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Judicial function, in general, is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. One clothed with the
authority to
determine such questions acts judicially. Judicial power implies the construction
of laws and
the adjudication of legal rights. (Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188)
196 Rule 65, Sec 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising
judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse
of discretion and there is no appeal, no any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or
modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.
xxx
197 In order that a special action of certiorari may be invoked, the ff must exist:
(1) there must
be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said
controversy is
brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their
respective
rights and obligations, (2) the tribunal… before whom the controversy is brought
must have
the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy
construing and applying the laws to that end and (3) the tribunal… must pertain to
that
branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which
does not
belong to the legislative or executive dept. (Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, supra.)

BIRAOGO VS PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION

After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1
(E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). 
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ
4. 4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E.
O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled
to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of
the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in
the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers.
If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

SALONGA VS PANO

=======================
 Whether or not PTC violates the equal protection clause enshrine in the
constitution.
 
Held:
Yes.
 
Ratio:
 Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power
of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
 One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936

Angara and Ynsua were rival in an electoral post in Tayabas 1st District. After the
election, on Dec. 3 1935, the National Assembly

proclaimed Angara as the winner. Ynsua filed a Motion of Protest. On Dec. 9, 1935,
the Electoral Commission issued a resolution stating that the last day of filing
electoral protests is Dec. 9, 1935.

With Ynsua’s protest within the prescribed date, the Electoral Commission
recognized Ynsua’ protest. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest on account
that the National Assembly has already proclaimed him the winner last Dec. 3. This
proclamation, he claims, should nullify the Electoral Commission’s due date for
filing. The Electoral Commission denied Angara’s Motion to Dismiss.

Angara went to the Supreme Court asking for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua.

Angara argues, “the constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of such election contests. Moreover, the
Commission can regulate the proceedings of election protests only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary power to regulate such proceedings.

ISSUE :Whether or not the Supreme has Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related
facts.

RULING:

  In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a
final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI
1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua. 

Miranda v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999

On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4,
1994,1the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. 
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720.
Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They alleged as ground
the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the
people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. 
The Solicitor General and intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao contend that petitioners
are not real parties in interest and it contended that the reclassification of
Santiago City did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary. 
WON The petition at bar presents a justiciable issue?
The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.
We find merit in the petition.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve
or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to
be self- evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not
a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the
requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide.
The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances
of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation. 
===============
The Court’s Decision on this landmark case started with a paean to our people’s
liberty: “All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid
formula are necessary.[1] Superior strength – the use of force – cannot make wrongs
into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the
constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty. “Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: ‘In
cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against
government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the
dispossessed and the weak.’ Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come
to the courts ‘with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.’”[

DAVID VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017) declaring a state of national emergency. On the same day, the President
issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) implementing PP 1017. The proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
government as a clear and present danger. All programs and activities related to
the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I are cancelled. Likewise,
all permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments are revoked.
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the
President’s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that “warrantless arrests
and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.” During
the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant)
petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

HELD:

Moot and academic case - one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic.   During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it.  Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?  Do they
justify these alleged illegal acts?  These are the vital issues that must be
resolved in the present petitions.  It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional
act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case.  Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if:  first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption
of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.  Petitioners alleged that the issuance
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution.  There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s
basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.   Moreover,
the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules.  It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the
extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly,
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.  Certainly, the petitions
are subject to judicial review. 

============
Issue:

  whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic

Held:

  The power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following requisites
are present: first, there must be an actual case or
controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must
be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

                An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right,

an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;” a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor
General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that
the present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s
issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they
justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be
resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional
act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify the Supreme Court’s
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question
that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the
people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.
Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And
lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
petitions are subject to judicial review.

Issue:

                whether petitioners have legal standing

Held:

                Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of

justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-
parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-
in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the
plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in
public actions. However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial
interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus
hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service the
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury” test. For a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive
or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a
result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public. However, being a mere procedural technicality,
the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion in cases of transcendental importance and far-reaching implications.

                By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by the Supreme Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:

(1)    the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2)   for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3)   for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
(4)  for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5)   for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Issue:

                whether or not the Supreme Court may review the factual bases of
the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power

Held:

  Yes. In IBP v. Zamora, while the Court considered the President’s “calling-out”
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the
Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of
the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power,
the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” The
latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial
prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang v.
Garcia adopted the test that judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President’s decision is correct, but that the President did not
act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court further ruled
that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support
his assertion, then the Supreme Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out

power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There
was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid.

Issue:

                whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

Held:

                Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases

involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only “spoken words” and
again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.” Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,”

to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”
The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be
applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the
Court.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an

exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects
of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as applied for”
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the
Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of
its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.

The task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and

requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect,
is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of
the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process
of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind
of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can
be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even
attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which

holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” It is subject
to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not
even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed
to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and
application of PP 1017.

=============

ABS-CBN v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 133486 | January 28, 2000]

Doctrine: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through
mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Hence, COMELEC cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest,
orderly, and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly
conducted and publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-
fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
COMELEC to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit
polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.

Narrative:

An information from a reliable source provides that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections
and to make an exit survey of the vote during the May 11, 1998 elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which
shall be broadcast immediately. The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of
the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). Hence, Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents, or representatives from conducting the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, the Supreme Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed by
ABS-CBN. It was ruled that:

There is no law that prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls.

An exit poll is an electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of

individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by
confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for,
immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the
survey are announced to the public to give an advance overview of how, in the
opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted.

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. COMELEC, the Court held
that free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of

attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and
political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and
change. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. It means more than the right
to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to
official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any
public consequence.

However, this right may be regulated by the State in the exercise of its police
power.

The two tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms are as
follows:

Clear and present danger rule; and

Dangerous tendency rule.
The first test means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
“extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the utterance
can be punished. It must first be determined whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

The “dangerous tendency” rule, on the other hand, is if the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks
to prevent.

On COMELEC Ban on Exit Polling

The COMELEC’s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls —
disorder and confusion in the voting centers — does not justify a total ban on
them. The Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting
centers. There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview
voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented
proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to
create disorder or confuse the voters.

On Violation of Ballot Secrecy

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed.
Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly
tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the COMELEC, to minimize or suppress
incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.

For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to
regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if,
in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are
unduly curtailed.
============

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Group vs COMELEC

Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailingCOMELEC Res. No. 98-1419 which resolved to approve the issuance of
restraining order to stopthe petitioner or any groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting exit survey. Theelectoral body believed that the
exit survey might conflict with the official COMELEC count, aswell as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).
Italso had not authorized or deputized petitioner to undertake the exit survey.The
petitioner filed for a temporary restraining order which was granted by the court
on May 9,1998.Solicitor General contends that the petition is already moot and
academic because the May 11,1998 elections has already been held and done with and
there is no longer any actual
controversy. SG further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for
petitioner’s failure to
exhaust available remedies before issuing forum, especially the filling of a motion
forreconsideration.The Court believed that the issue is not
totally moot
because of the basic feature of ourdemocratic government which is the periodic
elections where exit polling is said to be tied withit. The Court ruled that the
procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriageof justice when
the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
andspeedy remedy available. The Court based its judgment on the span of time the
instant petitionwas filed by the respondent and the time when the petitioner got
hold of a copy thereof. Underthe circumstances, the court believed that there was
hardly enough opportunity to move forreconsideration and to obtain a swift
resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections.

Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves

transcendental constitutionalissues.
And the court also resolved to settle the issue because the fundamental freedoms
ofspeech and of the press are being invoked

============

Facts:

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a]
reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups,
to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of
the x x x vote during the... elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial... quick count of the National Movement
for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized
Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Issues:

"Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a
restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or...
representatives from conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."

Ruling:

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the
May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no
longer any actual controversy before us.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically
to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom
of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a
basic feature of our democratic... government. By its very nature, exit polling is
tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it
"also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and
bar on the extent of... protection given by constitutional guarantees."

Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here,
we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise
protect the holding of exit polls and the... dissemination of data derived
therefrom.

Principles:

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it
"also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and
bar on the extent of... protection given by constitutional guarantees.

============

ISSUE:

Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case?

RULING:

No.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically
to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people’s fundamental freedom
of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a
basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is
tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it
“also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and
bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.” Since the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have
resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect
the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.

===============
CASE DIGEST : ABS- CBN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts : Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21,
1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable
Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to
make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of
the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9,
1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner.
We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant
thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by
media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue : WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN
in conducting exit polls during the election

Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such

freedoms, as follows: These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the
"dangerous tendency" rule. means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high"
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on
the other hand, . . if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary
that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be
justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right
to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only
be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must
not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil sought to be
avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
restraint of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees
or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as
possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be
at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the
polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on
the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are
the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the
results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is
only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of
the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that the interest of the
state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the
contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls — properly conducted and
publicized — can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and
credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other
electoral ills.

===============

EN BANCRESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTG.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
Landmark Case: Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
(Digested Case)
by
Dagitab
-
March 25, 2015
0
In 1980, someone challenged an Executive Order issued by President Marcos because
it imposed a penalty without giving the violator a right to be heard. He succeeded
in having the law declared unconstitutional and was commended by the Supreme Court
"for his spirit" in asserting his rights.

G.R. No. 74457 20 March 1987

Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for
violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years
old if female). The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright

confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries, thus denying due process.

RULING:

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so
conveniently resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.” Flexibility must be
the best virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice
and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is
missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright
confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus
denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen
fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled.

================

YNOT V. IAC | POWERS OF ADMINITRATIVE AGENCIES

June 3, 2018
G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987

Petitioner: Restituto Ynot

Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station Commander, Integrated
National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo and the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal
Industry, Region IV, Iloilo City

Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge

the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions
and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

Law Applicable: EO No. 626-A

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

Summary

EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:

The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the method employed to conserve

the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
FACTS:

Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the

interprovincial movement of carabaos.
Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for
recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of replevin.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation. The
court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed validity.
(Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.

RULING:

EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)

To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that “no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another.” The object of the prohibition escapes
us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner’s peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why
the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in
a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal in nature,
the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution.
OTHER ISSUES

Constitutionality is not always presumed.

while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is

not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted if there be a clear showing
of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then “will be the time to
make the hammer fall, and heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant warning.
Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing
another distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
EO 626-A is really a presidential decree that promulgates a new rule instead of
implementing an existing law.
EO 626-A was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of the President’s legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. (whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to
act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law)
In this case, there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of the
executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made
by the President “in his judgment, ” a phrase that will lead to protracted
discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter
until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.
History of Due Process Clause

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an “iron rule” laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty.
The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to
every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require
No Due Process in this case.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness.
We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the
State, is entitled to “the law of the land,” which Daniel Webster described almost
two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as “the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial.”
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions.
Police Power, as an exception for due process

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
EO 622-A as an exercise of Police Power

The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be
conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.”
We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening
energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts
of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps
to protect and preserve them.
What constitute a valid exercise of police power
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals (US v. Toribio)
HOWEVER, the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is
not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation,
as a member of the police, to enforce it.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as

affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas
bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No
costs.

============

QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the

interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No.
626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

Facts:
– 13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A
– Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O.
626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the govt, to be
distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may
see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit (carabao). This amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter
of carabaos of age.
– Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed
supersedeas bong of P12,000.00
– Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaos—sustained; ordered confiscation of the
bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority
and its presumed validity
– Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC
upheld the TC.
Petitioner’s arguments:
1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.

Issue/s:
– WON EO 626-A is constitutional.

Ruling:
– EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to petitioner.

Ratio:
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
– Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts
subject to review of the Supreme Court.
“..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.”
– Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.

On the presumption of constitutionality

– Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted

On due process
– Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to
avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
– Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient; flexibility
– MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing –intended as safeguard against
official arbitrariness.

On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A

– The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by
Pres. Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully
executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.
– But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the
extraordinary power

Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A

– Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but
this is the same with the fit between means and objective test)
– 1 = “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.”
– Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation
of carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of
carabaos.

=============

ESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION

COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONALPOLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMALINDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.Facts:On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilowhen the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation ofE.O. 626- A. A case was
filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and
therecovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and thecourt declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the IntermediateAppellate Court but
it also upheld the ruling of RTC. The Respondent contends that it is a valid
exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO626 in basic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme
courtsaid that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achievedby the questioned measure is missing the Supreme
Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killedanywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in oneprovince will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make iteasier to kill them there
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional? Ruling: The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
Due processwas not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police stationcommander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given asupersedeas
bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
withoutgiving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process. Ratio: On the
power of courts to decide on constitutional matters – Resolution of such cases may
be made inthe first instance by lower courts subject to review of the Supreme
Court. “..while lower courts should observea becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented
fromresolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the
highest tribunal.” – Sec. 5[2(a)] ArtVIII, 1987 Constitution Police power as used
by the government to justify E.O. 626-A – Test: 1. Compellingstate interest 2.
Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the same with the fit between means
andobjective test) – 1 “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for thebenefit of the small farmers who rely on them for
energy needs.” – Failed to comply with #2; there is noreasonable connection betw

=============
MARIANO VS COMELEC
Facts. RA 7854 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati in Into a Highly
Urbanized City xxx”. Sec 51 thereof (which provides that the incumbent officials of
the Municipality shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati) carries the
proviso “that the new city will acquire a new corporate existence”. Petitioners
contend this disregards the limit of 3 terms of office of elective local officials
set in the Constitution. They argue that the “new corporate existence” will restart
the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati disregarding the
terms previously served by them. They particularly point to incumbent Mayor Binay
who has already served for 2 consecutive terms.

Issue. May the petitioners validly challenge the constitutionality of said Sec 51?

Held. No. The petitioners have far from complied with the requirements203 before
this Court may have the jurisdiction to pass upon questions of constitutionality.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e. Mayor
Binay will run again this coming elections, that he would be re-elected, and that
he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. Petitioners,
thus, merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
theproper parties to raise this issue. A “proper party” is one who has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the [governmental] acts complained of

Requirements before litigant may challenge the constitutionality of a law: (1) xxx
actual case or controversy; (2) question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case
itself (Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211, 220-221)

=============
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority

GR 107921, 224 SCRA 236 [Jul 1, 1993]

Facts. Petitioner Macasiano seeks to declare as unconstitutional Secs 28 and 44 of

RA 7279 (Urban Devt and Housing Act of 1992). Assailed Sections provide as a
general rule that eviction or demolition shall be discouraged and that a moratorium
of 3 years shall be provided on the eviction of all program beneficiaries.
Macasiano predicates his locus standi on his being a consultant of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he
alleges that said Secs “contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as a
drawback” to his “tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures”.

Issue. May Macasiano validly challenge the constitutionality of the foregoing

provisions of law?

Held. No. The first two fundamental requisites for a successful judicial inquiry
into the constitutionality of a law are absent. There is no actual controversy.
Macasiano does not claim that he has been actually
prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a
property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the
challenged sections of the said Act. He is likewise not a proper party. As a DPWH
consultant, he is not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and
encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on private lands. Nor
does the petitioner claim he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and
use would be affected by the challenged provisions. “As far as a taxpayer’s suit is
concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained.” An “ACTUAL case or controversy” presupposes that it is NOT moot or
academic.204

=========

Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.

GR 114222, 243 SCRA 436 [Apr 6, 1995]

Facts. The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) sought o

construct LRT III along EDSA in accordance with the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
Law. The project was awarded to EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd.
under its “Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer an LRT
System for EDSA” with theDOTC. Sen. Tatad et al., as taxpayers and members of the
Senate, now seek to prohibit respondents from further implementing said Agreement
on account of several alleged inconsistencies with the Constitution and the BOT
Law. Respondents aver that Tatad et al. are not the real parties-in-interest and
they do not have legal standing to sue.

Issue. Does Tatad et al. have legal standing to sue?

Held. Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suit are to allow taxpayers to
question contracts entered into by the national govt or govt-owned or controlled
corps. allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc v.
Guingona) and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved
(Bugnay Const. and Devt Corp. v. Laron) For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
locus standi is not reversed, we are constrained to follow
it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute present
action. In class suits, there may be legal standing to file suit in behalf of
succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
===========

=================
SALONGA vs PAÑO

Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.

FACTS

Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti Subversion Act
after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the
series of bombings in Metro Manila.

He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations

for two because of his remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He
allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if
reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.

His house was used as a “contactpoint” where the subversive group allegedly met; ”

Petitioner filed motion to dismiss the charges against him for failure of
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. This was denied by
respondent judge, the resolution of which is now the subject of this current
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salonga;s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of
speech.

HELDYes. The petition is dismissed

RATIOThe thought andexpression. Protection is especially mandated for political

discussions. Political discussion is essential tothe ascertainment of political
truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The constitutionalguaranty
may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminentlawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case
at bar, there is no threat againstthe government.In PD 885, political discussion
will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in asubversive organization
if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of
suchassociation or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof.
In the case, there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan
to overthrow the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared that his
bombing mission was not against the government, but directedagainst a particular
family. Such a statement negates any politically motivated or subversive
assignment. OBITER DICTUM:To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it
would be to transgress constitutional dueprocess. However, it is not enough that
the preliminary investigation is conducted to satisfy the dueprocess clause. There
must be sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case or that probable
causeexists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.

=================
SALONGA vs. CRUZ PANO JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City),
Respondent GUTIEREZ JR., J. Group 3

Facts: 1.
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the
iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.

. Background Facts:

This case was being decided in the context of a series of bombings that occurred in
the Metro Manila area between the months of August, September, and October. A
certain Victor Lovely was hospitalized when he nearly killed himself setting off a
bomb in his room at the YMCA building in Manila.

In his possession, the police and military found pictures taken at the birthday
party of former Congressman Raul Daza’s in his Los Angeles residence.

Petitioner Salonga were among the people captured in the group pictures. Lovely was
then taken out of intensive care and was transferred to the office of Col. Madella
where was held incommunicado for some time.

3. From September-October of the same year, more bombs would go off around the
area.

Finally, on October 19, minutes after the President had finished delivering his
speech before the International Conference of American Society, a small bomb
exploded.

This proved to be the final straw as within the next 24-hours arrest, search, and
seizure orders were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Lovely
one of whom was Petitioner Salonga; who was arrested in his hospital room while
being treated for his chronic ailment of bronchial asthma.

Salonga was accused as leader of subversive organizations including the “Movement

for Free Philippines” because of two reasons:

His house was used as a “contactpoint” where the subversive group allegedly met;
b. Because he “mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being
most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.”

Petitioner filed motion to dismiss the charges against him for failure of
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. This was denied by
respondent judge, the resolution of which is now the subject of this current
petition.

Issue: WoN prosecution was able to establish prima facie case against the
petitioner.

[No]

Ratio: After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the Evidence
offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case
against the petitioner. We grant the petition. 1. Petitioner’s constitutional right
to free speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, punishment, and unwarranted
prosecution applies to the case. Free Speech 1. To the first right of free speech,
the court established the doctrine in saying that “No man deserves punishment for
his thought; and quoted the opinion of the late Justice Oliver Holmes in US v
Schwimmer, which reads as follows:

“If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
attatchment than any other it is the principle of free thought not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”

. The Court interpreted this to mean that political discussion, even among those
opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The only time that it would constituted prima facie evidence
of membership is such discussion amounts to “Conferring with officers or other
members of such association or organization in fuherance of any plan or enterprise
thereof.” 3. In this case at hand, no evidence was properly established to link
petitioner and any subversive organization.

. Although Lovely testified that political discussion took place at Daza’s birthday
party, no proof was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of plans to
overthrow the government.

Right to Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest, Punishment, and Unwarranted Prosecution

1. The court laid down the general rule as to the right of freedom from arbitrary
arrest, punishment, and unwarranted prosecution, established in People vs. Dayad,
when it stated: a. “Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probably under the circumstances.” 2. In the
case at hand, the prosecution was not able to come up with a single iota of
evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of
the Movement for Free Philippines. 3. Lovely already testified that during the
party of Daza no political action was taken but only political discussion. 4. The
“contact point” theory (House meeting) is too tenuous a basis to conclude that
Salonga was a leader or mastermind as to indict a person simply because some
plotters masquerading as visitors have somehow met in his house or office would be
to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against
abuse of govenemntal processes in criminal prosecution would be seriously
undermined. a.

However insofar as the absence of prima facie case to warrant filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision is rendered moot and academic by action of
prosecution. 1.

They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We
reiterate the rule however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an
information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the
records. WF, the petition is dismissed for having become moot and academic.

==================