Deep Disagreement Johnson
Deep Disagreement Johnson
Deep Disagreement Johnson
doi:10.1017/epi.2020.31
ARTICLE
Abstract
Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the
appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which
there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this
paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement
offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagree-
ments are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are
unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troub-
ling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a
topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmat-
ically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree?
I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate
to have towards one’s hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis
for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.
1. Introduction
I take the following to be a paradigmatic instance of deep disagreement:
Alex and Billie: Alex is a deeply religious Christian. Her views on a variety of
topics are influenced by her Christian identity. For instance, she believes that
God implants a soul at the moment of conception. This belief informs Alex’s
firm pro-life stance on the topic of abortion. Billie is an atheist. He was raised
in a secular household. Billie believes that morality is independent of religion,
and is pro-choice. Alex and Billie regard each other as generally intelligent and
reasonable, but when it comes to abortion, they do not see eye to eye. Neither
accepts the reasons offered by the other for their respective positions. Whenever
the topic comes up, Alex and Billie’s discussion either becomes heated, or they
avoid talking about their views and change the subject.
can imagine that in a case like this, ordinary methods for resolving disagreement, such
as gathering more evidence, compromising, clarifying the positions of the disputants,
etc., are ineffective in bringing about a consensus. Yet Alex and Billie, we can imagine,
each continues to think that they are right and the other is wrong, rather than suspend-
ing judgment or lowering confidence in their own view. Could such a steadfast response
to a disagreement of this sort be anything other than irrational?
There are several explanations of the persistence of deep disagreement. I shall focus
(in section 3) on an account of deep disagreement, offered by hinge epistemology, that I
find plausible at least for a limited but significant range of cases.1 This account holds
that deep disagreements are not directly rationally resolvable when they concern a
hinge commitment of one of the disputants – that is, a commitment held with maximal
subjective certainty yet which lacks rational grounding (in a sense to be explained).
Though I focus here on hinge epistemology, the issue I aim to explore in this paper –
namely, that of how intellectual humility can be useful in navigating deep disagreement –
is relevant for other accounts that also explain the persistence of deep disagreement by
appeal to beliefs, principles, or assumptions that are particularly resistant to change by
rational means.2 So I shall not primarily be arguing for the theoretical advantages of a
particular explanation of the persistence of deep disagreement. (Indeed, I see no reason
to think that the persistence of all cases of deep disagreement must be explained in
just one way.) Nevertheless, I shall frame the issues throughout in terms of hinge epistem-
ology, since I find that to provide a plausible account of the disagreements of interest, and
to provide a framework suitable for illuminating the points I wish to make about intel-
lectual humility.
The conclusion that seems to be invited by the hinge epistemic approach is that when
one’s hinge commitments are challenged, the only rational response available is to dogmat-
ically hold to them, and thus if a resolution to the disagreement is possible at all, it will have
to proceed (at least initially) through non-rational means.3 This conclusion appears
unappealing for two reasons: first, because it seems to endorse dogmatism or arrogance
as a response to certain disagreements, and second, because it possibly leaves us with
something like propaganda or even force as the only available means of resolving deep dis-
agreements on pressing matters. However, I shall identify (in section 4) an attitude of intel-
lectual humility that it is appropriate to have towards our hinge commitments, and discuss
how this attitude can be useful for navigating deep disagreement.
1
See Pritchard (2018) and Ranalli (2018a, 2018b). Siegel (2019) provides a critical response to the hinge
epistemic account of deep disagreement.
2
For instance, Lynch (2010, 2012, 2016) explains deep disagreement in terms of disagreement concern-
ing fundamental epistemic principles. See also Kappel (2012).
3
Pritchard, for instance, talks of persuasion in a ‘side-on’ fashion (2018: 7).
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Episteme 3
4
So understood, the standard ‘restaurant bill’ case discussed in the epistemology of disagreement is a
shallow peer disagreement. In that case, two people have agreed to split the bill at a restaurant, but
when the bill comes, and each calculates how much they owe, they arrive at different amounts. This dis-
agreement is shallow because both parties will likely find that simply double-checking calculations or
using a calculator will be sufficient to resolve the disagreement towards a substantive consensus.
Conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement hold that the rational response in the restaurant
bill case is for disputants to suspend judgment, or at least lower their confidence in their initial calculations,
after learning that they disagree with an epistemic peer (see Feldman 2005, Christensen 2007, and Elga 2007
for defenses of conciliatory views). My depiction of shallow disagreement is compatible with the concili-
atory conclusion about this case: initially, the rational thing to do is to suspend judgment. But eventually,
and probably sooner rather than later, the disputants in the case will come to a substantive consensus.
5
Conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement, of course, claim that all peer disagreement can
be resolved in just this way. However, it is not clear that the notion of peer disagreement that conciliation-
ism focuses on captures the interesting aspects of deep disagreement. What demarcates deep from shallow
disagreement, on my view, has to do with the ease with which the disagreement might eventually be
resolved; not with whether the mere fact of disagreement is epistemically significant.
6
We might distinguish between two kinds of problem of disagreement; there are disagreements that are
deep in an internalist sense, in that there are no reasons the disputants themselves would both accept that
would lead to a substantive consensus. And then there may be disagreements that are deep in an externalist
sense, in that the evidence itself equally supports two incompatible propositions. My concern is with the
former sense.
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4 Drew Johnson
any disagreement with this stubborn interlocutor will not be a shallow disagreement,
unless it is us who would easily be convinced by him. I do not see this as a problem,
however. We should ask whether the stubborn interlocutor genuinely holds to his com-
mitment with such certainty that he finds it reasonable to reject any reasons which
might call his commitment into question, or whether he is only posing, perhaps in
order to play devil’s advocate, or perhaps because he just likes to argue.7 If the former,
then I think we may indeed be faced with a deep disagreement. If the latter, then we are
not facing deep disagreement, for the interlocutor is not truly making an assessment of
what it is rational to believe, and is instead engaging in some other kind of activity. This
reveals that in order for deep disagreement to occur, it must at least be the case that the
disputants share some epistemic goals; they must be concerned with truth, and with
deciding what it is rational to believe.8 (As we shall be in a position to see later,
those who persist in disagreement without sharing a concern for the truth cannot
exhibit the sort of intellectual humility I go on to identify.)
The notion of deep disagreement that is of interest for the present project I define as
follows:9
(i) distinguishes deep disagreement from shallow disagreement. But (i) alone, I
think, is not sufficient to capture what is characteristic of paradigmatically deep dis-
agreement. In some disagreements, it may be that no substantive consensus can easily
be reached, but nevertheless disputants do find it reasonable to agree to disagree, or to
suspend judgment, or to judge that there is no knowable objective truth of the matter.
For instance, we might have a persistent disagreement over how many hairs were on
Aristotle’s head at the moment he died, but the reason we cannot reach a substantive
consensus here is just that we recognize that we cannot know the answer. This may
qualify as deep disagreement in some sense, but the range of disagreement of interest
here are disagreements where there is rational pressure towards consensus, in the
sense of there being a commitment to there being a knowable truth of the matter.10
Part of what is distinctive of deep disagreement is that it is cause for cognitive con-
cern. Alex and Billie are unable to easily reach a substantive consensus through an
7
See Pritchard (2017: 27–9) on dialectical poseurs.
8
Thanks to Michael Lynch for highlighting this point about shared epistemic goals.
9
Henceforth, I simply call this ‘deep disagreement’, but it should be understood that I leave room for
other sorts of deep disagreement – for instance, disagreement where no substantive consensus can easily
be reached, but where disputants can rationally suspend judgment or agree to disagree.
10
Note that this disagreement is not shallow just because it concerns a trivial matter where there is no
need to reach consensus, but because the answer is unknowable (for us). Suppose A and B disagree in their
predictions about global warming; A believes the effects of global warming will have catastrophic effects for
human life in 30 years, while B believes it will have catastrophic effects in 75 years. A lot seems to hang on
getting things right here. But, we can imagine, the evidence currently available does not allow us to ascer-
tain whether A is correct or B is correct. Here, I submit, we ought not assign a very high degree of credence
to either A’s prediction or B’s prediction, when it comes to deciding what to believe. Yet we may have prac-
tical reasons to ‘play it safe’ and accept (where this is distinct from believing) A’s prediction for the purpose
of making policy decisions and adjusting our individual behavior. Thanks to Dorit Bar-On for raising this
issue.
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Episteme 5
15
Thanks to Michael Lynch for pushing me to think about this point.
16
Conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement, of course, would advance this conclusion.
17
One might object that the sophistication of philosophical arguments concerning the permissibility of
abortion indicates that most non-philosophers have not considered the issue with sufficient depth to have
an epistemically justified view on the matter. I worry this reasoning would over-generate skeptical conclu-
sions – there is sophisticated philosophical work to be done in thinking about what is generally wrong with
killing, for instance, but we shouldn’t conclude from this that most people do not justifiably believe (much
less know) that killing is generally wrong. This is for the same reason that one does not need to understand
the intricacies of our best physics to form reasonable predictions about, say, how a billiard ball will behave
when one hits it in a certain way. It seems to me that ordinary people are capable of thinking through even
complex moral dilemmas in an intellectually responsible way, though philosophical training no doubt can
aid in sharpening our moral reasoning.
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Episteme 7
disappear. But in some instances of deep disagreement, I submit, disputants are not
rational in suspending judgment, lowering confidence, or agreeing to disagree. That is,
in some instances of deep disagreement, disputants are in fact not talking past each
other, and there is an objectively correct position to take that is knowable, both dispu-
tants are epistemically blameless in holding the views they do, yet at least one of them
has a false belief. The case of Alex and Billie is meant as an example of such a case.
The possibility of this kind of disagreement should not surprise us. As Rawls (2005)
tells us, it is part of living in a liberal democracy that there be a plurality of reasonable
religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines. We must have some convictions, and
these will inevitably conflict with the convictions of others. This brings us to the
third possible explanation of the persistence of deep disagreement; some deep disagree-
ments appear not to be directly rationally resolvable because they really are not directly
rationally resolvable. The hinge epistemic account of deep disagreement is one instance
of this strategy, and I turn to this in the next section.18
3. Hinge epistemology
The hinge epistemic account of deep disagreement holds that deep disagreements are
not rationally resolvable when they concern hinge commitments. According to the
brand of hinge epistemology I prefer (due to Pritchard 2012, 2016, inter alia), ‘hinges’
are commitments which are held with maximal subjective certainty, yet which are (for
that very reason) not directly responsive to rational considerations and difficult to aban-
don. Because these commitments are not directly responsive to rational considerations
and difficult to abandon, neither the mere fact of disagreement, nor the reasons put
forward in the course of an argument can lead one to rationally doubt the hinge,
and neither can one simply abandon the hinge and thereby come to be able to subject
the relevant contested proposition to rational evaluation.19
Hinge epistemology, which takes inspiration from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
(1969), is often presented as a response to radical epistemological skepticism. The
core idea, shared by various accounts of hinge epistemology, is that certain of our com-
mitments are exempt from doubt, because of the special role those commitments play
in making the epistemic practice of giving and asking for reasons (including raising
doubts) possible in the first place.
There are different views on how best to understand the notion of a hinge commit-
ment, each with different implications for the analysis of disagreement. Here are four
18
As noted above, the hinge epistemic account is not the only account explaining the apparent rational
unresolvability in this way. Another account of deep disagreement, the fundamental epistemic principle
account, holds that these disagreements are not rationally resolvable when they concern fundamental epi-
stemic principles; that is, principles concerning how one ought to form one’s beliefs and which are not in
turn based on any further epistemic principles (Lynch 2010, 2012, 2016). These principles cannot be
defended without circularity. When a disagreement concerns fundamental epistemic principles, there
will be in principle no evidence that can settle the dispute to the satisfaction of those involved, since the
disputants will not be able to offer reasons in favor of the fundamental epistemic principles they accept
that will be convincing to someone who does not also accept those principles. Although I shall use the
hinge epistemic framework for explaining deep disagreement, the conclusions I want to draw about intel-
lectual humility apply, mutatis mutandis, to the fundamental epistemic principle account. See Ranalli
(2018a) for a comparison between the fundamental epistemic principle account and the hinge epistemic
account of deep disagreement.
19
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to consider the latter possibility – namely, of a subject
abandoning her hinge commitment, and thereby gaining the capacity to directly rationally consider argu-
ments bearing on the relevant proposition.
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8 Drew Johnson
dimensions along which hinge epistemologies differ. First, there is a division among views
that take hinge commitments to have propositions as their objects (including, inter alia,
Wright 1986, 2004; Coliva 2010, 2015, 2016; Pritchard 2012, 2016), and those that take
hinge commitments to concern non-propositional objects that are neither true nor false
(Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 2016). There is then a second division between views that take
hinge commitments to have a positive epistemic status20 (Williams 1991; Wright
2004), on the one hand, and views that take the attitude of hinge commitment to be
removed from the scope of rational evaluation altogether, and so not even enjoying epi-
stemic entitlement (Coliva 2010, 2015, 2016; Pritchard 2012, 2016), on the other hand.
Relatedly, whereas on Wright’s view our entitlement to accept a hinge proposition is
defeasible, in that one may only rationally accept the hinge in the absence of any reason
to think the hinge false (Wright 2004: 181), for Pritchard, our hinges are not responsive
to evidence even in this way. On Pritchard’s view, because hinges are held with maximal
subjective certainty, any reason that might be offered for thinking the hinge false will
seem less certain to one than the hinge itself, and so one would instead have reason to
reject the purported counter-evidence rather than the hinge.
Third, some views seem to take hinge commitment to be a context-sensitive notion,
in that an attitude’s status as hinge commitment is specific either to a particular domain
of inquiry or intellectual project (e.g., Williams 1991; Wright 2004). Other views take a
commitment’s status as a hinge commitment for a person to be largely independent of
the context of inquiry (Pritchard 2012, 2016). For instance, on Williams’ view, the prop-
osition that the world did not come into existence just five minutes ago will count as a
hinge commitment relative to certain domains of inquiry (e.g., history), but not relative
to others (e.g., philosophical reflection on skepticism) (Williams 1991: 121–5). By con-
trast, on Pritchard’s view, if the proposition that the earth did not come into existence
just five minutes ago is held as a hinge commitment by someone, then that person will
hold this as a hinge commitment regardless of context of inquiry (2016: 106).
And finally, some views hold that there are principled limits on what kinds of pro-
positions can play the hinge commitment role (Wright 2004; Coliva 2016) – in particu-
lar, only ‘Moorean certainties’ such as the proposition that one has two hands can be
hinge propositions. Whereas others hold that (almost) any proposition can be a
hinge commitment for a particular person, so long as it plays the relevant role – namely,
being held with maximum subjective certainty (Pritchard 2012, 2016). Thus, on
Pritchard’s view it could be that, in the right circumstances (given one’s upbringing,
the beliefs of one’s culture, etc.), one could be maximally subjectively certain of, and
therefore have a hinge commitment to, just about any proposition. It is this feature
of Pritchard’s view that I think makes it the most natural framework for developing
a hinge epistemic account of disagreement.
Although Pritchard’s view allows for variability in personal hinge commitments, it
also captures what all hinges have in common, in virtue of which they are hinges:
namely, the functional role the hinge commitment plays in the cognitive economy of
the person holding it. All hinges are alike in that they are immune from direct rational
evaluation and difficult to abandon, because they are held with maximal subjective cer-
tainty. And despite the possibility for variation in hinge commitment between people,
we should also expect that generally there will be agreement in our hinge commitments;
indeed, Moorean certainties (such as commitment to the proposition that one has two
hands) and anti-skeptical commitments (such as commitment to the proposition that
the earth did not pop into existence just five minutes ago) are hinge commitments
20
This may be either because we are entitled to place rational trust in them, or because they are possible
pieces of knowledge, despite the fact that we lack strong justification for thinking the hinge.
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Episteme 9
that nearly everyone will share.21 As I think of hinge epistemology, in the game of giving
and asking for reasons, hinge commitments are like the board on which this game is
played, in that they are not themselves subject to requests for reasons, nor do they dir-
ectly provide reasons (they are not moves on the board), but they are commitments we
must hold if we are to give and ask for reasons at all (they are the board).22
Thus, drawing from Pritchard’s non-epistemic propositional view, we can define the
notion of ‘hinge commitment’ as follows:
Hinge Commitment: S has a hinge commitment to the proposition that p just in case
S is subjectively maximally certain that p is true, where (for that reason) S’s commit-
ment is arationally held, in that it is not based on any particular reasons for thinking
p true, and is generally resistant to purported reasons for thinking p false.
The arationality and the maximal subjective certainty are crucially related. Because
hinges are maximally subjectively certain, no evidence can lead one to rationally reject
one’s hinge (again, by one’s own lights), as the hinge will be more certain than any
reasons speaking against it. But by the same token, no evidence can speak in favor of
a hinge, either, as any such evidence will also be less certain than the hinge itself.
Thus, we should understand Pritchard’s view as adopting the following principle,
which I dub ‘the rational grounding principle’ (see Pritchard 2012: 256–7; 2016: 63–6):
The Rational Grounding Principle: Rational grounds for S to doubt (or believe)
proposition p must themselves be more subjectively certain to S than the propos-
ition p which is to be doubted or believed.
When we combine this principle with the observation that, for any epistemic agent,
there will be some propositions the agent holds with a maximum subjective degree of
certainty, the core commitments of Pritchard’s hinge epistemology fall out:23 First, what-
ever is held to a maximum degree of subjective certainty must be rationally groundless –
by definition, there is nothing more certain for the agent that could stand as its rational
ground. Second, whatever is held to a maximum degree of subjective certainty cannot
directly provide rational grounds for knowledge of other initially less certain
21
As Pritchard puts it, all the various personal hinge commitments ‘codify’ the more basic ‘über hinge
commitment’ we all share to the proposition that one is not fundamentally and radically mistaken in one’s
beliefs. This über hinge commitment then entails the denials of skeptical hypotheses, thus generating anti-
skeptical hinge commitments which will also be nearly universally shared (Pritchard 2016: 94–103).
22
This feature of hinge commitments (their being removed from the scope of rational evaluation) dis-
tinguishes them from fundamental epistemic principles (as discussed by Lynch 2010, 2012, 2016).
Fundamental epistemic principles cannot themselves be epistemically justified in a non-circular manner,
yet they do still provide a source of epistemic justification for beliefs. Hinge commitments do not them-
selves directly justify other beliefs; rather, holding the hinge commitment is a prerequisite for being able
to have justification for one’s beliefs.
23
One might wonder why it would be true that epistemic agents must hold some commitments that are
maximally subjectively certain and yet arational. A full defense of hinge epistemology goes beyond the
scope of the present paper, but the basic thought is that it is part of the ‘logic’ of rational evaluation
that if some grounds are to be ‘more’ or ‘less’ certain for S, they are so only relative to some maximally
certain proposition(s) that S holds. Given the rational grounding principle, however, such a proposition
could not be directly rationally supported by other propositions – hence, it is rationally groundless for
S. And since such a proposition is rationally groundless for S, it also could not directly rationally support
other propositions for S. Thus, holding some propositions with maximal certainty is a prerequisite for
rational evaluation altogether, yet such propositions would be immune from rational evaluation themselves.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this point.
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10 Drew Johnson
propositions. For, the hinge, being itself rationally groundless, cannot serve as the
rational ground for accepting other propositions. If it could, then reason to doubt the
proposition so grounded could provide reason to doubt the hinge commitment ground-
ing that proposition – but hinges, being maximally subjectively certain, are immune to
rational doubt. As a result, hinge commitments are themselves arational, standing out-
side of our ordinary epistemic practices. Yet we must have some hinge commitments
in place, because it is only relative to (though not by appeal to) these maximally subject-
ively certain commitments that we are able to provide rational grounds for doubting and
believing other propositions. As Pritchard concludes, the fact that hinge commitments
stand outside the scope of rational evaluation shows that our practices of rational evalu-
ation are necessarily local – it is thus simply not possible to subject all of one’s cognitive
commitments to doubt at once, as radical skepticism would have us do.
Though hinge disagreement will be rare, I do think that there are some real life
instances. It is difficult to say to any degree of precision whether a given disagreement
is a hinge disagreement, because this will largely depend on the role that the proposition
under dispute plays in the cognitive economy of each disputant. Pritchard offers the
following as examples: “someone raised in a religious community where God’s existence
is taken as an obvious fact of life is likely to have religious hinge commitments that
would be alien to someone raised in a largely secular environment. Or consider some-
one raised in a deeply politically conservative social milieu, as opposed to someone
brought up in a commune exclusively populated by people of a left-wing political per-
suasion. Clearly, one would expect this to lead to individuals with very different hinge
commitments regarding core political matters” (Pritchard 2018: 3).
I would add, as a possible historical example, the attitudes held by white slave-
owners towards slavery in the pre-civil war American South, compared with the atti-
tudes of abolitionists. It would not be surprising, I think, for a white person raised in
a plantation setting, confronted with slavery as an everyday fact of life, to hold that
the institution of slavery is morally justified as a hinge commitment. Racist attitudes
held even today may, for some people, play the hinge commitment role.26 As a concrete
instance, I offer the case of Derek Black, a former white nationalist. From a young age,
Black was raised to accept white nationalist ideals – “his father, Don Black, had created
Stormfront, the Internet’s first and largest white nationalist site, with 300,000 users and
counting. His mother, Chloe, had once been married to David Duke, one of the coun-
try’s most infamous racial zealots, and Duke had become Derek’s godfather,” and
“Derek had been taught that America was intended as a place for white Europeans
and that everyone else would eventually have to leave. He was told to be suspicious
of other races, of the U.S. government, of tap water and of pop culture” (Saslow
2016).27 Given this sort of upbringing, I suggest that Black’s white nationalist views
(prior to his conversion – more on this in section 4) are plausible candidates for
hinge commitments with which we should disagree.
can’t explain everything.’ We should feel ourselves very intellectually distant from someone who said this”
(Wittgenstein 1969: passage 108).
26
These examples illustrate, of course, that hinge commitments are not guaranteed to be true.
27
Thanks to Tracy Llanera for introducing me to this story and influencing my thinking on it.
28
Ranalli (2018a: 6) similarly distinguishes between direct and indirect hinge disagreement. I use ‘imme-
diate’ and ‘mediate’ to avoid confusion, as I shall be simultaneously discussing direct and indirect methods
for resolving hinge disagreement.
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12 Drew Johnson
32
Though Allan Hazlett (2012) offers an alternative; one can exhibit intellectual humility by adjusting
one’s higher-order attitude towards one’s initial belief, while still retaining that belief. As we shall see,
my own view is similar to Hazlett’s.
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14 Drew Johnson
humility is epistemically valuable for the humble agent – and also because it is neces-
sary for reasonable public discourse – it is required for fulfilling our epistemic duties to
others. But if the hinge epistemic explanation of deep disagreement is correct, it cannot
be rational for one to adjust one’s confidence in one’s hinge commitments when one
discovers that others disagree with that hinge. This is because the hinge is not respon-
sive to rational evaluation. It cannot be that one ought, rationally, to adjust one’s atti-
tude towards a proposition when the very nature of that attitude is such that it does not
respond to reasons in the first place.
The problem can also be illustrated by considering Lynch’s argument for the value of
intellectual humility. Intellectual arrogance, according to Lynch, involves taking the atti-
tude that one’s worldview is not open to improvement by the evidence or experience of
others. But it is hard to see how we could fail to have such an attitude of arrogance
towards our hinge commitments. To the extent that you see your worldview as open
to improvement, it seems, you will have to be less than absolutely certain it is correct.
Thus, even if intellectual humility is a valuable attitude for navigating peer disagree-
ment, it apparently cannot be the appropriate attitude to have in deep disagreements
explained by hinge disagreement, because it is not an attitude one can have with regard
to hinge commitments. Given that deep disagreements are characterized by a pressure
towards resolution, what methods are left to us? One might begin to worry that the only
options here are morally and epistemically problematic; violence, propaganda, manipu-
lation, and coercion come to mind. Wittgenstein suggests we think of what happens
when missionaries convert natives, but this does not bring much comfort when we
reflect on some of the practices in which missionaries have engaged in the name of
their cause.33
Regarding (i): I do not see this as requiring that ordinary folks be aware of the details
of hinge epistemology. Rather, realizing the rational groundlessness of certain of one’s
commitments is a way of owning the fact that one has not ‘earned’ those commitments
33
“Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with each other, then each man
declares the other a fool and a heretic. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man – but wouldn’t I give him
reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons come persuasion. (Think what happens
when missionaries convert natives)” (Wittgenstein 1969: passages 611–12).
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Episteme 15
through intellectual effort (it is thus a way of owning one’s limitations).34 This recog-
nizes the Wittgensteinian point that it is part of becoming a member of a community of
epistemic agents that we must ‘swallow down’ some propositions as being beyond doubt
without argument.35 A failure to recognize the rational groundlessness of certain of
one’s commitments amounts to intellectual hubris. This may provide a possible inter-
pretation for why Wittgenstein admonishes Moore for asserting that he knows he has
hands (1969: passage 151); in so doing, Moore presents himself as being in a position
to demonstrate that this is so – Moore exhibits intellectual hubris. In this sense, argu-
ments for radical skepticism can be seen as an important corrective, and are properly
regarded as humbling.36
But in considering arguments for radical skepticism, we should not become overly
modest in our estimation of our epistemic positions. An acceptance of radical skepticism
in this regard would amount to an intellectual meekness. The radical skeptic underesti-
mates her epistemic abilities to such an extent that she claims no knowledge whatsoever;
in attempting to doubt even that she has hands, she attempts to disavow any intellectual
commitments at all. This is why the proper attitude towards our hinge commitments will
involve (ii) – taking responsibility for the hinge commitments one in fact has. As I
understand it, ‘standing by’ one’s hinge commitments means recognizing their subjective
certainty and continuing to endorse them. In more mundane contexts, where radical
skepticism is not under discussion, taking proper responsibility for one’s hinge commit-
ments might include not concealing those commitments (including in self-deception).37
One cannot exhibit humility concerning one’s convictions if one pretends not to have
any. In the context of deep disagreements, one way to fail to take responsibility for
one’s hinge commitment is to (misleadingly) present that commitment as though it
were an ordinary (if firmly held) belief, in principle open to rational revision. This
can occur when one engages in a dialogue concerning whether p while concealing the
fact that the question of whether p is not genuinely open for one – this would be a
bad faith effort at dialogue.
The self-awareness involved in the intellectually humble attitude to take towards
one’s hinge commitments is (following Whitcomb et al. 2017) a mean between oblivi-
34
In this way, the view fits with Whitcomb et al.’s (2017) view of intellectual humility as appropriate
awareness and taking ownership of one’s cognitive limitations. But the limitation here is not merely a con-
tingent limit; it is not as if we could persuade everyone if only we were excellent debaters. Rather, this is a
principled limit.
35
Wittgenstein (1969: passage 143): “I am told, for example, that someone climbed this mountain many
years ago. Do I always enquire into the reliability of the teller of this story, and whether the mountain did
exist years ago? A child learns there are reliable and unreliable informants much later than it learns facts
which are told it. It doesn’t learn at all that that mountain has existed for a long time: that is, the question
whether it is so doesn’t arise at all. It swallows this consequence down, so to speak, together with what it
learns”.
36
In this respect, the attitude of intellectual humility I identify is similar to Hazlett’s (2012), since on his
view, one can exhibit intellectual humility regarding one’s own knowledge by taking up a higher-order atti-
tude of agnosticism about whether one knows – one can have knowledge and yet suspend judgment about
whether one does have that knowledge. Similarly, I am maintaining, we can recognize the rational ground-
lessness of certain of our beliefs, without thereby being rationally compelled to abandon those beliefs.
37
This relates to Pritchard’s discussion of ‘dialectical posturing’ (2017: 27–9). A dialectical poseur
engages in a debate inauthentically. “By this I mean that there are parties to the dispute who, far from
expressing their genuine convictions about the subject matter at hand, are instead merely playing a certain
role, wearing a dialectical hat, if you will” (27) – whether they consciously mean to or not, I would add.
Someone who asserts (and so presents themselves as knowing) that there is no such thing as knowledge
is a dialectical poseur, in this sense.
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16 Drew Johnson
ousness and obsessiveness over one’s limitations. Obliviousness to one’s hinges would
amount to a failure to recognize where one’s reasons give out. The oblivious person
will continue to offer reasons that do not really have any bearing on their own commit-
ment; the provided reasons would be a post-hoc rationalization of the commitment.
Obsessiveness over one’s limitations may lead one to think reasons have given out
before they really have; the obsessive would be so uncertain of his own ability to present
his authentic reasons for belief, that he will likely avoid argument too often.
of intellectual humility, rather than dogmatism, for the following two reasons. First,
‘dogmatism’ carries with it the implication that the dogmatic are culpably unresponsive
to reasons: the dogmatic improperly refuse to believe in accordance with their evidence.
It strikes me that one can only refuse to do what one (thinks one) can do. We cannot
willingly lower our confidence in our hinge commitments, even in the face of purported
counter-evidence – thus, we cannot improperly refuse to do so. We are epistemically
innocent with respect to the rational non-responsiveness of our hinge commitments.
Second, the attitude of humility I identify – that of realizing the groundlessness of
the hinge commitments – is under the voluntary control of agents. This attitude reflects
the features of other general accounts of intellectual humility, including taking owner-
ship of one’s cognitive limitations, as discussed earlier (Whitcomb et al. 2017). When it
comes to hinge disagreement, I suggest that one can exhibit intellectual humility by
doing what it takes to recognize a limit on one’s dialectical position. Eventually, reasons
give out, and when they do, we should see that we are all equals in the groundlessness of
our believing. The first step towards addressing immediate hinge disagreement, then, is
realizing that one’s abilities to logically debate the matter are sometimes beside the point
and pursuing such debate will only increase tensions.39
If reasoned debate is of no avail, how ought we respond to direct hinge disagree-
ment? Here I think we can learn from the conversion experience of Derek Black.
Black’s conversion away from white nationalism was arguably sparked by his developing
a friendship with Matthew Stevenson, who had invited Black to his weekly Shabbat
dinners. Stevenson’s approach here seems to me an instance of an (initially) non-
rational, but also non-manipulative method for attempting to change the hinge com-
mitment of another. “Matthew decided his best chance to affect Derek’s thinking was
not to ignore him or confront him, but simply to include him. ‘Maybe he’d never
spent time with a Jewish person before,’ Matthew remembered thinking.” Developing
a friendship with the attendees of Stevenson’s dinners seems to have been a deciding
factor in Blacks eventual repudiation of white nationalism, although eventually discus-
sions of race were involved as well. Eventually, “[Black] decided early in his final year at
New College to finally respond on the forum. He wanted his friends on campus to feel
comfortable, even if he still believed some of their homelands were elsewhere. He sat at
a coffee shop and began writing his post, softening his ideology with each successive
draft.” Finally, Black would go on to fully reject his previous views. The key to
Stevenson’s strategy, I suggest, was that rather than immediately engaging in reasoned
argument with Black, Stevenson sought first simply to include Black in a community.
But of course, this non-rational strategy will only be effective in changing the hinge
commitments of those who are open, at least to some degree, to sharing experiences and
building relationships with those with whom they have significant differences; it is easy
to imagine Black simply rejecting Stevenson’s initial invitation. Lynch understands
intellectual humility as an attitude of seeing aspects of one’s worldview as open to
improvement by the evidence and experiences of others (2018). When it comes to
hinge commitments, reasons give out, and so one perhaps cannot view them as open
to improvement by the evidence of others. Nevertheless, if one sees one’s worldview
at least as open to improvement by the experiences of others – and by sharing
39
Still, it might be thought strange to describe an attitude of total certainty as also somehow exhibiting
intellectual humility. I do not think the view is so strange though, once we have clarified the target of the
attitude of humility. The idea is that humility for a hinge commitment to p is an attitude of humility con-
cerning the rational standing of the commitment to p, rather than an attitude of intellectual humility
regarding p itself. This is roughly along the lines of Hazlett’s proposal about intellectual humility as a
higher-order attitude (2012). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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18 Drew Johnson
experiences with others – then one’s hinge commitments will be open to change. Being
intellectually humble in the right way about our firmest convictions makes possible a
constructive albeit non-rational strategy for addressing deep disagreement.
5. Concluding remarks
Opening oneself up to the experiences (if not the evidence) of others, and sharing one’s
experiences with others, is a start to resolving immediate deep disagreement. This strat-
egy involves influencing the hinge commitments of others. However, this strategy is not
without risks and drawbacks. First, there is a risk involved, in that by developing a
connection with those whom one disagrees in hinge commitment, one opens up the
possibility that one’s own hinge commitments will shift. This is not a bad thing in itself,
though; if we never opened ourselves up to our convictions shifting in this way, how
would our worldviews ever improve? Opening oneself up is the mature way to relate
to one’s worldview.40 Nevertheless, with opening oneself up to the experiences of others
comes the risk that one’s one worldview may shift for the worse.
Second, such a strategy requires significant personal investment; reaching out to
develop relationships and share experiences with those whose views one might find per-
nicious takes time and energy. These concerns may explain why it is we sometimes
judge that seeking to resolve certain conflicts is ‘just not worth it’, and that it is better
not to engage. But at the same time, deciding that it is ‘not worth it’ to build connec-
tions and shared experiences with those whom we disagree with is also a way of exclud-
ing those people from our communities. Insofar as a democratic society is an ideal, we
may need to make a commitment to forging and maintaining relationships that reach
across deep disagreements. I leave it as a question for further consideration to what
extent we might have an obligation to change the views of those who we regard as
having morally pernicious hinge commitments.41
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This paper has benefitted from the insightful comments of many; apologies to any I have missed here.
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Drew Johnson is a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of Connecticut. He has published work
on hinge epistemology and moral skepticism, and several papers on self-knowledge (co-authored with Dorit
Bar-On). His research focuses on metaethics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. His current
research project focuses on developing a hybrid theory of ethical thought and discourse that draws from
neo-expressivism and teleosemantics.
Cite this article: Johnson D (2020). Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.
Episteme 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.31
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