SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 105409. March 1, 1993.]

MASTER TOURS and TRAVEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Twelfth Division), HON.
LEONARDO I. CRUZ, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25, FRANCISCO SALVADOR, Deputy
Sheriff, RTC of Manila, Branch 25, and CATHAY PACIFIC
AIRWAYS, LTD., respondents.

Charles Dimaano for petitioner.

Chua and Associates Law Office for Cathay Pacific Airways.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; ATTACHMENT; RULES ON THE

ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF ATTACHMENT EX-PARTE . — Davao Light and Power,
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA
343) lays down the rules on the issuance of writs of attachments ex-parte: "A
preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as
the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may,
at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the
property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is
purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the
provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits
its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy `at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter.' The phrase, `at the
commencement of the action,' obviously refers to the date of the filing of the
complaint - which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks `the
commencement of the action;' and the reference plainly is to a time before
summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What
the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced —
by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other
fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment
upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may
do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.
And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts:
for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for
attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counter-claim,
cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte
at the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise
sufficient in form and substance." ". . . The only pre-requisite is that the Court
be satisfied, upon consideration of 'the affidavit of the applicant or of some
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 other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action
exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 . . . (Rule 57), that
there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property
the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for
which the order (of attachment) is granted above all legal counterclaims.' If the
court be so satisfied, the `order of attachment shall be granted,' and the writ
shall issue upon the applicant's posting of `a bond executed to the adverse
party in an amount to be fixed by the judge, not exceeding the plaintiff's claim,
conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the
adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled
thereto.'"

2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT RENDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; AS A GENERAL RULE, IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY;
EXCEPTION. — Petitioner raises the issue of the permissibility of withdrawing a
compromise agreement which has not been approved by the court. The rule is
that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is
immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken
against the order denying the motion. (Arkoncel, Jr. v. Lagamon, G.R. No.
50526, December 4, 1991, 204 SCRA 560)

DECISION

PADILLA, J : p

Basically, the question here involved is the propriety of a writ of preliminary

attachment issued by the trial court ex parte, prior to notice and hearing but
served on the defendant simultaneously with the summons.

The Facts:
On 28 February 1991, summons together with a copy of the complaint for sum
of money filed by the private respondent Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. (Cathay)
and an Order of Attachment dated 21 February 1991 were served upon and
received by the petitioner. Pursuant to the Order of Attachment, the sheriff
immediately levied upon properties of the petitioner, with value equivalent to
Cathay's claim. LLjur

On 25 March 1991, defendant therein (herein petitioner) moved to set aside the
order of attachment on the grounds that there had been no prior notice or
hearing before the issuance of the writ and that the averments of the complaint
failed to satisfactorily allege the basis for attachment as required by the Rules
of Court. Pending resolution of this motion, petitioner filed its answer to
Cathay's complaint. On 29 April 1991, the trial court issued an order denying
the petitioner's motion to set aside or discharge the attachment writ; petitioner
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 thereupon moved for reconsideration.

However, pending resolution of the incident, the respondent sheriff and

Cathay's counsel, allegedly thru coercion and harassment, compelled the
petitioner, thru its counsel and vice-president, to enter into a compromise
agreement. Petitioner subsequently moved to withdraw the said compromise
agreement before the trial court could approve the same. On 7 June 1991,
petitioner's aforesaid motion for reconsideration and motion to withdraw
compromise agreement were jointly heard and later submitted for resolution.
Pending said resolution, respondent sheriff and Cathay's counsel allegedly
continued to harass the petitioner and were able to effect garnishment of
certain bank deposits of petitioner.

Faced with this predicament, the petitioner resorted to a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, but the latter court denied due course to the same as
the trial court had yet to rule on petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration
and withdrawal or compromise agreement.

Finally, on 17 October 1991, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's
twin motions. Petitioner again took recourse to the respondent appellate court,
but after hearing both parties, the appellate court ruled to dismiss the petition.
Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner principally contends that the respondent Court of Appeals committed

a grave reversible error in not holding that the trial court had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner for lack of notice and hearing when
it issued ex-parte the writ of preliminary attachment, hence, this was a denial
of due process.

Davao Light and Power, Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93262,
November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 343) lays down the rules on the issuance of
writs of attachment ex-parte:
"A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of
Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other
proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the
custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in
respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions
granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its
issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant.

Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy 'at the

commencement of the action or at any time thereafter.' The phrase, 'at
the commencement of the action,' obviously refers to the date of the
filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the date that
marks 'the commencement of the action;' and the reference plainly is
to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an
action is properly commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the
payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may
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 apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment
of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at
any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.
And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the
application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate
pleading (counter-claim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial
Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it
finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and substance." LLjur

" . . . The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon

consideration of 'the affidavit of the applicant or of some other person
who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists,
that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 . . (Rule 57), that
there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced
by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of
the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as
much as the sum for which the order (of attachment) is granted above
all legal counterclaims.' If the court be so satisfied, the 'order of
attachment shall be granted,' and the writ shall issue upon the
applicant's posting of 'a bond executed to the adverse party in an
amount to be fixed by the judge, not exceeding the plaintiff's claim,
conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason
of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant
was not entitled thereto.'"

Petitioner likewise raises the issue of the permissibility of withdrawing a

compromise agreement which has not been approved by the court. The rule is
that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is
immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken
against the order denying the motion. (Arkoncel, Jr. v. Lagamon, G.R. No.
50526, December 4, 1991, 204 SCRA 560).
In its order of 17 October 1991 (p. 249, Rollo), the Regional Trial Court said:
"The Court does not believe, so to speak, that the Executive Vice
President, who signed the compromise agreement cannot bind the
defendant for if it were otherwise, the defendant corporation's board as
portrayed above, would have been on guard. llcd

The compromise agreement, to say the least, in the contemplation of

the law, is a valid document binding not only on the Executive Vice
President, but also on the defendant corporation itself. It is not vitiated
by what the Executive Vice President of the defendant corporation and
the lawyer representing both call — lack of authority and threat and
intimidation — that compelled them (Executive Vice President and
counsel) to sign it. This protestation, is amply refuted in the plaintiff's
opposition . . . ."

The propriety or impropriety of withdrawing the compromise agreement is

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 more a question of fact than of law in this particular case.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, there being no reversible error

committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.

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