
upper drywell, depending on exact conditions in the relief line.
Independent containment spray system may or may not be credited.
Uncertainties of interest: Uncertainties relating to timing of events (such as FCV opening),
potential effect of independent containment sprays and RCS depressurization are of interest.
Effect of FCI phenomena at RPV melt-through.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do represent the full release path to the atmosphere if the
filtered containment venting system is explicitly modelled.

RC7. Typical sequence B: Large break LOCA with filtered containment venting.
The accident is initiated by a large break LOCA. All water injection to the core and residual
heat removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor
shutdown, containment isolation, safety relief valves and automatic depressurization systems

22
are assumed to work, activated according to the control logic. Flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wet well for ex-vessel debris coolability is initiated according to the control
logic. No containment failure due to FCI phenomena at RPV melt-through. The filtered
containment venting system (FCV) rupture disc will burst around 0.55 MPa pressure in the
upper drywell, depending on exact conditions in the relief line.
Independent containment spray system may or may not be credited.
Uncertainties of interest: Uncertainties relating to timing of events (such as FCV opening),
potential effect of independent containment sprays. Effect of FCI phenomena at RPV melt-
through.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do represent the full release path to the atmosphere if the
filtered containment venting system is explicitly modelled.

RC7. Typical sequence C: ATWS with main and auxiliary feedwater systems
unavailable – filtered release
ATWS in this context refers to any initiating event followed by failed insertion of control rods
and failed boric acid injection. Safety relief valves and automatic depressurization systems are
activated according to the standard control logic. Containment sprays and emergency core
cooling systems are available initially but switched off due to elevated temperature in the
suppression pool. Successful isolation of the containment. Flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wet well for ex-vessel debris coolability is initiated according to the standard
control logic. No containment phenomena at RPV melt through. Automatic activation of FCV
via rupture disk with manual opening of an additional valve in the FCV system in order to
prevent overpressurization.
Uncertainties of interest: Uncertainties relating to timing of events (such as manual FCV
opening) and the effect of containment sprays are of interest.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do represent the full release path to the atmosphere.

RC7. Typical sequence D: Loss of ultimate heat sink – filtered release.

A loss of the ultimate heat sink leads to reactor shutdown and initially operating auxiliary
feedwater system. The suppression pool is however heated due to deposited residual heat and
the loss of ultimate heat sink. When the temperature of the water in the suppression pool
reaches the setpoint value, the auxiliary feedwater stops automatically. Thereafter, connection
failure (or depletion) of the auxiliary feedwater external water source is assumed. The
automatic depressurization system and flooding of the lower drywell (LDW) from the wetwell
for ex-vessel debris coolability are initiated according to the standard control logic.
If no phenomena fail the containment at RPV melt-through, the sequence typically leads to
opening of the filtered containment venting system. The independent containment spray
system may or may not be used.

Uncertainties of interest: Uncertainties relating to timing of events (such as FCV opening)

and the effect of containment sprays are of interest.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do represent the full release path to the atmosphere.

23
 4.3.3. Large releases (RC1, RC2, RC3, RC4, RC5, RC6)
RC1. Typical sequence A (B): SBO with failed isolation of containment overpressure
protection line, with independent containment spray.
The accident is initiated by a station blackout that results in complete loss of all safety
equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual heat
removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor shutdown
and safety relief systems are activated according to the standard control logic (activation of
automatic depressurization system in Sequence B). Failed isolation of the containment
overpressure protection line. Flooding of the lower drywell (LDW) from the wetwell for ex-
vessel debris coolability is initiated according to the standard control logic. No containment
failure due to FCI phenomena at RPV melt-through but the rupture disk in the containment
overpressure protection line is assumed to open at RPV melt-through. The independent
containment spray system is started and operated in accordance with EOP/SAMG
instructions.
Uncertainties of interest: Transition from high pressure to low pressure scenario (e.g. due to
safety relief valves stuck open5), number of trains of containment spray in the drywell (in case
of recovery), FCI phenomena at RPV melt through and its effect on containment pressure
response (is it possible to avoid rupture disk opening at RPV melt through?). Potential effect
on RC category: Transition of RC category from RC1 to RC7 or RC8 (with sprays6).
Typical PSA supporting simulations do represent the full release path to the atmosphere.

RC2. Typical sequence: Unisolated break outside the containment in the shutdown
cooling system (IS-LOCA).
An unisolated pipe break occurs outside of the containment, in the shutdown cooling system
creating an IS-LOCA. Coolant is lost through the break until all available water sources are
depleted. The exact source term release path will depend on the location of the break.
Uncertainties of interest:
Uncertainties regarding timing are of interest.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do not model the full release path to the atmosphere
(typical representative deterministic calculations are performed for an unisolated LOCA in the
main steamlines outside the containment).

RC3. Typical sequence: SCRAM with failed main feedwater, auxiliary feed water
system available, failed ADS and failure to isolate main steam lines.
Uncertainties of interest:
For PSA, these sequences are typically added to the large release frequency. In reality, the
release will (at least initially) end up in the condenser and feedwater system.

5
Note that in typical PSA applications no positive credit is given for failed safety functions.
6
RC8 with sprays is a separate release category according to PSA L2 for Nordic BWR, but the contribution to
URF is below the cut-off frequency used in the analysis.

24
Uncertainties regarding fission product retention in the condenser and feedwater system are of
interest.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do not model the full release path to the atmosphere
(typical representative deterministic calculations are performed for an unisolated LOCA in the
main steamlines outside the containment).

RC4. Typical sequence: A Large Break LOCA (B SBO with RCS depressurization),
containment failure due to phenomena at RPV melt-through.
The accident is initiated by (a) a LBLOCA (b) station blackout, that results in complete loss
of all safety equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual
heat removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor
shutdown, safety relief, automatic depressurization system and flooding of the lower drywell
(LDW) from the wetwell for ex-vessel debris coolability are all initiated according to their
standard control logic. The containment fails due to an ex-vessel steam explosion at RPV
melt-through.
Uncertainties of interest: Uncertainties regarding timing of events, probability and magnitude
of phenomena are of interest.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do not model the full release path to the atmosphere.

RC5. Typical sequence A (B): Large LOCA with failing PS function and early
containment failure due to overpressurization.
A large or medium size LOCA occurs with the PS function being severely deteriorated. This
leads to an early overpressurization of the containment.
Sequence A: The rupture disc in the containment overpressure protection line will open
around 0,65 MPa. Core cooling systems and isolation of the containment overpressure
protection line (normally closing 20 minutes after containment isolation signal) are assumed
to fail.
Sequence B: The rupture disk in the containment overpressure protection line fails to open
(due to mechanical failure of the rupture disk, erroneous base position or spurious closure of
the isolation valves), leading to early containment failure due to overpressurization.
Containment spray may or may not be used.
Uncertainties of interest:
Uncertainties relating to timings are of interest in case of containment rupture due to
overpressure, as well as the effect of the filtered containment venting system and degree of PS
function deterioration needed to lead to overpressurization of the containment.
Typical PSA supporting simulations do represent the full release path to the atmosphere for
sequence A but do not for sequence B.

RC6. Typical Sequence A: SBO with failed isolation of containment overpressure

protection line and failed independent containment spray
The accident is initiated by a station blackout that results in complete loss of all safety
equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual heat

25
removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor shutdown,
safety relief systems and automatic depressurization system are activated according to the
standard control logic. Failed isolation of the containment overpressure protection line.
Flooding of the lower drywell (LDW) from the wetwell for ex-vessel debris coolability is
initiated according to the standard control logic. No containment failure due to FCI
phenomena at RPV melt-through but the rupture disk in the containment overpressure
protection line assumed to open. Independent containment sprays are considered unavailable.
Uncertainties of interest:
Transition from high pressure to low pressure scenario (e.g. due to safety relief valves stuck
open7), FCI phenomena at RPV melt-through and its effect on containment pressure response,
i.e. regarding whether the opening of containment overpressure protection line at RPV melt-
through can be avoided.

RC6. Typical Sequence B: SBO with failed containment depressurization via FCV
system and failed independent containment spray
The accident is initiated by a station blackout that results in complete loss of all safety
equipment that requires AC power, i.e. all water injection to the core and residual heat
removal systems are considered unavailable during the whole sequence. Reactor shutdown,
safety relief systems, containment isolation and flooding of the lower drywell (LDW) from
the wetwell for ex-vessel debris coolability are all initiated according to the standard control
logic. The filtered containment venting system is assumed to fail (due to mechanical failure of
the rupture disk, erroneous base position, or spurious closure of the isolation valves, together
with failed or too little time available for manual actions). Containment assumed to fail early
due to overpressurization. Independent containment sprays are considered unavailable.
Uncertainties of interest:
Timing of events. Transition from HP to LP scenario (e.g. due to safety relief valves stuck
open8).
Typical PSA supporting simulations do not model the full release path to the atmosphere.

RC6: Typical Sequence C: ATWS with failed isolation of main feed water lines.
ATWS (failed insertion of control rods and boric acid injection) with available main
feedwater system (due to failed isolation of main feed water lines). Automatic
depressurization, auxiliary feed water and emergency core cooling systems are activated
according to control logic. The auxiliary feedwater is switched to external water source after a
while due to elevated suppression pool temperature. Successful isolation of the main steam
lines and containment overpressure protection line.
After a while, all systems using the suppression pool as a water source will stop due to high
temperature. Core cooling is lost due to this or due to depletion of the external auxiliary
feedwater source, whichever occurs last. Independent containment spray may be used but it is

7
Note that in typical PSA applications no positive credit is given for failed safety functions.
8
Note that in typical PSA applications no positive credit is given for failed safety functions.

26
assumed that both this and the filtered venting fails to prevent containment overpressurization,
which occurs before the onset of core damage.
Uncertainties of interest:
Timing of manual activation of an additional valve in the filtered venting system on pressure
development in the containment together with the effect of water injection systems (e.g.
sequences with main feed water (due to IM isolation) and/or auxiliary feed water systems
unavailable typically lead to RC7 release category in PSA L2 for Nordic BWR).
Typical PSA supporting simulations do not model the full release path to the atmosphere.
4.4.Views of national regulators

4.4.1. DSA
In general, DSA has interest in accident sequences initiated by large break LOCAs and/or
station blackout. Associated to (and depending on) these initiating events, DSA proposed that
the project should consider uncertainty in the following functions and phenomena:
• Status of the primary circuit and automatic depressurization. Flow blocking by core
melt.
• Availability and timing of emergency core cooling and auxiliary feedwater, including
auxiliary water storage tanks.
• Core heat transfer after uncovered fuel
• Status of the containment isolation – unfiltered release via containment overpressure
protection system line
• Containment spray system unavailable
• Status of the containment integrity – Containment pressures above 0,65 MPa
Furthermore, DSA expressed interest in differences between the Swedish SSM-KTH
MELCOR model for Nordic BWR and the Finnish VTT model for OL1/2.
4.4.2. SSM
General
From a general knowledge standpoint, relating to studies typically performed as part of the
safety analysis report (SAR) deterministic analysis sections, SSM are interested in sequences
that may enhance understanding of source term uncertainties which relate specifically to core
degradation and containment phenomena.
PSA
From a PSA perspective, SSM notes that typical release categories cover many possible
scenarios, with possibly quite different source terms. This motivates some focus on “cliff-
edge studies” of how large parameter variations (and resulting source term variations) can be
made without making the sequence “jump” to another release category. Examples:
• How large can a diffuse leakage scenario be before changing to a filtered release
scenario?

27
 • How large can a filtered release scenario be before surpassing design capacity of the
filtered venting system? (E.g. after failed reactor shutdown, extensive containment
water filling or other deteriorating conditions.)
• How much source term overlap is there between sequences with and without
containment spray when varying other parameters?
• How much PS function deterioration is needed for opening of containment
overpressure protection in case of LOCA?
Emergency preparedness & response
In Sweden new emergency planning zones and distances will become operational as of 1 July
2022. These emergency planning zones and distances are based on the report 2017:27e
Review of Swedish emergency planning zones and distances. Two scenarios form the basis for
the emergency planning zones and distances. The two scenarios both represent severe
accidents involving core meltdown and vessel melt-through. In the first scenario (FILTRA),
the mitigation systems function in accordance with regulatory requirements and releases pass
via the filtered containment venting system. In the second scenario (100xFILTRA), the
mitigation systems malfunction and the reactor containment leak tightness is lost in
connection with vessel melt-through. The later scenario corresponds to a conceivable worst-
case scenario in terms of release magnitude from a Swedish nuclear power reactor.

The scenarios were analysed by both GRS in Germany using MELCOR and the licensees of
Swedish nuclear power plants using MAAP. The differences between source terms for
different reactor types (BWR and PWR), produced using the same computer code for
analysis, are comparable with the differences between source terms produced using different
computer codes for the same reactor type. With the exceptions of release height and
distribution of iodine forms in the release, the assessment is that it is unwarranted to use
different representative source terms for BWR and PWR. Moreover, the differences in
thermal power between the reactors that will remain in operation over the next few years in
Sweden are not of a magnitude warranting production of different representative source terms
for reactors with different thermal power output. Thus, the overall conclusion is that all
Swedish reactors can be represented by the same source terms in relation to emergency
preparedness and response.

The scenarios and the associated source terms are believed to be reasonably conservative. The
source term for the worst-case scenario (100xFILTRA) is on a par with the source terms used
by IAEA in EPR NPP Public protective action (2013) and Germany in their review of
emergency response management in the vicinity of NPPs (H. Walter et.al, 2015). This is
despite the fact that the German scenario is quite different from the one used in Sweden. The
source term for the worst-case scenario (100xFILTRA) is also on a par with the total
atmospheric release from reactors 1 to 3 at Fukushima Daiichi (IAEA, The Fukushima
Daiichi Accident, 2015). The source term for the scenario with functioning mitigation systems
(FILTRA) is also thought to be reasonably conservative. The filtered containment venting
systems are designed to be substantially more efficient in reducing the release of key nuclides
as compared to the regulatory requirements used by SSM in the assessment. The two
scenarios and the development of the source terms are described in detail in Appendix 3 to the
report 2017:27e Review of Swedish emergency planning zones and distances.

28
To determine the radial extension of the new emergency planning zones and distances, a
reference level of 20 mSv effective dose was used for the scenario with functioning mitigation
systems (FILTRA) and a reference level of 100 mSv effective dose was used for the worst-
case scenario (100xFILTRA). As it turned out, the worst-case scenario (100xFILTRA) and a
reference level of 100 mSv annual effective dose is limiting for the radial extension of all
planning zones and distances. This opens up possibilities to develop emergency arrangements
within the zones and distances enabling a lower reference level of 20 mSv to be used for
lower release magnitudes.

In practice, three release magnitude intervals are used FILTRA, 10xFILTRA and
100xFILTRA. The release magnitudes for all nuclides with the exception of noble gases are
10 and 100 times larger for 10xFILTRA and 100xFILTRA respectively as compared to
FILTRA. All noble gases are always assumed to be released. The reason not to use more
release magnitude intervals is twofold. First, emergency arrangements within the emergency
planning zones cannot be too fragmented and still be efficient. The second reason to use a
limited number of release magnitude intervals is the large uncertainties associated with severe
nuclear emergencies. Placing a possible release magnitude within one of the release
magnitude intervals may, however, be possible under certain circumstances. An example
would be an accident in which the filtered containment venting system is operational and
where it is likely that a release will pass via the filter.

Sensitivity studies performed with scenarios that could be more challenging than the worst-
case scenario indicate that the distances used before and during release are robust. The
sensitivity studies include events having a brief period of forewarning, events affecting fuel
pools and events involving simultaneous releases from several reactors at the same NPP.
Common for these events is that more far-reaching protective actions are not feasible without
jeopardizing the efficiency to implement protective actions at shorter distances. However, it
may be more challenging to keep residual doses below 100 mSv annual effective dose for
these events. The sensitivity studies are described in detail in Appendix 3 to the report
2017:27e Review of Swedish emergency planning zones and distances.

The fact that SSM uses three release magnitude intervals with regard to emergency
preparedness and response has resulted in an intense focus on the time to release trying to
answer the question: How much time does the rescue commander have to implement
protective actions?

From an emergency preparedness and response perspective it would thus be interesting to

perform sensitivity analysis that results in:
• changing the release magnitude from one interval to another e.g. from FILTRA to
10xFILTRA
• changing the time to release from e.g. 6 h to 12 h or 12 h to 24 h.

Large releases
SSM areas of interest relating to large releases include intersystem LOCAs, outside
containment steam line breaks or bypass cases to the turbine. It is understood that these will
however require structures and/or systems outside of the containment to be modelled in more
detail compared to what has currently been done in typical MELCOR input decks.

29
4.5. Summary of selection of accident sequences

4.5.1. KTH
• Option 1 (RC4A – Large release due to containment failure due to phenomena)
o Main assumptions:
§ Containment fails due to FCI phenomena at/after RPV melt-through
§ Flooding of the LDW is initiated according to standard control logic.
o Sequence description:
▪ Sequence initiated by a LB-LOCA. All water injection and containment
spray systems are unavailable during the whole transient. Fission
products pass trough the suppression pool until RPV melt-through.
Containment fails due to ex-vessel steam explosion or basemat melt-
through.
o Suggestions for specific uncertainty studies (accident sequence variability):
▪ Possibility of containment failure due to ex-vessel steam explosion.
▪ Possibility of containment failure due to basemat melt-through,
possibility of release via containment filtered venting system due to
melt resolidification and plugging in the cable penetrations located in
the LDW floor.
• Option 2 (RC4B – Large release due to containment failure due to phenomena)
o Main assumptions:
§ Containment fails due to FCI phenomena at/after RPV melt-through
§ Flooding of the LDW is initiated according to standard control logic.
o Sequence description:
▪ Sequence initiated by a SBO with successful (unsuccessful)
depressurization of the RCS. All water injection and containment spray
systems are unavailable during the whole transient. Fission products
pass trough the suppression pool until RPV melt-through. Containment
fails due to ex-vessel steam explosion or basemat melt-through.
o Suggestions for specific uncertainty studies (accident sequence variability):
▪ Possibility of containment failure due to ex-vessel steam explosion.
▪ Possibility of containment failure due to basemat melt-through,
possibility of release via containment filtered venting system due to
melt resolidification and plugging in the cable penetrations located in
the LDW floor.
4.5.2. VTT
• Option 1 (RC3, Containment bypass via unisolated MSIVs – as per functionality of
VTT MELCOR model for bypass sequences)
o Main assumptions.

30
 o Sequence description.
▪ Any accident sequence with unisolated MSIVs.
o Suggestions for specific uncertainty studies (accident sequence variability):
▪ as per functionality of MELCOR model

• Option 2 (RC7/8 – Diffuse leakage/filtered release in case of SBO)

o Main assumptions:
▪ Rupture disk in FCV opens at RPV melt-through.
o Sequence description.
▪ Accident initiated by a SBO with water injection/ containment spray
systems are unavailable.
o Suggestion for specific uncertainty studies (accident sequence variability):
▪ Pressure spike generated at RPV melt-through is high enough to
activated FCV (see main assumptions above)
▪ Timing of recovery of water injection to avoid activation of FCV
(release category transition from Filtered Release to Diffuse leakage).
▪ Timing of recovery of containment sprays to avoid activation of FCV
(release category transition from Filtered Release to Diffuse leakage).
4.5.3. Vysus Group
• Option 1 (RC7/8 – Filtered release/Diffuse leakage due to SBO or LOCA)
o Main assumptions:
▪ Rupture disk in FCV opens at RPV melt-through.
o Sequence description.
▪ Accident initiated by a SBO or LOCA with water injection/containment
spray systems are unavailable.
o Suggestion for specific uncertainty studies (accident sequence variability):
▪ Pressure spike generated at RPV melt-through is high enough to
activated FCV (see main assumptions above)
▪ Timing of recovery of water injection to avoid activation of FCV
(release category transition from Filtered Release to Diffuse leakage).
▪ Timing of recovery of containment sprays to avoid activation of FCV
(release category transition from Filtered Release to Diffuse leakage).
• Option 2 (RC5 – Large release due to containment failure in case of LOCA with
“initially” degraded PS function).
o Main assumptions:
▪ PS function is degraded initially, due to covered blowdown pipes after
maintenance outage.

31
o Sequence description:
▪ Accident initiated by a large LOCA with degraded PS function. Early
containment failure due to overpressurization.
o Suggestions for uncertainty study (accident sequence variability):
▪ Degree of PS function degradation (amount of blocked blowdown
pipes).

32
 5. Identification of uncertainties of interest

5.1.Initial inventory and decay heat

The initial inventory of radionuclides and their respective decay heat power generated in the
fuel represent the main hazards concerning reactor safety and severe accidents with successful
reactor shutdown. The amount of decay heat generated in high power reactors with significant
burn-up levels can lead to core uncovery and fuel damage in the time frame of minutes in case
of a LB-LOCA or a transient with loss of effective coolant inventory makeup, or hours in case
of a transient with loss of ultimate heatsink with subsequential loss of effective coolant
inventory makeup. The decay power information is therefore one of the most important inputs
for any severe accident simulation.
The production of radionuclides and the variation in their inventory during and after reactor
irradiation are governed by the Bateman equations [8]. This system of equations is typically
solved numerically by using specific computer codes (ORIGEN2/ORIGEN-S, DARWIN-
PEPIN).
In the MELCOR code the fission products and associated decay heat are treated by the DCH
(Decay heat) and RN (Radionuclide) packages:
• The MELCOR decay heat (DCH) package models the decay heat power resulting from
the radioactive decay of fission products. Decay heat is evaluated for core materials in
the reactor vessel and cavity and for suspended or deposited aerosols and gases.
MELCOR couples thermal-hydraulic processes and fission product behaviour during
the calculation [10][11].
• The RadioNuclide (RN) package models the behaviour of fission product aerosols and
vapours and other trace species, including release from fuel and debris, aerosol
dynamics with vapor condensation and revaporization, deposition on structure
surfaces, transport through flow paths, and removal by engineered safety features. The
package also allows for simplified chemistry controlled by the user. The RN package
determines decay heat power for current radionuclide inventories from the Decay Heat
(DCH) package when requested by each of these packages [10][11].
It is important to note that in the MELCOR code, both the radionuclides present in the reactor
at the time of the accident and the radionuclide daughter products contribute to the decay heat.
In the calculation of decay heat, MELCOR does not explicitly treat each decay chain, since
detailed tracking of radionuclide decay chains would be too costly. When the RadioNuclide
package is active, the decay heat is calculated for each radionuclide class by using pre-
calculated tables from ORIGEN calculations. If the RadioNuclide package is not active, the
whole-core decay heat is computed from one of several possible user-specified calculations
[10][11].
The MELCOR code DCH package models the decay heat power as a function of time and the
total initial inventories of individual elements. The default decay heat curves and inventories
were obtained from ORIGEN calculations (see ref [1] in DCH Package manual [10]).
The base case ORIGEN run for a BWR used the following assumptions [10]:
• 3578 MWt General Electric BWR,
• five types of assembly groups,

33
 • initial enrichment for assemblies, either 2.83% or 2.66% U-235, depending on
assembly group,
• assemblies in core for either 3 or 4 years, depending on assembly group,
• refuelled annually,
• 80% capacity factor.
Within the RN package, daughter isotopes are assumed to be transported along with the
parents. Thus, the daughter products are assumed to retain the physical characteristics of their
parents. This assumption may not be appropriate in some cases, but the ORIGEN analyses
showed that the decay heat from the parent elements is generally much greater than that of the
daughter products. Because of these considerations, the decay heat of an element’s daughter
products is included in the decay heat tabulation for the parent element [10][11].
In general, mass inventories of elements are sensitive to fuel burnup and reactor design.
Therefore, two default mass inventories are included in the DCH package for the
representative BWR and PWR used in the ORIGEN calculations. The inventory masses of the
elements, normalized to grams per unit of reactor operating power (for the PWR and for the
BWR), were given by ORIGEN at four times in the equilibrium fuel cycle: start-of-cycle,
one-third point, two-thirds point, and end-of-cycle [10][11].
The radioactive elements treated by the DCH package are further grouped into chemical
classes for tracking by the RN package. Table 5-1 lists the default classes treated by the RN
and DCH packages. The remaining elements that do not contribute significant decay heat (<
1%) are enclosed in parentheses [10][11].
Table 5-1. Default Radionuclide Classes and Member Elements [10][11].
Class number and name Member elements
1. Noble gases Xe, Kr, (Rn), (He), (Ne), (Ar), (H), (N)
2. Alkali Metals Cs, Rb, (Li), (Na), (K), (Fr), (Cu)
3. Alkaline Earths Ba, Sr, (Be), (Mg), (Ca), (Ra), (Es), (Fm)
4. Halogens I, Br, (F), (Cl), (At)
5. Chalcogens Te, Se, (S), (O), (Po)
6. Platinoids Ru, Pd, Rh, (Ni), (Re), (Os), (lr), (Pt), (Au)
7. Transition Metals Mo, Tc, Nb, (Fe), (Cr), (Mn), (V), (Co), (Ta), (W)
8. Tetravalents Ce, Zr, (Th), Np, (Ti), (Hf), (Pa), (Pu), (C)
9. Trivalents La, Pm, (Sm), Y, Pr, Nd, (Al), (Sc), (Ac), (Eu), (Gd), (Tb),
(Dy), (Ho), (Er), (Tm), (Yb), (Lu), (Am), (Cm), (Bk), (Cf)
10. Uranium U
11. More Volatile Main (Cd), (Hg), (Pb), (Zn), As, Sb, (Tl), (Bi)
Group Metals
12. Less Volatile Main Sn, Ag, (In), (Ga), (Ge)
Group Metals

34
 Class number and name Member elements
13. Boron (B), (Si), (P)
14. Water (H2O)
15. Concrete (CON)
16. Caesium Iodide (classes 2 and 4)
17. CsM (classes 2 and 7)

The decay heat power is computed for each class by weighting the elemental decay heats by
the relative mass of each element in the class given by the ORIGEN calculations.
Total radioactive class masses are normally determined by the DCH package from the
operating power of the reactor and the mass of each element in the class per unit of operating
power, while RN package input generally defines only the initial distribution of these masses
in the core (masses can be distributed among core cells according to radial and axial decay
heat power profiles in the core. In addition, a fraction of the radionuclides in a core cell can be
designated as residing in the fuel-cladding gap). Until released as vapors or aerosols, fission
products within the fuel are transported with the fuel as it relocates from core cell to core cell
or is ejected to the reactor cavity [10][11].
5.1.1. Swedish NBWR model
The Swedish NBWR MELCOR model employs:
• Sandia ORIGEN model for the whole-core decay heat power calculation, at the end of
equilibrium fuel cycle (default) scaled to DCH_OPW = 3900 MWth.
• Gap fractions defined based on NUREG-1465 [41].
• SC3210 = 1 - multiplier for all ORIGEN elemental decay heat curves. This sensitivity
coefficient is a multiplier that will be applied to all elemental decay heat power curves
stored as default data in MELCOR.
The current model is sufficient for the research purposes. However, if the model would be
used for plant-specific safety analyses, the decay heat curve should be updated.
Modelling parameters to be considered in sensitivity analysis:
- SC3210: Since the decay heat is one of the most important inputs for severe accident
simulations, SC3210 multiplier for all ORIGEN elemental decay heat curves was
considered in the separate effect analysis with (i) default value SC3210 = 1.0, and (ii)
SC3210 = 1.15 to evaluate the effect of the decay heat power on code predictions.
5.1.2. Finnish NBWR model
VTT's MELCOR model of Olkiluoto 1&2 employs:
• The fission product inventories, where the decay heat of each element are based on an
old ORIGEN calculation. They are outdated, as the fuel type and burnup have
changed.

35
 • The whole-core decay heat is presented as a tabular function, which is based on an old
ORIGEN calculation. The decay heat curve is outdated, as the fuel type and burnup
have changed. MELCOR normalizes the elemental decay heats so that their sum is
equal to the whole-core decay heat, given in the tabular function.
• The gap fractions follow the MELCOR best practice recommendations [12] (5 % of
noble gases, Cs, I and Te, and 1 % of Ba).
The current model is sufficient for the research purposes. However, if the model is used for
actual safety analyses, the old decay heat curve should be updated.
Modelling parameters to be considered in sensitivity analysis:
- The decay power is one of the most important inputs for severe accident simulations.
The NRC SOARCA study considers the uncertainty of the decay heat to be about 6 %
at a fixed point in the fuel cycle [43]. The power can be easily changed by modifying
the multiplier of the decay heat tabular function.
5.2.Gap release
As stated earlier, the RN package input defines the initial distribution of radionuclide masses
in the core, specifically a fraction of the radionuclides in a core cell can be designated as
residing in the fuel-cladding gap. Upon cladding failure, the gap inventory of the entire radial
ring is released to the appropriate control volume. In addition, any release of radionuclides
from the fuel is held up in the gap until cladding failure. Therefore, a puff-type release is
usually seen when the cladding fails.
The default value (1173K) will be used and no modelling parameters will be considered in
sensitivity analysis.
5.3.Early in-vessel release
During the early in-vessel phase of severe accident progression, the fuel and other structural
materials in the core heat up and reach sufficiently high temperatures that the reactor core
geometry is no longer maintained. The fuel and other materials start to degrade (melt, convert
into particulate debris and relocate). During this phase, significant quantities of the volatile
fission products in the core inventory as well as small fractions of less volatile fission
products are expected to be released into the reactor coolant system and containment.
5.3.1. FP release kinetics from the fuel before the onset of fuel rod collapse
In the MELCOR code, the release of radionuclides can occur from the core fuel (with
nonradioactive releases from other core structures), from the fuel-cladding gap, and from
material in the cavity.
There are several options available to model release of radionuclides from the core fuel
component: the CORSOR (ICRLSE=1), CORSOR-M (ICRLSE=2) or CORSOR-Booth
(ICRLSE=3) (including revised CORSOR-Booth (Modified ORNL-Booth) model
(ICRLSE=5,7). The CORSOR-BOOTH model contains low (ICRLSE=3,5,7) and high burn-
up options (ICRLSE=-3,-5,-7). In addition, the CORSOR and CORSOR-M release rates can
be modified to be a function of the component surface-to-volume ratio as compared to a base
value, derived from the experimental data on which CORSOR is based (ICRLSE=-1,-2 for
CORSOR and CORSOR-M ) [10][12].

36
The CORSOR and CORSOR-M models are classified as fractional release rate models,
differing only slightly in mathematical form, which specify the fractional release rate of the
fission product inventory remaining unreleased up to that time. These are empirical models
that are based largely on the small-scale horizontal induction (HI) and vertical induction (VI)
experiments performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The CORSOR-Booth
diffusion model is by comparison a physics-based model, albeit oversimplified, that describes
the transport of fission products within fuel grains to the grain surface as a diffusion process
[10][12].
Based on the assessment of MELCOR code fuel release models, performed in [12], the
revised CORSOR-Booth (ICRLSE=5,-5) was accepted as the best practice for MELCOR code
analysis of severe accidents.
Furthermore, based on the discussion in [13], a new revised ORNL-Booth (CORSOR-Booth-
7) model was introduced in MELCOR (ICRLSE=7,-7). The original CORSOR-Booth model
(CORSOR-Booth-5), which calculated the diffusion release fraction for all classes by scaling
the diffusion release rate of caesium, while the modified version of the CORSOR-Booth,
instead, scales the diffusion coefficient for each RN class based on the diffusion coefficient
for caesium. For the analyses with especially long durations, such as spent fuel pool boiloff
accidents, depletion of RN Class 2 (Cs) will no longer prevent other RN classes from
releasing.
The results of MELCOR code simulations of Phebus FPT1 experiment using CORSOR-
Booth-5 and CORSOR-Booth-7 show comparable results for release of Xe, Cs, Te, Ru. The
release fraction of I2 is comparable for both models in MELCOR 2.2.14959 and CORSOR-
Booth-7 in MELCOR 2.2.17260, however slightly underestimate the experimental data.
CORSOR-Booth-5 in MELCOR 2.2.17260 slightly overestimate I2 release fraction compared
to other models and experimental data. Although, CORSOR-Booth-7 and CORSOR-Booth-5
(in MELCOR 2.2.14959) have better agreement with the Phebus FPT1 experimental data
during the transient simulation, the final release fraction of I 2 has better agreement with
CORSOR-Booth-5 model in MELCOR 2.2.17260. Release fraction of Ba is overestimated by
CORSOR-Booth-7 and underestimated by CORSOR-Booth-5, approximately by a factor of 5.
Based on the discussion above, it is suggested to use CORSOR-Booth-5 model (RN1_FP00
'RCB_HBF' – Revised CORSOR-BOOTH for high burnup fuel, by enabling ICRLSE=-5 on
RN1_FP00 record) for sensitivity analysis, since (i) the model gives slightly better estimate of
I2 release, as well as (ii) MELCOR simulations will be performed for transients and LOCA
scenarios at fuel reactor power (with successful reactor shutdown), thus we expect rather
rapid accident progression from intact fuel rod geometry to degraded/collapsed core. For
instance, previous MELCOR code simulations of an unmitigated SBO in Nordic BWRs (see
[14][15]) suggest that the time frame between the onset of core oxidation and fuel rod
collapse is ~20 min, and between the onset of fuel rod collapse and core support plate failure
is ~45 min.
It is important to note that the corresponding time windows for high pressure scenarios (e.g.,
Case B in [14]), or scenarios with loss of ultimate heat sink can be sufficiently larger, so the
effect of the differences between CORSOR-Booth-5 and CORSOR-Booth-7, mentioned
above, can be of importance for the end result. Thus, it is suggested to perform a “separate
effect” analysis, considering the CORSOR-Booth-5 and CORSOR-Booth-7 models with other
MELCOR modelling parameters fixed to the default/best estimate values.

37
CORSOR-Booth Model
The CORSOR-Booth model considers mass transport limitations to radionuclide releases and
uses the Booth model for diffusion with empirical diffusion coefficients for caesium releases.
Release fractions for other classes are calculated relative to that of caesium.
Based on the analysis of the CORSOR-Booth modelling given in the MELCOR code
reference manual [10], two sets of parameters was considered in sensitivity analysis:
• CORSOR-Booth Coefficients for cesium release presented in Table 5-2.
• CORSOR-Booth Class Scaling Factors presented in Table 5-3.
A Detailed description of the CORSOR-Booth model and modelling equations can be found
in section 2.3.1.3 of the RN Package reference manual [10].
Table 5-2. CORSOR-Booth Coefficients for Caesium.
SC Coefficient Default value [11] SA Range Units
C7106(1,1) - Low burn-up
1.0E-6 5.0E-8 – 1.0E-6 m2/s
value of 𝐷0 .
C7106(2,1) - High burn-up
1.0E-6 2.5E-7 – 1.0E-6 m2/s
value of 𝐷0 .
C7106(4,1) - Activation 2.41E5 –
3.814E5 J/kg-mole
energy Q. 3.814E5
C7106(5,1) - Equivalent
6.0E-6 6.0E-6 – 1.0E-5 m
sphere radius of fuel grain.

Table 5-3. CORSOR-Booth Class Scaling Factors: Nominal Values

RN Sensitivity Value Units
Group Coefficient
XE C7103-XE 1.0 -
CS C7103-CS 1.0 -
BA C7103-BA 4.0E-4 -
I2 C7103-I2 6.4E-1 -
TE C7103-TE 6.4E-1 -
RU C7103-RU 2.5E-3 -
MO C7103-MP 6.25E-2 -
CE C7103-CE 4.0E-8 -
LA C7103-LA 4.0E-8 -
UO2 C7103-UO2 3.2E-4 -
CD C7103-CD 2.5E-1 -
AG C7103-AG 1.6E-1 -

38
 RN Sensitivity Value Units
Group Coefficient
CSI C7103-CSI 6.4E-1 -
CSM C7103-CSM 1.0 -
To reduce computational burden and number of model evaluations in sensitivity analysis,
only CORSOR-Booth coefficients for cesium release was considered. The uncertainty in
release of other RN groups will be included through variability of Cs release, since these are
defined through scaling factors in sensitivity coefficients array - SC7103 [10][11].
5.3.2. Fuel rod collapse
Currently, the Swedish MELCOR model of the Nordic BWR employs the time-vs-
temperature model for fuel rod collapse, presented in [12]. Fractional damage is accrued in
this way locally by axial level and radial ring throughout the core. The best practice
dependence of time-to-failure as a function of temperature, enforced through user input via
tabular function is presented in Table 5-4.
Table 5-4. Best-estimate time to fuel rod collapse versus cladding oxide temperature.
Cladding Time to Failure
Temperature (K) (Sec)
2000.0 1.0E10
2090.0 8.64E5
2100.0 36000.0
2500.0 3600.0
2600.0 300.0
2700.0 30.0
Times to failure intermediate to entries in Table 5-4 are linearly interpolated. Infinite lifetime
is assumed at cladding oxide temperatures below the melting point of Zircaloy. The relatively
short time associated with 2500 K and the even shorter time associated with 2600 K reflect
the melting tendencies of irradiated fuel inferred from the Phebus experiments. Damage
function accumulation does not begin until unoxidized cladding thickness drops below 10%
of nominal values [12].
VTT's MELCOR model of Olkiluoto 1&2 uses the default time-at-temperature model for fuel
rod collapse. The MELCOR manuals do not specify the default time to failure as a function of
temperature, so it is not possible to compare the default model with Table 5-4.
Based on [16], the information obtained from VERDON and VERCORS tests showed that the
systematic fuel collapse has been observed for a temperature range of 2300-2800K
irrespective of burnup. Furthermore, the analysis showed significant effect of the final
atmosphere in the tests (VERCORS HT2 vs. VERCORS HT1/HT3, VERCORS RT6 vs.
VERDON-1, VERDON-3 vs. VERDON-4). It was observed that in oxidizing conditions the
relocation temperature was systematically lower (~200K) than in reducing conditions [16].

39
 Figure 5-1. Fuel collapse temperature of VERCORS and VERDON tests compared with melting point of
un-irradiated UO2 and UO2-ZrO2 eutectic [16].
Based on the considerations above, it is suggested to use the fuel rod collapse model
presented in the NUREG/CR-7008 [12], with scaling coefficient applied on the tabular
function to cover a wider range of temperatures of fuel rod collapse, as illustrated in Figure
5-2.

a. b.
Figure 5-2. Time to fuel rod collapse versus cladding oxide temperature.
Modelling parameter (scaling coefficient of the tabular function for fuel rod collapse time vs.
cladding oxide temperature, IRODDAMAGE record) TFFAIL = 1 with range [0.5,1.5] (-).
5.3.3. Material interactions
In the current models of Nordic BWRs, the eutectics model is disabled, and all material
interactions are captured via secondary material transport model (COR_CMT - a simple
model that allows transport of unmolten secondary materials by melt, e.g., transport of UO2
or ZrO2 by molten Zr, see COR package manuals in [10]).
Significant improvements in modelling of eutectic formations between zirconium and
stainless-steel, zirconium and inconel, as well as between uranium oxide and zirconium oxide
have been made during recent years [13]. Thus, it is suggested to perform a “separate effect”

40
evaluation of the model on code predictions of in-vessel accident progression and vessel
lower head failure.
The eutectics model can be activated by setting COR_EUT input record to ON or by
specifying eutectic pairs (e.g. ZR/SS, ZR/INC, UO2/ZRO2), solidus temperatures for the
eutectic pair (e.g. 1210K, 1210K, for ZR/SS and ZR/INC; 2450K for UO2/ZRO2 – all default
values) and molar fraction of the first member in the pair at the eutectic temperature (default
options are 0.76, 0.76 and 0.5 for ZR/SS, ZR/INC and UO2/ZRO2, respectively, see COR
package manuals in [10] for more details).
The following parameters will be considered in sensitivity analysis (Table 5-5):
• Solidus temperatures for ZR/SS and ZR/INC eutectic pairs will be represented by a
single parameter TZRSSINC.
• Solidus temperature for UO2/ZRO2 eutectic pair will be represented by TUO2ZRO2.

Table 5-5. Solidus temperature for eutectic pairs.

Parameter Default [K] Range [K]
TZRSSINC 1210 1210-1700
TUO2ZRO2 2450 2450-2800
VTT has observed that the new eutectics model causes calculations to crash frequently.
Therefore VTT is using the 2014 best practice [12] of "interacting materials" UO2-int and
ZrO2-int, with the melting temperature set to 2800 K.
5.3.4. Oxidation kinetics.
The MELCOR models of Nordic BWR employ a general oxidation model of structural
materials (such as zircaloy and steel) which is discussed in detail in the COR reference
manual [10]. The general oxidation model calculates the reacted metal mass using standard
parabolic kinetics. Solid-state diffusion of oxygen through an oxide layer to unoxidized metal
is represented by the parabolic rate equation (see eq (2-156) in [10]) where the rate constant is
expressed as an exponential function of surface temperature multiplied by the low and high
temperature range constants (see Chapter 2.5.1 in COR reference manual in [10] for details).
The default values of sensitivity coefficients SC1001-N-1 (N=1,2,3,4) for low temperature
(SC1001-5-1 < 1853K) and high temperature (SC1001-6-1 > 1873K) oxidation of Zr by
steam corresponds to the Urbanic-Heidrich model [18]). To address the uncertainty in Zr
oxidation models and underlying parameters, different oxidation models were considered
instead of considering variations in either rate coefficients or exponents (see COR package
user´s manual for details [11]), which was inspired by the work done in [20].
Four correlations for the rate of zirconium–steam oxidation will be considered in sensitivity
analysis, based on the work performed in [19][20]. The models to be used in the analysis are
presented in Figure 5-3 and Table 5-6.

41
 Figure 5-3. Zr oxidation rate as a function of temperature.

Table 5-6. Zr-steam oxidation models and parameters.

OXM High temperature oxidation model Low temperature oxidation model
1 Urbanic- SC1001-1-1=29.6 Urbanic- SC1001-3-1=87.6
Heidrich Heidrich
SC1001-2-1=16820 SC1001-4-1=16820
2 Prater-Courtright SC1001-1-1=26763.6 Urbanic- SC1001-3-1=87.6
Heidrich
SC1001-2-1=26440 SC1001-4-1=16820
3 Prater-Courtright SC1001-1-1=26763.6 Baker-Just SC1001-3-1=3330
SC1001-2-1=26440 SC1001-4-1=22897
4 Prater-Courtright SC1001-1-1=26763.6 Leistikow- SC1001-3-1=425.8
Schanz
SC1001-2-1=26440 SC1001-4-1=20962
The models will be switched using the parameter OXM = 1,2,3,4.
5.3.5. Radiative heat transfer
Radiative exchange factors for radiation radially outward and upward from the cell boundary
to the next adjacent cell (FCELR and FCELA) affect inter-cell radiation, incorporating spatial
information and view factors [10][11]. Based on the literature review [12], the following
range will be used for both parameters: FCELRA = [0.1,0.25](-).
5.4.Fission products aerosol dynamics.
During severe accidents, fission products may be aerosolized as they are released from fuel
early in the sequence and later expelled from the reactor coolant system. Other events and
processes that occur later, such as core-concrete interactions, pool boiling, direct containment

42
heating, deflagrations, and resuspension may also generate aerosols. High structural
temperatures may also result in aerosolization of nonradioactive materials [10].
In the MELCOR code, the aerosol dynamics are based on the MAEROS computer code, but
without direct inclusion of condensation or evaporation within the MAEROS solution
framework. Vapor condensation on and evaporation from aerosol particles are handled
separately to reduce the stiffness of the differential equation set and to ensure consistency
with the calculation of these processes by other models and packages [10].
The MELCOR calculation of changes in aerosol distribution and location within a plant
considers the following general processes [10]:
1) aerosol sources from other packages, such as release from fuel rods or during core-
concrete interactions, and user-specified sources;
2) condensation and evaporation of water and fission products to and from aerosol
particles;
3) particle agglomeration (or coagulation), whereby two particles collide and form one
larger particle;
4) particle deposition onto surfaces or settling through flow paths into lower control
volumes;
5) advection of aerosols between control volumes by bulk fluid flows; and
6) removal of aerosol particles by engineered safety features, such as filter trapping, pool
scrubbing, and spray washout.
The RN package includes models to simulate each of these processes, but only user-defined
aerosol sources and agglomeration and deposition processes are formally coupled in the
MAEROS integrated solution framework. See MELCOR code RN package reference manual
[10] for detailed description of MELCOR modelling of aerosol dynamics.
Based on the literature review [10][11][26][27][28][29], the modelling parameters described
in sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.7 was considered in sensitivity analysis.
5.4.1. Agglomeration and dynamic shape factors.
The models describing aerosol dynamics have been traditionally developed for spherical, fully
dense particles. Dynamic and agglomeration (collision) shape factors are introduced into the
aerosol physics equations to describe the dynamics of non-spherical particles. These
parameters are provided as MELCOR code inputs on RN1_MS00 record [11]. Real aerosol
particles in the primary system or the containment are seldom either fully dense or spherical.
So-called primary particles may agglomerate to form fractal structures but vapours
condensing on them can change their shapes. Only at a very high humidity or with steam
condensation in the bulk do the particles become spherical (droplets) [26].
In the SOARCA study, presented in [27], it has been assumed that agglomeration and
dynamic shape factors are equal to 1 (which represents a perfectly spherical aerosol particle).
The assumption is based on hygroscopic effects during the accident sequence, which will
induce some condensation of moisture on the aerosol particles causing the particles to tend
towards being spherical and limit the degree of non-spherical shapes.

43
The findings presented in [26] suggest that dynamic shape factors can range from 1 (for water
filled voids) to 4 (dry voids), depending on accident conditions.
The analysis performed in [28] considered a range from 1 to 3. Furthermore it showed that
variability in these parameters have high impact on the suspended aerosol mass in a control
volume.
The following parameter ranges was considered [26][28][29]:
• Aerosol dynamic shape factor CHI = [1.0, 3.0] (-).
• Aerosol agglomeration shape factor GAMMA = [1.0, 3.0] (-).

5.4.2. Particle sticking probability

The rate of agglomeration is affected by the probability that a collision between two particles
results in the two particles actually sticking together. Often this factor is taken as 1.0;
however, this may depend on the wetness of the particles and could be influenced by
electrostatic phenomena; like-charged particles that might otherwise collide and stick may
instead fail to collide as their distance of separation closes [29]. This parameter is provided as
a MELCOR code input on RN1_MS00 record [11]. The analysis performed in [28] suggest
that this parameter has a strong influence on the suspended aerosol mass. The suggested range
for this parameter is [0.25, 1] based on [29], and [0.5, 1] based on [28].
The following range was considered: STICK = [0.5, 1] (-).
5.4.3. Particle density
Gravitational deposition is often the dominant mechanism (especially for large control
volumes). One of the sources of uncertainty within gravitational deposition is the particle
density. This parameter is provided as a MELCOR code input on RN1_ASP record [11]. The
default density used in MELCOR is 1000 kg/m3, however the densities of materials
represented in the RN classes of interest are in the range between 3700-4900 kg/m3 [27].
The following range was considered: RHONOM = [1000, 4900] (kg/m3).
5.4.4. Number of sections
Sections are particle size bins based on particle mass. This parameter is provided as a
MELCOR code input on RN1_DIM record [11]. The MELCOR code default is 10 sections
between 0.1 and 50.0 mm in geometric diameter.
The following range was considered: NUMSEC = [10, 20] (-).
5.4.5. Turbulence dissipation rate
The turbulent energy dissipation factor, [default 0.001 m2/s3] appears in the agglomeration
coefficients in the turbulent shear and inertial terms [10]. This parameter is provided as a
MELCOR code input on RN1_MS01 record [11]. The analysis performed in [28] suggests
that this parameter has an important influence on the results and thus was considered in this
study.
The following uncertainty range will be assumed: TURBDS = [7.5E-4, 1.25E-3] (m2/s3).

44
VTT's experience from the EU MUSA project shows that the turbulence dissipation rate has
only a minor effect on the results. Therefore, VTT is not going to examine the effect of this
parameter.
5.4.6. Chemisorption
MELCOR employs a set of models for chemisorption of fission product vapours on metallic
surfaces. Based on a review of the MELCOR code manuals [10][11], when the chemisorption
option is on (provided by MELCOR input card RN1_CAF ON), it uses default chemisorption
classes defined in the reference manual (see RN package manual in [10]).
The parameters of the governing equations are implemented as sensitivity coefficient array
SC7160.
Currently, due to modelling restrictions, such as no provision for revaporization of
chemisorbed species, it is suggested to perform a separate effect evaluation of the
chemisorption model on code results. This can be achieved by standalone MELCOR
calculations for the best estimate model (default/BE values of modelling parameters and
sensitivity coefficients) with chemisorption model being activated and deactivated.
5.4.7. Condensation, evaporation and hygroscopic behavior
Fission products and water can condense onto or evaporate from aerosols, heat structure
surfaces, and water pools. Calculation of mass transfer due to condensation and evaporation
of fission product vapours is performed in the MELCOR code using the TRAP-MELT2
equations [10][11], which employ vapour diffusivity for the fission product vapours in the
bulk gas, calculated by the MP package, using the sensitivity coefficient array SC7111.
The sigma C7111(1) and E/K C7111(2) values are Lennard-Jones parameters, where sigma is
a characteristic diameter of the molecule and E/K is the characteristic energy of interaction
between the molecules divided by the Boltzmann constant [10][11]. The default values and
proposed ranges of these parameters are presented in Table 5-7.
Table 5-7. Vapour diffusivity constants, from [11].
Class Sigma SA Range (default E/K SA Range (default
C7111(1) (Å) +/- 15%) C7111(2) (K) +/- 15%)
Xe* 4.055 - 229 -
Cs, Ba 3.617 SC7111CS1= 97 SC7111CS2=
[3.0745,4.1595] [82.450, 111.550]
I2 4.982 SC7111I1= 550 SC7111I2=
[4.2347,5.7293] [467.50, 632.50]
Other (Te, 3.617 SC7111CS1= 97 SC7111CS2=
Ru,…, [3.0745,4.1595] [82.450,111.550]
CsI, CsM)
* The parameters will not be considered in SA/UA.
Aerosol particles (such as CsOH and CsI) that are soluble in water exhibit hygroscopic
properties such that they can absorb moisture from an atmosphere with relative humidity less
than 100%. This effect leads to a growth of the particle size as water vapor condenses onto the
soluble particle. An important consequence of this growth in size (and mass) is an increase in

45
the gravitational settling rate, and the subsequent depletion of airborne fission product
aerosols.
In the MELCOR model of Nordic BWR the hygroscopic model is switched ON and uses
default values of sensitivity coefficients (SC array 7170). The following parameters and
ranges was considered:
• Saturation solubility at low temperature reference for Cs – RN Class Alkali Metals
(CsOH) default value 3.95 +/-15%, SC7170CS = [3.3575, 4.5425] (kg/kg H2O).
• Saturation solubility at high temperature reference for Cs – RN Class Alkali Metals
(CsOH) default value 3.95 +/-15%, SC7170CS = [3.3575, 4.5425] (kg/kg H2O).9
• Saturation solubility at low temperature reference for CsI – RN class CsI default value
0.44 +/-15%, SC7170CSI3 = [0.374, 0.5060] (kg/kg H2O).
• Saturation solubility at high temperature reference for CsI – RN class CsI default value
2.25 +/-15%, SC7170CSI4 = [1.9125, 2.5875] (kg/kg H2O).
• Saturation solubility at low temperature reference for CsM – RN class CsM default
value 0.67 +/-15%, SC7170CSM = [0.5695, 0.7705] (kg/kg H2O).
• Saturation solubility at high temperature reference for CsM – RN class CsM default
value 0.67 +/-15%, SC7170CSM = [0.5695, 0.7705] (kg/kg H2O).10
These parameters are entered as RN package sensitivity coefficients on the RN1_CSC record.
The Finnish NBWR MELCOR model does not consider cesium molybdate; all Cs is assumed
to be CsOH and CsI.
5.5.Late in-vessel release
The release rate of fission products from the fuel and debris before core support plate failure
is affected by several phenomena, such as formation of particulate debris in the core and
debris relocation, molten material candling and refreezing on intact structures or debris, debris
coolability above the core support plate as well as axial and radial debris relocation.
Based on the scoping analysis performed in [12][14] and [15] as well as review of recent
modelling changes in the MELCOR code [13], a set of MELCOR modelling parameters was
proposed to be addressed in sensitivity analysis, and discussed further in this section.
5.5.1. Debris formation
Fuel failure and formation of particulate debris (PD) from the fuel is discussed in section
1.3.2. Once particulate debris is formed, the MELCOR code treats it as a porous debris bed,
that excludes other PD from an effective bed volume, 𝑉𝑏𝑒𝑑 , defined by [10][11]:
𝑉𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑑 (1)
𝑉𝑏𝑒𝑑 = max (𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 , )
1−𝜀

where, 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 is the total volume of material in the PD, 𝑉𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the volume of the
portion of the material that has never been melted and 𝜀 is a user-defined porosity (PDPor).
The unmelted PD forms a debris bed with user defined porosity (PDPor), and molten

9
CS7170-CS-3 and CS7170-CS-4 will be represented by a single parameter CS7170CS.
10
CS7170-CSM-3 and CS7170-CSM-4 will be represented by a single parameter CS7170CSM.

46
materials may fill some or all of the pores. PDPor – is defined by a user for all cells in every
axial level in COR package input.
The following range was considered: PDPor = [0.3, 0.5] (-).
The modelling of control rod failure in the MELCOR model of Nordic BWR is achieved by
the temperature exceeding the threshold temperature at which NS (non-supporting structure
that represents control rods) collapses, independent of the remaining metal thickness [10][12].
The recommended temperature for BWR control rods collapse as PD is 1520 K [12]. If this
record is not defined, the COR package will use the default melting temperature of the
material specified on COR_NSM record (Steel is the default).
Based on the above, the following range is proposed: CORNSBLD = [1520, 1700] (K).
5.5.2. Debris and molten material relocation
The MELCOR code calculates the radial relocation of solid and liquid debris using [10][11]:
Δ𝑡 (2)
𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 𝑉𝑒𝑞 (1 − exp (− ))
𝜏𝑠𝑝𝑟
where 𝑉𝑒𝑞 – is the volume of the material that should be moved to balance the levels between
two adjacent cells, 𝜏𝑠𝑝𝑟 – is a time constant for radial solid SC1020(1) and liquid SC1020(2)
debris relocation (see [10][11] for more details).
The downward relocation of particulate debris by gravitational settling is modelled in
MELCOR as a constant-velocity process, with user defined velocity VFALL. The code
determines (starting from bottom to top cells) how far particulate debris from a cell can fall
during one MELCOR time step. Once the lowest cell in the correspondent ring is identified,
the algorithm fills the available space, until either the debris source is exhausted or there is no
free volume available. The process is repeated recursively, updating conditions after every
iteration, for all cells in every radial ring (see [10][11] for more details).
Furthermore, the VFALL and DHYPDLP parameters are used in the falling debris quench
model, which is triggered by a failure of core support plate in one of the radial rings. It is
assumed in the MELCOR code that debris would fall into the lower plenum with user-defined
velocity VFALL, and the heat transfer surface area will be calculated based on the assumption
that the debris particles have an equivalent spherical diameter DHYPDLP. The model is
deactivated once the leading edge of the jet reaches the bottom of the vessel, which is
identified as the lowermost cell with empty volume available for PD. During the time between
the failure of the core support plate and the time at which the falling debris leading edge
reaches the lower head, the models for candling, dissolution, and radial spreading of debris in
the affected ring are deactivated [10][11].
The default values for SC1020(1) and SC1020(2) are 360 s and 60 s respectively. The default
value for VFALL is 1 m/s, however the value suggested by the SOARCA study [12] is
0.01 m/s.
Based on [10][11][12] the following ranges for VFALL = [0.01, 0.1] (m/s), SC1020(1) =
[180, 720] (s) and SC1020(2) = [30, 120](s) was considered.
The MELCOR candling model assumes that molten mass is generated at a constant rate over
the MELCOR time step [10][11] and flows downwards due to gravity. The refreezing heat
transfer coefficients for different materials (such as molten stainless steel, Zircaloy, etc.) are
used to calculate the mass that refreezes on different components below. The default values
are 1000 W/m2-K in MELCOR 1.8.6, and 2500 and 7500 W/m2-K for stainless steel and

47
zircaloy in MELCOR 2.2, respectively. Furthermore, the MELCOR candling model allows
molten materials holdup by an oxide shell until the shell is breached. The sensitivity
coefficient SC1131(2) (default value 2400 K) – defines the critical temperature (breach
condition) at which molten materials (Zircaloy) are released from an oxide shell (ZrO 2) or
local blockage (crust). Furthermore, MELCOR uses the molten cladding drainage rate,
defined by sensitivity coefficient SC1141(2) (default value 1 kg/m-s), that represents the
maximum flow rate (per unit surface width) of the molten material after breakthrough. This is
necessary since the assumption built into the candling model of constant generation of melt
over the time step is no longer valid when molten materials have been just released after hold
up by an oxide shell or by a flow blockage (crust) [10][11].
Based on [12], the following parameter ranges will be considered: HFRZSS = [1000,
2500](W/m2-K), HFRZZR = [1000, 7500](W/m2-K), SC1131(2) = [2100, 2500](K) and
SC1141(2) = [0.2, 2.0](kg/m-s).
5.5.3. Material relocation in the lower plenum
MELCOR represents particulate debris beds as composed of fixed-diameter spheres. It is
assumed in MELCOR that when structure failure criteria are reached, the structure is
converted into particulate debris with a user defined porosity (PDPor) and particle size.
Moreover, the debris porosity in every COR cell can change over time due to molten material
relocation (candling) or melting of the materials in PD with lower melting points. The
particulate debris equivalent diameter, together with the particulate debris porosity will define
its volume and surface area, which will affect the extent of debris coolability (heat transfer
surface area), oxidation (oxidation surface area), and material relocation (free volume). The
diameter DHYPDLP is also used in the falling debris quench model, to calculate heat transfer
area of the debris falling into water in the lower plenum, following the failure of the core
support plate.
Based on [12][17] the following range for lower plenum particulate debris equivalent
diameter was considered: DHYPDLP = [0.002, 0.005] (m)
In the MELCOR in-vessel falling debris quench model, it is assumed that debris falls with a
user-specified velocity and heat transfer coefficient. This allows the debris to lose heat to the
surrounding water in the lower plenum as it falls to the lower head, following failure of the
core support plate in each radial ring [10][12][11].
The following range for the heat transfer coefficient was considered: HDBH2O = [200, 2000]
(W/m2-K).
5.6.Vessel failure modelling
It is assumed in the MELCOR code that the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) Lower Head (LH)
can fail through the following mechanisms:
i. Penetration failure, when the temperature of a penetration reaches a failure temperature
(TPFAIL) specified by a user, or a logical control function specified by a user
[10][11].
ii. Vessel lower head wall failure due to:
a. Creep-rupture failure of a lower head segment, which occurs in response to
mechanical loading under conditions of material weakening at elevated
temperatures (failure is declared when the strain fraction reaches the value

48
 specified by SC1601(4), with default value of 0.18 – which corresponds to
18% strain);
b. Gross failure of the lower head segment is assumed when the temperature of
the bottom lower head node exceeds the penetration failure temperature
TPFAIL (default value 1273 K) defined by the user [10][11].
These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, i.e. gross vessel wall failure can follow
penetration failure if respective conditions are fulfilled (see [10][11] for more details).
Based on the literature review (see ([10][11][12][21][22]) the following ranges was
considered:
• TPFAIL – [1273, 1600] (K).
• HDBPN – [100, 1000] (W/m2-K) – heat transfer coefficient between particulate debris
and LH penetration (default value 1000 W/m2-K).
The creep rupture strain limit will not be considered in the sensitivity analysis, since this
parameter was identified as a parameter that has a negligible effect on the timing of the lower
head failure in the analysis performed in [15].
In this work, lower head penetrations and correspondent failure modes are only modelled for
instrument guide tubes (IGTs), since, according to [22], the control rod drive housing support
located under the vessel limits downward displacement of control rod guide tubes to
approximately 3 cm, while the thickness of the vessel lower head is around 20 cm. Therefore,
the scenario with ejection of the control rod guide tubes was not considered in the analysis.
In MELCOR model of the Swedish BWR, the total of 66 IGTs are uniformly distributed
between the radial rings, proportionally to the area of the horizontal cross section of the rings.
Furthermore, in the analysis we assume two options for IGT failure, i.e. we assume that either
25% or 100% of IGTs would fail in every radial ring (EIGT25 and EIGT100), once the failure
criterion is reached, to account for inherent randomness of the process and possible clamping
of IGTs due to, for instance, vessel lower head deformation [23]. Then the initial effective
area of the breach (prior to ablation) due to IGTs failure is calculated based on:
2
𝐴𝐼𝐺𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝑁𝐼𝐺𝑇 𝜋𝐷𝐼𝐺𝑇 /4 (3)
and the effective breach diameter is calculated:
𝐷𝐼𝐺𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝐷𝐼𝐺𝑇 √𝑁𝐼𝐺𝑇 (4)

where 𝐷𝐼𝐺𝑇 = diameter of an IGT penetration (m), and 𝑁𝐼𝐺𝑇 = number of failed IGTs in every
radial ring.
The effect of the number of failed instrumentation guide tubes 𝑁𝐼𝐺𝑇 at every radial ring when
the penetration temperature exceeds the value defined in TPFAIL can be considered in the
sensitivity analysis. The study performed in [15] showed that the vessel breach size (25% vs.
100% of IGTs in respective radial ring) can have a quite significant impact on the accident
progression. In the analysis of the Swedish BWR we assume that 50% of IGTs (in respective
radial ring) will be ejected once the temperature of penetrations exceeds the value specified in
TPFAIL.

49
 5.7.Melt & debris ejection modelling
After the lower head has failed, the mass of each material in the bottom axial level that is
available for ejection (but not necessarily ejected) is calculated. There are two options
available, provided by a so-called solid debris ejection switch. In the default option (ON,
IDEJ = 0), the masses of each material available for ejection are the total debris and molten
pool material masses, regardless of whether or how much they are molten (see Figure 5-4). In
the second option (OFF, IDEJ = 1), the masses of steel, Zircaloy, and UO2 available for
ejection are simply the masses of these materials that are molten; the masses of steel oxide
and control poison materials available for ejection are the masses of each of these materials
multiplied by the steel melt fraction, based on an assumption of proportional mixing; the mass
of ZrO2 available for ejection is the ZrO2 mass multiplied by the Zircaloy melt fraction.
Additionally, the mass of solid UO2 available for ejection is the Zircaloy melt fraction times
the mass of UO2 that could be relocated with the Zircaloy as calculated in the candling model
using the secondary material transport model [10][11]. Furthermore, MELCOR puts
additional constraints on the mass that can be ejected at vessel failure: (i) to initiate melt
ejection, the mass of molten material should be greater than SC1610(2) (5000 kg – default
value), or a melt fraction should be larger than SC1610(1) (0.1 – default value).
Here, the values of sensitivity coefficients SC1610(1,2) were set to zero, so any amount of
melt available for ejection would be ejected. However, VTT considered it better to use the
default values, in order to prevent numerical problems in the Cavity package.
We expect that limiting debris ejection to only molten materials (IDEJ 1) would lead to the
vessel wall being exposed to hot oxidic debris for a longer period of time, which may result in
accumulation of debris and delayed failure of the vessel LH wall.
In case of gross failure of the vessel wall, it is assumed that all debris in the bottom axial level
of the corresponding ring, regardless its state, is discharged linearly over 1 s time step without
taking into account the failure opening diameter. The maximum mass of all materials that can
be ejected during a single COR package time step is calculated as [10][11]:
𝑀𝑒𝑗 = 𝜌𝑚 𝐴𝑓 𝑣𝑒𝑗 Δ𝑡 (5)
where 𝜌𝑚 – is density of material being ejected, 𝐴𝑓 - failure area, 𝑣𝑒𝑗 – velocity of debris
being ejected, Δ𝑡 – COR package time step. The fraction of the ejected material mass 𝑀𝑒𝑗 to
the total mass available for ejection has a maximum value of 1.0. This fraction is applied to
each material available for ejection. The velocity of material being ejected is calculated by
[10][11]:
𝑣𝑒𝑗 = 𝐶𝑑 (2Δ𝑃/𝜌𝑚 + 2𝑔Δ𝑧𝑑 ) (6)
where 𝐶𝑑 is the flow discharge coefficient (𝐶𝑑 = 1 (default value) was used in the analysis
presented in this paper), Δ𝑃 = pressure difference between LP and reactor cavity control
volumes, 𝑔 = gravitational acceleration constant, and Δ𝑧𝑑 = debris and molten pool height
(see references [10][11] for more details).

50
a. b.
Figure 5-4. Mode of debris ejection from the vessel (a) solid debris ejection – OFF (IDEJ1); (b) solid
debris ejection – ON(IDEJ0).
The effect of the mode of debris ejection from the vessel (IDEJ= 0 or 1) was considered as a
phenomenological splinter [30]. The work performed in [15][31][32] and [25][33] showed
that the mode of debris ejection from the vessel is the major contributor to the uncertainty in
melt release conditions and conditional probability of containment failure due to ex-vessel
phenomena.
5.8.Fuel Dispersal Interactions (FDI) package
Debris enters the FDI package via the Transfer Process (TP) package interface from the core
(COR) package after failure of the reactor pressure vessel has been calculated.
After the introduction of debris material, the FDI package classifies the ejection event as
either a low- or a high-pressure melt ejection event on the basis of the ejection velocity passed
through the TP package [10][11].
Previous analysis performed in [15] showed that in high pressure scenarios the vessel lower
head fails due to failure and ejection of IGTs, well before formation of significant amounts of
molten materials in the lower plenum, which effectively leads to RCS depressurization
through failed IGT penetrations in one of the radial rings. Furthermore, other mechanisms,
such as MSL creep rupture, or SRV stucking open can lead to RCS depressurization well
before the vessel LH failure. Olkiluoto 1&2 have several methods to depressurize the reactor
before lower head failure. If DC power is available, the automatic depressurization system
will actuate. If DC power is lost, two so-called fast opening valves will automatically open
and keep the reactor pressure at a low level.
Thus, the scenario with high pressure melt ejection and associated phenomenological
uncertainties are not considered as risk significant and will not be included in the present
study. Low pressure RPV failure and melt ejection was considered as the dominant mode of
RPV failure and debris ejection to the cavity.
No FDI modelling parameters will be considered.
5.9.Ex-vessel release
Formation of aerosols in the containment following an accident is more of an issue than
formation in reactor cooling system (RCS). Time scales for the aerosol formation in the
containment leads to transformations due to radiolysis, oxidation, formation of bicarbonates.
There is a potential for secondary sources of aerosols in the containment due to ejection of

51
corium, hydrogen deflagration and MCCI. Aerosols usually with low volatility produced in
the containment provide a long-term aerosol and FP source [44]. The phenomena related to
ex-vessel release is discussed here.
5.9.1. Fuel Coolant Interactions
FCI is complex thermohydrodynamical mixing process during a severe accident involving
core melting and relocation. Premixing is the first phase in the progression of melt release to
the cavity. Premixing involves fragmentation and melt dispersion. Premixing may lead to
[45][44]
• Steam explosion (SE) under certain critical circumstances
• Global pressurisation of the containment from boiling or local pressurisation of pit
• Formation of debris bed based on fragmentation and solidification of melt

Phenomenologically SE occurs by the following inter-related mechanisms [46]

• Break-up of corium jet into varied size debris particles
• Interfacial heat transfer between melt and 2 phase mixture during mixing
• Fragmentation of debris submerged in water pool into finer particles
• Explosive heat transfer between finer particles and water

Jet breakup is a crucial point in premixing that results in uncertainties in generation rate and
size of droplets, distribution of droplets, solidification, and void fraction [46]. Significant
work has been done regarding the fragmentation and heat transfer [47][48][49]. Capillary
instabilities in the case of small jets, and Rayleigh Taylor & Kelvin Helmholtz (KH)
instabilities in the case of large jets are considered as the dominant mechanisms of jet breakup
processes [50][51].
OECD/SERENA project was conducted to address issues of FCI and its impact on ex-vessel
SE [52]. It concluded jet fragmentation model improvement is important in defining scope of
SE event (premixing > voiding > explosion triggering > explosion propagation). Recent
improvements in KH based models are sufficient, with further studies in jet fragmentation
with local conditions, non-vertical jets and high velocity jets need focus [47].
Melt fragmentation controls void formation and melt solidification, both of which mitigate SE
triggering and strength. Voiding in premixing stage is due to two phenomena – vapour
(possibly with hydrogen) due to heat and mass transfer around melt drops; and two-phase
flow of coolant. While physics of heat and mass transfer around drops is known sufficiently,
improvements in description and experimental data can be helpful. The same can be said for
two-phase flows [52]. Voiding enhances velocity difference before and after shock wave, this
in turn enhances fragmentation.
FARO tests showed strong dependency of SE on void [44]. KROTOS showed presence of
high voids in premixing stage, however its effect on mitigation was not analysed [53]. Melt
density, coolant temperature and water sub-cooling were found to be an important parameter
describing formation of voids [52]. Mitigating effect of voids was especially noted at high
void fractions and at large scales [54]. Voiding is also an important effect in pressurisation
stage of SE.
Melt solidification prevents fine fragmentation, thereby preventing/limiting SE. It also allows
formation of coolable debris bed [55]. For melts with oxidic corium UO2/ZrO2 this

52
phenomenon during premixing stage is responsible for strong reduction of potential explosion
loads [56][57]. Solidification is dependent on the corium composition and conditions of
cooling and steam removal at the surface of the droplet. Considering metallic, sub-
stoichiometric or stoichiometric corium, little experimental data exist with no parametric laws
[52]. Tests in KROTOS and TROI produced ambiguous results which require further
understanding of the phenomena [52]. Recently crust models have been implemented in FCI
codes, that need further study because the theoretical assumption of elastic behaviour of crust
is unlikely [57].
Hydrogen generation by oxidation of UO2/ZrO2 melts is demonstrated with experiments
(KROTOS and FARO), however its impact is not characterised because of uncertainties in
kinetics of the phenomena and material properties [44]. While this is demonstrated, data is
scarce, and results also show ambiguity in mitigation (in SERENA [52]) of SE and magnitude
(in ZrEx). OECD report [56] concluded that this phenomenon and impact on FCI was poorly
understood. Modelling is difficult firstly; it occurs in varied situations at very high melt
temperatures. Secondly, strong feedback impact in 3 ways; 1) hydrogen production, 2) energy
input, and 3) change melt properties.
Currently modelling of is largely parametric due to lack of analytical experimental data.
5.9.1.1.Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion
SE is a complex phenomenon involving high temperatures, supercritical pressures, oxidation
and melt solidification [55]. Initial conditions of the SE depend on the premixing stage. SE
process can be subdivided into 4 steps [58]
• Premixing phase
• Triggering phase
• Propagation phase
• Expansion phase

Fine fragmentation (FR) of the melt during premixing phase governs the explosivity. FR
increases the contact area for rapid heat transfer between the melt and water. The thermal
loads are transformed into pressure buildup leading to mechanical shockwaves. Triggering is
initiated by collapse of vapour film, caused by destabilization of interface due to thermal
effect or external disturbance [59]. Two type of fragmentation can be involved in a SE [65].
• Thermal fragmentation – destabilization of vapour film (cause of this is an area of
study) and occurs influential at the early parts of SE
• Hydrodynamic fragmentation – involves Rayleigh-Taylor instabilities, Kevin-
Helmholtz instabilities and boundary layer stripping. This fragmentation occurs in 2
integral ways: 1) drop accelerated in surrounding media; 2) shock impacts the drop
and is dominant in propagation phase

Several phenomenological models regarding FR exist [60][61], models put forth by Ciccarelli
& Frost [62] was consistent in early experiments performed in MISTEE [60] where the melt
drops pre-fragments upon destabilisation of vapour film. The coolant was also found to be
entrained in the drop as was proposed by Kim & Corradini [63]. TEXAS-V uses an adapted
version of [63] to model FR.
According to Inoue [64] the destabilization of vapour film causes local contacts, this leads to
strong local pressurization leading to destabilization of the drop. Further studies are based on

53
this premise. KROTOS experiments [53] showed that SE is always possible if the triggering
has enough strength. While triggering is considered stochastic event and thermal
fragmentation as cause for it, Pavel et al [68] found systematic spontaneous and energetic
steam explosions during spreading phase of simulants in shallow water while no SE were
observed in DEFOR-S [69] and DEFOR-A. Further understanding of triggering is needed.
Following the trigger of an explosion, the initial pressure wave causes destabilization of the
vapour films of surrounding melt drops leading to FR subsequently leading to high pressures.
Subsequently the pressure drives hydrodynamic fragmentation owing to relative motion of
melt and coolant. KROTOS experiment [66] compared SE in alumina and corium
(UO2/ZrO2) and found SE in alumina is stronger compared to corium, leading to discussions
of material effects. The velocity of the propagating front is affected by the initial peak
pressure and the void.
SERENA-II [47] allowed to clarify this effect. Effect of solidification and oxidation on
fragmentation and pressurization need to be addressed. There is also a need to address lateral
break. FARO tests [67] have showed generation of hydrogen in the corium-water interaction.
This void generation may also explain weaker explosions in corium.
Pressurization is the sudden release of energy following fragmentation. Pressurization occurs
due to change in the density of the coolant. Due to low compressibility of the coolant
pressurizations of upto 1000 bar have been recorded in KROTOS experiment. Two models
for pressurization
• Micro-interactions approach – proposed by Chen [70] and Theofanous [71] heat from
fuel melt is transferred to only a part of coolant. Heated part is transient and is
determined by the entrainment of coolant into microinteraction field (melt and coolant
in thermal equilibrium, called m-state). Pressurization is linked to thermal expansion
of the hot liquid coolant. This model assumes that only small part of water participates
in the interaction.
• Direct boiling (vapourization) or non equilibrium approach – proposed by Berthoud &
Brayer [72] and used by Corradini & Tang [73] in TEXAS. Portion of the heat from
melt is transferred directly to coolant, resulting in vapour boiling at the vapour liquid
interface under thermal nonequilibrium. Pressure buildup is due to phase change. The
remaining coolant is homogenously heated by heat not used in boiling. This coolant
heatup has secondary impact.

TREPAM experiment [74] simulated heat transfers between fragments and coolant in
conditions close to an explosion in reactor conditions, has shown that there exists vapour film
at the surface, even in supercritical conditions, supporting the nonequilibrium approach. There
is however a consensus regarding the need for further study of the phenomena involved, the
use of constant value of entrainment as against constitutive law for it, integration of non-
condensable gases, effect of void on the pressurization are current focus of studies.
PULIMS experiment at KTH [75][68] demonstrated that the melt might spread on the cavity
floor and participate in the SE or trigger it. Certain accident scenarios with large jet and
shallow pool can be susceptible to this. A premixed layer forms above the stratified melt and
can spontaneously trigger SE [76].
Several phenomena were hypothesized for the existence of premixture layer [68].

54
 • Periodic process of growth, expansion and collapse of steam bubbles, producing an
impact of water on the melt, creating a splash
• Evaporation of entrapped bubbles under melt surface water
• Rapid release of non-condensable gases during melt cooling
• Melt spread interface instabilities
• Jet breakup and impingement on the melt layer

Further experiments are necessary to clarify physical phenomena for interface instability and
formation of premixing layer.
5.9.2. Debris Bed Coolability
The cooling of the debris bed is provided by heat transfer to the water that ingresses into the
porous bed interior. Coolability can be assessed in 2 stages
• Quenching of debris particles settled on the cavity floor
• Long-term cooling of the quenched particles

Steam generated inside debris bed is escaping upwards. Upward flow changes conditions for
FCI. FCI changes particle properties (size distribution and morphology). Particle properties
affect the debris bed coolability phenomena. It is essential to know how the quench front
propagates, and if the bed can completely be quenched before local particles remelt.
Long-term coolability is limited by the dryout heat flux (DHF) and is associated to a steady-
state where evaporated water is replaced by water ingress in the bed [77]. Fragmentation
drives easy coolability, due to higher surface area for heat transfer. Fragmentation also causes
uneven particle size distribution, which is unfavourable to cooling.
In boiling water reactors (BWRs) multiple control rod guide tube penetrations in the lower
head may lead to early vessel failure before steel failure, leading to multiple jets of melt. The
fragmentation of melt is dependent on the vessel pressure when failure occurs. High-pressure
melt ejection causes melt to be in jet form with energetic gas discharge, leading to fine
particles and wider spreading area. Gravity-driven melt ejection, with low vessel pressure,
leads to less dispersal and dense corium collection which forms hard to cool bed.
Several experiments and theoretical programs have been performed to understand and gain
knowledge regarding the coolability. General criteria accepted for a successful long-term
cooling is that flow rate of coolant through the porous bed is high to prevent any local dryout.
Natural circulation of coolant is expected to prevent dryout [78].
Phenomenon involved in debris bed formation and coolability is complex and involves
mechanisms with own efficiency limits,
• Jet fragmentation
• Melt droplet sedimentation and interaction with coolant
• Debris agglomeration
• Particle spreading by pool flow
• Debris bed self levelling by vapour flows
• Debris bed coolability
• Post dryout behaviour with remelting

Debris bed coolability is affected by

55
 • Debris properties
• Accident scenario parameters
• Geometrical configuration of the bed

If the pool depth is shorter than jet breakup length, then the melt will form a cake at the top of
the bed. This will impede spreading of the debris and its coolability. Particle spreading due to
circulation flows are effective when the coolant is [partially] vapourised. This may also affect
transmissibility of fission products when there is containment failure. Previous work by Pavel
[78] has shown that formation of a tall and non-coolable debris bed is very less likely and that
dryout will not impede the self-levelling of the debris bed.
Dryout has received extensive focus on model development and experiment [79][80][81].
These studies assume a thermal equilibrium between debris bed and the saturated water pool.
Further studies [82][83] on the propagation of quench front were performed. Recently
DEBRIS facility [84] investigated quench of hot and dry debris, the boiling phenomena and
validation of friction laws included in dryout models. PEARL facility performed large scale
reflooding tests to study degraded core coolability with large scale debris beds [85].
With the flow of steam and coolant in a concurrent flow, and in certain regions (upper
regions) it may happen that the steam flux limits coolant flux needed to replace steam and this
critical steam flux determines the dryout heat flux (DHF). This is the case in a 1D
homogenous particulate bed with top flooding [80] and with bottom flooding [83][86].
In further studies on multidimensional effects, mostly 2D axisymmetric conditions, natural
circulation loops can be established [87], and with downcomers, DHF was found to increase
[88]. With heap-like shape, complex multi-dimensional flow of coolant into the debris bed is
possible [90]. DEFOR-E studies [94] showed porous beds formed is far from homogeneous.
COOLOCE experiment by VTT [91][92][93] performed under SAFIR program and
POMECO-HT experiment at KTH [81] investigated this multidimensionality of conical and
stratified beds and found an increase in heat removal capacity.
Under SARNET program DEFOR-A [95][96] tests were performed that studied fraction of
agglomeration of debris as a function of water depth, water subcooling and jet diameter.
Formation of debris cake was found to be important on the coolability of the debris.
Agglomeration can be avoided if the jet diameters are minimal [97][98], and with larger jets
cake formation occurs.
The effect of particle diameter and porosity were studied previously, summarized in [87][89].
Larger particles have smaller surface area in comparison. Implying smaller frictional forces
and flow resistance, improving coolability of porous medium. Internal voids in remelted
particles (encapsulated porosity) also effect coolability and this needs to be studied in detail.
Height of debris bed is another important parameter affecting coolability. Debris is coolable if
it is spread over the basemat than form a tall mound shaped bed [92][100-104]. Height is
determined by phenomenon of
• melt release scenarios (rapid, gradual, multiple releases)
• pool conditions (saturated or subcooled, deep or shallow)
• melt fragmentation
• particle sedimentation and interaction with two-phase flows in the pool
• as well as avalanching of the debris heap

56
In a gradual melt release, natural convection can be very efficient in flattening the debris bed
formed in a saturated pool, or in a subcooled pool after the onset of boiling [103][104][105].
In rapid melt release, the particle avalanching is likely to play the primary role in determining
the initial debris bed shape. Shape of the bed can change by the vapor flow through the bed
according to spreading/self-leveling phenomenon [106-109] which was demonstrated at KTH
[110][111]. Investigations mentioned previously have demonstrated that time scale for
spreading can vary significantly, depending on the initial debris bed configuration and other
relevant parameters [90][103-115].
The system pressure affects coolability through steam properties. At higher pressures steam
density is higher, and volume is smaller. Larger heat removal rate can be achieved with denser
steam because of larger pore volume available for coolant. Squarer et al. [117] and Miyazaki
et al. [116], investigated effect of pressure on dryout and noticed that the DHF increased with
increasing pressure. The decrease in the latent heat of vaporization as a function of pressure
counteracts the effect of the increased density but, for containment-relevant pressures, density
increase is the dominant effect [118]. In reactor typical cases the system pressure to be
expected depends strongly on the reactor type, as well as the accident history.
Limiting condition (DHF) for a steady state in a debris bed is given by the counter-current
flooding limit (CCFL) [119], where just all evaporated coolant can be replaced. High power
in bed causes dryout at the bottom, causing remelt. Enhanced coolability can be expected if
coolant inflow via the bottom of the particle bed is possible.
Studies have shown that bottom flooding and multi-dimensional flooding are clearly more
effective in removing heat than top flooding [81][86][120-122]. In cases with bottom
flooding, the CCFL is not the limit of coolability, because not all the water necessary to
maintain steady cooling has to penetrate the debris bed from above. Higher liquid saturation
in lower bed causes friction of the coolant to be reduced.
Discussion in [89] showed it is generally not possible to determine the coolability of
volumetric heated debris by just using bed properties like bed height, porosity, particle
diameter and system pressure. A more detailed analysis with a multidimensional model to
include realistic configurations is necessary.
This is similar regarding the case of inhomogeneities. Experiment by Hofmann [124] showed
for a simple 1D top fed configuration, the coolability is dramatically reduced for smaller
particle sizes. Reduction is due to the capillary pressure at the interface between the main
particle bed and the layer of the smaller particles. This effect will be reduced if other flow
paths to the main debris exist.
From the point of view of coolability, post-dryout behaviour also needs to be considered. It
may happen that a new steady state is reached with stabilized temperature and without
remelting [91][125]. Some form of post dryout temperature stabilization were seen in
COOLOCE with truncated cone configuration.
In this case coolable refers to the limited increase of temperature, not to the loss of liquid
water in the pores of the bed. It is worth considering defining the coolability limit using the
solid temperature, rather than the void fraction because
• the void fraction criterion may be overly conservative
• it is the high temperature that threatens the containment integrity, not the phase
fraction.

57
Cooling mechanisms of an ex vessel debris bed were studied in the MACE and MCCI with
real corium in top flooding arrangement. These experiments defined various debris heat
transfer mechanisms that could provide long-term cooling [127]. Formation of a stable crust
at the interface of the coolant and debris bed that inhibits heat transfer limits the coolability.
Two conditions have to be met for a stable crust [126]
• Thermal condition – interfacial temperature must be below corium freezing
temperature
• Mechanical condition – mechanical loads of the agitated melt must be tolerated by the
crust

This is the bulk cooling regime, where predominantly conduction and radiation heat transfers
(across agitated interface) occurs, and lasts till formation of stable crust. The melt concrete
interaction leads to generation of gas, and the effective heat transfer coefficient depends on
gas sparging rate, bubble size, thermophysical properties of the mixture, coolant properties
and containment pressure [126].
The crust is characterized by some degree of porosity, or cracks, owing to venting concrete
decomposition gases. Following that the heat transfer occurs via conduction through the crust
and water ingress to the melt along the thin cracks. Quenching can be completed if
• Melt depth is below the minimum depth at which decay heat can be removed via
conduction alone
• Water is able to penetrate into the debris to provide sufficient augmentation to the heat
transfer process

Three mechanisms can provide pathway for coolant to penetrate the debris
• Water ingression forms additional cracks due to quenching. Water ingression thins the
boundary between crust and melt enhancing heat transfer and is dependent on the
crack propagation process.
• Melt eruptions occurs when the pressure built up by the gases generated by corium
concrete interaction is unable to vent through the cracks. The erupted melt then
quenches and forms a porous particle bed in contact with the coolant. Melt is entrained
in the gases, which are expedited when heat removal rate of the crust decreases,
leading to higher melt temperature and more concrete interactions [126].
• It may happen that the thick crust formed is attached to the sidewalls, and with the
lower melt eroding into the concrete, the suspended crust separates from the melt
(volume shrinks due to decarbonisation), due to its mechanical instability from its own
weight, the weight of the coolant above, accumulated dispersed material and pressure
of decomposed gases. Eventually the suspended crust will fail, leading to rapid
ingression of water beneath the crust [126].

The cooling mechanisms will repeat and lead to massive heat removal from the melt. For the
break to happen at least one third of the melt has to be crust. The crust may also float in the
melt pool, and in that case there will be no crust breach. In the experiments so far this beach
has not been observed, while experts believe most probable configuration would involve crust
attached to the cavity walls with a floating crust area in the middle [126][127]. The coolability
of corium was demonstrated integrally in the COTELS experiments [128], whereas MACE

58
could not clearly demonstrate coolability in top flooding condition [127]. The reasons for
coolability of debris in COTELS experiments in contrast to MACE tests are speculated to be
• The sidewall concrete erosion prevented bonding of the crust on the walls
• Water was able to penetrate beneath the melt through the cracks near the sidewall and
melt coolant interface
• Some inherent porosity was formed in the melt during the pouring of the melt to the
concrete crucible that enhanced coolability

5.9.3. Molten Corium Concrete Interaction

When the lower drywell flooding is unavailable and the melt from the RPV collects in the
cavity, or if the available coolant has all evaporated and is unable to cool the debris, there will
be enhanced molten corium concrete interaction (MCCI). MCCI has the potential to cause
• Pressurization of the RCV by long-term release of non-condensable gases.
• Ablation of concrete basemat.
• Ablation of concrete side wall to degrade its capability as an RPV supporting
structure.

Thermal ablation is the major process governing the interactions. MCCI have a highly
complex phenomenology coupling concrete high-temperature behaviour, molten pool thermal
hydraulics, thermochemistry, mechanics [129]. Without additional measures, melt-through
may occur, depending on the basemat thickness.
The release of steam and gases from concrete decomposition increases the containment
pressure. Moreover, the hydrogen and carbon monoxide from such concrete decomposition
lead to an increase of combustible gases. A further consequence of corium concrete
interaction is the release of fission products in form of vapors and aerosols.
Many experiments were conducted at Sandia National Laboratory - SWISS, SURC, HOT
SOLID [130-132]. These tests mainly analyzed the behavior of concrete during the ablation
process, the release of fission products, and also the ablation kinetics.
Recent experiments such as MCCI, VULCANO, COMET-L [133-138] mainly address two
subjects
• The 2D aspects of the ablation
• Crust formation and melt segregation

MACE tests [137] conducted at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) focused on quantifying
fission product release during MCCI. Aerosols released in ACE tests contained mainly
constituents of the concrete. In the tests with metal and limestone/sand or siliceous concrete,
silicon compounds comprised 50% or more of the aerosol mass, with low releases of uranium
and low-volatility fission-product elements, and high releases of tellurium and neutron
absorber materials. The dry cavity test results show that core-concrete interaction during the
early phase is influenced by the extent of unoxidised cladding that is initially present in the
melt. During the long-term, the nature of the core-concrete interaction is found to be a strong
function of concrete type.
One of the major findings of the MCCI and VULCANO tests was the observation that dry
ablation tests with silica-rich concretes tend to present an anisotropic ablation, radial rate

59
ablation to be faster than the axial ablation rate, resulting in a more efficient ablation of the
sidewalls compared to downwards ablation. The tests with limestone-rich concrete showed a
more isotropic ablation. CLARA [140], BALI [141] and ÉCLAIR [142] focused on
anisotropic ablation behaviour. These indicated that asymmetric gas sparging alone is not
responsible for the physical differences in ablation behaviour observed for different concrete
types.
The oxides in corium and concrete are miscible with each other, but the metallic species are
immiscible with the oxides. Because the metals are lighter than the corium oxides, a metallic
layer may be formed on the surface of the oxidic pool [139]. When concrete oxides are added
to the melt, its density decreases eventually below the density of the metals and the metallic
layer may relocate to the bottom of the pool. On the other hand, intense stirring of the pool by
the rising gas bubbles may cause the metals and the oxides to be mixed with each other. This
phenomenon is a real challenge [143].
5.9.4. Effect of ex-vessel phenomena on the containment and environmental source
term
In general, the major contribution to the uncertainty in energetic ex-vessel phenomena is the
uncertainty in the likelihood of containment failure and unmitigated/unfiltered release of the
airborne activity in the containment to the environment. The study (integrated DSA-PSA,
NKS-SPARC project) performed in [144], showed that the expected value of conditional
probability of unacceptable release can increase by a factor of 5, depending on the uncertainty
in melt release conditions. The ex-vessel phenomena also have significant contribution to the
generation and deposition of FPs and aerosols in the containment.
The major part of high-volatile FPs will be released in-vessel during the core degradation
phase. Later, aerosols may be generated ex-vessel by MCCI, with pool boiling and
resuspension processes also leading to FP release. Aerosols usually with low volatility
produced in the containment through the MCCI provide a long-term aerosol and FP source,
after the in-vessel release phase.
In case of MCCI, the melt temperature has a major influence on the quantity of aerosol and
FP release. It is assumed that volatile FPs are released rapidly during the MCCI. For the less
volatile components, the non-volatile release fraction depends on the molten debris structure.
As the melt reacts with concrete components and as melt temperature decreases, releases
decline [126]. In general, the MCCI has a negative effect on the containment pressurization
rate, it has a positive effect on the rate of aerosol deposition in the containment (due to
increased concentration of non-radioactive aerosols in the containment atmosphere, which
promote aerosol agglomeration and gravitational settling).
For the Nordic BWR conditions, where SAM measures rely on melt-debris fragmentation and
cooling in the deep pool of water in the reactor cavity, the likelihood of MCCI and its effect
on the airborne activity in the containment is expected to be minimal.
Ex-vessel steam explosion can result in the release of fission products into containment as a
result of interactions between molten core debris and water (FCI).
On the other hand, if the containment remains intact, the generation of fission products which
may occur from the ejected melt fragments will then be accompanied by rain-out and wash-
out effects. As a consequence, a large fraction of the released products will be removed from
the atmosphere by serving as nuclei for the steam condensation or just by impaction of water

60
droplets. Furthermore, significant amount of steam produced can affect deposition rates of
hygroscopic FPs (such as CsOH).
5.10. In-containment and environmental source term
Engineered Safety Features models are currently available for the removal of radionuclides by
pool scrubbing, filter trapping, and spray scrubbing [10][11].
5.10.1.Containment sprays scrubbing
The MELCOR SPR package, which calculates the thermal-hydraulic behaviour associated
with spray systems, is coupled to the RadioNuclide (RN) package for the calculation of
aerosol washout and atmosphere decontamination by the sprays. The spray model includes
vapour adsorption and aerosol removal by diffusiophoresis, inertial interception and
impaction, and Brownian diffusion. Aerosols and fission products removed by the sprays are
deposited in the pool associated with the control volume or a user-defined sump pool.
The containment droplet diameters in MELCOR code are defined via a discrete probability
distribution. In the MELCOR model of the Swedish BWR, the droplet diameter is DIAMO =
1 mm. In VTT's model of Olkiluoto 1&2, the diameter is 1.5 mm.
Note that when the SPR package is coupled to the RN package for the calculation of aerosol
washout and atmosphere decontamination by sprays, there are several limitations of this
interface which require some restrictions on the input to the SPR package to avoid
nonphysical results associated with multiple calculations in the same control volume. When
the SPR and RN packages are both active, the user should limit the spray input so that only
one spray train passes through each control volume and only a single drop size is used in this
spray train [10][11].
Based on [34] the following droplet size range was considered: DIAMO = [0.0001, 0.002]
(m).
5.10.2.Pool scrubbing and filters trapping
The pool scrubbing models, adapted from the SPARC-90 code (A Code for Calculating
Fission Product Capture in Suppression Pools, see reference [10] in MELCOR RN Package
reference manual [10]), include the effects of steam condensation at the pool entrance and
aerosol deposition by Brownian diffusion, gravitational setting, and inertial impaction, subject
also to evaporative forces, for the rising bubble. Decontamination is calculated only for those
flow paths activated on the FL_JSW input record (see the FL Package Users’ Guide [11]). As
further specified by the user on input record RN2_PLS, the model treats regular flow paths
that vent through pools, as well as gases generated by core-concrete interactions flowing
through overlying pools. Iodine vapor is also scrubbed [10][11].
Furthermore, the MELCOR RN package contains a simple filter model. When aerosols and
vapours are transported through flow paths with the bulk fluid flow, a fraction of the
transported RN materials may be removed by the action of filters in the flow path. A single
filter can remove either aerosols or fission product vapours, but not both. However, a flow
path can contain more than one filter. The efficiency of each filter is defined by
decontamination factors, specified by user input. By default, a single decontamination factor
is applied to all RN classes except water, for which the default DF is 1.0. Additional user
input may be used to modify the DF on a class-by-class basis, including the water class. The
parameters for the filter characteristics are specified on the RN2_FLT input record.

61
The effect of filter mass loading on the flow resistance of the associated flow path may be
modelled through user input. A maximum loading may be specified for each filter; when this
loading is reached, no further RN materials are removed (i.e., the DF is set to unity) [10][11].
In the Swedish MELCOR model of Nordic BWR, the SPARC-90 model is enabled for the
following flow paths:
• FP203 (Blowdown pipe exit): Connecting CV230 (Blowdown pipe) and CV250
(Wetwell).
• FP207 (Overflow pipe exit): Connecting CV240 (Overflow pipe between LDW
and WW) and CV250 (Wetwell).
• FP314 (ADS): Connecting CV180 (Steamlines) and CV250 (Wetwell).
• FP330 (VX105 motor operated valves in ADS): Connecting CV180 (Steamlines)
and CV250 (Wetwell).
VTT's model of Olkiluoto 1&2 has the SPARC model for similar flow paths, even though the
path numbers differ from the Swedish model.
Furthermore, the MELCOR model of Swedish BWR employs the Multi Venturi Scrubber
System (MVSS) filter with constant decontamination factor DF=500 for aerosols
implemented for the flow path connecting the upper drywell and MVSS11. Based on the
literature review, the efficiency (DF) offered by the FILTRA-MVSS system is in the range
from 100 (guaranteed DF) to 500 (design DF) [42]. MVSSDF = [100, 500] (-). VTT added
the filter to the containment venting system, with a default DF of 500 for aerosols.
The following sensitivity coefficients was considered in the SPARC-90 model:
• SC7150 SPARC-90 Model Parameters. SC7150-10 vent exit condensation
decontamination factor scaling factor. This factor is applied to the decontamination
factor that is calculated as a result of steam condensation in the vent exit region that
occurs when the bubbles are thermally equilibrated with the pool temperature. Based
on [10][11] the following range was considered: SC715010 = [1, 3] (-).

• SC7151 SPARC-90 Globule Size Correlation. The SPARC-90 model employs a

correlation that relates the initial size of the globule formed to the Weber number of
the gas exiting the vent [10][11]. SC7151-1-1 is the Weber number multiplier used in
the equation for the initial diameter of the gas globule for a sparger-type vent (see
equations in RN Package user’s guide [11]). The following range was considered:
SC715111 = 3.45 (default value) +/- 15% = [2.9325, 3.9675] (-).

• SC7152 SPARC-90 Bubble Size/Shape Model. In the SPARC-90 Bubble size model,
the mean diameter of the bubbles formed at the vent exit depends solely on the
fraction of non-condensable gases, and is thus limited between 0.561 cm (with 0
fraction) and 0.681 cm (with 1 fraction), when considering default values of sensitivity
coefficients [35][36]. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, we will consider

11
DF factor for RN Class Xe equals to 1.

62
 SC7152-1 - initial bubble diameter correlation coefficient, with default value equal to
7.E-3 m, with the following range: SC71521 = [5.E-3, 8.E-3] (m) (see Figure 5-5).

• SC7153 SPARC-90 Bubble Rise Velocity Model. Coefficient for rise velocity
correlation of small bubbles (diameter below SC7153-3 = 0.5 cm). Only the
coefficient for rise velocity correlation of small bubbles SC7153-1 was considered,
since it is involved in calculation of rise velocities for both, small and large bubbles
(see equations in RN Package user’s guide [11]). The default value of SC7153-1 is
7.876 cm/s. The following range (default +/-15%) was considered: SC71531 =
[6.6946, 9.0574] (cm/s).

• SC7155 SPARC-90 Particle Impaction Model. If the gas bubbles leave the vent exit at
a high velocity, the initial globules rapidly loose that velocity. The forwards globular
interface, as it slows and stops, can capture particles if they have sufficient inertia. In
the SPARC-90 model, inertia and drag of particles is represented by the Stokes
number, which is a function of particle diameter, density, vent exit gas velocity, gas
viscosity, and vent diameter (see equations in RN Package user’s guide [11]).
Sensitivity coefficients SC7155-1 and SC7155-5 are the multiplication constants in the
DF factor correlations for small (SC7155-1) Stokes numbers, and large (SC7155-5)
Stokes numbers. The transition value is defined by SC7155-4 (see [11]). The
following sensitivity coefficient and ranges was considered:

o SC7155-1, default value 1.79182 with range (default +/-15%) SC71551 =

[1.5230, 2.0606] (-).

o SC7155-5, default value 1.13893 with range (default +/-15%) SC11555 =

[0.9681, 1.3098] (-).

• SC7154 – SPARC-90 Swarm Velocity Model. SPARC-90 bubble swarm rice

velocity was identified as one of the most influential parameters on the pool
scrubbing efficiency (DF) in [35]. Based on the analysis of SPARC-90 bubble
swarm rice velocity correlation models presented in [11] and [36] with default
values of sensitivity coefficients, proposed in [36] (see also red curve in Figure
5-6), the following parameter was considered: SC7154-2 = 3.011E-3 l-s/cm2 with
uncertainty range (default +/-15%) SC71542 = [2.5593E-03, 3.4626E-03] l-s/cm2,
(see the respective uncertainty range of average swarm rice velocity (cm/s) as a
function of the gas injection velocity (l/s) in Figure 5-6 (blue dashed curves)).
Note that the maximum velocity is limited by the sensitivity coefficient SC7154-5
= 170 cm/s (see black dashed line in Figure 5-6).

• SC7156 SPARC-90 Solute Ionization Correlations. SPARC-90 combine all particle

growth mechanisms into one set of relationships, see [36]. Sensitivity coefficient
array SC7156 represents additive and multiplicative factors in the van’t Hoff
factors, which are used in modelling hygroscopic effects that promote steam
condensation on hygroscopic particles, even in subsaturated atmospheres [36][11].
Based on the analysis of the models involved (see equations 2.87 – 2.92 in [36]),
all van’t Hoff factors for CsI and CsOH are corrected for temperature based on

63
 equation 2.92 in [36]. For the purpose of the sensitivity analysis, we will use the
multiplicative constant in a temperature correction correlation SC7156-8 with
default value equal to -2.321E-3 (-) with uncertainty range (default +/-15%)
SC71568 = [-2.6691e-03, -1.9728e-03] (-).

• SC7157 SPARC-90 Settling Velocity Correlation. In the SPARC-90 model a set of

empirical correlations is used to determine the Reynolds number (Re) to calculate
the settling velocity of particles in the rising bubbles [11]. To reduce the
computational burden, for sensitivity analysis we will consider denominator
factors in the settling velocity correlations (SC7157-N, N=2, 5, 8, 11, 14) = (27,
24.32, 15.71, 6.477, 1.194). The default values of sensitivity coefficients will be
scaled by a scaling factor SC7157 sampled on interval [0.85, 1.15] (-), see Figure
5-7.

Figure 5-5. SPARC-90 Mean bubble size model.

Figure 5-6. SPARC-90 average swarm velocity as a function of gas injection velocity (default model - red
curve) at 9m depth.

64
Figure 5-7. Sensitivity coefficients SC7157-Y (Y=2, 5, 8, 11, 14) vs. respective values of SC7157-X (X=1, 4,
7, 10, 13).

65
 5.11. Summary of uncertainties of interest
Table 5-8 presents the summary of the MELCOR modeling parameters and respective ranges
for the sensitivity analysis. Parameter variations not considered in the Finnish NBWR
MELCOR model are highlighted.
Table 5-8. Summary of the parameters to be considered in sensitivity analysis.
N Group Parameter name Default Range Units
1 SC710611 1.0E-6 [5.0E-8, 1.0E-6] m2/s
FP Release from fuel

2 SC710621 1.0E-6 [2.5E-7, 1.0E-6] m2/s

3 SC710641 3.814E5 [2.41E5, 3.814E5] J/kg-mole
4 SC710651 6.0E-6 [6.0E-6, 1.0E-5] m2/s
5 CORSOR-BOOTH -5 -5 or -7 -
ICRLSE
6 TFFAIL 1 [0.5,1.5] -
7 TZRSSINC 1210 [1210, 1700] K
8 TUO2ZRO2 2450 [2450, 2800] K
9 OXM 1 [1,2,3,4] -
10 FCELRA 0.25 [0.1, 0.25] -
11 PDPOR 0.3 [0.3, 0.5] -
12 CORNSBLD 1520 [1520, 1700] K
Core degradation and relocation

13 VFALL 0.01 [0.01, 0.1] m/s

14 SC10201 360 [180, 720] s
15 SC10202 60 [30, 120] s
16 HFRZSS 1000 [1000, 2500] W/m2-K
17 HFRZZR 1000 [1000, 7500] W/m2-K
18 SC11312 2400 [2100, 2500] K
19 SC11412 0.2 [0.2, 2.0] kg/m-s
20 DHYPDLP [0.002, 0.005] m
21 HDBH2O 100 [200, 2000] W/m2-K
head failure
RPV lower

22 TPFAIL 1273 [1273, 1600] K

23 HDBPN 1000 [100, 1000] W/m2-K
24 IDEJ 1 0 or 1 -
25 CHI 1 [1.0, 3.0] -
dynamics
Aerosol

26 GAMMA 1 [1.0, 3.0] -

FP &

27 STICK 1 [0.5, 1] -

66
 N Group Parameter name Default Range Units
28 RHONOM 1000 [1000, 4900] kg/m3
29 NUMSEC 10 [10, 20]
30 TURBDS 1.E-3 [7.5E-4, 1.25E-3] m2/s3
31 SC7111I1 4.982 [4.2347, 5.7293] Å
32 SC7111I2 550 [467.50, 632.50] K
33 SC7111CS1 3.617 [3.0745,4.1595] Å
34 SC7111CS2 97 [82.450,111.550] K
35 SC7170CS 3.95 [3.3575, 4.5425] kg/kg H2O
36 SC7170CSI3 0.44 [0.374, 0.5060] kg/kg H2O
37 SC7170CSI4 2.25 [1.9125, 2.5875] kg/kg H2O
38 SC7170CSM 0.67 [0.5695, 0.7705] kg/kg H2O
39 DIAMO 0.001 [0.0001, 0.002] m
40 SC715010 1 [1,3] -
Spray & pool scrubbing and filters trapping

41 SC715111 3.45 [2.9325, 3.9675] -

42 SC71521 0.007 [5.E-3, 8.E-3] m
43 SC71531 7.876 [6.6946, 9.0574] cm/s
44 SC71551 1.79182 [1.5230, 2.0606] -
45 SC11555 1.13893 [0.9681, 1.3098] -
46 SC71542 3.011E-3 [2.5593E-03, l-s/cm2
3.4626E-03]
47 SC71568 -2.321E-3 [-2.6691e-03, - -
1.9728e-03]
48 SC7157 1 [0.85, 1.15] -
49 MVSSDF 500 [100, 500] -
50 SC3210 1 [1, 1.15] -
Given the fact that some default values are at the end of the specified ranges, a case ID
numbering of bounding analyses was defined, see Table 5-9. Cases corresponding to
parameter variations not considered in the Finnish NBWR MELCOR model are highlighted.

67
 Table 5-9. Case ID numbering for bounding parameter analyses
Parameter Parameter value Case 38 SC7111CS1 3.075E+00
Case 0 Best estimate Case 39 SC7111CS1 4.160E+00
Case 1 SC710611 5.000E-08 Case 40 SC7111CS2 8.245E+01
Case 2 SC710621 2.500E-07 Case 41 SC7111CS2 1.116E+02
Case 3 SC710641 2.410E+05 Case 42 SC7170CS 3.358E+00
Case 4 SC710651 1.000E-05 Case 43 SC7170CS 4.543E+00
Case 5 TFFAIL 5.000E-01 Case 44 SC7170CSI3 3.740E-01
Case 6 TFFAIL 1.500E+00 Case 45 SC7170CSI3 5.060E-01
Case 7 TZRSSINC 1.700E+03 Case 46 SC7170CSI4 1.913E+00
Case 8 TUO2ZRO2 2.800E+03 Case 47 SC7170CSI4 2.588E+00
Case 9 FCELRA 2.500E-01 Case 48 SC7170CSM 5.695E-01
Case 10 PDPOR 3.000E-01 Case 49 SC7170CSM 7.705E-01
Case 11 PDPOR 5.000E-01 Case 50 DIAMO 1.000E-04
Case 12 CORNSBLD 1.700E+03 Case 51 DIAMO 2.000E-03
Case 13 VFALL 1.000E-01 Case 52 SC715010 3.000E+00
Case 14 SC10201 1.800E+02 Case 53 SC715111 2.933E+00
Case 15 SC10201 7.200E+02 Case 54 SC715111 3.968E+00
Case 16 SC10202 3.000E+01 Case 55 SC71521 5.000E-03
Case 17 SC10202 1.200E+02 Case 56 SC71521 8.000E-03
Case 18 HFRZSS 1.000E+03 Case 57 SC71531 6.695E+00
Case 19 HFRZZR 1.000E+03 Case 58 SC71531 9.057E+00
Case 20 SC11312 2.100E+03 Case 59 SC71551 1.523E+00
Case 21 SC11312 2.540E+03 Case 60 SC71551 2.061E+00
Case 22 SC11412 1.000E+00 Case 61 SC71555 9.681E-01
Case 23 DHYPDLP 5.000E-03 Case 62 SC71555 1.310E+00
Case 24 HDBH2O 2.000E+02 Case 63 SC71542 2.559E-03
Case 25 TPFAIL 1.600E+03 Case 64 SC71542 3.463E-03
Case 26 HDBPN 1.000E+03 Case 65 SC71568 -2.669E-03
Case 27 CHI 3.000E+00 Case 66 SC71568 -1.973E-03
Case 28 GAMMA 3.000E+00 Case 67 SC7157 8.500E-01
Case 29 STICK 5.000E-01 Case 68 SC7157 1.150E+00
Case 30 RHONOM 4.900E+03 Case 69 OXM 4
Case 31 NUMSEC 20 Case 70 IDEJ 1
Case 32 TURBDS 7.500E-04 Case 71 MVSSDF 1.000E+02
Case 33 TURBDS 1.250E-03 Case 72 SC3210* 1.150E+00
Case 34 SC7111I1 4.235E+00 CORSOR-
Case 35 SC7111I1 5.729E+00 Case 73 BOOTH -7
ICRLSE
Case 36 SC7111I2 4.675E+02
* Scaling of existing value.
Case 37 SC7111I2 6.325E+02

68
 6. Analysis specification
Based on the selected accident sequences from section 4.5 and the uncertainties of interest
summarized in section 5.11, each of the project participant organizations responsible for
MELCOR simulations in the project defined a number of bounding analysis cases. The cases
were simulated using MELCOR 2.2.18019 over 24 h with reactor shutdown occurring at t = 0
h. It should be noted that the cumulative release of radionuclides for some of the studied
scenarios may need a significantly longer time to stabilize. In view of this, the 24 h simulation
time was chosen as a reasonable trade-off between the computation time needed to perform
all analyses and the interest of presenting results as being close to the total releases.
KTH and VG performed their analyses on the same Swedish configuration NBWR model,
described in section 3.2.1, while VTT performed their analyses on the Finnish configuration
NBWR model, described in section 3.2.2. Release category RC7A, station blackout leading to
filtered containment venting, was simulated both in the Swedish and the Finnish model,
however with different assumptions regarding the mechanism for opening of MVSS.
The number of bounding cases simulated by each organization was selected based on selected
accident sequences as well as on available time and computation resources.

69
 7. Results
Note that these results cannot be interpreted statistically as no likelihoods or distributions
have been associated with the identified bounding parameter ranges during the first phase of
the project. Also, the results are influenced by numerical noise and time step sensitivity,
whose impacts have not been quantified. Sensitivity analysis and statistical quantification is
planned for the following project phases.
7.1. KTH results
KTH studied option 1 and option 2 scenarios from section 4.5.1. In option 1, scenario is
initiated by a large LOCA at t = 0, without water injection/sprays. The parameter variations
are shown in Table 7-1 for this scenario, and are compared to the reference case. In option 2,
scenario is initiated by a SBO at t = 0. The parameter variations are shown in Table 7-2 for
this scenario, and are compared to the reference case. The selected parameters that will be
studied further are highlighted in the tables.
7.1.1. RC4A – Large Break LOCA leading to containment failure due to ex-vessel
phenomena at RPV melt-through.
Table 7-1. RC4A bounding analysis results.
Case PARAMETER TLHF CS_ENV [- I2_ENV [- TLHF [%] CS_ENV I2_ENV
ID [h] ] ] [%] [%]
0 REFERENCE 1.736 0.069 0.072 - - -
CASE
1 SC710611 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
2 SC710621 1.767 0.051 0.066 1.824 -26.120 -8.155
3 SC710641 1.870 0.121 0.134 7.754 76.129 84.697
4 SC710651 1.852 0.044 0.052 6.689 -35.783 -28.436
5 TFFAIL 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
6 TFFAIL 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
7 TZRSSINC 2.003 0.052 0.066 15.416 -24.312 -8.763
8 TUO2ZRO2 2.460 0.124 0.162 41.691 80.854 123.550
9 FCELRA 2.143 0.068 0.106 23.466 -0.209 46.416
10 PDPOR 1.807 0.061 0.063 4.115 -11.481 -12.951
11 PDPOR 1.794 0.050 0.077 3.377 -26.860 6.615
12 CORNSBLD 1.732 0.071 0.073 -0.211 3.649 1.297
13 VFALL 1.319 0.065 0.064 -23.991 -5.138 -11.324
14 SC10201 1.726 0.056 0.068 -0.567 -18.614 -5.912
15 SC10201 1.779 0.057 0.073 2.472 -16.959 1.011
16 SC10202 1.985 0.059 0.066 14.363 -13.790 -8.756
17 SC10202 1.653 0.040 0.044 -4.785 -40.997 -39.583
18 HFRZSS 1.866 0.023 0.025 7.524 -66.266 -65.678
19 HFRZZR 1.910 0.063 0.099 10.026 -8.607 37.549
20 SC11312 2.241 0.073 0.111 29.129 7.151 53.501

70
Case PARAMETER TLHF CS_ENV [- I2_ENV [- TLHF [%] CS_ENV I2_ENV
ID [h] ] ] [%] [%]
21 SC11312 1.702 0.049 0.073 -1.966 -28.178 1.586
22 SC11412 1.924 0.034 0.037 10.851 -49.764 -48.449
23 DHYPDLP 1.594 0.058 0.061 -8.187 -14.899 -15.107
24 HDBH20 1.757 0.057 0.085 1.228 -16.750 17.447
25 TPFAIL 2.222 0.053 0.076 28.022 -23.302 5.071
26 HDBPN 1.463 0.122 0.157 -15.735 78.234 117.189
27 CHI 1.921 0.040 0.045 10.646 -41.982 -37.737
28 GAMMA 2.473 0.052 0.063 42.476 -23.925 -13.443
29 STICK 1.872 0.091 0.123 7.826 32.573 70.294
30 RHONOM 1.705 0.049 0.061 -1.763 -28.489 -14.987
31 NUMSEC 1.495 0.052 0.057 -13.852 -23.776 -20.706
32 TURBDS 1.703 0.070 0.074 -1.908 2.550 1.927
33 TURBDS 1.788 0.060 0.090 3.008 -12.646 25.003
34 SC7111I1 1.774 0.042 0.060 2.212 -38.283 -16.720
35 SC7111I1 2.351 0.142 0.183 35.415 106.815 152.978
36 SC7111I2 1.883 0.059 0.091 8.498 -14.562 26.004
37 SC7111I2 1.522 0.055 0.059 -12.333 -19.790 -18.220
38 SC7111CS1 1.918 0.067 0.103 10.474 -1.500 43.053
39 SC7111CS1 1.819 0.038 0.047 4.818 -44.673 -34.785
40 SC7111CS2 2.108 0.080 0.113 21.459 17.067 56.566
41 SC7111CS2 1.567 0.034 0.038 -9.745 -50.819 -47.864
42 SC7170CS 1.750 0.058 0.077 0.799 -14.952 6.288
43 SC7170CS 1.872 0.037 0.045 7.839 -45.943 -38.023
44 SC7170CSI3 1.737 0.073 0.103 0.095 5.876 42.974
45 SC7170CSI3 1.685 0.063 0.090 -2.954 -7.787 24.215
46 SC7170CSI4 2.424 0.098 0.130 39.658 42.766 79.604
47 SC7170CSI4 1.684 0.044 0.053 -2.960 -35.780 -26.670
48 SC7170CSM 1.797 0.061 0.102 3.536 -10.359 40.715
49 SC7170CSM 1.969 0.066 0.086 13.443 -4.070 19.214
50 DIAMO 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
51 DIAMO 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
52 SC715010 1.794 0.051 0.064 3.378 -25.841 -10.974
53 SC715111 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
54 SC715111 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
55 SC71521 1.856 0.055 0.064 6.946 -20.006 -12.077
56 SC71521 1.609 0.071 0.101 -7.294 3.420 40.002
57 SC71531 2.022 0.060 0.080 16.468 -12.937 10.810

71
 Case PARAMETER TLHF CS_ENV [- I2_ENV [- TLHF [%] CS_ENV I2_ENV
ID [h] ] ] [%] [%]
58 SC71531 1.776 0.102 0.114 2.300 49.583 57.345
59 SC71551 1.828 0.053 0.059 5.298 -22.668 -19.039
60 SC71551 1.839 0.066 0.076 5.935 -4.123 5.138
61 SC71555 1.676 0.087 0.108 -3.438 27.187 48.817
62 SC71555 1.758 0.056 0.073 1.252 -18.026 1.036
63 SC71542 1.910 0.046 0.080 10.053 -33.490 10.654
64 SC71542 2.298 0.139 0.189 32.406 103.298 161.297
65 SC71568 1.692 0.058 0.070 -2.544 -15.284 -3.755
66 SC71568 1.732 0.064 0.075 -0.211 -6.210 3.732
67 SC7157 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
68 SC7157 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
69 OXM 2.042 0.056 0.071 17.620 -18.932 -1.982
70 IDEJ 1.783 0.064 0.073 2.736 -7.096 1.091
71 MVSSDF 1.783 0.055 0.082 2.736 -20.140 13.464
72 SC3210 1.680 0.049 0.057 -3.224 -28.182 -20.937
73 CORSOR- 1.911 0.096 0.091 10.095 39.677 26.216
BOOTH ICRLSE

Figure 7-1. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - containment pressure evolution.
Since MELCOR code has limited ability to model ex-vessel steam explosion, the containment
failure is postulated at the time of RPV failure. Containment failure results in a direct flow
path, with 2 m2 flow area, from the containment to the environment. This leads to rapid
pressure drops, seen at around 2h.

72
 Figure 7-2. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – cesium release fraction to the environment.

Black line indicates the reference case. It is observed that only a few cases lead to larger
release than the reference case. The results were analysed at few time slices (black vertical
lines).

Figure 7-3. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – cumulative distribution for the cesium release
fraction.

73
 Figure 7-4. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - cesium release fraction to the environment.

It can be observed that the median cesium release fraction for all the cases is around 0.06.

Figure 7-5. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - iodine release fraction to the environment.

74
 Figure 7-6. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – cumulative distribution for the iodine release
fraction.

Figure 7-7. RC4A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - iodine release fraction to the environment.
It can be observed that the median iodine release fraction for all the cases is around 0.08.

75
7.1.2. RC4B – SBO leading to containment failure due to ex-vessel phenomena at RPV
melt-through
Table 7-2. RC4B bounding analysis results.
Case PARAMETER TLHF CS_ENV [- I2_ENV TLHF CS_ENV I2_ENV
ID [h] ] [-] [%] [%] [%]
0 REFERENCE 2.736 0.027 0.071 - - -
CASE
1 SC710611 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
2 SC710621 2.592 0.033 0.122 -5.280 22.371 71.320
3 SC710641 3.886 0.013 0.019 42.028 -50.222 -72.634
4 SC710651 2.827 0.015 0.026 3.332 -45.528 -64.107
5 TFFAIL 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
6 TFFAIL 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
7 TZRSSINC 2.915 0.029 0.080 6.525 9.293 12.459
8 TUO2ZRO2 2.553 0.031 0.082 -6.701 15.450 15.463
9 FCELRA 3.044 0.024 0.101 11.267 -11.231 42.093
10 PDPOR 2.803 0.028 0.081 2.435 3.379 13.981
11 PDPOR 2.017 0.037 0.084 -26.295 38.331 18.450
12 CORNSBLD 2.844 0.032 0.102 3.958 19.252 44.123
13 VFALL 2.328 0.042 0.119 -14.923 54.793 66.743
14 SC10201 2.761 0.036 0.094 0.912 32.027 31.753
15 SC10201 2.564 0.024 0.062 -6.295 -12.371 -12.444
16 SC10202 2.864 0.028 0.081 4.669 5.073 13.724
17 SC10202 3.064 0.028 0.088 11.978 5.158 23.443
18 HFRZSS 2.436 0.035 0.120 -10.965 28.638 68.303
19 HFRZZR 2.717 0.030 0.077 -0.712 10.981 8.902
20 SC11312 3.010 0.028 0.093 10.014 4.728 30.147
21 SC11312 2.814 0.032 0.085 2.841 18.799 20.201
22 SC11412 2.153 0.033 0.092 -21.321 22.117 29.831
23 DHYPDLP 2.960 0.029 0.092 8.164 7.429 28.769
24 HDBH20 2.867 0.033 0.100 4.770 23.791 41.292
25 TPFAIL 5.153 0.033 0.124 88.323 24.401 74.593
26 HDBPN 2.472 0.037 0.154 -9.645 37.239 116.240
27 CHI 2.789 0.042 0.092 1.928 57.688 28.993
28 GAMMA 3.218 0.004 0.018 17.592 -83.678 -75.036
29 STICK 2.475 0.033 0.083 -9.544 20.892 16.168
30 RHONOM 2.767 0.021 0.032 1.116 -23.555 -54.907
31 NUMSEC 2.797 0.026 0.072 2.232 -3.995 1.005
32 TURBDS 2.847 0.045 0.163 4.061 67.758 129.735

76
Case PARAMETER TLHF CS_ENV [- I2_ENV TLHF CS_ENV I2_ENV
ID [h] ] [-] [%] [%] [%]
33 TURBDS 2.322 0.034 0.105 -15.128 26.432 48.067
34 SC7111I1 2.827 0.026 0.067 3.335 -2.664 -6.161
35 SC7111I1 2.375 0.031 0.076 -13.217 15.308 6.768
36 SC7111I2 2.678 0.035 0.103 -2.134 31.365 44.306
37 SC7111I2 3.181 0.012 0.018 16.242 -56.367 -74.793
38 SC7111CS1 3.161 0.018 0.057 15.532 -31.770 -20.533
39 SC7111CS1 2.667 0.046 0.167 -2.538 71.021 134.707
40 SC7111CS2 2.736 0.034 0.127 0.000 25.652 78.947
41 SC7111CS2 2.739 0.018 0.023 0.099 -33.094 -67.328
42 SC7170CS 2.766 0.023 0.035 1.099 -14.472 -51.239
43 SC7170CS 2.650 0.035 0.121 -3.149 30.821 69.883
44 SC7170CSI3 2.625 0.032 0.132 -4.061 20.287 85.727
45 SC7170CSI3 3.097 0.026 0.089 13.197 -3.813 24.926
46 SC7170CSI4 2.814 0.034 0.086 2.842 25.144 20.322
47 SC7170CSI4 2.781 0.024 0.076 1.624 -10.187 6.203
48 SC7170CSM 3.161 0.013 0.024 15.532 -51.747 -65.569
49 SC7170CSM 2.731 0.035 0.111 -0.204 29.624 55.634
50 DIAMO 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
51 DIAMO 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
52 SC715010 2.997 0.031 0.084 9.541 13.916 17.503
53 SC715111 2.886 0.028 0.067 5.482 3.402 -5.551
54 SC715111 2.825 0.031 0.086 3.238 16.040 20.716
55 SC71521 2.253 0.035 0.096 -17.666 29.670 35.459
56 SC71521 2.633 0.039 0.095 -3.758 44.280 33.377
57 SC71531 2.919 0.035 0.108 6.700 28.852 52.259
58 SC71531 2.870 0.026 0.079 4.873 -2.551 11.180
59 SC71551 2.892 0.030 0.085 5.685 11.921 19.063
60 SC71551 3.008 0.027 0.067 9.947 -1.057 -6.191
61 SC71555 2.920 0.039 0.157 6.701 45.432 121.490
62 SC71555 3.313 0.016 0.027 21.070 -41.054 -62.541
63 SC71542 2.992 0.025 0.073 9.339 -6.979 2.757
64 SC71542 3.717 0.016 0.041 35.835 -38.958 -42.843
65 SC71568 2.670 0.029 0.078 -2.405 9.516 10.350
66 SC71568 3.092 0.025 0.068 12.992 -6.979 -3.823
67 SC7157 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
68 SC7157 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
69 OXM 2.870 0.036 0.096 4.873 34.173 34.772

77
 Case PARAMETER TLHF CS_ENV [- I2_ENV TLHF CS_ENV I2_ENV
ID [h] ] [-] [%] [%] [%]
70 IDEJ 2.900 0.037 0.134 5.988 36.441 88.771
71 MVSSDF 2.900 0.021 0.053 5.988 -21.475 -25.769
72 SC3210 2.789 0.031 0.081 1.928 15.947 14.586
73 CORSOR- 3.561 0.016 0.055 30.151 -42.188 -22.409
BOOTH ICRLSE

Figure 7-8. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - containment pressure evolution.
As mentioned before, the MELCOR code has limited ability to model ex-vessel steam
explosion, the containment failure is postulated at the time of RPV failure (around 3 hours
after initiating event in case of SBO). Containment failure results in a direct flow path, with 2
m2 flow area, from the containment to the environment. The smaller peaks after RPV failure
may be due to the modelling assumptions for LPME in FDI package.

78
 Figure 7-9. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - cesium release fraction to the environment.
Black line indicates the reference case. It can be observed that the release is uniformly spread
on either side of the reference case. The results were analysed at few time slices (black
vertical lines).

Figure 7-10. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – cumulative distribution for the cesium release
fraction.

79
 Figure 7-11. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - cesium release fraction to the environment.
It can be observed that the median cesium release fraction for all the cases is about 0.03.

Figure 7-12. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - iodine release fraction to the environment.

80
 Figure 7-13. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – cumulative distribution for the iodine release
fraction.

Figure 7-14. RC4B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - iodine release fraction to the environment.
It can be observed that the median iodine release fraction for all the cases is about 0.03.

7.2.VTT results
VTT studied the "option 2" scenario from section 4.5.2. The accident is initiated by loss of all
AC power. In addition, it is assumed that the RPV failure causes a short pressure spike that
breaks the rupture disk of the containment filtered venting system from the drywell. The
calculations were continued until 10 h because by that time the fission product release to the

81
environment had practically stopped. Two figures of merit were investigated: the start time of
the filtered venting, and the integral cesium release to the environment during the 10 h.
Most of the parameters were varied four times including the bounding values and two values
in between. The parameter variations that were observed affecting the simulation results are
listed in Table 7-3 along with the calculated FCV opening times and the total cesium releases.
It was noticed that almost all the sensitivity cases caused smaller Cs release than the reference
case. Therefore the relative difference between the cases was studied by comparing the
calculated values to the median values of all the calculations. Parameters with major and
irregular deviations in their results between their variant cases are highlighted.
Table 7-3. The results from VTT's simulations.

Case ID Parameter Value T_FCV [s] T_FCV [%] CS_ENV [-] CS_ENV [%]
0 Reference 6270 1.4 % 5.427E-05 50.1 %
1 SC710621 2.50E-07 6160 -0.3 % 2.132E-05 -41.0 %
2 SC710621 4.38E-07 6188 0.1 % 1.892E-05 -47.7 %
3 SC710621 6.25E-07 6182 0.0 % 2.807E-05 -22.4 %
4 SC710621 8.13E-07 5883 -4.8 % 2.560E-05 -29.2 %
5 SC710641 2.41E+05 5986 -3.2 % 2.746E-05 -24.1 %
6 SC710641 2.76E+05 6557 6.1 % 3.633E-05 0.5 %
7 SC710641 3.11E+05 6669 7.9 % 4.262E-05 17.9 %
8 SC710641 3.46E+05 6219 0.6 % 3.319E-05 -8.2 %
9 SC710651 7.00E-06 6133 -0.8 % 3.720E-05 2.9 %
10 SC710651 8.00E-06 6229 0.8 % 3.214E-05 -11.1 %
11 SC710651 9.00E-06 5986 -3.2 % 3.608E-05 -0.2 %
12 SC710651 1.00E-05 6241 1.0 % 3.800E-05 5.1 %
13 OXM 1 6221 0.6 % 3.014E-05 -16.7 %
14 OXM 2 6118 -1.0 % 3.602E-05 -0.4 %
15 OXM 3 6053 -2.1 % 4.207E-05 16.3 %
16 OXM 4 6102 -1.3 % 4.354E-05 20.4 %
17 FCELRA 0.1350 6118 -1.0 % 5.087E-05 40.7 %
18 FCELRA 0.1750 6064 -1.9 % 3.995E-05 10.5 %
19 FCELRA 0.2125 6201 0.3 % 4.631E-05 28.1 %
20 FCELRA 0.2500 6161 -0.3 % 2.463E-05 -31.9 %
21 PDPor 0.30 6221 0.6 % 2.146E-05 -40.6 %
22 PDPor 0.35 6085 -1.6 % 2.284E-05 -36.8 %
23 PDPor 0.45 6236 0.9 % 2.747E-05 -24.0 %
24 PDPor 0.50 6196 0.2 % 3.815E-05 5.5 %
25 CORNSBLD 1565 6039 -2.3 % 3.856E-05 6.6 %
26 CORNSBLD 1610 6274 1.5 % 3.178E-05 -12.1 %
27 CORNSBLD 1655 5290 -14.4 % 1.748E-05 -51.7 %

82
Case ID Parameter Value T_FCV [s] T_FCV [%] CS_ENV [-] CS_ENV [%]
28 CORNSBLD 1700 5738 -7.2 % 4.473E-05 23.7 %
29 VFALL 0.010 10504 69.9 % 5.812E-05 60.7 %
30 VFALL 0.025 5516 -10.8 % 3.269E-05 -9.6 %
31 VFALL 0.050 5742 -7.1 % 2.906E-05 -19.6 %
32 VFALL 0.075 6303 2.0 % 4.485E-05 24.0 %
33 VFALL 0.100 6249 1.1 % 4.079E-05 12.8 %
34 SC10201 180 6198 0.3 % 3.411E-05 -5.7 %
35 SC10201 315 6165 -0.3 % 2.729E-05 -24.5 %
36 SC10201 450 6156 -0.4 % 4.273E-05 18.1 %
37 SC10201 585 6202 0.3 % 4.037E-05 11.6 %
38 SC10201 720 6211 0.5 % 3.644E-05 0.8 %
39 SC10202 30.0 6260 1.3 % 3.170E-05 -12.3 %
40 SC10202 52.5 6228 0.8 % 4.448E-05 23.0 %
41 SC10202 75.0 6184 0.0 % 4.458E-05 23.3 %
42 SC10202 97.5 6170 -0.2 % 2.155E-05 -40.4 %
43 SC10202 120.0 6215 0.5 % 2.607E-05 -27.9 %
44 HFRZSS 1000 5712 -7.6 % 4.202E-05 16.2 %
45 HFRZSS 1375 6111 -1.1 % 2.729E-05 -24.6 %
46 HFRZSS 1750 6051 -2.1 % 2.424E-05 -33.0 %
47 HFRZSS 2125 6035 -2.4 % 3.511E-05 -2.9 %
48 HFRZZR 1000 5487 -11.2 % 2.414E-05 -33.2 %
49 HFRZZR 2625 6163 -0.3 % 3.844E-05 6.3 %
50 HFRZZR 4250 6110 -1.2 % 4.664E-05 29.0 %
51 HFRZZR 5875 5962 -3.6 % 2.935E-05 -18.8 %
52 SC11312 2100 6224 0.7 % 3.587E-05 -0.8 %
53 SC11312 2200 5983 -3.2 % 3.167E-05 -12.4 %
54 SC11312 2300 6100 -1.3 % 4.013E-05 11.0 %
55 SC11312 2500 5893 -4.7 % 3.928E-05 8.6 %
56 SC11412 0.20 5962 -3.6 % 3.848E-05 6.4 %
57 SC11412 0.65 6188 0.1 % 3.920E-05 8.4 %
58 SC11412 1.55 6170 -0.2 % 1.881E-05 -48.0 %
59 SC11412 2.00 5636 -8.8 % 1.499E-05 -58.5 %
60 DHYPDLP 0.00275 6270 1.4 % 5.031E-05 39.1 %
61 DHYPDLP 0.00350 6270 1.4 % 5.484E-05 51.6 %
62 DHYPDLP 0.00425 6270 1.4 % 4.862E-05 34.4 %
63 DHYPDLP 0.00500 6270 1.4 % 4.539E-05 25.5 %
64 HDBH2O 200 6270 1.4 % 5.427E-05 50.1 %

83
Case ID Parameter Value T_FCV [s] T_FCV [%] CS_ENV [-] CS_ENV [%]
65 HDBH2O 650 6270 1.4 % 5.427E-05 50.1 %
66 HDBH2O 1100 6270 1.4 % 5.411E-05 49.6 %
67 HDBH2O 1550 6270 1.4 % 5.391E-05 49.1 %
68 HDBH2O 2000 6270 1.4 % 5.065E-05 40.0 %
69 TPFAIL 1355 6274 1.5 % 5.559E-05 53.7 %
70 TPFAIL 1437 6277 1.6 % 5.520E-05 52.6 %
71 TPFAIL 1518 6281 1.6 % 5.404E-05 49.4 %
72 TPFAIL 1600 6286 1.7 % 5.234E-05 44.7 %
73 HDBPN 100 6475 4.7 % 4.882E-05 35.0 %
74 HDBPN 325 6316 2.2 % 5.285E-05 46.1 %
75 HDBPN 550 6288 1.7 % 4.334E-05 19.8 %
76 HDBPN 775 6277 1.5 % 5.414E-05 49.7 %
77 CHI 1.5 6086 -1.5 % 4.630E-05 28.0 %
78 CHI 2.0 6225 0.7 % 5.458E-05 50.9 %
79 CHI 2.5 6092 -1.4 % 5.675E-05 56.9 %
80 CHI 3.0 6179 0.0 % 5.399E-05 49.3 %
81 GAMMA 1.5 6150 -0.5 % 2.055E-05 -43.2 %
82 GAMMA 2.0 6367 3.0 % 2.069E-05 -42.8 %
83 GAMMA 2.5 6267 1.4 % 3.281E-05 -9.3 %
84 GAMMA 3.0 6060 -2.0 % 1.715E-05 -52.6 %
85 STICK 0.500 6228 0.8 % 2.268E-05 -37.3 %
86 STICK 0.625 6181 0.0 % 6.113E-05 69.0 %
87 STICK 0.750 6251 1.1 % 4.434E-05 22.6 %
88 STICK 0.875 6268 1.4 % 2.941E-05 -18.7 %
89 RHONOM 1975 5932 -4.0 % 5.112E-05 41.4 %
90 RHONOM 2950 5890 -4.7 % 5.072E-05 40.2 %
91 RHONOM 3925 6182 0.0 % 3.530E-05 -2.4 %
92 RHONOM 4900 6197 0.3 % 2.582E-05 -28.6 %
93 NUMSEC 13 6417 3.8 % 2.201E-05 -39.1 %
94 NUMSEC 15 6229 0.8 % 2.604E-05 -28.0 %
95 NUMSEC 18 6276 1.5 % 2.005E-05 -44.5 %
96 NUMSEC 20 6172 -0.2 % 2.417E-05 -33.2 %
97 SC7111I1 4.2347 6185 0.1 % 3.901E-05 7.9 %
98 SC7111I1 4.6084 6222 0.7 % 3.093E-05 -14.5 %
99 SC7111I1 5.3557 6289 1.7 % 5.524E-05 52.8 %
100 SC7111I1 5.7293 5994 -3.0 % 3.289E-05 -9.1 %
101 SC7111I2 467.50 6314 2.1 % 2.620E-05 -27.6 %

84
Case ID Parameter Value T_FCV [s] T_FCV [%] CS_ENV [-] CS_ENV [%]
102 SC7111I2 508.75 6165 -0.3 % 2.815E-05 -22.1 %
103 SC7111I2 591.25 6175 -0.1 % 4.789E-05 32.4 %
104 SC7111I2 632.50 6276 1.5 % 4.132E-05 14.3 %
105 SC7111CS1 3.0745 6257 1.2 % 3.261E-05 -9.8 %
106 SC7111CS1 3.3458 6255 1.2 % 2.719E-05 -24.8 %
107 SC7111CS1 3.8883 6449 4.3 % 3.652E-05 1.0 %
108 SC7111CS1 4.1595 6061 -2.0 % 4.478E-05 23.8 %
109 SC7111CS2 82.450 6151 -0.5 % 2.465E-05 -31.8 %
110 SC7111CS2 89.773 6041 -2.3 % 2.347E-05 -35.1 %
111 SC7111CS2 104.275 5855 -5.3 % 5.241E-05 44.9 %
112 SC7111CS2 111.550 6165 -0.3 % 3.783E-05 4.6 %
113 SC7170CS 3.3575 6055 -2.0 % 4.400E-05 21.7 %
114 SC7170CS 3.6538 6311 2.1 % 2.923E-05 -19.2 %
115 SC7170CS 4.2463 6267 1.4 % 3.151E-05 -12.9 %
116 SC7170CS 4.5425 5941 -3.9 % 3.615E-05 0.0 %
117 SC7170CSI3 0.374 6248 1.1 % 3.111E-05 -14.0 %
118 SC7170CSI3 0.407 6207 0.4 % 3.229E-05 -10.7 %
119 SC7170CSI3 0.473 6197 0.3 % 4.063E-05 12.4 %
120 SC7170CSI3 0.506 6196 0.2 % 5.231E-05 44.6 %
121 SC7170CSI4 1.9125 6167 -0.2 % 2.598E-05 -28.2 %
122 SC7170CSI4 2.0813 6020 -2.6 % 3.862E-05 6.8 %
123 SC7170CSI4 2.4188 6392 3.4 % 3.325E-05 -8.1 %
124 SC7170CSI4 2.5875 6331 2.4 % 3.462E-05 -4.3 %
125 SC715010 1.50 5984 -3.2 % 3.972E-05 9.8 %
126 SC715010 2.00 6087 -1.5 % 3.438E-05 -4.9 %
127 SC715010 2.50 6180 0.0 % 2.243E-05 -38.0 %
128 SC715010 3.00 6061 -2.0 % 3.636E-05 0.5 %
129 SC715111 2.9325 6119 -1.0 % 2.160E-05 -40.3 %
130 SC715111 3.1913 6271 1.5 % 3.480E-05 -3.8 %
131 SC715111 3.7088 6320 2.2 % 3.704E-05 2.4 %
132 SC715111 3.9675 6279 1.6 % 2.664E-05 -26.3 %
133 SC71521 5.00E-03 6137 -0.7 % 3.235E-05 -10.5 %
134 SC71521 5.75E-03 6179 0.0 % 2.772E-05 -23.3 %
135 SC71521 6.50E-03 6146 -0.6 % 3.618E-05 0.0 %
136 SC71521 7.25E-03 6068 -1.8 % 3.004E-05 -16.9 %
137 SC71521 8.00E-03 6259 1.3 % 3.048E-05 -15.7 %
138 SC71531 6.6900 6160 -0.4 % 3.524E-05 -2.6 %

85
 Case ID Parameter Value T_FCV [s] T_FCV [%] CS_ENV [-] CS_ENV [%]
139 SC71531 7.2853 6161 -0.3 % 4.577E-05 26.6 %
140 SC71531 8.4667 6132 -0.8 % 2.473E-05 -31.6 %
141 SC71531 9.0574 6153 -0.5 % 2.723E-05 -24.7 %
142 SC71551 1.5230 5892 -4.7 % 3.908E-05 8.1 %
143 SC71551 1.6574 6120 -1.0 % 2.730E-05 -24.5 %
144 SC71551 1.9262 6003 -2.9 % 5.274E-05 45.8 %
145 SC71551 2.0606 5884 -4.8 % 4.870E-05 34.7 %
146 SC71555 0.9968 6035 -2.4 % 5.128E-05 41.8 %
147 SC71555 1.0535 6170 -0.2 % 2.275E-05 -37.1 %
148 SC71555 1.2244 6158 -0.4 % 2.635E-05 -27.2 %
149 SC71555 1.3098 6236 0.9 % 2.965E-05 -18.0 %
150 SC71542 2.5593E-03 6164 -0.3 % 2.281E-05 -36.9 %
151 SC71542 2.7851E-03 5870 -5.0 % 2.494E-05 -31.0 %
152 SC71542 3.2368E-03 6042 -2.2 % 3.358E-05 -7.2 %
153 SC71542 3.4626E-03 6097 -1.4 % 3.751E-05 3.7 %
154 SC71568 -1.9728E-03 6120 -1.0 % 4.542E-05 25.6 %
155 SC71568 -2.1469E-03 6319 2.2 % 2.665E-05 -26.3 %
156 SC71568 -2.4950E-03 6173 -0.1 % 3.160E-05 -12.6 %
157 SC71568 -2.6691E-03 6375 3.1 % 4.865E-05 34.5 %
158 MVSSDF 100 6270 1.4 % 2.666E-04 637.2 %
159 MVSSDF 200 6270 1.4 % 1.360E-04 276.1 %
160 MVSSDF 300 6270 1.4 % 8.945E-05 147.3 %
161 MVSSDF 400 6270 1.4 % 6.560E-05 81.4 %
162 DECAYH 0.94 6542 5.8 % 3.526E-05 -2.5 %
163 DECAYH 0.97 6350 2.7 % 2.455E-05 -32.1 %
164 DECAYH 1.03 5692 -7.9 % 3.874E-05 7.1 %
165 DECAYH 1.06 5711 -7.6 % 4.098E-05 13.3 %
Median 6181 3.616E-05

The FCV starting times are plotted in Figure 7-15 along with the median of all cases.

86
 Figure 7-15. The opening times of filtered containment venting by case ID, and the median of all cases.

In most cases, the effect of the parameter variations on the FCV opening times appears to be
small. Some larger deviations can be observed in the variations of parameters SC710641,
CORNSBLD, VFALL, HFRZSS, HFRZZR, SC11412 and DECAYH. The most notable
deviation occurs when VFALL = 0.01. However, a closer look reveals that the LHF occurs
around the same time as in the other cases (t = 5980 s) and that the delay in the start of FCV is
caused by the slow accumulation of melt in the lower head. The melt ejection does not begin
before there is at least 5000 kg of melt in the lower plenum, or at least 10 % of the materials
in the lower plenum are molten.
The release of cesium during the simulation period is presented in Figure 7-16.

87
Figure 7-16. The total release of cesium as a function of time in simulated cases. The dashed black curve
represents the cesium release during the reference case, and the dashed red line represents the median of
the total cesium releases.

By far the largest releases were obtained by reducing the DF of the filtered venting system
(the MVSSDF parameter). This is an obvious result, since almost all of the Cs is released
through the venting system, and the role of the containment leakage is very small in this
scenario.
In almost all cases, changing the parameter values unexpectedly resulted into lower cesium
releases than in the reference case. As shown in Table 7-3 and Figure 7-16 , the median of the
release is 33% lower than the release in the reference case. At least a partial reason is that in
the reference case, a significant amount of MCCI occurred in the pedestal, generating
hydrogen and thereby increasing the flow rate through the filtered venting system. In many
variant cases, little or no MCCI occurred. The severe accident management strategy of
Olkiluoto 1&2 aims at preventing MCCI by flooding the pedestal before the melt ejection, but
MELCOR does not have models for particle bed formation and coolability. The irregular
variation of the MCCI obscures the effect of the varied parameters on the Cs release. In next
year's studies, the concrete erosion will be switched off in the Cavity package, in order to
obtain comparable results.
The cesium release can also be observed changing rather irregularly between the variants of
almost all the parameters. Due to this behavior and the lower Cs releases, it is difficult to
point out which parameter variations have the highest impact on the simulation results.
Therefore, only the large and irregular deviations are highlighted in Table 7-3. This result
highlights that investigating the effect of certain parameters on the results would require a
large number of calculations, which would allow a statistical analysis of the results to see if

88
there is a correlation or not. Choosing any single calculation as a reference case may not be
justified because all calculations involve some random variation ("numerical noise").
7.3.VG results
Results of MELCOR simulations performed by VG during the project are described in the
following sections. The following accident sequences have been studied:
• RC7A – Station blackout leading to filtered venting
• RC8 – Recovered station blackout leading to diffuse leakage
• RC7B – Feedwater line LOCA and station blackout, leading to filtered venting
• RC5 – LOCA with failing PS function and failure to close unfiltered venting line

Based on typical PSA results after introduction of independent core cooling systems, it should
be noted that the two latter sequences for internal events represent release categories with
very low frequencies; numbers lower than 10-8 and 10-11 per reactor year respectively are not
unreasonable. They have been included to study sequences that from a deterministic analysis
perspective represent reasonable worst-case limits for release paths that are fully represented
in the models.
7.3.1. RC7A – Station blackout leading to filtered venting
The accident sequence was defined by the following system availabilities:
• Reactor shutdown is successful at t=0.
• AFW, ECCS, RHR and CSS are all assumed unavailable from t=0.
• ADS is initiated according to standard control logic.
• LDW flooding system is initiated according to standard control logic.
• FCV opens when the containment pressure exceeds 5.5 bar (absolute).

Selected results for all bounding analysis cases are shown in Figure 7-17 - Figure 7-23. It can
be noted that FCV opening times range from 4 to 7 h from initiating event, however with
most cases within 5 to 6 h, see Figure 7-19. The time from lower head failure to FCV
opening, for the base case amounting to almost 3 h, is in this respect substantial, as a typical
assumption in PSA is that FCV opening occurs at the time of lower head failure, see Figure
7-23.
An overview of parameter significance in terms of relative differences compared to the best
estimate case in selected figures of merit is given in

89
Table 7-4. These results will be used for screening of parameters for sensitivity analysis in the
next project phase. The parameters whose bounding cases lead to the 9 largest absolute
variations in total Cs release are highlighted in the table.

90
 Table 7-4. RC7A bounding analyses parameter significance
T_FCV H2
Case T_FCV T_LHF CS_ENV I_ENV
Parameter Value -T_LHF COR
ID [h] [h] [-] [-]
[h] [kg]
Best estimate 0 5.61 2.90 2.71 527.0 5.58E-06 3.32E-04
SC710611 5.00E-08 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC710621 2.50E-07 2 -6% -21% 10% -16% 40% 91%
SC710641 2.41E+05 3 19% 26% 12% -1% 52% -70%
SC710651 1.00E-05 4 -6% -2% -11% 1% 11% 18%
TFFAIL 5.00E-01 5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TFFAIL 1.50E+00 6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TZRSSINC 1.70E+03 7 5% 1% 9% 8% 18% -18%
TUO2ZRO2 2.80E+03 8 3% 3% 4% -2% 33% 10%
FCELRA 2.50E-01 9 -8% 6% -23% 18% 36% 12%
PDPOR 3.00E-01 10 8% -3% 21% -19% 36% 57%
PDPOR 5.00E-01 11 1% -22% 25% -1% 51% 4%
CORNSBLD 1.70E+03 12 -3% -3% -3% 14% 34% 100%
VFALL 1.00E-01 13 -13% -21% -5% -22% 28% 100%
SC10201 1.80E+02 14 1% -4% 6% 23% 56% 47%
SC10201 7.20E+02 15 1% -16% 21% -12% 41% 111%
SC10202 3.00E+01 16 -3% -1% -5% 5% 35% 5%
SC10202 1.20E+02 17 0% 6% -5% 15% 22% -27%
HFRZSS 1.00E+03 18 -8% -9% -7% 5% 5% -1%
HFRZZR 1.00E+03 19 2% -3% 9% -3% 28% 87%
SC11312 2.10E+03 20 6% 5% 7% -8% 21% 91%
SC11312 2.54E+03 21 5% 28% -21% -2% 23% -63%
SC11412 1.00E+00 22 -14% -11% -17% -19% 26% 144%
DHYPDLP 5.00E-03 23 -1% -2% 1% 9% 58% 56%
HDBH2O 2.00E+02 24 -3% -1% -5% 7% 74% 67%
TPFAIL 1.60E+03 25 32% 78% -18% 12% 88% 110%
HDBPN 1.00E+03 26 7% -15% 31% -6% 57% 196%
CHI 3.00E+00 27 -7% 1% -16% 4% 202% 35%
GAMMA 3.00E+00 28 -6% -11% -2% 5% -71% -25%
STICK 5.00E-01 29 3% -15% 23% -6% 124% 155%
RHONOM 4.90E+03 30 -11% -5% -19% 5% 11% 130%
NUMSEC 20 31 -5% -6% -5% 17% -2% 12%
TURBDS 7.50E-04 32 -10% 1% -22% 8% 76% 75%
TURBDS 1.25E-03 33 8% -21% 38% 1% 47% 168%
SC7111I1 4.24E+00 34 0% -5% 5% -10% 32% 34%
SC7111I1 5.73E+00 35 -5% -13% 4% -14% 59% 97%
SC7111I2 4.68E+02 36 6% -16% 29% 25% 45% 119%
SC7111I2 6.33E+02 37 2% -8% 12% 15% 47% 109%
SC7111CS1 3.08E+00 38 -2% -9% 6% -17% 40% 132%
SC7111CS1 4.16E+00 39 4% -5% 13% -7% 33% 87%
SC7111CS2 8.25E+01 40 -2% -13% 10% -1% 70% 115%

91
 T_FCV H2
Case T_FCV T_LHF CS_ENV I_ENV
Parameter Value -T_LHF COR
ID [h] [h] [-] [-]
[h] [kg]
SC7111CS2 1.12E+02 41 -1% -8% 6% -11% 52% 99%
SC7170CS 3.36E+00 42 6% -5% 17% 12% 78% 160%
SC7170CS 4.54E+00 43 10% 6% 14% 0% 19% 5%
SC7170CSI3 3.74E-01 44 -4% -6% -2% -10% 27% 137%
SC7170CSI3 5.06E-01 45 -25% 7% -59% 6% 74% 14%
SC7170CSI4 1.91E+00 46 22% 31% 13% -1% 127% 58%
SC7170CSI4 2.59E+00 47 -3% -7% 1% 2% 22% 58%
SC7170CSM 5.70E-01 48 8% -2% 18% -2% 51% 67%
SC7170CSM 7.71E-01 49 -11% -8% -14% 2% 16% 127%
DIAMO 1.00E-04 50 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DIAMO 2.00E-03 51 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC715010 3.00E+00 52 3% -4% 9% -10% 11% 108%
SC715111 2.93E+00 53 4% -18% 27% -15% 52% 147%
SC715111 3.97E+00 54 25% 40% 9% -17% -2% -82%
SC71521 5.00E-03 55 6% 2% 10% 12% 28% 2%
SC71521 8.00E-03 56 -3% -7% 1% 5% 15% 88%
SC71531 6.70E+00 57 -4% -3% -5% 11% 23% 67%
SC71531 9.06E+00 58 1% -7% 10% -14% 64% 218%
SC71551 1.52E+00 59 -1% 6% -9% -4% 10% 10%
SC71551 2.06E+00 60 10% -17% 39% -3% 79% 127%
SC71555 9.68E-01 61 6% -2% 16% 1% 18% 100%
SC71555 1.31E+00 62 -4% -11% 2% 4% 57% 92%
SC71542 2.56E-03 63 5% 3% 8% 4% 33% 6%
SC71542 3.46E-03 64 -6% -10% -2% 2% 52% 40%
SC71568 -2.67E-03 65 -7% -7% -6% -3% 2% 30%
SC71568 -1.97E-03 66 2% -5% 10% 7% 25% 109%
SC7157 8.50E-01 67 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC7157 1.15E+00 68 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
OXM 4 69 -3% -8% 1% -14% 62% 90%
IDEJ 1 70 10% 0% 20% 15% 93% 108%
MVSSDF 1.00E+02 71 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 4%
SC3210* 1.15E+00 72 -12% -9% -15% 12% 46% 119%
CORSOR-
BOOTH -7
ICRLSE 73 20% 8% 32% -1% -18% 62%

92
 Figure 7-17. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - containment pressure.

Figure 7-18. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – filtered containment venting flow rate.

93
Figure 7-19. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model –filtered containment venting opening times.

Figure 7-20. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total hydrogen masses from COR package.

94
Figure 7-21. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Caesium release fractions to environment.

Figure 7-22. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Iodine release fractions to environment.

95
Figure 7-23. RC7A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – time delays from lower head failure to opening
of filtered containment venting.

96
 7.3.2. RC8 – Recovered station blackout leading to diffuse leakage
The accident sequence was defined by the following system availabilities:
• Reactor shutdown is successful at t=0.
• AFW, ECCS, RHR and CSS are all assumed unavailable from t = 0 h.
• ECCS, RHR and CSS are assumed recovered at t = 2 h.
• ADS is initiated according to standard control logic.
• LDW flooding system is initiated according to standard control logic.
• FCV opens if the containment pressure exceeds 5.5 bar (absolute).

Selected results for all bounding analysis cases are shown in Figure 7-24 - Figure 7-27.
An overview of parameter significance in terms of relative differences compared to the best
estimate case in selected figures of merit is given in Table 7-5. These results will be used for
screening of parameters for sensitivity analysis in the next project phase. The parameters
whose bounding cases lead to the 9 largest absolute variations in total Cs release are
highlighted in the table.

97
 Table 7-5. RC8 bounding analyses parameter significance
H2 COR
Parameter Value CaseID CS_ENV[-] I_ENV[-] T_LHF [h]
[kg]
Best estimate 0 419.0 9.5E-07 2.0E-06 3.03
SC710611 5.00E-08 1 -30% 7% -25% N/A
SC710621 2.50E-07 2 -37% -46% -62% N/A
SC710641 2.41E+05 3 -37% 86% 0% N/A
SC710651 1.00E-05 4 -34% -36% -56% N/A
TFFAIL 5.00E-01 5 -30% 7% -25% N/A
TFFAIL 1.50E+00 6 -30% 7% -25% N/A
TZRSSINC 1.70E+03 7 -32% 0% -33% N/A
TUO2ZRO2 2.80E+03 8 20% 36% 176% 2.86
FCELRA 2.50E-01 9 -16% 8% -22% N/A
PDPOR 3.00E-01 10 -26% 13% -20% N/A
PDPOR 5.00E-01 11 18% 78% 159% 2.25
CORNSBLD 1.70E+03 12 -26% 17% -15% N/A
VFALL 1.00E-01 13 -34% -11% -41% N/A
SC10201 1.80E+02 14 -29% 9% -24% N/A
SC10201 7.20E+02 15 -4% 16% -13% 3.17
SC10202 3.00E+01 16 -26% 13% -19% N/A
SC10202 1.20E+02 17 -27% 16% -17% N/A
HFRZSS 1.00E+03 18 -37% -14% -45% N/A
HFRZZR 1.00E+03 19 -30% 12% -21% N/A
SC11312 2.10E+03 20 -22% 18% -15% N/A
SC11312 2.54E+03 21 -28% 17% -17% N/A
SC11412 1.00E+00 22 -33% 15% -21% N/A
DHYPDLP 5.00E-03 23 -29% 8% -25% N/A
HDBH2O 2.00E+02 24 -30% 7% -25% N/A
TPFAIL 1.60E+03 25 -30% 7% -25% N/A
HDBPN 1.00E+03 26 -30% 7% -25% N/A
CHI 3.00E+00 27 -31% 18% -24% N/A
GAMMA 3.00E+00 28 -22% -77% -88% N/A
STICK 5.00E-01 29 -35% 4% -31% N/A
RHONOM 4.90E+03 30 -35% 6% -26% N/A
NUMSEC 20 31 -22% 0% -28% N/A
TURBDS 7.50E-04 32 -34% -7% -37% N/A
TURBDS 1.25E-03 33 16% 55% 130% 2.29
SC7111I1 4.24E+00 34 36% 13% 18% 2.57
SC7111I1 5.73E+00 35 -31% 9% -23% N/A
SC7111I2 4.68E+02 36 -24% 21% -9% N/A
SC7111I2 6.33E+02 37 -28% 11% -22% N/A
SC7111CS1 3.08E+00 38 -29% 8% -24% N/A
SC7111CS1 4.16E+00 39 -29% 14% -20% N/A
SC7111CS2 8.25E+01 40 -29% 16% -14% N/A
SC7111CS2 1.12E+02 41 -29% 5% -27% N/A

98
 H2 COR
Parameter Value CaseID CS_ENV[-] I_ENV[-] T_LHF [h]
[kg]
SC7170CS 3.36E+00 42 -28% 13% -21% N/A
SC7170CS 4.54E+00 43 -28% 8% -20% N/A
SC7170CSI3 3.74E-01 44 -29% 15% -16% N/A
SC7170CSI3 5.06E-01 45 -29% 2% -32% N/A
SC7170CSI4 1.91E+00 46 -31% 8% -28% N/A
SC7170CSI4 2.59E+00 47 -29% 14% -20% N/A
SC7170CSM 5.70E-01 48 16% 104% 204% 2.05
SC7170CSM 7.71E-01 49 -29% 14% -21% N/A
DIAMO 1.00E-04 50 -28% 10% -17% N/A
DIAMO 2.00E-03 51 -28% 33% 1% N/A
SC715010 3.00E+00 52 -30% -7% -33% N/A
SC715111 2.93E+00 53 22% 7% 27% 2.43
SC715111 3.97E+00 54 -32% -23% -50% N/A
SC71521 5.00E-03 55 -33% -15% -44% N/A
SC71521 8.00E-03 56 -32% 1% -32% N/A
SC71531 6.70E+00 57 -31% 24% -14% N/A
SC71531 9.06E+00 58 -34% -26% -51% N/A
SC71551 1.52E+00 59 -28% 17% -17% N/A
SC71551 2.06E+00 60 23% 69% 71% 2.31
SC71555 9.68E-01 61 -33% 11% -20% N/A
SC71555 1.31E+00 62 -29% 23% -15% N/A
SC71542 2.56E-03 63 -27% 15% -20% N/A
SC71542 3.46E-03 64 9% 2% 52% 2.72
-2.67E-
SC71568 65 -25% 13% -17%
03 N/A
-1.97E-
SC71568 66 -35% -25% -52%
03 N/A
SC7157 8.50E-01 67 -28% 15% -13% N/A
SC7157 1.15E+00 68 -28% 15% -13% N/A
OXM 4 69 -31% 11% -20% N/A
IDEJ 1 70 -28% 15% -13% N/A
MVSSDF 1.00E+02 71 -28% 15% -13% N/A
SC3210* 1.15E+00 72 -22% 68% 24% N/A
CORSOR-
BOOTH -7 73 -15% -33% -53%
ICRLSE N/A

99
 Figure 7-24. RC8 in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - containment pressure.

Figure 7-25. RC8 in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total hydrogen masses from COR package.

100
Figure 7-26. RC8 in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Caesium release fractions to environment.

Figure 7-27. RC8 in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Iodine release fractions to environment.

101
 7.3.3. RC7B – Feedwater line LOCA and station blackout, leading to filtered venting
The accident sequence was defined by the following system availabilities:
• Feedwater line LOCA with successful reactor shutdown at t=0.
(Subsequent feedwater isolation valve closure assumed successful.)
• AFW, ECCS, RHR and CSS are all assumed unavailable from t=0.
• ADS is initiated according to standard control logic.
• LDW flooding system is initiated according to standard control logic.
• FCV opens when the containment pressure exceeds 5.5 bar (absolute).

Selected results for all bounding analysis cases are shown in Figure 7-28 - Figure 7-34. It can
be noted that FCV opening times range approximately from 1,5 to 5 h from initiating event,
see Figure 7-30. The time from lower head failure to FCV opening, is generally not as large as
for the SBO case, however with some cases still resulting in a delay of about 3 h, see Figure
7-34.
An overview of parameter significance in terms of relative differences compared to the best
estimate case in selected figures of merit is given in Table 7-6. These results will be used for
screening of parameters for sensitivity analysis in the next project phase. The parameters
whose bounding cases lead to the 9 largest absolute variations in total Cs release are
highlighted in the table.

102
 Table 7-6. RC7B bounding analyses parameter significance
T_FCV H2
Case T_FCV T_LHF CS_ENV I_ENV
Parameter Value -T_LHF COR
ID [h] [h] [-] [-]
[h] [kg]
Best estimate 0 3.64 1.76 1.88 508.1 6.21E-04 4.38E-04
SC710611 5.00E-08 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC710621 2.50E-07 2 6% -23% 33% 17% -70% -56%
SC710641 2.41E+05 3 -43% 27% -108% -16% -65% -39%
SC710651 1.00E-05 4 -54% -8% -97% 26% -87% -73%
TFFAIL 5.00E-01 5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TFFAIL 1.50E+00 6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TZRSSINC 1.70E+03 7 -45% 14% -100% 23% -60% -52%
TUO2ZRO2 2.80E+03 8 21% -1% 42% 44% -78% -60%
FCELRA 2.50E-01 9 30% 22% 37% -13% -14% -7%
PDPOR 3.00E-01 10 30% -17% 74% 12% 49% 36%
PDPOR 5.00E-01 11 -52% 7% -108% 28% -77% -66%
CORNSBLD 1.70E+03 12 -47% 6% -97% 34% -49% -25%
VFALL 1.00E-01 13 18% -3% 38% -18% -53% -51%
SC10201 1.80E+02 14 -7% 2% -16% -25% -57% -48%
SC10201 7.20E+02 15 4% -2% 9% -5% -68% -68%
SC10202 3.00E+01 16 12% 4% 20% -3% -75% -66%
SC10202 1.20E+02 17 0% 69% -64% 11% 72% 54%
HFRZSS 1.00E+03 18 27% -15% 67% -9% -62% -61%
HFRZZR 1.00E+03 19 25% -2% 50% -3% -78% -73%
SC11312 2.10E+03 20 -50% 9% -105% 30% -42% -21%
SC11312 2.54E+03 21 -48% 17% -108% -14% -77% -70%
SC11412 1.00E+00 22 1% -15% 17% -5% -84% -80%
DHYPDLP 5.00E-03 23 3% -5% 12% -1% 41% 31%
HDBH2O 2.00E+02 24 8% 1% 16% 4% 26% 20%
TPFAIL 1.60E+03 25 -41% 30% -107% 4% 209% 159%
HDBPN 1.00E+03 26 -45% -15% -73% 2% -78% -54%
CHI 3.00E+00 27 -55% 0% -107% 6% -79% -70%
GAMMA 3.00E+00 28 -36% 29% -97% 19% -61% -44%
STICK 5.00E-01 29 -20% -3% -37% 12% -83% -67%
RHONOM 4.90E+03 30 8% -21% 36% 36% -78% -65%
NUMSEC 20 31 -46% 9% -98% 23% -79% -63%
TURBDS 7.50E-04 32 18% 0% 35% -18% -73% -69%
TURBDS 1.25E-03 33 -49% 10% -105% 31% -84% -72%
SC7111I1 4.24E+00 34 -53% 0% -102% 3% -69% -53%
SC7111I1 5.73E+00 35 -10% 12% -31% 7% -58% -48%
SC7111I2 4.68E+02 36 -26% 0% -51% -29% -85% -62%
SC7111I2 6.33E+02 37 24% -15% 62% -2% -60% -57%
SC7111CS1 3.08E+00 38 -42% 35% -115% -5% -71% -41%
SC7111CS1 4.16E+00 39 -52% -1% -100% 22% -78% -63%
SC7111CS2 8.25E+01 40 19% 1% 36% 2% -68% -42%

103
SC7111CS2 1.12E+02 41 -23% -1% -44% -6% -81% -67%
SC7170CS 3.36E+00 42 -54% 1% -105% 36% -68% -54%
SC7170CS 4.54E+00 43 -2% 13% -15% 8% -73% -69%
SC7170CSI3 3.74E-01 44 -12% -6% -17% -11% -85% -61%
SC7170CSI3 5.06E-01 45 43% -8% 90% -7% -42% -45%
SC7170CSI4 1.91E+00 46 15% 5% 24% 8% -67% -37%
SC7170CSI4 2.59E+00 47 -55% -2% -105% 55% -80% -67%
SC7170CS
5.70E-01
M 48 -57% -12% -98% 25% -85% -72%
SC7170CS
7.71E-01
M 49 20% 11% 29% 4% -73% -64%
DIAMO 1.00E-04 50 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DIAMO 2.00E-03 51 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC715010 3.00E+00 52 21% 10% 32% 13% -40% -34%
SC715111 2.93E+00 53 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC715111 3.97E+00 54 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC71521 5.00E-03 55 -53% 15% -118% -26% -89% -82%
SC71521 8.00E-03 56 15% -9% 38% 7% 11% 8%
SC71531 6.70E+00 57 11% 15% 7% 30% -56% -41%
SC71531 9.06E+00 58 2% 6% -1% 12% 200% 177%
SC71551 1.52E+00 59 6% 4% 8% 6% -78% -72%
SC71551 2.06E+00 60 -4% 4% -12% 12% -77% -52%
SC71555 9.68E-01 61 -29% -14% -44% -37% -89% -78%
SC71555 1.31E+00 62 -49% 9% -103% 25% -82% -72%
SC71542 2.56E-03 63 -19% -5% -31% 36% -56% -41%
SC71542 3.46E-03 64 38% 4% 69% 7% 168% 134%
SC71568 -2.67E-03 65 -50% 1% -98% 38% -62% -35%
SC71568 -1.97E-03 66 13% 2% 24% 0% -62% -61%
SC7157 8.50E-01 67 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SC7157 1.15E+00 68 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
OXM 4 69 1% 11% -9% 8% -12% -5%
IDEJ 1 70 113% -22% 240% 17% 4903% 6205%
MVSSDF 1.00E+02 71 0% 0% 0% 0% 31% 75%
SC3210* 1.15E+00 72 6% -10% 20% -21% -44% -39%
CORSOR-
BOOTH -7
ICRLSE 73 18% -5% 40% -12% 148% 103%

104
 Figure 7-28. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - containment pressure.

Figure 7-29. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – filtered containment venting flow rate.

105
Figure 7-30. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model –filtered containment venting opening times.

Figure 7-31. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total hydrogen masses from COR package.

106
Figure 7-32. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Caesium release fractions to environment.

Figure 7-33. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Iodine release fractions to environment.

107
Figure 7-34. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – time delays from lower head failure to opening
of filtered containment venting.
The results presented in Figure 7-32 show quite significant difference in the fraction of Cs
released to the environment in Case 70 (IDEJ = 1) compared to the rest of the results. IDEJ is
the modelling switch that limits the mode of debris ejection from the vessel (see section 5.7
for more details) to (i) in case of IDEJ = 1- only molten materials; (ii) in case of IDEJ = 0
(default) – both molten and solid materials. Effectively it means that in case of IDEJ =1 the
UO2/ZrO2 debris will remain in vessel until either complete remelting or vessel lower head
failure due to creep-rupture.
The exposed debris in the vessel will heat-up the atmosphere inside the vessel and the
containment (Figure 7-35) which can lead to revaporization of the aerosols suspended in the
vessel/containment atmosphere.

Figure 7-35. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – atmosphere temperature in the containment.

108
The MELCOR model of Swedish BWR employs the Multi Venturi Scrubber System (MVSS)
implemented as a simple filter with constant decontamination factor DF=500 for aerosols (see
section 5.10.2 for more details). It means that the radioactive vapours will be released to the
environment without any filtering/decontamination.
An additional sensitivity calculation was performed for the Case 70 with DF = 500 for both
aerosols and vapours (excluding noble gases, i.e. DF=1 for RN class 1 (Xe) – always released
as vapour). Figure 7-36 shows the comparison of the fraction of Cs released to the
environment with (i) only aerosols filtering (Orange – NVF) and (ii) both aerosols and
vapours filtering (Blue – WVF). The release of Cs to the environment is almost two orders of
magnitude smaller in case of both aerosols and vapours filtering than in case of aerosols
filtering only, which is also reflected in the fraction of Cs deposited in the MVSS filter
illustrated in Figure 7-37.

Figure 7-36. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – Case 70 (IDEJ = 1) – fraction of Cs released to
the environment.

Figure 7-37. RC7B in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – Case 70 (IDEJ = 1) – fraction of Cs deposited in
the MVSS system.

109
The results presented above indicate quite significant effect of the modelling of MVSS
system, modelling of the mode of debris ejection from the vessel on the containment and
environmental source terms.
7.3.4. RC5A – LOCA with failing PS function and failure to close unfiltered
containment venting line
The accident sequence was defined by the following system availabilities:
• Feedwater line LOCA with successful reactor shutdown at t=0.
(Subsequent feedwater isolation valve closure assumed successful.)
• 75% of the blowdown pipes cross-section area is assumed unavailable, thereby
deteriorating the PS function.
• AFW, ECCS, RHR and CSS are all assumed unavailable from t=0.
• ADS is initiated according to standard control logic.
• LDW flooding system is initiated according to standard control logic.
• FCV and unfiltered containment venting opens when the containment pressure exceeds
5.5 bar and 6.5 bar (absolute) respectively.
• Automatic valve closure in the unfiltered containment venting line fails.

To evaluate the effect of containment pressure response in case of LB-LOCA with partially
degraded PS-function, a set of simulations was performed with (a) 25%, (b) 50% and (c) 75%
of the total flow area in the blowdown pipes. The results, presented in Figure 7-38, show that
a LB-LOCA would lead to the opening of the rupture disk in the containment venting line in
case of 75% reduction of the blowdown pipes flow area (PS function 25%). In case of 50%
reduction of the blowdown pipes flow area, the maximum pressure is very close to the
pressure setpoint of the containment venting line, thus a reduction of >50% is very likely to
lead to the venting line opening.

Figure 7-38. Containment pressure response at LB-LOCA with (black curve) 25%, (red curve) 50%,
(green curve) 75% of the blowdown pipes flow area.
Selected results for all bounding analysis cases are shown in Figure 7-39 - Figure 7-42.

110
An overview of parameter significance in terms of relative differences compared to the best
estimate case in selected figures of merit is given in Table 7-7. These results will be used for
screening of parameters for sensitivity analysis in the next project phase. The parameters
whose bounding cases lead to the 9 largest absolute variations in total Cs release are
highlighted in the table.

111
 Table 7-7. RC5A bounding analyses parameter significance
Parameter Value CaseID T_LHF [h] H2 COR [kg] CS_ENV[-] I_ENV[-]
Best estimate 0 1.8 477.8 3.4E-01 3.6E-01
SC710611 5.00E-08 1 -2% -16% 2% 1%
SC710621 2.50E-07 2 15% 1% 12% 17%
SC710641 2.41E+05 3 12% 88% -6% -13%
SC710651 1.00E-05 4 -19% 0% 10% 15%
TFFAIL 5.00E-01 5 -2% -16% 2% 1%
TFFAIL 1.50E+00 6 -2% -16% 2% 1%
TZRSSINC 1.70E+03 7 1% 52% 2% 0%
TUO2ZRO2 2.80E+03 8 -5% -6% -1% -4%
FCELRA 2.50E-01 9 15% 32% 3% 5%
PDPOR 3.00E-01 10 12% 15% -2% -5%
PDPOR 5.00E-01 11 -32% 43% 42% 46%
CORNSBLD 1.70E+03 12 21% 41% 2% 2%
VFALL 1.00E-01 13 7% -2% -3% 6%
SC10201 1.80E+02 14 7% 37% 3% 2%
SC10201 7.20E+02 15 12% 29% -2% -3%
SC10202 3.00E+01 16 -11% 6% 9% 8%
SC10202 1.20E+02 17 9% 7% 3% -1%
HFRZSS 1.00E+03 18 -5% 10% -2% -3%
HFRZZR 1.00E+03 19 14% 35% -5% -4%
SC11312 2.10E+03 20 1% -2% -6% -5%
SC11312 2.54E+03 21 9% 15% -3% -3%
SC11412 1.00E+00 22 21% -5% 4% 1%
DHYPDLP 5.00E-03 23 10% -15% -5% -6%
HDBH2O 2.00E+02 24 -2% -20% -3% -6%
TPFAIL 1.60E+03 25 10% -20% -1% -4%
HDBPN 1.00E+03 26 -14% 27% -2% -3%
CHI 3.00E+00 27 3% 32% 22% 14%
GAMMA 3.00E+00 28 17% 0% -27% -24%
STICK 5.00E-01 29 -14% -5% 6% 2%
RHONOM 4.90E+03 30 10% 15% 3% 4%
NUMSEC 20 31 -2% 22% 1% -2%
TURBDS 7.50E-04 32 2% 10% -1% 1%
TURBDS 1.25E-03 33 0% 5% 5% 3%
SC7111I1 4.24E+00 34 51% 8% 10% 3%
SC7111I1 5.73E+00 35 16% 12% 0% -2%
SC7111I2 4.68E+02 36 0% 75% -1% -3%
SC7111I2 6.33E+02 37 11% 37% -2% -3%
SC7111CS1 3.08E+00 38 45% 26% 9% 7%
SC7111CS1 4.16E+00 39 22% 0% 3% 4%
SC7111CS2 8.25E+01 40 9% 15% 3% 1%
SC7111CS2 1.12E+02 41 -4% 16% 6% 7%
SC7170CS 3.36E+00 42 5% 28% 0% -1%

112
Parameter Value CaseID T_LHF [h] H2 COR [kg] CS_ENV[-] I_ENV[-]
SC7170CS 4.54E+00 43 15% 39% -3% -5%
SC7170CSI3 3.74E-01 44 -11% -19% 2% 1%
SC7170CSI3 5.06E-01 45 12% 7% 5% 4%
SC7170CSI4 1.91E+00 46 -1% 19% 6% 4%
SC7170CSI4 2.59E+00 47 25% 21% 3% 4%
SC7170CSM 5.70E-01 48 10% 41% -3% -6%
SC7170CSM 7.71E-01 49 12% 29% -2% -5%
DIAMO 1.00E-04 50 -2% -16% 2% 1%
DIAMO 2.00E-03 51 -2% -16% 2% 1%
SC715010 3.00E+00 52 -1% 5% -3% -4%
SC715111 2.93E+00 53 -2% -16% 2% 1%
SC715111 3.97E+00 54 -2% -16% 2% 1%
SC71521 5.00E-03 55 8% 40% -2% -2%
SC71521 8.00E-03 56 18% 10% 3% -3%
SC71531 6.70E+00 57 16% 40% 2% -2%
SC71531 9.06E+00 58 1% 7% 9% 7%
SC71551 1.52E+00 59 16% 29% -6% -1%
SC71551 2.06E+00 60 5% 32% 2% 0%
SC71555 9.68E-01 61 6% 55% 0% 0%
SC71555 1.31E+00 62 13% 30% 1% 0%
SC71542 2.56E-03 63 3% 9% 0% -2%
SC71542 3.46E-03 64 7% -1% -4% -4%
-2.67E-
SC71568 65 -2% -16% 2% 1%
03
-1.97E-
SC71568 66 -2% -16% 2% 1%
03
SC7157 8.50E-01 67 -2% -16% 2% 1%
SC7157 1.15E+00 68 -2% -16% 2% 1%
OXM 4 69 21% 2% 2% 0%
IDEJ 1 70 -2% -12% 8% 6%
MVSSDF 1.00E+02 71 -2% -16% 2% 1%
SC3210* 1.15E+00 72 12% -2% 4% 4%
CORSOR-
BOOTH -7 73 12% -2% 4% 4%
ICRLSE

113
 Figure 7-39. RC5A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model - containment pressure.

Figure 7-40. RC5A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total hydrogen masses from COR package.

114
Figure 7-41. RC5A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Caesium release fractions to environment.

Figure 7-42. RC5A in Swedish NBWR MELCOR model – total Iodine release fractions to environment.

7.3.5. Summary
Figure 7-43 illustrate, based on typical L2 PSA results and the simulations performed in this
work, a normalized frequency uncertainty distribution of RC7A (SBO), RC8, RC7B (LOCA)
and RC5 release categories, together with their respective spread of the fraction of Cs core
inventory released to the environment, as presented in figures 7-21, 7-26, 7-32 and 7-41. Note
that the spread and distribution along the frequency axis is subject to limitations and
assumptions in L1 & L2 PSA parametric uncertainty analysis while the Cs release axis
uncertainty so far is only a parameter range scoping study. Absolute frequency results of

115
operational plants are usually not cited in open sources while typical target values of 10 -5 per
year for core damage frequency and 10-7 per year for large release frequency are instructive,
see e.g. [6] for an open overview of targets in use in Sweden and Finland.
The results show that all simulations performed for RC7A (SBO), RC8 and RC5 are within
prescribed limits for respective release categories, i.e. RC7A (SBO) and RC8 belong to
acceptable release category according to the SSM MVSS design criterion, and RC5 belongs to
large early release. Simulations performed for RC7B (LOCA) show that in some MELCOR
calculations the fraction of Cs core inventory released to the environment exceed the design
criterion.

Figure 7-43. Distribution of Fraction of Cs inventory released to the environment as a function of

Distribution of normalized RC frequency.

It should be noted that the MELCOR code is quite sensitive to the maximum time step used in
analysis, thus, without proper sensitivity and uncertainty analysis the results should be
considered as indicative. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis is planned for the second phase
of the project.

116
 8. Discussion and conclusions.
The main goal of the first phase of the project was to identify a set of representative accident
scenarios and relevant deterministic modelling parameters that can affect accident progression
and the magnitude of the source term released to the environment. To achieve these goals, a
set of activities has been performed that include the review of the safety design of the
Swedish and Finnish BWRs; review of the PSA L2 for a typical Nordic BWR and
identification of risk significant accident sequences; review of severe accident phenomena and
respective modelling in the MELCOR code as well as identification of epistemic modelling
parameters that can affect severe accident progression and the source term. Furthermore, the
work includes the best-estimate and bounding assessments of the magnitude of fission
products released to the environment.
Review of the Swedish and Finnish Nordic BWR designs and respective MELCOR modelling
has been performed, to identify similarities and differences in the designs. The main
differences are the reactor thermal power (larger mass of fuel/larger decay heat in Swedish
BWR), gas volume in the containment and capacity of active safety systems. Another
important difference in the design is the possibility of filtered containment venting from both
the drywell and the wetwell in the Finnish BWR design. The filter design in itself is also
different in Sweden and Finland.
Based on the review of PSA L2 for a typical Nordic BWR design, as well as insights from the
emergency preparedness and response and national regulators, a set of risk significant
accident sequences was selected for the analysis. The selected accident sequences include
accident scenarios that lead to acceptable release (diffuse leakage from the intact containment,
filtered containment venting in case of transient or LOCA), as well as scenarios that lead to
unacceptable release (either due to containment rupture due to ex-vessel phenomena or
unfiltered containment venting in case of failed containment isolation, or containment bypass
sequences). Note that the detailed deterministic modelling of the sequences that lead to
containment rupture (failure of the hatch door in the lower drywell) or containment bypass
(IS-LOCA, un-isolated break in MSLs or transient with failed isolation of MSLs) require
detailed modelling of the systems and structures located outside the containment to obtain
more realistic/less conservative results. Current results, e.g., for RC4A or RC4B release
categories, can be considered as conservative, and can be refined in the latter phases of the
project.
In total, 50 MELCOR code parameters were selected for further analysis based on the review
of the MELCOR modelling of severe accident phenomena and uncertain epistemic
(phenomenological) modelling parameters that can affect severe accident progression and the
source term released to the environment. These parameters involved in the modelling of core
degradation and relocation, fission products release from fuel, debris behaviour in the core
region and vessel lower head, vessel lower head failure, fission products behaviour in the
RCS and the containment, as well as modelling of the filter trapping, containment sprays and
pool scrubbing.
Preliminary screening of the MELCOR code modelling parameters and accident scenarios
was performed using best-estimate + bounding assessment, where modelling parameters were
varied one-at-a-time from the default (or best-estimate) value to the minimum/maximum
values on the specified ranges, which results in 74 MELCOR code evaluations per accident
scenario for VG/KTH. MELCOR code calculations performed by VTT include intermediate
values of some parameters, which resulted in 166 code evaluations per accident scenario.

117
The results of VG MELCOR calculations are summarized in Figure 7-43, which illustrate,
based on typical L2 PSA results and the simulations performed in this work, a normalized
frequency uncertainty distribution of RC7A (SBO), RC8, RC7B (LOCA) and RC5 release
categories, together with their respective spread of the fraction of Cs core inventory released
to the environment. The spread and distribution along the frequency axis is subject to
limitations and assumptions in L1 & L2 PSA parametric uncertainty analysis while the Cs
release axis uncertainty the result of the best-estimate + bounding analysis. The results show
that all simulations performed for RC7A (SBO), RC8 and RC5 are within prescribed limits
for respective release categories, i.e. RC7A (SBO) and RC8 belong to acceptable release
category according to the SSM MVSS design criterion, and RC5 belongs to large early
release. Simulations performed for RC7B (LOCA) show that in some MELCOR calculations
the fraction of Cs core inventory released to the environment exceed the design criterion.
Furthermore, the results indicate that the importance of different modelling parameters
depend on the accident scenario, for instance, the most influential parameter for RC7B is
IDEJ (the mode of debris ejection from the vessel), while for RC7A other parameters, such as
CHI (Aerosol dynamic shape factor), GAMMA (Aerosol agglomeration shape factor), STICK
(aerosol particles sticking probability) have significant influence on the fraction of Cs
released to the environment. MELCOR simulations performed for RC8 (recovered SBO)
scenario show that the Cs release is larger in scenarios where ECCS recovery does not prevent
vessel lower head failure and debris ejection from the vessel (10 out 74 cases predict vessel
lower head failure if ECCS and containment sprays recover after 2 hours after initiating
event). Simulation results for RC5A (LOCA with deteriorated PS function and failed
containment isolation) show that the uncertainty in the Cs release is relatively small, and
mostly limited to PDPor (particulate debris porosity).
VTT simulations of RC7A scenario (unmitigated SBO) showed that almost all the sensitivity
cases caused smaller Cs release than the reference case. Therefore, the relative difference
between the cases was studied by comparing the calculated values to the median values of all
the calculations. In most cases, the effect of the parameter variations on the FCV opening
times appears to be small. Some larger deviations can be observed in the variations of
parameters SC710641, CORNSBLD, VFALL, HFRZSS, HFRZZR, SC11412 and DECAYH.
The most notable deviation occurs when VFALL = 0.01. However, a closer look reveals that
the LHF occurs around the same time as in the other cases (t = 5980 s) and that the delay in
the start of FCV is caused by the slow accumulation of melt in the lower head. The melt
ejection does not begin before there is at least 5000 kg of melt in the lower plenum, or at least
10 % of the materials in the lower plenum are molten. The largest releases were obtained by
reducing the DF of the filtered venting system (the MVSSDF parameter). This is an obvious
result, since almost all of the Cs is released through the venting system, and the role of the
containment leakage is very small in this scenario. In almost all cases, changing the parameter
values unexpectedly resulted into lower cesium releases than in the reference case, at least a
partial reason is that in the reference case, a significant amount of MCCI occurred in the
pedestal, generating hydrogen and thereby increasing the flow rate through the filtered
venting system. In many variant cases, little or no MCCI occurred. The severe accident
management strategy of Olkiluoto 1&2 aims at preventing MCCI by flooding the pedestal
before the melt ejection, but MELCOR does not have models for particle bed formation and
coolability. The irregular variation of the MCCI obscures the effect of the varied parameters
on the Cs release. In next year's studies, the concrete erosion will be switched off in the
Cavity package in order to obtain comparable results.
The cesium release can also be observed changing rather irregularly between the variants of
almost all the parameters. Due to this behavior and the lower Cs releases, it is difficult to

118
point out which parameter variations have the highest impact on the simulation results. This
result highlights that investigating the effect of certain parameters on the results would require
a large number of calculations, which would allow a statistical analysis of the results to see if
there is a correlation or not. Choosing any single calculation as a reference case may not be
justified because all calculations involve some random variation ("numerical noise").
KTH calculations were performed for RC4B (unmitigated SBO with containment failure due
to ex-vessel phenomena at RPV melt-through) and RC4A (unmitigated LOCA with
containment failure due to ex-vessel phenomena at RPV melt-through). In case of LOCA, the
postulated containment failure due to ex-vessel steam explosion occurs at around 2h after
initiating event (the time of vessel lower head failure). The fraction of Cs released to the
environment is withing ~4-15% in most of the cases. Furthermore, in case of LOCA, only a
few cases lead to a larger release than the reference case. In case of SBO, the postulated
containment failure due to ex-vessel steam explosion occurs at around 3h after initiating event
(the time of vessel lower head failure). The difference between the timing of vessel lower
head failure between LOCA and SBO scenarios is relatively small, since in case of LOCA the
coolant inventory is lost through the break in the RCS, while in case of SBO, the coolant is
lost due to RCS depressurization at approximately 30 min after initiating event. In case of
SBO, the fraction of Cs released to the environment is within ~1-4% of the core inventory.
This difference can be explained by the greater effect of suppression pool scrubbing in case of
SBO.

119
 9. Outlook
The present study showed that the MELCOR code is quite sensitive to the parameter and time
step variations and results are subject to numerical noise, which makes direct interpretation of
the results quite challenging, without proper statistical treatment. Such statistical treatment
can be achieved by application of methods and tools for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis.
Thus, the goal of the second phase of the project will be evaluation of the sensitivity of the
magnitude of the fission products release in different accident scenarios (aleatory uncertainty)
to the variability in deterministic modelling parameters (epistemic uncertainty), identification
of the major contributors to the uncertainty, as well as quantification of the uncertainty in the
results.
The work will include a review of available literature, development and implementation of the
algorithms for sensitivity analysis and uncertainty quantification with MELCOR.
The sensitivity and uncertainty calculations with MELCOR will be performed for the accident
scenarios identified in the first phase of the project for both the Swedish and Finnish plant
configurations. Additional dedicated codes and tools may be used to address uncertainty in
specific severe accident phenomena, which are either not modelled or over-simplified in
MELCOR, such as ex-vessel steam explosion and debris coolability (e.g. the ROAAM+ tool
developed by KTH). Insights regarding the impact of the results on the analysis of off-site
consequences and emergency preparedness and response will be provided. Furthermore, this
work may include assessment of available literature as well as relevant new methods
concerning source term estimation for containment bypass sequences.

120
Acknowledgements
NKS conveys its gratitude to all organizations and persons who by means of financial support
or contributions in kind have made the work presented in this report possible.

The work performed by VG was performed with additional support from the Swedish
Radiation Protection Authority (SSM).

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this document remain the responsibility of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect those of NKS. In particular, neither NKS nor any other organisation or
body supporting NKS activities can be held responsible for the material presented in this
report.

121
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Bibliographic Data Sheet NKS-461

Title Source Term And Timing Uncertainty in Severe Accidents

Author(s) Sergey Galushin1, Anders Riber Marklund1

Dmitry Grischenko2, Pavel Kudinov2
Tuomo Sevón3, Sara Ojalehto3, Ilona Lindholm3
Patrick Isaksson4, Elisabeth Tengborn4
Naeem Ul-Syed5
1
Affiliation(s) Vysus Sweden AB
2
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
3
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd
4
SSM Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
5
DSA Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

ISBN 978-87-7893-554-0

Date July 2022

Project NKS-R / STATUS

No. of pages 132

No. of tables 18

No. of illustrations 58

No. of references 144

Abstract One set of representative accident scenarios and one set of relevant
max. 2000 characters deterministic modelling parameters that can affect Nordic boiling
water reactor (BWR) severe accident progression and the magnitude
of the source term released to the environment were identified. To
achieve this, a set of activities was performed, including review of
the safety design of the Swedish and Finnish BWRs; review of the
PSA L2 for a typical Nordic BWR and identification of risk
significant accident sequences; review of severe accident
phenomena and respective modelling in the MELCOR code as well
as identification of epistemic modelling parameters that can affect
severe accident progression and the source term.

The scenario set was based on review of PSA L2 for a typical

Nordic BWR design, as well as insights from the emergency
preparedness and response and national regulators, including
accident scenarios that lead to acceptable release (diffuse leakage
from the intact containment, filtered containment venting in case of
transient or LOCA), as well as scenarios that lead to unacceptable
release (either due to containment rupture due to ex-vessel
phenomena or unfiltered containment venting in case of failed
containment isolation, or containment bypass sequences).
 In total, 50 MELCOR code parameters were selected for further
analysis based on the review of the MELCOR modelling of severe
accident phenomena and uncertain epistemic (phenomenological)
modelling parameters that can affect severe accident progression
and the source term released to the environment. These parameters
involved in the modelling of core degradation and relocation, fission
products release from fuel, debris behaviour in the core region and
vessel lower head, vessel lower head failure, fission products
behaviour in the RCS and the containment, as well as modelling of
the filter trapping, containment sprays and pool scrubbing.

Best-estimate and bounding assessments of the magnitude of fission

products released to the environment were performed for the set of
selected scenarios and parameters using MELCOR simulations
performed at KTH, VTT and Vysus Group. A preliminary screening
of the parameters and scenarios was performed using the obtained
results and proposals for further study in phase two of the project
were made.

Key words Severe accident, Source term, PSA L2, Boiling Water Reactor,
MELCOR, Uncertainty analysis

Available on request from the NKS Secretariat, P.O.Box 49, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark.
Phone (+45) 4677 4041, e-mail [email protected], www.nks.org