North American Philosophical Publications

Ideas, Images, and Truth

Author(s): Frank Lucash
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 161-170
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
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 History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 6, Number 2, April 1989

IDEAS, IMAGES, AND TRUTH

Frank Lucash

of the most difficult and challenging of all of Spinoza's writings is

ONE Part II of the Ethics. In this Part he combines doctrines ofPart Iwith a
detailed account ofhow modes, specifically bodies and ideas, are related to
one another. What has been most perplexing to those interested in this
aspect of Spinoza's philosophy is the nature of ideas and images and the
difference between true and false ideas. In particular, the twomajor prob
lems center around what the nature of the object of the idea is and how
false ideas are possible.

The significance of Part II should be obvious. Apart from its own value
for a theory of knowledge, it is crucial for understanding Part I because
the existence of substance cannot be made clear until we first explain our
idea of substance. Part II is also essential for understanding Parts III-V
because the passions, their bondage and freedom, cannot be understood
until we are able to explain the activity and passivity of the mind.

Before presenting different accounts ofwhat constitutes the object of an

idea and arguing for one of them, Iwant tomake clear what an idea, a true
idea, a false idea, an image, an adequate idea, and an inadequate idea are
and the relationships among them. This will lay the groundwork for criti
cizing several different accounts ofwhat constitutes the object of the idea
and the origin and nature of false ideas. I hope to show that most writers
have misunderstood Spinoza on how to solve these two problems.
First of all, an idea is a concept of themind which expresses God's nature
in a certain and determinate way. The cause of an idea is another idea or,
as Spinoza says, God insofar as he is affected by another idea. This means
that God or substance is ultimately the cause of all ideas, but most ideas
have other intermediate ideas as their direct cause. A true idea arises from
the power and activity of themind. It differs from its object like the idea of
a circle differs from the actual circle. This is the case when we consider the
attributes as different from one another, that is, an idea of a circle under
the attribute of thought and a circle or something circular under the attri
bute of extension. A circle and an idea of a circle are one and the same
when the attributes are considered identical. A true idea is not caused by
an external object but caused by another idea or it is deduced from the
nature of the mind alone. It does not require anything else, only itself, to
make it true. Spinoza gives a sphere as an example of a true idea. An idea

161

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162 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

of an object, like a sphere, can be true even if the object does not exist
outside the mind. In order for a thought to be true, we must understand
its cause, another idea, and eventually God. The reason for this is that
everything is in God and nothing can exist outside God, and in order to
know a thing, we must know its cause. A true idea is part of the infinite
intellect ofGod. When one has a true idea, one knows that he has a true
idea, and one knows the difference between it and a false idea. There is
nothing about truth which takes us beyond a true idea.
A true idea is related to a false idea as being or completeness is related
to non-being or incompleteness. Falsity means two things for Spinoza. It
means partial or incomplete knowledge, such as an idea of the sun being
closer or farther away than it actually is or not being aware that each
action we perform has a cause. It also means affirming or denying some
thing, such as motion and rest of a circle. A false idea has its origin in
the imagination (ideas of images). Falsity arises when ideas of bodies
external to our own occur simultaneous with our body when it is affected
by external bodies. It does not arise from the power of the mind. Rather,
the mind is passive or acted upon when it has ideas of other objects.
Images are affects of bodies and occur when external bodies affect our
body, and we have ideas of images when we have ideas of such occurrences.
The mind has ideas of external bodies through ideas or affections of its
own body. Images are constituted by corporeal motions and fall under
the attribute of extension. Ideas of images fall under the attribute of
thought. Images contain no error, but ideas of images do.
An idea is not an image and cannot be expressed in words. Certain
things like a square-circle can be expressed in words but cannot be
expressed by the imagination or the understanding. We have no sensa
tions or images of such a thing. The distinction between the understanding
and the imagination is the distinction between true ideas and all other
ideas. A true idea does not involve remembering or forgetting. Substance,
infinity, indivisibility, and eternity can only be grasped through true
ideas. Ideas of images are ideas only of such things as individual bodies
and their parts.

The body is the object of the human mind. It is what the mind thinks
about. The idea of the body is composed of other ideas because it is a
complex idea. Some of the ideas ofwhich it is composed are adequate and
some are inadequate. The mind can only have ideas which involve the
existence of its body. This means that the mind's knowledge only extends
to those things which are contained in the idea of its body or which follow
from such an idea. The mind can perceive itself, its body, or external
bodies either adequately or inadequately. The mind only knows its own
body through ideas by which its body is affected. In other words, it knows
its body indirectly through ideas of external bodies affecting its own body.
So, the idea of an affection of the human body involves the nature of the
external body. The mind only knows external bodies indirectly also. It
knows them through ideas by which its body is affected. The mind also

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 IDEAS, IMAGES, AND TRUTH 163

knows itself through ideas by which its body is affected. In this case the
mind only knows itself indirectly too. All this means is that the mind,
through the imagination, does not have clear and direct knowledge of
itself, its own body, and external bodies. It can only know them through
something else, hence inadequately.
An idea is considered adequate ifwithout relation to its object, it has
all the properties of a true idea. When God has the idea of other things
in addition to the idea of a particular mind, that mind perceives things
partially or inadequately. In a sense all our ideas are inadequate or
incomplete because we never have all the ideas that God has. We are
only part of an infinite being, some of whose thoughts constitute our
mind and some ofwhose thoughts do not. All God's ideas are adequate,
but only some of ours are. The mind though can have an adequate idea
of God. Each idea expresses in its own way and to its own extent the
nature of substance. So each idea in doing so involves the eternal and
infinite essence of God. How does this happen? The body has God for its
cause, and to know a thing is to know its cause. The mind has an idea
which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity. When
the mind knows itself, its body, and external bodies under a species of
eternity, it knows God and hence has an adequate idea.

Now that certain basic concepts are clear, I can pursue the various
interpretations that commentators have given of what constitutes the
object of the idea. Four different accounts in the literature are given of
the object of the idea. One is that Spinoza cannot account for an object
of thought at all. Another is that the object of thought is ambiguous or
has a double meaning. A third is that ideas represent their objects, or at
least some ideas do. Finally, there is the view that ideas do not represent.
Some other account must be given of the relation between the idea and
its object.

The first view?that Spinoza cannot properly account for an object of

thought?is taken up by Joachim, Barker, and Wilson. Spinoza holds
that the mind and body are identical, that an idea is identical with its
object of thought. Joachim says that this cannot be true, certainly not in
all cases.1 For example, the object of Peter's thought is his body, and the
idea of his body in Peter's mind may be identical with his body. But the
idea of Peter which Paul has is not identical with Peter. The ideatum of
that idea is not Peter as he is in himself but as he appears to Paul.
Joachim thinks it is impossible not to maintain a distinction between
this thought (Paul's idea) and its object (Peter's body). Joachim maintains
that thought and its object in this case and in some sense in all cases are
always distinct. He says "... an idea which is in no sense distinguishable
from its 'ideatum' has lost the character of a mode ofThought, and cannot
possibly do the work of a feeling of self, or a consciousness of one's think
ing."2 If Spinoza's intention is to achieve a unity to the mind, he failed
because he ends up not with one idea but an aggregate ofmany ideas.3

I think Joachim ismistaken. First, Spinoza does not intend to say that

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164 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Paul's idea of Peter is identical with Peter's body. He says that it is

identical with Paul's body or part of his body. Paul's mind and body is
one thing which is affected by Peter's body, such as in seeing or touching.
Secondly, Spinoza's idea of a human mind is that it is one complex idea
made up ofmany different ideas. Its unity lies in its wholeness which,
like substance, remains the same while undergoing constant change. The
mind does not become a disjointed series of separate and unintegrated
ideas.

Barker argues that knowledge is always of something other than itself

and is only possible when we directly perceive extended things.4 But he
says that this is impossible with Spinoza because Spinoza does not allow
a body, a mode of extension, to cause an idea, a mode of thought. According
to Spinoza ideas in one attribute have no access to objects in another
attribute. The object of knowledge can only be in the attribute of thought.
In that case we can only have an idea of an idea, never of a physical
object. Even ifwe made extended things into ideas or ideas into extended
things, knowledge would still be impossible.
Barker simply fails to understand Spinoza's identity of the attributes
that is expressed in EIIP7S. In EIIP7S Spinoza says that a mode of exten
sion and an idea of that mode are one and the same thing but expressed
in two ways, and when we conceive things under the attribute of extension
or under the attribute of thought we shall find that the same things
follow one another. If the modes are identical then the attributes under
which they occur must be identical, although the modes, like substance,
can be expressed in different ways. Knowledge is possible because the
attributes are identical, not because they are forever separate and distinct.
The modes ofmind (the idea) and body (the object of the idea) are also
identical. What the mind knows is an idea or body. This is only possible
because the two things, an idea and a body have something in common
(EIA5,P3). What they have in common is that they belong to the same
attribute because the attributes are identical.
Wilson argues that the identification ofminds with God's ideas offinite
things does not provide a tenable account of the human mind in relation
to the human body.5 She says, ". . .Spinoza is unable to reconcile his
theory of 'minds' with any intelligible conception ofmental representa
tion, or any coherent and credible account of the scope of conscious aware
ness."6 She believes that in order to say that an idea (effect) represents
a body (cause) something more is needed besides the following: 1) the
object must affect the body and 2) the human body must have something
in common with the external body.

My objection toWilson's argument is that Spinoza is not trying to give

an account of how ideas represent external bodies. What I think Spinoza
is saying is that some bodies (minds) affect other bodies (minds), even
when they have nothing in common, though we would probably not call
it knowledge if they have nothing in common.7 If representation means

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 IDEAS, IMAGES, AND TRUTH 165

anything, it only means being aware (having ideas) ofmy body or parts
ofmy body insofar as it is affected by external objects. I only know external
objects through modifications ofmy own body. What I experience ismy
own body. There is no representation in the traditional sense. There are
just affections or ideas.

A second view on the relation between an idea and its object is that
the object of an idea is ambiguous or has a double meaning. Martineau
says that Spinoza sometimes describes the object of an idea as an external
object and sometimes as a bodily affection.8 We know only particular
affections of our own body, and our ideas of other bodies are mixed with
these affections. Some of our affections are properties of our own body
and some are properties of external bodies. The affections of our own
body are inseparable from the affections of external bodies. We are left
with no clear account of the relation between other bodies and our own.
This also leads to a confused knowledge of our own mind because we get
the idea of our mind from the affections of the body.
Pollock states that the word "idea" denotes two kinds of relation.9 In
one case it is a concept; in the other a physiological process. When I think
of Peter, my consciousness is an idea of Peter. But also there is the idea,
not of Peter, but the corresponding state ofmy brain. The object of the
first idea is Peter. The object of the second ismy bodily organism, which
is correlated to the thinking mind. Pollock thinks that Spinoza mixes up
concepts of representation and correlation under the term "idea." With
correlation there is only one object of an idea. With representation there
are as many objects as there are ideas in the minds of individuals who
think about them.

Hart also believes that Spinoza equivocates on the term "object."10

Spinoza says that the mind is the idea of the body or the body is the
object of the mind. But Hart thinks that the object of knowledge is an
idea, not a body. On one hand the object of the mind is identical to the
body. On the other hand the object of knowledge?that which the mind
thinks about?is an idea which may be adequately or inadequately known.
The mind is identical to its body, not to the objects of knowledge.

In reply toMartineau we can inmost cases easily distinguish an affec

tion of our own body from an affection caused in us by an external body.
We separate an affection of our body or a part of our body like the color
of our skin from an affection caused in us by another body such as the
color of the chair. Furthermore, we can distinguish between different
external objects such as the wall and the floor. It is true that through
affections of our body we attribute certain properties to external objects.
But this need not lead to confused knowledge of our mind because once
we separate the affections of our body from an external body, we can
reflect on these affections and in doing so have a clearer knowledge of
ourselves.

Pollock does not understand the relation between the mind and the

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166 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

body. My idea of Peter is a modification ofmy body. My brain state is

part ofmy body. So, my idea of Peter is the same as what goes on inmy
brain state. The idea that any individual has is identical with the mod
ification that takes place in that individual's body.

Hart thinks that the intervention of ideas is needed if one is to have

knowledge of one's own body. If we keep the attributes separate and
distinct then it is obvious that we can only have ideas of ideas, not ideas
of bodies. This is because ideas only give rise to ideas, and bodies only
cause changes in other bodies. But ifwe make the attributes identical,
as I think they should be, then itmakes no difference ifwe say we have
ideas of ideas or ideas of bodies, since what follows the "of in both cases
is the same. What I am saying is that an idea is always an idea of
something, and itmakes no difference ifwe call the object of the idea an
idea or a body. An idea is an activity themind undergoes and it is identical
with a physical process. Some ideas are caused in us by other ideas more
powerful than our own. Other ideas, ideas of images, are caused in us by
ideas of external bodies. The latter ideas occur at the same time that
external bodies act on our own.

A third view tells us that all or some ideas represent. Hart takes the
position that all ideas represent.11 He says that the mind and its object
(the body) are identical, but this does not mean, as was pointed out, that
the mind and the object of knowledge are identical. All ideas refer, point
toward, or intend their objects of knowledge. The referent of the idea of
an image is another image. The referent of other ideas is an idea, not a
body.
Mark says that representation has to do only with those ideas which
are ideas of images.12 These ideas represent external objects (finite phys
ical bodies different from our own). Representation is confined to the first
kind of knowledge?imagination. Ideas are modifications of thought.
Images are modifications of extension. Ideas do not represent and are not
different for different people. Only ideas of images represent because they
are passive or acted upon. Other ideas are active.

The problem I have with these views which say that ideas represent
is the word "represent." The word "represent" or an explication of it is
not necessary for understanding Spinoza. For Spinoza the mind is the
same as the body. As the body undergoes changes so does the mind. An
idea is an affection or change in the bodily process. Some affections arise
because of the body's own power and others arise because the body is
acted upon. In either case the body is modified and some changes take
place which in us is a perception of our body or some other body through
our body. This modification is an idea which is caused by other ideas. At
any rate, we have an idea of something. All our ideas are of something.
The "of something" is not part of the idea orwhat the idea intends; rather
it is the idea itself. This is what is meant by saying that the idea and
what it is about (its object) are the same.13 An idea is one whole. There

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 IDEAS, IMAGES, AND TRUTH 167

is no consciousness lurking behind it. There are only more ideas which
are integrated into one individual called a human mind.

A fourth view says that ideas do not represent or representation is not

an important relation in Spinoza. I think that the person who comes
closest to this view is Harris. He takes the position, which I agree with
and take up elsewhere,14 that the mind is the idea of the body, and the
idea of the body is the consciousness that the body has of itself, that is,
it is the body's self-awareness.15 The reason we have ideas of other bodies
besides our own is because other bodies affect our body through sensations
like seeing and touching and we have ideas of this. Every idea is an
awareness of our body or some part of it, and our knowledge of external
bodies is derived from our awareness of our own body. Ideas are also
reflexive so we can compare and relate them to form ideas which are
common to all objects, such as motion and rest. Hence, we can eventually
proceed to knowledge of substance.
What we have then in stating my conclusion on this issue is an idea
which is identical with a body and vice versa. The object or content of an
idea is an idea or a body, but the object is no different from the idea, that
is,what thinks and what is thought about are the same, an idea. Further
more, since the idea and the body are the same, either is aware of itself
and its parts and what happens to it.What happens to parts of the body
affect the whole body, but the whole body remains the same.

Three positions have been taken on the second issue, the truth and
falsity of our ideas. One is that none of our ideas are true. A second is
that all of our ideas are true. A third is that one or only a few of our
ideas are true. I would like to examine these interpretations and argue
that none of them are really in line with Spinoza's thinking.

The first position, that no ideas of human beings are true and that
there is only one idea which agrees with its ideatum, is stated but not
necessarily held by Parkinson.16 That one idea is God's idea or the idea
of the whole. Ideas that human beings have are incomplete and falsity
is incompleteness. Ideas that are incomplete are only part ofGod's intellect
and hence are false. Only God has true ideas since he is the only one
with the idea of the whole. Human beings at best have only fragments
of the truth. According to this position, all human ideas are false because
falsity means incompleteness, and our ideas are partial or fragmentary.
But this position cannot be correct for Spinoza affirms in Book II P34,
P36, 38-43, 46-47 the truth and adequacy of some of our ideas.
Joachim and Mark take the second and opposite position that every
idea we have is true. Joachim says that according to Spinoza every idea
is its ideatum and every idea is true.17 The criterion of truth is within
the idea itself. An idea is not made true by being brought into agreement
with an object. Its truth belongs to it internally. Mark says that truth
and idea mean the same thing.18 Truth is a property which inheres in
the idea. It does not connect the idea with the object. It leaves the object

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168 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

stranded. Truth is its own criterion. We know what it is by having a true

idea. This position is also wrong because some of our ideas are false,
namely, those which arise from ideas of images. Falsity, we said, arises
from our ideas of images, so some of our ideas are false. They are false
because all of our ideas do not arise from the power of the mind. Ideas
of our being affected by objects external to ourselves are indications that
the mind is being acted upon. Hence such ideas are false.

Joachim and Mark also take the third position. They hold that although
other ideas can be true to some extent, only the idea ofGod that human
beings have is ultimately or absolutely true. Joachim says that this idea
is true because "it is inwardly coherent. . . ."19Mark
real, complete, says
". . .no idea, except the idea ofGod, corresponds to reality in every respect,
so every idea, except the idea of God, must fail to correspond to reality
in some respect."20 The distinction between truths which are absolute and
those which are not can perhaps be clarified by Curley's distinction
between truths which are absolutely necessary and truths which are
relatively necessary which is based on Leibniz's distinction between neces
sary truths and contingent truths.21 The former are those whose denial
is self-contradictory or whose reason for existence is contained in their
nature (substance). The latter are those whose denial does not involve a
contradiction or whose reason for existence lies outside their nature
(modes). Joachim also holds that there are degrees of truth in finite
minds.22 An idea is true to the degree that it is in its own mind what it
is in God's mind or to the extent that God's idea is in the thought of a
finite mind.
If it is the case that only our idea of God is absolutely true and other
ideas are only true to some extent, then either all our other ideas are
false or falsity when it occurs makes up the lack of the truth of our ideas.
Spinoza rejects the first disjunction because he admits that many of our
ideas are true or can be true. He says that falsity consists in partiality,
in not having other ideas in addition to the ones we have. So in order to
know that an idea is false or partial we must be able to compare itwith
an idea that is true or complete. For example, our basis for the view in
thinking that the sun is very close to us lies in the fact that our bodies
are affected by a large, bright object. But there are other, more scientific
ways, that we can explain our distance from the sun. There are different
levels of awareness of an object. We are only part of a complete whole,
and what we affirm sometimes extends beyond or falls short of what is
involved in the idea. God or a complete intelligence is incapable of doing
this, but we are not.
It must be the case that we have true ideas and falsity makes up the
lack of truth of our other ideas. We can have a true idea of substance,
and we can have a true idea of things other than substance. We can have
a true idea of the distance between the earth and the sun, and we can
have a true idea of the causes of our action. Spinoza asserts that the mind
is an idea (EIIP11), a complex idea composed ofmany other ideas (EIIP15)

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 IDEAS, IMAGES, AND TRUTH 169

and that truth is nothing more than an idea or kind of idea (TEI, par.
36). The mind does contain true ideas (EIIP34, 45). Spinoza often speaks
in terms of the plurality of true ideas. Also he argues that since all God's
ideas are true (EIIP32); the human mind is part ofGod's mind (EIIP11C);
man's idea of God is part of God's idea of himself (EVP36); the human
mind has an adequate knowledge ofGod (EIIP47); we can conclude that
we do have true ideas and that truth means the same as these ideas.

University ofNevada at Reno

Received December 11, 1987

NOTES

1. Harold Joachim, A Study of theEthics of Spinoza (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964,

reprint of 1901), pp. 138-39.

2. Ibid., p. 141.
3. Ibid.

4. H. Barker, "Notes on the Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics (II)," Mind, vol. 47 (1938),

reprinted in Studies in Spinoza, ed. by S. Paul Kashap (Berkeley: University of California,

1972), pp. 101-44.

5. Margaret Wilson, "Objects, Ideas, and 'Minds': Comments on Spinoza's Theory of

Mind," in The Philosophy ofBaruch Spinoza, ed. by Richard Kennington (Washington,

D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1980), pp. 103-20.
6. Ibid., p. 104.
7. See, for example, Spinoza's explanation of how evil arises (EIVP30).

8. James Martineau, A Study of Spinoza (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press,
1971, reprint of 1895), pp. 140-42.
9. Frederick Pollock, Spinoza (London: C. Kegan Paul, 1880), pp. 131-34.

10. Alan Hart, Spinoza's Ethics, Part I and II (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), pp. 96-99.
11. Ibid. Most of Chapter 2 is devoted to an appraisal of the papers ofMark, Radner and

Brandom.

12. Thomas Carson Mark, "Truth and Adequacy in Spinozistic Ideas," in Spinoza: New

Perspectives, ed. by Robert Shahan and J. Biro (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1978),

p. 16, and Spinoza's Theory of Truth (New York: Columbia University, 1972), pp. 23-26.

13. This is what I think Wallace Matson is saying in his "Spinoza's Theory ofMind," in

Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, ed. by Eugene Freeman and Maurice Mandelbaum (La

Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1975), p. 59.

14. See my paper, "The Mind's Body: The Body's Self-Awareness,"Z)?aZogz?e, vol. 23 (1984),

pp. 619-633.
15. Errol Harris, Salvation from Despair (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 80-82
and "Body-Mind Relation in Spinoza's Philosophy," in Spinoza's Metaphysics, ed. by James
Wilbur (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976) pp. 14-15.

16. G. H. R. Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory ofKnowledge (Oxford University Press, 1954),

Chap. 6.

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 170 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

17. Joachim, op. cit., pp. 148-49.

18. Mark, Spinoza's Theory of Truth, p. 62 and "Truth and Adequacy in Spinozistic Ideas,"
pp. 11-34.
19. Joachim, op. cit., p. 149.
20. Mark, Spinoza's Theory of Truth, p. 57.
21. E. M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969),

pp. 89-92.
22. Joachim, op. cit., p. 151.

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