Worldwide Equipment Guide

7 Nov 2000

Chapter 13
Theater Missiles

The trend among military forces for acquisition of theater missiles has expanded with the
growth of regional rivalries and the strategy of using long-range strike capability to gain regional
leverage. Theater missiles can be categorized among two typestheater ballistic missiles
(TBMs) and cruise missiles. They are launched from ground launchers, aircraft, or naval vessels.
These systems are designed for deep strike missionsbeyond those of close battle assets. Be-
cause of the high cost and limited numbers of these systems compared to artillery, they will be
used against high-priority targets at critical phases of a conflict, or against political targets. Se-
lected OPFOR forces with limited numbers of missiles may hold them in a separate missile unit
at echelons above the supported ground force commander. Those missiles may be used for pur-
poses other than execution of military strike missions. Where missiles are subordinate to the
ground force commander, they will be used as another strike asset to support his plan.

The OPFOR cruise missiles can be launched from ground launchers or naval platforms.
Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) are treated as munitions in aircraft chapters. Foreign
ground and sea-launched cruise missiles are generally employed in an anti-ship role. However,
applications may be developed for use against ground targets. Such systems can be addressed in
future WEG updates.

The TBMs employ a high-atmosphere or exo-atmospheric ballistic trajectory to reach the

• Fixed ground launchers (usually associated with hardened underground sites).

• Mobile launch complexes with dozens of vehicles and significant set-up time.

• Trailer launchers.

• Highly mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).

Launchers vary from older systems with simple modifications, to specialized vehicles designed
for operation in all types of terrain. Newer launchers may incorporate improved mobility to re-
duce vulnerability to location by terrain anaysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

The missile system is selected for a mission based on its ability to reach the target within
targeting timelines, and its ability to deliver effective lethality on the target. Improved heavy
multiple- rocket launcher systems with course correction and increased-lethality warheads have
replaced TBMs as preferred strike systems against selected deep targets. For instance, a Russian
9A52 MRL can deliver twelve 300-mm rockets 70-90 km with precision and minimal prepara-
tion time. However, a modern TBM can deliver twice the payload a farther distance with better
precision against critical heavy targets.
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Keys for timely delivery include target location, fire mission calculation and transmis-
sion, launcher and missile responsiveness, reload time, and move times. Therefore, modern mis-
sile system support equipment can include computerized fire control and location/navigation sys-
tems (such as global positioning systems), as well as dependable and secure communications.

The most critical component of a theater ballistic missile system, which differentiates
system capabilities and limitations, is the missile. Missiles are generally classified according to
their range

• Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), 0-1,000 km.

• Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), 1,001-3,000 km.

• Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), 3,001-5,500 km.

Various approaches are used to improve range, such as lengthening missiles for increased fuel
and longer burn time, improving motors (in the propulsion section), using more efficient solid
fuel motors, and employing smaller and lighter warheads. Below is an example of a modern
missile (the Russian Tochka-U SRBM) and its major components.

The warhead (within the payload section) is the munition, the lethality mechanism which
is selected for that strike mission and around which the system is designed. Many countries ac-
quired ballistic missiles specifically to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against ci-
vilian targets such as urban centers. For such a mission, a less accurate system with a large pay-
load capacity is sufficient for the mission. A substantial proportion of SRBM and some MRBM
designs are copies or variants of the former-Soviet SCUD-B/SS-1c. Although these systems lack
accuracy and responsiveness of some the newer systems, they can deliver large lethal payloads
against fixed targets or targets whose limited mobility permits them to be stationary long enough
for the TBMs' operational timelines.

A number of newer TBM designs with improved range, accuracy and operational considerations
have been fielded. Modern warhead developments include separating warheads, multiple war-
heads, maneuvering reentry vehicles (RVs), varied lethal and electronic warhead fills, warhead
buses (varied submunitions), precision navigating and homing warheads, and warheads with

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countermeasures (penaids). Separating and maneuvering warheads, penaids, and other technical
measures will further challenge the capability of theater missile defense assets to prevent strikes
against priority targets.

Operational timelines include launcher emplacement and survey times, mission transmis-
sion time, missile preparation time (which includes aiming), launch sequence, displacement time,
move to a hide/transloading point, then move to the next launch point. Target location, com-
mand and control, and fire mission transmission times are separate. Often the launcher will be
emplaced with some launch preparation steps completed and ready for a mission. These steps
may sacrifice accuracy for reduced exposure time. More modern launchers will have a minimal
preparation time between emplacement and execution of a fire mission.

After a launch, the launchers will displace as quickly as possible (often <5 minutes) to
reduce the possibility of detection and tracking, and to avoid strikes from specially-assigned
counter-missile assets and units. To assure survivability of these expensive long-range weapons,
the forces will employ tactical countermeasures and, where possible, use rapid emplacement and
autonomous operations to reduce losses. Some forces employ technical countermeasures to add
increased survivability of the launcher and increased probability of missile/warhead success.
Countermeasures include improved coatings and camouflage patterns and nets, underground
hides/facilities, decoys, and secure communications. These measures are intended to degrade the
enemy's detection, targeting, impact or effectiveness kill, and lethality effects.

State-of-the-art TBMs can cost more than a million dollars each. If the systems are not
accurate enough, or if the enemy has ABM capabilities, those TBMs may not have a high assur-
ance of success, and may not be a factor in the OPFOR plan. The OPFOR may limit its missile
requirement to systems used to gain regional political leverage by targeting civilian targets.
Thus, budgetary, political, and military considerations affect TBM decisions. Given the budget
limitations and systems costs which have impacted most military forces in the last decade, the
OPFOR will likely have a mix of older and newer systems and selected upgrades. Systems fea-
tured in this chapter are the more common systems, or represent the spectrum of missile systems
which can threaten US Army forces or interests within an operational environment.

Questions and comments on data in this specific update should be addressed to Tom
Redman, DSN: 552-7925, e-mail: [email protected]. Otherwise, TBM analyst is:

Dr. Don Madill

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Tochka-U/SS-21 B610 / CSS-8 M-11/ CSS-7

SCUD-B / SS-1c DF-3 / CSS-2

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Foreign Theater Ballistic Missiles

System Technologies
Type SRBM SRBM SRBM SRBM SRBM SRBM SRBM MRBM IRBM & Trends
Name/ Tochka-U B610 / M-7 M-11/ DF-11 M-9/DF-15 Nodong-1 DF-3 More SCUD
NATO Name SCARAB SCUD-B SCUD-B SCUD-C variants
Designator SS-21 Mod 2 CSS-8 SS-1c SS-1c Mod 2 CSS-7 SS-1d CSS-6 CSS-2
Producing Russia China Russia Russia China Russia China North Korea China Technology
Country North Korea North Korea Transfer
Proliferation At least 6 At least 2 At least 20 At least 1 At least 2 At least 5 At least 1 At least 1 At least 2 Increased
(countries) proliferation
Type TEL TEL Fixed, TEL Fixed, TEL TEL Fixed, TEL TEL TEL Fixed, Mobile/decoy
Launcher Mobile complex launchers
Propulsion Single-stage Single-stage Single-stage Single-stage Single-stage Single stage Single-stage Single-stage Single-stage Non-ballistic
Solid (est) Solid Liquid Liquid Solid Liquid Solid Liquid Liquid trajectory
Range Min- 20-120 50-150 50-300 300 50-300 500 200-600 170-1,300 1,500-3,000+ Increased
Max (km) range
Guidance Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Multi-sensor
IR homing Homing
Accuracy (m) 50 150 1,000 50 300 <800 600 4,000 2,000-2,500 Improved
Guidance
Payload (kg) 480 190 1,000 600 800 700 500-600 770 1,500-2,150 Separating
multiple RVs
Warheads HE, Chem, HE, Chem HE, Chem, Separating Separating HE, Chem Separating. HE, Chem HE, Nuc, Cluster,
Nuc, ARM, Nuc HE, Nuc HE, Nuc HE, Nuc poss Nuc or 3 separating Volumetric,
EMP, poss Chem poss Chem reentry vehicles Submunitions
Submunitions Poss Fuel- (RVs) BW warheads,
Air ARM, EMP
Submuni-
tions
Comments TEL is Modified Technology Requires Possible SCUD-B SCUD-B Variants with Autonomous
amphibious SA-2 SAM widely used compatible export or variant variant varied warheads operation
IR imagery technology and ranges
Tracked export to Russia ND-2 IRBM Penaids/
TEL other limited variant Towed launcher Counter-
countries production measures
Poss export Lengthy prep
time Reduced prep/
displace times
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