Multimarket Competition and Competitive Aggressiveness
Multimarket Competition and Competitive Aggressiveness
Multimarket Competition and Competitive Aggressiveness
OF TULANE UNIVERSITY
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
____________________________________
APPROVED: ___________________________
ALBERT A. CANNELLA, Ph.D.
Director
____________________________
JOHN M. TRAPANI III, Ph.D.
____________________________
ANA ELISA IGLESIAS, PhD.
ABSTRACT
when a set of firms have presence and face each other as competitors in multiple different
markets (Baum & Korn, 1996; Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno &
Woo, 1994, 1996; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Jayachandran, Gimeno, &
Varadarajan, 1999). In such situation, the chances of knowing, hurting or benefiting each
cautious when deciding which competitive actions to make because the outcome of a
move depends heavily on how rivals respond to it (Baum & Korn, 1996; Bernheim &
Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Jayachandran et al.,
1999). This situation pushes firms to tacitly collude and mutually forbear (Bernheim &
Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Feinberg, 1985), lowering the intensity of competition
understood as the level of aggressiveness and speed of the actions and counteractions
According to Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor (2001), most competitive actions can be
classified as pricing actions, marketing actions, new product actions, capacity and scale-
related actions, service and operations actions, and signaling actions. Each one describes
a set of similar moves, that are assumed to have similar implications for the intensity of
rivalry (Chen, 1996). However, in the field of marketing it is widely argued that many
2006; Magrath, 1986; McCarthy, 1978), and categorization used in competitive dynamics
ignores that fact. Thus, in this dissertation, I propose to categorize all product, pricing,
distribution, and promotional actions as marketing actions, and group them in the
marketing mix (McCarthy, 1978), which presents marketing tactics as sets of actions that
different competitive action categories should be considered all marketing actions, and
equally important, these actions should be jointly analyzed as tactical competitive moves,
Since tactical marketing actions, those of the marketing mix, are deployed on a
day-to-day basis, even under multimarket contact conditions it may seem that competitive
aggressiveness and intensity of competition increase, contrary to the tenets of the theory.
tactical marketing perspective, mainly with the aim of understanding how firms under a
tactical level without disrupting mutual forbearance. For this, I will develop some
hypotheses and test them using the Colombian car industry as empirical setting.
MULTIMARKET CONTACT AND COMPETITIVE AGGRESSIVENESS AT THE
MARKETING MIX TACTICAL LEVEL
OF TULANE UNIVERSITY
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
____________________________________
APPROVED: ___________________________
ALBERT A. CANNELLA, Ph.D.
Director
____________________________
JOHN M. TRAPANI III, Ph.D.
____________________________
ANA ELISA IGLESIAS, PhD.
© Copyright by Juan Manuel González Sánchez, 2015
In the first place I want to thank my advisor, Dr. Albert A. Cannella Jr. He did a
great job guiding me through this long and meaningful process. Additionally, the
enlightening, for which I have to thank them: Dr. John Trapani and Dr. Ana Iglesias.
At last, but not least, I have to thank my wife Martha and my daughter María José
for being patient, for sacrificing their time with me, for understanding me. Martha was
there since the beginning and María José in the last year and a half, I love you both so
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1.4 Measures and levels of analysis used in multimarket competition research ....30
iii
4.1 Research context ......................................................................................................53
4.4 Sample......................................................................................................................59
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................87
TABLES ............................................................................................................................99
FIGURES .........................................................................................................................127
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 11 – Mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum for the variables
Table 13 – Cox regression for H1a without discriminating whether ads are new or old
................................................................................................................................ 114
Table 14 – Cox regression for H1a keeping new ads from initiator and response as any
................................................................................................................................ 115
Table 15 – Cox regression for H1a keeping new ads from initiator and new ads from
Table 16 – Cox regression for H1a keeping new ads from initiator and old ads from
v
Table 17 – Competing risk model considering new and old ads as responses for H1a .. 118
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
vii
8
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In today’s markets, multimarket competition has become a reality that has caught
the attention of researchers in different fields, especially in strategy from the perspective
of competitive dynamics picturing the competitive relationship among firms that do not
compete in isolated markets and have the need to find sources of growth while protecting
Multimarket competition occurs when two or more firms meet each other in more
than one market, and it has several implications for the parties to such competition as
well as for single-market rivals in those markets. For example, some of the implications
include decisions about whether to attack competitors or not, whether to respond to the
moves of rivals or not, which rivals to attack, and how to defend the firm market position
from both single-market and multimarket rivals over time (Heide & Miner, 1992). When
two or more firms compete in more than one market, the chances of knowing, hurting or
benefiting each other increase, leading to a situation where firms recognize their
interdependence. That is, they realize that their futures are intertwined, and that they
must exercise caution when deciding which competitive moves to make because the
outcome of a move depends heavily on how rivals respond to it (Baum & Korn, 1996;
Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000;
and it appears to be an agreement that it provides at least the possibility that the firms
involved can develop mutual forbearance – the condition in which firms decide to
implicitly collude and avoid attacking each other – the multimarket competitors, because
those rivals can easily strike back at vulnerable points, inflicting significant harm
reflected in higher and more stable prices in the market and higher margins for forbearing
firms than if no forbearance at all was taking place (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990).
frames the field of multimarket competition in the field of competitive dynamics, which
provides a basic model to understand and analyze how such firms will behave. In their
comprehensive work, Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor (2001) characterize a competitive action
as the conceptual foundation for the competitive dynamics research stream, and argue
that most competitive actions can be classified as follows: pricing actions, marketing
actions, new product actions, capacity and scale-related actions, service and operations
actions, and signaling actions. Each of these categories describes a set of similar moves,
that are assumed to have similar implications for the resulting intensity of rivalry (Chen,
it is widely argued that many actions across categories are naturally interconnected
(Borden, 1984; Constantinides, 2006; Magrath, 1986; McCarthy, 1978), and some of the
actions classified into different categories as Smith et al. (2001) and others have done,
ignores that fact. For example, viewing discrete categories of actions like pricing actions,
10
marketing actions, and new product actions separately naturally minimizes the
marketing mix, which presents marketing tactics as sets of actions that can be categorized
as either product, price, promotion, or place. These four categories comprise the
marketing mix, and, as noted earlier, marketing theory holds that the elements of the mix
must be analyzed jointly. Product refers to the type of entity produced and sold, its
features and changes in them, and even the firm’s portfolio of related products (Borden,
1984). Price refers to how much a customer has to pay for a product or a service, as well
elements related with both products and frequently brands that support products and
services. Promotion includes advertising, publicity, and public relations among others
(McCarthy, 1978). Finally place refers to distribution channels where the product is sold
or where the service is delivered. Put differently, place is how the firm makes the
should be considered all marketing actions, and equally important, these actions should
competition topics is important for two reasons. First, mutual forbearance does not result
among rivals. However, the engagement is designed to avoid sharp conflicts, territorial
incursions, or other actions that might set off large-scale price wars. Put differently,
mutually forbearing rivals engage each other, but do so in ways that do not lead to sharp
responses or escalating price wars. For example, Kang, Bayus and Balasubramanian
(2010) showed that multimarket rivals tended to respond to price cuts from rivals with
new product introductions, not destructive price cuts that are likely to lead to a protracted
price war. The use of multimarket competition theory through the lens of the marketing
mix tool will help me to predict how multimarket rivals might respond to actions in ways
that are more or less aggressive, as mutual forbearance theory fundamentally predicts.
The point here is that tactical actions around the marketing mix elements are useful to
track intensity of competition for multimarket competing firms, because things like
changes in the number of ads placed, changes in price, opening of new sales facilities,
new product features and other changes in the marketing mix elements, are signals of
firms’ tacit agreement of preserving market equilibrium or not, depending on the way
Second, rather than view actions in isolation, the marketing mix approach permits
me to analyze sets of what have been categorized as dissimilar actions as part of a broad
marketing strategy, because tactical marketing actions must be considered jointly because
they are interconnected (Borden, 1984) as they are the implementation of marketing
strategy in terms of targeting and positioning, where changes in one element of the
12
marketing mix need adjustments in the other elements in order to maintain a coherent
positioning according to the characteristics of the target market, hence, marketing mix
actions are related to each other and can’t be analyzed as isolated ones, and doing so
misrecognizes the importance of coordination between strategy and tactic. The resulting
analysis of competitive moves as tactical marketing mix actions will lead to new theory
initiate increases in aggression through their own actions without provoking destructive
that limits aggression without reducing the observed frequency of actions taken that can
be considered aggressive.
Finally, my approach provides a more complex but complete and accurate picture
of rivalry among firms with multimarket contact. By analyzing sets and sequences of
actions as broad parts of tactical engagement among rivals, we can better understand the
the perspectives of market structure (Porter, 1980), firms’ characteristics, and some
marketing variables such as product differentiation (Jayachandran et al., 1999). For the
product line rivalry and entry strategy (Jayachandran et al., 1999); new product
introduction and spending in advertising, promotion and sales force (Shankar, 1999);
Jayachandran, & White, 2001); and price and new product introduction (Kang et al.,
13
2010). These approaches, however, leave a gap in analyses of interfirm rivalry in the
is reflected in changes to the marketing mix variables, which as noted earlier, are product,
price, place and promotion (McCarthy, 1978). The marketing mix, as a whole, has not
been brought to bear in the study of mutual forbearance Hypothesis nor for understanding
marketing mix variable, frequently occur in nearly any day-to-day rivalry in settings
where advertising is important to competition. Such changes may or may not provoke
responses from rivals and could reflect one or more other marketing mix elements in the
texts and images displayed. Firms may engage in such tactical deployment without
improving their standing just as a matter of survival or for the purpose of maintain the
status quo, which means developing advantages just to match other advantages
Queen effect that will cause a competitive spiral where it is necessary for firms to invest
1996; Delacour & Liarte, 2012; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Voelpel,
Leibold, Tekie, & Von Krogh, 2005). For instance, and from a tactical perspective, let’s
suppose a two-firm market where firm A cuts the price in a 50% and firm B does the
same and matches firm A´s price, the competitive advantage developed by firm A will be
destroyed by firm B, margins for both firms will decrease but market share will probably
remain about the same, which means making efforts to end up at the same competitive
positions where both firms were at before, which is a reflection of acting just for
14
maintaining the status quo. Therefore, theory behind the marketing mix would seem to
benefit the attempt to capture the larger picture of competitive actions in the study of
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Feinberg, 1985), which implies a positive relationship
between multimarket contact and performance. Most research has shown support for this
broad prediction (Yu & Cannella, 2013). In a recent comprehensive review Yu and
Cannella (2013) presented intensity of rivalry as one of the core issues that has been
extensively studied in the field of multimarket competition, and in that line, individual
firm competitive behavior as the key way of capturing rivalry. In their review, Yu and
Cannella (2013) refer to studies that used competitive moves and their speed as measures
of intensity of rivalry, which in turn, if known in detail, can be deployed into attack
characteristics such as those presented by Ferrier (2001). Ferrier pointed out that
volume, duration, complexity, and unpredictability. This view, closely linked to Austrian
notion of individual competitive actions with that of a competitive attack, which in turn,
that has performance as a consequence (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999;
Lee, Smith, Grimm, & Schomburg, 2000; MacCrimmon, 1993; Miller & Chen, 1996;
Competitive actions can be strategic or tactical (Ansoff, 1984; Dutton & Jackson,
1987; Porter, 1980), and the difference between to retaliate or not is a matter of
differentiating the nature of each type of action (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992). Strategic
actions, since they generally require major investments, involve a greater commitment in
terms of time, resources (Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986), and definition of business (Abell,
1980) among others, thus, as a reflection of such serious commitment, rivals may restrain
themselves from responding (Porter, 1980; Schelling, 1960). Instead, because fewer
resources and minor changes are needed, Porter (1980) and Ansoff (1984) stated that
competing firms will be more willing to respond and will respond faster to tactical
actions than to strategic ones, just as supported in Chen, Smith and Grimm’s (1992)
study. This difference establishes that the daily battleground for multimarket rivals is
likely to be captured by tactical actions. Such is the case of firms introducing new
products that must rely on marketing mix variables to sell them, as well as to remind
customers of how great they are. This automatically makes these moves visible to
among them; they orient most of their tactical actions to customers or markets. For
mutual forbearance to emerge, the multimarket rivals must develop effective ways of
communicating or signaling. In such a context, the marketing mix becomes a useful set of
elements oriented to go after a particular market action (Waterschoot & Bulte, 1992) and
Since the marketing mix is a set of tactical actions oriented to implement strategic
decisions (Borden, 1984), the way firms deploy it and make changes to it should
16
determine the competitive aggressiveness of the firm that manages it, thus, generating an
impact on its subsequent performance and on that of competitors. Firms will be more
prone to respond to competitive attacks at the tactical level (Ansoff, 1984; Chen et al.,
1992; Porter, 1980), therefore, when they resort to tactical actions to communicate with
their markets, new tactical actions will appear in response from competing firms. In such
a scenario, competition is more intense and performance for competing firms is going to
be lower than if no struggling was taking place at all and this prediction has received
strong support in several studies of competitive dynamics (K. G. Smith et al., 2001).
In multimarket contact settings, evidence has shown that competition will be less
intense to preserve equilibrium and avoid rivals’ counterattacks in important markets (W.
Barnett, 1993; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Martinez, 1990), which suggests that playing
and negatively affect performance. If that were the case, it would not be possible to find
stable industries with firms competing aggressively at a tactical level, because it would
mean that if no firm makes a strategic move such as investing in R&D and developing a
disrupting technology, the whole industry should have to stay still and not make any
a Red Queen effect (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Delacour & Liarte, 2012; Derfus et al.,
firms in the multimarket scenario are expecting for maintaining the equilibrium, but if
17
not; it will be disrupted because some more aggressive rival will move to fill in the space
In this entire context and according to what previous research has used for
Shankar, 1999; Varadarajan et al., 2001), tactical competitive actions need to be fully
accounted for in order to understand their impact on competitive aggressiveness and firm
competitors and the impact such interaction has on competitive aggressiveness and
complexity, and unpredictability. In that sense, and developing from the relationship
between multimarket contact and performance, and the one between competitive
competitive aggressiveness from the view proposed by Ferrier (2001), and performance is
needed. In that line, the purpose of my research is to understand how firms under a
multimarket contact setting deploy competitive movements at the marketing mix’s tactical
To work out this research I will develop a study using the Colombian car industry,
a dynamic market with 34 different brands and more than 200 car models competing in
10 product market, not geographic, segments, where each of them will play the role of a
market with presence in the whole country. For capturing all the tactical movements, I
will analyze car advertisings for years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 in Semana magazine,
the one with the greatest readability in Colombia, not only counting the number of ads
18
placed every week by each brand, but also analyzing the content of the advertising
looking for key elements that reflect the other 3 p´s of the marketing mix. In this setting,
the level of analysis will be at the model of car identified by brand, and multimarket
contact will be captured using information about presence of brands in product market
intangible resources (Yu & Cannella, 2013), the present research can further those
multimarket rivals might respond to actions in ways that are more or less
3. Developing a marketing mix approach that will permit the categorization and
complex but complete and accurate picture of rivalry among firms with
multimarket contact.
The following parts of this dissertation are organized as follows. In Chapter two I
review important literature regarding multimarket competition and its main principles,
levels of analysis. In the same chapter I also review the concept of competitive
aggressiveness from the perspective of Ferrier (2001), and the tool of the marketing mix.
Finally, I close Chapter two with a short review. In Chapter three I present the research
model, put all the theory, concepts, and tools together, and follow a line of reasoning that
leads me to the development of the Hypotheses that constitute the heart of this study.
Chapter four presents the explanation of the research setting or context; I explain where
data comes from and finally give the explanation of the methodology I am going to use.
In Chapter five I present the results, and finally, in Chapter six, I proceed to present
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
(Chen, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1994, 1996; Jayachandran et al., 1999; Karnani &
Wernerfelt, 1985). This theory centers in interfirm competition, specifically when a set of
firms have presence and face each other as competitors in multiple different markets,
thus, having multimarket contact and being multimarket competitors (Baum & Korn,
1996; Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1994, 1996;
Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Jayachandran et al., 1999). Multiple contacts among
firms can decrease the intensity of competition (Edwards, 1955), and in that sense
Edwards (1955)’s Hypothesis suggested that multimarket competitors are vigilant to how
competitive moves in a given market impact competition in other markets, and as a result
will tacitly organize coordinated actions that will generate a mutual benefit for all the
firms involved. In light of that, firms that are multimarket competitors develop such
interdependencies that competitive moves in one market may cause responses in other
markets.
understood as a group of similar consumers that are seeking goods and/or services that
serve similar functions (Abell, 1980; Jayachandran et al., 1999). In my study, product
21
markets are market segments. In the case of the Colombian car industry, there are 10 such
geographic units to be served with goods and/or services. In my study there is a single
geographic market which is the whole Colombia, because brands do not discriminate by
selling some models in some regions of the country, all models can be bought and are
markets they become the firm’s market domain (Jayachandran et al., 1999). For firms to
overlap, which actually happens because rival firms usually have incompatible positions
due to the fact that they fight for the same resources (especially customers). Thus, one
firm’s move is seen and felt by the other or others (Baum & Korn, 1996; Caves, 1984;
Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990) in much the same way as single-market competition
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Since competing firms have overlapping market domains,
they need similar resources in order to cope with their markets’ needs, and the more
similar the requirement for resources, the greater the potential for competition in the
meeting markets (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Hannan & Freeman, 1989;
Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990; Tirole, 1988). Interdependencies as such described
previously are also called multimarket contact (MMC), which is a central construct in
firms.
22
challenging a competitor in a market and receiving the counterattack not only in the
challenged market but also in other markets where both firms compete and vice versa.
The fact that moves made by a given firm can be seen and felt by its competitors
means that competitors can countermove in order to defend their stakes of interest. This
possibility might place a warning sign to the firm that is considering making the first
move, because the reaction of the attacked firm could mean the loss of the position
occupied in one or more markets (i.e. market share loss), pressing the former firm to
decide not to attack the latter one or to act less aggressively (Chen, 1996).
When firms behave in such manner, tacitly colluding, deciding not to hurt each
other due to the menace or threat of retaliation across multiple markets, keeping each
other from defecting from the established equilibrium; it is said that there is mutual
forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Feinberg, 1985). The threat
deterrence mechanism (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985) that, when effective, lowers the
actions and counteractions firms initiate to compete in the market (Chen, 1996). Low
intensity of competition can lead to higher prices and higher margins for competing firms
that high intensity of competition might not cause, since firms don´t have to invest in
23
aggressive competitive moves because they just try to keep the balance for not putting
Ultimately, the situation described above represents for leader firms a lower
intensity of price competition from rivals, a higher equilibrium market share, and a need
for less intense competitive behavior display. On the other hand, those are often socially
undesirable outcomes (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990) since benefit is being maximized
for competing firms while customers, down in the market, have to pay the price of an
implicit monopoly. Put differently, prices are higher under multimarket competition than
different markets among those in which they overlap, it can be said that spheres of
interests among the rivals. These differences will lead to different firms dominating
different markets, being the dominated markets the spheres of influence of the firm that
dominates them and the real stakes to defend. For each firm, its spheres of influence
represent those markets in which it is dominant and therefore both most profitable and
most vulnerable to harm from an attack. In light of that, if the spheres of influence of
multimarket competing firms are different and are attacked by rivals, then the intensity of
competition between those firms will tend to be accentuated (Baum & Korn, 1996). For
24
example, if firm A threatens with entering or attacking firm B’s spheres of influence, the
threatened firm could, and surely will, counterattack entering or increasing the intensity
actions will probably generate a result such like the dividends of the taken action in the
spheres of influence of the attacked firm won’t compensate the cost generated by the
counterattack of the offended firm in firm A’s spheres of influence. Thus, if the situation,
it is better to just lower the intensity of competition and respect to each other’s spheres of
coordination mechanisms are one condition for mutual forbearance, because coordination
within the firm is frequently needed for coordination between firms (Golden & Ma,
Whinston (1990), for generating mutual forbearance behavior needs to meet the
following conditions:
• Repeated interactions.
• Perfect monitoring.
In other words, firms and markets cannot be identical, there must be spheres of
influence, and there has to be always detection and punishment for defection where the
prospect of losses is greater than the prospect of gains from defecting from the
equilibrium. However, more recent works than Bernheim and Whinston have challenged
the asymmetry condition (Spagnolo, 1999) and the perfect monitoring condition
(Matsushima, 2001). Despite these challenges, the mutual forbearance Hypothesis has
25
received strong empirical support and is widely accepted as a central tenet of multimarket
competition.
is characterized by a deterrence effect that keep firms away from vigorously attacking
each other, or at least showing respect for their spheres of influence, which finally will
Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978). That means there is a negative relationship between the
degree of multimarket contact and the intensity of competition between firms (Gimeno,
1999).
2.1.3.1 Antecedents
antecedents (Baum & Korn, 1999; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Gimeno, 2002; Gimeno &
Woo, 1999; Henrich R. Greve, 2000; H. R. A. Greve, 2006; Helaine J. Korn & Baum,
1999; H.J. Korn & Rock, 2001; Varadarajan et al., 2001). Whether multimarket contact
emerges from an intentional process or not is a matter of discussion. For instance, Korn
and Baum (1999) point out that firms can find themselves in a multimarket competition
setting without intending to be part of it, just as a result of market conditions produced by
a conjunction of individual firms’ strategies. Other researchers have followed the same
path and, in one way or other from results on their research, defend the position that
of those who state that the creation of multimarket competition is intentional because
26
managers seek it to obtain the benefits of mutual forbearance (Fuentelsaz & Gómez,
unintentionally, but either way the final effect on performance is the same, mutual
forbearance and its implied effects. Gimeno’s (2002) findings are not to be taken for
granted since several studies, despite accounting for intentionality, have not found
support for mutual forbearance (Alexander, 1985; Mester, 1987; Rhoades & Heggestad,
1985; Strickland, 1985). In Gimeno’s (2002) defense, many others have found empirical
support for mutual forbearance (W. Barnett, 1993; Baum & Korn, 1996, 1999; Boeker,
Goodstein, Stephan, & Murmann, 1997; Cotterill & Haller, 1992; Evans & Kessides,
1994; Feinberg, 1985; Fernandez & Marin, 1998; Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1994,
1999; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Martinez, 1990; Parker &
One plausible explanation for such equivocal results is that most of the studies
that did not find support for the mutual forbearance Hypothesis used cross-sectional data,
which contrasts with most studies that have found support for the mutual forbearance
Hypothesis, which have used longitudinal data (Jayachandran et al., 1999). In that line,
2.1.3.2. Consequences
attention. In the following three paragraphs I center attention on the type of actions
accounted for in the studies despite their findings, because my intention is to note that an
approach from the perspective of tactical actions like marketing mix actions, taking all
researchers have found strong support for a positive relationship between multimarket
contact and firm performance (Yu & Cannella, 2013) using different settings such as
banking (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978), airlines (Kim & Singal, 1993) manufacturing
(Hughes & Oughton, 1993), different diversified and conglomerated U.S. industries
(Feinberg, 1985), and among diversified U.S. manufacturers (Scott, 1982). On the other
hand, there have been studies that have not found support for the positive relationship
between multimarket contact and performance, and such is the case of Strickland (1985)
in a sample of 195 of the top 200 U.S. manufacturers in 1963, Rhoades and Heggestad
(1985) in U.S. local banking markets, and Waldfogel and Wulf (2006) in U.S. radio
broadcast markets. Despite the conflicting evidence, and probably because of it,
researchers.
many of them at the strategic level, others overlooking key elements of a complete
competitive scene, but none of them analyzing day-to-day rivalry with the complete set of
tools that firms use to compete at the tactical level such as the marketing mix. For
example, Rhoades (1973) used price-cost margins to measure intensity of rivalry, and
found support for the Hypothesis that diversification is an structural element of the
28
industry that has a systematic effect on industry profit performance by creating barriers to
entry. Strickland (1985) used advertising ratios to test the mutual forbearance Hypothesis,
and Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) used market share instability in 1974’s dominant
banking markets in the United States to test the prediction that multimarket contact
between dominant banks negatively affects the degree of rivalry between them. Martinez
(1990) used changes in the overall rank positions of firms in testing the linked oligopoly
Hypothesis or mutual forbearance Hypothesis, finding support for the prediction that as
larger banks in the United States meet one another in increasing numbers of local banking
A number of studies have used firm-level actions that are directly observable as
their concepts of interest. For example, Fuentelsaz and Gómez (2006), Haveman and
Nonnemaker (2000), and Baum and Korn (1999) used market entry and exit to capture
contact and rates of entry in the Spanish banking industry, savings and loans in 58
Entry and exit behavior are troublesome concepts to use in studies of multimarket
contact, however, because these actions are not only guided by the implicit rules of
multimarket contact, but the actions themselves change the level of multimarket contact.
Some researchers have used individual firm rivalrous behavior to capture intensity of
rivalry. For example, (Yu & Cannella, 2007) studied the behavior of 13 global
their central measure of rivalry. Similarly, Young, Smith, Grimm and Simon (2000) used
29
frequency and speed of competitive actions in the U.S. software industry as their key
outcome variable.
In a different line, some researchers have focused their attention on the investment
that firms make in tangible and intangible resources to capture intensity of rivalry.
Example measures include marketing spending for new brand introduction (Shankar,
1999), multiproject contacts (Vonortas, 2000), and decisions about prices and new
product introductions (Kang et al., 2010). Researchers have also used firm and sales
growth to capture intensity of rivalry, finding support for the mutual forbearance
Hypothesis (H. R. Greve, 2008; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). And, additionally,
changes in service quality as a measure of intensity of rivalry was used by Prince and
Simon (2009) in their empirical work in the U.S. airline industry, finding support for the
Thereafter, and understanding that research in the field has looked at intensity of
competition in terms of strategic actions or has used some tactical actions in isolation, not
jointly with other tactical actions in order to really reflect strategy, my contribution is to
apply a new set of tools that firms themselves use to compete at the tactical level –
light on the mechanisms that govern competitive relationships at the tactical level among
firms that have multimarket contact. Specifically, using the marketing mix permits me to
link together a variety of actions that have been treated as separate or even not taken into
consideration at all. I view actions from the perspective of the marketing mix rather than
isolated or as singly occurring in response to the actions of rivals. This means that I see
30
competitive actions as a complex set of interrelated ones that are the implementation of
strategy, and as such, they need to be analyzed together instead of isolated like in
previous research because analyzing tactical actions in isolation means losing sense of
strategy, which at the end is the what that traces the rout for organizations . This allows
literature.
levels of analysis have been used. In this section, I present those levels of analysis and
some measures that can be used in multimarket competition research with the sole
purpose of understanding the level of analysis selected for the present study.
The most aggregated set of measures is the market level, which is focused on the
Jeong, 2001). Some settings where the market level of analysis has been used are
manufacturing (Feinberg, 1985; Hughes & Oughton, 1993), airline routes (Evans &
Kessides, 1994; Singal, 1996), and regional cement markets (Jans & Rosenbaum, 1997).
The simplest measure of multimarket contact at the market level is a basic count, which
could include the number of multimarket contacts among firms in the focal market, the
average multimarket contact of all the dyads in a focal market (Evans & Kessides, 1994)
or the average number of rivals without multimarket contact in the focal market (Jans &
Rosenbaum, 1997), among others. One possible shortcoming of using this level of
analysis emerges because multimarket contact is the result of relationships between two
firms (Baum & Korn, 1999), and this raises problems for studies that use aggregated or
31
averaged measures. Specifically, because such measures don’t permit the researcher to
observe the actions of individual firms they can hamper our understanding of the
theory.
level, which captures the aggregated degree of multimarket contact between a focal firm
and its competitors in a given market (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Some settings where
firm-in-market level of analysis has been used include airline routes (Baum & Korn,
1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996), manufacturing (Feinberg, 1985), and hospital services
(Boeker et al., 1997). As in the case of market-level measures, the firm-in-market level
doesn’t give a clear understanding of the competitive relationship between pairs of firms
because of the aggregated nature of the measures (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001), but represents
a good measure when there is no information about which competitive movements are
The dyad level comprises a third level of analysis, capturing the total degree of
multimarket contact between two firms across all the markets where they encounter each
other and downplaying the idea of a focal market (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). As with the
other levels of analysis, airline routes have been used as a setting for multimarket contact
research at the dyad level (Baum & Korn, 1999; Chen, 1996). This level of analysis
accounts for some details of individual dyads that can yield a better reflection of the
levels of analysis. However, since a firm’s competitive actions in one market may target
one specific rival, some rivals, or all rivals, it can be difficult to identify which action is
32
multimarket contact between pairs of firms in a given market (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). A
good example of the use of this level of analysis is the work of Scott (1982) in a
manufacturing product setting with sales as the dependent variable. As with other levels
of analysis, a basic count of multimarket rivals is the simplest measure and the departing
point for measuring multimarket contact at the dyad-in-market level of analysis. This
level of analysis puts together what is most valuable of the previous three levels of
analysis, market, firm-in-market and dyad, because it permits the researcher to capture
the competitive relationship between two firms accounting for the market context of the
market (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Again, when it is not clear who the target of the
competitive action is, this measure represents a problem for the researcher because
In accordance with the previous four paragraphs, market, dyad, and dyad-in-
market levels of analysis would not be as precise and objective as what is needed in the
present study, since market level is too general and does not capture enough information
about the competitive relationship among firms, and dyad and dyad-in-market levels have
the serious problem of double-counting of actions plus the limitation that data available
does not permit to know the target of specific competitive actions. . In light of that, and
since competitive actions in this study are not targeted to an specific rival, instead they
are intended for all competitors in the market, firm-in-market level measurement is
33
optimal for my study, since it will permit me to capture details about the relationships
among competing firms while considering the competitive context - the market, which, in
turn, will lead me to a more realistic analysis of the effects of multimarket contact on the
innovate to surpass their own capacities and those of their competitors, hence, creating
competitive advantages that will disturb the status quo of the market, which in turn will
market share or margin. After disturbance, the market stabilizes until another competitor
seeking new competitive advantages, or perhaps the same player, starts a new movement
to unbalance market conditions in its favor. This scenario can be thought of as a type of
game where players start a competitive engagement when one says and does something
and the other responds to it. The response can involve mimicking the previous
different and perhaps completely unexpected. That is the game of competitive dynamics,
where the actor, the competitive action, the reactor, the competitive response, the
competitive environment, and the consequences of the action are studied (K. G. Smith et
al., 2001). The mentioned elements of study can be grouped into four categories: the
competitive actions, which can have many forms or characteristics such as type,
visibility (K. G. Smith et al., 2001). With those characteristics, competitive actions are
moves is a way to capture competitive rivalry (Yu & Cannella, 2013). In their
comprehensive review, Yu and Cannella (2013) cite studies that used competitive moves
Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor (2001) as a way to characterize a set of competitive actions.
specific duration and intensity. Further, Ferrier (2001) proposed four dimensions that
unpredictability (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2000; MacCrimmon, 1993;
Volume refers to the total number of competitive actions that comprise an attack
(Abbott, 1983, 1990). According to this, firms that have attacks with greater volume are
more competitively aggressive (Ferrier et al., 1999; Gunther & D'Aveni, 1994; Young et
al., 1996)
Duration refers to the time from the beginning of a competitive attack to the end –
from the first competitive action in a sequence to the last (Abbott, 1983; Ramaprasad,
35
1992). Firms that sustain attacks of longer duration are perceived as more aggressive
of actions (Ferrier, 2001). According to previous research, firms that deploy more
complex attacks (those involving different kinds of actions) are more aggressive than
those that deploy simpler attacks (Ferrier et al., 1999; Gunther & D'Aveni, 1994; Miller
deployed during an attack differs from that of a previous or subsequent attack (Ferrier,
2001). Firms with unpredictable repertoires can disrupt the equilibrium of the market
(Gunther & D'Aveni, 1994; MacCrimmon, 1993; Rizzo & O'Driscoll, 1985), and hence
performance. The important point for my study here is that those dimensions, combined
as a proxy for competitive aggressiveness and in a multimarket contact setting, have the
potential to capture tactical movements such as those of a day to day rivalry reflected in
the marketing mix variables, giving me the opportunity to combine Ferrier’s (2001)
approach and the action-response one into one that allows me to analyze sets of
rivals, which in turn represents a more complex but complete and accurate picture of
36
rivalry among firms with multimarket contact, complementing extant literature which
The marketing mix is a business tool used in marketing, and has only recently
begun to evolve into a clear theory with a body of knowledge developed around it. My
intent is to use it as the lens through which multimarket competition can be understood at
providing key concepts and definitions that will be used later to develop specific
Hypotheses.
The concept of the marketing mix appeared in the 1950’s as a list of 12 elements,
organizations (Borden, 1984). During the 60’s the marketing mix concept gained
relevance with the appearance of the 4p´s concept, which rapidly gained importance for
Jobber (2001) the strength of the 4p’s resides in the practical framework it represents for
decision-making and for the practical tool it is for case analysis in colleges and
universities.
globalization, innovation and a complex environment are factors that have made
researchers and practitioners think about extending marketing theory to better understand
these factors. Additionally, many believe that in recent years, consumers have become
more demanding, more self-centered, more independent, more critical and better
informed (Capon & Hulbert, 2000; Lewis & Bridger, 2000). Further, consumer power
37
has increased due to the increased amount of information available, accessible through
the internet to companies and customers alike. This has motivated companies to change
the scope of their actions from those oriented toward mass markets to those oriented
toward personalized ones, involving direct dialog and interaction with consumers. These
changes, added to a rapidly growing services sector and the appearance of the Internet as
a buying and delivery channel, reflect the problematic of services and social sectors as
particular industries, where the traditional marketing mix is not enough to respond to the
industry challenges (Lovelock, 2011), requiring to take into consideration the role of
As all disciplines, marketing has its own basic principles, but the central ones are
those that cope with decisions shaped by targeting and positioning choices, the marketing
strategy. Targeting refers to the process of evaluating the potential and commercial
attractiveness of each market segment in order to select one or more to be served with
products and services (Kotler & Armstrong, 2010; Lawther, Hastings, & Lowry, 1997),
and positioning refers to the process of developing a desired detailed position of the
product in a market segment in reference to other’s positions (Kotler & Armstrong, 2010;
tactical level that requires designing, developing, and introducing products to markets;
pricing those products; selecting proper distribution and commercialization channels for
those products; and communicating both the nature of the products and their benefits
through advertising, personal selling, or publicity as free advertising, or a mix of all these
(McCarthy, 1978). This “marketing mix” needs to be carefully tailored since changing
38
one element can cause a misalignment with the strategy (represented by the marketing
mix). So, in order to change one element, marketing executives must make integral
once in order to achieve strategic alignment. McCarthy (1978) developed today’s 4p’s
has been widely accepted and used in both marketing practice and marketing research
As suggested above, services marketing has often been considered as separate and
distinct from product marketing, and thus for services there are other elements to the
“mix” concept. However, for products (which are the focus of my study), the traditional
4p’s approach fits very well and comprises the key factors driving the purchase decision.
Table 2.2 contains a more precise definition of each P constructed from Borden (1984),
strategy. Marketing mix decisions can be made and changed on a daily basis as a way to
cope with rivalry, which contrasts with the nature of strategic choices. Strategic choices
tend to be much more stable since strategy is not changed frequently. Analyzing
that executives face every day and how those dynamics are calibrated with long-run
to track those competitive movements that are intended to influence and facilitate
39
customers’ buying decision processes, moving, in the short run, customers away from
competitors offerings. That is exactly what the marketing mix is intended for, therefore
its use in this study can help to explain why in a multimarket contact setting firms seem
a strategic level.
competitive aggressiveness and the marketing mix. In this section I will consolidate the
material I have covered and explain how I will use the marketing mix as a key new
theoretical framework and how that will contribute to knowledge about competitive
About multimarket competition I know that the theory describes the outcome of a
form of competition characterized by firms that have presence and face each other as
competitors in multiple different markets (Baum & Korn, 1996; Bernheim & Whinston,
1990; Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1994, 1996; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000;
Jayachandran et al., 1999). This situation can decrease the intensity of competition
because multimarket competitors are vigilant about how competitive moves in a given
benefit for all parties involved (Edwards, 1955). Benefits include each rival preserving
its spheres of influence (Edwards, 1955; McGrath et al., 1998). This outcome is broadly
described as mutual forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Feinberg,
1985).
40
behavior, firm grow/service quality and investment in tangible and intangible resources
(Yu & Cannella, 2013). However, it lacks a tactical focus that enhances understanding of
the rules of engagement for day to day rivalry. To resolve this shortcoming, I argue that
the marketing mix concept accurately characterizes the tactical actions that firms engage
in as their overall marketing strategy (Borden, 1984; McCarthy, 1978), which in turn is a
at the tactical level is that it offers an integrative approach, which means that changes in
one element – a P, require changes and adjustments in the other P’s, because of the
maintain or change the marketing strategy a firm must adjust all the marketing mix
elements so that they are aligned in the same direction/position and are consistent
(Borden, 1984; Kerin, Hartley, & Rudelius, 2011; Kotler & Armstrong, 2010; Mahajan,
Varadarajan, & Kerin, 2011). Marketing mix adjustments are competitive actions at the
tactical level.
Additionally, many studies have used competitive moves and their speed as
measures of intensity of rivalry (Yu & Cannella, 2013), hence, rivalry as competitive
actions can be classified into attack and response characteristics such as the ones
unpredictability.
competition, competitive aggressiveness and the marketing mix to provide a more tactical
from that approach with respect to firm performance at a tactical level. The manipulation
of product, price, place and promotion features as a tactical display of marketing strategy
is a compendium of competitive actions that constitute an attack that can be more or less
the competitive conditions of the relationship between them, whether if they have
fills a gap in the literature, since most research is centered on strategic moves instead of
tactical ones, and those that do take into consideration tactical moves do not account for
the relationship that different types of tactical moves have with each other. Contrary to
the case of tactical marketing moves, mainly marketing mix ones, which require checking
for the need of adjustment of different elements of the 4 P’s if one or more of them are
manipulated as a competitive attack or response. The need for adjustment of the 4 P’s
responds to the coherence that is required in order to establish and preserve a market
positioning (Borden, 1984; Kotler & Armstrong, 2010), therefore, integrally taking into
just looking at isolated competitive movements, whether strategic or tactical ones, and
becomes an approach that opens a new route to analyze day to day rivalry among firms
42
that can be very useful not only for researchers to further the field of study, but also to
CHAPTER 3
This chapter develops a research framework for understanding how firms under a
tactical level without disrupting mutual forbearance. I propose a model that focuses on
two dimensions of competitive aggressiveness at the tactical level, and their behavior in a
multimarket contact setting. The chapter begins by describing the model, with its
and its dimensions in terms of attack characteristics at the tactical level through the lens
of the marketing mix tool and taking into account a multimarket contact setting. Finally I
Figure 3.1 presents a theoretical model that represents the expected relationships
aggressiveness. In the figure, the dotted line gathers the selected characteristics of
competitive aggressiveness, and the solid lines represent the relationships explored in this
dissertation. Those relationships have been previously studied using multimarket contact
as the key antecedent variable and with the intent of evaluating support for the mutual
44
represented by the solid lines at the marketing mix tactical level, where the mutual
forbearance hypothesis will be tested with respect to mechanisms that have not been
previously studied.
each of the attack characteristics or dimensions is more prominent (Ferrier et al., 1999;
Gunther & D'Aveni, 1994; MacCrimmon, 1993; Miller & Chen, 1996; Rizzo &
O'Driscoll, 1985; Young et al., 1996). Following that logic, a long-lasting competitive
actions – information about product, price and distribution, and that does not resemble in
type, time, magnitude, and order those of previous attacks is an aggressive one. However,
at the same time, the level of competitive aggressiveness is a relative concept, since it
depends on how actions impact rivals and the competitive actions it provokes from rivals.
What would seem to be a very aggressive attack might not turn out to be so aggressive, as
such attacks might be common practice in the industry and generally lead to minimal
harm for rivals. Therefore, aggressive attacks need to be salient, and saliency means
investing more resources implying a higher financial commitment. This situation is very
clear at the marketing mix level, which calls for tactical decisions and actions (Borden,
communication strategy. All of these require financial outlays and all of them must be
coordinated to obtain or maintain a desired positioning. Recall that all the marketing mix
45
variables have to be adjusted at the same time towards the same position, because they
are interconnected (Borden, 1984). However, the way actions at the marketing mix level
are deployed would seem to imply aggressiveness, because Ferrier’s (2001) dimensions
of a competitive attack are all simultaneously affected. The number of actions of price,
of the mix, are the volume of the attack. The time taken during the deployment of the
total marketing mix actions is the duration of the attack. The composition of the mix used
during the attack represents its complexity, and finally the extent to which the type, time,
order, and magnitude of the marketing mix actions deployed during the attack resemble
count of advertising pieces, which does not add to the purpose of using the marketing mix
tool. For unpredictability, determining detailed changes from one competitive attack to
the other requires analyzing detailed content of advertising texts, which takes the study to
product, pricing, promotion, and distribution. For example, my interest is in how a firm
reacts when a competitor includes references to product features in its advertising, but I
am not concerned with the type of product features that are included in the advertising.
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999; K. G. Smith et al., 2001). The
main differences are that the one proposed here is limited to the tactical level, instead of
the strategic level, and that I propose the use of the marketing mix to track competitive
46
behavior since analyzing the four components of the mix together is essential (Borden,
lot of its resources on growing its segments and defending them, since they become the
expected behavior since the firm’s revenues derive from those segments.
different markets among those in which they overlap, it can be said that spheres of
influence exist (Edwards, 1955; McGrath et al., 1998), but when a firm does not compete
in multiple markets, its lone market is its sphere of influence even if its market share is
well below the leader’s. In a situation like this, aggressive competitive movements, either
as attacks or as responses, can be expected when the firm feels threatened. In addition,
when a firm competes in different market segments and the competitors it meets in each
market are unique to that market, no multimarket contact exists so there is no mutual
forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). As such, the firm has no reason to forbear
and will act aggressively, either attacking or responding to attacks, in its markets. In this
situation (without the possibility of mutual forbearance) an aggressive attack from the
the media, including information about the product, the price and the distribution
channels.
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Feinberg, 1985), which implies a positive relationship
between multimarket contact and performance, for which several researchers have found
strong support (Yu & Cannella, 2013). The mutual forbearance Hypothesis suggests the
(Feinberg, 1985; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Kim & Singal,
1993; Scott, 1982). However, firms still have to act. Mutual forbearance simply suggests
that the actions taken by firms will be intentionally planned so as not to provoke
increased rivalry with each other. It also can be the consequence of firms moving in the
same direction as competitors in order to preserve the equilibrium, which, finally, means
moving forward, spending resources and at the end maintaining the same position.
Following the logic of mutual forbearance, when a firm decides to place a new ad
breaker, which can be neutralized if multimarket competing firms also place new ads.
The same can happen when a firm decides to change advertising complexity reducing or
adding product, price and distribution features placed on it, therefore multimarket
competing firms may change their advertising complexity to neutralize the competitors’
move and as a means to maintain or restore equilibrium. Additionally, and following the
same logic, in a high multimarket contact setting, firms’ advertising features are likely to
resemble each other in the sense that firms do not want their advertising features to
contrast sharply with multimarket rivals in order to preserve mutual forbearance. In the
same sense and in consequence with existing theory, in a high multimarket contact setting
firms’ advertising features may move away from price emphasis, because price
movements, such as cuts are likely to lead to disruptive price wars (Kang et al., 2010),
48
and stable prices are a consequence of mutual forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston,
H1a: When a firm launches a new ad, its multimarket rivals are more likely than its
single-market rivals to launch new ads too.
H1b: When a firm changes its ad complexity, its multimarket rivals are more likely than
its single-market rivals to change their ad complexity in the same direction.
H1d: When multimarket contact is high, a firm’s advertising is less likely to emphasize
price and more likely to emphasize product and/or place.
introduced, but as the duration of the advertisement prolongs and ad repetition increases,
its effectiveness will begin to diminish because of saturation (Schumann, Petty, &
Clemons, 1990). Since firms in a single market need to protect that market, and letting ad
firms will change ads on a regular basis before saturation occurs. This suggests that being
aggressive through ad exposure duration requires that the ad campaign’s timing is short
enough to avoid saturation. Note that this prediction differs from Ferrier’s (2001)
prediction about competitive attacks – the greater the duration the more aggressive the
movement.
lessen for reasons attributable to mutual forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990;
Edwards, 1955; Feinberg, 1985). That is, lower competition arises because firms know
each other very well and know their spheres of influence, their interdependencies, their
capabilities (Alexander, 1985; Feinberg, 1985; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978). However,
49
despite the previous, firms keep on competing on a day-to-day basis because they have to
maintain communication with their customers. They keep implementing tactical actions
in distribution channels and make product and price adjustments, but do so in ways that
permits the equilibrium to persist. It may seem that firms are aggressive when exerting
(Borden, 1984), but firms may be careful in selecting what moves to make and how to
make them in order to appear aggressive while not actually being aggressive. This avoids
contact. The situation I describe is one that appears to be aggressive, but upon closer
examination reflects coordination and mutual forbearance among the multimarket rivals.
For example, an advertising campaign that persists for a long time may seem to be very
Firms that compete in multimarket settings tend to mutually forbear and seek to manage
the intensity of competition (Baum & Korn, 1996; Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Chen,
1996; Edwards, 1955; Feinberg, 1985). As such, the duration of ads placed on the media
will tend to be long enough to reduce their effectiveness, and as such the firm can avoid
disturbing the equilibrium established by mutual forbearance. The long ad duration will
compensate for the disrupting effects of the early stage of ad placement when it actually
is effective due to novelty (Schumann et al., 1990). From this I derive the following
prediction:
H2a: The relationship between the level of multimarket contact and focal firm’s ad
placement duration will be positive.
50
(Carpenter, Glazer, & Nakamoto, 1994; Kotler & Armstrong, 2010; Porter, 1985). In the
same line, highlighting several attributes when differentiating a product may send a
confusing message to consumers, since where the real value is will not be clear for
audiences that will see products as trying to be good on many dimensions but being
outstanding in none (Dickson & Ginter, 1987; Kotler & Armstrong, 2010; Nowlis &
Simonson, 1996; Simonson, Carmon, & O'Curry, 1994; W. R. Smith, 1956). In addition,
there is empirical evidence showing that as the emphasis on future sales rises, the optimal
number of product features decreases, reflecting feature fatigue (Simonson et al., 1994;
Thompson, Hamilton, & Roland, 2005). A product (or advertisements about a product)
piece that contains information about product features, price features and distribution
features is a compound of tactical information in the full sense of the 4 p’s of the
According to Ferrier (2001), more complex attacks are more aggressive than those
less complex, but theory and evidence from marketing (Kotler & Armstrong, 2010;
Thompson et al., 2005) implies otherwise in the case of advertisements. In that context,
being less complex and highlighting fewer features is likely to be more effective than
being more complex and presenting a larger set of features. In the same sense, an
advertisement full of marketing mix features could be thought of as very aggressive from
51
Ferrier’s (2001) perspective but in fact be not very aggressive according to marketing
theory. In that line of reasoning, a firm that has to defend its sphere of influence or only
source of revenue would be prone to be aggressive with its advertising by trying to avoid
complexity, and providing much focused advertising. While complex attacks are
aggressive according to existing theory (Ferrier, 2001), but from the perspective of a
features simply falls victim to feature fatigue (Thompson et al., 2005), reducing its
effectiveness. Because it is not be clear for audiences where the product’s value
performance is minimal. In that same sense, multimarket contact firms that are
forbearance have an incentive to continue on placing complex advertising pieces that tend
to preserve the established equilibrium and its benefits. The previous reasoning leads me
H2b: The relationship between the level of multimarket contact and focal firm’s ad
complexity will be positive.
In this chapter I proposed a model that focuses on two competitive actions at the
tactical level and their behavior in a multimarket contact setting: advertising complexity
and advertising duration, after testing for an expected behavior according to marketing
theory. The research framework developed in this chapter in order to propose the
mentioned model, definitely will help to understanding how firms under a multimarket
contact setting deploy competitive movements at the marketing mix’s tactical level
In the next three chapters I will focus on explaining the methods that I will follow
in order to test the hypotheses developed in the present chapter, as well as to present the
CHAPTER 4
METHODS
To conduct this research I developed a study based on the Colombian car industry,
a dynamic industry with, as at 2013, 34 different brands and 217 car models. The 34
brands belong to 23 parent companies that own them, and have a presence in 10 well-
defined segments as can be seen in Table 2.1. For the purpose of this study, each of these
segments represents a market. For capturing all the tactical movements, I analyzed car
advertisements for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 in Semana magazine, the one
with the greatest distribution in Colombia, not only counting the number of ads placed
every week by each parent, but also analyzing the content of the advertising looking for
key elements that reflect the other 3 p´s of the marketing mix. In this context each parent
The Colombian car industry, for its size, has a good number of competitors, with a
segments are based only on product characteristics; geography is not a component of the
market, because competitors have a presence country-wide and they advertise and
communicate their brands in media that covers the whole national territory
.
54
In the Colombian market it is very common that firms invest much money in printed
magazines to advertise their different corporate branded vehicles and their characteristics
and communicate information about distribution channels, financing and price features.
These factors make for a good setting to capture multimarket contact and marketing mix
deployment. In light of that, this is a proper setting with multimarket firms with extended
interdependence because the same competitors are likely to encounter each other in
several product markets. Additionally, even though products are not identical, within
segments, vehicles tend to have the same features, causing a certain level of product
homogeneity. In this setting there are also competitors of different sizes, with different
performance, and different levels of multimarket contact, which permits this setting to
have heterogeneity in the dependent and independent variables. The condition of full
observability for the setting is also met since vehicle features, price, and distribution
channels are extensively published in Colombia, and therefore are in the public domain.
Finally, this setting permits me to have longitudinal data at a fairly disaggregated level.
The data required for this study were gathered from different sources: from
Semana Magazine, the advertising pieces which include information about product, price
and distribution features; from Publicaciones Semana - the holding company that owns
the magazine, I gathered information about car advertising expenditure; from the Registro
data about car sales (in number of units) for each model sold in the country; from
55
companies in the country; and finally, from SOFASA, a leading car manufacturer in
Colombia and one of the oldest in the Country, I gathered the categories and
I created the study’s final datasets in two different stages. First by identifying all
the brands and their car models advertised in Semana magazine in the years 2010, 2011,
2012 and 2013. Then, I classified each reference into one market segment according to
the advertisement itself. After that, I created a questionnaire that was sent to marketing
experts in different Colombian universities asking for the most determining elements,
among marketing mix features present in printed car advertising. With the information
from the questionnaire , I reviewed each advertising piece in Semana magazine for the
years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 , and created the complexity variable. I calculated
advertising duration by checking each advertisement for each car model in Semana
magazine for the years 2010 to 2013, noting when a particular ad was first introduced and
how many times and for how many weeks it was used. Market share was calculated from
Semana magazine for each car model, as well as country-wide advertising expenditure
for each car model. After the creation of this first dataset, I made important changes in
order to suit the study’s needs and moved to the second stage, which I began by changing
the data structure from one observation per brand-reference-market to one observation
per parent-market-week. Data have to be consolidated at the parent level and at the
market level to test the hypotheses I outlined in Chapter three. In light of that, I created a
56
new variable – parent, because a number of the brands I identified in the first stage were
owned by other brands at the moment the dataset was being created. Table 4.3 shows the
procedure I followed in the statistical package in order to group those brands owned by
While creating the dataset in the second stage, I had to limit the sample to one
observation per parent-market-week, which mainly made me focus on two large changes.
First, I identified that there was some advertising that was brand advertising instead of
car reference advertising, causing problems because it was not targeted at any market at
all. Thus, in order to overcome this problem I replicated the ad across all markets that the
brand, not the parent, operates in and weighted each at 1/the number of markets the brand
operates in. Second, I also experienced some trouble because a small handful of parent-
finally ended up with 1081 ads that resulted in a single ad per parent-week, 37 with 2 ads
The original dataset from stage one had 205 weeks covered. However, I needed
to collect data to use for control variables, for which I concentrated on sales and
advertising in Colombian Pesos. The approach I used was to capture 10-week moving
sums of units sold, both for the parent-market and for the parent overall as well, and for
Colombian Pesos invested in marketing for the parent-market and Colombian Pesos
invested in marketing for the parent overall. I ended up with two datasets with the lagged
57
variables and starting in week 11. I will explain these two datasets in the section titled
Measures.
4.3 Procedures
To test the six hypotheses stated in this dissertation, I used different approaches as
For testing hypothesis H1a, which states that when a firm launches a new ad, its
multimarket rivals are more likely than its single-market rivals to launch new ads too, I
will structure the dataset as an event-history dataset. Every time any firm in a given
market launches an ad, I’ll create one observation per week for each rival in the market.
The outcome variable will be “response” – a zero-one variable that is coded zero for each
week that a rival does not launch an ad, and one for the week in which a rival launches an
ad. When any rival launches an ad, it will end the entire set of initiator-respondent pairs
and then will create a new set of observations with the responding ad as initiator and all
other firms in the market as responders. The previous information suggests a survival
approach, thus, a Cox survival analysis is going to be used. I will test this hypothesis
following five different approaches. The first one without discriminating whether ads are
new or repeated. The second one keeping new ads from the initiator and considering
either response (new or old ad). The third keeping only new ads from the initiator and
new ads from the responder. The fourth one keeping new ads from initiators and only old
ads as responses from responders. Finally, I will use a competing risk model that
considers both new and old ads as responses. In order to make the distributions of the
control variables more normal, I will make log transformations calculating the logarithm
58
of the addition of 1 and the variable and use the result to replace the original score of the
variable.
Hypothesis H1b states that when a firm changes its ad complexity, its multimarket
rivals are more likely than its single-market rivals to change their ad complexity in the
same direction. Since changes in ad complexity do not occur randomly, in fact, they are
consciously intended, I will use a two-stage Heckman Selection Model, where the first
stage models the likelihood of response and the second stage models, given a response,
what the characteristics of the response might be. As with the previous hypothesis, in
order to make the distributions of the control variables more normal, I will make log
transformations calculating the logarithm of the addition of 1 and the variable and use the
result to replace the original score of the variable. Then, I will create a complexity
distance measure first squaring the difference between ad complexity of the initiator and
ad complexity of the responder, and second calculating the square root of that squared
is likely to emphasize features that it shares with its multimarket rivals. Similar to the
case of H1b, for testing this Hypothesis, I will use a Heckman Selection Model, but prior
to running any test I will make log transformations of the control variables in order to
make their distributions more normal, calculating the logarithm of the addition of 1 and
the variable and using the result to replace the original score of the variable. I will create
differences between the price, product, place and complexity of the initiator and the
responder. I will then create a fifth variable which is the sum of the previous four
59
variables and a sixth variable, which is the square root of the fifth. This sixth variable will
be used as advertisement distance measure and the other variables will be discarded.
less likely to emphasize price and more likely to emphasize product and/or place. For
testing this Hypothesis, I will use OLS regressions in three different relationships: first,
and third, using it as a predictor of product. For acquiring more clarity about the
The last two hypotheses, H2a and H2b, which state that the relationship between
the level of multimarket contact and the focal firm’s ad placement duration (H2a) and
4.4 Sample
Parents, brands and car models included in the study are those that advertise in
Semana Magazine, which is the entire range of standardized commercial brands intended
for individual purchase that were sold in Colombia during the years 2010, 2011, 2012,
and 2013.
Since some car models are introduced and withdrawn from the market at a very
fast pace, year selection was intentionally set as the last four years to aid the stability of
information. This is because in these four years there was a reduced number of model
withdrawals.
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4.5 Measures
In what follows, I am going to present the measures I am using in this study and,
later and for some cases where needed, to explain the building process to create them.
• Multimarket contact: number of multimarket rivals that the parent meets in the
market divided by the number of rivals that the parent meets in the market.
• New ad:
• Total number of units sold by the initiator in the market during previous 10
• Number of units sold by the initiator across all markets during the past 10 weeks:
during the previous 10 weeks: ad expenses are only incurred when the parent runs
markets during the previous 10 weeks: ad expenses are only incurred when the
• Total number of units sold by the responderin the market during previous 10
• Number of units sold by the responder across all markets during the past 10
the current week: ad expenses are only incurred when the parent runs an ad.
markets during the previous 10 weeks: ad expenses are only incurred when the
I started with the creation of a dataset that includes the full 205 weeks covered by
the selected issues of Semana. I named this dataset as PMW and the level of analysis
included in this dataset is the parent-market-week, and the variables and their measures
Next, I created a dataset based on the previous one, named PMW2, but covering
the last 195 weeks of the previous dataset and having the level of analysis of the parent-
market-week. The only difference between this dataset and the previous one is that this
one has lagged control variables and therefore only includes 195 weeks as the first 10
62
weeks are used only to estimate control variables – sums of ad expenditures and units
sold. Table 4.5 presents the list of variables and measures for PMW2.
I also created a dataset that I called PROMOTION, covering the entire 205 weeks
of the dataset, and it has the level of analysis of the advertisement run in Semana, with
one observation per time the ad was run in Semana. Table 4.6 presents the list of
across all weeks in the dataset. The level of analysis is the parent-market. It was named
I needed to create a dataset with only a single observation representing the matrix
an array with 11 columns (one column for each market, plus an additional column (11)
for the total number of markets the firm operates in). It also has 24 rows, one per parent
company plus one (24) for the total number of firms operating in the market. Using the
whether or not the parent operates in the market. MMC will be 1 if the parent competes in
Finally, I created the dataset that I used the most: the event history dataset –
EVENTHIST dataset:
a. The maximum values of place, price, product, complexity, and brand were
retained
b. The minimum value of week_ (the number of times the ad was run, at this
b. A 23-unit retained vector was generated, coding whether or not the parent ran
an ad that week. Missing values for all firms not in the market were inserted.
retained to indicate the week that the vector represents. If at the end of the
first week of data no ad has been run, the vector continues on to the second
week and so forth until at least one firm runs an ad for that market.
c. A 23-unit response vector with missing values for all parents not in the market
was created. It was coded for the response observations with 1 for firms that
i. Variables market_, parent_, and week were retained to later add data for
ii. Finally, the attack and response vectors were jointly processed.
1. Variables market and week were retained as they are in PMW, and
2. The response vector was checked to see if any firm responded that
week; if yes, the order was to wait until all observations have been
as output
5. After processing, if any firm ran an ad, newresponse=1 was set and the
attack vector was replaced with the response vector. If no firm ran an
ad, newresponse=0 was set, the attack vector and attackweek were
retained and then proceeded directly to the next week, replacing the
response vector.
d. The variables i_parent, market_, and week in the EVENTHIST dataset were
used, and information about the attacks and responses was added (the initiator
e. I needed a unique identifier for response panels. That is, the observations
data by market_, i_parent, parent, and week. I set the data by market_,
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by 1.
3. Given the dataset above, I set the PROMOTION dataset established first and
attackweek. Then I merged it with the dataset above by market_, i_parent_, and
attackweek.
(responder) but parent and week were kept as they are. Then, I merged it with the
Table 4.8 presents the list of variables and measures for EVENTHIST.
Ad complexity is a central part of this study and is a central part of the variables
of the previous datasets. Following is a detailed description of the way the variable was
obtained:
Colombian universities. Taking into consideration that the ad, per se, is about the
promotion part of the marketing mix, the experts were asked what elements of a car
advertisement reflect product, price and place. I used three simple multiple-response
questions regarding each of the three variables. As response options, I include the most
common elements that could be observed during the construction of the advertisement
listing from Semana magazine, for product, I included options such as the whole car, a
detailed part of the car, car accessories, explicitly written technical characteristics and
66
adjectives such as comfort and elegance. For price, I provided options such as price,
amount of initial payment, discounts, payment plans (with no rates) and financing plans
(with rates).. For place I captured and provided detailed information about dealer
addresses, cities where the car is distributed, explicit invitation to visit a dealer, contact
Second, I calculated percentages for each response option for each marketing mix
variable with SPSS frequency tables, which I then used for reviewing each of the
advertisements and checked for presence of the elements asked for in the survey,
assigning to each element the percentage obtained from the frequency tables in a way that
an advertisement that has all the elements referring to product will receive a 100% (1) in
that variable and the one that has none will have a 0% (0). The same was done with the
other marketing mix variables, then, at the end of this process, I had three different
Third, I surveyed 350 people at car dealers from all the brands present in the
database about the importance that each of the marketing mix variables, excluding
promotion, has on their buying decision process. For 46% of surveyed people, product
and all its features was the key variable on their buying decision process, followed by
Finally, for calculating complexity, I used the final three percentages obtained in
the second step – one for product, one for price, and one for place, and multiplied each
one by the percentage each one received in terms of importance within the buying
decision process in the third step and added the final numbers together to generate a
67
result between 0% (0) and 100% (1), indicating that the higher the number the more
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Table 5.1presents means, standard deviations, medians and ranges, while Table
5.2 shows correlations. The correlation matrix shows no high correlations between
variables that might bias the estimates, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be
of concern. For the case of mmc_newad and i_newad the correlation seems quite high
(0.916), but it makes sense since mmc_newad is the interaction term between mmc and
i_newad – level of multimarket contact and new ad on the part of the initiator
respectively .
Hypothesis 1a predicts that when a firm launches a new ad, its multimarket rivals
are more likely than its single-market rivals to launch new ads too. The wording of the
Hypothesis and the data itself suggest a survival approach, thus a Cox survival analysis
was considered and implemented for testing this hypothesis. Different approaches were
necessary to develop in testing H1a: the first one without discriminating whether ads are
new or repeated; the second one keeping new ads from the initiator and considering either
69
response (new or old ad); the third keeping only new ads from the initiator and new ads
from the responder; the fourth one keeping new ads from initiators and only old ads as
responses from responders. Finally, I used a competing risk model that considered both
in order to make their distributions more normal. I calculated the logarithm of the
addition of 1 and the variable and used the result to replace the original score of the
variable.
As can be seen in Table 5.3, without discriminating whether ads are new or old,
five of the ten control variables are not significant as follows: new ad on the part of the
initiator, the interaction between multimarket contact and new ad on the part of the
initiator, units sold by the parent initiator firm in the previous ten periods, Colombian
pesos expended by the initiator firm in the previous ten periods, and Colombian pesos
expended by the initiator parent firm in the previous ten periods. Multimarket contact is
significant (p < .05) and has a hazard ratio of 0.736, which means that multimarket
26.38%. In the same line, number of units sold by the initiator in the previous ten weeks
because it has a hazard ratio of 0.952 (p < .001). The other four control variables were
significant and all of them increase the hazard rate of response of a non-single market
firm when a multimarket rival launches an ad. Such is the case of sold vehicles by
responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.060; p < .001); sold vehicles by parent firm
responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.149; p < .001); Colombian pesos expended
70
by responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.071; p < .001); and Colombian pesos
expended by parent firm responder in the previous ten weeks (HR =1.033; p < .001).
Table 5.3 shows the results when not discriminating whether the response involves an ad
As shown in Table 5.4, keeping new ads from initiator and modelling the response
as any, whether old or new ad, multimarket contact becomes non-significant and the
same three control variables from the previous model also become insignificant. Those
variables are units sold by the parent initiator firm in the previous ten periods, Colombian
pesos expended by the initiator firm in the previous ten periods, and Colombian pesos
expended by the initiator parent firm in the previous ten periods. Number of units sold by
the initiator in the previous ten weeks decreases the probability of non-single-market
rivals to respond with any ad when attacked by a multimarket rival with a new one by
6.16% (HR=0.938; p < .01). The other four control variables were significant and all of
them increase the hazard rate of response, with any type of ad, of a non-single market
firm when a multimarket rival launches a new ad. Such is the case of sold vehicles by
responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.050; p < .01), sold vehicles by parent firm
responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.167; p < .001), Colombian pesos expended
by responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.072; p < .001); and Colombian pesos
expended by parent firm responder in the previous ten weeks (HR = 1.038; p < .001).
Table 5.4 shows the results when keeping new ads from the initiator and response as any
ad (new or old).
71
Table 5.5 shows that keeping new ads from initiators and new ads from
responders, multimarket contact becomes non-significant and five control variables are
not significant. These variables are new ads on the part of the initiator, the interaction
between MMC and new ads on the part of the initiator, units sold by the parent initiator
firm in the previous ten periods, Colombian pesos expended by the initiator firm in the
previous ten periods, and Colombian pesos expended by the initiator parent firm in the
previous ten periods. Number of units sold by the initiator in the previous ten weeks
decreases the probability of non-single-market rivals to respond with new ads when
attacked by a multimarket rival with a new one by 10.23% because it has a hazard ratio of
0.897 (p < .001). The other four control variables were significant and three of them
increase the hazard rate of response with new ads, of a non-single market firm when a
multimarket rival launches a new ad. For the case of sold vehicles by responder in the
previous ten weeks it does it by 35.99% (HR = 1.359; p < .001); similarly, for the case of
Colombian pesos expended by responder in the previous ten weeks, it does it by 4.91%
(HR = 1.049; p < .001); and finally for the case of Colombian pesos expended by parent
firm responder in the previous ten weeks it does it by 4.70% (HR = 1.047; p < .001). Sold
vehicles by parent firm responder in the previous ten weeks decreases the probability of
non-single-market rivals to respond with new ads when attacked by a multimarket rival
with a new one by 18.56% because it has a hazard ratio of 0.814 (p < .001). Table 5.5
shows the results when keeping new ads from initiator and new ads from responders.
As shown in Table 5.6, keeping new ads from initiators and old ads from
responders, multimarket contact becomes significant at the 0.01 significance level and
has a hazard ratio of 0.558 (p < .01), which means that multimarket contact decreases the
probability of non-single-market rivals to respond with old ads to a multimarket rival that
launches a new ad by 44.14%. Six control variables are non-significant; they are new ads
on the part of the initiator, interaction between MMC and new ads on the part of the
initiator, units sold by the initiator firm in the previous ten periods, units sold by the
parent initiator firm in the previous ten periods, Colombian pesos expended by the
initiator firm in the previous ten periods, and Colombian pesos expended by the initiator
parent firm in the previous ten periods. Number of units sold by the responder in the
previous ten weeks decreases the probability of non-single-market rivals to respond with
old ads when a multimarket rival launches a new one by 4.84% because it has a hazard
ratio of 0. 951 (p < .001). The other three control variables were significant and all of
them increase the hazard rate of response with old ads, of a non-single market firm when
a multimarket rival launches a new ad. For the case of sold vehicles by parent firm
responder in the previous ten weeks it does it by 44.23% (HR = 1.442; p < .001); for the
case of Colombian pesos expended by responder in the previous ten weeks it does it by
8.63% (HR = 1.086; p < .001); and for the case of Colombian pesos expended by parent
firm responder in the previous ten weeks it does it by 2.79% (HR = 1.027; p < .01). Table
5.6 shows the results when keeping new ads from initiators and old ads from responders.
Finally, the odds for a non-single market firm to respond to a new ad launched by
a multimarket rival with an old ad, instead of not responding at all, are significant (p <
.01), and multimarket contact has a decreasing effect on such odds (b = -0.570) given the
control variables in the model. In contrast, the odds for a non-single market firm to
respond to a new ad launched by a multimarket rival with a new ad, instead of not
responding at all, are non-significant (p = 0.868), which in turn does not give support to
Hypothesis H1a. Table 5.7 presents the results of the competing risk model considering
Hypothesis 1b predicts that when a firm changes its ad complexity, its multimarket rivals
are more likely than its single-market rivals to change their ad complexity in the same
direction. Prior to test this Hypothesis, I made log transformations of the control variables
in order to make their distributions more normal. I calculated the logarithm of the
addition of 1 and the variable and used the result to replace the original score of the
variable. Then, I created a complexity distance measure: first I squared the difference
between ad complexity of the initiator and ad complexity of the responder, and then
calculated the square root of that squared term in order to have positive values between 0
and 1.
Model to test this Hypothesis. Table 5.8 shows that the error terms have a very strong
negative correlation (rho = -1.000), suggesting that firms that are less likely to have
multimarket contact, are more likely to change their ad complexity in the same direction
74
than a firm that has changed its ad complexity. The result was just the opposite of what I
was predicting, which, in turn, does not give support to Hypothesis 1b.
is likely to emphasize features that it shares with its multimarket rivals. As in the
previous Hypothesis, before testing H1c, I made log transformations of the control
variables in order to make their distributions more normal. I calculated the logarithm of
the addition of 1 and the variable and used the result to replace the original score of the
variable. Then, I created an advertisement distance measure: first I created four variables
squaring the differences between the price, product, place and complexity of the initiator
and that of the responder. Then I created a fifth variable which is the sum of the previous
four variables, followed by the creation of a sixth variable, which is the square root of the
fifth. Finally I kept the sixth variable as the advertisement distance measure and
Similar to the case of H1b, for testing this Hypothesis I used the Heckman
Selection Model and the results are shown in Table 5.9. The error terms have a strong
positive correlation (rho = 0.673), suggesting that firms that are more likely to have
multimarket contact, are more likely to emphasize features that they share with their
multimarket rivals, just as predicted by Hypothesis 1c, thus, giving support to it.
is less likely to emphasize price and more likely to emphasize product and/or place. For
testing this Hypothesis I ran three different OLS regressions: the first one using
multimarket contact as a predictor of price; the second one using multimarket contact as a
predictor of place; and the third one using multimarket contact as a predictor of product. I
variables were non-significant at the 0.05 significance level: total number of units sold by
the parent in the market during previous 10 weeks (b = 0.000; ns), number of units sold
by the parent across all markets during the past 10 weeks (b = -0.000; ns), and sum of
Colombian Pesos invested in Semana by the parent across all markets during the previous
10 weeks (b = -0.001; ns); while sum of Colombian Pesos invested in Semana by the
parent in the market during the previous 10 weeks was significant (b = 0.004; p < .001).
This model explains 1.16% of the variance in competitor’s advertising emphasizing price,
predicted in H1d, although this does not mean support for it.
emphasizing place. The following control variables were non-significant at the 0.05 level:
total number of units sold by the parent in the market during previous 10 weeks (b =
76
0.001; ns), Colombian Pesos invested in Semana by the Parent in the market during the
previous 10 weeks (b = 0.001; ns), and sum of Colombian Pesos invested in Semana by
the Parent across all markets during the previous 10 weeks (b = 0.003; ns); while number
of units sold by the parent across all markets during the past 10 weeks was significant (b
= 0.078; p < .001). This model explains 18.70% of the variance in competitor’s
MMC actually reduces competitor’s advertising emphasizing product, which is not what
was predicted in H1d. In this scenario the only control variable that was not significant at
the 0.05 significance level is total number of units sold by the parent in the market during
previous 10 weeks (b = 0.003; ns), and the only significant one that seems to be adding
positively to the model is sum of Colombian Pesos invested in Semana by the Parent
across all markets during the previous 10 weeks (b = 0.003, p < .05). This model explains
firm’s advertising is less likely to emphasize price and more likely to emphasize brand, it
still does not receive enough support, because the model explains 18.86% of the variance
77
to that variance is not statistically significant (b = -0.031; ns) as predicted, which can be
observed in Table 5.13. In line with the previous four analyses, Hypothesis H1d does not
receive support.
contact and the focal firm’s ad placement duration will be positive, and was tested
running an OLS regression. As it can be observed in Table 5.14, this model explains
15.30% of the variance observed in ad duration, but multimarket contact, even though
duration, suggesting that for every unit of increment of multimarket contact, ad duration
is reduced by 2.162 units, thus, leaving Hypothesis 2a without enough support. Increases
in ad duration are better explained by number of units sold by the initiator parent across
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the relationship between the level of multimarket contact and
the focal firm’s ad complexity will be positive. As H2a, this hypothesis was tested using
an OLS regression, and its results, presented in Table 5.15, show that this model explains
4.55% of the variance observed in ad complexity with none of the control variables being
significant; but multimarket contact, even though significant (b = -0.111; p< .01), appears
78
to have a negative relationship with ad complexity, suggesting that for every unit of
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Multimarket competition is a field that has received much attention (Chen, 1996;
Gimeno & Woo, 1994, 1996; Jayachandran et al., 1999; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985) and
has been studied from different perspectives: its antecedents (Baum & Korn, 1999;
Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Gimeno, 2002; Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Henrich R. Greve,
2000; H. R. A. Greve, 2006; Helaine J. Korn & Baum, 1999; H.J. Korn & Rock, 2001;
Varadarajan et al., 2001), its consequences (Feinberg, 1985; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978;
Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Kim & Singal, 1993; Scott, 1982; Yu & Cannella, 2013), and
its measures and levels of analysis (Boeker et al., 1997; Chen, 1996; Evans & Kessides,
1994; Feinberg, 1985; Gimeno & Jeong, 2001; Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Jans &
Rosenbaum, 1997; Scott, 1982; Singal, 1996). Although different approaches have been
used to study multimarket competition, a view from a tactical perspective that reflects a
more day to day rivalry has been lacking. Thus, I used such an approach in this
dissertation, trying to analyze sets and sequences of actions as broad parts of tactical
engagements among rivals, a marketing mix approach, in order to better understand the
The first hypothesis on this set, H1a, states that when a firm launches a new ad, its
multimarket rivals are more likely than its single-market rivals to launch new ads too. I
80
tested this hypothesis using different approaches as I described in the previous section of
this dissertation. Without discriminating whether ads are new or old, results actually
appear to support a relationship that works right in the opposite direction than the one I
rivals to respond with ads by 26.38%. Even though the rationale behind the hypothesis is
strong enough to build the relationship I predicted, it also does make sense to find a
reflection of the mutual forbearance hypothesis; because what I am finding here is a non-
single-market firm that apparently does not want to engage in rivalry when another firm
competition lessens. Control variables related to responders such as units sold in the
previous ten weeks, and Colombian pesos expended in the previous ten weeks, as well as
the same two at the parent company level, increase the hazard rate of response of a non-
single market firm when a multimarket rival launches an ad, which can be just a
reflection of a firm acting in consequence to its own actions and their outcomes, instead
of acting as a response to a rival. I found the same behavior across the two other
approaches (keeping new ads from the initiator and response as any, and keeping new ads
from the initiator and new ads from responders), reinforcing the possibility of firms
the probability of non-single-market rivals to respond with old ads to a multimarket rival
that launches a new ad by 44.14%, which taken in consideration with the results of the
81
third approach (keeping new ads from initiator and new ads from responders) does not
give enough room to think about a firm responding at all to an ad launch from a
multimarket rival, despite the type of ad. All these points appeared to be reinforced with
the results of the competing risk model considering both, new and old ads as responses.
The odds for a non-single market firm to respond to a new ad launched by a multimarket
rival with an old ad, instead of not responding at all, are significant, and multimarket
contact has a decreasing effect on such odds. This gives some room to think again that
the new ad of the initiator has a deterrence effect that is causing the intensity of
competition to lessen, with multimarket contact accentuating such effect, just like
multimarket rivals are more likely than its single-market rivals to change their ad
complexity in the same direction. Results suggest that firms that are less likely to have
multimarket contact, are more likely to change their ad complexity in the same direction
than a firm that has changed its ad complexity, just the opposite of what I predicted.
Judiciously considering this results, a plausible explanation can be found to why firms
that tend to have less multimarket contact actually follow others placing ads with the
same orientation in terms of complexity. This is especially true if we refer to the rationale
behind this hypothesis. When firms are multimarket competitors and they meet each
other in product markets, they talk to the same audiences, they compete for the same
audiences, and if they want to preserve a given equilibrium and not to disrupt it, they
need to move their advertisings in the same directions, as predicted in the hypothesis
(unfortunately without support). However, when another firm that does not meet those
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other multimarket competing ones launches a new ad, it can actually start to differentiate
in its market by emulating advertising tactics that others have successfully used in other
markets, given that its audiences probably have not been exposed to that type of message
yet. Another possible explanation is that given the competitive conditions faced by
their only sphere of influence at any cost, which can mean following the steps of firms
Hypothesis 1c, the only one that received statistical support, predicts that when
shares with its multimarket rivals. This hypothesis captures a very interesting situation,
because emulating competitors’ moves can be perceived as being aggressive given that
the effort of a firm to differentiate and build a competitive advantage is being torn apart.
Nevertheless, these results reinforce the suggestion that at a tactical level, such as the
marketing mix level, competitive actions that appear to be aggressive and mutual-
the firm appears to be active in the market in order to maintain its presence.
is less likely to emphasize price and more likely to emphasize product and/or place. Let
us remember that for testing this hypothesis I ran four different OLS regressions: the first
one using multimarket contact as a predictor of price; the second one using multimarket
contact as a predictor of place, the third one using multimarket contact as a predictor of
product, and, even though it was not necessary due to hypothesis scope, I also ran a
83
hypothesis did not receive support because statistical significance was lacking in three of
the four regressions, and in addition, the amount of variance explained by the different
models was considerably low. In the only regression that multimarket contact was
product, its effect was negative, reducing competitors’ advertising emphasizing product.
Even if I look only at the sizes and signs of the coefficients, I find that the relationship
which makes sense according to theory, but its size is smaller than the one for the
product, which additionally was significant; suggesting that for the industry I used in this
dissertation price is a marketing variable that is not perceived as a source of threat. This
last suggestion may sound counterintuitive, but since the approach of this dissertation is
from the scope of tactical movements, instead of strategic ones, expected behavior
according to the statements of multimarket theory may not be identical at tactical level as
at strategic level. However, further research is needed in order to clarify this point.
The first hypothesis in this set, H2a, predicts that the relationship between the
level of multimarket contact and the focal firm’s ad placement duration will be positive.
As with the previous one, I tested this hypothesis running an OLS regression obtaining
the result that multimarket contact was significant but with a negative relationship with
ad duration, which contrasts with the positive relationship that I predicted, which mainly
equilibriums and keep mutual forbearance. Nevertheless, these results suggest that in
firms actually tend to decrease the amount of time they maintain their ads without
contradicting result can possibly find a plausible explanation in the fact that car
companies in this market tend to start selling their new-year models increasingly earlier
communicate the arrival of the new models, as well as to promote their old ones in varied
ways to evacuate their inventory. Since this is a widely spread practice, all firms seem to
be doing the same thing. Therefore, behaving in that way is not perceived as aggressive,
making it not necessary to maintain advertising pieces for longer periods of time in order
to preserve an equilibrium. Research in this direction can help to clarify this issue.
The last hypothesis, H2b, predicts that the relationship between the level of
multimarket contact and the focal firm’s ad complexity will be positive. This finding
presents similar behavior as that in H2a, where I found statistical significance for a
negative relationship. This inverse relationship suggests that as the level of multimarket
contact increases, the complexity of ads decreases, and, in light of that, firms maintain
equilibriums brought about by mutual forbearance with such behavior. If I combine this
finding with the possible explanation that I formulated for the results of the previous
hypothesis, I believe an explanation for this one can be constructed following the same
logic. Since firms tend to change their advertising regularly to communicate their new-
model arrivals and to evacuate old-model inventories, they need these advertising pieces
85
something related to price, to product, or to distribution channels. The condition for this
to be true and to be an explanation of the results obtained for this hypothesis, is that
multimarket-competing firms behave in the way described, not just one firm but many of
them. But as noted before, research in this direction has to be conducted to be certain
about this.
Finally, summarizing the findings of this dissertation and with knowledge that
support for the hypotheses was almost completely absent, results reinforce what
originally motivated me to follow the path I chose here. I still do not have an explanation
for the behavior of marketing mix variables, which are tactics, in the presence of
multimarket contact, but results for H1c tend to reinforce the suggestion that at a tactical
level, such as the marketing mix, competitive actions that appear to be aggressive and
the hope offered by this last finding, I have drawn here some plausible explanations for
the lack of support for the hypotheses. This now becomes a new path to follow in a
• Even though firms increase their multimarket contact, can they be making tactical
moves that are not a response to multimarket rivals, but instead just a reflection of
• Are new ads, instead of causing a matching response or even a more aggressive one
• If a firm that does not meet other firms because it just participates in one market
launches a new ad, can it actually start to differentiate its offer in the market by
86
emulating advertising tactics that others have successfully used in other markets? If
so, is the reason for it that its audiences probably have not been exposed to that type
of message yet?
• Will a firm protect a single sphere of influence at any cost? In so doing, will it follow
the steps of firms identified as leaders in other markets with actions such as emulating
• Is there a possibility in an industry such as the automobile one, that price becomes a
• If several firms start to “shake up” things in order to promote their incoming and
outgoing models, and that is a regular practice in that industry, is that behavior
perceived as not aggressive? Isn’t that defecting from an equilibrium? Isn’t that just a
These, and surely some other questions that may come up from the results of this
dissertation, represent material for further analysis in the same line of the topics I
questioned and developed through this work. Alternatively other lines of discussion may
result from the analyses leaving the door open for the further addition of knowledge to
the field.
87
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TABLES
Market
Description Car models
(segment)
Compact vehicle, BYD: F-Zero. Chevrolet: Spark. Fiat: Uno. Hyundai: i10. Kia:
I1 entry level Picanto. Peugeot: 107. Renault: Twingo. Suzuki: Celerio.
(Hatchback)
Chevrolet: Sonic. Citroën: C3. Fiat: 500, Palio, Punto. Honda: Fit.
Small sports
Hyundai: Getz. Mazda: 2. Morris Garages: MG3. Nissan: March.
I2 vehicle, 1.6L
Peugeot: 206, 207, 208. Renault: Clio, Sandero, Stepway. Seat: Ibiza.
(Hatchback)
Skoda: Fabia. Suzuki: Jimny, Swift. Volkswagen: Gol.
Small sedan Chevrolet: Aveo, Chevy, Cobalt, Sail. Fiat: Siena. Hyundai: Accent,
vehicle between i25. Kia: Rio. Nissan: Versa. Renault: Logan, Symbol, Megane.
M1BM
1.4L and 1.6L
(Sedan)
Medium vehicle Citroën: C4. Ford: Fiesta. Hyundai: i30, i35. Kia: Cerato Forte.
between 1.6L and Mazda: 3. Mitsubishi: Lancer. Morris Garages: MG350, MG550.
M1A
1.8L (Hatchback- Nissan: Tiida. Peugeot: 301, 308. Renault: Megane 2, Scala. Seat:
Sedan) Leon. Suzuki: SX4. Volkswagen: Jetta, New Beetle
Mini personal Fiat: Idea. Kia: Sedona, Soul. Seat: Altea. SsangYong: Rodius, Stavic
M1MV van / station Volkswagen: Crossfox.
wagon
Large medium Chevrolet: Cruze, Optra. Ford: Focus. Honda: Civic. Hyundai: i40,
vehicle (Coupe- i45, Veloster. Morris Garages: MG6. Nissan: Altima, Sentra. Peugeot:
M2
Hatchback- 408. Renault: Megane 3, Fluence. Skoda: Octavia. Suzuki: Kizashi.
Sedan) Toyota: Corolla. Volkswagen: New Jetta.
Alfa Romeo: Mito, 159, Giulietta. Audi: A1, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, TT.
BMW: I8, Serie 1, Serie 3, Serie 4, Serie 5, Z4. Chevrolet: Camaro.
Sophisticated
Citroën: C5. Ford: Fusion, Mustang. Honda: Accord. Hyundai: Azera,
premium vehicle
Genesis. Kia: Cadenza, Optima. Mahindra: XUV. Mazda: 6.
S (Coupe-
Mercedes-Benz: Clase C, Clase B, Clase E. Mini: Mini Cooper.
Hatchback-
Mitsubishi: Eclipse. Nissan: Juke. Peugeot: 508. Porsche: Boxster,
Sedan)
Cayman, Panamera. Toyota: Camry Volkswagen: Bora. Volvo: S40,
S60, V40.
100
Market
Description Car models
(segment)
Audi: Q3, Q5, Q7 BMW: X1, X3, X5, X6. Chevrolet: Trail Blazer.
Ford: Edge, Explorer. Jeep: Grand Cherokee. Land Rover: Discovery,
Sophisticated
S/SUV Freelander, Range Rover. Mercedes-Benz: GLK. Nissan: Murano,
suburban vehicle
Pathfinder. Subaru: Tribeca. Toyota: FJ Cruiser. Volkswagen:
Touareg. Volvo: XC60, XC90.
101
VARIABLE MEANING
Product Everything, tangible or intangible offered to a market for purchase, use
or consumption that can satisfy a need or a desire. Almost everything,
material goods, people, ideas, services, places, and organizations are
products. A good example of a mass-produced object is a motor car. All
products have a life cycle, which comprise at least four phases:
introduction, growth, maturity and decline. The decisions concerning
the cycle include the formulation and presentation of the product,
specific brand development, and characteristics of the packaging,
labeling, and container among others as the product move through the
cycle, plus decisions related with other elements or variables of the
marketing mix. Another consideration of the product variable is the
product mix, because marketing decision makers can vary the current
product mix by increasing or decreasing a certain product line's depth
or by increasing or decreasing the number of product lines. In this
sense, key decisions are how to position the product, what to do with
the brand, how to configure the product mix so that each product
complements the other, and what product development strategies will
be followed.
Price Is the monetary amount associated with the transaction exchange, even
though sometimes goods and services are also paid with time and
effort. It includes payment mode, credit type, prompt payment
discounts, volume, surcharges, etc. The price variable is defined after a
previous market research that will help to define the price to enter the
market. The price is the only element of the marketing mix that
provides income, as the other components only produce costs. Price
decisions have a profound impact on the marketing strategy because,
depending on the price elasticity of the product, it will positively or
negatively affect the demand and, thereof, sales. Since positioning is
affected by decisions at the marketing mix level, price setting must
complement the other elements of the marketing mix since price
impacts customer perceived value for the product.
Place (distribution) Where to market the product or service being offered, which is essential
for the product to be at consumer reach for purposes of convenience
and positioning. This element considers the effective management of
the distribution channel, which implies that the product reaches the
right place at the right time and in the right conditions, which can be
done through intensive distribution, selective distribution or exclusive
distribution in accordance with the other marketing mix variables and
positioning decisions.
Promotion (communications) All the methods to communicate, to inform and to persuade customers
and other stakeholders about the company, its products, and offerings to
pursue organizational objectives. The promotional mix is conformed by
sales promotion, personal selling, advertising, public relations, direct
marketing, mailing, emailing, catalogs, web pages, etc. The variable
promotion usually is the tip of the marketing iceberg, because, in
consumer markets such as motor vehicles, is what is most visible of all
the marketing strategy for customers.
102
No.
1 BMW
2 BYD
3 Chery
4 Chevrolet
5 Chrysler
6 Fiat
7 Ford
8 Honda
9 Hyundai
10 Mahindra
11 Mercedes B
12 Mitsubishi
13 Morris Gar
14 Peugeot
15 Renault
16 SsangYong
17 Subaru
18 Suzuki
19 Tata
20 Toyota
21 Volkswagen
22 Volvo
23 Zotye
103
parent=brand;
if (parent="Alfa Romeo") then parent="Fiat";
if (parent="Audi") then parent="Volkswagen";
if (parent="Citroen") then parent="Peugeot";
if (parent="Dodge") then parent="Chrysler";
if (parent="Jeep") then parent="Chrysler";
if (parent="Kia") then parent="Hyundai";
if (parent="Land Rover") then parent="Tata";
if (parent="Mazda") then parent="Ford";
if (parent="Mercedez benz") then parent="Mercedes Benz";
if (parent="Mini") then parent="BMW";
if (parent="Nissan") then parent="Renault";
if (parent="Peugeout") then parent="Peugeot";
if (parent="Porche") then parent="Volkswagen";
if (parent="Sang Yong") then parent="SsangYong";
if (parent="Seat") then parent="Volkswagen";
if (parent="Skoda") then parent="Volkswagen";
105
Table 11 – Mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum for the variables
of the study
Table 12 – Correlations
Table 13 – Cox regression for H1a without discriminating whether ads are new or old
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
_t | Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | .7361232 .1033641 -2.18 0.029 .5590202 .9693341
i_newad | .9518187 .1567145 -0.30 0.764 .6892965 1.314324
mmc_newad | 1.055712 .2002382 0.29 0.775 .727942 1.531066
i_sold10 | .9525618 .0105411 -4.39 0.000 .9321241 .9734477
i_sold_pt10 | 1.005804 .0158894 0.37 0.714 .9751381 1.037433
i_adexp_10 | 1.012964 .0248053 0.53 0.599 .9654951 1.062768
i_adexp_pt10 | 1.03179 .7656573 0.04 0.966 .240959 4.418143
sold_10 | 1.060619 .0117411 5.32 0.000 1.037854 1.083882
sold_pt10 | 1.149598 .0187977 8.53 0.000 1.11334 1.187038
adexp_10 | 1.071258 .0036786 20.05 0.000 1.064073 1.078492
adexp_pt10 | 1.033375 .0061953 5.48 0.000 1.021303 1.045589
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
115
Table 14 – Cox regression for H1a keeping new ads from initiator and response as any
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
_t | Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | .727276 .1412899 -1.64 0.101 .4969743 1.064301
i_sold10 | .9383275 .0210323 -2.84 0.005 .8979973 .9804689
i_sold_pt10 | 1.025814 .0259507 1.01 0.314 .9761921 1.077959
i_adexp_10 | 1.091781 .0504027 1.90 0.057 .9973312 1.195176
i_adexp_pt10 | .6282431 .6929168 -0.42 0.673 .072327 5.457015
sold_10 | 1.05015 .0173204 2.97 0.003 1.016745 1.084652
sold_pt10 | 1.167811 .0290143 6.24 0.000 1.112307 1.226086
adexp_10 | 1.072171 .0057343 13.03 0.000 1.06099 1.083469
adexp_pt10 | 1.038189 .0098574 3.95 0.000 1.019047 1.05769
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
116
Table 15 – Cox regression for H1a keeping new ads from initiator and new ads from
responders
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
_t | Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | 1.096858 .208908 0.49 0.627 .7551446 1.593201
i_newad | .9614758 .2106948 -0.18 0.858 .6257613 1.477298
mmc_newad | 1.163228 .3017131 0.58 0.560 .6996551 1.933953
i_sold10 | .8976481 .0145623 -6.66 0.000 .8695556 .9266482
i_sold_pt10 | 1.000699 .023697 0.03 0.976 .9553149 1.048239
i_adexp_10 | 1.014021 .0380437 0.37 0.711 .9421322 1.091395
i_adexp_pt10 | 7.249857 8.232023 1.74 0.081 .7830914 67.11916
sold_10 | 1.359853 .0307789 13.58 0.000 1.300846 1.421536
sold_pt10 | .8143376 .021039 -7.95 0.000 .7741286 .8566352
adexp_10 | 1.049113 .0051488 9.77 0.000 1.03907 1.059253
adexp_pt10 | 1.047046 .0083036 5.80 0.000 1.030897 1.063448
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117
Table 16 – Cox regression for H1a keeping new ads from initiator and old ads from
responders
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
_t | Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | .5585063 .1153511 -2.82 0.005 .3725848 .8372034
i_newad | .9296601 .2308967 -0.29 0.769 .5713654 1.512636
mmc_newad | .9985572 .2801435 -0.01 0.996 .5761955 1.730518
i_sold10 | .9912195 .014981 -0.58 0.560 .9622878 1.021021
i_sold_pt10 | 1.012778 .0215027 0.60 0.550 .971498 1.055811
i_adexp_10 | 1.013819 .0326837 0.43 0.670 .9517422 1.079945
i_adexp_pt10 | .2360067 .2306393 -1.48 0.140 .0347601 1.602387
sold_10 | .951535 .0124442 -3.80 0.000 .9274547 .9762404
sold_pt10 | 1.442251 .0334682 15.78 0.000 1.378124 1.509362
adexp_10 | 1.086278 .00528 17.03 0.000 1.075978 1.096676
adexp_pt10 | 1.027863 .0096727 2.92 0.003 1.009079 1.046997
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
118
Table 17 – Competing risk model considering new and old ads as responses for H1a
oldad==1
newad==2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
complexdistance | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
complexdistance |
mmc | .0626754 .1150561 0.54 0.586 -.1628305 .2881813
i_sold10 | .0243421 .0198792 1.22 0.221 -.0146205 .0633046
i_sold_pt10 | -.0048021 .0077194 -0.62 0.534 -.0199319 .0103277
sold_10 | -.0284398 .0265823 -1.07 0.285 -.0805402 .0236605
sold_pt10 | -.0648935 .0555896 -1.17 0.243 -.1738471 .0440602
adexp_10 | -.0313526 .0278861 -1.12 0.261 -.0860083 .023303
adexp_pt10 | -.0103777 .0099266 -1.05 0.296 -.0298334 .009078
_cons | 2.882299 2.30283 1.25 0.211 -1.631165 7.395763
----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
select |
mmc | -.1112021 .0632072 -1.76 0.079 -.2350859 .0126818
i_complexity | -.0441785 .0709148 -0.62 0.533 -.1831689 .0948118
i_sold10 | -.0284853 .006078 -4.69 0.000 -.0403979 -.0165727
i_sold_pt10 | .0016616 .0083325 0.20 0.842 -.0146698 .017993
i_adexp_10 | .011074 .00927 1.19 0.232 -.0070948 .0292428
i_adexp_pt10 | -.0560241 .3885688 -0.14 0.885 -.8176049 .7055568
sold_10 | .0372324 .0062094 6.00 0.000 .0250622 .0494025
sold_pt10 | .0750475 .0086107 8.72 0.000 .0581708 .0919243
adexp_10 | .0388033 .0016968 22.87 0.000 .0354776 .042129
adexp_pt10 | .012161 .0026054 4.67 0.000 .0070546 .0172674
_cons | -2.368535 1.084073 -2.18 0.029 -4.493279 -.2437915
----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mills |
lambda | -.9917247 .8615361 -1.15 0.250 -2.680304 .696855
----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
rho | -1.00000
sigma | .99172474
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
120
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
distance | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
distance |
mmc | -.1264768 .0393293 -3.22 0.001 -.203561 -.0493927
i_sold10 | -.0051971 .005231 -0.99 0.320 -.0154496 .0050555
i_sold_pt10 | .005443 .0033771 1.61 0.107 -.001176 .012062
sold_10 | .0006917 .0067024 0.10 0.918 -.0124448 .0138282
sold_pt10 | .0260604 .0135652 1.92 0.055 -.000527 .0526478
adexp_10 | .0075212 .0066226 1.14 0.256 -.0054588 .0205012
adexp_pt10 | .0037194 .0026758 1.39 0.165 -.001525 .0089638
_cons | -.0025895 .5442259 -0.00 0.996 -1.069253 1.064074
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
select |
mmc | -.1139438 .0633299 -1.80 0.072 -.2380681 .0101804
i_price | .0909962 .1293918 0.70 0.482 -.1626071 .3445996
i_place | .0242477 .0751295 0.32 0.747 -.1230034 .1714988
i_product | -.0735624 .1628522 -0.45 0.651 -.3927468 .245622
i_complexity | -.0783759 .3479466 -0.23 0.822 -.7603387 .6035869
i_sold10 | -.0280315 .006088 -4.60 0.000 -.0399639 -.0160992
i_sold_pt10 | .0023526 .0088647 0.27 0.791 -.0150218 .0197271
i_adexp_10 | .012608 .0094539 1.33 0.182 -.0059213 .0311372
i_adexp_pt10 | -.1219243 .3930676 -0.31 0.756 -.8923226 .6484741
sold_10 | .037507 .006261 5.99 0.000 .0252357 .0497782
sold_pt10 | .0752139 .0086317 8.71 0.000 .058296 .0921318
adexp_10 | .0387551 .0016971 22.84 0.000 .0354289 .0420813
adexp_pt10 | .0121729 .002608 4.67 0.000 .0070614 .0172845
_cons | -2.197062 1.091223 -2.01 0.044 -4.33582 -.0583045
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mills |
lambda | .2169123 .2030868 1.07 0.285 -.1811306 .6149552
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
rho | 0.67301
sigma | .32230386
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
121
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
price | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | -.057516 .0393062 -1.46 0.144 -.1346053 .0195734
sold_10 | .0001778 .0031784 0.06 0.955 -.0060558 .0064115
sold_pt10 | -.0004033 .0047221 -0.09 0.932 -.0096644 .0088579
adexp_10 | .0040458 .0010596 3.82 0.000 .0019677 .0061239
adexp_pt10 | -.0014268 .0019474 -0.73 0.464 -.0052461 .0023925
_cons | .3459728 .0396194 8.73 0.000 .2682693 .4236763
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
122
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
place | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | .0680611 .0375625 1.81 0.070 -.0056083 .1417306
sold_10 | .0011397 .0030374 0.38 0.708 -.0048174 .0070968
sold_pt10 | -.078289 .0045126 -17.35 0.000 -.0871393 -.0694387
adexp_10 | -.0012397 .0010126 -1.22 0.221 -.0032257 .0007462
adexp_pt10 | .0030223 .001861 1.62 0.105 -.0006275 .0066722
_cons | .9287344 .0378618 24.53 0.000 .854478 1.002991
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
123
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
product | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | -.1718009 .0347964 -4.94 0.000 -.2400453 -.1035564
sold_10 | .0039431 .0028137 1.40 0.161 -.0015753 .0094615
sold_pt10 | -.0134249 .0041803 -3.21 0.001 -.0216234 -.0052263
adexp_10 | -.0021871 .000938 -2.33 0.020 -.0040268 -.0003474
adexp_pt10 | .0035377 .0017239 2.05 0.040 .0001566 .0069188
_cons | .6659876 .0350736 18.99 0.000 .5971995 .7347758
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
124
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
brand | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | -.0317398 .0673746 -0.47 0.638 -.1638784 .1003988
sold_10 | -.0472648 .0054481 -8.68 0.000 -.0579499 -.0365797
sold_pt10 | .1381248 .0080941 17.06 0.000 .1222503 .1539994
adexp_10 | -.005386 .0018162 -2.97 0.003 -.0089481 -.0018239
adexp_pt10 | -.0004713 .003338 -0.14 0.888 -.0070179 .0060754
_cons | -.1986455 .0679114 -2.93 0.003 -.3318369 -.0654542
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
125
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
duration | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | -2.162109 .5258036 -4.11 0.000 -3.194342 -1.129876
sold_10 | .232007 .075311 3.08 0.002 .0841601 .379854
sold_pt10 | .3987314 .0836976 4.76 0.000 .2344203 .5630426
adexp_10 | .0265506 .0160046 1.66 0.098 -.0048689 .05797
adexp_pt10 | -.0190478 .0258317 -0.74 0.461 -.0697594 .0316638
_cons | -.0464389 .5039605 -0.09 0.927 -1.035791 .9429128
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
126
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
complexity | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mmc | -.1116791 .0350497 -3.19 0.002 -.180487 -.0428712
sold_10 | -.0075219 .0050202 -1.50 0.134 -.0173773 .0023334
sold_pt10 | -.0082214 .0055792 -1.47 0.141 -.0191742 .0027315
adexp_10 | .0009244 .0010669 0.87 0.387 -.00117 .0030188
adexp_pt10 | .0008118 .0017219 0.47 0.637 -.0025686 .0041922
_cons | .5986923 .0335936 17.82 0.000 .5327429 .6646417
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
127
FIGURES
BIOGRAPHY
Juan Manuel González Sánchez was born on October 9, 1979, in Popayán, Colombia. He
attended Universidad Icesi in Cali – Colombia, and graduated with a Bachelor of Science
Entrepreneurship and Family Business from EAE Business School and Universitat
from Tulane University in 2012. He started the Ph.D. in Management at A.B. Freeman