Microeconomics 21st Edition Mcconnell Test Bank

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The key takeaways are that the document discusses characteristics and principles of market systems including private property, freedom, self-interest and competition. It also discusses specialization, money and its advantages over barter.

Competition is important in relation to self-interest in a market system because it ensures that firms act in the interests of consumers by keeping prices low and quality/variety high through competitive pressures.

The five fundamental questions that every economy must answer are: what to produce, how to produce, for whom to produce, how to motivate people to work, and how to distribute goods and services.

Microeconomics 21st Edition McConnell Test Bank

Microeconomics 21st Edition McConnell Test


Bank
Full download link at: https://testbankbell.com/product/microeconomics-21st-
edition-mcconnell-test-bank/

CHAPTER 2
The Market System and the Circular Flow

A. Short-Answer, Essays, and Problems

1. Define the term economic system. Discuss the two ways in which economic systems can differ.

2. Explain the term “laissez faire capitalism.”

3. Explain what is meant by a command economy.

4. Evaluate the statement: “The government should have no place in a capitalistic market system.”

5. List nine characteristics of the market system.

6. Why is the right of private property an essential characteristic of a market system?

7. What role does freedom play in capitalism? How important is it to the operation of a competitive market
economy?

8. Explain the importance of self-interest in the operation of a market system.

9. What is the importance of competition in relation to self-interest in a market system?

10. What conditions are necessary for economic competition to exist?

11. “The regulatory force in the market system bears the seeds of its own destruction.” Explain and evaluate.

12. Explain why the market system is an organizing mechanism.

13. Respond to the following question: “Producing capital goods or advanced technology takes time, so how
can that be a more efficient form of production of consumer goods?”

14. Describe two types of specialization in production.

15. What are the economic advantages of specialization?

16. Describe three ways that human specialization contributes to society’s output.

17. What advantage does a money economy have over a barter economy?

18. How does the use of money differ from the use of barter in the exchange of goods and services?

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19. What is money and what important function does it perform? Explain how it overcomes the disadvantages
associated with barter. What conditions are necessary for people to accept paper currency in exchange for
the goods and services which they sell?

2-36

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20. Suppose Tom, Dick, and Harry live in a barter economy. Tom produces wine, Dick bakes bread, and Harry
makes cheese. Tom wants some bread to go with his wine and is willing to trade 1 gallon of wine for two
loaves of bread. Dick wants some cheese to go with his bread and is willing to trade one loaf of bread for
one-half pound of cheese. Harry doesn’t want bread, but wants some wine to go with his cheese and is
willing to trade cheese for one gallon of wine. It is not possible for all three to meet together at one time.
(a) Explain how this situation illustrates the difficulty with a barter economy.
(b) Devise a money system using precious stones where four stones are equivalent in value to one gallon
of wine. In other words tell how much bread and cheese would be worth in terms of stones in this
economy. In this system, how much cheese must Harry sell in order to buy one gallon of wine?

21. What are the so-called Five Fundamental Questions that every economy must answer?

22. A firm has the choice between producing product A, B, or C. In producing the products the firm faces a
weekly cost of $10 for product A, $130 for product B and $200 for product C. The prices received for each
product at different quantities are listed in the table below.
Product Product Product Profit Profit Profit
Output A B C A B C
5 $3.00 $15.00 $35.00
10 2.00 12.00 20.00
15 1.25 9.00 10.00

(a) Compute the firm’s profit for A, B, and C and enter this data into the table.
(b) Which product will the firm choose to produce and how much output will maximize profit?

23. Assume that a firm can produce product A, product B, or product C with the resources it currently employs.
These resources cost the firm a total of $100 per week. Assume, for the purposes of this problem, that the
firm’s costs cannot be changed. The market prices and the quantities of A, B, and C these resources can
produce are given as follows.
Market
Product pri Output Profit
ce

A $14.00 10 $
B 9.00 11
C .50 300

(a) Compute the firm’s profit when it produces A, B, or C and enter these data in the table.
(b) Which product will the firm produce?
(c) If the price of A rose to $16, which product will the firm produce?
(d) If the firm produces A at a price of $16, what would tend to happen to the number of firms
producing product A?

2-37

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following books what he had already stated in the previous ones, when I
have thought it convenient, for the sake of brevity, to curtail some of these
repetitions. Should any one, however, peruse these passages from a desire
to enlarge his knowledge, and not to raise captious objections, he will do
better to have them expounded by persons of skill. For it is an absurdity to
have the fictions of poetry and the ridiculous plays of comedy[352]
interpreted by grammarians, and to suppose that without a master and an
interpreter any one is able to learn those things which are spoken either of
God or of the heavenly virtues, and of the whole universe of things, in
which some deplorable error either of pagan philosophers or of heretics is
confuted; and the result of which is, that men would rather rashly and
ignorantly condemn things that are difficult and obscure, than ascertain
their meaning by diligence and study.

CHAPTER I.

[Transcriber’s Note: As described in the following footnote,


the original book printed the translations from both the Latin
and Greek originals. In the original book, the top of each page
printed lines from the translation from the Latin, and the
bottom of the page printed lines from the translation from the
Greek, and the reader would be able to compare them, with the
text for the numbered sections running over multiple printed
pages. In this e-book, instead, the Latin translation for an entire
numbered section will be printed, followed by that paragraph’s
Greek translation, and then the next section.]

TRANSLATED FROM LATIN OF RUFINUS.


CHAPTER I.
ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.[353]
1. Some such opinions, we believe, ought to be entertained regarding the
divine promises, when we direct our understanding to the contemplation of
that eternal and infinite world, and gaze on its ineffable joy and blessedness.
But as the preaching of the church includes a belief in a future and just
judgment of God, which belief incites and persuades men to a good and
virtuous life, and to an avoidance of sin by all possible means; and as by
this it is undoubtedly indicated that it is within our own power to devote
ourselves either to a life that is worthy of praise, or to one that is worthy of
censure, I therefore deem it necessary to say a few words regarding the
freedom of the will, seeing that this topic has been treated by very many
writers in no mean style. And that we may ascertain more easily what is the
freedom of the will, let us inquire into the nature of will and of desire.[354]

TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK.


CHAPTER I.
ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL[355], WITH AN EXPLANATION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THOSE STATEMENTS OF SCRIPTURE
WHICH APPEAR TO NULLIFY IT.

1. Since in the preaching of the church there is included the doctrine


respecting a just judgment of God, which, when believed to be true, incites
those who hear it to live virtuously, and to shun sin by all means, inasmuch
as they manifestly acknowledge that things worthy of praise and blame are
within our own power, come and let us discuss by themselves a few points
regarding the freedom of the will—a question of all others most necessary.
And that we may understand what the freedom of the will is, it is necessary
to unfold the conception of it,[356] that this being declared with precision, the
subject may be placed before us.

FROM THE LATIN.

2. Of all things which move, some have the cause of their motion within
themselves, others receive it from without: and all those things only are
moved from without which are without life, as stones, and pieces of wood,
and whatever things are of such a nature as to be held together by the
constitution of their matter alone, or of their bodily substance.[357] That view
must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by
corruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose.
Others, again, have the cause of motion in themselves, as animals, or trees,
and all things which are held together by natural life or soul; among which
some think ought to be classed the veins of metals. Fire, also, is supposed to
be the cause of its own motion, and perhaps also springs of water. And of
those things which have the causes of their motion in themselves, some are
said to be moved out of themselves, others by themselves. And they so
distinguish them, because those things are moved out of themselves which
are alive indeed, but have no soul;[358] whereas those things which have a
soul are moved by themselves, when a phantasy,[359] i.e. a desire or
incitement, is presented to them, which excites them to move towards
something. Finally, in certain things endowed with a soul, there is such a
phantasy, i.e. a will or feeling,[360] as by a kind of natural instinct calls them
forth, and arouses them to orderly and regular motion; as we see to be the
case with spiders, which are stirred up in a most orderly manner by a
phantasy, i.e. a sort of wish and desire for weaving, to undertake the
production of a web, some natural movement undoubtedly calling forth the
effort to work of this kind. Nor is this very insect found to possess any other
feeling than the natural desire of weaving; as in like manner bees also
exhibit a desire to form honeycombs, and to collect, as they say, aerial
honey.[361]

FROM THE GREEK.

2. Of things that move, some have the cause of their motion within
themselves; others, again, are moved only from without. Now only portable
things are moved from without, such as pieces of wood, and stones, and all
matter that is held together by their constitution alone.[362] And let that view
be removed from consideration which calls the flux of bodies motion, since
it is not needed for our present purpose. But animals and plants have the
cause of their motion within themselves, and in general whatever is held
together by nature and a soul, to which class of things they say that metals
also belong. And besides these, fire too is self-moved, and perhaps also
fountains of water. Now, of those things which have the cause of their
movement within themselves, some, they say, are moved out of themselves,
others from themselves: things without life, out of themselves; animate
things, from themselves. For animate things are moved from themselves, a
phantasy[363] springing up in them which incites to effort. And again, in
certain animals phantasies are formed which call forth an effort, the nature
of the phantasy[364] stirring up the effort in an orderly manner, as in the
spider is formed the phantasy of weaving; and the attempt to weave follows,
the nature of its phantasy inciting the insect in an orderly manner to this
alone. And besides its phantasial nature, nothing else is believed to belong
to the insect.[365] And in the bee there is formed the phantasy to produce
wax.

FROM THE LATIN.

3. But since a rational animal not only has within itself these natural
movements, but has moreover, to a greater extent than other animals, the
power of reason, by which it can judge and determine regarding natural
movements, and disapprove and reject some, while approving and adopting
others, so by the judgment of this reason may the movements of men be
governed and directed towards a commendable life. And from this it
follows that, since the nature of this reason which is in man has within itself
the power of distinguishing between good and evil, and while
distinguishing possesses the faculty of selecting what it has approved, it
may justly be deemed worthy of praise in choosing what is good, and
deserving of censure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed
must by no means escape our notice, that in some dumb animals there is
found a more regular movement[366] than in others, as in hunting-dogs or
war-horses, so that they may appear to some to be moved by a kind of
rational sense. But we must believe this to be the result not so much of
reason as of some natural instinct,[367] largely bestowed for purposes of that
kind. Now, as we had begun to remark, seeing that such is the nature of a
rational animal, some things may happen to us human beings from without;
and these, coming in contact with our sense of sight, or hearing, or any
other of our senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements, or the
contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external source, it is not
within our own power to prevent their coming. But to determine and
approve what use we ought to make of those things which thus happen, is
the duty of no other than of that reason within us, i.e. of our own judgment;
by the decision of which reason we use the incitement, which comes to us
from without for that purpose, which reason approves, our natural
movements being determined by its authority either to good actions or the
reverse.

FROM THE GREEK.

3. The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature,


also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and
accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them.
Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the
contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good
and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise
when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we
do the reverse. We must not, however, be ignorant that the greater part of
the nature assigned to all things is a varying quantity[368] among animals,
both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in hunting-dogs and
in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason.
Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us
this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are
dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence
in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the
reason within us, which, as occasion offers,[369] arouses us towards efforts
inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the
reverse.

FROM THE LATIN.

4. If any one now were to say that those things which happen to us from an
external cause, and call forth our movements, are of such a nature that it is
impossible to resist them, whether they incite us to good or evil, let the
holder of this opinion turn his attention for a little upon himself, and
carefully inspect the movements of his own mind, unless he has discovered
already, that when an enticement to any desire arises, nothing is
accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the
mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion; so that a claim
might seem to be made by two parties on certain probable grounds as to a
judge residing within the tribunals of our heart, in order that, after the
statement of reasons, the decree of execution may proceed from the
judgment of reason.[370] For, to take an illustration: if, to a man who has
determined to live continently and chastely, and to keep himself free from
all pollution with women, a woman should happen to present herself,
inciting and alluring him to act contrary to his purpose, that woman is not a
complete and absolute cause or necessity of his transgressing,[371] since it is
in his power, by remembering his resolution, to bridle the incitements to
lust, and by the stern admonitions of virtue to restrain the pleasure of the
allurement that solicits him; so that, all feeling of indulgence being driven
away, his determination may remain firm and enduring. Finally, if to any
men of learning, strengthened by divine training, allurements of that kind
present themselves, remembering forthwith what they are, and calling to
mind what has long been the subject of their meditation and instruction, and
fortifying themselves by the support of a holier doctrine, they reject and
repel all incitement to pleasure, and drive away opposing lusts by the
interposition of the reason implanted within them.

FROM THE GREEK.

4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature
that it is impossible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his
attention to his own feelings and movements, [and see] whether there is not
an approval, and assent, and inclination of the controlling principle towards
some object on account of some specious arguments.[372] For, to take an
instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to
be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to
act contrary to his purpose, is not a perfect[373] cause of annulling his
determination. For, being altogether pleased with the luxury and allurement
of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it, or to keep his purpose, he
commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the same
things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has
disciplined himself[374]), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements;
but his reason, as being strengthened to a higher point, and carefully
trained, and confirmed in its views towards a virtuous course, or being near
to confirmation,[375] repels the incitement, and extinguishes the desire.

FROM THE LATIN.

5. Seeing, then, that these positions are thus established by a sort of natural
evidence, is it not superfluous to throw back the causes of our actions on
those things which happen to us from without, and thus transfer the blame
from ourselves, on whom it wholly lies? For this is to say that we are like
pieces of wood, or stones, which have no motion in themselves, but receive
the causes of their motion from without. Now such an assertion is neither
true nor becoming, and is invented only that the freedom of the will may be
denied; unless, indeed, we are to suppose that the freedom of the will
consists in this, that nothing which happens to us from without can incite us
to good or evil. And if any one were to refer the causes of our faults to the
natural disorder[376] of the body, such a theory is proved to be contrary to the
reason of all teaching.[377] For, as we see in very many individuals, that after
living unchastely and intemperately, and after being the captives of luxury
and lust, if they should happen to be aroused by the word of teaching and
instruction to enter upon a better course of life, there takes place so great a
change, that from being luxurious and wicked men, they are converted into
those who are sober, and most chaste and gentle; so, again, we see in the
case of those who are quiet and honest, that after associating with restless
and shameless individuals, their good morals are corrupted by evil
conversation, and they become like those whose wickedness is complete.[378]
And this is the case sometimes with men of mature age, so that such have
lived more chastely in youth than when more advanced years have enabled
them to indulge in a freer mode of life. The result of our reasoning,
therefore, is to show that those things which happen to us from without are
not in our own power; but that to make a good or bad use of those things
which do so happen, by help of that reason which is within us, and which
distinguishes and determines how these things ought to be used, is within
our power.

FROM THE GREEK.

5. Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put
away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of
wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon
them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the
statement of him who wishes to destroy[379] the conception of free-will. For
if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it
consisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause
came inciting to the reverse. But to blame, on the other hand, the mere
constitution of the body,[380] is absurd; for the disciplinary reason,[381] taking
hold of those who are most intemperate and savage (if they will follow her
exhortation), effects a transformation, so that the alteration and change for
the better is most extensive,—the most licentious men frequently becoming
better than those who formerly did not seem to be such by nature; and the
most savage men passing into such a state of mildness,[382] that those
persons who never at any time were so savage as they were, appear savage
in comparison, so great a degree of gentleness having been produced within
them. And we see other men, most steady and respectable, driven from their
state of respectability and steadiness by intercourse with evil customs, so as
to fall into habits of licentiousness, often beginning their wickedness in
middle age, and plunging into disorder after the period of youth has passed,
which, so far as its nature is concerned, is unstable. Reason, therefore,
demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own
business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as
a judge and an investigator[383] of the manner in which we ought to meet
those events that come from without.

FROM THE LATIN.


6. And now, to confirm the deductions of reason by the authority of
Scripture—viz. that it is our own doing whether we live rightly or not, and
that we are not compelled, either by those causes which come to us from
without, or, as some think, by the presence of fate—we adduce the
testimony of the prophet Micah, in these words: “If it has been announced
to thee, O man, what is good, or what the Lord requires of thee, except that
thou shouldst do justice, and love mercy, and be ready to walk with the
Lord thy God.”[384] Moses also speaks as follows: “I have placed before thy
face the way of life and the way of death: choose what is good, and walk in
it.”[385] Isaiah, moreover, makes this declaration: “If you are willing, and
hear me, ye shall eat the good of the land. But if you be unwilling, and will
not hear me, the sword shall consume you; for the mouth of the Lord has
spoken this.”[386] In the psalm, too, it is written: “If my people had heard me,
if Israel had walked in my ways, I would have humbled her enemies to
nothing;”[387] by which he shows that it was in the power of the people to
hear, and to walk in the ways of God. The Saviour also saying, “I say unto
you, Resist not evil;”[388] and, “Whoever shall be angry with his brother,
shall be in danger of the judgment;”[389] and, “Whosoever shall look upon a
woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his
heart;”[390] and in issuing certain other commands,—conveys no other
meaning than this, that it is in our own power to observe what is
commanded. And therefore we are rightly rendered liable to condemnation
if we transgress those commandments which we are able to keep. And
hence He Himself also declares: “Every one who hears my words, and
doeth them, I will show to whom he is like: he is like a wise man who built
his house upon a rock,” etc.[391] So also the declaration: “Whoso heareth
these things, and doeth them not, is like a foolish man, who built his house
upon the sand,” etc.[392] Even the words addressed to those who are on His
right hand, “Come unto me, all ye blessed of my Father,” etc.; “for I was an
hungered, and ye gave me to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink,”[393]
manifestly show that it depended upon themselves, that either these should
be deserving of praise for doing what was commanded and receiving what
was promised, or those deserving of censure who either heard or received
the contrary, and to whom it was said, “Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting
fire.” Let us observe also, that the Apostle Paul addresses us as having
power over our own will, and as possessing in ourselves the causes either of
our salvation or of our ruin: “Dost thou despise the riches of His goodness,
and of His patience, and of His long-suffering, not knowing that the
goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But, according to thy hardness
and impenitent heart, thou art treasuring up for thyself wrath on the day of
judgment and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render
to every one according to his work: to those who by patient continuance in
well-doing seek for glory and immortality, eternal life;[394] while to those
who are contentious, and believe not the truth, but who believe iniquity,
anger, indignation, tribulation, and distress, on every soul of man that
worketh evil, on the Jew first, and [afterwards] on the Greek; but glory, and
honour, and peace to every one that doeth good, to the Jew first, and
[afterwards] to the Greek.”[395] You will find also innumerable other
passages in Holy Scripture, which manifestly show that we possess freedom
of will. Otherwise there would be a contrariety in commandments being
given us, by observing which we may be saved, or by transgressing which
we may be condemned, if the power of keeping them were not implanted in
us.

FROM THE GREEK.

6. Now, that it is our business to live virtuously, and that God asks this of
us, as not being dependent on Him nor on any other, nor, as some think,
upon fate, but as being our own doing, the prophet Micah will prove when
he says: “If it has been announced to thee, O man, what is good, or what
does the Lord require of thee, except to do justice and to love mercy?”[396]
Moses also: “I have placed before thy face the way of life, and the way of
death: choose what is good, and walk in it.”[397] Isaiah too: “If you are
willing, and hear me, ye shall eat the good of the land; but if ye be
unwilling, and will not hear me, the sword will consume you: for the mouth
of the Lord hath spoken it.”[398] And in the Psalms: “If my people had heard
me, and Israel had walked in my ways, I would have humbled their enemies
to nothing, and laid my hand upon those that afflicted them;”[399] showing
that it was in the power of His people to hear and to walk in the ways of
God. And the Saviour also, when He commands, “But I say unto you,
Resist not evil;”[400] and, “Whosoever shall be angry with his brother, shall
be in danger of the judgment;”[401] and, “Whosoever shall look upon a
woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his
heart;”[402] and by any other commandment which He gives, declares that it
lies with ourselves to keep what is enjoined, and that we shall reasonably[403]
be liable to condemnation if we transgress. And therefore He says in
addition: “He that heareth my words, and doeth them, shall be likened to a
prudent man, who built his house upon a rock,” etc. etc.; “while he that
heareth them, but doeth them not, is like a foolish man, who built his house
upon the sand,” etc.[404] And when He says to those on His right hand,
“Come, ye blessed of my Father,” etc.; “for I was an hungered, and ye gave
me to eat; I was athirst, and ye gave me to drink,”[405] it is exceedingly
manifest that He gives the promises to these as being deserving of praise.
But, on the contrary, to the others, as being censurable in comparison with
them, He says, “Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire!”[406] And let us
observe how Paul also converses[407] with us as having freedom of will, and
as being ourselves the cause of ruin or salvation, when he says, “Dost thou
despise the riches of His goodness, and of His patience, and of His long-
suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?
But, according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou art treasuring up
for thyself wrath on the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous
judgment of God; who will render to every one according to his works: to
those who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory and
immortality, eternal life; while to those who are contentious, and believe not
the truth, but who believe iniquity, anger, wrath, tribulation, and distress, on
every soul of man that worketh evil; on the Jew first, and on the Greek: but
glory, and honour, and peace to every one that worketh good; to the Jew
first, and to the Greek.”[408] There are, indeed, innumerable passages in the
Scriptures which establish with exceeding clearness the existence of
freedom of will.

FROM THE LATIN.

7. But, seeing there are found in the sacred Scriptures themselves certain
expressions occurring in such a connection, that the opposite of this may
appear capable of being understood from them, let us bring them forth
before us, and, discussing them according to the rule of piety,[409] let us
furnish an explanation of them, in order that from those few passages which
we now expound, the solution of those others which resemble them, and by
which any power over the will seems to be excluded, may become clear.
Those expressions, accordingly, make an impression on very many, which
are used by God in speaking of Pharaoh, as when He frequently says, “I
will harden Pharaoh’s heart.”[410] For if he is hardened by God, and commits
sin in consequence of being so hardened, the cause of his sin is not himself.
And if so, it will appear that Pharaoh does not possess freedom of will; and
it will be maintained, as a consequence, that, agreeably to this illustration,
neither do others who perish owe the cause of their destruction to the
freedom of their own will. That expression, also, in Ezekiel, when he says,
“I will take away their stony hearts, and will give them hearts of flesh, that
they may walk in my precepts, and keep my ways,”[411] may impress some,
inasmuch as it seems to be a gift of God, either to walk in His ways or to
keep His precepts,[412] if He take away that stony heart which is an obstacle
to the keeping of His commandments, and bestow and implant a better and
more impressible heart, which is called now[413] a heart of flesh. Consider
also the nature of the answer given in the Gospel by our Lord and Saviour
to those who inquired of Him why He spoke to the multitude in parables.
His words are: “That seeing they may not see; and hearing they may hear,
and not understand; lest they should be converted, and their sins be forgiven
them.”[414] The words, moreover, used by the Apostle Paul, that “it is not of
him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth
mercy;”[415] in another passage also, “that to will and to do are of God;”[416]
and again, elsewhere, “Therefore hath He mercy upon whom He will, and
whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet
find fault? For who shall resist His will? O man, who art thou that repliest
against God? Shall the thing formed say to him who hath formed it, Why
hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the
same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another to dishonour?”[417]
—these and similar declarations seem to have no small influence in
preventing very many from believing that every one is to be considered as
having freedom over his own will, and in making it appear to be a
consequence of the will of God whether a man is either saved or lost.

FROM THE GREEK.


7. But since certain declarations of the Old Testament and of the New lead
to the opposite conclusion—namely, that it does not depend on ourselves to
keep the commandments and to be saved, or to transgress them and to be
lost—let us adduce them one by one, and see the explanations of them, in
order that from those which we adduce, any one selecting in a similar way
all the passages that seem to nullify free-will, may consider what is said
about them by way of explanation. And now, the statements regarding
Pharaoh have troubled many, respecting whom God declared several times,
“I will harden Pharaoh’s heart.”[418] For if he is hardened by God, and
commits sin in consequence of being hardened, he is not the cause of sin to
himself; and if so, then neither does Pharaoh possess free-will. And some
one will say that, in a similar way, they who perish have not free-will, and
will not perish of themselves. The declaration also in Ezekiel, “I will take
away their stony hearts, and will put in them hearts of flesh, that they may
walk in my precepts, and keep my commandments,”[419] might lead one to
think that it was God who gave the power to walk in His commandments,
and to keep His precepts, by His withdrawing the hindrance—the stony
heart, and implanting a better—a heart of flesh. And let us look also at the
passage in the Gospel—the answer which the Saviour returns to those who
inquired why He spake to the multitude in parables. His words are: “That
seeing they might not see; and hearing they may hear, and not understand;
lest they should be converted, and their sins be forgiven them.”[420] The
passage also in Paul: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,
but of God that showeth mercy.”[421] The declarations, too, in other places,
that “both to will and to do are of God;”[422] “that God hath mercy upon
whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say
then, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will?” ”The
persuasion is of Him that calleth, and not of us.”[423] “Nay, O man, who art
thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that hath
formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the
clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto
dishonour?”[424] Now these passages are sufficient of themselves to trouble
the multitude, as if man were not possessed of free-will, but as if it were
God who saves and destroys whom He will.

FROM THE LATIN.


8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who
is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the
people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be
considered, where he says, “Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will,
and whom He will He hardeneth.”[425] For it is on these passages chiefly that
the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that
souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and
that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one
which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that
Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by
God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on
those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of
their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether
they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they
term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If
so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so
doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what
further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but
several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to
persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him
who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it
follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might
give way when overpowered[426] by signs and wonders. But he was
necessary for God’s purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude,
He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous
miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this
means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these
persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which
they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature.[427]
And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them
in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your
view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to
suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If,
indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no
longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next
place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be
saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second
compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come
naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that,
because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that
so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of
the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the
fable[428] of good or bad natures, i.e. of earthly or spiritual souls, in
consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost.

FROM THE GREEK.

8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh—that he was


hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which
will be examined also the statement of the apostle, “Therefore hath He
mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth.”[429]
And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages,
themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures
incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost;
and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by
God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see
now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy
nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy
nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is
there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless
perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would
certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs
and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree,[430] in
order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the
multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them
in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of
a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to
the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who
perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly
those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on
whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there
need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for
salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their
nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if
they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may
not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the
condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons.

FROM THE LATIN.

9. And now we must return an answer also to those who would have the
God of the law to be just only, and not also good; and let us ask such in
what manner they consider the heart of Pharaoh to have been hardened by
God—by what acts or by what prospective arrangements.[431] For we must
observe the conception of a God[432] who in our opinion is both just and
good, but according to them only just. And let them show us how a God
whom they also acknowledge to be just, can with justice cause the heart of a
man to be hardened, that, in consequence of that very hardening, he may sin
and be ruined. And how shall the justice of God be defended, if He Himself
is the cause of the destruction of those whom, owing to their unbelief
(through their being hardened), He has afterwards condemned by the
authority of a judge? For why does He blame him, saying, “But since thou
wilt not let my people go, lo, I will smite all the first-born in Egypt, even
thy first-born,”[433] and whatever else was spoken through Moses by God to
Pharaoh? For it behoves every one who maintains the truth of what is
recorded in Scripture, and who desires to show that the God of the law and
the prophets is just, to render a reason for all these things, and to show how
there is in them nothing at all derogatory to the justice of God, since,
although they deny His goodness, they admit that He is a just judge, and
creator of the world. Different, however, is the method of our reply to those
who assert that the creator of this world is a malignant being, i.e. a devil.

FROM THE GREEK.

9. But to those who think they understand the term “hardened,” we must
address the inquiry, What do they mean by saying that God, by His
working, hardens the heart, and with what purpose does He do this? For let
them observe the conception[434] of a God who is in reality just and good;
but if they will not allow this, let it be conceded to them for the present that
He is just; and let them show how the good and just God, or the just God
only, appears to be just, in hardening the heart of him who perishes because
of his being hardened: and how the just God becomes the cause of
destruction and disobedience, when men are chastened by Him on account
of their hardness and disobedience. And why does He find fault with him,
saying, “Thou wilt not let my people go;”[435] “Lo, I will smite all the first-
born in Egypt, even thy first-born;”[436] and whatever else is recorded as
spoken from God to Pharaoh through the intervention of Moses? For he
who believes that the Scriptures are true, and that God is just, must
necessarily endeavour, if he be honest,[437] to show how God, in using such
expressions, may be distinctly[438] understood to be just. But if any one
should stand, declaring with uncovered head that the Creator of the world
was inclined to wickedness,[439] we should need other words to answer them.

FROM THE LATIN.

10. But since we acknowledge the God who spoke by Moses to be not only
just, but also good, let us carefully inquire how it is in keeping with the
character of a just and good Deity to have hardened the heart of Pharaoh.
And let us see whether, following the example of the Apostle Paul, we are
able to solve the difficulty by help of some parallel instances: if we can
show, e.g., that by one and the same act God has pity upon one individual,
but hardens another; not purposing or desiring that he who is hardened
should be so, but because, in the manifestation of His goodness and
patience, the heart of those who treat His kindness and forbearance with
contempt and insolence is hardened by the punishment of their crimes being
delayed; while those, on the other hand, who make His goodness and
patience the occasion of their repentance and reformation, obtain
compassion. To show more clearly, however, what we mean, let us take the
illustration employed by the Apostle Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews,
where he says, “For the earth, which drinketh in the rain that cometh oft
upon it, and bringeth forth herbs meet for them by whom it is dressed, will
receive blessing from God; but that which beareth thorns and briers is
rejected, and is nigh unto cursing, whose end is to be burned.”[440] Now from
those words of Paul which we have quoted, it is clearly shown that by one
and the same act on the part of God—that, viz. by which He sends rain
upon the earth—one portion of the ground, when carefully cultivated,
brings forth good fruits; while another, neglected and uncared for, produces
thorns and thistles. And if one, speaking as it were in the person of the rain,
[441]
were to say, “It is I, the rain, that have made the good fruits, and it is I
that have caused the thorns and thistles to grow,” however hard[442] the
statement might appear, it would nevertheless be true; for unless the rain
had fallen, neither fruits, nor thorns, nor thistles would have sprung up,
whereas by the coming of the rain the earth gave birth to both. Now,
although it is due to the beneficial action of the rain that the earth has
produced herbs of both kinds, it is not to the rain that the diversity of the
herbs is properly to be ascribed; but on those will justly rest the blame for
the bad seed, who, although they might have turned up the ground by
frequent ploughing, and have broken the clods by repeated harrowing, and
have extirpated all useless and noxious weeds, and have cleared and
prepared the fields for the coming showers by all the labour and toil which
cultivation demands, have nevertheless neglected to do this, and who will
accordingly reap briers and thorns, the most appropriate fruit of their sloth.
And the consequence therefore is, that while the rain falls in kindness and
impartiality[443] equally upon the whole earth, yet, by one and the same
operation of the rain, that soil which is cultivated yields with a blessing
useful fruits to the diligent and careful cultivators, while that which has
become hardened through the neglect of the husbandman brings forth only
thorns and thistles. Let us therefore view those signs and miracles which
were done by God, as the showers furnished by Him from above; and the
purpose and desires of men, as the cultivated and uncultivated soil, which is
of one and the same nature indeed, as is every soil compared with another,
but not in one and the same state of cultivation. From which it follows that
every one’s will,[444] if untrained, and fierce, and barbarous, is either
hardened by the miracles and wonders of God, growing more savage and
thorny than ever, or it becomes more pliant, and yields itself up with the
whole mind to obedience, if it be cleared from vice and subjected to
training.

FROM THE GREEK.


10. But since they say that they regard Him as a just God, and we as one
who is at the same time good and just, let us consider how the good and just
God could harden the heart of Pharaoh. See, then, whether, by an
illustration used by the apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews, we are able to
prove that by one operation[445] God has mercy upon one man while He
hardens another, although not intending to harden; but, [although] having a
good purpose, hardening follows as a result of the inherent principle of
wickedness in such persons,[446] and so He is said to harden him who is
hardened. “The earth,” he says, “which drinketh in the rain that cometh oft
upon it, and bringeth forth herbs meet for them for whom it is dressed,
receiveth blessing from God; but that which beareth thorns and briers is
rejected, and is nigh to cursing, whose end is to be burned.”[447] As respects
the rain, then, there is one operation; and there being one operation as
regards the rain, the ground which is cultivated produces fruit, while that
which is neglected and is barren produces thorns. Now, it might seem
profane[448] for Him who rains to say, “I produced the fruits, and the thorns
that are in the earth;” and yet, although profane, it is true. For, had rain not
fallen, there would have been neither fruits nor thorns; but, having fallen at
the proper time and in moderation, both were produced. The ground, now,
which drank in the rain which often fell upon it, and yet produced thorns
and briers, is rejected and nigh to cursing. The blessing, then, of the rain
descended even upon the inferior land; but it, being neglected and
uncultivated, yielded thorns and thistles. In the same way, therefore, the
wonderful works also done by God are, as it were, the rain; while the
differing purposes are, as it were, the cultivated and neglected land, being
[yet], like earth, of one nature.

FROM THE LATIN.

11. But, to establish the point more clearly, it will not be superfluous to
employ another illustration, as if, e.g., one were to say that it is the sun
which hardens and liquefies, although liquefying and hardening are things
of an opposite nature. Now it is not incorrect to say that the sun, by one and
the same power of its heat, melts wax indeed, but dries up and hardens
mud:[449] not that its power operates one way upon mud, and in another way
upon wax; but that the qualities of mud and wax are different, although
according to nature they are one thing,[450] both being from the earth. In this
way, then, one and the same working upon the part of God, which was
administered by Moses in signs and wonders, made manifest the hardness
of Pharaoh, which he had conceived in the intensity of his wickedness[451],
but exhibited the obedience of those other Egyptians who were
intermingled with the Israelites, and who are recorded to have quitted Egypt
at the same time with the Hebrews. With respect to the statement that the
heart of Pharaoh was subdued by degrees, so that on one occasion he said,
“Go not far away; ye shall go a three days’ journey, but leave your wives,
and your children, and your cattle,”[452] and as regards any other statements,
according to which he appears to yield gradually to the signs and wonders,
what else is shown, save that the power of the signs and miracles was
making some impression on him, but not so much as it ought to have done?
For if the hardening were of such a nature as many take it to be, he would
not indeed have given way even in a few instances. But I think there is no
absurdity in explaining the tropical or figurative[453] nature of that language
employed in speaking of “hardening,” according to common usage. For
those masters who are remarkable for kindness to their slaves, are
frequently accustomed to say to the latter, when, through much patience and
indulgence on their part, they have become insolent and worthless: “It is I
that have made you what you are; I have spoiled you; it is my endurance
that has made you good for nothing: I am to blame for your perverse and
wicked habits, because I do not have you immediately punished for every
delinquency according to your deserts.” For we must first attend to the
tropical or figurative meaning of the language, and so come to see the force
of the expression, and not find fault with the word, whose inner meaning we
do not ascertain. Finally, the Apostle Paul, evidently treating of such, says
to him who remained in his sins: “Despisest thou the riches of His
goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering; not knowing that the
goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but, after thy hardness and
impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath on the day of wrath and
revelation of the righteous judgment of God.”[454] Such are the words of the
apostle to him who is in his sins. Let us apply these very expressions to
Pharaoh, and see if they also are not spoken of him with propriety, since,
according to his hardness and impenitent heart, he treasured and stored up
for himself wrath on the day of wrath, inasmuch as his hardness could never

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