Div 7 Newsletter Oct Nov 2018
Div 7 Newsletter Oct Nov 2018
Div 7 Newsletter Oct Nov 2018
time with your Dad. On June 17, 2001, Father’s Day, the New York City Fire
Department (FDNY) experienced one of the most challenging and deadly fires in
its long and illustrious history. It was a fire that started out as what appeared to
be a routine fire. It ended in tragedy. It left those who were on the FDNY on June
17, 2001 thinking that it cannot get any worse than this fire.
12-20 ASTORIA BOULEVARD: This building is designated as the original fire
building. Both this building and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard were interconnected and
formed the “Long Island General Supply” hardware store. It was a two-story brick
and wood joist (class 3 construction) structure. It was 20 feet x 55 feet. The first
floor occupancy was a hardware store. The first floor and cellar of this building
were interconnected with exposure 2 (12-22 Astoria Boulevard). There was a 27
foot wide opening in the common wall at the store level between the fire building
and exposure 2. The second floor was used for storage for the hardware store.
The cellar was used for storage for the hardware store.
12-22 ASTORIA BOULEVARD: This building is designated as exposure 2. It was a
two-story brick and wood joist (class 3 construction) structure. It was triangular in
shape and it was a corner building. The dimensions were 51 feet x 60 feet. It
bordered on Astoria Boulevard and 14th Street. The second floor of this building
had two apartments.
The two buildings were interconnected on the first floor and the cellar. The
cellar opening had a metal sliding fire door. This fire door was illegally propped
open with a piece of wood so that it would not activate in the event of a fire. The
opening in the cellar walls between the two buildings was 2 ½ feet wide.
Neither the original fire building nor exposure 2 were sprinklered in the
cellar or the first floor.
14th Street sloped downward from Astoria Boulevard. Due to the slope of
the ground, the buildings were three stories in the rear. The rear of the fire
building and exposure 2’s cellar was exposed and above ground in the rear. There
was a masonry free-standing wall that extended from the rear corner on the 14th
Street side of exposure 2 that had a roll down security door. This masonry wall
extension was in place to provide security for storage of materials in the rear
yard.
EXP. 3
Cellar 8' 20' 2"
Diagram
5'
th
14
Street
'
59' 11"
75
EXP. 2
2'-6"
54'-11"
First 8'
EXP. 3 20'-2"
UP UP
Floor
5'
51' 8" 20' 2"
EXP. 1 th
14 Dia
Astoria
Street
27'
'
59' 11"
75
EXP. 2
54'-11"
UP UP
Second
5'
Floor
Diagr
EXP.
Similar
Attached
'
59' 11"
75
2 EXP. 4
54' 11"
Down Down
Upon Squad 288’s arrival, an adult male spoke to Captain Murphy and told
him that he knew where the fire was. There was light smoke coming from behind
the roll-down gates of the “Long Island General Supply” hardware store. The
civilian took Captain Murphy into the cellar of exposure 4 (12-18 Astoria
Boulevard) and out into the rear yard. They crossed over to the address where
the fire was reported and Captain Murphy could hear fire crackling behind the
door. There was an odor of smoke and gasoline near the door. Captain Murphy
wondered how this guy knew that there was a fire here with relatively minor
indicators. It turns out that this man was the father of one of the teenagers that
started the fire and he was the person who called 911.
Captain Murphy called his Chauffeur, Fr. Adam Rand, and told him to
transmit a 10-75. Engines 262, 312, Ladder 117 and Battalion 49 would be
dispatched. Ladder 116 would be assigned as the Firefighter Assist and Search
Team (FAST) and Rescue 4 would be dispatched as well.
Captain Pat Horne was the officer of Ladder 116. Ladder 116, the
designated FAST Truck, was the first ladder company to arrive at the scene and
they would be put to work as the first due ladder. Ladder 116’s Forcible Entry
team started working on gaining entry to the front of the store along with Squad
288. Captain Horne made a brief survey of the second floor and quickly returned
to his Forcible Entry team. Ladder 116’s aerial ladder was positioned on 14th
Street and raised to the roof of exposure 2. Ladder 116’s Roof Firefighter and
Outside Ventilation Firefighter started vertical ventilation. Ladder 116’s Outside
Ventilation Firefighter was Joe Vosilla.
Engine 262, Ladder 117, and Battalion 49 would all arrive within seconds of
each other at around
1425 hours. Ladder
117 would assume
the second due
ladder duties and go
to the second floor
for search and to
check for extension.
Haz-Mat Co. 1 arrived and reported to B.C. Seelig. He ordered them to the
security gate on exposure 2 side. They were told to force it open so we would
have easier access to the rear yard and the point of attack. Haz-Mat 1 would not
be assigned to the box. They offered their assistance to B.C. Seelig and he asked
them to start forcible entry on the rear door to the cellar.
Captain Pat Horne of Ladder 116 made a brief search of the second floor of
exposure 2. There were two apartments on the second floor. He evacuated the
occupants from the second floor.
At 1427 hours, Ladder 115 would be assigned to the fire to act as the
replacement FAST Truck.
Inside the store on the first floor, Captain Denis Murphy of Squad 288
found the interior
stairway that led to
the cellar. It was
about 30 feet
inside the building
from the front
door. Captain
Horne and Ladder
116 encountered a
heavy smoke
condition without
a high heat
condition. Captain
Horne opened the
interior cellar stairway door and found flames coming up the stairway. He closed
the door to keep fire from racing up the stairway. Squad 288 positioned their
hose line so it could be advanced down the stairs. The sound of popping aerosol
cans coming from the cellar was almost constant.
Rescue 4 arrived at the fire at 1430 hours. The forcible entry team was
Captain Brian Hickey, Firefighter Brian Fahey, and Firefighter John Gaine. They
assisted in forcing the remaining roll-down security gates. They made entry with
Squad 288 and Ladder 116 already inside the store. Ladder 116 had performed a
search of the first floor. Squad 288 had stretched their 2 ½ inch hose line to the
cellar stairway entrance. Rescue 4 was performing searches and used their
thermal imaging camera (TIC) to check for fire extension to the first floor.
Captain Pat Horne from Ladder 116 opened the cellar door a second time.
This time, there was no flame, but there was a considerable black smoke
condition coming up the stairway. He could hear Battalion Chief Bill Seelig say
that he didn’t want the stairway door
opened. Chief Seelig said that they
had a hose line coming in from the
rear. He told Captain Murphy of
Squad 288 to hold their position to
prevent fire from coming up the
stairway.
The conditions inside the store were continuing to get worse. Smoke was
pushing out of cracks in the floor. The cellar door blew open from the pressure
being generated by the
fire. When the door
blew open, blue flames
filled the lower half of
the doorway. Then,
the flames went out.
Then, the flames re-
ignited. This time, the
color of the flames was
orange. Firefighter Tim
Geraghty was the
Nozzle Firefighter from
Squad 288. He opened up the
nozzle while the interior cellar
door was open for a few seconds.
The Firefighters recognized that
the flames were an unusual color
and there was an unusual odor,
not the odor of burning wood.
Throughout the building, there
were reports of an odor of
lacquer or paint thinner. There
was a discussion about advancing
down the interior cellar stairs.
Battalion Chief Seelig from
Battalion 49 told Squad 288 to hold their position. “They were working on the
door in the rear (at cellar level) and they would have water on the fire shortly.”
Battalion Chief Seelig of Battalion 49 was becoming frustrated with the lack
of progress of the operation in the rear. He told Captain Denis Murphy of Squad
288 that they may have to advance down the interior cellar stairs with their hose
line.
At 1443 hours, Ladder 163 succeeded in opening the rear door about 18
inches. Lieutenant Brendan Manning and Battalion Chief Kevin Duffy of Battalion
45 squeezed into the cellar. Lieutenant Manning used his TIC to see what the
heat conditions were in the cellar. It caused the screen to show “red”. B.C. Duffy
exited the cellar and told Ladder 163 to continue to remove the entire door with
their power saw.
Deputy Chief Artie Messbauer of the 14th Division arrived at the fire at 1445
hours. He checked the rear of the building to get an overall view of the
conditions. He saw Ladder 163 working on the rear door with the power saw. He
walked to the front of the building and saw a smoke condition in the front and a
hose line going into the building. Captain Brian Hickey of Rescue 4 came out of
the building and addressed Deputy Chief Messbauer and told him they have seen
fire extending to the first floor through their TIC and he requested another hose
line in the store. At this time, Deputy Chief Messbauer turned to his Aide and told
him to transmit a 2nd alarm.
At 1446 hours, Lieutenant
Brendan Manning of Ladder 163
looked back into the rear cellar
door with his TIC. He looked into
the camera and saw “red” (which
means it is very hot). He was
about to tell Battalion Chief Kevin
Duffy of Battalion 45 what he
saw. He didn’t get the word
“red” out of his mouth when the
explosion happened. Lieutenant
Manning was propelled past Chief
Duffy and everyone in the rear
was knocked down. Lieutenant
Manning was severely injured.
He had severe burns on his face
and a fractured orbital socket.
The force of the explosion
knocked Lieutenant Manning
unconscious. Lieutenant
Manning would later be removed
to the New York Cornell Burn Center. Chief
Duffy’s face had blood coming down. A large
section of the rear wall was damaged and in
danger of collapse. Battalion Chief Duffy
transmitted a “Mayday” and had Fire Officers
account for their members.
On the 14th Street side (exposure 2), the entire two/three story masonry wall
collapsed in a curtain wall type collapse. It came down onto Firefighters Harry
Ford of Rescue 4, John Downing of Ladder 163, and Firefighter Joe Vosilla of
Ladder 116. Firefighters Ford and Downing were completely buried by the bricks.
Firefighter Vosilla was buried up to his chest.
Squad 288, Ladder 116 and Rescue 4 were inside the first floor store
occupancy when the explosion occurred. It was reported that the floor felt like a
wave. The sound came a split second before the shock wave. Captain Denis
Murphy and Firefighter Tim Geherty
and Firefighter John Berna of Squad
288 all sustained fractured left legs.
There was a large fire ball within the
store. They all crawled in the smoke
toward light. The light was there
because that is where the exposure 2
exterior wall once stood. They crawled
out onto the bricks and on to 14th
Street.
Captain Brian Hickey and Firefighter John Gaine of Rescue 4 were blown in
different directions. Firefighter Gaine was blown toward the rear of the store. He
could see Captain Hickey
silhouetted against the ball of
fire. Once the ball of fire
subsided, the heat in the store
increased. Firefighter Brian Fahey
of Rescue 4 was no longer there.
The floor had opened near the
stairway going downstairs and
Firefighter Fahey was swallowed
into the abyss of the fire and
smoke-filled cellar. Multiple “Maydays” were being transmitted over the handi-
talkie. Captain Hickey and Firefighter Gaine were disoriented and dazed.
However, they could hear a voice. The voice was that of Firefighter Adam Rand,
the Chauffeur of Squad 288. They followed the sound of Fr. Rand’s voice and they
crawled out onto Astoria Boulevard.
Captain Pat Horne of Ladder 116 and
his Forcible Entry Firefighter were near the
front of the building heading out to change
their SCBA cylinders when the explosion
occurred. They were thrown several feet.
They saw light in one direction. They headed
toward the light. The light was the hole in
the exposure 2 side created by the
explosion. They crawled out onto the pile of
brick and rubble. There was heavy fire and
smoke showing on the exposure 2 side. As
the Firefighters from Ladder 116 crawled out
onto the rubble, Ladder 116’s Forcible Entry
Firefighter found Firefighter Joe Vosilla
buried in the bricks and rubble.
At 1447 hours, the Aide to the 14th Division
called the Queens Dispatcher and said: “Transmit
a second alarm, a full second alarm.” “We have
had a major explosion.”
At 1448 hours,
Deputy Chief Artie
Messbauer grabbed his
Aide and told him to
call the Queens
Dispatcher and transmit a full 4th alarm. Just three
minutes later, Deputy Chief Messbauer transmitted
the 5th alarm.
1. The propped open sliding cellar fire door; this effectively doubled the area
exposed to fire and allowed more flammable liquids to become involved in the
fire/explosion.
2. The lack of a Sprinkler System in the cellar and the store; both floors were
being used for storage of flammable and combustible liquids and gases.
In addition to the
aerosol cans exploding, it
is reported that Liquified
Petroleum Gas (LPG)
cylinders and cans of paint
thinner failed which
contributed to the force of
the explosion.
Secondary Collapse: At this fire, the explosion caused the collapse of the bearing
wall on 14th Street. Also, the fire intensified. After any collapse, we have the
hazard of a “secondary collapse”. Building components rely upon each other to
resist the pull of gravity. Once building components are radically displaced, the
remaining building components are no longer fully supported. In fact, the
remaining building components may be resisting gravity by an un-designed load
(i.e.: simple beams may now be cantilevered beams). At this fire, the front
parapet masonry wall was no longer plumb and the masonry was no longer in a
straight line. This created an un-designed load on the wall and it collapsed. The
longer firefighters have to work within a collapse zone for rescue, the greater the
danger of secondary collapse to rescuing firefighters.
Wall Collapse:
The wall collapse
of the exposure 2
wall (14th Street)
was a “curtain
wall type” of
collapse. The
wall fell straight
down and created a large
pile of bricks on the sidewalk,
several feet deep. The peak force of
the explosion at this fire was 7-8 psi,
which is enough to knock down brick
walls. 1 psi is enough to knock a firefighter down.
Cellar Fires Strategy: The progression of cellar fire strategy is as follows:
1. Hose lines: This involves advancing a hose line down the cellar stairs to
the cellar floor. Depending upon conditions, this act can require great
tenacity. If a hose line is advanced down a cellar stairway, a back-up line
must be in place to protect the firefighters advancing the hose line down
the stairs. Fire would show at the interior cellar stairway door (rollover).
This back-up hose line would also extinguish extending fire. If there is an
outside cellar entrance door due to a change in grade, that would be a good
choice to mount an attack since the advancing firefighters would not have
to descend through the thermal layers to get to the cellar floor.
The success of
hose lines advancing
down into a cellar fire
may depend upon
ventilation. Cutting a
hole in the first floor
near a window on the
first floor will provide
relief for the Engine
Company advancing
the hose line. The
hole in the floor
should be away from
the stairway the hose
line is advancing
down. In so doing,
the heat and smoke will be drawn to the ventilation hole and away from the
firefighters.
2. Indirect Method: If hose line advancement fails, the
indirect method of attack is called for. This would be
the use of cellar pipes or distributors. This is a
make-shift sprinkler system. Cut a hole in the floor
as close to being over the fire as safety permits and
deploy the cellar pipe. If the “Bresnan Distributor”
is used, a “shut-off” must be placed in-line so the water flow
can be controlled. An additional hose line should be
stretched as a protection line for the firefighters
operating the cellar pipe or distributor. This
strategy will not completely extinguish the fire.
However, it will stop the expansion of the fire.
Deployment of the cellar pipe/distributors in a highly
heated area may break up the explosive atmosphere.
In preparation of using a cellar pipe or distributor, as much ventilation on
the first floor should be performed.
Foam: While most flammable liquid vapors have a gas specific gravity greater
than 1 (heavier than air), the specific gravity of flammable liquids is less than one
(lighter than water). At this fire, flammable liquid was floating on top of three
feet of water in the cellar and it was burning. A foam line operation should be
called for when flammable liquids are burning on top of water.
Quenching, Venting,
Flanking: When
backdraft conditions
exist, firefighters can
protect themselves by
quenching, venting,
and/or flanking.
Quenching is the act of
deploying a hose stream
into a doorway or
window to break-up
superheated gases. This
action may break up an
explosive atmosphere.
TIP OF THE HELMET TO: The Officers and Firefighters of Engine 75, Ladder 33,
and Battalion 19 for hosting and conducting the Plaque Dedication for Battalion
Chief Michael Fahy (Promoted to Deputy Chief Posthumously). It was an
emotional service that was well attended. It was a great moment to see
Michael’s Dad, Retired Battalion Chief Tom Fahy, give a speech honoring his son.
Well done.
TIP OF THE HELMET TO: Captain Eddie Boles of Ladder 59 and Firefighter LeRoy
McGinnis of Engine 266 for being named the Emerald Society’s 2018 “Irishmen of
the Year”.
TIP OF THE HELMET TO: The Officers and Firefighters from Engine 95 and Ladder
36 who hosted the Memorial Day collation on October 10th. Well done.
FIREFIGHTER MICHAEL T. McDONALD, LADDER 128 (RET.):
Passed away on Saturday August 11, 2018 from injuries
sustained at Manhattan Box 5-5-8087. This was the rescue and
recovery effort at the World Trade Center after the attacks on
September 11, 2001. May he rest in peace. Never forget!