STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

LESSON 1
COMPILATION OF PERTINENT CASES

CASE NO. 1
G.R. No. L-44113 March 31, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MERICIA B. PALMA and ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA, respondents.
FACTS:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed
the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without
prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years
olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the
time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the
Juvenile Court.
RULING:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction
over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”.
The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth
offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did
not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21
years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
 CASE NO. 2
G.R. No. L-1276 April 30, 1948
ROSARIO VALERA, assisted by her husband, Juan Valera, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO TUASON, Jr., Justice of the Peace of Lagayan, Abra, MANUEL TULLAS ET AL.,
respondents-appellees.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL, intervenor-appellee.
FACTS
• A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace court of Lagayan over which
Judge Federico Paredes presided. Finding himself disqualified, by reason of relationship to one of the
parties, to try the case, Judge Paredes transferred it to the justice of the peace of La Paz, the nearest
municipality to Lagayan.
• The justice of the peace of La Paz, over the objection of the attorney for the defendants,
proceeded with the trial, after which he gave judgment for the plaintiff and returned the record of the case
with his decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan – this was overturned by the new justice of peace
appointed for Lagayan (Tuason) on the ground that the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is
that "the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and decide a given case, when the justice
having jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in law given to the
disqualifying justice but 'to the judge of the district' who 'shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.'
• Section 73 of Act No. 190 as amended provides:
In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any ground
mentioned in section eight of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall thereupon
appear and try the cause, unless he shall be likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which event the
cause shall be transferred to the nearest justice of the peace of the province who is not disqualified.
• Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Auxilliary justice — Qualifications and duties. — The auxilliary justice of the peace shall have the same
qualifications and be subject to the same restrictions as the regular justice, and shall perform the duties of
said office during any vacancy therein or in case of the absence of the regular justice from the
municipality, or of his disability or disqualification, or in case of his death or resignation until the
appointment and qualification of his successor, or in any cause whose immediate trial the regular justice
shall certify to be specially urgent and which he is unable to try by reason of actual engagement in
another trial.
In case there is no auxilliary justice of the peace to perform the duties of the regular justice in the cases
above mentioned, the judge of the district shall designate the nearest justice of the peace of the province
to act as justice of the peace in such municipality, town, or place, in which case the justice of the peace so
designated shall have jurisdiction and shall receive the total of his own salary and seventy-five per
centum of the salary of the justice of the peace whom he may substitute.
ISSUES
WON Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code has impliedly repealed Section 73 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (Act No. 190).
RULING
NO. Section 73 of Act No. 190 and Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code can stand together.
By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said
to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative
Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure
NOTES:
• One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made
to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law
may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.
• Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
• The history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were designed to complement each
other. The two enactments have different origins, one independent of the other, and have been intended to
operate side by side.
 CASE NO. 3
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV,
respondents.
FACTS
This is a petitiion for certiorari filed by spouses Primitivo and Leonora A. De Espiritu seeking the
nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Br. XV/Trial Court including (1)
Order dated August 4, 1970 sustaining respondent Ricardo Cipriano’s motion to dismiss on the authority
of Republic Act 6126/Rental Law and (2) Order dated October 16, 1970 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the 1st Order. Respondent/Defendant Cipriano’s house was built on the property of
plaintiff/petitioner spouses Espiritus by virtue of an oral contract of lease. Cipriano was their lessee since
1954. Before 1969 the lease was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then payable at or before the
end of the year. Starting January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was
increased to P30 a month by the lessors. Their dispute emanated on the failure of Cipriano to pay rental
since January 1969 at the monthly rate mentioned. This lead to the filing of a complainant of Unlawful
Detainer against Cipriano in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, with a favorable decision for lessors
Espiritu. Respondent Cipriano filed a motion to dismiss said complaint invoking the prohibitory provision
of R.A. 6126, which was upheld by the Trial Court in the 2 Orders assailed by spouses Espiritu. II.
ISSUE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PROHIBITORY PROVISION OF R.A. 6126 III.
RULING
SC found the petition of spouses Espiritu meritorious, thus, reversing the Trial Court’s Decision and
ordering the Trial Court for the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M on the merits in accordance
with RA 6031. The increase in the rental was warranted/valid. It has effected in January 1969. The law in
question took effect on June 17, 1970 or after 1 ½ years after the increase in rentals had been effected.
The law had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language
that: Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling of a unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located shall,
during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the
lessor and the lesses prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred
pesos (P300) a month. Hence, the prohibiton against the increase in rentals was effective on March 1970
up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not, by the express mandate of the
Republic Act, operate. IV.
LEGAL BASIS
1. THE SUBJECT PROVISION AFFECTS SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS HENCE A STRICT AND
PROSPECTIVE CONSTRUCTION THEROF IS IN ORDER. 2. AS THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT MUST BE HELD TO MEAN WHAT IS PLAINLY SAYS. 3.
EXPRESSIUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM – NO REASONABLE IMPLICATION THAT THE
LEGISLATURE EVER INTEDED TO GIVE THE LAW IN QUESTION A RETROACTIVE EFFECT
MAY BE ACCORDED TO THE SAME (INTENT OF THE LAWMAKERS CAN BE VERIFIED ON
THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE CONGRESS ON HOUSE BILL 953 WHICH BECAME R.A. 6126)
 CASE NO. 4
G.R. No. L-23979 August 30, 1968
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and VICENTE A. RUFINO,
petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL., respondents,
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 on
December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of emergency in view of the
prevailing scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes in the City of Manila which shall
provide housing accommodations especially for the poor at reasonable rates. An action was brought by
the Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino against the
Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to nullify the aforementioned Municipal
Ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is constitutional.
RULING:
NO.The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. Inasmuch as the same
generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected
and even guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the
prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty,
otherwise known as the Bill of Rights — the police power measure must be "reasonable". In other words,
individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only — and only
to the extent — that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
If such demands are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights,
resulting from the regulations adopted to meet the situation, must be, by and large, co-extensive, co-equal
or co-terminous with the existence thereof.
As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to tide over a critical
condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a "definite" period of time, the length of which must be
"reasonable", in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount.
Needless to say, the powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the National Government
cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the latter — as the source of said powers — is subject.
Then, again, since our law on municipal corporations is, in principle, patterned after that of the United
States, the rule therein, to the effect that "in a proper case, emergency legislation, limited in time, may be
enacted under the police power" of a municipal corporation, 16 should be considered a part of our legal
system.
 CASE NO. 5
G.R. No. L-52265 January 28, 1980
SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, NATIONAL TREASURER, and
DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.
Occeña Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FACTS
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments proposed are so
extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to
revise and not to amend.
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not
the fundamental law. The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12, 1981.
ISSUES
1. WON the 1973 Constitution is already in effect.
2. WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments.
3. WON the three resolutions are valid.
RULING
1. Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In
the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a
vote of six to four. It then concluded: “This being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.”
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be
obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate.
In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also
sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices.
That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has
invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated
barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at
least ten cases may be cited.
2. Yes. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The
Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to
be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence its authority to do so is clearly beyond
doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

3. Yes. The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute amendments or revision is of no
relevance. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del
Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new
one … is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’
or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people.”

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.