O'Boyle 2020

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
This classic edition includes a new foreword by former APA President

Antonio E. Puente which primes the reader for a unique, bold, and lively
account of the history of psychology that remains relevant and useful to this
day. This text surveys core areas in the history of psychology, covering the
history of applied, developmental, clinical, cognitive, and experimental
psychology.
O’Boyle writes in the “historical present,” which gives readers a sense of
immediacy and aliveness as they journey through history. Her account uses
imaginative new features, including “The Times,” which gives readers a feel
for what everyday life was like during the age discussed in the chapter.
Descriptions of ordinary life, as well as information about important issues
influencing people’s lives such as wars, social movements, famines, and
plagues will pique student interest. “Stop and Think” questions, scattered
throughout, enhance retention and encourage critical thinking.
This book continues to provide a creative, distinct, and valuable
contribution to the field, and it is an essential read for undergraduate
students undertaking courses in the history of psychology and history of
science, history and systems of psychology, and introductory psychology.
Cherie O’Boyle is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at California State

University, San Marcos, USA.
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History of Psychology (Classic Edition): A Cultural Perspective

Cherie O’Boyle
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A Cultural Perspective
Classic Edition
Cherie O’Boyle
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First edition published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2006
Second edition published by Routledge 2011
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: O’Boyle, Cherie Goodenow, 1950– author.

Title: History of psychology : a cultural perspective / Cherie O’Boyle.
Description: Classic edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series:
Psychology Press & Routledge classics | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020037642 (print) | LCCN 2020037643 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780367693619 (paperback) | ISBN 9780367693626 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781003141518 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Psychology—History.
Classification: LCC BF81 .O26 2021 (print) | LCC BF81 (ebook)
DDC 150.9—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037642
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037643
ISBN: 978-0-367-69362-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-69361-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-14151-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman

by Apex CoVantage, LLC
This book is dedicated to my faculty colleagues at California State
University, San Marcos. They are the most committed, hard-
working, and generous professionals with whom I have ever had
the privilege of being associated. This book could never have been
written without their help and support.
Contents
Foreword to the Classic Edition
Foreword
List of Photographs and Illustrations
Preface
1 Origins of Psychological Thought: Why Do Other People Have Such

Bizarre Beliefs and Behave So Strangely?
The Questions of Psychology

Universal Psychological Characteristics
Perceptual and Cognitive Influences
Biases in Processing Information
Important Distinctions Across Time and Culture
The Place of Humans and Other Animals in the Universe
Relationships Between the Self and Others
Desire for Power or Degree of Control That an Individual Can Have
Ways of Coming to Believe
Trust
Reason
Experience
Folk Psychology
Conclusions About the Answers
A Science of Psychology
The Greek Psyche
Modern Definitions
2 From Greek Philosophy to the Middle Ages: What and How Do We
Believe?
What We Believe and How We Come to Believe

The Significance of Greek Culture
Greek Antiquity
The Classical Greek World
Transitions in Ontology
Transitions in Epistemology
Reasons for the Transitions
Choosing an Epistemology
Belief Systems in Classical Greece
The True Reality of Numbers
Natural Philosophy
The Greek Physis
Platonic Philosophy
The Aristotelian Milieu
Aristotle’s Psychology
End of an Era
Transition of Power to Rome
Philosophies of Personal Happiness
Stoicism
Epicureanism
Mystery Religions
After Rome
The Early Middle Ages in Europe
Neo-Platonism
Augustinian Doctrines of Christianity
Implications of Religious Thought for Psychology
A Period of Intellectual Stagnation
3 From an Age of Spirits to Humanism: How Many Angels Can Dance on

the Head of a Pin?
Philosophy in the Middle East
Byzantine Influences
Islamic Religion and Philosophy
Natural Philosophy in Islamic Thought
The High Middle Ages in Europe
The Search for Stability
The Power of the Roman Church
Scholasticism
The Problem of Knowledge
Summary of Scholastic Thought
The Consequences of Scholasticism
The Black Death
A Psychology of Disaster
Challenging the Church
Humanism: A New Focus
Disease and Famine
Secular Powers Grow Stronger
A New Way of Knowing
Inherited Assumptions
Epistemology for a New Age
From Certainty to Doubt in the West
The Certainty of Trust
The Costs of Trust
Cracks in the Foundation of Faith
Individualism
Humanism
The Centrality of Human Perspective
Skepticism Returns
A Skeptical Perspective
The Discomfort of Doubt
Empirical Discovery: Two Steps Forward
Human Potential
Medicine
Human Nature
Evidence
And One Step Back: The Church Reacts
The Certainty of Mathematics
Revealed Truth in Nature
Cosmology
Psychological and Theological Consequences
4 The Birth of Science: Is There Anything You Cannot Doubt?
Revolution Is in the Air

Ontological Revolution
Epistemological Revolution
A New Way of Knowing
False Idols of Knowledge
Knowledge Is Power
Philosophy Must Be Divorced From Religion
Begin With Inductive Reason
Natural Philosophy Must Be Dynamic, Cooperative, and Cumulative
The Physical Universe
The Role of Measurement
Knowledge and Opinion
Signs as Evidence
Reasons to Measure
Uses of Measurement
Rationalism as Another Way of Knowing
Antiauthoritarian
Skepticism and Naturalism Are Dangerous
The Rational Method
Introspection
Weaknesses in Human Reason
The Rational Process
Rational Conclusions
Trust Sensory Information
Innate Ideas
Mechanism
The Consequences of Rationalism
A Case Study: The Enlightened Mind and 300 Years of Witch Persecution
Magic, Science, and Religion
Irrational Thought Reigns
Scientific Evidence Against Witches
Paradigm for a New Age
The Scientific Paradigm
The Principles of Newtonian Science
The Goals of Scientific Study
The Modern Scientific Paradigm
Scientific Assumptions
Scientific Questions
Scientific Methods
5 Philosophical Answers to Psychological Questions: If a Tree Falls in the

Forest and There Is No One Around to Hear It, Does It Make a Sound?
Philosophers and Philosophies of the Human

The Women
The Selfish Motive
The Blank Slate
Everything Is God
Religious Skepticism
Nature and Mind
Appearance Is Truth
Categories of Thought
Summary of Philosophical Speculation
Romantic Rebellions
Literature
Romantic Psychologies
Scientific Progress
Physics and Chemistry
Relevance to Psychology
Biology’s Connections With Psychology
Philosophical Psychology
Political Science and Economics
Human Nature
Positivism
Natural History and Psychology
Early Evolutionary Theory
Natural Selection
Relevance for Psychology
6 Physiological to Experimental Psychology: Can Consciousness Be

Inspected?
Physiological Psychology
Vitalism and the Study of the Human
Neurophysiology
The Sensory System
Physiological Conclusions
Psychophysics
Romantic Ideas
Art and Literature
Romantic Philosophy
The Rejection of a Science of Consciousness
Spiritualism and the Occult
Structure and Function: Measuring Mind
The Origin of Human Mind
Mental Measurement
Statistics and Mental Measurement
Exploring the Contents of Consciousness
German Experimental Psychology
Experimental Psychology Outside of Germany
Unconscious Mind
7 A Divided Discipline: What Is the Function of Mind?
Divisions Created by Ideas

Elementalism
Holism
Evolutionary Principles
Psychology Follows Many Paths
The Study of Consciousness
Comparative Psychology
Medical Psychology
Madness
Early Explanations
Enlightened Lunacy
Modern Madness
The Reformers
Science and Insanity
Empirical Psychology: A Uniquely North American Blend
The Women
Functionalism
Higher Mental Functions
Pragmatic American Functionalism
The Methods of Functionalism
8 A Science of Behavior: Is Consciousness a Myth?
The Landscape Changes

Elementalism and Evolution
From Introspection to Experimentation
Physiological Bases for Psychology
The Physiology of Vision
Psychological Characteristics
Instincts and Habits
The Behaviorists’ Manifesto
Psychological Testing
Immigrant Testing
Army Testing During the Great War
Army Testing After the War
Eugenics
School Testing
Industrial Applications
Behaviorism After the Great War
Stimulus-Response Theory
Russian Physiological Associationism
Personality
The Conditioned Reflex
Weird Science
Physical Science and Science Fiction
Psychic Research
9 Paradigms Proliferate: Is There an Unconscious Mind?
Gestalt Psychology
The Phi Phenomenon
Animal Insight
An Experimental Test of Gestalt Theory
Gestalt Principles of Perception
Gestalt Notions of Consciousness
Application Versus Pure Science
Industrial Psychology
Psychologists’ Advice for Increasing the Supply
Increasing the Demand: Advertising
Clinical Applications
Mental Hygiene
Psychoanalysis
Secessions From Freud
Relations Between Psychoanalysis and Psychology
Psychoanalytic Influences on Clinical Psychology
Freud’s Cultural Context
Child Study and Developmental Psychology
Social Psychology/Sociology
10 Age of Theory: Why Are There So Many Different Psychological

Theories?
Psychology and the Scientific Method

Developments in Statistics and Measurement
Learning Theories
Learning Theorists’ Goals
Questions About Learning
Learning Theorists’ Answers
Comparative Psychology and Learning
Learning Theory and the Psyche
Social and Personality Theory
Methods in Social Research
Social Theorists’ Questions
Developmental Theory
Clinical Psychology
Personnel Testing
Educational Testing
Intelligence Testing
Diagnostic Testing
Psychotic Mental Illness
Neurotic Mental Illness
11 When Motivation Is the Question: Why Do We Do What We Do?
Experimental Psychology
Learning and Motivation
Physiological Learning
Mathematical/Mechanistic Learning
The Contingencies of Reinforcement
Learning and Loss of Motivation
Information Processing
Ethology
Animal Psychology
Interactions
Integration and Synthesis
Developmental Psychology
Attachment and Loss
Social Learning Theory
Temperament
Social Psychology
The Zeitgeist
Social Statistics and Research Designs
Ethics in Research
The Humanistic/Existential Movement
Reasons for Humanistic Theory
Humanistic Psychology as Personality Theory
Humanistic Psychology as Therapy
The Fate of the Humanistic Movement
Clinical Psychology
Defining Personality
Causes of Mental Illness
Therapy
The Effectiveness of Therapy
12 The Mind Returns: What Questions Are Psychologists Exploring Now?
From Learning to Cognition

Cognitive Science
Artificial Intelligence
Neuroscience
Cognitive Neuroscience
Sociobiology
Evolutionary Psychology
Animal Language Learning
Social Psychology
Social Cognition
Cultural Influences on Social Behavior
Developmental Psychology
Infant Skills
Behavior Genetics
The Role of Nurture
The Nature of the Interaction
Future Directions
Statistical and Methodological Changes
Clinical Psychology
Treatments
The Future of Clinical Psychology
Positive Psychology
Psychology of Women
Psychology of Religion
Industrial/Organizational Psychology
Psychology for Tomorrow
Glossary
References
Name Index
Subject Index
Foreword to the Classic Edition
Professor O’Boyle has authored an imminently engaging and provocative

book on the history of psychology. Using a cultural foundation to ask bold
questions throughout the book, the reader is given the opportunity to bring
into one’s life the long and wonderful history of psychological thought and
science.
The book begins by asking fundamental questions of what and how we
believe. The treatise ends with how the following important topics have, are,
and will shape psychological history; social cognition, women, religion, and
evolutionary perspectives. Hence, not only are the foundations of
psychology clearly presented but so are the bricks and mortar as well as its
vibrant and exciting future. By shifting away from the traditional
approaches in the history of psychology of chronological and biographical
analyses, the readers’ imagination is quickly captured into thinking,
questioning, and opening intellectual horizons.
In addition, pushing the boundaries of current knowledge in the history of
psychology, Professor O’Boyle takes us from how knowledge has evolved
from trust to later reason and eventually experience as a way to appreciate
how mind and behavior are best understood. In this journey, the reader is
pushed to consider the heretofore concepts of natural philosophy of the
Middle East; how knowledge is power but directionless; the basics of science
such as validity, reliability, transparency, and practicality; the utility of
philosophical science; the complexity of how psychology has, is, and will
follow “many paths”; the depths and challenges of what is and what isn’t the
purpose of consciousness; how culture shaped the thinking of psychology’s
great minds; and leaving us with deep questions such as what it is to be
human.
In this to be classic contribution, Professor O’Boyle challenges all of us to
question and to believe in the beauty, power, and promise of psychology and
its history.
Antonio E. Puente
Professor of Psychology
University of North Carolina Wilmington
125th President, American Psychological Association
Foreword
This text is fascinating, original, creative, and fun to read. Its content is well
presented and organized in a coherent way. It is unusually “reader-friendly”
and pedagogically sound, with a lively writing style as well as a feminist
orientation that is missing in most standard texts on the history of
psychology. A welcome alternative to the typically stuffy, detail-laden,
deeply serious, and dry scholarly treatise, it tells a gripping, often fast-paced
story that should be of interest not only to students but to many other
readers as well.
Professor O’Boyle’s bold and clever work may even generate a new trend
in the teaching of the history of psychology: concentration on the history of
ideas in their sociocultural and political context rather than the currently
widespread practice of emphasizing biographical details concerning the lives
of major figures in the history of psychology. It is a breath of fresh air in a
field in which there is typically little variation among standard run-of-the-
mill texts that focus on names and dates. Her account uses imaginative new
features, such as the closing “The Times” section of each chapter, which gives
the reader a feel for what everyday life was like during the age discussed in
the chapter. Each chapter also opens with a well-chosen question, which
piques the reader’s interest. The consistent use of the present tense
throughout the whole book generates a vivid immediacy to the ideas and
events being discussed. Another successful innovation is the “Stop and
think” questions interspersed generously throughout the volume. Yet
another appealing feature of this book is that it begins much earlier than
most standard textbooks in the field and covers much more than only the
history of experimental psychology. Most significant is that Professor
O’Boyle clearly knows how students think and what will capture their
imaginations.
Professor O’Boyle has produced an intriguing new approach to the
teaching of the history of psychology. I enjoyed reading it.
Michael Wertheimer, PhD
Professor Emeritus
University of Colorado at Boulder
List of Photographs and Illustrations
1.1 Neanderthal Bone Flute

2.1 Weighing of the Souls of the Damned
3.1 De Humani Corporis Fabrica
4.1 The Alchymist
5.1 Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte
5.2 Emotional States in Man and Animal
6.1 Electrical Curing
7.1 Brass Instruments
8.1 Weight-Judging Experiment
9.1 A Measure of “Spunk”
10.1 Gua and Donald
11.1 Training the Laboratory Rat
12.1 A Model of Visual Recognition
Preface
This book is written for those who are curious about the history of scientific
and intellectual thought within a Western cultural context, and about the
mysteries surrounding thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. It is for anyone
who wonders about the history of the art and the science of modern
psychology.
History of Psychology: A Cultural Perspective is different from other texts
in a number of ways. First, this book is a history of ideas, concepts, and
questions, not of dates, events, or great minds. While historians may be
fascinated by the biographies of individuals, most people are more interested
in philosophical issues, scientific explorations, and questions about their
own and others#_#x2019_# thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Histories of
great minds are about other people, whereas histories of ideas, concepts, and
questions are about us and are therefore as relevant today as they were for
the first humans.
Second, this book explores more than the history of experimental
psychology. Traditional texts approach the topic from within paradigms of
psychology that prevailed during the middle of the last century. Times and
paradigms have changed, and the historical record changes along with them.
Therefore this book also explores the histories of applied, social,
developmental, clinical, and cognitive psychology. Beyond the discipline, the
history of all of science is inextricably intertwined with events in the
surrounding environment. Thus, this history includes information about the
intellectual and cultural context in which the history of psychology unfolds.
Finally, this is a critical, perhaps iconoclastic history, in that it holds no
ideas sacred and regards no individuals as heroes. At the same time, it is a
friendly history, written by an experimental scientist and psychologist who
understands deeply why science came to be and the role that science plays
as #_#x201C_#a candle in the dark.#_#x201D_#
A FEW NOTES ABOUT STYLE LEARNING TOOLS
The exploration of psychology began the first time one human wondered
what caused thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. This journey through the
history of psychology thus begins with the appearance of modern-day
humans. Readers are invited to participate on this journey if they are willing
to engage in an active pursuit of the answers to psychology#_#x2019_#s
questions.
This journey is told in a style called the historical present. That means
that this story is told in the present tense. This is an invitation to put oneself
intellectually into the place and time presented in each chapter and to adopt
that worldview. When it is necessary to jump temporarily to the actual
present, the text is italicized.
Because this history is based on present-day scholarship, the times before
the year 1 in the Western calendar will be referred to as
BCE#_#x2014_#Before the Common Era, as opposed to using BC, Before
Christ, to designate this era. Similarly, the times from the year 1 and after
will be referred to as CE, of the Common Era, as opposed to AD, Anno
Domini.
Finally, the study of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is not a strictly
scientific enterprise. Therefore, this journey takes place in the rich context of
everyday life that includes cultural influences including contributions from
literature, music, and art. A variety of aspects of Western intellectual history
are included, rather than regarding advancements in psychology as the
contributions of just a few great men. This way, the contributions of many
to philosophy, theology, and science are acknowledged. Contributions that
often remain unrecognized are seen and ways in which, for some people, the
pathways to intellectual achievement have been systematically blocked, are
revealed.
Each chapter includes a section titled #_#x201C_#The Times#_#x201D_#
here the Zeitgeist or #_#x201C_#spirit of the times#_#x201D_# is captured.
Descriptions of what life was like for ordinary people at the time are
included, as well as information about important issues influencing the lives
of those living then. The chapters also include short sidebars containing
interesting stories or legends that illustrate important points related to the
history of psychology. Along the way, stop and think questions are
encountered. These are provocative questions intended to invite readers to
stretch and explore the limits of their own intellectual landscapes. They are
places to stop and ponder the important question that is presented. These
intellectually challenging questions will enhance interest, curiosity,
retention, and critical thinking.
Terms that may be unfamiliar to some readers are printed in bold-face
where they are first used and are also listed in a glossary at the back of the
book.
CONTENT HIGHLIGHTS
Because the answers to some psychological mysteries are based on the ways
in which humans think, this journey begins at the time when homo sapiens
appear on the Earth some 120,000 years ago. We then continue through
ancient philosophical ideas in Classical Greece, explore the influences of
theological thought in the West during the Middle Ages, and conclude in the
scientific world of the future with questions such as the role that psycho-
active medications play in informing us about the origins of personality.
Thus, the history of psychology is a very broad topic. Chapters 1 through
3 focus on two ways of coming to believe, trust and reason, and how those
allow for speculation about the mysteries of the universe and
humans#_#x2019_# place in it. During this era, the big questions about how
and why we think, feel, and behave as we do are answered by applying
logical argument, philosophical speculation, preexisting beliefs, and
theological systems of thought. In chapter 4 a third way of coming to
believe, science, is born. In chapters 5 and 6 the mysteries of psychology
begin to be approached through publicly observable experience and the
systematic gathering of evidence. In psychology during this time, the curious
still sometimes wander down the blind alleys of vitalism, spiritualism, and
the occult arts. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the emergence of modern methods
of psychology as a science, follow the transition of psychology from Europe
to North America, and illustrate the shift from basic research to practical
applications in the New World. Chapter 9 through chapter 12 explore the
developments that led to current questions and present-day theories in the
many domains of modern psychology. The histories of both experimental
and descriptive research are examined, for example, and the early days of
social psychology are explored, partly to learn why ethics became and
remains an important consideration in psychological research.
MY GOALS
In embarking on this journey, I wish to achieve four goals. First, I want

readers to understand what science is, and what it is not. Science education
in the United States is widely acknowledged to be woefully inadequate to
meet the political and economic challenges of our time. Especially in the
field of psychology, there remains confusion about the methods of science as
they apply to the study of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Second, I want readers to know where psychology comes from so that
they will better understand why Western psychologists make particular
assumptions about thoughts, feelings, and behaviors and how those
assumptions shape the questions that are studied in psychology today. Third,
I want readers to examine and come to know why they believe what they
believe. I hope this text helps to facilitate movement out of the intellectual
stage in which everyone#_#x2019_#s opinion is as good as anyone
else#_#x2019_#s and beyond the post-modern assertion that truth is
whatever anybody decides that it is. I want readers to understand why
evidence is sought and evaluated before accepting a belief. Finally, I hope
that readers will become as captivated by the wonders and the mysteries of
psychology as I am. At the end of the journey, I would like readers to be as
curious as I hope they are at the beginning. Science, like philosophy, begins
in wonder, and I hope that wonder of discovery stays alive throughout our
journey through history.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Without the help and support of many individuals, this book would never
have come into existences. It is with wonder at their dedication and undying
gratitude for their time, advice, and support that I thank my colleagueo in
psychology, Wesley Schultz and Patricia Worden, who read and edited each
chapter over a period of more than 4 years and made many valuable
suggestions for improvement. At least 11 anonymous reviewers provided
thoughtful comments and motivating opinions. I am most grateful for the
clarifications, corrections, and encouragement provided by the esteemed Dr.
Michael Wertheimer during the final revisions, and I am humbled by the
very supportive foreword that he has kindly written for the book. Thanks
are also due to many aolleagues in many departments at California State
University, San Marcos, who gave generously of their expertise and advice.
My appreaiation goes also to friends and family who were kind enough to
read and comment on various sections and chapters and who provided
encouragement throughout. Finally, I am most grateful for the clarifications,
corrections, and encouragement providod by the final reviewers: Michael
Wertheimer, University of Colorado at Boulder; Alfred H. Fuchs, Bowdoin
College; and John C. Malone, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
AND SO WE EMBARK
This journey began before history and will go on as long as humans

continue to exist. Right now my dog Scout is outside in the sun looking at
me through the window as I sit at my computer, and he seems to be
wondering why I ami inside on such a beautiful day. If that is really what he
is thinking (Do dogs think?), perhaps this journey will continue on even
after humans have left the scene. In the meantime, enjoy your ventures into
the history of psychology.
Bon voyage!
A Cultural Perspective
1
Origins of Psychological Thought: Why
Do Other People Have Such Bizarre
Beliefs and Behave So Strangely?
The purpose of this chapter is to identify some of the questions that have been or are considered
within the purview of psychology and to introduce the ways in which humans think about such
questions. There are universal human characteristics that influence how psychology’s questions
are answered, there are cultural differences, and there are learned influences that shape individual
beliefs. Therefore, three ways of coming to believe something to be true are presented: trust,
reason, and experience. These three ways of coming to believe establish a major theme of the text.
Finally, the definitions of psychology, both in the past and today, are explored at the end of this
chapter.
The real origins of psychological thought are lost in prehistoric mystery. In

the Western world, psychology is broadly the search for the causes of
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. At various times and in various places,
different assumptions about those causes have led to different answers and
even different ways of seeking the answers, but the questions have remained
much the same. And, after more than 3,000 years of written history, in many
ways, the questions are still unanswered. Psychology is often a mystery.
THE QUESTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY

For early humans, the most important problems probably concerned
immediate survival: getting enough food, finding shelter, nurturing the
young, and avoiding being eaten by more successful predators. Because our
ancestors often depended on other people to help solve these problems,
questions about the behavior of others and relationships between and
among people became significant. Just as today, common questions probably
included:
Why do other people behave the way they do?
How can I get other people to do what I want them to do?
Why are other people so different?
As the problems of immediate survival become more consistently solved,

people might have become concerned with the following issues:
Where do thoughts and feelings come from, and how do they influence the body and behavior?
Do other people think and feel the same way you do?
Do other animals have thoughts and feelings?
Given enough leisure time, people may have asked questions about the
place of humans in the universe and how much control it is possible to have
over thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Questions like these may have been
asked:
How much of what happens to you can you control?
Can you control your thoughts, feelings, and behaviors?
Still other questions might have had to do with:

What is the source of human happiness?
What is the best way to live?
All of these questions still concern people today, and in one way or
another, they have all become part of the discipline of Western psychology.
UNIVERSAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
CHARACTERISTICS
There are many ways that these questions about ourselves, our relationships
with others, and our place in the universe are answered. Among the
influences on these answers are the psychological characteristics that are
universal to humans. These characteristics have been selected for during
evolution. Thus, humans exhibit innate perceptual mechanisms that are the
same across time and culture. We share with other animals many social
responses that enhance survival when danger or threat is perceived and that
allow us to get along with and work constructively with others. Reactions
such as “fight or flight” in the face of immediate physical danger allow all
animals to survive, to reproduce, and to adapt to a wide variety of
environments. Various cognitive mechanisms enable all animals to discern
meaningful information in a complex and sensory-rich environment. Even
Neanderthals possessed the artistic and cognitive ability for abstract
thinking, modeling, and manufacturing something other than tools
(Marshack, 1972). For example, the flute shown in Fig. 1.1, found at a former
Neanderthal hunting camp in Slovenia in 1996, indicates that Neanderthals
possessed the ability to produce music and possibly to express the fears,
longings, and joys in their lives. This enforces the idea that even
Neanderthals had basic human behavior (Wilford, 1996). It is not possible to
be certain which aspects of human thoughts, feelings, or behaviors can be
traced to their common genetic inheritance, but because some characteristics
appear across cultural and ethnic groups, it is safe to assume that at least
some of them originate in the evolutionary past.
FIG. 1.1. Neanderthal bone flute (On the Origins of Music, by Robert Fink, 2003,
Saskatoon, CA: Greenwich).
✔ Stop and think.

Do humans really all think the same way?
Perceptual and Cognitive Influences
It is true that the culture an individual belongs to can influence how

questions about relationships with others or the sense of self are answered.
There are also individual differences in how psychology’s questions are
answered. These sources of difference may lead us to think that the beliefs of
others are bizarre or that their behavior is strange, but the perceptual and
cognitive mechanisms that underlie these different beliefs and behaviors are
quite similar. Understanding innate ways of perceiving and thinking may
help illustrate why humans so often make the same mistakes in thinking,
share similar incorrect assumptions, ignore important evidence if it does not
support existing beliefs, and are thus likely to answer questions about
psychological questions in similar ways. Researchers have begun to learn
about some of these innate responses.
Simplicity
For example, humans prefer simple answers that can be readily

understood, even for complex questions (Shermer, 1997). In an uncertain and
confusing world, where sensory input is constant, intense, and at times
overwhelming, humans quickly categorize new information and seek simple
solutions and answers (Kagan, 1998). Humans need to quickly ascertain
which incoming information has significance and which does not. In the
evolutionary past, those individuals able to identify significant information
and deduce simple and effective solutions fast were more likely to survive
and go on to reproduce. Thus, the human brain today quickly categorizes
incoming information and seeks out simple answers that have high face
validity. An answer that has high face validity is one that looks, on the
surface of it, as though it must be true.
For every complex problem there is a simple answer, and it is wrong.
H. L. Mencken
Pattern Recognition
Psychologists find that humans are predisposed to infer order, pattern, and
meaning in what they experience, even when none is present (Kagan, 1998).
The visual/perceptual system, for example, tends to “see” whole patterns
from partial or even completely random evidence. We have all seen the
shape of a Big Dipper among the stars at night, even though the only thing
we have really seen are seven points of light:
Humans, like other primates, are a gregarious lot. We enjoy one another’s company. We’re
mammals, and parental care of the young is essential for the continuance of the hereditary lines.
The parent smiles at the child, the child smiles back, and a bond is forged or strengthened. As soon
as the infant can see, it recognizes faces, and we now know that this skill is hardwired in our
brains. Those infants who a million years ago were unable to recognize a face smiled back less,
and were less likely to win the hearts of their parents, and less likely to prosper. These days nearly
every infant is quick to identify a human face, and to respond with a goony grin.
As an inadvertent side effect, the pattern-recognition machinery in our brains is so efficient in
extracting a face from a clutter of other detail that we sometimes see faces where there are none.
We assemble disconnected patches of light and dark and unconsciously try to see aface. The Man
in the Moon is one result. (Sagan, 1996, p. 45)
Humans infer patterns and meaning not only with visual perceptions, but
with other information as well. Errors in logic are committed by drawing
conclusions from a few facts, even when no such conclusion is warranted by
the available evidence. Retailers know this when they announce low prices
on a few very visible items, leading to the inference that overall prices are
lower at that store (Pechmann, 1996).
People often treat single events as overly representative of whole patterns
and small samples as overly representative of entire populations (Schwartz,
1998). If one person wins the lottery with a ticket purchased at the local
mini-mart, that becomes the lucky location to purchase tickets. If one person
hits it big in the stock market, the stock market begins to seem like the place
to make a fortune.
Cause and Effect
These ways of thinking are part of why humans tend to think in terms of
cause-and-effect relationships. In the search for simple answers, humans are
prone to assume that events that occur together are causally related to one
another (Gilovich, 1991).
If the assumption that two events that occur together must be causally
related is a correct one (this fruit must be washed before it is safe to eat), it
may aid in survival. If the assumption is incorrect (all fruit must be washed
before it is safe to eat), it is a superstitious belief. A superstitious belief is
defined as acquiring a response that is falsely believed to be associated with
a reward. Using this definition, even nonhuman animals exhibit evidence of
holding superstitious beliefs (Shermer, 1997). Some people have a
superstitious belief that going outside in cold weather will cause them to
“catch” a cold. Superstitious beliefs are very common and very easily formed
(Vyse, 1997). Little evidence is required to develop a superstitious belief,
especially if it is also a simple answer that has high face validity. People do
catch colds more often during the winter months, and the idea that one can
get sick from being uncomfortably damp and cold has high face validity. Of
course, there are times when conclusions are drawn about causal
relationships that turn out to be “accidentally” correct. Nearly all of the
medicines in use today have their origins in folk medicines from earlier
times and in other cultures, and the usefulness of these folk medications was
almost certainly discovered through accidentally correct superstitious
beliefs.
Biases in Processing Information
There are also biases that influence how incoming information is processed,
such as a motivational bias, or the tendency to answer questions in a
particular way because of a desire or wish to answer them in that way.
Filtering Evidence
Although there are many verifiable truths about nature, the universe, and
the questions that concern psychologists, humans are not naturally
predisposed to seek out and believe only the verifiable truth. Instead, we
seek out and attend to evidence that supports what is expected and what is
already believed to be true. Psychologists call this tendency to selectively
attend to the available evidence selective attention.
Once a hypothesis has been formed or a conclusion drawn, humans are
slow to change their minds, even in the face of disconfirming evidence.
Psychologists call this a confirmation bias. Having already formed a
hypothesis, we tend to pay attention only to evidence that supports the
hypothesis and ignore evidence that refutes the hypothesis. In fact, the more
educated people are, the more quickly they will form hypotheses and the
more likely they will notice only evidence that confirms that hypothesis
(Snelson, 1993). So when we think we already know what is true, we observe
only evidence that will be most likely to support those preexisting beliefs.
There are also mechanisms of memory that filter evidence and allow for
the maintenance of fondly held beliefs. Humans tend to remember only
confirming evidence. That is, once a belief is accepted, the evidence that
supports the belief is more likely to be remembered and the evidence that
refutes the belief is forgotten. As a consequence of this, people come to
believe that there is more supporting evidence than refuting evidence.
Psychologists call this selective recall. Persons who call themselves psychics
make predictions, only a few of which come to pass. But the client is more
likely to remember the accurate predictions, or “hits,” than the inaccurate
predictions, or “misses,” and is thus more likely to conclude that the psychic
might really be able to foresee the future.
Desire for Social Consensus
The natural human desire and need to maintain bonds with significant
others creates another motivational bias in thinking. Humans depend on one
another for survival. Early hominids (erect, bipedal primate mammals,
including ancestral forms of humans) were somewhat defenseless against
predators because they did not have large claws or teeth to fight with and
could not flee very fast or very far to escape. Like other prey animals, early
hominids were dependent on others in their social group to provide
sufficient warning to escape at the approach of danger and to join together
when it was necessary to fight. Seeking the company of others is thus “hard-
wired” into the human brain. Although there is individual variation in how
much company is desired, humans tend to feel a sense of security in the
presence of others, feel anxious when alone for long periods, and form
emotional attachments to those with whom they spend time. This need for
social acceptance is likely what explains why beliefs are often influenced by
the presence of others and agreement within a group is sought.
The desire to maintain cohesion within social groups influences thinking,
particularly in the ways that decisions are reached. For example,
psychologists find that, in a group decision, everyone involved tends to
center on the same focal points and that there is a tendency to overestimate
the accuracy of consensus. We tend to think that if the group agrees with us
that something is true, then it really must be true. We are even likely to
change our opinion to match that of the group if the group’s opinion differs
from our own (Dawes & Mulford, 1996).
Personal Contact
Evidence is also filtered based on the degree of personal contact. Personal

contact with an object or event results in more weight being given to that
experience than other information (Clarke, 1995). For example, if you are
acquainted with someone who actually knows the sister-in-law of a man
who was purportedly cured of cancer by a psychic surgeon, you might be
more likely to believe that particular myth than other people.
Optimistic Bias
Another motivational mechanism that influences how questions about

ourselves and our relationships with others are answered is the human
tendency toward unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980). Most people under
60 years of age, especially males, tend to be overconfident about their ability
to forecast the future, make correct decisions, and understand complex
information (Schwartz, 1998). When asked, most people predict that they
will be more successful than they turn out to be at answering questions and
at comprehending difficult material (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977).
What this means is that most people suffer from an unwarranted high level
of optimism. Although this may mean that they are somewhat out of touch
with reality, it is easy to imagine how being overly optimistic, that is,
hopeful, might enhance survival and thus be a personality characteristic
acquired through evolution.
All over the world, in all cultures and across time, humans use innate
emotional reactions, perceptual and cognitive mechanisms, and motivational
biases in formulating thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. During this journey
through the history of Western psychology, we will find that the history of
psychology is replete with answers that reflect these influences. As we
examine answers to the questions of psychology, both past and present, we
need to remain wary of both our own and others’ tendencies to accept
simple answers, form superstitious beliefs, assume cause and effect, filter
evidence, and agree with others.
IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS ACROSS TIME AND

CULTURE
This book considers the answers to the questions of psychology as they are
developed within the context of Western European and North American
intellectual culture from the time of Classical Greece to the present. This is
not the only perspective that can be taken on the answers to these questions.
Although humans have common ways of thinking across time and culture,
the answers that are developed to psychology’s questions are often strikingly
different based on varying assumptions made in different times and places.
In what anthropologists and psychologists have called worldview, various
times and cultures have taught their members to have perspectives that are
divergent from those in other times and cultures. In particular, different
perspectives are held on issues like the place of humans in the universe,
understandings about relationships between the self and others, and the
desire for power or degree of control that individuals have or should wish to
have over events, the actions of others, and even their own actions.
The Place of Humans and Other Animals in the Universe
Cultures and times differ in the degree to which humans are seen to play a
central role in the structure of the universe. In the Western view, humans are
absolutely central. Humans are thought of as the “paragon of God’s
creations” and the reason that the Earth was created. In contrast, Classical
Greek culture saw humans as incidental tools created and used by
supernatural powers that had little or no concern for the lives or misfortunes
of any single living being. Thus, the centrality of humans has changed
dramatically across time.
Relationships Between the Self and Others
There are also differences in how the sense of self is experienced and how
the self is viewed in relationship with others. In the West, people are taught
to have a strong sense of themselves as separate individuals. Individuals
learn to be independent and to rely most strongly on their own opinions and
resources. According to Karl Marx and others, this individualistic focus is a
necessary consequence of a culture divided by economic classes, especially
one where a capitalistic ideology predominates (Wogaman, 1977). In other
times, places, and worldviews, people have been taught that the self is only a
small part of a large interdependent group. In these groups, people learn to
work cooperatively and to consider the wishes and needs of others before
making any decision. For example, among the Yoruba of West Africa,
humans are believed to be created as beings-in-relationship to others. From
birth to death each person is embraced within concentric circles of
belonging from the family through the village and even across time and
space by connections with ancestors and gods. Yoruba tribespeople go
through life closely “attached” to others (Lowery-Palmer, 1980).
Desire for Power or Degree of Control That an Individual Can Have

In the West, individuals are usually thought to have absolute power over at
least their own actions and some degree of control over many of the events
that occur in their lives. Furthermore, this degree of control is thought of as
desirable. It is believed that people are happier when they have, or believe
they have, control over their actions and the events in their lives. In other
cultures, the causes of behavior are thought of very differently. For example,
before their contact with Europeans, the view of some aboriginal Native
American peoples living in California was that everything both natural and
supernatural was endowed with power. An individual could acquire more
power by gaining knowledge about power and about the sources of power.
But generally, only a moderate amount of power was considered desirable,
as the possession of too much power could be potentially as dangerous as
too little power (Kearney, 1984).
Also in these cultures, supernatural beings were believed to exert some
control over one’s fate, but most individual behavior was controlled by a
strong set of social mores regarding cooperation and generosity. An
individual gained power and influence in these cultures by sharing
generously with others. Those who were generous and took care of others
could be assured that others would take care of them when they were in
need (Margolin, 1978).
In still other cultures, both past and present, an individual’s actions may
be thought of as determined by forces beyond the control of the individual.
These might be supernatural forces or forces in nature. In either case,
individuals have little control over their own actions and not much control
over the events that occur in their lives. In these cultures, it is believed that
people are happiest when they are able to give up the desire for control and
accept whatever happens without complaint.
These are only a few of the contrasting worldviews that have shaped
various times and cultures. Even though humans all begin with similar
emotional responses, cognitive mechanisms, and social motivations,
radically different answers to psychology’s questions are developed
depending, in part, on the culture or time period. It is important to
remember that what may seem like significant questions to those of us
imbedded in one time or culture may seem pointless or even nonsensical to
people imbedded in another worldview. For example, the field of psychology
itself is a product of a Western worldview, and the parameters of today’s
psychology appeared and evolved within the context of Western civilization.
WAYS OF COMING TO BELIEVE
✔ Stop and think.

What do you know to be true?
What do you know to be true? How do you know what is true? When do
you decide for certain that something is not true? If emotions influence
beliefs, if simple answers are sought and superstitious beliefs are easily
formed, if evidence is selectively attended to and recalled based on what is
already believed, if agreement with others is sought even at the cost of
ignoring evidence, how do you know that any belief is true? What kind of
evidence do you personally require before you believe something to be true?
What kind of evidence do you need to overcome all of those ways in which
your thinking can become confused? The study of knowledge and how
knowledge is acquired is called epistemology. Epistemological questions
originated in philosophy, but they have become central to the study of
psychology as well.
Trust, reason, and experience are three ways of coming to believe that
something is true. As this story moves through history, we will see that, in
Western cultures, as in many others, trust in a variety of beliefs more often
influences answers than reason or experience. But to a greater or lesser
extent, all three ways of coming to believe have been used during nearly all
time periods and in nearly all places.
Trust
For the purposes of this discussion, the word trust is defined as believing
something to be true without either logical proof or publicly observable
experience or evidence. It may sound paradoxical to say that psychological
questions are sometimes answered by simply trusting in a given answer.
Nevertheless, that is often exactly how those questions are answered. Your
friend may say that the reason he has trouble with authority figures is
because he had a difficult relationship with his father. When pressed for how
he knows this to be true, he might respond by saying that he “just knows”
that is the case or that explanation “just feels right.” Trust that something is
true comes from a variety of sources, including intuition, authorities, stories,
and religions. In the case of modern Western cultures, his belief may come
from the pervasive influence that Freud’s theories have had in this culture.
✔ Stop and think.

Is it possible that he had a difficult relationship with his father because
he has trouble with authority figures?
Intuition
One source of trust is intuition. Because we “just feel” something “must

be true,” we attribute truth to it. This reliance on intuition is very popular,
probably because it is based in emotions, is simple, and usually has high face
validity. Intuition might be defined as an awareness that seems to arise
from within us so that we have direct and immediate knowledge. Although
intuitions do seem to arrive in mind unbidden, in fact, intuitions probably
arise from experiences that lie just outside conscious awareness. From that
perspective, an argument could be made that intuition represents an
experiential way of coming to belief, rather than a way of coming to believe
through trust. However, the origin of intuitions usually lies outside
conscious awareness. For example, imagine that you run into a friend whom
you have not heard from in some time. Your friend seems happy to see you,
but your intuition tells you she is not. She seems upset or angry with you.
Did this belief just come to you intuitively? Or was there observable
evidence of your friend’s anger that you noticed but of which you were not
consciously aware? Did you read your friend’s “body language” to arrive at
your intuition? Was there something in her tone of voice? Intuitions
sometimes serve as powerful sources of belief, and they can be very
convincing because they at least seem to arise solely from within, are a part
of our immediate personal experience, and thus seem undeniably true.
✔ Stop and think.

Who do you believe?
Authorities
Authorities, defined as other people or institutions believed to have access

to the truth, often serve as important sources of trust in beliefs. In the case of
very complex questions, humans often seek out authorities for answers.
Sometimes we prefer to be told what the truth is and not to have to figure it
out for ourselves. There are also questions, especially complex ones, that
each of us could never be expected to know the answers to and for which we
must rely on the expertise of authorities. Whether we recognize it or not,
and whether we even remember the source of our knowledge, much of what
we believe to be true came to us originally through the voices of authorities:
Even a casual scrutiny of history reveals that we humans have a sad tendency to make the same
mistakes again and again. We’re afraid of strangers or anybody who’s a little different from us.
When we get scared we start pushing people around. We have readily accessible buttons that
release powerful emotions when pressed. We can be manipulated into utter senselessness by clever
politicians. Give us the right kind of leader and, like the most suggestible subjects of the hypno-
therapists, we’ll gladly do just about anything he wants—even things we know to be wrong.
(Sagan, 1996, p. 424)
Stories and Narratives
Much of what humans believe to be true, both in the present and in the
past, comes to us through stories. The Old Testament, for example, is a set of
stories that gives one version of the origin of the Earth and of life on Earth.
Greek mythology provided the Greeks with rules about how best to live,
how to interact with others, and what personality characteristics to strive to
achieve. Much of the handed-down wisdom in any culture comes in the
form of stories.
Supernatural Powers
Humans do not seek knowledge purely out of curiosity. Many forms of

adversity faced by humans seem inexplicable, and even trusted authorities
cannot provide satisfying explanations. What explanation can there be for
such seemingly inexplicable events? As human culture began to develop, as
crops began to be cultivated and animals domesticated, understanding these
bad events in nature became literally matters of life and death.
✔ Stop and think.

Why do bad things happen to good people?
These adversities in nature require explanation and solution. At some

point in nearly all human cultures, what seems like the capricious and
arbitrary forces of nature become attributed to supernatural forces (Vyse,
1997). The most important function of attributing events in nature to
supernatural forces appears to be to provide simple and seemingly
reasonable explanations for apparently unreasonable events and phenomena.
Maybe bad things happen to good people because the supernatural forces
have been angered. Maybe they have not been shown the proper respect or
sufficient sacrifice has not been made. Even if the event seems inexplicable
to us, it may make sense to the supernatural powers that caused it.
A belief in supernatural forces forms the foundation of all religions, both
past and present. The belief that humans share the world with extraordinary,
extracorporeal, and invisible beings is called animism and has been
described as the most primitive form of religion (Tylor, 1924). Animism is
nearly universal among human cultures. The evidence that we share the
world with mostly invisible others is obvious to many and comes in many
forms. Some of us wake up in the morning with vivid memories of seeing
relatives or friends who have died. Memories of dreams are often as vivid as
memories of what happened yesterday. Every time we walk out into the
sunshine we see, moving along the ground beside us, an aspect of self, our
shadow. When we look into a still pond, we see another aspect of self, our
reflection. To some, these shadows and reflections constitute evidence of a
spirit living inside. The physical body is only one aspect of the self. The body
that is a part of nature dies, but the self that transcends nature lives on in a
supernatural world.
If the supernatural forces are believed to be good or to have our best
interests at heart, it can be comforting to believe in them. Bad things may
still happen, but comfort can be taken from knowing that the supernatural
forces have designed nature and cause it to function in a very purposeful
way. Believing that there is an aspect of the self that transcends physical
death and that can travel to and live on in a supernatural realm can be
reassuring, too, if we believe that the supernatural realm is a happy one.
Belief in the supernatural becomes the vehicle by which, symbolically,
anxieties about misfortunes and even death can be calmed. Many
explanations for belief in the supernatural have been offered by philosophers
and theologians. Psychologists have suggested that these beliefs function to
reduce anxiety about the capriciousness of nature, misfortune, and physical
death.
Recently, a national magazine ran the above question as its headline for
the month. Several popular television programs now have as their
theme the notion that having faith can cause physical healing to occur.
Many people believe that prayer can change the course of physical
disease. Is this possible? Can faith really heal?
Psychologists would have to answer yes, absolutely! It is true that
beliefs about what is true (the mental state) can actually alter the
physical state. Does this mean that a supernatural being has intervened
in our behalf and caused the physical illness to depart? If a
supernatural being has not intervened, but faith can alter the physical
state, then what is the mechanism that causes the cure to happen?
For psychologists, the mechanism that allows beliefs to alter the
physical state is known as the placebo effect. A placebo is a neutral
treatment, that is, one that objectively has no effect, like a sugar pill,
but which the patient believes will have a beneficial effect. Placebos
have repeatedly been found to be very effective treatments for a
variety of conditions, as long as the patient has faith that they will be
effective. In fact, a placebo condition is almost always included in any
research protocol where the efficacy of various treatments is being
tested because placebos alone are so often found to be helpful, even
when no drug or treatment is provided. As one researcher reported,
“The placebo component of drug administration can be as powerful or
more powerful than the pharmacological component of drug effects”
(Kirsch, 1985, p. 1192).
Reason
A second way of coming to believe that something is true is through the use
of logical argument or reason. Reason is employed when a set of premises or
observations can be associated together to form a coherent story. Sherlock
Holmes used reason when he observed several pieces of evidence and then
drew a conclusion about how the crime was committed.
Reason as Evidence
A coherent story put together through logical argument can provide

strong evidence in support of a belief. For example, it seems reasonable that
spanking children will cause them to behave, even though psychologists
know that spanking results in several undesired outcomes (Deater-Dekard,
Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1996).
Although logical arguments can be used to support beliefs based on trust,
they are more often used to explain experiences and observations of the
environment in useful ways. If you notice that when you take a hot bath,
your sinus headache goes away, you may logically conclude that the hot
bath has some curative power over the headache. You may then begin to
speculate in logical ways about what aspect of the bath is influencing the
headache. If it is simply the relaxation involved, then a nap should have the
same effect. The speculation that a nap would also relieve the headache is a
hypothesis. A hypothesis is a guess about a relationship between variables
(the variables in this case being the headache and relaxation). Because
humans seem predisposed to see patterns of cause-and-effect in any kind of
correlation, they are constantly forming hypotheses. If you take a nap
instead of a bath the next time you have a headache, you would be testing
your hypothesis. Humans universally test hypotheses. This logical
development and testing of hypotheses can be thought of as a rudimentary
form of natural science, and it is something that humans do without being
taught. Logical argument or reason is thus a way to tie together pieces of
evidence that have been observed and to test the validity of the resulting
conclusion.
The use of statistics is one of the most common instances of using reason
as evidence. We will see that, in Western cultures, considerable trust is
placed in evidence that is presented in terms of numbers.
Reasoning begins with premises, or assertions that are presumed to be
true, and ends with conclusions logically supported by the premises. If all of
the premises used to support a conclusion are true, then the logical
conclusion must also be true. When the premises are all true, but the
conclusion is not logical, some form of a rhetorical trick has probably been
used to reach the conclusion.
Rhetoric
The skillful use of words to outline an argument is called rhetoric.

Rhetoric is a useful tool to help people communicate ideas effectively to one
another. Rhetoric can be used to outline both logical and illogical arguments.
Most of us are vulnerable to a number of “tricks” in how words are used and
can easily be convinced of the truth of a claim through the use of rhetorical
tricks. Rhetorical tricks have even been used to support some answers to
psychology’s questions. A few such tricks are described in the following
section.
Forexample, we can sometimes be convinced that if a claim cannot be
disproved, then the claim must be true. If I tell you that I was visited in the
night by an angel, can you prove that I was not? If not, then my claim
stands. It is not even your word against mine, because you were not there to
witness the visitation. Therefore, what I say must be true. Related to this
trick are “black or white” arguments, in which either/or terms are used, and
logical thinking is clouded. The “if you are not with us, then you are against
us” argument is a common one.
In 1948, something unusual fell from the sky near Roswell, New
Mexico. Military officials from the nearby Army Air Force Base came
out and collected the pieces of this strange object. They say that they
examined the objects and then discarded them, reporting that the
objects were part of an experiment launched a couple of weeks earlier
by another government agency. Now, 50 years after the “incident,”
some people claim that this object was actually an extraterrestrial
vehicle and that it was occupied by creatures from an extraterrestrial
location. The Army Air Force Base in Roswell has been closed for 30
years, and other government agencies have no comment to make on
these claims. Here come the rhetorical tricks:
What is the government hiding? Why won’t they tell us what that
object really was? Why won’t they explain what happened to the
remains of its occupants?
Wording questions in this way seems to make it obvious that
something sinister is afoot. “The government” appears to be refusing to
disprove these claims. What would the government say if nothing was
being hidden? All agencies involved have already issued statements
saying that the object was an experimental radio device sent up by the
U.S. Air Force. What more could the government say if it really was
just such a device? How could they explain what happened to its
occupants if there were really no occupants?
Some rhetorical tricks involve claiming that the unexplained is

inexplicable. In other words, objects or events for which no natural cause
can currently be identified must therefore arise from some mysterious or
supernatural cause. For example, no one is yet able to explain exactly how
dreams happen, although there is considerable ongoing research into some
of the neurological mechanisms involved. Does the fact that the origins of
dreams cannot yet be fully explained mean that dreams must be the
manifestations of spirits from beyond the physical world or messages from a
supernatural realm? Is it necessarily true that a phenomenon that cannot be
explained naturally must therefore have a supernatural explanation?
Arguments that use their own assertions as evidence of their validity are
often used as rhetorical tricks to “prove” the logic of a position. These are
referred to as circular arguments. Assuming that you are angry because
you have been wronged, and the evidence that you have been wronged is
that you are angry, is a circular argument. Here is another common example
of a circular argument: Living things live because they are endowed with a
“life-force,” which is a form of energy that scientists have not yet discovered;
even though scientists have found no evidence of this form of energy, it
must exist because how could living things live without a life-force?
Similarly, arguments that reduce the issue to a level where it no longer
makes any sense, called reductio ad absurdum, can also make something
illogical seem logical. Zeno’s paradox (see box, Zeno’s Paradox) is a good
example of a reductio ad absurdum argument. Psychologists are sometimes
accused of using reductive arguments when they explain behavior on the
basis of neurological functioning alone.
Zeno’s Paradox
The Greek teacher Zeno submits this logical paradox for your
puzzlement. Imagine that you are standing at the entrance to a great
hall, and you wish to cross the room to the stage. Before you can cross
all the way to the stage, you must first walk halfway across the room.
That much is clearly logical. Having crossed half the distance, now you
must cross half of the remaining distance. In fact, each time you wish
to proceed you must first cross one half of the remaining distance.
What this means logically is that you can never go all the way across
because you must first cross one half of the remaining distance. The
inevitable reductio ad absurdum conclusion: Logical argument has just
proven that you can never get anywhere because first you have to get
halfway there.
Logical argument requires the use of language to communicate that logic
to others and is thus subject to rhetorical tricks. Despite the fact that it can
be misused, logical argument or reason is an essential component of both
what we believe to be true and how we seek knowledge.
Experience
A third way of coming to believe that something is true is through publicly

observable experience. This usually means using sensory equipment (sight,
sound, touch, taste, or smell) to observe the environment. All animals
possess the ability to observe, but sensory abilities vary greatly. Dogs, for
example, have senses of smell and hearing that are far superior to those of
humans. Similarly, the visual equipment of most birds allows them to
observe the environment in much more visual detail than can humans. The
capabilities of the sensory equipment possessed by most humans seem to fall
somewhere in the midrange to very modest range compared with that of
other animals.
✔ Stop and think.

Can you trust your observations and experiences?
For most people in the Western world, experience forms the primary
evidence that something is true. It can be hard to believe that someone close
to us has died until we actually see the body of the deceased person. Because
sensory experience forms the primary evidence for truth, it is important that
we trust that our observations do reveal reality accurately. Fortunately, for
most of us most of the time and for most practical purposes, observations do
accurately reflect the real world. If you see a doorway in a wall, most of the
time it really is a doorway that can actually be walked through.
Occasionally, however, observations turn out to be false. If a puddle
appears in the middle of the road on a hot day far off in the distance, it may
only be a mirage, meaning an accidental perception resulting from how the
visual system functions. When running a very high fever, it is not unusual to
“see” visions referred to as hallucinations. If you see a flying saucer glide
across the sky while driving on a dark and stormy night, it might just be the
reflection of light in a raindrop sliding across the windshield. From a
practical standpoint, humans would not be able to function in the physical
universe without trusting observations, but observations and experiences are
not entirely foolproof.
✔ Stop and think.

What provides the best explanation for why we think, feel, and behave
as we do, trust, reason, or experience?
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
Given these various ways of coming to believe, how are questions about our
own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; our relationships with others; and
our place in the universe answered? Folk psychology, sometimes called
commonsense psychology, is a set of answers that are derived from
superstitious beliefs, the desire to remain affiliated with others, trust,
everyday reason, and unstructured observations. Folk psychology is made up
of assumptions. Assumptions are beliefs that are not questioned or tested.
They are like premises in a logical argument in that they serve as the
foundation for a sequence of beliefs. If the assumptions are correct, the
sequence of beliefs that follows should also be true. Unfortunately, a serious
problem arises if the assumptions are not correct because not only may
conclusions based on false assumptions be wrong, but also the assumptions
themselves are not ever tested.
One example of an assumption of Western folk psychology is the belief
that each person behaves in ways that they expect to find rewarding,
although each person’s definition of reward varies greatly. Other
assumptions include that perceptions actually reflect what is real, that other
people think and feel in similar ways, or that all people behave the way they
do to achieve some purpose. The assumptions of folk psychology help us to
understand ourselves and to interact successfully with other people. The
problem with folk psychology in general is that the assumptions on which it
rests often arise from collections of cognitive mistakes and motivational
biases that turn out not to be supported by objective evidence. Remember,
assumptions are not tested, and beliefs based on intuition, authorities, or
cultural stories are similarly untested. It sometimes turns out that much of
what seems like common sense to those in the present-day West has little or
no evidence to support it and might not sound sensible at all to people from
other cultures or from other times.
The assumptions of a particular folk psychology are specific to a particular
time period or culture. For example, in the West, it is assumed that the way
people behave as adults depends in large part on how their parents treated
them when they were small children. Thinking of children as “lumps of clay”
shaped by their environment is a nice, simple story. Casual observation
might reveal that adults who behave badly grew up in “broken homes,” so
there seems to be a cause-and-effect relationship between early treatment
and adult outcome. Authorities like Sigmund Freud, ancient writings, and
cultural stories support this belief: As the twig is bent, so the tree will grow.
So part of our answer to questions about the personalities of others will be
something about how they were treated when they were young. This just
sounds like common sense. It might surprise you to know that people in
other cultures do not necessarily share this assumption.
Another part of Western folk psychology has to do with questions about
motivation. Why do we behave as we do? If there is a single question that
defines Western psychology today, this is probably it. Throughout history, a
variety of answers to this question have been generated. Among these are
that behavior is caused by an imbalance of fluids in the body, by
supernatural powers, by what has been learned, by unconscious and
repressed thoughts, or by the influences of genes. In the West, understanding
the causes for human behavior has been an important issue. But in some
cultures, the question itself sounds strange. Some cultures make the
assumption that humans behave the way they do for the same reason that
rocks behave the way they do. That is, humans behave the way they do
because that is just how humans behave. Rocks have a rock way of
behaving, birds have a bird way, and humans have a human way. Each
aspect of nature plays its own respective role, and humans are part of
nature. To ask why humans behave the way they do would be like asking
why the rock just sits there year after year; that is what rocks do.
If folk psychology is just common sense, but the assumptions of folk
psychology differ somewhat across culture and time, does that mean that
some of the assumptions are wrong? How would you know which
assumptions are true and which are not? Remember, folk psychology arises
out of the ways that humans think and the untested assumptions that
humans make. As long as the assumptions remain untested, no one will ever
know which are true and which are not.
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE ANSWERS
Across cultures and times, humans rely on universal ways of thinking and
cultural worldviews to answer questions about the nature of the universe,
relationships between individuals, and the place of humans in the universe.
We rely on intuition, we ask for and accept the word of authorities, we listen
to cultural stories, and we practice religions to learn what to believe. In the
face of uncertainty, and especially in situations of extreme importance, we
resort to supernatural explanations.
Although thinking logically about a problem or collecting observational
evidence in nature is something that most humans can do, it is likely to be
done only in certain situations. Reason or experience are more likely to be
used only when the evidence is clear, we have some sense of certainty about
our answers, or the situation is of less immediate importance. The methods
of logical explanation and collecting observational evidence take longer than
simply believing, and the answers acquired through those means may be
very different from those provided by authorities or believed by others.
Given the desire for social consensus, accepting answers based on logic or
evidence may be uncomfortable. No matter how valid you may trust your
own answers to be, you may not wish to violate the social consensus of your
group and risk becoming an outcast, or worse.
Questioning accepted wisdom is called skepticism. Skepticism has
doubtless been present among all peoples, but the formal appearance of
skepticism in Western thought occurs in about 800 BCE in the writings of
Greek philosophers. These philosophers argued that, before something can
be accepted as true, there should be some logical or observable evidence in
support of the belief.
Skeptical questioning has been more acceptable in some cultures and in
some times than others. At some times in Western culture, for example,
skepticism has been severely punished. The astronomer Giordano Bruno was
sentenced to death for teaching that the sun, not the Earth, is at the center of
the universe. At the time, Christian Church doctrine, based not on the Bible
but on Greek and Egyptian philosophy, asserted that the Earth was at the
center of the universe. Thus, Church authorities found early astronomers’
observations to be heretical and persecuted those who spoke publicly about
them.
Skepticism was critical in the birth of science. On our journey through the
history of Western psychology, we will examine the roles of trust, reason,
experience, and skepticism in answering the questions posed by psychology.
✔ Stop and think.

What is psychology?
A SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology is studied as a science for the same reason that any aspect of
nature is studied as a science. The previous sections illustrate that humans
do not necessarily see the natural world as it is. Science, and psychology
when it is practiced as a science, is a method for exploring and attempting to
understand nature without being fooled by mistakes in thinking and
perception. The science of psychology allows us to learn about how and why
we think, feel, and behave as we do, without being misled by trust in
preexisting beliefs, failures of logic, or misperceptions.
Before the journey to examine the history of psychological thought in the
Western world can begin, the scope of the itinerary must first be clear. What
exactly is psychology? What does the word psychology mean, both in the
past and today?
The Greek Psyche
The word psychology derives from Greek and means the study of “psyche.”
But what is psyche? Therein lies the confusion, from ancient times until the
present, about the scope of psychology. In the beginning, psyche was the
name of a beautiful girl in a Greek story about love and immortality.
The Legend of Psyche and Eros

Once upon a time, a lovely mortal maiden, Psyche, was deeply but
secretly loved by the young and immortal god Eros. Eros was the son
of the god Chaos and the goddess of love, Aphrodite. Eros was a god of
love and as such was considered one of the primeval forces of nature.
Aphrodite was jealous of the attention that Eros paid to the beautiful
Psyche so she commanded him to make Psyche fall in love with the
ugliest and most despicable mortal man on Earth. But Eros was
desperately in love with Psyche himself. So keeping his identity secret,
he took her away to a remote hiding place, a palace with walls
decorated with gold, where he could visit her in secrecy whenever he
wished. He instructed Psyche to try to be content with the riches he
provided in the palace. He forbade her ever to look at him in the light
and visited her only in total darkness. But one night, Psyche was
overcome with curiosity. She lit an oil lamp and saw the god of love
sleeping beside her. A drop of oil from the lamp fell on Eros and
awakened him. He angrily reproached Psyche for looking at him, then
flew away, abandoning her to her fate. Psyche left the palace and
wandered desolately in search of Eros. Eventually, she fell into the
hands of Aphrodite, who forced her to perform a series of difficult
tasks, including making a treacherous journey to the underworld.
Finally, touched by Psyche’s repentance and continuing love for him,
Eros rescued her. He then persuaded Zeus to make Psyche immortal,
and the story ends happily with Psyche’s marriage to Eros (adapted
from Grant, 1973; Grimal, 1965).
In this Greek myth, the story of Psyche and Eros serves as an allegory
about the journey of a mortal, Psyche, as guided through life by love, Eros.
When she becomes immortal, Psyche becomes a spirit. So the study of the
psyche might be interpreted as the study of the part of the human (or other
animal) that is not the body. What is meant by a “part of the human that is
not the body” is not at all clear, however, and remains a subject of rancorous
contention among psychologists even today.
The Greeks meant something very different by the word psyche than is
meant today in the West when discussing an aspect of the human that is not
physical. When used by Greek philosophers such as Plato, the word psyche
refers to some aspect of a living thing that is not identifiable as part of the
physical body. This is sometimes translated as, or understood to mean, the
mind and its various functions, such as thought, perception, and memory. At
other times, psyche is translated as spirit. But for these Greeks, psyche is not
a spirit that goes on after the body dies. Instead, the word psyche refers in
Greek writings to the biological processes that sustain life (Aristotle), or to
breath (Homer).
Some Greek writings, especially later translations, refer to psyche as a
life-force, a type of energy that differentiates living matter, like plants and
people, from nonliving matter, like rocks or water. At first glance, living
things do seem to be categorically different from nonliving things. Only
living things are born, develop, sometimes move about, react to their
environment, reproduce, and die. These characteristics are explained by
attributing to living things a life-force that is not possessed by nonliving
things. As long as the life-force is present, the thing lives, but when the life-
force departs, the thing dies. This idea that living matter possesses a special
type of energy, or life-force, is called vitalism. In many cultures, vitalism is,
and has been, a popular belief. Today, scientists understand that there is no
special life-force that causes things to live but that living things are subject
to the same force, or forces, that govern all matter in the universe.
In English versions of the work of Greek philosophers, the word psyche is
often translated as soul. In Western thought, the word soul usually means
some aspect of the human that transcends the physical, that remains
coherently identifiable as an individual after death, even in the absence of a
body, and that is able to travel intact to metaphysical or other-worldly
realms. It is important to remember that the Western understanding of the
word soul is not what the Greeks meant by the word psyche. As an
illustration of this, consider that Aristotle suggested that even plants have
psyche or soul. By this, he meant only that plants have a life-force that
leaves them when they die.
Modern Definitions
Modern definitions of psychology vary widely depending on who is being
asked. This makes the scope of psychology very broad and the limits of
psychology hard to define. The study of the history of this discipline will
often wander far in any number of directions from where you might expect.
The questions that concern Western psychologists are questions about
how and why animals (mostly human animals) think, feel, and behave as
they do. Today, psychologists have organized themselves into two large
professional organizations, each of which state a definition of psychology
from the viewpoint of the individuals affiliated with that organization. For
example, the largest of these organizations, the American Psychological
Association (APA), founded in 1892, defines psychology as “the study of
mind and behavior” and goes on to say that “the understanding of behavior
is the enterprise of psychologists.” Psychologists with many different
perspectives belong to the APA, but clinical psychologists (practicing
psychotherapists) are most strongly represented in this group. Another
organization, the American Psychological Society (APS), was founded in
1988, and academic or research psychologists are most strongly represented
in this group. This group offers a different definition of psychology,
describing it as “the scientific study of thoughts, feelings and behavior.”
✔ Stop and think.

What assumptions underlie these different definitions?
Throughout history, individual psychologists themselves have held

varying opinions about the definition of psychology. These varying
definitions are determined in part by the time period in which the
psychologists are living and the assumptions that they make about the
qualities of human nature.
Often, people who are not psychologists have very different opinions
about what psychology is or should be. The most common definitions of
psychology among nonpsychologists refer to the study of human behavior,
or mind, and usually to clinical or therapeutic applications of that study.
At the advent of the 21st century, there are thousands of people
throughout the world who call themselves psychologists, ranging from
research scientists studying the neurochemical bases of brain functioning, to
“parapsychologists” studying extrasensory perception, to therapists
providing marriage and family counseling. One thing that unites all
psychologists, however, is a passionate interest in the kinds of questions
raised in this chapter.
The Times
What has life been like for most people? Seventy thousand years ago,
anatomically modern humans were using controlled fire and practicing
ritual burials. Ten thousand years ago, small settlements were being
established. Five thousand years ago, larger settlements were appearing
in various places on the globe, economies were changing from barter
and trade to money, and writing was used, mostly to record
transactions of goods and services. As trade increased, a merchant class
arose, and leadership moved from spiritual powers or priests to secular
powers. These stages of development toward civilization are universal
across all cultures, although not simultaneous across time.
It is hard to know what daily life was like before written records
were kept. Even when written records began to appear, much of early
history recounts battles and wars. Histories are also more likely to be
written about wealthy and influential individuals than about ordinary
people. Throughout most of history, most people lived their lives in
routines of meeting daily needs for food and shelter, sharing life with
friends and family, and enjoying respites of occasional holidays and
celebrations, much as is true today.
By the time historical records were made and preserved, human
cultures were usually already well developed. Thus, it is difficult to
know how early cultures were structured in terms of the roles of men
and women. We do know that, in most groups, the status of women
declined as the transition was made from a hunter-gatherer economy,
where smaller populations are desirable, to an agrarian economy,
where larger populations can provide more labor. Anthropologists and
historians attribute this decline in the status of women, first, to the
development of agriculture and the need for increased population, and,
second, to the discovery of the fact that men also play a role in
reproduction. The practice of agriculture provided an increased
nutritional status for everyone, an increase in fertility for the women,
and a decrease in infant mortality. Thus, women’s roles in the
community were more likely to be circumscribed by more frequent
pregnancies and births, and their reproductive capacity began to be
valued as a commodity. The discovery of paternity meant that men
took control of women to own their reproductive capacity. Men also
took control of agricultural surpluses to engage in trade with
surrounding peoples. This gave men economic power, which they
consolidated through the political and religious practice of patriarchy
(Lerner, 1986). Although patriarchy is not universal, it is currently the
predominant form of human social organization.
2
From Greek Philosophy to the Middle
Ages: What and How Do We Believe?
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the transition from ancient supernatural explanations of
natural phenomena to Classical Greek philosophy, where knowledge was sought through reason
and in observations of nature. Many reasons this transition happened, and how this change
influences the questions of psychology, are discussed. The chapter ends with the influence of
Augustinian Christian doctrines on Western thought in the early Middle Ages.
WHAT WE BELIEVE AND HOW WE COME TO

BELIEVE
We are about to visit the Classical Greek philosophers to see how they
grappled with questions about what to believe and their reasons for
believing. Before beginning the journey, we should review some important
concepts that will be important for understanding the issues that concern
these Greeks and the Western cultures that follow.
Ontology. Ontology is the study of what is real and the nature of

reality. Is there anything that can be established as real beyond all
doubt? For example, does reality include that which cannot be
observed? This is a critical question for many psychologists.
Epistemology. As defined previously, epistemology is the study of
knowledge and the methods by which we come to know. Trust,
reason, and experience are three methods for coming to believe. Each
of these epistemologies provides support for some, but not all, beliefs.
Belief in the unobservable, for example, can only be achieved
through trust or logic.
Psychology and the unobservable. Not only the origin of the universe
but even questions about ourselves, our relationships with others,
and our place in the universe can be and often have been explained
as acts of the unobservable or supernatural. For example, through
most of history in the West, “mental illness” has been attributed to
the acts of supernatural forces. Even today, many people explain
their actions or behaviors as resulting from supernatural powers, as
in “the devil made me do it.”
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GREEK CULTURE
Our journey takes us to the islands and scattered settlements of Classical

Greece. There are two reasons why this time and place serves as a good
beginning for this exploration. First, the questions that were asked, the kind
of knowledge that was sought, and especially the epistemological methods of
Classical Greece are not seen before in human history. That is, as far as we
know, no one before asked these questions or attempted to answer them in
quite the same way as did the Classical Greek philosophers.
A second reason that this period is significant is because of the almost
worldwide influence that Classical Greek philosophies had on human
history. These philosophical ideas spread across the globe, carried by
travelers like Alexander the Great and by the growth of the Roman Empire.
Roman culture adopted many of the Greek ideas and much of Greek culture.
Thus, Greek influences in art and philosophy are found as far away as India,
Africa, England, the Middle East, and everywhere else that the Roman
armies traveled. In no small way, the roots of Western culture lie buried in
this intellectually fertile Classical Greek soil.
Greek Antiquity
The first historical Greek period, or time when written records are kept, is
the Mycenaean age, roughly between 1600 and 1100 BCE. During this time,
towns are established, along with stone fortresses and palaces, and a rich
cultural and worldly life develops (Lommel, 1966). Literacy exists but is
limited to members of the ruling classes. The collection of city/states that
make up Greece is believed by its citizens to be the center of the world. So,
for example, the settlement at Delphi, which is at the center of Greece, is
referred to as “the navel of the world.”
These Greeks trade with people living to the east as far as Persia and
south along the coast of the African continent, and with a variety of smaller
groups around the Mediterranean. Thus, Greek culture is strongly influenced
by the mythologies, supernatural beliefs, and values of the Mesopotamian,
Babylonian, Sumerian, and Hebrew cultures to the east and the Egyptians to
the south.
Written Greek mythology is born during this era, and beliefs in
supernatural beings flourish among people of all economic classes. Literate
upper-class Greek citizens are able to maintain their wealth by exploiting a
large lower class of working people, including women, servants, and slaves.
The religious beliefs that appeal to the people of the exploited classes are
ones that promise some relief in a life after this one. These people think of
the natural world as a living thing and believe that one is liable to encounter
gods and goddesses everywhere in every form imaginable. When the deities
appear, often as birds or small children, they give guidance or warnings but
are also capable of deceiving or deluding humans into making bad decisions.
Gods and spirits of the underworld make regular appearances. Faith healers,
miracle-workers, and prophets wander the countryside in search of converts.
Forms of magic like Babylonian astrology, or the foretelling of the future by
the position of planets and stars, are widely accepted. Mystery cults flourish,
in particular the Dionysian faith, practicing secret religious rites and
promising benefits in an afterlife to believers. Ritual human sacrifice is still
occasionally practiced, and animal and other types of sacrifice are routinely
practiced, justified by religious beliefs (Bergmann, 1992).
As is true in most early human groups, women in both human and
supernatural forms play decisive roles in the religious beliefs of this culture
(Knox, 1993). The power of women to give birth is revered, and there are
some indications that the status of women is substantially higher early in
Greek history than during later periods (Demand, 1994).
The supernatural beings of literate and economically privileged Greeks
are the gods and goddesses living on Mt. Olympus and described in the
works of the poet Homer. Wealthy Greek citizens are more concerned with
happiness in the present and less likely to believe in an afterlife. From early
on, the Olympian deities seem to regard mortal humans as interesting
distractions and playthings, but not of much import in the deities’ own
divine and immortal lives.
The Classical Greek World
Our exploration of Classical Greece begins in the area called Ionia and in
particular in the seaport city of Miletus. Miletus is an important center of
trade and commerce for the entire Mediterranean and becomes a center of
learning and philosophy as well. The Classical Greek period begins at about
the time of the appearance of the Pythagorean school in 530 BCE and lasts
until about the death of Aristotle in 322 BCE.
Much of the evidence about Greek culture has been filtered, and only the
history that others decided to preserve is available. The only evidence
remaining about Greek civilization of any era is the artifacts and a few
pieces of writing that were chosen by others to be saved. In particular, the
Greek works that survive to influence Western thought were selected by the
early Christians. These works were copied onto a more durable material,
parchment, and thus made available to us. Those works that were not
deemed important, or that conflicted with the tenets of early Christianity,
either disappeared or were changed to fit Christian doctrines. For example,
the Hippocratic Oath attributed to the Greek physician Hippocrates includes
the phrase “I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy (the means to
produce an abortion)” (Edelstein, 1967). Abortion was routinely practiced
during the Classical Greek era, as it was in nearly all cultures of this era. So
either this phrase was added by early Christians or the entire oath was
written during the early Christian era and then misattributed to the Greeks
as support for Christian doctrines (Gross, 1998; Edelstein, 1967).
Transitions in Ontology
If the primary epistemology in a culture is trust, as was true in the 6th

century BCE in Greece, then questions about the origin of the universe are
about who the supernatural powers are that made the universe and why
they made it. When skepticism begins to cause doubt in cultural and
religious stories, the origin questions change to ones about what the “stuff”
of the universe is and the mechanics of how that “stuff” works in the
universe.
Transitions in Epistemology
When the questions change, then the methods by which answers are sought
also change. Greek philosophy comes into being just as epistemology based
on trust shifts to other ways of coming to believe. The problem is how can
beliefs based only on trust be supported? Are there other ways to establish
the truth of a belief than to simply trust?
Reasons for the Transitions
Historians offer several explanations for why, at this place in human history,
apparently for the first time, something other than intuition, religion, and
folk wisdom is sought as the source for the truth about nature. These
explanations include developments in literacy, medicine, trade, leisure,
religion, and politics.
Literacy
In about 800 BCE, the Greek poet Homer writes an allegorical and
historical account of wars between mainland Greece and Troy, basing his
written history on a long oral tradition. The Olympian deities play starring
roles in Homer’s account, and his history of these wars is the first place that
the personalities of the Greek deities are captured in writing. Homer’s critics
complain that he “ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a
disgrace among mortals” (Bevan, 1913). Once captured in writing, the deities
lose some of their power and mystery and are brought down to a merely
human level. This dethroning of the deities may contribute to Greek
philosophers’ willingness to give up their trust in stories and seek another
way of answering questions about nature and the beginning of the universe.
Medicine
Prior to this era, Egyptian physicians made great progress in observing

and describing physical illness, including serious brain injuries. This
information became available to Greek doctors during the 7th century BCE.
Earlier Greek cures for disease and injury relied on appeals to the gods, and
illness was believed to be caused by supernatural forces. Cures involved
sacrifices, incantations, prayers, and other rituals, similar to those prescribed
by faith healers today.
By the 6th century BCE, Greek practitioners of medicine note many
significant relationships between natural substances and health. Thus, these
physicians are less likely to seek explanations for disease in supernatural
factors and more likely to search in nature for both causes and cures.
Prosperity and Trade
The Greek upper classes of the 6th century BCE enjoy a high standard of
living, due in no small part to the relative freedom from thievery allowed by
conducting trade over the sea. The seaport city of Miletus becomes a center
of trade for many surrounding cultures. Here, not only goods, but also ideas,
are imported from Egypt, Persia, and many other settlements around the
Mediterranean. Each of these cultures has its own religion and each its own
story about the beginning of the universe, or cosmogenic story. Each
culture’s story regards its own citizens as the central and most favored
group.
✔ Stop and think.

Which of these stories (if any) is the true story?
If you are a merchant in the city of Miletus, the first thing you might
notice is that all of these cosmogenic stories are equally plausible. There is
no evidence to support any of the stories; there are only people who believe
them to be true. Each of these stories posits the existence of supernatural
forces that cause the cosmos to come into being and place humans and other
animals in it for some purpose.
Unfortunately, these stories are also mutually exclusive. That is, only one
of them can be true. On what basis could you decide which one is the true
one? Other people seem to believe just as strongly in their story as you do in
yours. So who did create the universe, and why was it created? It becomes
evident that stories, intuitions, and trust in authorities may not provide any
evidence, even about something as basic as the origin of the universe.
The Babylonian Cosmogenic Myth

In the beginning were the waters, the sweet water, and Tiamat, the sea,
containing within her the seeds of all life. She gives birth to all the
gods and rules over the forces of Chaos in the cosmos. Her son,
Marduk, emerges from the many, becomes the god of the sun, and
threatens to take from Tiamat the power of renewal and of giving life.
Marduk proposes to battle his mother, Tiamat, on the condition that he
be given supreme power among the gods if he should win. Then
Marduk, who is now called the Creator, mounts his storm-chariot
armed with lightning and floods, slays Tiamat, slashes her into pieces,
and then stands upon her body in triumph. He drives away the dragons
and serpents of the army of Chaos and creates order in the cosmos. He
builds a reed raft on the surface of the waters that becomes Earth. Then
all of the gods sacrifice the god Kingu, and from his blood they create
the creature Marduk names “man,” whose purpose is to serve the gods
that they might be “at ease” (Grimal, 1965).
Cosmogenic stories are not the only ideas being exchanged across
cultures. By exposing themselves to different peoples and different ways of
thinking, the Greeks of Miletus are creating for themselves a truly
cosmopolitan social environment that almost certainly plays a role in
opening their minds to alternative points of view. They are thus more likely
to question the authorities of their own culture and to seek answers through
some other means than accepting the word of others.
Leisure
Throughout Greece, the work of large numbers of slave laborers, nearly

all women (Lerner, 1986), provide significant leisure time for upper-class
males. Miletus is an especially privileged city economically because of its
location as a center of trade. This advantage allows upper-class Ionians an
unprecedented high standard of living and additional leisure time with
which to consider important questions about reality and the nature of the
cosmos.
Religion
The lack of concern with human affairs shown by the Olympian deities
results in a religious environment that is less doctrinaire and dogmatic than
is found in other cultures. It is uncommon in history for a single culture to
support more than one religious system, but the Olympian religion of the
upper class, and the Dionysian and other mystery religions of everyone else,
coexist within the same culture in Greece. In addition, new peoples moving
into the region are bringing their own belief systems with them. Eastern
peoples bring the goddess Ishtar and her host of deities. The Egyptians
worship Isis among many other deities. The Jews bring their unusual
monotheistic belief in a single male god. Indeed, virtually every group that
travels to the region believes in a different set of gods or goddesses than do
the Greeks. It is likely that this plurality of religious beliefs is one factor that
leads Greek culture to tolerate and foster the skepticism that eventually
results in a radically different epistemology.
Politics
Instead of being a single geographically united state, the Greek world is

really a collection of small cities scattered around the shorelines of the
eastern Mediterranean. Each of these cities is ruled independently by its
citizens (the free men). Each citizen is expected to pay attention to the
political affairs of the city and to play an active role in decision making.
Ideally, all opinions are to be voiced, each opinion is to be listened to with
respect and tolerance, and differences of opinion are to be resolved through
discussion. Thus, the Classical Greek political environment fosters tolerance
for divergent perspectives and critical thinking. This type of political
organization is also founded on an assumption that ordinary men are
capable of discerning truth and right courses of action through reasonable
discussion and without recourse to divinely informed rulers (Ehrenberg,
1968).
Choosing an Epistemology
So, here in Miletus in the 6th century BCE, there are changes in cosmogenic
questions and in the way answers are sought. The importance of this period
lies not in the truth of the answers that are found, but in this transition in
epistemology. If there are three ways of coming to believe—trust, reason,
and experience—and if skepticism arises about the beliefs reached through
trust, then which way of coming to believe would be better?
✔ Stop and think.

Isn’t it obvious that experience, including the direct observation of
nature, would be a better way to know?
Observations and Folk Wisdom
Perhaps personal experience with the direct observation of nature would

best reveal what is really real. Each individual can conduct personal
observations using a variety of sensory modalities. From a practical point of
view, the senses provide evidence about the physical world that is usually
reliable. Ground that looks flat usually is flat. Food that smells bad probably
should not be eaten. For most of us, most of the time, our own personal
sensory experience is enough to establish that something is real.
Comparing Epistemologies: Observation and Trust
Although trust and observation are fundamentally different ways of

answering questions about nature, they are in some ways similar. If you
watch, you will notice that the sun changes its relationship to objects on the
earth as the day passes. From the perspective here on Earth, it appears that
the sun is moving across the sky. If someone asks you why the sun moves
across the sky, you might make up a story about a god who attaches a beast
to the sun and rides it across the sky each day. This kind of story is quite
common in human cultures. But how would you answer the question about
why the sun moves across the sky without reference to mythical or
supernatural beings? In other words, what if you had decided to answer
questions about nature using only explanations derived from nature and
observable by humans?
✔ Stop and think.

Why does the sun move across the sky?
Any explanation you come up with will be essentially another story. For
example, if you think of air as a substance, then you can think about the
Earth and our sun both suspended in air. You may have also noticed that
similar bodies seem to float past the Earth every night. So they are not just
floating randomly, but are floating in a repeating pattern. From these
observations, a story can be constructed about the sun and other objects in
the sky suspended in air and floating around the Earth. You have no more
evidence for this story than you have for the one about the god pulling the
sun, but you have answered the question using only observations of nature.
You may have also noticed that objects floating on water seem to swirl
together and maintain position relative to one another, so you can then add
something to your story about some force in the air that pulls objects along
together in the same way that water does. Now you have a fairly coherent
answer to the question about the sun moving across the sky that uses only
natural observation as evidence.
One difference between the natural explanation and the story about the
god pulling the sun is that there is evidence in nature for the natural
explanation, although it is important to note that not all of this explanation
is supported by observable evidence. Neither the assertion that air is a
substance in which bodies like the sun can be suspended, nor the suggestion
that there is a force that pulls all of those bodies along together, is supported
by observable evidence. These are assumptions and form the basis of a
theory about why the sun moves. Theories are plausible but nevertheless
hypothetical abstract ideas that are then tested through observation. That is,
theories are predictions established through temporary trust until
observational evidence is available. For example, you have observational
evidence to support part of your theory about the sun and trust to support
the assumptions. Those telling the story about the god pulling the sun have
only trust that the god is there. There is no evidence in nature to support
their story.
The other important difference between the explanation based on
observable evidence and the story based on trust is that other people can
make their own observations of nature, can follow the logical sequence of
your explanation, and will probably come to a similar conclusion
themselves. Observation is a fundamentally different epistemology than
trust. Observation provides evidence. Furthermore, observations can be
replicated by others who then will likely come to the same conclusion.
Clearly, then, observation must be a better way to arrive at beliefs than
trust. Or is it?
✔ Stop and think.

How many reasons can you think of for not relying on observation?
Man is the measure of all things.
Protagoras
Objections to Observation
The first problem with relying on observation as a way of knowing about

reality is the selective perception of the person making the observation.
Imagine that you and I are driving across the desert late on a dark and
stormy night. Does my observation of a UFO flying across the sky establish
the reality of that UFO? What if you look and observe only a raindrop sliding
across the windshield (Sagan, 1996)? Does the UFO suddenly cease to exist
and the raindrop suddenly come into being? If we measure reality one “man”
at a time, if “man is the measure of all things” then things will come into
being and disappear from being depending entirely on who is observing
them. One Classical Greek philosopher, Socrates, rightly asks, why should
man be the measure of all things? Why not make the dog-faced baboon the
measure of all things? Then only that which the baboon observes will have
reality.
A second reason that observations of nature may not be reliable in
revealing what is real is that nature is always changing. In fact, this
constantly changing nature is one of the perplexing facts about trying to
establish what is real in nature. What color is the sky, really? The answer to
this question should not depend on what time of day it is or what the
weather is today. There should be some color that the sky is really, shouldn’t
there? In spite of the fact that nature is always changing, some philosophers
argue that there must be some part of the universe that is real, certain, and
unchanging no matter who is observing it or when they are observing it.
✔ Stop and think.
Are objects that are not observable therefore not real?

A third objection to using observations to establish reality is that this
limits reality to things that can be observed. This might mean that only
those things that are accessible to sensory organs are real, an assertion we
surely would not want to make. Are there real objects in nature that are not,
at least immediately, accessible to our sensory organs? Like most people, you
probably have to take the existence of molecules, atoms, and subatomic
particles on trust. But what about objects like bacteria or viruses? If you
cannot directly observe them, then you can at least observe the
consequences of their real existence as first one and then another of your
family comes down with a cold. And yet those viruses are inaccessible to
your unaided sensory equipment.
✔ Stop and think.

Can thoughts be observed? Can mind be observed?
Are thoughts real? Can the thoughts of others be observed? You are
capable of at least experiencing your own thoughts, but can you really
observe your thoughts? Do we really want to limit reality to only that which
can be observed?
According to some philosophers of the Classical Greek era, neither trust
nor experience can establish the reality of anything. Trust provides no
evidence, only belief. And the evidence provided by experience and
observation is unreliable, varies as a function of a constantly changing
nature, and does not reveal all of nature anyway. Reason alone is left as a
way of knowing some immutable reality. Pure, abstract reason is the only
road to sure truth about reality. This is the position taken by the philosopher
Pythagoras and later by Plato.
BELIEF SYSTEMS IN CLASSICAL GREECE
The True Reality of Numbers
Because he desires a reality that remains constant in spite of changes in

nature and has a distrust of both trust and observation, the Greek citizen
Pythagoras develops an ontology based on abstract reason alone. Abstract
reason reveals the immutable reality of numbers, and for this reason,
mathematics becomes the foundation of reality for Pythagoras.
The bases of Pythagorean philosophy are the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4. These
numbers define reality because 1 defines a single point, 2 points define a
line, 3 points define a plane, and 4 points are needed to define a solid.
Pythagoras believes that mathematical formulas exist that define every
relationship in nature. Even the relationships between the notes in a musical
scale are defined by mathematical formulas.
The existence of supernatural gods or goddesses is not supported by any
mathematical formula, so Pythagoras does not assume the existence of
anything supernatural. Nature is the physical manifestation of the
mathematical formulas; therefore, only nature and mathematics are real.
Pythagoras does not worship deities, although later his followers develop a
very mystical, almost religious, set of beliefs and come close to regarding
Pythagoras himself as a god-like being.
Natural Philosophy
Pythagoras conducts the same observations of nature that humans have

always conducted, but he combines these observations with a logical
sequence of thought that both explains the observation and also predicts
what may happen in the future. Using observation to describe nature and
logic to explain and predict nature becomes the foundation of philosophy.
Philosophy is (philo) the love of (sophia) knowledge or wisdom. Philosophy
is the seeking out of knowledge through observation and logic.
Human Powers to Know
Asking questions like of what is the universe made or how nature works,
suggests an underlying belief that humans have the capacity to understand
the answers, even if they do not yet understand. Asking questions implies
that the answers may someday be understood.
All men, by nature, desire to know.
Aristotle
Some of the conclusions the Greek philosophers reach cannot be true. The
important point is not the conclusions they reach, but the ways in which
they support and defend their beliefs. It is necessary to keep in mind the
intellectual distance between what you personally know now about science
and philosophy and what Classical Greek natural philosophers knew. As you
follow their arguments, try to step into their sandals and see the world
through their eyes. Try to remember their context and what they knew or
believed to be true.
For example, Greek natural philosophy recognizes four elements in
nature: earth, water, air, and fire. Everything in nature is composed of these
elements combined in various ways. The sun, for example, is made of fire.
These four elements form paired opposites. Water is the opposite of fire, and
earth is the opposite of air. Much of nature in fact is arranged in these
dichotomies. Hot is the opposite of cold, wet of dry, sweet of bitter.
The Greek Physis
Nature is constantly changing, transforming in state, color, position,

temperature, sound, and appearance. Underlying this change, philosophers
assume, must be some unchanging reality. What is that immutable reality?
Everything that exists came from something before. Nothing can come from
nothing. Thus begins the search for the one true, unchanging reality of
which nature is made. Even before it is identified, the stuff of which
everything else is made is called the physis, and those who are engaged in
this search are called “physicists.”
By using observations of nature tied to logical reason, the Greek physicist
Thales decides that water is the one reality of which all of nature is
composed. First, he observes that water is essential to life, all life forms need
water to survive, and life begins in a watery environment. He further points
out that all three of the other elements can be reduced to water.
✔ Stop and think.

Can you explain how all three of the other elements can be reduced to
water?
The Soul
Thales also makes an observation about the unobservable psyche or soul.

His definition is that soul is “that which is the cause of motion” in objects.
Anything that is capable of independent movement, or that can cause
motion, has soul. Soul is not a transcendent thing because on death, the
ability to move is lost. Thus, Thales concludes, even a magnetic stone has
soul because magnetic stones move toward metal (Bremmer, 1983).
Critical Thinking
Having suggested some answers to questions about nature, Thales next

does something that is truly unusual in human history. He invites his
students to examine the facts for themselves and see if they can come up
with alternative explanations that fit the facts better. Perhaps Thales does
this because of his background as a citizen of a Greek city. In any case,
inviting critique is not something that is often done. Other later physicists
come to different conclusions than Thales, but they use similar observations
of nature tied to a logical sequence of thought to support their conclusions.
One student of Thales’, Anaximander, suggests that choosing one of the
four elements as the basis of the other three makes no logical sense, because
each of them is the opposite of another. He decides that there must be
something more basic than any of these four that serves as the physis and
that can take on the properties of each of the four elements.
Atomic Theory
What Anaximander is suggesting is an atomic theory, and his ideas are

similar to those of Democritus from the city Abdera near Macedonia.
Democritus asserts that all objects are composed of atoms, or tiny pieces of
matter. These atoms of matter are in constant motion, coming together and
then breaking up, causing a constantly changing nature without the atoms
themselves ever changing. Atoms are of many different shapes and come
together through the laws of nature to form all objects in the physical
universe, even humans. If Democritus had stopped here, physics may have
made more progress in understanding the universe in the ensuing 2,000
years. But Democritus takes one more step and asserts that there is nothing
in the universe except atoms, and the spaces in between the atoms called the
void.
✔ Stop and think.

What about the gods? Are they made of matter also?
Suggesting that there is nothing in the universe except atoms and the void
raises questions about the deities. If there is nothing except matter and the
space between, then the gods must be made of matter also and are thus not
supernatural at all. Using a rational argument, Democritus responds to these
questions by saying that all belief in the supernatural, including belief in the
gods, is motivated primarily by fear. The gods are not made of matter
because they exist only as beliefs in the minds of frightened humans.
If the gods are only beliefs and if the universe is composed of atoms and
the void, then of what are beliefs made, or thought, or will, or feelings, or
what the Greeks call psyche? Democritus answers that psyche is breath, and
breath is atoms of matter; therefore, there is no life-force, only atoms of
matter interacting with other atoms. Thoughts are also made of atoms of
matter and reason itself is made of atoms of matter interacting with other
atoms. Even what is thought of as the will to act is simply atoms of matter
acting on other atoms. These atoms are ruled by the laws of nature, and thus
what is called free will is not free, but is determined by the laws of nature.
This assertion spells the end of Democritus’ atomic theory for 2 millennia.
The ideas that rational thought is made of matter, that all actions are caused
by matter acting on matter, and that free will is only an illusion are
profoundly disturbing. In fact, Plato is rumored to have wanted to burn all
of Democritus’ writings. Even centuries later, when Christian theologians
examine Democritus’ atomic theory, they repudiate it completely. An
individual will that is assumed to be free forms the foundation of Christian
morality. If the will is not free, but actions are instead determined by the
laws of nature, individuals cannot be held responsible for their actions.
Christian scholars suppress Democritus’ ideas, and nothing resembling
atomic theory is heard for another 2,000 years.
Platonic Philosophy
The work of the philosopher Plato has been interpreted in so many different
ways that some argue that no one really knows what he may have meant in
many of his writings. To confound the confusion, in many of his dialogs,
Plato paraphrased the thoughts of his teacher, the philosopher Socrates.
Although Plato lived and taught just a century after Thales, some critics
suggest that it is hardly fair to describe Plato’s work as a study of nature. In
fact, some say, Plato’s ideas offer an explanation of reality that relies on
faith in the supernatural, in direct opposition to natural explanations (Gross,
1998). Other critics, however, provide convincing arguments that Plato’s
philosophy is grounded in the same naturalistic worldview that pervades the
work of most Classical Greek philosophers (Kantor, 1963–1969).
Often, Platonic philosophy seems to paraphrase the beliefs of the Orphic
mystery religion of his time. These beliefs include the idea that this earthly
existence, and physical bodies, are only prisons in which human souls are
trapped as punishment for past sins.
Rejection of Observation
Like Pythagoras, Plato is disturbed by a constantly changing nature and

by unreliable human observations. Therefore, he seeks a way to find what is
real that does not depend on observation by suggesting that the world of
objects is really only a kind of reflection of reality. Reality itself does not
exist on Earth, but exists instead on an ideal plane of existence in much the
same way that mathematics does. In this view, reality consists of the ideal
forms of objects, and each object that is encountered in the natural world is
only an approximation of its ideal form. Thus, he argues, cats on Earth are
only poor copies of the ideal form of cat, which exists, but does not exist in
nature and is not observable with physical senses.
Observation relies on imperfect sensory systems and can only imperfectly
reveal even the approximations of the ideal forms found on Earth. Thus, for
Plato, observations are unreliable, although he does suggest that the senses
of vision and hearing are more reliable than smell, taste, and touch.
Fortunately, humans do not need to depend on observations to know reality,
because humans already know the ideal forms. This knowledge derives from
the time before each individual is incarcerated in a human body. The
exercising of rational thought reveals knowledge of the ideal forms. Humans
know because they have existed and will exist again on that ideal plane
when this painful earthly life is over.
There is considerable controversy over what Plato means by these
assertions. Early Christian writers interpret Plato’s thoughts about this ideal
plane of existence to mean that there is a perfect place, a heaven, where a
transcendent part of the human, the soul, will live after physical death.
However, given the naturalism of most Greek philosophy, notions about
transcendent souls are probably quite foreign to Plato.
To get a better sense of the point Plato is making, consider a “right
triangle.” The perfect right triangle cannot ever be drawn by humans on
Earth, but is determined by a mathematical formula and exists only as an
idea, not as a real triangle. This is Plato’s point. True, immutable, perfect
reality exists only as ideas, never as real objects in nature. Thus, Platonic
philosophy is similar to the Pythagorean idea that reality is realized only
through abstract reason.
Plato transmits his ideas in written dialogs, like plays. These dialogs
anticipate many of the questions considered by psychology in the ensuing
centuries. For example, in The Republic (380/1993), Plato explores questions
about what motivates human behavior.
✔ Stop and think.

What do you think motivates behavior?
Platonic Psychology
In The Republic, Plato has some of his characters taking the position that
human behavior is motivated by desires of the moment, suggesting that
humans behave in ways that they believe will bring them pleasure. Because
people will inevitably come into conflict with one another if everyone
behaves this way, there must be rulers to mediate conflict. Plato has other
characters in the dialog argue that, although motivated by passionate
desires, humans bring rational thought to bear on decisions about how to
behave, so that behavior is also motivated by considerations of what is right
and wrong. Thus, people most capable of rational thought, and by this Plato
means the philosophers, should be the ones to rule. Plato’s suggestion for
how to get others to follow a leader is to either use brute strength and the
threat of it, or to use persuasion and reason. His conclusion is that the most
effective of these strategies is rational persuasion.
Plato is from an affluent family, and believes that only the best-educated
citizens should rule. Of course, the best-educated citizens are also the
wealthiest, and this accounts for Plato’s reputation in history as a
totalitarianist and an opponent of democracy. He advocates a classed society
made up of three groups: common people, soldiers, and a group of wise
rulers he calls the guardians. He suggests in The Republic that the best
individuals within each class be brought together to breed better off spring.
If any of these off spring prove to be defective in any way, they should be
“exposed,” that is, left outside to die.
The Platonic dialogs explore many of psychology’s questions, but because
the characters in the dialogs advocate a variety of answers, it is sometimes
difficult to identify Plato’s own beliefs on a given question. For example, he
lives in a very patriarchal culture and Plato seems to agree with these
patriarchal values. However, in The Republic, he describes an ideal city as
one where girls and boys receive the same education and physical training
and where women are as likely to be soldiers or guardians as are men, for
“their original nature is the same” (as cited in Russell, 1945, p. 111). In spite
of his general agreement with Classical Greek androcentric or male-
centered values, Plato is probably the least misogynistic of all the Classical
philosophers, that is, he exhibits the least hatred of women (Lerner, 1986).
The Aristotelian Milieu
Plato’s student Aristotle is widely revered in Western culture, both past and
present. Aristotle is unabashed in his denigration of women, asserting that
the natural purpose of men is to engage in “politics, philosophy and rational
discourse,” and the natural purpose of women and slaves is to “minister to
the needs of life” (Lerner, 1986, p. 209). Aristotle’s androcentric philosophy
ultimately has great influence over the development of theology in Europe,
as do many of the books of the Old Testament, which are being compiled at
about the same time that Aristotle is composing his works.
From Ethics to Anthropology
Instead of speculating about the nature of the universe or asking abstract

questions about ethics and moral conduct, Aristotle is concerned with
animal physiology and with the human experience. Psychological questions
are addressed directly. How is the body built and how does it work? How
does it influence immediate life experiences? What are thoughts and
feelings? What role does friendship play in men’s lives? Aristotle attempts to
answer these questions using purely naturalistic explanations. That is, he
conducts observations, writes descriptions, and attempts to tie these
observations and descriptions to logical theories.
Illness and Nature
The son of a doctor, Aristotle is in every sense a biologist. For him, as well
as for other educated Greeks, illness, including psychological illness, is
attributed to bodily factors. By the 3rd century BCE, Greek physicians reject
previous superstitious beliefs about illness and seek natural explanations for
even mental illness through careful observation and case studies. Among the
upper class in the Greek world, the practice of medicine is now separated
from the practice of supernatural magic, although many people, even
educated people, still seek the advice of both physicians and magicians when
illness strikes.
The medical school in the city of Croton is renowned throughout the
Greek world for its physiological approach to medicine. The study of
physiology and anatomy by performing dissections of animals is first
discussed in writings from this school. Alcmaeon, the school’s most famous
physician, examines the nerves of the visual system in these dissections and
decides on the basis of his studies that the brain is the site of sensation and
cognition. In another Greek medical school, Empedocles champions the
heart as the central organ of intellect and blood as the medium of thought.
Greek physicians identify four fluids, or “humors,” in the body: phlegm,
black bile, blood, and yellow bile. Health, including mental health, is
accomplished by maintaining a balance among these four humors. Thus,
those with an excess of phlegm will develop a head cold, and the job of the
physician is to help eliminate the phlegm and recover the proper balance of
humors. Therapies consist of rest and quiet, soothing baths, and a simple but
nutritious diet, all designed to help return the humors to balance.
Treatments for mental illness are similar, because mental illnesses are also
presumed to arise from an imbalance in the humors.
Certain personality traits or patterns of behavior are attributed to the
humors of the body as well. For example, Aristotle asserts in Problems that
children are physically moister and hotter than adults and are thus more
hot-tempered, greedier, and tend to be angrier than adults. This physical
difference also accounts for children’s greater likelihood to express
emotional passion; therefore, he regards childhood as the time when the
appetite for pleasure is strongest (Barnes, 1984).
Descriptive Biology
The Lyceum is the school Aristotle founds in Athens for the purpose of
facilitating the descriptive biological research that he organizes. Specimens
and data are collected on every form of plant and animal life in the known
world. One of Aristotle’s former students, Alexander the Great, allows
scholars from the Lyceum to travel with his armies, and some of his soldiers
collect specimens to send back to Athens. Aristotle’s goal is to make the
natural world knowable to humans by describing nature and by using
deductive logic.
The Causes
Aristotelian philosophy identifies four causes, or four bases on which

everything can be explained. A thing can be explained on the basis of the
material from which it is made, as in: An eye is made from various kinds of
matter. A thing can be explained on the basis of the shape that it takes, as in:
Matter put together in this way forms an eye. A thing can be explained on
the basis of the force that causes it to take that shape, as in: Eyes are shaped
by the laws of nature. Finally, a thing can be explained on the basis of the
purpose that it serves, as in: The eye helps us to see and get around. This
final cause, the purpose that something serves, is interpreted by later
theological scholars to mean that there must be a designer who designed
eyes with the intention of providing sight, but that is not Aristotle’s intent
(Kantor, 1963–1969).
The Problem of First Cause
Aristotle also discusses a puzzling logical problem. He notes that all living
things move, and they move as a consequence of causes. That is, movement
is caused by some previous cause. This line of causes could be followed back
in time, but at some point, there has to be a first cause. Theorizing that
everything is caused creates a logical dilemma by requiring a first cause that
is not itself caused.
✔ Stop and think.
How would you resolve this dilemma?
Aristotle resolves the dilemma by naming this first cause the “unmoved
mover,” which is the first cause of everything in nature. By its very
definition, nothing moves the unmoved mover. Later interpreters of Aristotle
resolve this dilemma by assuming a supernatural first cause. In the Middle
Ages, Christian scholars turn Aristotle’s logical dilemma into evidence in
support of the existence of a deity, but this conclusion is not supported in
Aristotle’s writings.
Aristotle’s Psychology
In his role as a scholar of living things, Aristotle carefully describes human

animals along with other animals, and so studies the psyche. Aristotle
defines psyche as “that principle as a result of which any living thing comes
to have life” and “the first principle of living things” (Robinson, 1989). For
Aristotle, everything that lives has psyche.
Aristotle’s Psyches
Aristotle differentiates three types of psyche:
1. Vegetative psyche allows a living organism to obtain nourishment

and to reproduce its own kind. All living things, including plants,
have vegetative psyche.
2. Sensitive psyche allows the organism to receive sensory
information and perceive its meaning. Thus, pleasure and pain may
be experienced, memories may be formed, and learning may occur.
Both practical and specific knowledge may be acquired that is
useful in facilitating survival. Aristotle refers to this kind of
knowledge as passive reason. All animals, but not plants, have
sensitive psyche.
3. Rational psyche yields what Aristotle describes as active reason.
Active reason allows for knowledge about universal principles,
rather than just specific pieces of information. For example, it is
Aristotle’s rational psyche that allows him to seek out the universal
principles that govern the functioning of nature. Only men possess
rational psyche, and it is man’s nature to use this rational psyche to
exercise active reason. Engaging in active reason is what gives men
their greatest pleasure (Bremmer, 1983).
Aristotle clearly asserts that women do notpossess rational psyches. In

fact, after careful biological study, Aristotle concludes that, even in
reproduction, women contribute only the material cause of life, the matter
that makes up the new body. Men plant the psyche and the seed that
contains the life, and thus men impart the shape that life takes, supply the
force that causes it to take shape, and provide the purpose that it will serve
(Lerner, 1986).
For those searching for one, there is a hierarchy implied in Aristotle’s
arrangement of the psyches, one that puts the male rational psyche in a
position above those of all other living things. This apparent hierarchy
comes to have far more significance in Western cultures than Aristotle gives
it. For Aristotle, men have a rational purpose that makes them different from
other animals, but men are still animals. Perceiving and understanding are
not identical “for the former is universal in the animal world, the latter is
found in only a small division of it” (Aristotle, 330/1961 BCE).
The Sensory Systems

According to Aristotle, information coming from one sensory system can
interfere with conflicting information from another system, so that when
attentively watching something, we sometimes cannot hear someone calling
us. Our sensory system has a limited capacity and can be overloaded by
excessive sensory input. At the same time, two (or more) sensory systems
can yield confirmatory information. This confirmatory function of the senses
Aristotle calls “common sense,” such as having a common sense that a thing
that looks soft also feels soft.
Like many before him, Aristotle believes that sensory information takes
on the shape of the stimulus, the way that a piece of wax may take on the
shape of something pressed into it. That shape can sometimes remain even
after the stimulus has been removed. This accounts for the ability to
remember stimuli that are no longer present. Thus, imagination is a case of
the sensory system continuing to register a previously presented stimulus or
combining several previous sensory inputs. Similarly, dreaming is caused by
the form, or shape, of a previously experienced stimulus remaining in the
senses.
Aristotle’s speculations about dreams illustrate how different his
naturalistic explanations are from superstitious and supernatural
explanations. Supernatural explanations for dreams include that they are
messages sent by deities or demons and that they foretell the future or warn
of flaws in character. In contrast, the naturalistic view is that dreams are a
consequence of the way that sensory systems function. Thus, any organism
with a sensory system may dream.
The Emotional System
For Aristotle, emotions play a primarily motivational role, although they

can also distract and distort perception and can amplify biologically based
dispositions. All animals experience similar emotions, but there are different
dispositions among species and even among individuals within a species, so
that different individuals may be more or less likely to experience different
emotions, depending on their individual dispositions. According to Aristotle,
all animals seek those conditions that lead to pleasure. Thus, emotions
motivate actions or behaviors designed to secure pleasure. All animals seek
pleasures afforded by the physical senses because they are motivated to do
so by their sensitive psyches. But for men, who possess a rational psyche, the
greatest pleasure comes from acting in accordance with their rational
nature, not from sensory pleasures. Men who seek only sensory pleasures
are no different from women or animals. In Aristotle’s view, fulfilling one’s
natural function, flourishing as a man, means using active reason to come to
understand the universal principles underlying one’s perceptions.
The Mind
In spite of having access to advanced medical knowledge, Aristotle denies

the central role of the brain in sensation and movement, saying instead that
it is the heart that receives sensory information and generates physical
movement. He cites observational evidence of this, as well as logical
deductions, illustrating that even very careful description coupled with logic
can sometimes be wrong.
Like other philosophers of the time, Aristotle is unconcerned with a
conscious mind that is independent of the body. For him, thinking is the act
of compiling sensory information and generating physical movement. This
process is the same for all animals, including humans. There is little sense in
the Greek world of consciousness or mind as something distinct from the
body. The rational psyche is a part of the physical body, and the pleasure of
exercising the rational psyche ends when life ends. For Aristotle, what gives
meaning to men’s lives is the flourishing of the rational psyche in the
present, and what gives meaning to women’s lives is ministering to the
needs of others.
Meaningful Social Relationships

Classical Greek culture takes a very different perspective on what
constitutes meaningful relationships with others than do present-day
Western cultures. Today, heterosexual romantic love and the maintaining of
close biological family ties are usually cited as the most meaningful
relationships with others. For Greek citizens, and for Aristotle, friendship
serves the role that romantic love is said to play in the present. He identifies
three types of friendships. The first is based on considerations of sensual
pleasure, and this friendship survives only as long as the sensual pleasure
does. The second is based on considerations of utility and lasts only as long
as the two are useful to one another or until someone else comes along who
would be more useful. Both of these types of friendship are self-focused, that
is, your concern in maintaining these friendships is with meeting your own
wants and needs. The third type of friendship Aristotle calls the perfected
friendship, which is characterized by equality and mutual concern for the
other. This friendship is based on the desire to promote the best interests of
the other. Thus, one’s concern in a perfected friendship is in helping the
friend to achieve the friend’s goals, and each reveres and celebrates the other
for the other’s sake, not for any reward. Curiously, the topics of love and
friendship are not ones about which psychologists have had much to say in
the centuries since, but Aristotle provides something to start with in his
thoughts on these subjects.
End of an Era
Virtually every question that is of importance to present-day psychologists is

addressed by one or more of the philosophers of the Classical Greek period,
as they seek naturalistic explanations for human experience. But the
Classical period lasts roughly 300 years, after which progress in Greek
philosophy ends. Initially, Greek philosophy is interrupted by civil wars,
resulting in an increasing focus on personal and immediate gratification.
Then it is seriously disrupted by the takeover of Greece by Rome. Eventually,
Greek philosophical thought is subsumed under Christian and Islamic
religious doctrines by theologians seeking support for their beliefs.
TRANSITION OF POWER TO ROME
As so often happens in human history, war halts, or at least dramatically

alters, social, cultural, economic, political, and philosophical progress.
During the 3rd century BCE, philosophical speculation about the nature of
reality and the place of humans in nature declines in favor of concerns about
how to live a good life, and the focus is on attaining personal happiness. As
Rome’s power and influence grows in the middle years of the Roman
Empire, the standard of living goes up in the outlying provinces. A class of
tradesworkers and craftsmen come into being, and Roman stone
architecture, based on that of the Egyptians, appears. Political organization
in most Roman provinces is oligarchic, meaning that only a few select and
wealthy individuals hold power. In the view of the Romans, the wealthy and
powerful should rule, and getting others to do as the powerful want is a
simple matter of having the advantage in physical strength, economic
resources, and political cunning.
Roman culture is characterized by a focus on tradition, and Romans have
little interest in skepticism or tolerance for change. Like the Egyptians before
them, the Romans respect established authority, value civic order, and
maintain longstanding cultural traditions. The individual, and individual
opinion, is subordinated to the state. Roman society and politics are strictly
patriarchal, and women, slaves, and nonlandowners have no power or place
in public life. There is widespread respect for the achievements of Greek
scholars and philosophers, but little advancement in original intellectual
thought among the Romans.
One sign of intellectual progress during the Roman era comes in
medicine, exemplified by the work of Galen. He gathers extensive clinical
experience during his tenure at a gladiatorial school in Pergamon, where he
is able to conduct animal dissections. Most of the information that he
gathers about anatomy, and especially about brain functioning, survives to
influence the study of these issues later in Byzantium and much later in
Europe. For example, he distinguishes two different nerve pathways, one for
sensory nerves and one for motor nerves, and establishes that it is the brain,
not the heart, that is the center of nerve impulses.
Galen elaborates on the Greek idea of the elements by tying them to four
bodily humors (phlegm, blood, yellow bile, and black bile) and applying the
influences of the bodily humors to psychology and personality. According to
Galen, personality characteristics are associated with these four humors,
such that some people are born with a biological predisposition to be more
phlegmatic, and thus more melancholic (depressed) than others, for example.
However, most people are primarily cheerful because humans have a lot of
blood, and blood is the humor associated with a happy disposition
(Diogenes, 500/1972).
PHILOSOPHIES OF PERSONAL HAPPINESS
Toward the end of the Roman Empire in the 4th century of the Common
Era, there is a further decay of respect for independent thought and more
emphasis on practical concerns. People are interested in how to be happy
and how to maximize personal gains in a time of rapidly changing fortunes.
A series of emperors take over political power, usually by brutal means.
Beliefs in supernatural forces grow stronger, and the conviction is
widespread that whatever happens must be happening toward some
purpose. People determine that whoever takes power, and by whatever
means, the gods must have decided that it should be so.
The philosophies that prosper during this period help people to cope with
an uncertain environment. Skepticism and Cynicism are philosophical
systems that have been around since Greek times, but they are not very
comforting systems of thought. Both Skepticism and Cynicism suggest that
one should not trust others, either in word or deed, and Cynicism even
recommends removing oneself from the company of other people. The
systems of thought that people find most comforting during this time are
Stoicism, Epicureanism, and various mystery religions.
Stoicism
Stoicism is a set of beliefs founded on the simple cause-and-effect idea that

there is an underlying rational principle or cosmic order in nature that is
responsible for all that exists and all that happens. This rational principle
should serve as a guide for how to live. This principle leads to a set of laws
that govern everything in nature and that supercede civil laws. Furthermore,
civil laws only promote justice to the extent that they mirror natural laws.
Happiness for humans lies in living in accordance with natural laws. This
rational principle, or cosmic order, is like the ideal right triangle: It exists
outside the bounds of temporal lives and temporal circumstances. But, and
of this the Stoics are certain, it is not a god.
Because there is a rational principle that underlies everything that
happens, people are encouraged to accept whatever happens to them. No
matter what the misfortune, it must ultimately make rational sense, if not in
the moment then at least in the context of the cosmic order. In this way,
Stoicism, like many other philosophies and theologies, is teleological.
Teleology is the idea that there is some design or purpose in nature, an
assumption that is shared by nearly all folk psychologies and religions.
Countless examples of organisms perfectly suited to their environments can
be seen in nature. Natural processes that seem to work perfectly are
apparent, such as the adult salmon slowly disintegrating into fish food just
as its spawn emerge and need to eat. Clearly, there is a simple, logical,
cause-and-effect explanation for such perfect systems that is supported by
unstructured observation of the natural world. That explanation is the telos,
the design and purpose in nature, the ultimate cosmic order behind it all.
Stoicism helps people who live in an uncertain world feel better by
pointing out that the individual who lives by natural law has a kind of
freedom and independence from within that no despotic ruler can take
away. Individuals can take comfort in the sure knowledge that there is a
cosmic order and that everything is unfolding as it should.
Some of the influence of Stoicism extends to the present day in systems of
religious thought that derive from late Roman times. Other aspects of
Stoicism are lost, or deliberately suppressed, and must be re-articulated
centuries later. For example, the Stoic philosopher and Roman slave,
Epictetus (138/1948) suggests how emotional equilibrium might be
maintained: “Remember that it is not he who gives abuse or blows, who
affronts, but the view we take of these things as insulting. When, therefore,
anyone provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes
you” (p. 23), and “Never say about anything, ‘I have lost it,’ but only, ‘I have
given it back’” (p. 23).
It is the duty of a Stoic to participate in public life and in the forming of
civil laws to oversee their adherence to natural law. If, however, one wishes
instead to withdraw from public life, then one should undertake the study of
another philosophy.
Epicureanism
Epicureanism originates in part from the religious practices at the oracle at

Delphi. Here, the priests focus on the idea of human limitations and
encourage a wisdom of the middle line, of “never too much.” The inscription
on the temple at Delphi, often mistakenly attributed to Socrates, says “Know
Thyself” (Freeman, 1956). This is not an exhortation to introspection but a
prescription for maintaining that comfortable middle ground. Know what it
is that excites you too much, and avoid it. Know what leaves you feeling
empty, and avoid it as well. For Epicureans happiness lies in seeking
tranquility through moderation, such as is found in friendships, and by
avoiding intense passions, especially erotic love.
Epicureanism is a naturalistic philosophy. It is not teleological, nor does it
posit supernatural worlds or promise an afterlife. In fact, Epicureans argue
that, for most people, the idea of an afterlife is frightening. Most people are
living a hand-to-mouth existence with far too little pleasure and far too
much pain. To tell them that this life is not the end, that there will be no rest,
and that they will go on living in another life is simply too upsetting.
Epicureans believe there is nothing beyond nature and that we are each
composed of a chance combination of matter that exists here and now and
will not come together in this way again. Therefore, we should try to take
advantage of this existence by enjoying moderate pleasures and minimizing
pain.
Mystery Religions
Religions are another pathway to comfort during late Roman or any

uncertain times. Mystery religions, so called because they are organized
around a mystery of some sort, are an important part of the early human
landscape. They persist even through the Classical Greek period among the
lower classes. A number of these mystery religions, usually of Eastern
origin, experience a resurgence in popularity in Rome as the Empire begins
to disintegrate during the first few centuries of the Common Era. Among the
most popular of the older mystery religions is one organized around the
Persian god Mithras, whose birthday is celebrated on December 25. Another
ancient and popular mystery religion is the worship of Isis, the Egyptian
mother goddess, who is often depicted tenderly holding her divine infant.
And throughout the Greek and Roman eras, Dionysian religious rituals
persist, based on worship of Dionysus, a god of fertility.
Among the common themes in mystery religions are impending
cataclysm, safety and eventual salvation for the chosen, and the appearance
of a savior. The coming catastrophe will destroy the world, and only
members of the correct religion will be allowed to escape from their current
unhappy prison-like existence where their lives are the sport of the gods. A
young king will come, bringing spring and summer and he will save the
Earth that winter has made cold and lifeless. There will also be a woman, a
fertility goddess, who is both a mother (fertile) and a virgin. The saved will
join in an ultimate union with their savior in a kingdom of heaven on Earth.
To become one of the chosen, an individual must undergo initiation rites,
take part in various rituals carried out in strict secrecy, and make a
substantial financial donation to the religion.
New mystery religions continue to make appearances from time to time.
In about the year 815 by the Roman calendar (or 60 CE), word begins to
spread of a relatively new Jewish sect that is based on the mystery of the
death and redemption of a man named Jesus, from the city of Nazareth.
Members of this Jewish sect believe that the young king, the savior, has
already come to Earth in the form of the man Jesus, that Jesus was executed
by the Romans, and that he subsequently disappeared from the place of his
internment. They believe that this savior will return to Earth to rule after the
coming apocalypse. The primary advocate for this Jewish sect is a man
named Paul from the city of Tarsus. Under Paul’s leadership, this new sect
experiences a slow but steady growth (Fredriksen, 1988).
AFTER ROME
For centuries, Roman polytheistic “paganism” (as it is called by later

Christian writers) tolerates religious diversity, just as the Greeks had done.
New peoples with different sets of beliefs are simply assimilated into Roman
culture. However, by the 4th century of the Common Era, this changes with
the increasing power of the growing Jewish sect, now called Christianity.
For the Christians, there is only one right way to believe. Thus, as the
Christians become increasingly powerful in the Roman world, tolerance for
other faiths disappears, and the Empire is torn apart by bloody battles
between peoples of different faiths. By about the 6th century, after waves of
violence, the Christians triumph and the public practice of other faiths is
destroyed. By that time, the center of the Roman Empire has already been
moved far from Rome.
In 312, the Roman general Constantine defeats his rivals and takes over as
Emperor of the Roman Empire. In 330, he moves the capital of the Empire to
his homeland and renames its principal city Constantinople. He takes with
him as many of the writings of Greek philosophers as he can gather. These
serve as the philosophical foundation for a new culture that outlasts any in
the West since Egypt.
The city of Constantinople and its surrounding empire, Byzantium,
remain at the center of religious and cultural life in the West for centuries.
Whatever progress occurs in Europe in medical and psychological thought
during this time occurs in Byzantium. As Byzantium interacts economically
and militarily with its Arabic neighbors to the south, the Greek influence
passes to Islamic philosophers. Thus, Islamic philosophers have an advantage
over their European counterparts in Rome because they have access to many
more Greek texts, including the works of Galen and Aristotle.
THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES IN EUROPE
Rome continues to be weakened by a variety of pressures. These include a

continuing influx of tribes from all over western and northern Europe; a
bankrupt economy where money has disappeared and transactions have
reverted to a barter system; a population sent into precipitous decline
through civil war, disease, and famine; and a serious disruption of the
familiar class structure (Bark, 1958). In the face of these pressures, those who
remain in Rome search for ways to restore the glory and social stability of
the old Roman Empire. Stoicism becomes the official state philosophy of
Rome during the early centuries of the Common Era. Another popular
philosophy is Neo-Platonism, so called because this philosophy draws some
of its originating ideas from the writings of Plato.
Neo-Platonism
Neo-Platonism borrows liberally from Platonic philosophy but also adds

much that would most likely seem quite foreign to Plato.
The Essential Duality of the Human
Neo-Platonic philosophy begins with an assumption that a person is not a

single entity but is both a material body and a separate spiritual soul.
Similarly, the world itself is material but is an inferior copy of a perfect
spiritual realm. The material world is of interest only because it can
occasionally provide signs or clues about the spiritual realm.
The material body of a human is created from earth, is in a constant state
of decay and corruption, and is only a temporary abode for the soul, which
is imprisoned within the material body. The soul is released at the time of
the physical death of the material body and then travels to and dwells in the
spiritual realm.
True Knowledge
According to Neo-Platonic philosophy, sensory observations of the

material world are unreliable. In fact, sensory systems only provide illusions
of reality; they actually interfere with gaining true knowledge. True
knowledge is revealed only when one is free of sensory distractions. True
knowledge is revealed in dreams, trances, sudden insights, and intense inner
experiences, not through observation, nor through reason.
Augustinian Doctrines of Christianity
The goal of early Christian theologians was to encourage the growth of

Christianity by finding ways to bring divergent sets of beliefs together into a
single faith. Many theologians contributed to the effort to win new converts.
Their work is relevant to the history of psychology because their ideas shape
epistemology in the West for at least the next 1,000 years.
Among these theologians is Augustine of Hippo in North Africa, who
begins his writings after Rome is finally sacked in 455, not long after
Christianity is declared legal in Rome. Instead of bringing the kingdom of
heaven to Earth and reunifying Rome, it appears to many that conversion to
Christianity has caused the absolute destruction of Rome. Augustine is thus
sometimes described as a “Christian apologist” because his first efforts are
directed at explaining why Rome falls at the same time that Christianity is
adopted by Roman leaders. Building on the work of many others, Augustine
articulates a theological position and integrates many divergent belief
systems into one. He turns a simple faith in the teachings of an obscure
Jewish sect into Christianity, which becomes a power, a worldview, and a
dominating system of thought that influences the history of psychology in
profound ways.
Augustinian Ontology and Epistemology
For Christian ontology, the one god (now God) is what is real. What man
needs to know about the material world is that God created it. According to
Augustine, man does not need to know anything about nature except that
God created it. God created the heavens and the Earth, and God placed man,
the paragon of His creation, at the center of the universe.
When, therefore, you ask what we should believe in matters of religion, the answer is to be found
not by exploring of the nature of things, as was done by those whom the Greeks call physicists.
Nor need we be fearful if a Christian should fail to know some things about the force and number
of the elements: about the motion and order and eclipses of the stars; about the form of the
heavens; about the species and natures of animals, plants, stones, fountains, mountains; about the
reaches of space and time, about the signs of approaching storms, and a thousand-and-one things
which these men discovered or thought they had discovered. For even they, excelling by their
great genius, burning with the love of research and free to indulge in it, investigating some things
by the aid of human conjecture and searching out others by means of historical research, have not
found out all things. And so as to their vaunted discoveries, these more often are opinion than
certain knowledge.
For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, in heaven or on
earth, whether visible or invisible, is none other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one
and true God. Further, the Christian believes that nothing exists save God himself and what comes
from him.
(Augustine, 420/1947, p. 19)
For the Church fathers, or clerics, man knows only by interpreting

revelations from God, especially the Scriptures, and through the faith that is
granted to believers. The Scriptures are written in Latin, and only clerics can
read. They alone receive divine revelation because only they live sufficiently
spiritual lives. A spiritual life is conducted by engaging in meditation and
other forms of intense introspection.
Before he comes to these conclusions, Augustine lives a life of debauchery
and skepticism. He wonders if there is anything that he can really believe.
Eventually, using logical introspection, he concludes that he must at least
believe in his own existence as a thinker because he can doubt his own
existence. Having come to believe in his own existence and in the existence
of the one omnipotent God through reason and introspection, Augustine
writes that others must have faith in his word because God is revealed to
him (Augustine), to other church fathers, and through religious rituals.
Free Will and Salvation
Augustine develops a religious doctrine focused on the struggle between

the material human body that is part of nature and the spiritual human soul
that is part of the divine. The body seeks to persuade man to do evil but the
soul can help man to do good. God is omnipotent but He grants men
knowledge of right and wrong and free will to choose between them. Evil
exists in the world because men choose evil. When men choose good, they
are rewarded in an afterlife, but when men choose evil, they suffer guilt.
Thus, man’s behavior is controlled by internal feelings of virtue and guilt.
The Romanesque stone carving shown in Fig. 2.1 adorns a cathedral in
Burgundy, France. Preoccupation with punishment and redemption
tormented Europeans of the early Middle Ages.
FIG. 2.1. The Weighing of the Souls of the Damned (Gislebertus, ca. 1100; photo courtesy
of John R. Benham).
Religious Doctrine and Misogyny
Misogyny is codified in the doctrines of many religions and philosophies.

Both Greek and Roman cultures are intensely patriarchal, and men are more
likely to be educated; therefore, the writings and teachings that survive are
more likely to be written by men. Thus, as Christian doctrine is formalized
in the early Church, women are blamed for bringing sin and misery into the
world through the “fall from grace” in the Garden of Eden and for seducing
men away from spiritual pursuits.
The Legend of Pandora

The god Prometheus steals fire from the heavens and gives it as a gift to
mortal humans. This infuriates Zeus, who asks Hephaestus, a patron
god of tradesworkers, to create the first woman. Zeus names this first
woman Pandora. The name Pandora means “all-giving” in Greek, so
the gods bestow all of their choicest gifts on her and place these in an
earthenware jar. Like most women, Pandora is insatiably curious, and
she cannot resist opening the jar to peer inside. But when she does, all
of the gifts from the gods begin to fly out. Before she can close the lid,
nearly all of the gifts have flown. Only one gift remains, and that is
Hope, the lid having been shut before she could escape. That is why, in
the face of all earthly evils, hope is the only blessing left to humankind.
IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT FOR
PSYCHOLOGY
The connections between Augustinian theological doctrines and psychology

are numerous. Many of the assumptions made in the Western world about
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are based on these early Christian
doctrines.
Free will versus determinism. Free will is the notion that behavior varies
as a function of individuals’ choices uninfluenced by biology, experience,
situation, or any other cause. Determinism is the belief that behavior is not
freely chosen but is caused. Augustine suggested that behavior is caused in
part by desires to avoid feeling guilty and desires to seek out the pleasure of
feeling virtuous. This notion of internal motivators for behavior is threaded
throughout the history of psychology and also raises some interesting
questions about the limits offree will within Christian doctrines.
✔ Stop and think.

Just how free is our will if God establishes absolute rights and wrongs,
then punishes and rewards behavior with feelings of guilt and virtue?
The mind-body problem. Coming to believe that there is an aspect of the

person that is not part of the physical body creates a new set of questions
having to do with the relationship between these parts. For many
philosophies, the immaterial aspect is the part of the human that thinks,
remembers, or has intentions and is called the intellect or the mind. For
religions, the aspect of the human that transcends the physical is the soul. In
either case, the mind-body problem is the question about how a nonmaterial
aspect of the human interacts with a material aspect. How and where does
that interaction occur, and what is the mechanism by which that happens?
✔ Stop and think.
If thoughts are immaterial, how can they be made into neurochemical
changes in the brain, and how can changing the neurochemistry of the
brain, as with modern antidepressants, change thoughts?
The nature-versus-nurture question. According to Christian doctrine, the

innate knowledge of right and wrong is what makes humans accountable for
their behavior. If right and wrong have to be learned, then individuals might
commit a wrong simply because they had never learned the difference. How
could persons then be held accountable for their behavior? Questions about
innate knowledge are referred to as the “nature-versus-nurture” debate, and
these questions present philosophers and psychologists with many
interesting problems for many centuries.
The relationship between human and nonhuman animals. A hierarchy
that places the human above nature, as does Christian doctrine, separates
humans from nature and from all other animals. In this way of believing,
men are no longer part of nature but are in conflict with nature as in “man
against the elements” Nature, nonhuman animals, slaves, women, and
children come under the dominion of man in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic
monotheistic religions. Placing a transcendent and divine soul in man makes
him qualitatively different from and superior to all other animals. This idea
influences Western perspectives about relationships between humans and
nature, between humans and nonhuman animals, between human males and
females, and even between Western humans and all other groups of humans.
In Greek culture, women and slaves are “less than” citizens through some
accident of nature or failing of virtue—the Greek concept of virtue being
equivalent to something like courage in battle. In early Christian doctrine,
women and slaves are created as lesser creatures by God. They thus fall
below men in the hierarchy and should be regarded accordingly.
A Period of Intellectual Stagnation
Although Greek philosophy is respected throughout the era of the Roman

Empire, after the collapse of Rome, the admiration for such intellectualism
disappears, and persecutions against philosophers and scholars by religious
leaders are more common. For example, in 415, at the library in Alexandria,
a celebrated female mathematician, astronomer, and Neo-Platonic
philosopher, Hypatia, is dragged into a place of worship by Christian monks
during Lent, beaten, hacked into pieces with oystershells while still alive,
and then burned. The monks are acting on orders from Cyril, the Bishop of
Alexandria. In addition to her intellectual achievements, Hypatia’s offenses
include an unwillingness to convert to Christianity. Neo-Platonic
philosophic influences are seen in her use of music therapy to treat mental
illness. These are regarded by Cyril as heresy against Christian beliefs. A
large part of the collection of manuscripts in the library is also burned at
about this time. The remainder of the collection is destroyed in 646, when
Islamic armies invade the city.
The Times
When thinking about the philosophy of the Greek Classical period, it is
important to keep in mind that this culture is intensely patriarchal and
androcentric. When the Greek philosophers talk about “the virtuous
man,” or ask “why do men behave the way they do,” they are really
talking about men. In fact, they are really talking only about free,
economically privileged men. Women, children through the age of
adolescence, the elderly, tradesworkers, servants, the poor, the crippled,
and slaves are not allowed a vote in the ruling of any city, are not
given ritual burials, and are not considered citizens.
Although the Western world shows admiration for Classical Greek
culture, philosophy, literature, and politics, more disturbing aspects,
such as slavery and the place of women in Greek society, are ignored,
even though these aspects were also important in shaping the Classical
worldview. The continuum of sexual practices acceptable for males in
Classical Greek culture, where upper-class men are expected to
respond at different times in their lives to both men and women, seem
especially disturbing to many Westerners. Interestingly, there is no
such noun as “homosexual” in the ancient Greek language, and there is
also no noun for “heterosexual.” Thus, the modern practice of placing
men into categories based on whom they are having sex with is
meaningless in that ancient culture (Dover, 1978). Although the
distinction might seem important today, one has to wonder if these
sexual practices influenced the development of philosophical or
psychological thought in Classical Greece or why some in the present
day assume that they must have.
The patriarchy comes to power with the establishment of permanent
cities, private ownership of land and other property, and the resulting
interest in identifying paternity of offspring. This emphasis on
preserving biological bloodlines is one factor causing men to restrict
and control the freedom and behavior of women. In the Greek cities,
for example, a typical upper-class household includes the man of the
house, a wife who seldom leaves the confines of the women’s quarters
in the inner house, sons and daughters, and a small collection of
household slaves (Keuls, 1985). In lower-class families, where cultural
practices like having to provide a dowry make female children an
economic drain, girl infants are often sold into prostitution or slavery,
left at the temple to serve as concubines for the priests, or abandoned
on a hillside to die (Mireaux, 1959).
During this era, slavery is widely practiced throughout the Middle
East and around the Mediterranean. Slaves are occasionally acquired
from far-distant lands, including parts of Africa, but more often they
are the women and children of vanquished enemies or former citizens
who have fallen into debt (Lerner, 1986). Slaves are considered to be
property and have no legal status. During Roman times, life for most
people is a matter of hand-to-mouth subsistence-level farming, but for
upper-class Romans in centers of population, standards of living are
relatively high. They enjoy such amenities as indoor plumbing, a wide
selection of foods, and, for the men, leisure time provided by large
numbers of slaves.
3
From an Age of Spirits to Humanism:
How Many Angels Can Dance on the
Head of a Pin?
This chapter takes us to European cultures that followed the fall of Rome and illustrates that many
Western assumptions about thoughts, feelings, and behaviors originate in the theology and
philosophy of the Middle Ages in Europe. The consequences of using trust in cultural and religious
beliefs as the way to know about nature are also examined. At the beginning of the Renaissance,
humanistic philosophies make their entrance.
PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Nearly all of Classical Greek and Roman philosophy is lost to the West after
the sacking of Rome and the burning of the great library at Alexandria in
the 4th and 5th centuries. The writings that do survive are those that are
carried by Constantine to the new Christian Byzantine capital and those
brought to the Arabic peninsula by scholars fleeing the fighting in
Alexandria.
Byzantine Influences
During this same period, Byzantium, like Rome, is a Christian city in which
Classical Greek philosophy is used to support and defend Christian doctrines
(Loverance, 1988). The primary contribution Byzantium makes to natural
philosophy is to preserve the work of Classical philosophers so that when
Byzantium comes into contact with the Islamic world, beginning in the 7th
century, these Greek works are transmitted to Islamic philosophers.
At least one Byzantine physician, Poseidonus, of the 4th century, does
make significant and unique contributions to later psychology. He reports in
detail the effects of brain damage, an indication that he understands the
localization of specific brain functions (Gross, 1998). Galen previously
identified the front of the brain as the location of mental faculties, but
Poseidonus finds that lesions in the front of the brain impair imagination,
lesions in the rear impair memory, and lesions in the middle produce deficits
in reasoning. It is not until several centuries later that Western medicine and
psychology are influenced by these findings.
Islamic Religion and Philosophy
In the 7th century, the Islamic religion begins to be organized around the
teachings of Mohamet, a prophet from Mecca born in about 570. Islam
quickly becomes a political, economic, and military power, as well as a
religious influence throughout the Arab region. Over the next 400 years,
Islam becomes the state religion of the area from Spain through North
Africa, eastward to Persia, and comes into increasing conflict with
Christians to the north and the west.
Like Judaism and Christianity, the Islamic religion is monotheistic.
Practitioners, called Muslims, believe that their god, Allah, is a god of reward
and retribution, omnipotent, omniscient, and grants free will to humans.
Muslims believe that Mohamet, like Jesus, was a prophet sent by Allah to
bring important messages to humans. In fact, Muslims regard Mohamet as
simply the last in a succession of prophets that includes Jesus (Fakhry, 1983).
In its early centuries, Islam is more tolerant of religious and cultural
diversity than are Christians of this era, but both relentlessly persecute those
who continue to believe in Greek and Roman gods and goddesses. Mohamet
preaches compassion and mercy for the downtrodden and brotherhood and
equality among men. But once formalized into a written doctrine, the
Islamic religion, like Judaism and Christianity, becomes uncompromisingly
patriarchal and condones numerous discriminatory practices toward women
(Lerner, 1986).
Until about 1100, Islamic religion supports the development of a natural
philosophy and the observational study of nature based primarily on
Classical Greek and Roman philosophy and medicine. Medical and
anatomical information gathered in Alexandria is available to Islamic
philosophers. Indian culture influences Islamic philosophy through writings
such as the ancient Upanishads, composed between 800 and 600 BCE. These
are dialogs, much like those of Plato, discussing how best to live and
addressing other psychological questions. Indian physicians believe, for
example, that although disease results primarily from supernatural powers,
it may also be related to poor sanitation or an imbalance of bodily humors.
Mental health is also considered to be associated with a refusal to control
desires and emotions. These Indian beliefs about factors that influence health
and personality eventually became part of early Islamic natural philosophy
(Fakhry, 1983).
Natural Philosophy in Islamic Thought
Islamic natural philosophy begins with the Greek philosophers whose works
are regarded as precious treasures. These writings are eagerly sought and
translated into Arabic, particularly those of Aristotle and Galen, and form
the foundation for Islamic observation and description of nature. Medicine,
in particular, is praised in the Islamic religious text, the Koran, as an art that
brings one closer to Allah.
Medicine
During the Middle Ages, Islamic medical practitioners rely more on
naturalistic explanations than do European physicians, who accept many
supernatural explanations. Adopting Galen’s methods of observation and
description can be productive of new knowledge, but one of Islam’s most
progressive naturalists and physicians, Abu Bakr al-Razi, points out that
simply adopting Galen’s writings as an authoritative source of truth may not
be fruitful. That is, al-Razi asserts, although it may be appealing and easier
to accept the word of an acknowledged authority like Galen, if the authority
is wrong, the treatment will probably not be effective. In spite of an
atmosphere of growing religious constraints on freedom to conduct medical
research in the 10th century, the nonconformist al-Razi also attacks a variety
of superstitious religious beliefs about illness and health, including the idea
of miracles and miracle cures. He is not the first, nor the last, to note that
people often prefer answers that make them feel happy over answers that
are factually true. Legitimate treatments often take time to show positive
effects, and al-Razi suggests that this is why many people prefer faith
healers whose effects, although illusory and transitory, are often dramatic
and immediate. In addition to several treatises on astronomy, philosophy,
and religion, al-Razi’s writings include careful descriptions of diseases and,
remarkable for the time, discussions about the relationship between hygiene
and disease. Based on Pythagorean and Platonic thought, al-Razi’s
treatments for both physical and mental illnesses include calming music,
healthy diet, and relaxing baths to restore balance and even some chemical
remedies. Individuals suffering from “melancholia,” another name for
depression, are encouraged to engage their minds with distracting and
complex games like chess (Davidson, 1992). Although al-Razi’s reputation as
a free thinker and challenger of religious doctrine survives, only a few scraps
of his writing do. Most of his works are lost, as both Islamic and Christian
religious fundamentalists become more powerful in the later Middle Ages.
Psychology
Nowhere is the influence of Classical Greek philosophers on Islamic
culture more evident than in the writings of Abu ‘Ali al-Husain Ibn Sina. Ibn
Sina interprets and elaborates Aristotle’s theory of the three psyches and
attempts to conform Greek philosophy to Islamic theology. Ibn Sina’s
thoughts about psychology evolve initially from Neo-Platonic influences
coming directly from the scholars at Alexandria. In Ibn Sina’s religious
interpretation, Aristotle’s three psyches take on a hierarchical form such that
vegetative and sensitive psyches make humans physical, earth-bound, and
animalistic, and the rational psyche makes humans god-like. The five
corporeal or bodily senses make humans like animals and the ability to
reason makes humans like Allah. In Western ideologies, the physical senses
through which information about particular objects is obtained make man
animal-like, but rational thought about universal concepts makes man god-
like. For Judaic and Christian ideologies, the soul is associated with the
body, but is also separate and independent, capable of transcendence. In
early Islamic ideologies, the soul is located in the body, specifically in the
brain.
Islamic philosophers and physicians of this era, including Ibn Sina, remain
unconvinced about the transmigration of the soul, the movement of the
soul from one body to another. Instead, they continue to believe as Classical
Greek philosophers did that reason and breath leave the body at death but
that no aspect of the human travels on to some metaphysical plane of
existence. The rational soul is immortal only in the sense that rational
thought itself, like a mathematical principle, does not die (Ivry, 1974).
The contribution Ibn Sina makes to Islamic psychology is based primarily
on an earlier Arabic interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, written by
Muhammad b. Tarkhan al-Farabi, who is more original than Ibn Sina but
less easily understood (Goodman, 1992). Ibn Sina elaborates Aristotle’s
psyches into a number of mental faculties, places them in a hierarchy, and
identifies the specific brain structures in which the faculties of the sensitive
psyche are located. Neither Ibn Sina nor al-Farabi are able to verify their
theories with observational evidence because later Islamic religion forbids
human dissection. Their works survive as texts in medical schools until the
16th century in Europe (Rahman, 1952).
Both Ibn Sina and al-Farabi focus their psychologies on the study of
thinking. Most mental faculties are attributed to the sensitive soul, with
reason alone reserved for the rational soul. This early Islamic psychology
includes an aspect of thinking called “potential reason.” Potential reason
includes a faculty, or special mental power, of prophecy. According to
Islamic philosophers, the mental faculty of prophecy is available to humans
as a consequence of the omniscience and omnipresence of Allah. Because
Allah is omniscient, all events everywhere at all times are knowable,
although most people do not exercise this aspect of the rational faculty.
However, some people do reason well enough to be aware of future or
distant events. They demonstrate prophecy either by foretelling future
events or by describing events that occur at a distance (Fakhry, 1983;
Davidson, 1992). In this way, Ibn Sina and al-Farabi provide a rationalistic
account of the popular belief in precognition and clairvoyance.
Islamic faculty psychology continues to influences Western thought far
into the Middle Ages. The hierarchical structure of mental faculties, for
example, is one significant aspect of Islamic thought that survives the
transition to European philosophy.
THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES IN EUROPE
The Search for Stability
In Europe, nostalgia for the great days of the Roman Empire begins in the
moments of its earliest decline. Longing for some real or imagined past
when life was easier, safer, more comfortable, and more stable seems to be
apart of the human condition. In the years from about 400 to 1400 of the
Common Era, each new political or military leader who emerges gains
strength by making promises to deliver safety and stability.
In 768, Charles the Great, better known as Charlemagne, is crowned king
of the Franks, one of the largest and most powerful tribes in Europe. Among
Charlemagne’s most noteworthy accomplishments is the establishment of
schools throughout his kingdom. Since the time of the fall of Rome at the
end of the 4th century, literacy has been restricted to members of the clergy.
When Charlemagne decrees the establishment of abbey schools at
monasteries, he makes education and literacy available to many more.
The teachers at abbey schools are Roman Christian monks, some of whom
gain recognition as gifted teachers. Aspiring scholars come from all over
Europe to study with them. Eventually, long after Charlemagne, these
communities of scholars develop into what are called universities. These
universities are not established to train people for employment in some field
or to educate them for the workforce, but to provide opportunities to study
theology and philosophy. The University of Paris, for example, is established
in the 12th century for the purpose of gathering clerical scholars together so
that they may interpret Scripture and critique and rewrite Classical Greek
philosophy so that it conforms to Church doctrine. Bringing scholars
together at these universities allows for the kind of critical, rational thought
that is expressed through skepticism, questioning, the weighing and sifting
of evidence, and lively debate (Kemp, 1996). This is the origin of the modern
university and the purpose for which universities are established.
The reign of Charlemagne also sees the reestablishment of criminal law,
so that violence for the sake of profit incurs a penalty, and some semblance
of a more stable society emerges. More monasteries and village churches are
built, and there begins to be a more orderly rhythm to people’s lives. The
Sabbath is recognized, although time cannot often be spared to observe it as
a day of rest. The local church bells ring out the canonical hours that divide
the day into time periods, and measured time begins to take on a
significance that it has not had in human culture prior to this period.
Agricultural innovations, including the iron plow and the harness for draft
animals, result in increased crop yields. There is a decrease in crop loss due
to marauders. Hence, people are better fed, infant mortality decreases, and
fertility and life expectancy increase.
The Power of the Roman Church
The Roman Christian Church grows slowly in power and wealth throughout
the Middle Ages, although the principles by which the Church functions and
its doctrines remain relatively fluid through the 11th century. Its remarkable
growth in economic power derives partly from the sale of clerical positions
in the Church hierarchy. Church members are also able to purchase promises
of redemption by buying printed prayers called indulgences. If enough
indulgences are purchased to cover one’s sins, entry into Heaven is assured.
In addition to receiving cash donations, the Church is also deeded large
tracts of land by rich noblemen on their deathbeds, in efforts to purchase
salvation.
Doctrines and Heresies
In 1096, Pope Urban II preaches the first Holy Crusade to Judea to reclaim
the land of Jesus’s birth from the Islamic and Jewish infidels who live there.
Among the spoils acquired by the West during the Crusades are many of the
writings of Greek Classical philosophers, including many of Aristotle’s
works. The recovery of these writings throws into question certain Church
doctrines and highlights existing dissention among the clergy as to official
religious practices. This then instigates the development of formal written
doctrines and religious ritual. It is at this time, for example, that the
Eucharist, the ritualized sacrifice and eating of the body and blood of
Christ, becomes a part of official Christian religious practice.
As religious doctrine is written down and agreed on by Church
authorities, it becomes orthodoxy, or the right way to think and believe.
Other forms of worship and other belief systems are defined as
heterodoxies, or wrong ways to think and believe. Wrong belief systems are
considered heresies, even if they, too, are based on the teachings of Jesus and
define themselves as Christian.
SCHOLASTICISM
During the 12th and 13th centuries, Aristotle’s philosophical works

concerning psychological questions become available to Christian clerics in
the West. These clerics, referred to as Scholastics, attempt to interpret the
writings of Classical Greek philosophers so that they support the more
mystical Roman Christian orthodoxy. Aristotle’s naturalistic approach to
psychological questions proves especially vexing to the Scholastics who,
after initially hailing these newly available philosophical writings, later
declare them to be pagan heresies and attempt to destroy them (Weinberg,
1964).
Eventually, however, ways are found to make Aristotle’s naturalism
conform to the Church’s supernatural doctrine. The Scholastics’ efforts are
made easier because they are working with Islamic translations and
interpretations of Aristotle’s writings that have already been made to appear
to support Islamic and Eastern Christian religious doctrines. The
epistemological questions that the Scholastics consider about what humans
can know and how they come to know can be organized into several issues,
all of which have direct application to the study of human behavior.
The Problem of Knowledge
According to Augustine, who is introduced in the previous chapter, God is

the only truth humans can know, and the way to know God is through trust
in revelation, Scripture, and church authorities. Scholastic clerics do not
doubt Augustine’s assertions, but, bowing to pressure from an increasingly
educated population, they seek a more complete answer to epistemological
questions.
✔ Stop and think.

How could you use logic to support the argument that God exists?
For example, the monk Anselm offers rational thought as an additional

way to know God. He puts forward a logical argument to prove that God is
real, which says that because the human mind can think about or conceive
of a being powerful enough to create and rule over everything, then that
being must truly exist. Thus, rational thought becomes a support for faith in
God. Writing at about the same time, Peter Lombard, also an Augustinian
monk, argues even more strongly for the use of reason and also for the use
of observation of God’s works in the world to know God. These 11th-
century monks thus set the stage for the arrival new epistemologies in
Western thought in the 13th century (Potts, 1980).
Realism Versus Nominalism
Scholastics also broaden the question from whether it is true that men can
really know God to wondering if men can really know anything at all. What
is real? The Scholastics, however, approach the issue from an entirely
different worldview than that of the early Greek physicists. For example,
Plato argued that the forms, or universals, were real, but some Scholastics
wonder if universals are real things or simply names that are given to classes
of things. Maybe the names do not represent anything real. Believing that
universals are real is called realism. Believing that universals are just names
given to sets of particular instances is called nominalism.
As you think about this issue, you might be comfortable enough accepting
only particular instances of cats as real and you might find the notion of a
universal form, catness, to be a rather foreign idea. But what about
something like justice?
✔ Stop and think.

Is justice a real thing, or is it a name given to a set of particular
instances of just behavior?
Similarly, what is intelligence? Is intelligence a real thing, or is it simply

the name given to a set of behaviors or characteristics? In the Middle Ages,
some Scholastics argue that universals are real, and others argue that they
are merely sets of instances that have been given a name. Because these sets
have been given names, they can seem to represent something with an
independent reality. But those may only be names, or, as the Scholastic
monk Roscelin would say, only flatus vocis, puffs of air made when the
name is spoken.
✔ Stop and think.
Are there other things that are believed to be real because they have a
name?
By What Method May We Know?
Throughout the Middle Ages, questions about how humans can know
God continue to be debated by the Scholastics, with several arguing against
the Church doctrine that faith, revelation, and authority are the only ways
to know God. The monk Peter Abelard suggests, for example, that if God is
really omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, then all ways of acquiring
knowledge would lead to knowledge of God and no method of inquiry could
lead to doubt. Several later Scholastic clerics make similar arguments. The
Dominican monk Roger Bacon outlines moving arguments in support of
using mathematics and what he calls experimental science, the
observational study of nature, as keys to understanding and knowing God.
Both Bacon and Robert Grosseteste, another monk, propose and conduct
scientific-like studies of light and its role in optics as avenues by which the
light of God may be better understood. These clerics argue that the Church
should encourage, not discourage, the use of reason and even observation of
the natural world as equally valid ways to know God (Burke, 1962).
Roger Bacon identifies four causes of human ignorance and error that
prevent men from receiving the benefits of divine wisdom. First is what
Bacon sees as an unjustified reliance on authorities, although he makes it
clear that he is not talking about Church authority. Second is the human
tendency to remain a slave to habits, traditions, and customs, even in the
face of contradictory evidence. Third is what Bacon calls popular prejudice
that blinds us to other evidence. He is speaking here about the ways in
which humans are predisposed to think, including the desire to maintain
social cohesion by going along with the opinions of others no matter how
ill-informed they may be. And finally, Bacon says, conceit and
overconfidence in our own knowledge and ability to reason cause us to
remain ignorant (Burke, 1962).
In making these arguments, Abelard, Bacon, and many others create an
atmosphere for the continued questioning of Church authority and doctrine.
Their goal is to demonstrate that all ways of knowing will lead to knowledge
of God, but the eventual effect is to open debate and doubt about the
authority of the Church. To Church authorities, these arguments create an
atmosphere of doubt in faith and skepticism about Church doctrine, which is
considered a sin. For this reason, many of these clerics are punished. Most of
Abelard’s writings are burned, and he dies on his way to appeal to the Pope
after being condemned by Church authorities. Roger Bacon is imprisoned for
his heresies and very nearly excommunicated.
Summary of Scholastic Thought
Scholastic thought in the 13th century may be usefully summarized by

examining the thoughts of the Dominican monk Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–
1274). Aquinas is convinced that Aristotelian naturalistic philosophy is
correct, but for the Church, this naturalism veers dangerously away from
orthodoxy. When the Scholastics are confronted with Aristotle’s apparent
heresy, they respond with a doctrine of “double truth.” One truth, they
contend, is based on reason, and this is the truth of the natural world. The
other truth, equally valid, is based on revelation and is the truth of Church
orthodoxy (Russell, 1945).
Aquinas sets about to reconcile these two truths and to resolve the
epistemological questions raised by Scholastic theologians about whether
one can know God through observation and reason or only through faith.
The resolution he proposes is that, because God created everything, God also
created the natural world, including humans. In the same way that one can
come to know an artist by examining the works created by that artist, one
can also come to know God by examining God’s creations in the natural
world. And the natural way to study the natural world is through
observation and reason. Aquinas argues that the spirit of man is
interdependent with the matter, or body, so that knowing about both are
equally valid ways to know God.
The theological system organized by Aquinas has important implications
for religion and religious practice, but there are three reasons that his work
is relevant to a history of psychology. First is his success in persuading
Church authorities that observation and the description of nature should be
encouraged rather than disallowed. This is important for the progress of all
domains of natural philosophy, as well as for the study of human and animal
behavior. Second, because Aquinas has great interest in human psychology,
he studies and writes about Aristotelian concepts of biopsychology. In doing
so, his work furthers the inclusion of psychology among the other natural
sciences that emerge in the following centuries, thus helping to make those
biopsychological concepts available today. Finally, Aquinas speculates about
human motivation and suggests that humans are motivated by desire. He
argues that humans are motivated by desires for what is not good for them.
Thus, humans do wrong, not because they are evil, but because they are
weak and unable to resist desire, even when they know their actions are
wrong (Russell, 1945).
The Consequences of Scholasticism
In many ways, Scholastic debates about Church doctrine have the opposite
of the desired effect. The very idea that the doctrine can be debated at all is
itself an example. The Scholastics’ intent is to strengthen Church doctrine,
but the result demonstrates that it is possible to debate and question the
doctrine. By successfully arguing that the Church should allow for the study
of nature as a way to know God, the Scholastics demonstrate that those
doctrines can be changed. This is contrary to the Church’s assertion that
doctrine represents God’s wisdom revealed to the authorities. Unfortunately
for the Scholastics, in 1277, the Church condemns the synthesis proposed by
Aquinas and forces the separation of philosophy, the study of the natural
world, from theology, the study of God.
The failure of the Scholastics’ attempted synthesis is articulated well in
the 14th-century works of Marsiglio, a monk at the University of Padua in
Italy, and by William, his protege and a Dominican monk from Ockham in
England. Marsiglio de Padua and William of Ockham conclude that nature
provides only circumstantial evidence, but no direct evidence for the
existence of God. These monks argue that God must be known through faith
alone. The same may be said of human will or the transcendent soul. If one
accepts Church doctrine, then one might well believe that will and soul are
real, but without faith in Church doctrine, there is no evidence in nature for
the existence of free will or of a transcendent soul. In spite of their steadfast
assertion of faith, both Marsiglio de Padua and William of Ockham are
excommunicated from the Church. They only manage to avoid the ultimate
penalty for challenging Church doctrine by taking refuge in the court of
Roman Emperor Louis IV, who is at war with the Pope. There they remain
under the protection of the Emperor for the last years of their lives.
William of Ockham is best remembered for the doctrine of parsimony,
the assertion that explanations that utilize the fewest assumptions are the
most likely to be true. Because assumptions are, by definition, beliefs for
which there is no evidence, it stands to reason that when attempting to
explain a phenomenon, the explanation for which there is direct
observational evidence is more likely to be true than an explanation that
requires assumptions. The argument that one should accept the explanation
that requires the fewest assumptions is referred to as Ockham’s razor.
THE BLACK DEATH
Widespread famine and diseases like smallpox are still common in Europe
throughout this period. Then, in 1348, the bubonic plague sweeps across
Europe from seaports in Italy. Called the Black Death because in its final
stages it darkens the skin of its victims, the virus is carried by fleas living on
the blood of infected rodents. The population of rodents explodes in the
decades just prior to 1348 because Christian monks preach that cats are
agents of witchcraft, and millions of cats are killed.
Demographic estimates are difficult to make for this period, but it is
generally agreed that at least 30% to 40% of the population of Europe dies
between 1348 and 1350 (Cantor, 2001). In some locations, death rates are
even higher. Normal burial practices are impossible to maintain, and in some
cases, entire villages have to be abandoned because of the number of
decaying bodies left unburied. Civic life breaks down, the planting and
harvesting of crops is disrupted, and care for domestic animals and even for
human infants and children becomes haphazard as families disintegrate.
After 1350, the bubonic plague returns again and again every few years with
little warning and no understanding as to its cause.
A Psychology of Disaster
Those who are left behind find a variety of ways to cope in the world that
remains. Some people adopt a stoic philosophy and carry on their normal
lives by accepting whatever happens as the will of God. Great acts of
heroism occur as some try to give comfort and care to the dying and others
expend great effort in burying the dead. Still others give up all hope and try
to blot out the terror around them by drinking heavily and engaging in
other acts of reckless abandon.
For all, the biggest question is why. What has caused this terrible disaster?
Many believe it is the will of God and that God is punishing them. This
explanation is undermined by the fact that Christians, even very devout
Christians, are dying too, including Christians who spend their days nursing
the sick.
✔ Stop and think.

Could you explain in your own words what causes disease? Would
your explanation sound plausible to someone who does not know
about germs?
The Church’s official position is that nonbelievers are to blame. In the

search for scapegoats, the burden eventually falls most heavily on the Jews.
Late in the previous century, Jews in England and in the region today called
France were forced to convert to Christianity and to abandon their land and
businesses or be killed. In the years of the plague and for several years after,
throughout Europe, hundreds of thousands of Jews are driven from their
homes or killed, including those who had already converted to Christianity.
Sometimes, nothing more than a rumor that the Black Death is in the next
village is enough to cause the villagers to kill whole families of Jews living
near them. In the face of seemingly inexplicable disasters, the first human
impulse seems to be to fall back on authority and to find someone to blame
and punish.
Challenging the Church
At a time when Church doctrines and clerical practices are beginning to be

questioned and even criticized by a few, the fact that Christian clerics die in
the plague only adds to the growing doubt about the adequacy of the
authorities. In the 14th century, an atmosphere of doubt encourages the
willingness to question and challenge Church authority. In addition to
doubts about Church doctrine, Christians are critical of the sinful behavior
and sexual misconduct of many clerics, outraged by the great wealth
generated through the sale of Church offices and indulgences, and convinced
that the Church is inventing bogus miracles to increase its power and
economic clout.
HUMANISM: A NEW FOCUS
Disease and Famine
One reaction to the plague is a shift away from concern about the afterlife to
interest in the present and heightened curiosity about the immediate human
experience. When combined with other economic and social developments,
these changes in intellectual interests give birth to the cultural movement in
the West called humanism.
From the Hereafter to the Here and Now
Throughout the Middle Ages, life for most people is difficult, violent, and
quite likely to come to a miserable but mercifully early end. Christians are
encouraged to hope for a better life in the hereafter. But something about the
devastating 14th century turns this focus around. The change begins first in
Italy and later moves throughout Europe. By the 15th and 16th centuries,
people are becoming more interested in their present earthly lives, in
attaining pleasure, maximizing happiness, and understanding the human
experience. Perhaps it seems as though death will come to us all soon
enough, and thus we had best enjoy the life we have been given while we
still have it (Tuchman, 1978).
The Workings of the Body
As a part of the concern with the present, the study of the human body
resumes in ways that have not been seen since the times of Galen. By the
16th century, the study of anatomy and medicine is reborn. Scholars at
universities in many parts of Europe are training doctors, performing
dissections, and conducting experiments to try to understand the workings
of human and nonhuman animal bodies.
Concepts of the Mechanical
There is a flurry of mechanical inventions at this time. Levers and pulleys

are put to work to raise and carry loads. Water-, wind-, and heat-propelled
turbines drive gears to operate mills and turn all sorts of engines.
When the increasing interest in the workings of the body is combined
with the accumulating understanding of mechanical principles, a new way
of thinking about the body is born: the body as machine. This mechanistic
conception of the body comes to have a significant impact on the study of
psychology in the centuries that follow.
Secular Powers Grow Stronger
From the 12th to the 16th centuries, secular powers, those not associated
with the Church or a religion, become more powerful, and the legal,
economic, and political powers of the Church decline. For close to 1,000
years in Europe, the Church held almost unlimited power and set the
intellectual agenda. Kings, emperors, feudal lords, and other secular political
powers were always thorns in the side or even outright threats to Church
authority. However, by the time of the 16th century, especially around the
region now called Italy, these powers become institutionalized in the
political forms of city/states and become economically capable of mounting
a credible challenge to the Church.
Small villages grow into larger settlements, as unlanded individuals move
to population centers. People begin to practice trades like ironwork,
carpentry, and cabinetmaking. Crafts- and tradesworkers gain more control
over their lives and begin to demand more respect. Organizations of
craftspeople form into guilds to establish standards for quality and fair
prices for their products, and to train apprentices in the trades.
A NEW WAY OF KNOWING
By the end of the 14th century, trust in Church authorities was no longer the
only way to know. Epistemology began to change in important and profound
ways and took on some of the reliance on observation and experience that
those in the 21st century will recognize as familiar. But this age of the spirit
left its imprint on Western philosophy and later, psychology. Many of the
assumptions that have influenced the study of psychology are inherited from
this time in history.
Inherited Assumptions
The following assumptions will sound familiar. They became part of the
official religious canon only a few hundred years ago, are still very much a
part of Western culture, and still influence many present-day answers to
psychology’s questions.
The Essential Duality Is Real
It is assumed that there are two parts to the human: spirit and body. This
duality also applies to the universe so that the universe consists of an
observable natural realm and an unobservable supernatural realm. The
human consists of an observable material body that is part of nature and an
unobservable spiritual aspect that is supernatural, that is divine, and that
separates humans from nature.
The Spiritual Is More Worthy of Study
Although nature is real, it is worthy of study only because it provides clues

to reveal the supernatural. For psychology, the spiritual aspect of the human
is the domain of study. The actions of the body are interesting only insofar
as they reveal the unobservable spiritual aspect that causes those actions.
Internal unobservable motivators of behavior are assumed to exist and are
more important to understand than the behaviors or any external motivators
originating in nature.
The Personal Is Private

The internal, spiritual aspect of the human is unique to each person and is
private, unknown, and unknowable to any other. Because this spiritual
aspect motivates behavior, humans have free will.
Epistemology for a New Age
In the late 13th century, the study of nature through observation is

sanctioned by the Church, but only because nature reveals the supernatural.
By the 16th century, the observational study of nature is conducted to
understand nature. This transition in epistemologies is a slow one and
fraught with many setbacks. Humans’ preferred ways of coming to believe,
such as simple explanations with high face validity, continually interfere
with these new ways of knowing.
FROM CERTAINTY TO DOUBT IN THE WEST
We enter the late 14th century just as the Black Death has plunged Europe
once again into economic despair and widespread famine. The Hundred
Years’ War between England and France will rage on until 1453, further
disrupting life in Northern Europe and depleting resources. In spite of these
adversities, people in this region eventually recover. Economic and
agricultural advances are made, and increasingly efficient forms of ship-
building and navigation come into use.
During the 14th through 16th centuries, technological developments allow
European explorers to come into extensive contact with peoples in many
parts of the world. Economic, political, and religious concerns also spur
geographic exploration and discovery.
The Certainty of Trust

For hundreds of years in the West, the Roman Christian Church provides
some semblance of order. For those living in misery, there is the promise of
salvation in the afterlife, a spiritual refuge. For those fearing for their safety
or living in poverty, the Church sometimes provides a place of physical
refuge, or at least a stable physical presence in changing times. For those
wishing to explore philosophical and intellectual issues, the Church defines
the scope of inquiry and eventually the limits of the discourse. For those
seeking answers to existential questions about the meaning and purpose of
life, the Church provides simple, unshakable answers and a refuge from
doubt, fear, and confusion. There is certainty and thus security and comfort
in coming to believe through trust.
✔ Stop and think.

What possible harm could come from having trust?
The Costs of Trust
There are many benefits to basing one’s beliefs on trust, especially during
difficult times when certainty is most ardently desired. But there are also
costs because coming to believe based on trust alone does not leave room for
questions. The answers must be accepted as given.
Trust Requires Obedience
An epistemology based on trust requires obedience to that belief system,

no matter how difficult or painful that might be. If your authorities say that
you must sacrifice your first-born child, you have no recourse, and because a
sacrifice is not really a sacrifice if you do not give up something dear to you,
that sacrifice is painful.
If trust requires that believers kill those who hold different beliefs, then
that is what is to be done without question or further explanation. Although
most wars have almost certainly been fought over economic and political
considerations, war is often justified and perpetuated based on differing
trust-based belief systems. For example, when Christian Crusaders reach
Jerusalem in 1099, they slaughter nearly everyone in the city of every other
faith, including the children. The English and the Irish have been at war with
one another over differing interpretations of Christian doctrine almost
incessantly since the reign of King Henry VIII in 1534. Even today, Christians
and Muslims are at war in many parts of the world, Muslims and Jews are
at war in Palestine, Catholic Christians are at war with Protestant
Christians in Ireland, and quasireligious wars go on in many other places as
well. All of this warfare is justified by belief systems based on trust.
To question a belief system built on trust is to demonstrate a lack of trust.
After all, if one is questioning, one must not have sufficient trust. Certainty
is granted only to those who are able to dismiss all doubt and never question
their belief system.
✔ Stop and think.

If having trust means never questioning your beliefs, how do you know
they are true?
Trust Can Be an Intellectual Dead End
By its very definition, trust does not allow for questions or require
justification. The goal of Scholastic theologians in the 13th century is not to
justify their faith, but to more fully understand the sources of their faith.
Scholastics’ questions are limited to knowing God. Some of them try to
assimilate questions about nature, but the goal is always to strengthen faith
in God.
Change Is Not Valued
Beliefs based on trust are unchanging and considered timeless. Thus,

progress or improvement is meaningless. The ancient Egyptians enjoyed a
stable and unchanging culture for at least 3,000 years using this strategy. The
ancient Chinese also enjoyed a highly developed and stable culture for more
than 2,000 years (Murphy & Murphy, 1968). But Western culture is diverse,
made up of many different groups with many different belief systems. By
the 14th century, Western belief systems are becoming more fluid. In this
era, Western epistemology entertains more questions and undergoes
significant change over time.
Life in Europe in the 14th century offers ample room for improvement, so
people are motivated to seek better lives. Sometimes doing so requires
questioning Christian Church dogma and revealing that some beliefs based
on trust are not borne out by the observation of events in nature.
CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF FAITH
For 14th- and 15th-century skeptical minds, Church doctrine leaves room for
doubt. The Church may say that the natural world is only an illusory copy of
an eternal and transcendent spiritual reality, but it is hard not to experience
nature as real. The promise that good behavior will be rewarded in an
afterlife may be appealing, but seeing that all around you greedy and evil
people are rewarded in this life is hard. The Church may tell you that you
are insignificant, that God speaks only to a chosen few, and that your
relationship with God is best mediated through the power of Church
authorities and the ritual and drama of Church liturgy. But if you are indeed
responsible for your own actions, then it only seems right that you should
also be able to communicate directly with God. If the purpose of life is to
serve God, is the exercise of the many creative gifts you have been given not
also a way to serve God?
Individualism
The most salient theme of the 15th and 16th centuries in Western intellectual
thought is the relatively novel idea of the importance and centrality of the
individual. Plato thought about universals, like the form human, rather than
particular humans. The Church focuses on God and life in the hereafter
rather than focusing on present lives here and now. After surviving the
Black Death and the subsequent breakdown of feudal society, philosophers
begin to be interested in the present lives of humans, not as a way to know
God but as a way to know the human experience. The reasons for this rise in
individualism are myriad, but they include religious, political, and economic
transformations.
A Personal Relationship With God
There are many obvious discrepancies between the founding doctrines of

Christianity and the rituals, practices, power, and wealth of the Roman
Christian Church in the 14th century. Even within the Church, these
discrepancies lead to widespread dissention that culminates when the
Augustinian monk Martin Luther nails his 95 theses to the door of the
church in Wittenberg in 1517. The sale of indulgences is particularly
disturbing to Luther, whose goal is to reform the practices of the Roman
Church. Luther believes that individuals should be held personally
responsible for their sinful transgressions and that the Church should not
mediate between the sinner and God’s judgment by granting absolution,
especially not for payment.
Others before Luther also argued that each individual should seek a
personal relationship with God. Francis of Assisi, for example, advocated
meditation and private prayer over Church ritual, and John Wyclif urged
that all people should read the Bible and decide for themselves what it says.
But Luther’s particular target is the Church’s practice of promising that it
can deliver divine forgiveness and salvation in return for money or land. He
protests that only God can forgive sin, and therefore those who sin should
not seek absolution from the Church no matter what they are able to pay.
Sinners should instead pray privately for forgiveness from God and be
prepared to suffer eternal damnation in hell. In Luther’s adamant and
uncompromising message, he preaches that belief in Christian principles is
essential if one expects to be saved.
Unfortunately for Luther, he has chosen as his target the one Church
practice that is the most lucrative and also affords the Church the most
power over its members. For this, he is accused of heresy and is
excommunicated from the Church. But the idea that individuals remain
personally accountable for their sins and should seek a personal relationship
with God catches fire, especially in Germany, where Luther’s protests
eventually become a Protestant movement and lead inexorably to a schism
in the Roman Church.
The Political and Economic Individual
The idea of the individual as a political entity is reawakened as people

move from serfdom, in which they are virtually enslaved to a feudal
landholder, to independence as skilled tradesworkers in the newly born
cities. Instead of going to war to protect the feudal lord and his lands,
individuals begin to think of themselves as citizens of a particular city and
are willing to go to war to protect their city as an extension of their own
personal interests. As citizens having responsibility for the governing of the
city, individuals take an interest in city policy, city planning, and the defense
of the city. Not since Classical Greek times has the individual been so
responsible for the life of the city.
Similarly, the idea of capitalism or the accumulation of assets is conceived
as individuals become the source of their own capital through work and the
exercise of their skills. Serfs work to increase the lord’s capital, but
independent citizens of the city work to produce their own assets.
✔ Stop and think.

Are there costs to the individual of living in an individualistic culture
rather than a collectivist culture?
Humanism
Tied closely with the theme of individualism is the idea that humans should
be at the center of human thought. The Scholastic assertion that all
philosophical thought and creative energies should be focused on
understanding God is displaced in the 15th and 16th centuries by the desire
to explore nature for the sake of understanding nature and by fascination
with the human experience and the place of humans in nature. This new
focus is called humanism.
The Nature of the Human Mind
Humanists argue that if men are at the center of God’s creation, and if
men have been given dominion over nature, then it is essential to
understand the true nature of what it means to be human. The Church
teaches that men are at the midpoint between God and inanimate matter,
standing just below angels in the hierarchy. Although Scholastic theologians
discuss and debate questions about how angels think, humanist philosophers
are concerned with how men think, asking questions such as, “Is there just
one divine truth, or does each man have a different perspective on truth?”
✔ Stop and think.

Is there a difference between truth and opinion?
The Potential for Improvement
What puts men into their exalted place in the divine hierarchy is that they
have rational and transcendent minds. That makes them god-like. Other
animals behave in a mechanical way as a consequence of being driven by
their natures and are thus not capable of improvement. Angels, on the other
hand, are already perfect and therefore have no need for improvement. Men
alone are in need of and capable of improvement. Men are able to change
because they possess a spark of the divine. Thus, they are capable of
changing for the better, improving, and making progress. In this era of
humanistic philosophy, the new idea appears that one need not settle for the
station or fate into which one is born, but can work to “better” oneself.
As one person is able to improve, so then are all, and therefore society as
a whole improves. An infectious sense of optimism is born in this era. Now
that the intellectual shackles of Scholasticism are broken and humans begin
to explore the mysteries of nature and the human experience, there is belief
in the human power to understand using god-like rational minds.
The Centrality of Human Perspective
This idea that the human experience is central spreads to many aspects of
Western culture, at least in Italy where this movement begins. This period in
Western history is named the Renaissance by later 19th-century scholars.
Art
In the fine arts, religious themes depicting scenes from Biblical stories
have dominated for centuries. In this new era of humanism, painters adopt
secular themes, showing ordinary people in the rich detail of everyday
situations. They illustrate folk stories and create portraits of wealthy patrons.
Leonardo da Vinci, for example, paints religious scenes but also sculpts and
paints the human figure with careful attention to anatomical detail.
This is the period in Western art when perspective appears. Previously,
figures and scenes were shown as flat objects against a flat background, as
God might have seen them. During the Renaissance, the perspective is
brought to earth and scenes begin to be shown as humans might actually see
them, receding into the background.
Music
Musical expression also moves away from religious themes and begins to
adopt and elaborate on folk songs and what is called street music. This
music is played on instruments that are relatively easy to make and to play
so that ordinary people can participate in making music.
Literature
The same transition occurs in the popular literature of the time and is
dramatically illustrated by comparing Dante’s Divine Comedy, completed in
1321, with Boccacio’s Decameron, completed in 1353. The Divine Comedy
describes the various levels of purgatory and hell, exemplifying a religious
theme. Boccacio’s bawdy and raucous Decameron, on the other hand, is a
story about a group of pilgrims who leave the city to escape the plague and
the all-too-human tales they tell one another as they wait in exile until it is
safe to return to the city.
In the 13th century, skepticism toward Church dogma begins to be voiced,
and by the 14th and 15th centuries, there is a transition in philosophy away
from the spiritual toward the earthly, human, and secular. By the 16th
century, there is a renewed sense of wonder in nature, discoveries in the
workings of nature, and an explosion in creative thought and expression.
Although humans crave stability and certainty, some philosophers suggest
that the spirit of discovery and creativity in the West in the 16th century is
born of and fostered by skepticism and the inevitable instability that follows
(Russell, 1945).
SKEPTICISM RETURNS
Just as Church authorities have feared, doubts about theological dogma

ignite a new wave of skepticism that ultimately undermines the influence,
power, and wealth of the Roman Christian Church. But the skepticism of
this era also stems from economic and political pressures. As feudal society
declines, cities and towns grow, a new middle class of tradesworkers
appears, and skepticism extends beyond Church dogma to nearly every
aspect of life in 16th-century Europe.
A Skeptical Perspective
One of the most influential writers of the era, and one whose thoughts
illustrate this new wave of skepticism, is French nobleman Michel de
Montaigne (1533–1592). Montaigne’s works are published in the last half of
the 16th century. He questions the very possibility of ever reaching certain
knowledge. He revives the Greek philosophers’ concerns that even
observations of nature cannot represent true knowledge because the natural
world is in a constant state of change. Montaigne attacks accepted doctrines,
such as the medieval understandings of Greek philosophy, and even newer
humanistic ideas about the centrality of man. He takes particular issue with
religious assertions and the common popular belief that humans are above
other animals in some teleological hierarchy and are therefore closer to God,
better able to reason and communicate, and capable of greater happiness
through the use of rational thought (Frame, 1965).
Montaigne’s Skepticism
Presumption is our natural and original malady. The most vulnerable
and frail of all creatures is man, and at the same time, the most
arrogant. He feels and sees himself lodged here, amid the mire and
dung of the world, nailed and riveted to the worst, the deadest, and the
most stagnant part of the universe, on the lowest story of the house
and farthest from the vault of heaven, with the animals of the worst
condition of the three (those that walk, those that fly, those that swim),
and in his imagination, he goes planting himself above the circle of the
moon and bringing the sky down beneath his feet. It is by the vanity of
this same imagination that he equals himself to God, attributes to
himself divine characteristics, picks himself out and separates himself
from the horde of other creatures, carves out their shares to his fellows
and companions the animals, and distributes among them such
portions of faculties and powers as he sees fit. How does he know, by
the force of his intelligence, the secret internal stirrings of animals? By
what comparison between them and us does he infer the stupidity that
he attributes to them?
When I play with my cat, who knows if I am not a pastime to her
more than she is to me? We entertain each other with reciprocal
monkey tricks. If I have my time to begin or refuse, so has she hers. …
This defect that hinders communication between them and us, why
is it not just as much ours as theirs? It is a matter of guesswork whose
fault it is that we do not understand one another; for we do not
understand them any more than they do us. By this same reasoning
they may consider us beasts, as we consider them…. We must notice
the parity there is between us. We have some mediocre understanding
of their meaning; so do they of ours, in about the same degree. They
flatter us, threaten us, and implore us, and we them. (Montaigne,
1580/1958, pp. 330–331)
The Discomfort of Doubt
The problem with skepticism is that, although it brings into question beliefs
that may be wrong, it does so at the expense of the stability gainedby
certainty. Doubting unseats stability. This may eventually lead to more
correct beliefs, but, in and of itself, doubt is not progressive. Montaigne’s
skepticism, for example, leads him to be very pessimistic about the plight of
humans. Other writers of his era recognize that what is needed is an
alternative epistemology, a new way of finding what is real and what is true,
a new method for establishing certainty and, it is hoped, stability.
EMPIRICAL DISCOVERY: TWO STEPS FORWARD
The epistemological philosophy that advocates experience as a foundation

for belief is called empiricism, possibly named after the Classical Greek
philosopher, Sextus Empiricus. Empiricus was a Skeptic whose writings were
recovered by the West in 1562 and then influenced skeptical thought in the
16th century.
Empiricism and rationalism are not mutually exclusive because both
empirical and rational philosophers accept and use elements of the other in
formulating beliefs. The hope is that empiricism informed by rationalism
will yield beliefs that are not just opinions but truths, and that will finally
provide the certainty that is so anxiously sought.
Human Potential
By the 16th century, Church authorities have told individuals for 1,000 years
that God has put them where He wants them to be, gives them everything
He wants them to have, and causes the events that He wants them to
experience. During the Renaissance, the idea arises that humans have the
power to challenge fate and change their lives. The Zeitgeist (the spirit of
the times) changes, and the idea of progress, of the potential for
improvement begins to take hold. Pessimism about this earthly life and the
focus on an afterlife wanes, and a new spirit of optimism grows, based on
the power of humans to observe and know the world of nature in which
they live. For 1,000 years, prayers have been offered as a means of avoiding
natural calamities. Sometimes prayers are answered and sometimes not. For
thousands of years before that, sacrifices are offered along with prayers, but
those seem to be answered in more or less random ways as well. By the 16th
century, some are suggesting that by knowing nature and by having a better
understanding of the place of humans in nature, humans might be able to
improve their lives by their own active efforts.
Medicine
After decades of devastating plagues in which the clergy are as likely to die
as anyone, people begin again to take an interest in natural causes of disease.
As religious strictures loosen, a new era of descriptive medicine is born.
Scholars at medical universities in Italy begin to conduct human dissections
and find evidence in their observations that some previous beliefs are false.
One such scholar is Andreas Vesalius of Padua, who publishes a medical text
based on his anatomical studies in which he refutes many of the beliefs
handed down from Galen.
Among the long-held beliefs dismissed by Vesalius is the idea that
thought originates in the ventricles of the brain and that this is where the
human soul resides. His argument is based on his dissections, which show
that many nonhuman animals have ventricles very similar to those found in
humans, yet only human animals have souls: “Such are the inventions of
those who never look into our maker’s ingenuity in the building of the
human body (Vesalius, 1543/1952, p. 6). In Fig. 3.1 Vesalius illustrates a
classic psychological paradox—the human brain contemplating itself.
FIG. 3.1. De Humani Corporis Fabrica (Vesalius, 1543/1952; photo courtesy of Francis A.
Countway Library of Medicine).
The belief that the ventricles of the brain have important functions in
human thought arises from the fact that these structures are readily
identifiable in dissection. In Vesalius’ time, it is believed that the cerebral
cortex serves primarily either as a protective covering, a kind of rind, over
the more important ventricles located along the brain stem, or, as
conjectured by Vesalius, as a structure to allow the blood vessels to bring
nutrients to the ventricles. The study of the cerebral cortex itself does not
really begin until the 17th century, when technological advances in
microscopy allow for the direct study of neural cells (Gross, 1998).
Human Nature
Speculation about the nature of human nature is reinvigorated in 15th- and

16th-century humanistic philosophies. Significant technological
improvements in printing make these speculations available to many people
throughout Europe.
Social/Political Psychology
Most of the interest in human nature in this era concerns how people
interact with and influence one another in groups. Niccolo Machiavelli
(1469–1527), for example, an Italian bureaucrat, publishes The Prince in 1532,
a text in which he provides guidelines for how best to take over, subjugate,
and rule groups of people. His guidelines, based on his observations and
descriptions of human behavior, suggest that most people can easily be
manipulated to behave as a leader wishes, even against their own best
interests. To achieve this goal, the leader must only exploit the people’s
desire for self-preservation and their need to maintain social cohesion. In
other words, to lead, a leader must instill fear and then create a vocal
minority that agrees with him. Machiavelli points out that individual human
behavior is malleable and that effective social organization may come from
exploiting the weaknesses inherent in how the human mind processes
information. He argues that religion, morality, and the law are institutions
that can be used by an astute leader much in the same way that armies are
used to gain control over people.
Machiavelli is condemned by the Roman Christian Church, his works are
placed on the Church’s Index of Forbidden Books, and he is accused of being
influenced by the devil. This is not surprising when one considers that
among his most controversial observations are those concerning the ways in
which religion is used to invoke obedience and control and to obtain desired
political ends.
Individual Differences
Other philosophers of this era focus on individual psychology. In 1538,

Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) of Spain publishes what eventually becomes a
very influential book, based on his observations and thoughts about human
behavior. Vives discusses the effects of emotions on behavior and suggests
that emotions can cause changes in the bodily humors. His ideas presage
notions of reciprocal relationships between physiological and psychological
states that suggest a physiological basis for psychological states.
Thoughts and Feelings
Vives believes that emotions also play a role in forming associations in

memory, so that experiences that occur in conjunction with intense
emotions tend to be associated with those emotions in memory, and later
those same emotions may elicit memories of the experiences. Thus, Vives
points out the importance of what is now called the learning environment.
He supports education for all, including women, and emphasizes the
importance of individualizing instruction for each student. Similarly, Julius
Scaliger (1484–1558), an Italian physician of the same era, speculates that
emotions and muscles are associated with memories so that subsequent
experiences not only elicit memories but emotional and muscular responses
as well.
The notions that experiences are remembered in both mind and body, and
that movements of the body can elicit thoughts about previous experience,
add to growing ideas about the ways in which human behavior is like the
functioning of a machine. Although these ideas are not original in this era,
the Zeitgeist supports their exposition at this time. As a result, Vives’ book
becomes very popular and influences French mathematician and philosopher
Rene Descartes and other later philosophers.
Evidence
Many of these ideas derive from ancient authorities and philosophies. The
conviction that there are bodily humors that influence physical health and
mental well-being is a persistent idea, for example, with no evidence to
support it beyond the word of authorities and widespread belief.
These ideas are also based on unstructured observations that are
associated in ways that make logical sense. Although these observations are
conducted by learned individuals, their methods are still the casual,
unstructured, and untested methods of folk psychology. This method yields
descriptive speculations that are supported mostly by face validity. However,
even strong face validity is not sufficient evidence; for example, the sun
appears to rotate around the Earth, but that does not make it true. An
epistemological method that can be relied on and that provides more
substantive evidence is needed.
AND ONE STEP BACK: THE CHURCH REACTS
Throughout Christendom, pressures are increasing to reform the corrupt

practices of the Roman Christian Church and its powerful and wealthy
leadership. Several alternative Christian religions are winning followers,
including the Protestants. Ancient Teutonic fertility cults are reappearing as
rural peoples move from mountain enclaves into the new cities, doubts are
rampant about the piety of Jews who have been forced to convert to
Christianity, and observations of nature are leading to confusion about the
veracity of many Church teachings. The Church responds by making some
changes in practice and a few changes in doctrine, but the strongest Church
reaction is to engage in an intense and deadly campaign to eliminate
dissenters. This campaign begins with the Inquisition against the Jews in
Spain in the 13th century and spreads throughout Europe for more than 300
years (Russell, 1972). There is no way to estimate the number of individuals
persecuted and killed by this movement during this period.
THE CERTAINTY OF MATHEMATICS
There is one source of certainty, mathematics, that is spiritual and

transcendent, and also earthly, scientific, and observable in nature. Certainty
in mathematical concepts is found throughout written Western history
beginning with the Egyptians, in Pythagorean thought and Platonic
philosophy, cited in Augustine, and revered by Aquinas. The truth of
mathematics is evident in observation and in reason, and even the most
skeptical philosopher can accept the universal truth of mathematics. Thus, if
a proposition can be proven using mathematics, if a question can be
addressed using numbers, the answer arrived at will be that much more
likely to be accepted and believed. This is as true in the 16th century as it is
today.
Belief in the truth of mathematics means that questions should be posed
in terms that are measurable. As Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) points out in the
17th century, there are really two worlds. There is the natural world of
physical reality where things have shape, size, and weight, and there is the
subjective world of sensory experience where things have reality only
insofar as they are experienced by a sensing animal. The size and weight of a
rose are objectively measurable, but its fragrance, the intensity and variation
of its color, and the degree of its beauty are qualities that are judged by
subjective opinion.
Hence I think that these tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the
object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness. Hence
if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
(Galileo, 1623/1957, p. 274)
The significance of this distinction for psychology is that the subject

matter of psychology has to do with qualities that are not measurable but
are subjective qualities of sense and thought. Galileo asserts, as many others
have since, that science is the study of objective and measurable physical
reality, implying that psychology, by its very definition as the study of
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, can never be a science.
REVEALED TRUTH IN NATURE
During the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, scholars in the West observe
nature for answers to questions about natural phenomena, strictly for the
purpose of understanding nature, not to discover clues about the
supernatural. Nature must be understood by observation informed by reason,
and the supernatural must be understood by trust. The conflicts that remain
between trust and observation, both in these centuries and today, concern
disagreements about the boundary where nature ends and the supernatural
begins. This distinction remains for psychology because of the lingering
assumption that human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors originate in some
aspect of the human that transcends nature.
Cosmology
The confusion between trust and observation in these centuries is

exemplified in the work of the Polish natural philosopher Nicolai Copernicus
(1473–1543). Copernicus delays publishing his heliocentric theory of the
universe until just before his death in 1543. This is because Copernicus’
religious beliefs that the sun is at the center of the universe violate Church
doctrines of an Earth-centered universe. Another example is Giordano
Bruno (1548–1600), a follower of Copernican theory. Bruno teaches
heliocentrics and argues that the universe is infinite, has many suns and
many planets orbiting other suns. He also argues for the possibility that
intelligent life exists elsewhere in the universe. Bruno travels to Italy in
hopes of convincing the Pope of his beliefs. Instead, he is interrogated by the
Inquisition, judged a religious heretic, and burned at the stake because of his
refusal to recant his beliefs.
Copernican heliocentricism is based on trust rather than observation and
is not much better at predicting astronomical events than the Greek
philosopher Ptolemy’s ancient geocentric, or Earth-centered, theory on
which Church doctrine is based. Copernicus’ theory is a case of a belief
based on trust that coincidentally happens to be true about nature. A
successor in the study of heliocentric cosmology is Johannes Kepler (1571–
1630). For Kepler, actual observations serve only as supporting evidence for
his religious faith in heliocentricism. Kepler makes mathematical
calculations of his observations of the movements of bodies in the sky,
proving that the sun is indeed at the center of the solar system and
demonstrating that elliptical models, rather than circular models, fit his
observations of the orbits of planets around the sun.
Other concepts about nature also make their appearance at about this
time. For example, the idea that everything in the universe is made up of
tiny particles of matter is resurrected, and this atomistic theory of the
material universe eventually becomes a foundational belief in natural
philosophy. The assumption that the universe operates by a set of
mechanical laws that can be mathematically calculated also gradually grows
into a model for examining all of nature.
Teleology and Natural Causes
The discovery of natural forces like gravity illustrates a distinction

between teleology and naturalism. Naturalism is the belief, supported by
systematic and replicable observations, that nature is governed by a set of
causes. In contrast, teleology is the belief that nature is governed by design
and that events in nature happen because they are meant to happen
according to the design. In other words, a teleological belief system asserts
that events in nature happen not as a consequence of causes, but for a
purpose. The natural human fondness for teleologies likely results from the
fact that significant events are more likely to be noticed by humans, because
humans see patterns even where they may not exist, and because humans
are likely to judge erroneously the probability of events in which they
already believe. People seem prone to believe in a cosmic or divine plan.
Finding that events in nature happen as a consequence of causal laws seems
disappointingly mechanical, makes human lives and needs tangential to
natural forces, and makes it more difficult to maintain teleological beliefs in
purpose and design.
As natural causes for natural events are found in the 16th century, beliefs
about supernatural powers and about the central place of humans in the
universe become harder to hold. Thus, learning that the sun, not the Earth, is
at the center of the solar system and that the Earth and other objects in
space move as they do because of natural forces challenges human beliefs in
divine plans. Religious doctrines that causal powers reside with God alone
are threatened by this growing reliance on naturalistic explanations for
events in nature.
Psychological and Theological Consequences
If the sun, not the Earth, is at the center of the universe, then humans are
not at the center of the universe and everything does not literally revolve
around us. But how could it be that the universe was not designed
specifically for us and for our use? If there are other suns and other planets,
possibly even other people, how can humans justify a belief that they are
God’s chosen and favorite creation? If our god is just our god, and other
people on other planets have other gods, which is the one true god? As
sailors begin geographic exploration, other people with many other gods are
being found even here on Earth.
Gradually, as heliocentricism becomes accepted and some of the laws of
nature that govern the physical universe are discovered, human
understanding about our place in the universe changes dramatically, and
God seems to withdraw and not be as close in a daily way. The events of
everyday life are explained more parsimoniously by the laws of nature. God
seems more like a creator who set everything in motion but may no longer
be present daily and may intervene only occasionally in the form of
miracles. Have we been abandoned in this mechanical universe by a now-
absent God?
In this era, mind is defined as a nonmaterial aspect of the human;
therefore, natural philosophy has nothing to say about mind. As long as
psychological questions are about individual subjective thoughts and not
about the observable physical universe, there is no place for psychology in
natural philosophy.
The Times
Europe is still heavily forested during the period from about 500 to
1348, and sudden death seems to lurk behind every tree. All kinds of
wild and dangerous animals lie in wait, especially bear, wild boar, and
the wolves of Red-Riding-Hood fame. Babies and children are common
prey for wild animals, especially during times of drought and famine
when, like in the story of Hansel and Gretel, parents intentionally
abandon some children deep in the forest so there will be more food for
the others. In the frequent years of famine, up to 10% of the population
dies. Visions, probably hallucinations caused by the effects of hunger or
food poisoning, are common. Even when food is available, it consists
mainly of grains, so that “Give us this day our daily bread” is a serious
and heartfelt prayer.
Homes are small, dark, cold, damp, and often made of earth. Most
people stay outside as much as possible, going indoors at night for
safety from predators. Without heat or windows, nor candles for light,
houses are a perfect breeding ground for disease. Epidemics of
smallpox, dysentery, malaria, and respiratory infections regularly
sweep through whole villages.
The average lifespan is about 21 years for people who are
comparatively wealthy, like the feudal lords and their families, but for
ordinary folks, it is even shorter. Among the well-off, one half of all
babies die in the 1st year of life. It is not unusual for a man to have
four or five wives in his short lifetime, losing several to death
associated with childbirth. Violence is a common occurrence, as a
percentage of the population makes a living by killing and stealing
from neighbors.
People living under these pressures are understandably naive and
credulous, believing that they are at the mercy of mysterious
supernatural forces, including evil spirits, sorcerers, and witches who
lurk around every corner. They search for signs in nature of what the
future may hold and seek salvation from this earthly hell. The
Christian saints are believed to possess supernatural powers and the
ability, if so disposed, to deliver this salvation. It is widely believed that
even conversion to Christianity is not sufficient to ensure salvation.
Nevertheless, not willing to take any chances, many do convert to
Christianity, and the wealthy make generous financial donations to the
local saints and to the Church.
Perhaps unintentionally, however, these promises of salvation also
promote many other superstitious beliefs. For example, the idea that
the natural earthly world is only a reflection of the perfect eternal
reality beyond suggests that the natural world might provide “signs” of
that eternal reality. Recall that humans tend to make assumptions
about design in nature, look for cause and effect, and see patterns
where none may exist. These tendencies caused people in the early
Middle Ages to look for such signs. They believe that the lines etched in
the palm of the hand, birth-marks, the location of the stars at the time
of birth, or the pattern of tea leaves at the bottom of a cup reveal
something important and valid about the future.
During this time, slavery is still practiced in Europe, as it is in most
of the rest of the world, and, as is also universally true, the slaves are
more likely to be women. In England, about 10% of the population
entered in the “Domesday Book” of 1086 are slaves. Male criminals and
debtors are killed or sold as field slaves. Their wives and children
become field or house slaves, and younger women who are landless,
uneducated, and otherwise unable to provide for themselves are sold
and used as prostitutes.
War follows on war throughout this period in Europe. From smaller
local conflicts to the Hundred Years’ War between France and England,
what few resources are available are often squandered in bloody battles
over territory.
Education, even at a rudimentary level, is available only to a select
few, and most people’s lives are not much different from those of their
parents. Toward the end of this era, the study of nature begins to yield
technological developments and advances in medicine, but again, those
are available only to a few. For example, as European medical
knowledge moves beyond the wisdom of the ancients, and as male
doctors are trained at universities, women are moved out of their
traditional roles as midwives. Childbirth, which had been a part of
everyday life attended to by midwives and friends of the mother, now
becomes a medical condition requiring the attention of male doctors.
This change, however, is not accompanied by a decrease in either
maternal or infant mortality, and childbirth is still a very dangerous
undertaking.
The Renaissance spreads, and by the 16th century, nearly all of
Europe begins to recover from successions of plague and famine.
Intellectual thought is evident again, although vastly altered from the
theological philosophies of the 14th century. The West is finally ready
for the emergence of a new way of knowing.
4
The Birth of Science: Is There Anything
You Cannot Doubt?
In this chapter, the birth of science as anew way of knowing is discussed, and the place of
Descartes’ rational philosophy in this new epistemology is explored. Important developments in
the methods of early science and statistics are covered, as well as the answers to psychological
questions offered by philosophers and politicians during this period. We seek to understand why
mathematics and science come to have such power in the West. Even as the revolution in
scientific, philosophic, and intellectual thought proceeds during the 17th and 18th centuries, both
science and philosophy become, for a time, the servants of frightening religious ends. Finally, at
the end of the 17th century the principles of Newtonian science are articulated.
REVOLUTION IS IN THE AIR
Ontological Revolution
For many centuries before the 16th, the cosmos was a mysterious and
wondrous place ruled by a grand hierarchy with a fearful and all-powerful
God at its head. Supernatural beings surrounded us, and signs and symbols
revealed the unseen spiritual realm to those who would see. Our worldview
was a profoundly spiritual one in which the physical body and spiritual
being were united. Western peoples believe that their experiences in and
perceptions of this world represent reality, so that if something is perceived
to be present, such as a mirage in the desert, then it really is present. As the
16th century closes, important changes begin to occur in what is believed to
be real.
During the next centuries, the world is increasingly viewed as mechanical
and mathematical. The symbols of mysticism retreat as nature becomes like
a machine, made of matter not spirit, and subject to predictable natural laws,
not the whims of spirits. The realization dawns more clearly that the
universe exists independently of human needs and concerns. Even our own
natures become strangely divided as the material body separates from the
spiritual soul. Opinions begin to be recognized as only subjective and not
necessarily reflections of objective reality.
As a consequence, it becomes harder to have trust in supernatural
beneficence granted through devotion and prayer. A simple but systematic
observation of the events in nature reveals that wishing rarely (if ever)
influences objective reality. At the same time, observations of nature bring
new knowledge about the workings of nature, so that people are less subject
to nature’s devastating vagaries. God is becoming more distant, but humans
can make life better through their own efforts, and further improvement is
expected through the use of reason and the systematic observation of nature.
Epistemological Revolution
Changes in what is believed to be true are driven by changes in

epistemology. After 2,000 years of believing only through faith and
authority, people in the West begin again to rely on observations of nature
informed by rational and independent thought. Although Scholastics like
Aquinas try to maintain a synthesis between coming to believe by trust and
coming to believe by observation, this attempt fails. The new epistemology
dictates that the supernatural must be known through trust only, and nature
may be known through observation. This is not a sudden transition, nor is it
final, especially when it comes to understanding the dual aspect of the
human, who is part natural and part spiritual.
A NEW WAY OF KNOWING
In 1574, when 13-year-old Francis Bacon (1561–1626) enters Trinity College,

Oxford, the curriculum consists exclusively of the study of Aristotle’s
writing as interpreted through Scholastic theology. Even in Oxford’s very
Protestant venue, Aquinas’ interpretation of “The Philosopher” (Aristotle) is
the basis of all that is known and all that will ever be known. Once they
have studied a Scholastically translated Aristotle and have mastered the art
of logical discourse, students will know what is known and be able to
engage in the study of knowledge.
False Idols of Knowledge
Bacon, like many adolescents, rebels against the traditional wisdom of his
elders and sets out on a path that carries him, and much of Western
philosophy, to a new method for seeking knowledge. As Bacon describes in
his book, Novum Organum, published in about 1605, human reason is
subject to various weaknesses that lead to beliefs that may not be true. A
new method must be devised that will reveal the truth in spite of human
propensities to believe untruths. Bacon suggests that these weaknesses in
reason have led to the worship of false idols of knowledge in the same way
that heretical religions might lead to the worship of false idols of faith.
Idols of the Theater
For example, people make false idols of the actors they have placed on
center stage: the authorities and Classical philosophers. People too readily
accept what is taught by authorities, without asking for evidence or proof.
Idols of the Marketplace

People also make false idols of the language used to conduct commerce or
to engage in logical rational argument. Language, which is used to explain
and transmit knowledge, can have different meanings for different people.
But people tend to assume that everyone means the same thing when using
the same words. Bacon suggests that when the results of observations are
put into writing, each word should have a fixed meaning.
Idols of the Cave
People make false idols of their own opinions, mistaking opinions for
truths and believing that their own opinions are true for all people.
According to Bacon, personal opinions arise from individual biological
predispositions in physiology or psychology, past experiences, and differing
educational backgrounds. Thus, these opinions are specific to each
individual. True knowledge should be sought collectively by pooling
observations and sharing interpretations among observers. In this way, the
weaknesses that cause people to believe that their personal opinion
represents truth may be overcome.
Idols of the Tribe
Finally, people make false idols of perceptions that result from weaknesses
inherent in the entire tribe of human minds. Bacon is especially critical of
the tendency of the human mind to see patterns where there are none; to
assume design; to be impatient to find quick, simple, cause-and-effect
answers; and to be unduly influenced by strong emotions.
✔ Stop and think.

Can you think of a recent example in which one or more of these idols
have interfered with good critical thinking?
Because of these weaknesses of human intellect, because people worship

false idols of knowledge that lead away from truth, Bacon says a new
method for seeking truth is needed, one that will help overcome these
weaknesses of intellect. He points out that a right method is like a right path
and that a very swift runner, if set on a wrong path, will only use swiftness
to move more and more quickly away from the truth. But even a slow
runner will eventually reach the right place if traveling on the right path.
The following four major themes are identified in Bacon’s proposal of a new
method.
Knowledge Is Power
Having knowledge about nature can give us power, not to have dominion
over nature, not to control nature, but to alter our relationship with nature.
Bacon believes that knowledge about nature will better the human
condition. When reading the Scholastics, students are encouraged to study
nature for the purpose of contemplating its relationship to the divine, but
Bacon points out that this spiritual contemplation has done nothing to
protect humans from ignorance about the workings of nature. Instead, the
study of nature should be put into the service of making humans less
helpless and less passive in the face of nature. Knowing the truth gives us
the power to alter our relationship with the thing known, and thus the goal
of knowledge should be to help us alter our fate.
For Bacon, knowledge of nature must always be sought in charity and
humility. Knowledge of nature must be sought for the purpose of alleviating
human suffering and enhancing the quality of life for all living creatures.
This knowledge should never be used to acquire private gain but should
always be shared freely and used for the greater good. And humans must
remain humble in the face of nature, recognizing that “nature can only be
commanded by being obeyed.” If humans try to impose their own designs
and schemes on nature, they will remain forever helpless. False knowledge
may make people feel powerful for a time, but nature will never be
dominated by mere humans.
Philosophy Must Be Divorced From Religion
Bacon reserves his most ardent criticism for Scholastic theologians who
have, he says, caused us to confuse natural philosophy with religion to the
detriment of both. Instead of learning from the patient and humble
observation of God’s actual creation, humans are too likely to assume that
there is a design, such as “everything happens for a reason.” Human minds
impose design and purpose on nature, arrogantly come to believe that this
human-invented design is genuine, and fail to examine God’s actual
creation:
Against [the corruption of philosophy by mixing it up with superstition and theology] we must
use the greatest caution; for the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil of all, and when folly is
worshipped, it is, as it were, a plague spot upon the understanding. Yet, some of the moderns have
indulged this folly, with such consummate inconsiderateness, that they have endeavored to build a
system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of
Scripture; seeking thus the dead amongst the living. And this folly is the more to be prevented and
restrained, because not only fantastical philosophy but heretical religion spring from the absurd
mixture of matters divine and human. It is, therefore, most wise soberly to render unto faith the
things that are faith’s. (Bacon, 1605/1859, p. 351)
Begin With Inductive Reason
As Bacon sees it, the right method for acquiring true knowledge is to start
by assuming that nothing is known. If it is possible to begin with a mind
clear of all prior assumptions, then observations will not be shaped and
biased by what is already believed to be true.
Once the mind is cleared, careful observations of the actual things in
nature may be conducted, always letting nature be in command by
remaining open to observing what nature reveals, one small piece at a time.
After enough observations have been conducted, some general conclusions
may be drawn about the objects of those observations. This general
conclusion should then be tested against further observations to ascertain if
it applies in all instances. The goal should be to draw larger and larger
conclusions, testing through observation at each level, until some basic law
of nature is arrived at that applies across all instances.
Doctor Watson: “This is indeed a mystery. What do you imagine that it means?”
Sherlock Holmes: “I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.”
(Conan Doyle, 1900, pp. 6–7)
Natural Philosophy Must Be Dynamic, Cooperative, and

Cumulative
Natural philosophy must be dynamic, or always open to change. This

dynamic aspect of the study of nature, what is today called science, is an
essential but often misunderstood component of the method. Religions assert
that there are absolute and sacred truths that are universal and unchanging
across all time. But for Bacon’s study of nature, and for scientists since,
generalizations about nature must always remain subject to further
observation and future change.
The study of nature must also be a cooperative venture, one that uses the
contributions of many diverse minds. It is through the cooperation of many
individuals conducting observations and suggesting possible generalizations,
Bacon believes, that the personal biases called the “idols of the cave” may be
overcome.
Finally, natural philosophy must be cumulative, so that higher and higher
levels of generalization are continually sought. In this way, human
understanding of the general principles underlying nature becomes deeper
and more complete.
For Bacon, and for science in general, the proper method for
understanding nature is one that overcomes the natural weaknesses in
human reason and has the potential to create a new relationship between
humans and nature. This technique produces verifiable and serviceable
truths about nature, not based on the word of authorities, not through
magical and sudden revelations, but through methodical and patient
observations:
Again, the reason science works so well is partly that built-in error-correcting machinery. There
are no forbidden questions in science, no matters too sensitive or delicate to be probed, no sacred
truths. That openness to new ideas, combined with the most rigorous, skeptical scrutiny of all
ideas, sifts the wheat from the chaff. It makes no difference how smart, august, or beloved you are.
You must prove your case in the face of determined, expert criticism. Diversity and debate are
valued. Opinions are encouraged to contend—substantively and in depth. (Sagan, 1996, p. 31)
THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE
Just over 20 years after Francis Bacon’s death, the Oxford Experimental
Science Club is founded in 1648 for the purpose of furthering Bacon’s new
way of knowing about the physical universe. Even without sophisticated
means of observation and measurement, members of this club explore
questions such as the physical nature of the moon and factors that might
influence the power of humans to someday travel in space (Purver, 1967).
Natural philosophers of the 17th century study nature by observing and
describing nature and only for the purpose of knowing about nature. Divine
revelation and philosophical speculation are abandoned in favor of the
empirical methods articulated by Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and others.
These empirical techniques yield more valid and reliable information about
the physical universe than has ever resulted from revelation or speculation.
The scope of what makes up the physical universe is defined in this era by
what Galileo calls the primary qualities. Everything that can be measured,
everything that has shape, size, or weight, is considered part of the physical
universe. Thus, everything in the physical universe can be experienced by
human sensory systems and also has a reality that transcends individual
sensory experiences. For example, two people weighing the same banana on
the same scales should find the same weight each time if the device is
reliable. The weight of the banana transcends individual sensory systems
and is thus a part of the physical universe.
✔ Stop and think.

What gets left out if one must consider as important only that which
can be observed and measured?
At the end of the 17th century, there are aspects of reality that are not
regarded as part of the physical universe but are important to the questions
of psychology. Among these are the spiritual aspects of the human,
including the will, soul, mind, or spark of the divine. These are secondary
qualities: the subjective aspects of reality, like beauty, that cannot be
measured. The secondary qualities are part of sensory experience, but they
do not transcend individual experience. The smell, taste, and color of a
banana are secondary qualities. Each individual may taste the banana but
may or may not agree with others that the banana tastes good. And even if
all agree that a banana tastes good, what is meant by that? How good is
good? Is the good taste of a banana a quality inherent in the banana or is it
dependent on taste perception, so that taste happens only in the eater’s
mouth? Secondary qualities are real but they are not, according to natural
philosophy in the 17th century, part of the physical universe. To the degree
that psychology is the study of subjective secondary qualities, it is not
considered part of the physical universe either. Thus, the questions of
psychology are not studied using the same methods that are used to study
the physical universe.
THE ROLE OF MEASUREMENT
Studying only the primary qualities encourages confidence in numerical

findings. How much do bananas weigh? If this banana weighs 120 grams,
but another banana weighs 130 grams, which is more representative of the
weight of bananas? Other questions could be asked about the range of
weights within which bananas fall and about where, within this range, this
particular banana falls. The numerical results transcend the opinion of any
one individual mind. The weight of bananas may appear to have little to do
with psychology, but some 18th-century natural philosophers do try to
weigh the soul, for example, by weighing a dying person just before and
after death. Noting that the weight does not change when death occurs, they
do not conclude that there is no soul. Instead, they conclude that the soul
must not weigh anything, thus illustrating that preexisting beliefs can
influence conclusions about what is observed.
Trust in the transcendent truth of numbers can leave humans vulnerable
to various kinds of statistical tricks if good critical thinking skills are not
used or the basic laws of probability are misunderstood. For example, a
mathematical statement can appear to be authoritative when it is really only
substituting mathematical terms for ordinary words. Or sometimes a
variable is chosen for study only because it is measurable, not because it is
predictive or interesting. Sometimes what is measurable is studied in an
effort to understand the immeasurable.
Knowledge and Opinion
Although statistics can be used to cause confusion, their use still helps
overcome the false idols of knowledge. Throughout this journey through
Western thought, humans have been concerned with degrees of certainty,
have usually recognized that some things are more certain than others, and
have nearly always accepted that mathematical truths are the most certain
truths of all (Cowles, 1989). Thus, in the 17th century, signs in the physical
universe are measured in the search for certain knowledge.
Degrees of Certainty
Some observable signs in the physical universe do indicate the state or

presence of something else that may be less observable or measurable. In
other words, some signs are reliable indicators about the state or presence of
something unobservable. For example, skin temperature and swollen lymph
glands are outward signs indicating something about the presence of illness,
whereas no matter how skilled the reader, tea leaves in the bottom of a cup
are not related to the state or presence of anything. Because some signs
actually do indicate the state or presence of something else, it becomes
important to discriminate between those signs that do reliably predict and
those that do not.
Scientia and Opinio
The Latin term for certain knowledge is scientia. By the 17th century,
certain knowledge is obtained through demonstration. There are the “high
sciences” of astronomy and physics, in which aspects of the physical
universe are demonstrable using measurable primary qualities. Signs in the
high sciences are readily measurable and highly certain. There are other
branches of inquiry in which the degree of certainty is less. What is known
in these areas is, in Latin, opinio, not certain knowledge, but probable
knowledge, or opinion. Opinions are those assertions that are made by
authorities or by the testimony of judges. The branches of inquiry in which
states or relationships are known by reading the less measurable signs are
the “low sciences,” such as alchemy or medicine. In the low sciences, the
signs are read and opinio is rendered, but measurement is not possible and
knowledge is less certain. In this era, psychology does not even achieve the
status of a low science. In Fig. 4.1, alchemists measure the signs of their
science.
FIG. 4.1. The Alchymist, by Pietro Longhi (1661; Pignatti, 1968, plate no. 176).
In the low sciences, there is confusion between the new scientific
epistemology and the traditional belief in authorities. What distinguishes
scientia from opinio is the method by which belief is derived. For scientia, it
is demonstration. For opinio, the method is the word of authorities or judges
who know how to read the signs in nature: the magicians, sorcerers, witches,
physicians, and those to whom God has chosen to reveal the secrets of
nature. Some people are more skilled readers of signs, and they become the
authorities or the judges. Some signs are also more valid, or objectively true,
than others. Will you get sick and die? The lines on your palm may reveal
the answer, but the pallor of your face and the temperature of your skin are
more valid signs. Signs are not certain, but they render an opinion more
probable.
The ability to read these kinds of signs is eventually transformed into the
practice of medicine. And the reading of signs is what physicians do to
diagnose and treat disease, both physical and mental. In the present day
these are called symptoms, but in the 17th century, they are called signs.
Signs as Evidence
The frequency with which a sign accurately predicts an outcome is a

measure of its validity. In science, signs with a very high probability of
being valid are referred to as evidence. Valid observable evidence accurately
predicts outcomes. Those speculations that are supported by evidence are
more likely to be true “scientia” and not just “opinio.”
Discriminating between what constitutes evidence and what does not
remains as difficult a task in the present day as it was in the early days of
science. Although many of the readers of signs make predictions that are no
better than chance, palm readers being an example, some learn to exploit
weaknesses in human reason and make people believe that what they offer is
evidence. Recognizing that the human mind sees patterns where none exist
or that people are more likely to believe what they want to be true, those
readers can easily trick us into paying good money for useless services.
Reasons to Measure
Humans are vulnerable to a variety of statistics-related mistakes in thinking

that can lead to beliefs for which there is no evidence. Measuring the
reliability of the signs and thus establishing evidence can help to overcome
these mistaken beliefs and the fears that follow. For example, the careful
measurement of the outcomes on all occasions when success is wished for
can help overcome the human tendency to remember those occasions when
wishing is associated with success and to forget those when it is not.
Overcoming the Idols of the Cave
The careful observation of signs, including measuring wherever possible,

helps to overcome the tendency to believe that what is already known is
what is true. It was measurement of the observed bodies in space that made
it clear that the sun does not circle the Earth, even though it looks as though
the sun moves across the sky. If two objects, one heavy, one light, are
dropped from the top of a tower, it seems certain that the heavy object will
fall faster and land first. But just as surely, measurement shows that this is
not the case.
Overcoming the Inability to Estimate Probability
Weaknesses in estimating probability can be exploited in a variety of

ways. Those who are not skilled at understanding the numerical odds of a
future event are more likely to risk more than they can afford to lose. Not
being able to estimate probability makes judging risk versus benefit more
difficult. Wise decisions are harder to make about everyday issues, such as
whether or not to buy insurance, the likelihood of winning the lottery, or
judging if one is likely to become a victim of crime. Measuring helps to
overcome the inability to estimate probability correctly (Hacking, 1975).
Overcoming Fears About Chaos
Often, nature and the gods can seem capricious and chaotic. One year the
plague sweeps through town, so people move to the country. The next year,
floods wipe out the new country home. One year crops are plentiful, the
next they are not. Fears about the capriciousness of nature are even reflected
in cosmogenic myths, in which deities achieve their place of prominence and
authority by first conquering the forces of chaos in nature. Measurement is
another way to help to calm human fears about the apparent randomness of
nature.
Uses of Measurement
Sampling
By 1700, several concepts about measurement are understood, even in the

low sciences. For example, it is understood that where it is not possible to
measure every instance, predictions may be made by measuring a sample of
instances. How many times must a rock be observed falling when dropped
before one might be willing to predict that the next time the rock is dropped
it will fall?
How will you die? What is the best way to know the most likely causes of
death? If a list of all causes of death for the last week is published, you could
select a sample of these lists and count how many people died from each
cause. But how many lists must be sampled before making a statement
about the most likely causes of death? Enough lists must be sampled to
avoid having a single unusual list cause an incorrect prediction. For
example, a terrible fire claiming many lives during 1 week would cause an
overestimation of the risk of dying in a fire. The lists chosen as the sample
must also accurately represent the whole population about which you wish
to predict. For example, to predict the likelihood of death from particular
causes in the city of London, one must make certain that the lists show all
possible causes of death, that they include all of London, and that they do
not count areas outside of London. If the sample is representative, it is
possible to predict for a whole population. This opens up new phenomena to
examination through measurement. Anything where measuring every
instance would be too cumbersome or even impossible can be studied by
examining a representative sample.
Divining Patterns in Nature to Estimate Risk

In the late 17th century, John Graunt, an English haberdasher (hat-
maker), was concerned that most people worried a great deal about
dying from causes that were not really very likely to kill them. He
understood that numerical data could be used to “divine” patterns in
the past that might shed light on the future. He used data from the “Bill
of Mortality” published each week, which listed the causes of deaths in
London the previous week. After examining the lists published
between 1604 and 1661, he determined from what causes people were
most likely to die. His conclusion: “Whereas many persons live in great
fear, and apprehension of some of the more formidable, and notorious
diseases following; I shall onely set down how many died of each: that
the respective numbers, being compared with the Total, those persons
may the better understand the hazard they are in.” (Graunt, 1662/1975,
p. 31)
RATIONALISM AS ANOTHER WAY OF KNOWING
By the early 17th century in the West, philosophers accept that, to

understand nature and what is physical, observations of nature must be
conducted, whereas the supernatural or metaphysical will be revealed only
through trust. In which domain does the human belong? Are humans purely
natural, or is there also a spark of the divine, the supernatural? If humans
are purely natural, then observations should eventually reveal everything
about human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, but if humans are partly
supernatural, then another method, another way of coming to believe,
another epistemology for the study of humans must be found. In the 17th
century, French mathematician and philosopher, Rene Descartes (1596–1650)
offers rationalism, the use of reason and logical argument, as this
alternative epistemology.
✔ Stop and think.

Which are humans: natural animals or supernatural beings?
Rationalist approaches to the study of nature and humans are proposed

because of several weaknesses in Bacon’s inductive empirical approach.
These weaknesses include common failures in human perception, like seeing
mirages in the desert. For Descartes, rationalism is seen as a way to improve
on perceptions, rather than as an alternative to empirical study.
Antiauthoritarian
Rationalistic philosophers, especially Descartes, reject Scholastic

philosophy’s reliance on authorities for understanding nature. Like Bacon,
Descartes is unhappy to find that the philosophy taught at the university
consists of the study of Aristotle’s philosophy and Aquinas’ theology and
that any other way of seeking knowledge is not just discouraged, but in this
era of increasing accusations of heresy, may even be persecuted. Both
Descartes and Bacon agree that the study of Aristotle will only get one as far
as Aristotle got, but no further.
Skepticism and Naturalism Are Dangerous
At the same time, Descartes is a devout Catholic. He is disturbed by

skeptical philosophies like those offered by Montaigne and by empirical
philosophies that regard humans as purely natural and mechanical.
Skepticism may be potentially productive of new and creative ideas, but it is
also disruptive to the social order and disturbing to individual happiness.
Allowing people to seek and accept truth on their own terms leads to a kind
of intellectual anarchy that may prove dangerous to the entire social order.
For example, in this era, skeptical and naturalistic conceptions are
threatening well-established beliefs in the divine hierarchy. As observations
in nature reveal amazing physical similarities between human and
nonhuman animals, questions arise about the assumption that humans are
closer to God or more god-like than other animals. Believing that humans
are like animals gives rise to doubts in the belief that humans have a
transcendent soul and animals do not. What is the soul, and where is it
located? Religious rationalists like Descartes seek certainty, but they insist
on a certainty that preserves the human soul and thus confirms theological
authority.
At the same time, rationalist conclusions must be compatible with the
growing movement for empirical study. Rational approaches to science
argue that pure inductive fact gathering is useless without a guiding
hypothesis that helps determine which observations to conduct. A
hypothesis is derived from reasoned thought about the subject at hand.
Observations can then be conducted to confirm the hypothesis.
THE RATIONAL METHOD

The rational method involves using observations combined with logical
argument to arrive at a certain conclusion. The first step is to establish
premises. If these are true, and the conclusion follows logically from these
premises, then the conclusion is certain. The premises of a logical argument
are assumed to be true. The classic example of a logical syllogism is this:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Introspection
Because logical argument or reason is necessarily conducted in the mind, an

examination or observation of one’s own knowledge is conducted to
determine correct premises. Thus, in arational argument, introspection is
considered a form of observation. In the same way that sight provides
information about the external world, introspection provides information
about the internal world. One of the problems with relying on introspection
as a research tool is that each person’s introspection is likely to lead to
different observations, making unifying generalizations difficult to reach.
Weaknesses in Human Reason
Like empiricists who are aware that sensory experience of objective reality
is altered by human perceptual processes, rationalists are aware that humans
commit systematic kinds of errors in reasoning. To help standardize the
knowledge gathered from introspection, Descartes proposes four rules to
control for these weaknesses in reason and thus attain certainty.
1. Whatever is concluded as certain must be so clearly true and so

logically sound as to allow for no reason for doubt.
2. A problem should first be divided into the smallest possible units
before attempts are made to solve it.
3. These smallest possible units should then be ordered from the
simplest to the most complex.
4. Although these units describe the problem completely, they only
describe specifics, but the conclusions drawn should be general.
According to Descartes, if these rules are followed in each analysis,

illogical conclusions may be avoided and certain knowledge may be
achieved.
✔ Stop and think.

Can you think of anything that is so clearly true and so logically sound
as to allow for no doubt?
The Rational Process
Begin in Doubt
Both empiricists and rationalists agree that if true knowledge is desired,

all assumptions and previously learned beliefs must be cleared from the
mind. Each premise must then be examined carefully before it is accepted to
determine if it can, in any way, be doubted. For example, Descartes begins
by examining everything that he believes to be true and can find almost no
belief that cannot be doubted. Can he doubt that God exists? Yes, this devout
Catholic concludes, this is a belief that can be doubted. Can he doubt that he
himself exists? Yes, he concludes, he can certainly doubt that his body exists.
He can doubt that his sensory organs and the information they provide are
real. All of this may simply be an illusion.
Resolve Doubt
In Descartes’ analysis, there are some beliefs that are so clearly true and
logically sound that there is no reason to doubt them. Descartes considers
beliefs of this nature to be innate. To build a body of knowledge, one must
begin with these innate truths. Even if Descartes can doubt that all of his
actions, experiences, and even his body are real, he cannot doubt that he is
doubting. Therefore, he must exist, if only as a doubter. This is both clearly
true, and it is also logically sound. Because doubting is a form of thinking,
Descartes concludes that because he is thinking, he must exist, if only as a
thinker—cogito ergo sum in Latin.
Build a Logical Sequence
Once established as true, premises may then be used to construct a logical

sequence of argument that leads to further truths. For example, having
concluded that he exists as a thinker, Descartes goes on to argue that the
existence of God may be established through logical argument as well.
According to Descartes’ logic, the fact that humans are able to conceive of a
God who is omnipotent, even though omnipotence is not a part of the
human experience, is evidence that an omnipotent God must exist. How else
would humans have conceived the concept of omnipotence? In this way,
logical arguments are constructed with conclusions that may, or may not, be
tested by observation.
Conduct Observations to Confirm
For rationalists, whereas observations are used to help establish premises,

the proper place of observations and experiments is to confirm conclusions
arrived at through logical argument. Thus, rationalists suggest that
conclusions reached through reason and supported by observations are
superior to conclusions reached only through observations inductively tied
together into reasonable generalizations.
RATIONAL CONCLUSIONS
By establishing the existence of mind, Descartes has defined and proven the
existence of an aspect of the human that is distinct from the body. No one
can doubt the existence of human reason and thought. No matter what
observations empiricists may make about the physical human body, human
reason still transcends nature. Furthermore, because only humans think
about their own thoughts, only humans possess this immaterial and
transcendent aspect. According to Descartes, other animals may think, but
they do not think about their own thoughts, and therefore they do not
possess souls. Souls in the form of minds live on after the material body dies
and will be rewarded or punished in the afterlife. Thus, the Church’s power
to provide salvation is maintained. In this way, Descartes’ philosophy
supports and preserves the authority of the Church.
Trust Sensory Information
Echoing Aquinas but using logical deduction to arrive at the same

conclusion, Descartes argues that because God exists, is perfect, and would
not deceive us, sensory experiences can usually be trusted. Even so, sensory
experiences must be clearly represented in consciousness to be considered
certain, and any discrepancy between sensory experience and rational
explanation should be resolved in favor of reason.
Innate Ideas
Descartes goes on to conclude that there are other ideas that are also innate.
For example, although there is no place in the material world where there is
perfect unity, the mind can conceive of unity; therefore, the ability to think
about unity must not derive from sensory experiences in this material world
but must be innate. Similarly, ideas of infinity and mathematical concepts
like those used in geometry must also be innate. Descartes is not concerned
with providing evidence that these ideas are innate; his argument is that
they are so clearly true and so logically sound as to allow for no reason for
doubt (Descartes, 1641/1986).
Mechanism
Mechanical devices are becoming an important part of the landscape in

17th-century Europe as time-keeping devices, as labor-saving machinery,
and even as entertainment. For example, Descartes is fascinated with the
mechanical moving statues of gods and goddesses in the grottoes under the
Royal Gardens at Saint-Germain. It is even rumored that he names his
daughter Francine after the Francini brothers who construct the statues in
1634 (Gaukroger, 1995). The statues are operated hydraulically by pressure
plates buried just below the surface in the pathways. Stepping on the plates
causes water to flow through hidden pipes and turns on the mechanical
figurines as one walks through the garden. Like others in this era, Descartes
sees many parallels between mechanical systems and living bodies.
Nerve Transmission
Descartes proposes a theory of nerve transmission in living beings that

works much the same way as the mechanical figures in the garden (Gross,
1998). Hollow nerves carry “animal spirits” to structures in the brain where
the spirits are transferred to response circuits, triggering muscular responses.
All of this can occur in the complete absence of conscious thought. In this
way, behavior is mechanical, and the body can be thought of as an “earthen
machine.”
Human Soul
Human nervous and muscular systems function much like those of other
animals. It is the human soul that allows for thinking about experiences and
behaviors. So although animals behave the way their machines are built to
function, the soul allows humans to reason about and choose behavior.
Because the soul is nonmaterial, it does not exist in space as a
multidimensional object. Descartes argues that it must be something like a
single point.
✔ Stop and think.

How could something nonmaterial, like a thought, get translated into
something material, like a body behaving?
Arguing that the human soul causes human behavior requires an

explanation about how exactly this nonmaterial soul could cause a material
body to act. This is the mind-body problem and a question that confounds
both philosophers and physiologists. Descartes proposes a solution. He
decides that the translation from thought to action occurs inside the brain
and that there must be a structure in the brain responsible for this function.
This structure would serve as the receiving station for the thought from the
nonmaterial soul and would then translate the thought into action in the
material body. It would also receive sensory information from the body,
change that into a nonmaterial form, and then transmit it to the soul for use
in choosing a response.
Descartes reasons that this structure would be present in the human brain
but not in other animals. Because human sensory systems generally provide
two impressions of experience (two eyes, two ears, etc.), but thoughts are
only one impression, there should only be one structure in the brain where
this translation occurs. He then conducts dissections on a variety of animals,
including on human brains obtained from autopsies. He observes that only
humans have a pineal gland and finds only one pineal gland in human
brains. As a result of his observations, he identifies the pineal gland as the
organ where the nonmaterial soul communicates with the material body.
Descartes is wrong, of course, on a number of counts. For example,
nonhuman animals do possess pineal glands. This is an instance where
Descartes’ rationalism might have benefited from some additional empirical
observation. The question about how the actions of the material body are
translated into the thoughts of the nonmaterial soul remains with us today.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF RATIONALISM
Descartes’ philosophical rationalism has a number of important

consequences for the history of science and psychology. One of the most
important is the idea that the truth about psychological matters may not
need to be observable or measurable if it can be established rationally. In
fact, to the degree that the study of psychology is the study of a nonmaterial
and thinking soul, certain truth about psychology may only be accessible
through rationalism according to Descartes.
From this point forward, the term mind is considered more appropriate
than the term soul when discussing psychological questions:
Thus because probably men in the earliest times did not distinguish in us that principle in virtue of
which we are nourished, grow, and perform all those operations which are common to us with the
brutes apart from any thought, … they called both by the single name soul. But I, perceiving that
the principle by which we are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think,
have declared that the name soul when used for both is equivocal; and I say that, when soul is
taken to mean the primary actuality or chief essence of man, it must be understood to apply only
to that principle by which we think, and I have called it by the name mind as often as possible in
order to avoid ambiguity; for I consider the mind as not as part of the soul but as the whole of the
soul which thinks. (Descartes, 1641, as cited in Watson, 1979, p. 13)
Even the mind, however, still lies outside the realm of the empirically
observable and measurable. In this era, the study of human experience,
including human perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, remains firmly rooted
in philosophical speculation.
Although rationalism as articulated by Descartes is not incompatible with
empiricism, observations and experience play entirely different roles in each
of these approaches. Philosophers of science today still argue over whether
the practice of science lives up to its Baconian ideal of fact-gathering
observations unbiased by hypothesized expectations or whether rationally
derived hypotheses are not just commonly used but are even necessary to
help define the scope of observations undertaken (Kuhn, 1970; Popper, 1968).
Even though new students of science are often taught that science begins in
unbiased wonder, rarely do scientists conduct observations without
expectations, usually worded as hypotheses, about what will be observed and
found.
In the West, both empiricism and rationalism take their places on the
intellectual stage only about 400 years before the present day. This is not
much time in terms of intellectual development. Thus, the models of
psychology that emerge in the 17th century are familiar to us in the present
day. For example, the origin of more modern studies of stimulus-response
relationships lie in Descartes’ conception of “earthen machines’,’ sensing and
responding to the environment without conscious intervention.
Even more striking is Descartes’ assertion that the human is dualistic. The
human body is physical and part of nature, but human thought is
metaphysical and so is not part of nature. This assumption of duality is
referred to in following centuries as Cartesian science. Furthermore, the
study of the body should be left to those who study nature, and the study of
the mind should be a different discipline altogether. The latter assumption
justifies the discipline of psychology. It also returns the nonmeasurable
secondary qualities to a legitimate place in science, at least for a while.
Descartes claims that he has defined a science of the study of secondary
qualities. That science of the secondary qualities eventually becomes
psychology.
A CASE STUDY: THE ENLIGHTENED MIND AND

300 YEARS OF WITCH PERSECUTION
Magic, Science, and Religion
From its earliest origins, science is inextricably bound up with religion and
magic (Dampier, 1948). Because humans are predisposed to making
superstitious assumptions, beliefs in supernatural powers are common. From
a time before history, some have earned a living by promising to invoke the
supernatural powers in our behalf. Healers combine a carefully acquired
knowledge of the medicinal effects of plants with incantations designed to
activate and exploit human biases in reasoning, often achieve dramatic
results, and occasionally even effect cures. Soothsayers invoke supernatural
powers and foretell the future, maintaining their credibility by taking
advantage of all-too-common human misunderstandings about the laws of
probability.
Magic
Concepts of good magic and evil magic, or the ability of humans to call
on the powers of the supernatural, have been present in Western thought
since at least Roman times. Good magic has beneficial effects, such as a cure
from disease, an abundant crop, or a healthy live birth. Evil magic has evil
consequences, and in Roman law, damage done through the use of evil
magic is as prosecutable as is damage that is done through a physical act. All
magic, both good and evil, is achieved through supernatural intervention.
By the 15th and 16th centuries, a distinction is made between natural
magic and supernatural magic. Supernatural magic enlists supernatural
powers to achieve its ends, but there is also a kind of natural magic that is
embodied in the properties of nature. Magnetism, for example, is thought of
as a magical power that allows some stones to effect movement in certain
other objects and is thus a form of natural magic. Natural magic invokes
only powers in nature. In this era, however, most people still believe that all
magic, supernatural or natural, requires the intervention of deities or
demons, and most people are thus very distrustful of the new study of the
powers in nature.
Demons
Widespread beliefs in the daily presence and activity of good and evil
supernatural powers, including Christian saints, forest spirits, and
mischievous demons of all kinds, add to the confusion among magic,
religion, and science. Christian beliefs in an evil supernatural power stem
originally from Jewish tales of evil deities, and those have their origins in
even more ancient Near Eastern supernatural powers of fertility and death.
When Europe comes into contact with Eastern Christianity in the 12th
century, these beliefs in a powerful supernatural deity of evil, second only to
God in its ability to intervene in the lives of humans, become an important
component of Western Christian thought. After the fall of Constantinople in
1453, when Western Christianity comes into contact with Eastern
Christianity, beliefs in demons and the devil blossom in a Western world
ripe for these ideas.
Irrational Thought Reigns

There are some circumstances that seem most likely to call forth human
tendencies to accept, use, and promote irrational thinking. Among these are
unstable economic, political, or religious times. The 16th through the 18th
centuries in the West see instability in all of these areas. Serfs who have
survived for generations by farming move off the land and into cities, the
feudal order disintegrates, secular political structures threaten the authority
of the Church, and the Church is torn by reform and revolution from within.
Beliefs in how best to live, in the rewards to be received in a heavenly
afterlife, and in the Church’s power to deliver that salvation, are shaken.
Moreover, rational, critical thought does not seem to come naturally to
humans, even in the best of times. As belief in the power of evil grows in the
West during these centuries, superstitious beliefs abound. Illnesses, crop
failures, and all sorts of calamities are thought to be the work of evil
demons. Arguments between friends, marital incompatibility, and lust are
caused by demons jealous of human relationships. Epileptic fits, delusions,
and especially behaviors today associated with mental illness are considered
evidence of demonic possession. Furthermore, demonic possession is
believed to be caused by sinful behavior. If human behavior is caused by
human thought, and human thought derives from the soul, it is not such a
leap to believe that deviant behavior is caused by a soul that has gone astray.
These wandering souls have joined forces with the devil. They have become
demons or witches, and they have the ability to call forth other demons to
do their bidding. Like the good supernatural powers, these evil demons may
also take on human or animal form (Ginzburg, 1985).
Of course, not all of the enthusiasm for the witch persecutions during this
era comes from irrational beliefs. Because anyone may accuse anyone else of
demonic possession, many accusations are motivated by personal, economic,
political, and especially religious ends. Those accused as religious heretics by
the Church are among those most likely to be executed as witches. No one is
much concerned that innocent and pious individuals may be falsely accused,
because everyone knows that God protects the innocent and would not let
them be accused. Property belonging to convicted witches is claimed by the
accusers, political enemies can be deposed simply by accusing them of
witchery, interpersonal animosities are permanently resolved, and religious
authority is strengthened. As men move into practicing the art of medicine,
women serving as midwives become targets of the accusation of witchcraft
(Clark, 1997). Once accused, denying that one is a witch is used as evidence
to substantiate the charge. Admitting that one is indeed possessed does not
help either, as that will only hasten one’s trip to the stake, although when
asked to name co-conspirators, at least one doomed but resourceful
confessor names all of the court officials as agents of the devil (Russell,
1980).
Pope Innocent VIII authorizes two Dominican monks to serve as
inquisitors in witch trials, and in 1486, they publish The Witches’ Hammer,
or Malleus Malefi-carum, a manual about how to recognize, bring to trial,
and “save” those who have willingly “abandoned themselves to devils.”
According to this widely read and very influential book, demons may
manipulate the thoughts of innocent humans and cause them to act in evil
ways. Demons may cause infertility, impotence, loss of sensory or motor
abilities, mental confusion, insomnia, sleepwalking, or sudden death.
Therefore, any form of emotional or psychological disturbance is taken as
evidence of consorting with demons. Acting as agents of the devil, witches
and their animal companions can cause evil by a malevolent stare or even a
sideways glance.
In descriptions that sound remarkably like stories of alien abductions from
our own times, the transcripts of witch trials include accounts of being
removed from bed, carried through walls, and whisked through the air to
distant locations. They tell stories of creatures that disturb sleep by sitting on
one’s chest, cause nightmares of suffocation and falling, suck blood, steal
children, and sexually molest and impregnate their victims.
Scientific Evidence Against Witches
If proof were ever needed that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, one of
the earliest uses of the new, empirical method is to identify and establish the
guilt of those accused of witchcraft. Among the most common false beliefs
about science is that observations of nature can be used to reveal the
supernatural. When people do not understand what constitutes scientific
evidence, they are more likely to succumb to the irrational claims of
pseudoscience. Pseudoscience is an area of study that claims to be scientific,
but produces no evidence based on the methods of science. Sixteenth-
century pseudoscience takes the form of observational and experimental
tests to identify those possessed by demons.
The Pricking Test
It is believed that demons enter through the skin and the area where entry
has occurred will be insensitive to pricks of a pin and less likely to bleed.
Those accused are thus subjected to pricking all over their bodies. If a site is
found that is less sensitive than others, that is evidence that a demon has
entered. Demons also hide themselves in the hair, especially pubic hair, so
the bodies of the accused are shaven, eliminating these hiding places. This
also reveals birthmarks, scars, moles, or warts, all of which are signs of
possession.
The Weeping Test
Because witches are the agents of evil, they are not moved by accounts of
the suffering of Christ on the cross or other sad stories and are thus less
likely than the innocent to shed tears. It is recommended that this test be
used with caution, however, as witches are sometimes able to shed false
tears or to smear their faces with spittle so that they appear to be crying.
The Floating Test

For the floating test, the accused witch should be shaven, tied wrists to
ankles, and then pushed to the center of a deep pool or pond by men
wielding long sticks. Because the soul has weight, if she still possesses her
soul, she will sink and fail to resurface, proving that she is innocent of the
charges. If she continues to float when the sticks are removed, that is proof
that her soul has been taken by the devil, and she should be removed from
the pool and burned.
These observational tests are used to identify and convict those who have
allowed the devil to enter their material bodies and take control of their
spiritual souls. The execution of a witch is conducted so that the demons
may be driven from her body and her soul may be saved. Officials are
reluctant to sentence a witch to death, however, until she has confessed.
Therefore, once she is identified, she is tortured until a confession is
extracted, although about 10% of those who are killed persist “in denying
their guilt to the moment of death” (Russell, 1980).
The best estimates are that as many as 750,000 people are executed for
heresy or witchcraft (Thomas, 1971). The vast majority of them are women,
and most are older women (Russell, 1972; Clark, 1997). They die a horrible
death. They are tortured and then usually shackled to a stake and burned
alive while family and former friends watch with the full approval of
religious authorities. “The Comtian view that human thought has progressed
from magic to religion to science is now thoroughly discredited, for the
three have often been indistinguishable, and in any event varying degrees of
sophistication in each have been found at all levels of society from the
primitive to the modern” (Russell, 1972, p. 7).
PARADIGM FOR A NEW AGE
By the end of the 17th century, the practice of science is transforming the
landscape of Western intellectual thought. As has been true in the past, this
change in epistemology is triggered by skepticism. Seventeenth-century
Western skepticism is based on the rejection of Scholastic epistemology. For
more than 200 years, skeptical voices have grown stronger and asked more
disturbing questions.
This latest wave of skepticism is profoundly different from those that have
gone before. Instead of a nihilistic tearing down of belief systems, this new
skepticism challenges thinkers to construct a new belief system. This new
way of knowing will be one that everyone can understand and help build,
one that reflects personal and immediate experiences, and one that
genuinely helps humans to cope with the awesome powers of the natural
world. The new skepticism is directed not at asserting certain truth, but at
embracing doubt as an integral part of its new way of knowing. This new
way of coming to believe is referred to by present-day philosopher Thomas
Kuhn as the scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1970).
The Scientific Paradigm
According to Kuhn, a paradigm is a shared worldview or way of looking at

and understanding a body of knowledge. A paradigm is a global theoretical
framework through which to view and experience the physical or social
environment. Part of the purpose of a paradigm is to facilitate interactions
and communication among individuals in the group. Paradigms begin with a
set of shared assumptions that suggest both specific questions and a
definition of the methods to be used in the search for answers.
The Assumptions of a Paradigm
By definition, assumptions are never tested. Thus, it might be reasonable

to suppose that before adopting assumptions on which to found a paradigm,
great care would be taken to assure their truth, but often this is not the case.
The shared assumptions that found paradigms are very often the sort of
“truths” arrived at intuitively. They can be simple, cause-and-effect
explanations that feature personal experiences and are compatible with
existing beliefs. For example, the Scholastic paradigm began with the
assumption that this planet and everything on it was created for the
occupation and use of humans by a supernatural entity called God.
The Questions of a Paradigm
The shared assumptions of a paradigm also give rise to a set of questions

to be explored. Thus, the questions explored within a paradigm are not all of
the possible questions, but only those that make sense to explore within the
context of the assumptions. For example, Scholastic questions were ones
about how God may be known, what human duties to God are, what sin is,
what will is, and if the soul is transcendent. Scholastics did not ask about the
relationship between humans and animals because their assumption was
that everything in the world had been provided by God for the use of
humans.
The Methods of a Paradigm
The assumptions also suggest the methods used to find answers. It is

through the use of common methods that interaction and communication is
made possible. To return to Scholastics as our example, if the spiritual realm
is the only one that really exists, and the most important question is to know
God, then the way to find the answer is to seek divine revelation. Reading
and discussing the wisdom that has been revealed to others and that has
been received in the form of Scriptures, the writings of Classical
philosophers, and the revelations of early Church Fathers, are also acceptable
methods by which to know God.
The Strengths and Weakness of Paradigms

Paradigms facilitate the search for knowledge by defining the boundaries
of what is already known, specifying the questions to be explored, and
establishing the ground rules for conducting the search. Without first setting
these parameters, no collective and cooperative search for knowledge could
be conducted.
On the other hand, paradigms necessarily limit the worldview. As
indicated earlier, questions that lie outside the boundaries of the
assumptions are not explored, and potentially illuminating methods based on
different sets of assumptions are not utilized. Finally, the assumptions on
which paradigms are founded are never tested. If the assumptions are not
true, then the entire enterprise is wasted. Because each person is immersed in
the paradigms of their own time and culture, entire lifetimes may be spent
convinced of a false set of beliefs.
✔ Stop and think.

How can paradigms be changed?
Why and How Paradigms Change
Paradigms do change, although change is usually a very slow and

potentially uncomfortable process. Paradigms change when the truth of the
founding assumptions is repeatedly and credibly challenged. It is only when
there is strong and undeniable evidence that the assumptions are almost
certainly false that a paradigm begins to change. The evidence that an
assumption is false arises not from tests ofthat assumption, because
assumptions are not tested, but instead from what are called anomalies. An
anomaly is a piece of evidence that violates one or more of the assumptions
of the paradigm. For example, 16th-century Christian Church doctrine
asserted that God has placed Earth at the center of the universe. However,
astronomers of this period realized that their observations were inconsistent
with this assumption of geocentricity, that the Earth was at the center.
Instead, their observations were more consistent with heliocentricity. These
observations were anomalies; they violated the assumptions of the Scholastic
paradigm. Most of the time, the individuals who uncover and point out
anomalies are ignored or discredited. But if the anomaly appears again and
again, as did these astronomical observations, they become more difficult to
ignore.
More than 100 years after these 17th-century observations are made, and
after repeated observations by many astronomers, the authority of the
Church is successfully challenged with regard to this issue. The real
significance of this anomaly, of course, is that it throws into doubt all of the
assertions contained within Church doctrine. If the Church Fathers are
wrong about this founding assumption of the medieval paradigm that places
humans at the center of God’s creation, what else might they be wrong
about? How is it possible that Church Fathers could interpret the Holy
Scriptures so incorrectly? Is the Bible to be interpreted only metaphorically
and not literally? How is one to know what to think if one cannot trust
Church authorities?
The Principles of Newtonian Science
From about 1680 onward, much of the credit for advancement in

understanding the laws that govern the physical universe is given to the
English physicist, mathematician, and alchemist, Isaac Newton (1642–1727).
And because from that time until recently most of science is conducted using
the principles of discovery articulated by Newton, for the next 2 centuries,
Western science is called Newtonian science. The principles of Newtonian
science begin with an assumption that, although God created the universe,
He does not actively intervene to influence events in the universe. Therefore,
natural causes must be found to explain events in the universe. The will of
God should not be used as an explanation for natural events no matter how
implausible a natural cause may seem. According to Newton, the following
five assumptions should be made when conducting science:
1. The physical universe is governed by natural laws, so all

explanations for events in the physical universe must be based on
these laws and nothing else.
2. There are four basic components of natural laws, and everything in
the physical universe can be explained in terms of these four
components:
(a) matter, existing at a point in space and having mass;

(b) absolute space, consisting of immovable points;
(c) absolute time, consisting of moments that flow equably
without regard to anything else; and
(d) motion, which is caused by force.
The explanations that science offers for any event in the physical universe
must be stated in terms of interactions among these four components of
natural law.
1. No teleological explanations may be offered. That is, there is to be

no assumption of purpose in the laws of nature.
2. Scientific explanations should use as few assumptions as possible to
explain events in the physical universe. Only those causes that are
necessary and sufficient should be accepted, removing all
philosophic and religious dogma and all unnecessary assumptions
from the practice of science.
3. Humans must always recognize that, although the laws of nature
are absolute across all time and space, human understanding of
those laws is incomplete. Humanly generated scientific knowledge
is, therefore, always provisional and open to further correction. This
is because of human ignorance, not because of any variability in the
laws of nature.
THE GOALS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY
Validity. This new epistemology should yield knowledge about nature

that is free from bias. The solutions to nature’s mysteries are not to
be found down blind alleys of prejudice that lead to confusion,
destruction, and death at the hand of the awesome forces of nature.
Scientific findings are to be objective and not tainted by any of
Francis Bacon’s idols of false knowledge. That is, scientific findings
will not be biased by cultural or religious assumptions, the
unfounded opinions of authorities, or political motives. Scientific
findings should not be subject to linguistic confusion, rhetorical
tricks, personal prejudices, or emotional reactions. By engaging in
direct observations of natural phenomena, and then organizing those
observations using logic, scientists hope to come as close to true
knowledge about nature as is possible for humans.
Reliability. By sharing scientific methods and findings, others will be
able to conduct their own observations of similar phenomena and
thus establish the reliability of the findings. Establishing reliability
allows the generalizing of findings to similar situations.
Public results. Findings are shared in public meetings and by publishing
in scholarly journals. As early as 1560 in Italy, then spreading
throughout Western Europe, small groups of men meet informally to
discuss their observations of nature. In 1660, the Royal Society of
London for the Promotion of Natural Knowledge is founded, and
chartered by Charles II in 1662. The Royal Society begins publishing
Philosophical Transactions in 1665 to share the findings of its
members. Across Western Europe, scientific societies organize and
begin publishing journals. Although women are often active
participants in collecting and analyzing data, financing scientific
studies, and writing up the results of scientific observations, they are
not permitted to join or be present at the meetings of these new
scientific societies.
Practical results. Although not a primary goal of the new empirical
science, it is hoped that a greater understanding of nature will allow
humans to be less subject to its negative effects. Even the most pious
and devout die in plagues, along with the wicked, raising doubt that
spiritual causes are to blame for illness. Even in cities and towns
where none of the usual scapegoats are found—no Jews, no gypsies,
and few witches—plagues still take their toll. Eventually, the practice
of systematically collecting empirical observations begins to reveal
patterns that are useful in helping to understand the true cause of
disease, not so much so that humans can control nature, but so that
its devastating effects may be avoided. Important and helpful
discoveries are made in physics, chemistry, medicine, biology, and
botany.
THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM
The scientific paradigm of the 19th and 20th centuries owes its allegiance to
these 16th- and 17th-century beginnings. From the assumptions that found
the paradigm to its skeptical methods, present-day science is Bacon’s new
way of knowing, Descartes’ rationalism, and Newton’s science.
Scientific Assumptions
Like all paradigms, the new epistemology is founded on assumptions. Besides

assuming that sensory experiences are valid and trustworthy, the scientific
paradigm also assumes that everything in the physical universe is made of
matter, a belief labeled materialism by 19th-century philosophers.
Furthermore, because the physical universe is made of matter, all events in
the physical universe must be caused or determined by matter acting on
matter.
Materialism
Assuming that everything in the physical universe is made of matter

leaves the spiritual aspects of the universe intact and permits scientific
inquiry without calling into question religious belief systems. Separating the
spiritual from the material creates a division between religion and natural
philosophy that allows for the pursuit of knowledge into the laws that govern
the physical universe. Assuming materialism allows for the study of these
laws through observation and measurement. After more than 1,000 years of
religious doctrines against the study of nature, by 1700, the beliefs of Greek
physicists like Thales and Democritus returned. Natural philosophers began
again trying to identify the matter that makes up the physical universe.
Determinism
A second assumption of science is that all events in the physical universe

are determined by matter acting on matter according to rational laws.
According to 18th-century philosophers, God is rational, and because
humans were created in His image, humans are also rational. The physical
universe is thus designed and governed according to rational principles, and
humans are capable of understanding the laws that govern nature using
their God-given rational minds and sensory systems.
The laws of nature dictate its design and function in the same way that
mechanical principles determine the functioning of machines. In 1628,
William Harvey published his findings that the blood in living bodies does
not ebb and flow the way the ocean tides do, as was previously thought, but
instead circulates throughout the system, pumped by the heart, which
operates in the same way as a mechanical pump. Determinism is the
assumption that everything that happens in the physical universe is
determined by these kinds of mechanistic natural laws. Assuming that
matter acts on matter in ways determined by the laws of nature eliminates
spiritual causes from the physical universe. That is, those who employ the
new empirical epistemology in the study of nature no longer accept
explanations that rely on unseen or immeasurable supernatural forces. Rocks
do not fall to the ground when dropped because they feel companionship
with the earth and wish to rejoin it, as Aristotle suggested. Instead, there is
assumed to be some observable and measurable force that causes rocks to fall
when dropped. The task of the new way of knowing was to find that natural
cause.
Scientific Questions
Assuming that the physical universe is made of matter means that there is
nothing in the physical universe that cannot be observed and potentially
understood by humans. Thus, this new epistemology could be used to study
everything in nature. In contrast, assuming that knowledge can only be
acquired through trust creates an epistemological dead end. Beyond agreeing
that spiritual forces work in mysterious ways, humans can know nothing
more about them. But assuming that humans are capable of experiencing
and understanding all of nature removes the shackles of supernaturalism.
The 18th century explodes with new scientific knowledge. Nature is no less
mysterious than it ever was, but it is a mystery that all are able to experience
and invited to explore and help solve.
Scientific Methods
The methods for conducting empirical research are determined by the

assumptions of the scientific paradigm. Scientists seek to understand the
physical universe by observing and experiencing nature. These observations
are conducted systematically, are measured rather than merely described,
and are shared in such a way that invites scrutiny and skepticism. By
conducting systematic and measured observations, nature will be understood
as it really is and not as human minds perceive it or wish it to be.
At all stages in the scientific endeavor, the spirit of skepticism is kept
alive. No finding is ever considered proof of anything, as nature is always
open to further investigation. Instead, the findings of science are stated in
terms of probability, so that there is always room for further study. In this
way, coming to believe through the methods of science is profoundly
different than coming to believe through trust or logical argument.
The Times
The 16th-century Reformation of the Roman Catholic Church leads to a
century of religious wars in Europe. The Thirty Years’ War, pitting one
faction of Christians against another, is only one of many wars that
rage throughout this era. The witch craze is another measure of the
power that charges of heresy have to destroy lives and even whole
communities.
Poverty is the primary fact of life for most people, as war, famine,
and plague continue to ravage Europe. Most people live in tiny huts
with their extended family, work hard on the land year round, and eat
nothing but bread and thin soups day in and day out. Toward the end
of this era in Europe, feudal patterns of land ownership begin to
disappear, and the wealthier classes look to other prospects for
exploiting resources. Among these are settlements in the New World.
These are established initially for the purpose of providing saleable
resources to European markets but prove disappointing until about the
mid-18th century, when it is discovered that tobacco grows well in the
New World.
From the early 17th century on, the universe is increasingly viewed
as mechanistic. Machines help to control nature, and even humans are
thought of as biological machines governed by the sometimes
discernible laws of nature. Although a part of nature, humans are also
capable of understanding nature.
5
Philosophical Answers to Psychological
Questions: If a Tree Falls in the Forest
and There Is No One Around to Hear It,
Does It Make a Sound?
This chapter explores 18th-century approaches to the questions of psychology. Because human
mind is thought to transcend the physical universe, the rational and speculative methods of
philosophy are used to study these questions. Various perspectives are explored, including
rational, empirical, and romantic philosophies. In the meantime, progress continues in
understanding the physical universe through science. By the early 19th century, the intellectual
world is ready for theories of evolution based on observational evidence and the application of
those theories to psychology’s questions.
PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES OF THE

HUMAN
During the 18th century, attempts to understand human thoughts, feelings,

behaviors, and relationships with others are not made by scientists, but by
philosophers, artists, poets, and novelists. Until well into the 19th century,
no empirical methods for the study of human mind are developed.
Therefore, philosophy is the main method that is used to answer
psychological questions, rather than science.
Some philosophers emphasize the role of experience in shaping
knowledge, motivation, and relationships. Others suggest that psychological
characteristics are a result of rational thought and the desire to achieve
goals. Regardless of whether a philosopher assumes that behavior is
motivated more by past experience or by rational thought, the philosophical
method is speculation. Speculations are then supported with logical
argument and casual observations. These are the only methods available to
philosophers of psychology in these centuries. Several of the philosophers
discussed in the next section are acquainted with one another, and most read
the written works of the others. They are the intellectual and educated elite
of their time; their writings and ideas are influential among their peers and
have remained so to the present day.
The Women
Before going further, it should be noted that, although a few individual

fathers permit their daughters to be educated in the privacy of their homes,
women are not admitted into any major institutions of higher education in
Europe or North America until about 1850. A few intellectuals argue that
women should be educated. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797),
a British author best known for her book A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman (1792), says that women should be given access to higher education,
but only for the purpose of making them into better mothers.
Some women participate in philosophical and intellectual discussions, but
male publishers will not print their writings, and women’s influence is thus
not felt outside their own circles (Bridenthal, Koonz, & Stuard, 1987; Cooney,
1996). As a result, the work explored here will only be that of a few men
who influenced psychological thought among the intellectual elite in this
era. Before beginning, let’s reacquaint ourselves with the questions of
psychology:
Why do other people behave the way they do?

How can I get other people to do what I want them to do?
How much of what happens to me can I control?
Can I be happier, and, if so, how?
What is the best way to live?
The Selfish Motive

… and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
(Hobbes, 1651/1958, p. 107)
Born prematurely along the southern cliffs of England amidst the

confusion of the Spanish war against England, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
develops one of the most cynical philosophies of human nature. He believes
that humans are each driven by a constant fear of violence at the hands of
others and by the desire to get what is needed to survive. People spend their
lives gathering as many resources as possible and arming themselves against
the attacks of others, always fearing that others have more resources and
more effective weapons. So for Hobbes, humans, like other animals, are
motivated by two basic emotions, fear and desire; are concerned first with
their own survival; and are willing to take from others without regard for
the needs of the others. Thus, people always behave the way they do out of
self-interest, and all people are driven by these same motives.
Hobbes bases his beliefs partly on his own experience of fearfulness. He
readily admits to a great many fears, including an almost overwhelming fear
of the dark. Given that humans are predisposed to see evidence that supports
what they already believe to be true, it is not surprising that the very fearful
Hobbes develops a philosophy that assumes selfish and fearful motives and
then sees ample evidence to support his beliefs.
Government is the only way to prevent humans from living in a constant
state of violence, according to Hobbes. To reduce their own fear and to
prevent a cycle of increasing interpersonal violence, people join together in a
social contract to form a government. Hobbes decides that an absolute
monarchy, meaning the rule of an all-powerful king, is the proper form of
government. If people live in awe of, and under the rules of, a monarch, and
if institutions of government are established to enforce social rules, only
then, Hobbes believes, can humans live together and work productively.
Hobbes’ writings represent one of the earliest articulations of a belief that
has become foundational in modern Western cultures: that of the motivating
power of self-interest. After Hobbes, it is common for political and
psychological thought in the West to be based on this belief that humans
behave almost exclusively out of self-interest. Although it is possible to
construe much of human behavior as motivated by self-interest, there is little
empirical support and much evidence that does not support this belief
(Miller, 1999; Wallach & Wallach, 1983).
A contemporary of both Francis Bacon and Galileo, Hobbes attempts to
bring a materialist philosophy to the study of the human. In the same way
that Galileo studies the material in the skies, Hobbes advocates for the study
of the material that drives human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. He
regards emotions as resulting from the movement of matter, the motion in
some internal substance in the head, which either helps or hinders the
achievement of some desired goal. Thus, humans are motivated by the desire
to seek pleasure and avoid pain caused by the motion of a material
substance in the head. Like Descartes, Hobbes views human psychology in
mechanical terms, so that human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are seen
as a result of the laws of nature applied to the material, biological, human
machine.
Also like Descartes, Hobbes speculates about how objects and events in
the world are transformed into perceptions and thoughts. He concludes that
it is the motion of matter that causes perceptions. External objects cause the
motion of matter in the eyes, which in turn causes the motion of matter in
the brain. It is thus motion that causes thoughts. Furthermore, the motion of
some matter in one part of the brain may cause the motion of nearby matter,
thus causing thoughts about related objects or events (Herbert, 1989).
Because of these speculations, Hobbes is identified as an early
associationist, or believer that knowledge about the world is acquired by
associating new information with previously experienced objects and events.
Hobbes’ philosophy is based partly on a few structured observations he
conducts to establish an empirical basis for his ideas. Thus, Hobbes provides
a philosophy that justifies later empirical measures of psychological
phenomena.
The Blank Slate
John Locke (1632–1704) is an English philosopher and medical doctor who

earns his degrees at Oxford University. He bases his philosophical
speculations on the assumption that humans begin life as blank slates, or in
Latin, tabula rasa. According to Locke, humans are born with a variety of
faculties or mental abilities but without the knowledge of ideas or facts. This
is a radical departure from earlier Scholastic assumptions that humans have
innate knowledge, for example, of the difference between right and wrong.
This is also a departure from Cartesian rationalism and the assumption that
the mind is innately stocked with a wealth of ideas. As evidence in support
of his principle of the blank slate, Locke offers observations of young
children and those he calls idiots, pointing out that if humans are born with
any ideas, then those ideas should be known by everyone, including
children. But if children, who have not yet learned, or idiots, who do not
have the ability to learn, do not know these ideas, then, Locke says, that is
evidence that these ideas must be learned. Observations of children make it
clear that they often do not have the kinds of ideas that Cartesians insist are
innate. Therefore, the evidence proves that Cartesian rationalism is wrong,
according to Locke’s observations.
Experience
According to Locke, experience forms the basis of most ideas, and

experience has two sources. The first is sensory experience of the physical
world. The second is reflection, or the operations of the mind as experience
is thought about and sensations are associated together. Thus, humans begin
with a blank slate and then learn by sensing the physical world and thinking
about and associating sensory experiences. Locke recognizes that there are
natural abilities and biases that are sometimes difficult to overcome but
maintains that education and experience shape character (Axtell, 1968).
For Locke, wrong ideas originate from incorrect associations. In the mind,
two events occurring closely together in time and space become associated
together. Although the simultaneous occurrence of these events may be
purely coincidental, people come to think of them as causally related to one
another. Because wrong ideas originate from incorrect associations, Locke
believes that wrong ideas can be corrected simply by demonstrating more
correct associations.
Influenced by Galileo and others of his peers, Locke distinguishes between
primary and secondary qualities. Unlike Galileo, Locke suggests that both
are important parts of the human experience and thus worthy of study.
Locke fashions a philosophy of the human that emphasizes mechanical
principles of sensory experience and the association of those experiences
through reflection.
Moral Responsibility
In suggesting that nothing is known innately, Locke brings into question

the basis of Western Christian morality. If individuals commit a
wrongdoing, but do so only because they have not learned otherwise, then it
becomes the failure of the teacher that is responsible for the wrongdoing and
not the action of the uneducated individual. Thus, Locke’s philosophy
appears to eliminate personal responsibility. Locke’s response is that if
individual responsibility is decreased in his philosophy, it is only because
social responsibility is increased. If the wrongdoer is less personally
responsible, that is only because society is more responsible. If experience is
primary in shaping individual psychology, then it is incumbent on all of us
to take responsibility for the shaping of individuals’ experiences.
✔ Stop and think.
How much responsibility should individuals bear for their behavior if
they have never been taught right from wrong?
Education
Locke is concerned with the treatment, education, and training of

children. Although he never marries and has no children of his own, he
advises that children need a proper diet without too much sugar, lots of fresh
air, plenty of sleep, and a good share of physical exercise. Most importantly,
children need education and, as a society, all should take responsibility for
seeing that children are properly educated. Locke emphasizes rewards and a
positive and affectionate relationship between teacher and child as the most
effective way for children to learn. At the same time, Locke suggests that if
we expect hardy citizens, we should begin by hardening children. Children
should sleep on hard surfaces, not soft beds; they should engage in rigorous
physical conditioning; and crying or other emotional displays should not be
tolerated (Locke, 1693/1989).
The Wild Boy of Aveyron

Early in the morning on January 8, 1800, a naked and dirty boy of
about 12 years of age approaches a small village in Aveyron, a province
in southern France. He appears to have lived alone in the woods for
quite some time and has learned to feed himself on roots and whatever
else he can find. It is likely that his family could not care for him and
so abandoned him in the woods. This sounds very cruel, as of course it
is, but the abandonment of children a family cannot care for has been
practiced among humans since before history. Remember the story of
Hansel and Gretel, abandoned in the woods by their stepmother?
News of this boy makes its way to Paris within a few days of his
capture, where it comes to the attention of medical doctors and natural
philosophers. They are anxious to observe the boy and study his
behavior. Here is an opportunity to discover what sort of a creature a
human would be if deprived of the influences of human culture—a
chance to explore the differences, if any, between human animals and
nonhuman animals. Most importantly for philosophers, this is a chance
to explore whether moral behavior must be learned or is an innate
characteristic of humans.
By this time in Western history, world travels have revealed the
existence of many different types of primates, many of which bear
some resemblance to humans. In fact, in Indonesia, an animal has been
found that seems to be a bridge between animals and humans. Called
the orangoutang (forest-man), this creature walks upright, hunts like a
human, and communicates with its fellows.
The wild boy of Aveyron is named Victor by the villagers and is
brought to Paris. Over the course of the next several years, a young
physician, Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard, attempts to teach Victor to speak,
to dress properly, and to behave as a morally upright young gentleman.
But the efforts come to naught. Victor either runs or trots but never
walks in a normal gait, and when he wishes to run fast, he drops to a
position using his hands as well as his feet. Although he is capable of
making sounds, he never learns to talk or even communicate about
anything other than his immediate physical needs.
His moral education is no more successful, as described here in Dr.
Itard’s diary:
I wanted to know if this child of nature would be content with his share if I put him with
another person and gave them each an equal proportion of the same food—if he would
respect that of his neighbor as property not belonging to him. But nothing of the sort
transpired; he has no idea of property, wants everything for himself alone, because he
thinks only of himself. (as cited in Lane, 1976, p. 43)
Victor does apparently experience human-like emotions. He grows sad after the death of
his guardian’s husband and demonstrates awareness that the man will not return by
removing his place setting at the table. Eventually however, Victor’s education is
abandoned. He returns to the forest whenever he can escape, and a decade later, he is found
in the woods again, fearful, half-wild, and still unable to speak (Lane, 1976).
Everything Is God
Born of Portuguese Jewish parents who are forced by the Spanish Inquisition
to take refuge in Amsterdam, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) develops a
rational theology and philosophy that he believes is better suited to an era of
naturalistic explanations than any of the established religious faiths of the
late 17th century. He begins by rejecting epistemologies based on revelation
and religious doctrine. At the same time, he also warns against too much
reliance on sensory information as a way of knowing truth. His personal
theology and philosophy are built on arguments that he views as logical, but
which offend nearly every intellectual and theologian of his time. All of
Spinoza’s books are placed on the Church’s Index of Forbidden Books. By
the end of his life, he is ostracized from his Jewish congregation and also
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.
Early in his career, Spinoza is enamored of Cartesian rationalism, but he
is bothered by Descartes’ dualism. Why, wonders Spinoza, should there be
two distinct realms, the spiritual and the worldly, the mind and the body,
God and nature? Instead, he suggests, there is really just one realm. The
spiritual and the worldly are two aspects of the same universe. The mind
and the body are different aspects of the human. God is the same as nature.
God Is Nature
Spinoza’s theology is called pantheism, which is the belief that God is

present everywhere and at all times because everything is God. There is no
division between God and nature because God is nature and God is nothing
more than nature. Spinoza suggests that it is the human imagination that
turns God into a human-like form and gives God human characteristics, like
the need for companionship, a gender, or emotions like love and anger.
Spinoza offers a new view of God for the new, empirical epistemology,
arguing that now that humans are beginning to understand nature, they will
no longer need to rely on ancient myths of a human-like God.
By denying that God is part of some other spiritual dimension, Spinoza
must then also deny the existence of spiritual demons. In his time, the kinds
of behaviors symptomatic of mental illness are commonly attributed to the
will of God or to the intervention of demons. Spinoza denies the existence of
supernatural gods or demons, insisting that whatever causes the distress of
the mentally ill must be natural and not the result of supernatural
intervention. He thus advocates for more humanitarian treatment of the
mentally ill and lays the groundwork for later medical interventions in the
treatment of mental illness.
Mind Is Body
Similarly, Spinoza argues that there is no mind separate from body, but
they are simply two aspects of the human. A mental event may be described
as a nonmaterial thought or as the action of matter in the brain, but those
are simply two different ways of talking about the same event. Because there
are two ways of talking about it does not make it two different events
(Spinoza, 1677/1985). Thus, Spinoza eliminates the mind-body problem by
denying that they are separate things. This also allows him to deny
Descartes’ theory of the pineal gland as the place where the spiritual mind
interacts with the physical body.
✔ Stop and think.

What evidence exists that there are aspects of mind that transcend
brain?
Spinoza’s assertion that the mind or soul is actually part of the physical
body has important implications for psychology. If human thought is the
consequence of matter acting on matter, then the study of thought is really
the study of observable and measurable matter. This makes thought a
primary quality and turns psychology into a study of primary qualities. If
human thought is a consequence of matter acting on matter, then it is
subject to the laws of nature. The characteristics of human thought thus
reside in the matter that makes up the human brain.
No Personal Immortality
If there is no spiritual realm but all is nature, then when the body dies, the
matter that makes up the mind will transform into some other kind of
matter, just as the body does. Thus, although the matter itself transcends
death, there is no spiritual aspect of the human that lives on, and all
religious promises of heavenly reward are illusion. This logical consequence
of Spinoza’s philosophy is profound and accounts for many of his problems
with established religions. Ultimately, his denial of immortality causes his
ideas to be rejected by both theologians and philosophers.
No Free Will
Equally disturbing is Spinoza’s argument that all human behavior is

determined by causes arising from the action of matter acting on matter.
Spinoza agrees that it is very hard to identify the causes that determine
behavior but insists that ignorance of the causes is no reason to conclude
that human behavior must be freely willed.
What many find upsetting about Spinoza’s doctrine of determinism is the
elimination of a sense of personal freedom. But, Spinoza argues, what is lost
is only an illusion anyway, the illusion of free will. What is gained is the real
freedom that lies in coming to understand better the laws in nature that
govern human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Having arrived at his
theology through logical argument, Spinoza then goes on to advocate for
observation as the way to know nature. Logic is a good way to engage in
philosophy, he suggests, but logic may not be a good way to study nature
because nature may not be logical.
Self-Preservation
Observation reveals that every life form seeks to preserve its own
existence. Thus, Spinoza concludes, self-preservation is the master motive
that determines all thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, including those of
humans. That which helps in survival is good, and that which threatens
survival is evil. Spinoza distinguishes between passions, which are intense
feelings uncontrolled by rational thought, and emotions, which are feelings
harnessed by reason. Passions reduce the possibility of survival, whereas
emotions enhance survival. The greatest good, or highest pleasure, comes
from a clear understanding of the laws of nature (God), and thus human
survival is most enhanced by the observational study of nature embodied in
the careful practice of science.
Religious Skepticism
“It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses,

mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence,
natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding”
(Berkeley, 1710/1920, p. 31).
Along with many of his colleagues, the philosopher and Anglican bishop
George Berkeley (1685–1753) becomes concerned with what he sees as a
dangerous movement toward materialism. For Berkeley, the inevitable
conclusion of materialism is the loss of faith in anything spiritual, including
not just human soul, but even God. Berkeley’s philosophical goal is to attack
materialism at its very foundation: the assertion that matter is the only
reality.
Recall Locke’s belief that primary qualities reside in material objects and
are thus independent of perception; they exist whether or not anyone is
currently perceiving them because they are properties of matter itself.
Secondary qualities, on the other hand, reside in the perceiver and thus do
not exist unless they are being perceived. Both primary and secondary
qualities are perceived, but secondary qualities exist only in perceptions.
Beginning from this materialist conclusion, Berkeley points out that even
primary qualities are known only through perception. The weight, shape, or
size of an object, for example, is known only as it is seen, touched,
measured, and so on. What this means to Berkeley is that there is no real
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. All qualities of all
objects are known only through perceptions, and thus, he concludes, if
perception is the basis of all reality, it is possible that objects may exist only
when they are being perceived. Berkeley calls into question the material
reality of anything.
Berkeley’s detractors ask how it could be that when perceiving objects,
humans are also able to perceive that the objects are at some certain distance
away. That is, if the object itself does not really exist but is only a
perception, why are those objects perceived in three dimensions, and why is
space observed between the object and the perceiver? Why should depth be
a quality of the perception of objects that have no material reality?
Others object that Berkeley’s assertion that there is no material reality,
only perception, violates all common sense—things do exist. And with this,
Berkeley has no argument. Objects do exist, but they exist only because they
are being perceived. Objects exist, according to Berkeley, because at all times
and in all places, objects are perceived by God.
✔ Stop and think.
If a tree falls in the forest, but there is no one around to hear it, does
the tree make a sound?
Nature and Mind
Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) asserts the primacy of the

study of the human mind, declaring that no science can reliably precede the
science of the human mind because all scientific study is conducted by and
through the human mind. He is linked with the British empiricists who
precede him, Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley, because of his assertion that
experience is the primary shaper of ideas. Hume believes that what can be
known about the world is only what can be perceived and that, absent
experience, there is no knowledge (Hume 1739–1740/1878).
Taking a materialist perspective in his philosophy, Hume points out that,
like other animals, the human body is designed to be capable of perceiving
those parts of the natural world that are necessary for continued survival.
The knowledge that humans have through perception is the only knowledge
humans can have, but that knowledge so accurately reflects what is
encountered in the world that it enables humans to survive. Hume’s
philosophy about the natural biological bases of human behavior leads him
to speculate about the possibility of conducting studies with peoples from
other parts of the world and even with other animals. The goal for Hume
and his contemporaries in conducting these kinds of comparative studies is
to learn more about what distinguishes White European males from all
other inhabitants of the planet. Their comparisons lead European
philosophers of this era to conclude that they and their peers are mentally
superior to all others.
Laws of Association
Hume shares the view that association is the principle by which elements
of perception adhere to one another. Association results in learning and the
forming of complex ideas. Hume suggests that there are three laws
governing how simple elements of perception are associated together into
ideas. First, he says, those perceptions that resemble or are like one another
are associated together in the law of resemblance. Second, those perceptions
that take place together in time and space are associated in the law of
contiguity. Finally, those perceptions that occur in regular sequence are
associated in the law of causality.
Causality
Hume expresses some controversial ideas about cause and effect. He

suggests that the human belief that two events are related causally is only an
accident of human perceptual capacities. In other words, human perceptual
systems operate in such a way that when two events meet the following
criteria, the belief then follows that A must cause B.
Event A and Event B occur closely together in time and/or space. Event
A precedes Event B.
Event B occurs only when preceded by Event A.
Humans come to believe that A causes B because this is a human habit,

the word Hume uses to designate human biological predispositions.
Causality is an idea humans get when events are associated together in this
way. So the idea that one event causes the other is only an accidental and
illusory relationship. Thus, Hume suggests that the idea that cause exists in
the universe may be an artifact of how the human perceptual system works
and not an accurate representation of what is true in the universe. Hume is
not necessarily saying that cause and effect do not exist in the universe, only
that the human assumption of cause and effect is a belief based on
perceptions. Like all beliefs, cause is only more or less probable, based on the
strength of the evidence.
✔ Stop and think.

Why do you think Hume is accused of being an atheist for suggesting
that cause is only an artifact of human habits?
The Self
Hume also offers a disturbing idea about another cherished notion, that of
the unified and coherent self. He asserts that the self is really only a series of
perceptions. Memories of how we felt and behaved in the past are associated
together, and the resulting complex idea is thought of as a self. But what is
called the self is still only a complex idea built out of a series of experiences,
not a real, independently existing thing.
✔ Stop and think.

Try to describe your “self” without listing a series of perceptions,
experiences, and memories.
The Passions
Hume argues that passion is the primary motivator of behavior. Human

passions constitute human nature, and they are established by human
physiology. Furthermore, as each individual experiences the world, some
experiences become associated with pleasant feelings and some with
unpleasant feelings. Those experiences that have been associated with
pleasure are sought out in the future, and those that have been associated
with pain or discomfort are avoided. This philosophy is referred to as
hedonism. Hume is arguing that behavior derives from past associations
with pleasure or pain. In other words, behavior derives from learning and
not from the exercise of free choice. Hume is thus another philosopher who
denies the existence of free will.
Appearance Is Truth
Influential as a rationalist philosopher, the Scotsman Thomas Reid (1710–

1796) takes a commonsense approach to understanding reality. Unlike
Berkeley, Reid asserts that physical reality exists independently of anyone’s
perception. Furthermore, physical reality exists in very much the same form
as it is experienced in sensory perceptions. In support of this argument, Reid
points out that even those who say they do not know for certain that their
senses accurately reflect reality still behave as though they do. They step
around posts rather than trying to walk through them, they avoid stepping
in puddles, and generally they behave as though they trust the information
provided by their senses. If they did not do so, if they routinely walked into
posts and behaved as though they did not trust or had “lost their senses,” we
would declare them “mad” and lock them away, if only for their own safety.
Not only is reality accurately sensed, but Reid also suggests that the
conscious experience of physical reality is not built up out of the basic
elements of sensation associated together by rational thought. Instead,
conscious experience is comprised of meaningful wholes perceived
immediately as they are in physical reality. This is in contrast to
associationistic philosophies, like those of another Scotsman, James Mill,
who believes that complex ideas, like the idea of a rose for example, comes
to consciousness first as perceptions of the basic elements: shapes, lines,
colors, smells, and textures. Eventually, those basic elements are associated
together into a perception of the whole rose. This happens only after the
basic elements have appeared contiguously several times. Reid rejects this
idea and says that the conscious experience of roses, and of the rest of the
world, consists of meaningful wholes perceived immediately as they are in
physical reality (Campbell & Skinner, 1982).
Reid points out that if perceptions of reality were built out of some basic
elements of sensory experience associated into meaningful wholes through
the use of reason, then most people would never perceive reality because
“the greatest part of men hardly ever learn to reason” (Reid, 1785/1969).
Categories of Thought
As a professor of philosophy in Germany in the late 18th century, Immanuel

Kant (1724–1804) is influential in philosophy, and many of his ideas bear
directly on questions considered later by psychologists. Kant himself admits
that his inquiries into psychological questions are instigated by Hume’s
assertion that humans only have subjective knowledge of the world based
entirely on sensory impressions. For Kant, this is an unsatisfactory
epistemology, and he sets out to establish for himself what it is that humans
can know and how it is that they come to know.
Innate Categories of Thought
Kant asserts that knowledge of the world begins with sensory

impressions, but the experiences of the senses are then organized into
categories of thought by an active mind. For example, visual impressions are
organized using the category of space, so that some objects are perceived as
near, whereas others are perceived as far away. Time represents another
category of thought. Sensory experiences are organized as having occurred
at some time in the past, presently, or anticipated to occur in the future.
Other categories of thought include possible or impossible events and
perceptions of cause and effect. Kant considers all of these categories of
thought to be innate. The human mind actively organizes sensory
experiences in these ways without having learned to do so, but simply
because this is the way mind works.
The Categorical Imperative and Morality
From his assertion that humans are impelled to categorize sensory

experience, Kant goes on to build a system of morality. Religions encourage
moral behavior by threatening punishment or promising reward.
Philosophers, who believe ideas are shaped by experience, suggest that
moral behavior is shaped by seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Morality
results from this hedonistic principle because all individuals should behave
so as to maximize the most good for the most people. Kant’s system of
morality rests instead on the idea that humans are impelled to behave
morally by an innate understanding that each of us should choose behavior
that we would want others to choose if they found themselves in a similar
situation. Thus, although making different choices is possible, humans know
innately that they should behave according to the categorical imperative,
treating others as they themselves would like to be treated.
Kant goes on to acknowledge that the idea of moral responsibility is
meaningless without assuming a belief in free will. He cannot prove the
existence of free will, does not attempt to do so, and makes no claim that
free will actually does exist. He only asserts that, for moral responsibility to
have any meaning, humans must believe that they have free will. According
to Kant’s logic, it is enough that humans believe they are free to choose.
The Phenomena and the Noumena
Kant agrees with the empiricists that observation is the proper way to
study nature. He calls those aspects of reality that are known through
sensory experience the phenomena. The actual objects of reality he calls the
noumena. The phenomena are our perceptions of reality, and the noumena
are the actual objects of reality. Because humans can only experience nature
through perception, they can never know the noumena, only the phenomena
(Kant, 1781/1927).
Psychology Cannot Be a Science
In Kant’s time, psychology is defined as the introspective analysis of the

mind. Defined thusly, psychology could never be studied experimentally for
two reasons. First, although the mind exists in time, it does not exist in
space, and things that do not exist in space can never be measured. Because
the basis of experimental science is the systematic observation and
measurement of the physical universe, an analysis of something that cannot
be measured must lie forever outside the realm of scientific study.
✔ Stop and think.

Where, in space, is a thought?
Second, science requires observation, and Kant argues that the mind
cannot be observed introspectively because it will not stop to be examined.
Even if it would, the very act of observing it introspectively changes it. Thus,
philosophers are left forever to speculate about the mind. Kant does suggest
that, although the why of behavior can never be studied empirically,
scientists could and should attempt to study the how of behavior.
Furthermore, a sort of a science of the mind might be developed by
examining the products of the mind as manifested in culture. Through such
study, scientists may hope someday to predict and control human behavior
in the same way that they are learning to predict and control other aspects
of nature.
Summary of Philosophical Speculation
A common assumption of most of these philosophical approaches to

understanding the human experience is that thought is not part of the
physical universe and thus cannot be studied empirically. Even John Locke,
who asserts that the questions of psychology will someday be subject to the
scientific method, still maintains that the mind is not made of matter.
Although there is nothing resembling a scientific psychology during the
17th and 18th centuries, clearly these philosophers are considering
psychological questions. Thus, the philosophical questions that are raised in
the 18th century begin to lay the foundation for the scientific study of
psychology in the centuries that follow.
ROMANTIC REBELLIONS
The seeds of a cultural perspective known as romanticism are sown during

the 18 th century, in opposition to rational and empirical philosophy. Most of
those engaged in the romantic movement are writers and artists, but some
are also philosophers. These individuals regard intense emotion as the most
important motivator of behavior and what brings meaning to human
experience. Romanticism is both an outgrowth of, and a rebellion against,
mechanical empiricism and cold, impersonal rationalism.
Eighteenth-century romantic philosophers oppose authority in all forms,
from religious and political powers to traditional philosophical thought.
They also oppose scientific empiricism, materialism, and systematic
observation as the way to gain knowledge of nature. For romantic
philosophers, there are true feelings hidden behind the observable and
measurable, and these are what bring meaning to human experience. This
mysterious realm of intense feeling is not accessible through scientific
observation but through literature and art.
Literature
Throughout human history, inquiries into psychological matters are often

conducted by telling stories about people’s lives. Thus, the literature, theater,
and art of any era represent attempts to understand the human experience.
Sixteenth-and 17th-century Western literature consists of poetry and plays,
much as it has since Babylonian times. The literature of this era explores the
human condition by telling stories about the lives of individuals, but does
not attempt to explain, either systematically or in general, why people
behave the way they do: “Out, out, brief candle! Life is but a walking
shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then
is heard no more” (Shakespeare, 1623/1969, p. 1133).
By the 18th century, a new form of literature, the novel, appears in the
West. In writing these fictional stories, novelists teach people how to live
better lives by showing them the consequences of misconduct or virtue. The
novels are directed at the newly emerging middle classes and tell stories
about why people think, feel, and behave the way they do; about
relationships between people; and even about the nature of mind. Thus, they
address psychological questions but not by conducting scientific or
philosophic inquiries. Instead, literature and theater engage in a kind of folk
psychology.
In the middle of the 18 th century, romantic thinkers begin to influence
literature with the introduction of a form called the Gothic novel. Gothic
stories are set in remote and desolate surroundings, have macabre and
intensely emotional themes, and tell tales about hidden and mysterious
aspects of human experience. These novels reflect romantic notions that life
cannot be fully understood without first recognizing the place of intense
emotions in motivating behavior. Both reason and experience create a thin
veneer over more basic but hidden human nature, which is rooted most
deeply in fear, desire, and the wish to be thought of well. The novel Dr.
Frankenstein, written in 1818 by Mary Shelley (who is 18 at the time she
writes the story), is an example of this Gothic genre. Dr. Frankenstein steals
body parts from cadavers to create an outwardly revolting creature. But the
monster’s hidden character is emotional, caring, and has the potential to be
loving, thus illustrating the contrast that can exist between outward
appearance and inward reality.
Romantic Psychologies
Romantic ideas influence the development of psychology in many ways.

Ideas about hidden motivators of behavior and the importance of emotion
are found in romantic philosophers’ emphasis on emotions, creativity,
spontaneity, and free will and are an important influence on 19th-century
philosophical psychology. The philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–
1860), for example, publishes The World as Will and Idea in 1818, in which
he argues that the only reality is a universal, immaterial, and unmeasurable
will to survive. Schopenhauer and other German romantic philosophers
assert that emotions are not made of matter, cannot be measured, and are
irrational. Thus, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are not determined by the
laws of nature but are spontaneous, so that the will is free. Some find
comfort in these ideas, but others find them disturbing. If it is true that there
is an immaterial will that is spontaneous, not measurable, and not bound by
the laws of nature, then there are no laws that govern thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors, and there can never be a science of psychology.
Some of Sigmund Freud’s ideas come out of this romantic tradition, as do
many ideas embodied in humanistic psychology. Romantic themes emerge
again and again in psychology through the next 200 years.
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
By the early 19th century, science is revealing secrets of nature and leading
to developments that will have profoundly beneficial effects on human life.
Science is not only describing nature but also predicting and sometimes even
controlling nature. Astronomers can now predict eclipses, and medical
researchers are developing vaccines that prevent some illnesses. Related
developments in technology are making life longer, more pleasant, and less
frightening for many in the West.
The idea is growing that all of nature might be explained in terms of
matter and material forces. Religious authorities still find this idea
disturbing, believing that the benefits of science come at too great a cost.
Materialism seems to eliminate God or at least remove God from everyday
life. The growing importance and even authority of science is undermining
the political, social, and economic power that has been held for centuries by
religious authorities. Theories about the physical universe no longer conform
to religious doctrine. The physical sciences also begin to separate themselves
from philosophy and from the methods of philosophical speculation.
Furthermore, the search for meaning is not a part of science. The methods of
science can provide answers about how the universe works and how
humans have come to be, but science must leave questions about why the
universe exists and the meaning of human existence to the domains of
philosophy, art, literature, and religion.
Throughout the 19th century, there are advances in understanding the
laws of nature. In spite of occasional humbling mistakes, the scientific
outlook is positive and optimistic. It seems as though there are no limits to
the human understanding of nature if research proceeds by using the careful
methods of science.
Although psychological characteristics seem inaccessible to the
experimental methods of the natural sciences, that changes toward the end
of the 19th century. For this reason, scientific developments in many
domains, but especially physics, chemistry, and biology, have relevance for
the history of psychology.
Physics and Chemistry
The physical universe is readily explained as atoms of matter. Chemistry is

the study of the ways in which atoms of matter can be combined. A variety
of different “elements” or kinds of atoms of matter are discovered. The
modern Periodic Table of Elements begins to take shape. Philosophers have
long assumed that there must be different kinds of energy. By the 19th
century, physicists learn that there is only one kind of energy, and the
suspicion grows that even energy might be made of atoms of matter
(Dampier, 1948).
The sciences of physics and chemistry are combined early in the 19th
century to build a battery that produces electricity. For the first time,
scientists make a direct connection between a material substance, chemicals,
and a force, magnetism, to produce another force, electricity. Along with
others, German physicist, anatomist, and physiologist Hermann von
Helmholtz (1821–1894) concludes that if matter is composed of atoms, then
electricity must also be composed of atom-like particles. If matter can be
used to produce energy, then matter and energy must, on some basic level,
be very much alike.
It is established that, although matter may alter its state from a solid to a
liquid to a gas, it does not change in amount. The amount of matter is
conserved, and this can be shown by its weight. This is called the
conservation of matter.
By 1840, it is known that energy can be converted from one type to
another. The power of falling water, the heat generated by fire, or an
electrical current, can all be turned into the force needed to turn gears
(Cohen, 1985). Thus, in 1847, von Helmholtz gives a general account of the
principle of the conservation of energy (Koenigsberger, 1965). This principle
states that nature contains a fixed amount of energy, which can be
transformed but not added to or subtracted from. In other words, in any
closed system, energy is conserved. Energy is a measurable quantity, and in
a closed system, which the universe is presumed to be, the total amount of
energy remains constant.
By the 19th century, light is understood to be either particles or waves, a
form of energy, and subject to the same principle of conservation as all
energy. To maintain consistency in what is known at the time about physics,
and because of the way that light travels in waves, it becomes necessary to
postulate the existence of a rigid substance that light travels on or through.
So instead of “atoms and the void,” most physicists of this era agree that
there must be another substance, which they call the aether. The aether is
unobservable but is everywhere that space is and, except for its rigidity,
behaves the way that space behaves. The theory of the aether persists
throughout the 19th century and is only abandoned during the early 20th
century when the laws of physics and the nature of “the void” are more fully
understood.
In spite of its eventual abandonment, the theory of the aether suggests
that there may be real but unobservable forces in nature that influence how
observable matter behaves. From here it is no great leap to a theory that
there may be real aspects of the human that, although unobservable and
unmeasurable, still influence human behavior (Kantor, 1963–1969).
Relevance to Psychology
These developments in the physical sciences have direct relevance for

understanding human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. The same principles
that are proving so productive in physics and chemistry may apply to the
processes of the human mind as well. If, as John Locke asserts, the mind is
like a blank slate at birth, how are experiences in the physical world
translated into mental events and then into observable patterns of behavior?
Associationists assert that our primary sensory experience of an object is of
the basic elements. These basic elements are analogous to the atoms of
matter in the physical universe or the elements in chemistry. Associationists
hold that the basic elements of perception are bound together by laws of
association, much like gravity binds atoms of matter, to form complex
thoughts and patterns of behavior.
✔ Stop and think.

Can you explain exactly how a sensory experience becomes a thought?
Biology’s Connections With Psychology
Biology is the study of living organisms. Thus, throughout history, the study
of human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is inextricably bound up with
biology. Through most of the 19th century, biologists, anatomists, and
physiologists share several goals. Among these is the desire to understand
the force that causes living things to live. These scientists also take on the
philosophers’ search for a metaphysical soul, or “ghost in the machine”
(Ryle, 1949). The difference between philosophical searches for the soul and
biological, anatomical, or physiological searches is the new method, the
empirical scientific method of systematic observation and experiment.
Understanding Life
With advances in optical technology, such as the development of the

microscope, comes the discovery of the basic unit of all life forms, the cell,
first observed in the 17th century. From the simplest organisms observed in
pond water to the most complex life forms, all are constructed from single
cells. The generation and reproduction of cells results in the beginning of
life, and the death of cells spells the death of organisms. Thus, the cell serves
as the basic building block of life. As such, the cell becomes the biological
equivalent of the atom in physics, the element in chemistry, and the basic
mental element in psychology. These analogies between domains make
nature seem to fit together into a simple and yet elegant pattern, and foster
even greater confidence in the truth and reliability of the scientific study of
nature.
Vitalism
Throughout history, the seemingly spontaneous nature of thoughts,

feelings, and behaviors, as well as the very appearance of life itself, have
given rise to and supported a variety of mystical assumptions about vitalistic
“life forces” and “psychic energies.” These forces are proposed to explain how
living things differ from nonliving things. During the 17th and 18th
centuries, the science of biology is established as the study of living things.
By the early 19th century, the search to find and understand the vitalistic
life-force has become a major goal for biologists.
✔ Stop and think.

What is the relationship between a soul and a mind?
The Ghost in the Machine
The philosophical problem of the relationship between the mind and the
body has undergone numerous transformations through the course of
history. During the Classical Greek and Roman era, it was believed that
rational thoughts came from a mysterious rational soul, but personality and
emotions were a consequence of physiology. It was the balance of the
humors that determined personality type, mood, energy level, desire for
sleep, and so on. Thus, many psychological characteristics resulted from
physical characteristics.
During the early Christian era in the West, the body was viewed as “mere
flesh,” despicable and worthless, a prison in which the soul was trapped and
a burden that tempted the soul away from the divine. The mind was caught
between the earthly body and the divine soul. Humans were given free will
by God and could thus use the mind to choose between pursuing physical
pleasures and contemplating the divine.
By the 19th century, the body is viewed as a machine that serves the soul.
The mind is the part of the human that links the material body with the
immaterial soul. Still, confusion remains as to how the mind mediates
between the mechanical body and the divine soul. Philosophers and
physiologists alike devote themselves to the study of the interactions among
sensory experiences, perceptions, emotions, and behaviors.
Some of the same principles that are transforming science and the
understanding of nature are reflected in other aspects of Western culture in
the 19th century as well. Associationistic ideas that complex thoughts are
built up out of collections of simple basic elements of perception are
reflected, for example, in the 19th-century style of painting called
pointillism. Pointillism is the use of tiny dots of color, associated together, to
give the impression of a scene. Pointillism is illustrated by the work of
Georges Seurat (1859–1891), shown in Fig. 5.1.
FIG. 5.1. Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte, by Georges Seurat (1886;
photo courtesy of the Art Institute of Chicago).
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Political Science and Economics
As has been true since the time of Machiavelli, Plato, and even before,
philosophers still speculate about how best to organize groups of people
under political and economic systems. Their inquiries are thus closely related
by topic, if not always by method, to psychology. Eighteenth- and 19th-
century political theories, in particular, have important influences on the
early development of psychology. For example, the political and economic
philosophy called utilitarianism grows out of the belief that humans are
motivated by the desire to maximize pleasure.
The philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), James Mill (1773–1836),
and his son John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) are usually credited with
developing the philosophy of politics and ethics known as utilitarianism. The
general principle of utilitarianism is the belief that the rightness of any
political, economic, or judicial system should be judged by the social
consequences of adopting that system. The amount of human happiness or
suffering generated by the adoption of a system determines its utility. In the
same way that individual humans are said to be motivated to seek pleasure
and avoid pain, political systems should be judged by how much good is
generated for how many people.
✔ Stop and think.

Which economic system, capitalism or communism, might generate the
greatest good for the largest number of people?
Although similar ideas have been articulated in the West at least since the
time of the Epicureans in Rome, utilitarianism is proposed in the 18th
century by Bentham in response to an existing judicial system that he sees
as based only on intuition and retribution. In Bentham’s view, wrongdoers
are being sentenced based only on feelings of revulsion for the crime and the
desire to seek revenge. Bentham proposes, instead, a system of justice in
which punishments for certain types of crimes would be spelled out in
advance and would be based on the social consequences of the criminal act.
Thus, a political leader who forms an alliance with an enemy of the state
would be judged more harshly than one who has a love affair while in office.
Wealthy individuals who embezzle money from companies would be judged
more harshly than parents who steal food to feed their children. This system
of justice specifically rejects the idea that some actions are wrong
independent of their consequences. A utilitarian in the present day might
argue, for example, that the private use of recreational drugs should be
considered a crime only if there are negative social consequences. So whereas
getting in a car and driving after the use of a drug would be a crime, the use
of the drug in the privacy of one’s home would not.
✔ Stop and think.

Are considerations of pleasure and pain really what motivates humans
to act in certain ways and not others?
Human Nature
French Naturalism
During the 18th century, a philosophy of human nature built on the work
of Rene Descartes arises in France. Referred to as naturalism, this
philosophy is exemplified in the writings of Julien Offray de La Mettrie
(1709–1751), aphysician and philosopher. French naturalism is based on the
assumption that the laws of nature apply to humans just as they do in the
rest of the physical world. Thus, understanding thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors requires understanding the laws of nature as they apply to
humans. In his book (entitled in English, Man a Machine (1748/1912), La
Mettrie asserts that humans are just like machines. Therefore, the concept of
soul is “but an empty word” used to explain the origins of thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors that arenot yet fully understood. In supportof his contention
that human behavior is mechanistic and bound by the laws of nature, La
Mettrie points out that various influences on the physical body, like drugs,
disease, and fatigue, can also influence thoughts and feelings. His point is
that the mind must not be independent of body because if it were, no such
interactions would be observed. If mind is body, then nonhuman animals
also have a mind. La Mettrie suggests that apes might be taught language in
the same way that deaf humans are taught to communicate and might be
made into “little gentlemen” if provided with the right education.
Positivism
Positivism is the assertion that only those aspects of the universe that can
be publicly observed can be known for certain. When it comes to the study
of human nature, positivism is most often associated with the work of an
otherwise obscure French political and social activist, Auguste Comte (1797–
1857). In 1855, his six volumes of positivist philosophy are published in
English. In these, he argues that science should be applied to the study of the
human, but only to those aspects of the human that can be observed and
measured. Thus, positivism equates the knowable with the observable.
According to Comte, there are two types of statements. One type of
statement refers to the objects of sense, and that is a scientific statement.
Any other type of statement is nonsense. All sciences, including a science of
human nature, should adhere to the method of observation. In the order of
the degree to which their conclusions can be publicly observed and thus
known, Comte arranges the sciences in the following hierarchy:
Mathematics
Astronomy
Physics
Chemistry
Physiology and Biology Sociology
The last science in the hierarchy, sociology, is the science of human social
nature proposed by Comte. He argues that societies can be ranked in three
stages based on how people in those societies explain events in nature. The
three stages are the theological stage, metaphysical stage, and scientific
stage. People in societies in the theological stage believe that events in
nature, such as floods, illnesses, or bountiful harvests, are caused by the
intervention of supernatural beings, gods, angels, demons, and devils. A
society progresses to the metaphysical stage when its people begin to believe
that events in nature are caused by unseen powers or forces, like psychic
energy, and are part of some cosmic teleological design or purpose. A society
only progresses to the final scientific stage when its people begin to believe
that events in nature are caused by the observable laws of nature. Floods are
caused by warmer ocean waters, illnesses are caused by germs, and
bountiful harvests are caused by adequate rain, good soil, and the right
crops. Comte proposes sociology as the study of how different human
societies compare in terms of the stages in which they are currently
operating. This comparative sociology is as close as a positivist could ever
hope to get to understanding human nature.
Psychology does not fit into Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences. He is
disdainful of the psychology of his era, which is the introspective study of an
unseen soul. What philosophers call consciousness, Comte refers to as a
collection of sensations and nothing more. He points out that, even after
thousands of years of introspection, not one single fact about consciousness
is known. Comte, like many others, concludes that, because science is the
study of that which is publicly observable and psychology is the study of the
private and unseen soul, psychology will never be a science and will thus
remain forever nonsense (Comte, 1855/1974).
NATURAL HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY
Like psychology, other disciplines, such as geology, geography, natural

history, and anthropology, begin to take shape during this era. The focus of
this research is to understand nature and the place of humans in it.
Early Evolutionary Theory

Theories that life forms currently found on Earth have gradually changed
from earlier forms have been around since the time of the early Greeks.
These theories are based on observable evidence, such as fossils, but have
little influence in Western thought until the mid-19th century. Plato and
Aristotle denied the possibility of the evolution of life forms, and early
Christian doctrine asserted that God had created all existing life forms in
their present state. The idea that life forms had changed since the time of
their creation implied to pre-19th century Christians that God’s first
creations had somehow been imperfect. A literal interpretation of the
Biblical story of Earth’s earliest days tells of a cataclysmic beginning and,
once creation is complete, an unchanging Earth, even in the face of natural
forces. Well into the 19th century, it is seriously argued that fossils are not
evidence of now-extinct life forms but, instead, are objects hidden in the
ground by God (or evil demons) to test our religious faith (Dampier, 1948).
During the 17th and 18th centuries in the West, an alternative doctrine
called transformism was suggested to explain the fossil evidence.
Transformism was the idea that life forms currently found on Earth were
not created in their present form by God, but emerged from primordial
matter as a result of the laws of nature and evolved slowly into those that
are present today. The idea of transformism was expressed in the
cosmogenic stories of many cultures throughout the world but was
suppressed in the Christian West from the time of Augustine.
By the 19th century, the growing science of geology uncovers more and
better fossil evidence of the prior existence of species not currently found, as
well as evidence for the gradual transformation of some species from one to
another. This evidence is problematic for at least two reasons. First, this
fossil record provides evidence that violates Church doctrine. Second, and
more importantly for scientists, this evidence requires some explanation.
How could it have come to be that an animal as large as a horse, and in the
form of a horse, was once a much smaller animal and a very different
looking animal, although still undeniably a horse?
✔ Stop and think.
Imagine that you do not know anything about genes or about natural
selection. Can you think of a way to explain how and why species have
changed over time?
By the middle of the 19th century, the evidence is undeniable that life
forms have changed over time. One explanation that is offered is the idea
that characteristics that are acquired during a lifetime are somehow passed
along to the offspring. Furthermore, if each individual strives to become
stronger, smarter, and more skilled, and those acquired characteristics are
passed on to offspring, gradually, over time, that family will become better
and better. This popular theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics
is attributed to French naturalist and botanist Jean Lamarck (1744–1829) and
is referred to as Larmarckian evolution. Larmarck’s idea, based on the fossil
record, is that the characteristics of life forms change as the characteristics
needed for survival change. For example, if the sources of food on dry land
disappear, but there is still plenty to eat in the water, some life forms on land
will learn to swim and adapt to living in an aquatic environment. Because
these organisms have learned to swim, their offspring will be born with the
ability to swim. Thus, Larmarck’s theory of evolution relies on the
transmission of acquired characteristics.
This theory has high face validity, that is, not only does it appear to fit the
available evidence, but it also seems likely to be true. However, the theory of
the inheritance of acquired characteristics is labeled as blasphemous because
it contradicts Church doctrine. What’s more, Larmarck’s theory seems to
require that life forms have had eons of time in which to adapt to these
changing environments. Using Scriptural references, earlier theologians had
calculated that only 4,004 years had elapsed between the creation of the
Earth and the birth of Jesus. In 1778, the French naturalist George-Louis
LeClerc, known better as Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), used geological
evidence to argue that Earth had been created about 75,000 years ago. In
neither case was this enough time to explain the very gradual changes in life
forms that are revealed in the fossils. It is not until 1833 that geological
evidence is published establishing that the Earth is significantly older than
previously believed.
Once the actual age of the Earth is understood, Larmarckian evolution
becomes a widely accepted explanation for the changes in species across
time. Early in his career, even the naturalist Charles Darwin accepts the
theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. As Larmarckian
evolution becomes more widely known and more popular, it begins to be
used to explain social as well as biological phenomena.
Sociology and Evolution
The chief proponent of the application of Lamarckian theory to the social

world in the mid-19th century is English philosopher Herbert Spencer
(1820–1903). Spencer has no formal education in philosophy or any of the
sciences, although he is a voracious reader. He also writes and, because his
ideas have popular appeal, is widely read. For Spencer, evolution is the
unifying principle for all branches of knowledge. With no evidence to
support his ideas, Spencer makes several assertions, many of which have
profoundly influenced psychology. For example, Spencer argues that
evolution leads species to attain greater and greater degrees of complexity.
Furthermore, greater intelligence derives from a more complex nervous
system. Thus, it is clear (to Spencer) that because “civilized man has also a
more complex or heterogeneous nervous system than uncivilized man”
(Spencer, 1880, p. 341), civilized man will also be uniformly more intelligent.
These beliefs increase the interest in comparing human psychological
characteristics with those of other animals, measuring intellectual
differences between Europeans and other peoples, and measuring individual
differences between Europeans. These beliefs also influence the study of
infant and child development.
Another of Spencer’s influential hypotheses is his explanation of the
origins of behavior. Like earlier philosophers of hedonism, Spencer argues
that when a behavior is followed by a pleasant or successful outcome, the
behavior will tend to be repeated, but when behavior is followed by an
unpleasant or unsuccessful outcome it will tend not to be repeated. Because
the philosopher Alexander Bain writes something very similar at about the
same time, this comes to be called the Spencer-Bain principle. For Spencer,
this principle explains association and is the basis of learning for all animals.
The only difference between species, according to this idea, is a quantitative
difference in the number of associations each species is able to make. Species
with highly complex nervous systems will be able to make many more
associations than those with simpler nervous systems. Furthermore, the
Spencer-Bain principle holds across all species, meaning that scientists can
make interesting and important discoveries about learning in humans by
studying the process in “simpler” species. Also, it makes no difference
whether the learning is happening in a laboratory or in the animal’s natural
environment; the principle remains the same across all learning
environments. These assumptions are what allow for psychology’s program
of laboratory research using rats in the 20th century.
The Spencer-Bain principle also suggests that the process of forming
associations is utilitarian. That is, associations serve useful purposes for the
individual by shaping more and more successful behaviors over time.
Assuming that psychological characteristics, like association, serve useful
functions in helping individuals to adapt provides the foundation for later
20th-century functionalist psychology.
Social Darwinism
Francis Bacon warned 3 centuries ago that people have a tendency to

believe those things that they want to believe, even when there is no evidence
to support those beliefs. And nowhere is that tendency better exemplified
than in the application of Larmarck’s evolutionary theory and Spencer’s
philosophical speculation to the set of beliefs that is referred to as “social
Darwinism’.’ Social Darwinism is the popular, but mistaken, notion that it is
possible to apply the principles of biological evolution to sociological
phenomena. In founding his sociology, or the formal study of societies,
Spencer argues that the same principles used to explain how strong species
get better over time whereas weak species die out can be applied to societies.
And, by applying those same principles to the process of learning, it is also
possible to explain why one strong individual thrives whereas a weaker one
only gets weaker. Businessmen and leaders of industry in the West believe in
and support Spencer’s ideas because they seem to provide a scientific
justification for the cutthroat economic practices and policies that have
allowed those men to succeed in a competitive market environment. Good
businessmen have succeeded because they are stronger and deserve to
succeed.
Many of Spencer’s assertions have a powerful influence on popular
thought in the 19th century and even today. Nevertheless, it is important to
remember that, even though many of these ideas have high face validity and
support much of what many people would like to believe to be true, Spencer
provides only casual observations to support his assumptions. Later,
scientists must search for supporting evidence, but many of those who follow
Spencer begin by assuming that his assertions are true, so that many of those
assertions are not tested for decades.
Natural Selection
This is the most significant problem with the Lamarckian theory of

evolution: It is based on untested assumptions. In 1858, armed with the
evidence of the real age of the Earth and after collecting the necessary
evidence, but working independently, British naturalists Alfred Russell
Wallace (1823–1913) and Charles Darwin (1809–1882) jointly present the
data that establish the principles of natural selection. These principles
propose laws in nature that cause life forms to change:
1. As the economist Thomas Malthus had established in 1798, living
organisms tend to produce more offspring than can be supported by
the environment. Thus, there is a constant struggle for access to
insufficient resources.
2. There is variation among members of a species, so that each
member of the species has slightly different characteristics than
every other member.
3. Those individuals that exhibit characteristics that allow them to
gain access to more of the resources survive and go on to
successfully reproduce and fill every available niche in the
environment.
So far, these principles are not much different from those proposed by
Lamarck. The difference comes when Wallace and Darwin add the final
piece.
1. It is the successful variations, not acquired characteristics, that are

transmitted to offspring.
Those physical variations that just happen to provide an advantage in

gaining resources in that environment appear in the next generation only
because individuals with those characteristics are more likely to reproduce.
Neither Wallace nor Darwin is able to provide any convincing explanation
of the mechanism that allows those variations to be transmitted to the
offspring. It is not until the work of Augustinian monk Johann Gregor
Mendel (1822–1884) becomes widely known early in the next century that
anyone understands the role played by genes in influencing individual
differences within a species and the variations among species.
Relevance for Psychology
These principles of natural selection come to have a significant impact on

psychology over the next several decades. To begin with, the brain is an
organ that has evolved along with all of the other organs. To the degree that
mental activity is a consequence of brain function, thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors can be understood as the result of the same evolutionary pressures
that have shaped the rest of human physiology. So, for example, in the same
way that there is a perceptual preference for simple, symmetrical visual
patterns, humans also have a tendency toward becoming overweight under
conditions of abundant high-caloric resources. Shared emotional responses,
cognitive mechanisms, and motivational biases are presumed to arise from
these same evolutionary pressures. Today, the study of possible evolutionary
pressures on thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is called sociobiology, or more
recently, evolutionary psychology. But the idea that human behaviors and
mental faculties have been modified over time by the principles of natural
selection is not a new one. Darwin himself proposed this idea (Richards,
The Expression of Emotions in
1982), even before the publication of his book,
Man and Animals, in 1872. In this book, Darwin illustrates similar emotional
states in a human and a chimpanzee (see Fig. 5.2).
Ideas about evolution, and especially the evolution of the mind, are also
influential in the rise of comparative psychology. In the 19th century,
comparative psychology is founded on the assumption that all animals,
including all “races” of humans, are distributed along a continuum of
evolution. This continuum is arranged so that those creatures closest to the
Earth are considered the least evolved and those closest to God (Caucasoid,
upper-middle class, educated, northern European, male humans) are
considered the most fully evolved.
Finally, the relevance of the principles of natural selection for psychology
is manifested in later schools of psychology. For example, the concept of
learning is of
A
B
FIG. 5.2. Emotional states in man and animal. Charles Darwin’s illustration of similar
mental states in (A) a human and (B) a chimpanzee (Darwin, 1872/1896, pp. 141, 180).
primary importance in behaviorism, and many behaviorists share the

assumption that not just behaviors, but thoughts and feelings as well, come
into existence and persist when they are reinforced by the surrounding
environment. Thus, in the same way that species-typical human psychology
exists as a result of successful adaptations to the environment evolved over
eons, the psychological characteristics of individuals are also shaped over a
lifetime by learning. The roots of functionalism, behaviorism, comparative
psychology, and evolutionary psychology are found in these principles of
natural selection.
The Times
In the 18th century, humans wrest more control over their own lives as
they learn to predict and control nature. Not just nature, but
totalitarian religious authority and despotic political rulers are
dethroned from their control over the lives of ordinary humans.
Revolutions occur in the New World and in France, as individual
freedom is sought, at least for a few. Political, economic, and
intellectual power is maintained in the hands of privileged White
European land-owning men, and is exercised as though it is a right.
Slavery of the poor and of people of other races is still widely practiced
throughout Europe and the Americas. Women are not educated, and
many live in conditions little different from those of slaves. People who
are weak, the poor, the sick, and the mentally ill are relegated to the
margins of society, persecuted, and despised.
The Western paradigm for seeking truth about the physical universe
becomes empirical and scientific. The physical universe is assumed to
be made of matter and governed by a few laws in nature. At the same
time, God becomes more distant. Instead of creating each rock, each
tree, each creature, each living thing, just as it is found, God has
created matter, put into place the laws that govern how matter acts on
matter, and now seems to have gone away. Slowly, the distance that
develops between God and humans begins to influence the way that
people think about their relationships with others, their understanding
of themselves, and their beliefs and feelings about their place in the
universe.
6
Physiological to Experimental
Psychology: Can Consciousness Be
Inspected?
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the use of the Scientific Method and the passion for
measurement begins to influence the study of consciousness in the early 19th century in the West.
The growth of scientific theory and knowledge in several domains will be examined along with
the transitions from philosophical psychology to physiology and then to experimental psychology.
By mid-century, the study of psychology is taking many directions. As a discipline, psychology
seems to be becoming more divided. Some psychologists reject science, whereas others pursue
anatomical studies and still others measure relationships between physiological and psychological
functioning.
PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The Story of the Two Astronomers

At Greenwich in 1796, the astronomer Maskelyne, as every
psychologist knows, dismissed Kinnebrook, his assistant, because
Kinnebrook observed the times of stellar transmits almost a second
later than he did. Maskelyne was convinced that all through 1794 there
had been no discrepancy between the two of them. Then in August,
1795, Kinnebrook was found to be recording times about half a second
later than Maskelyne. His attention was called to the “error,” and it
would seem that he must have striven to correct it. Nevertheless, it
increased during the succeeding months until, in January, 1796, it had
become about eight tenths of a second. Then Maskelyne dismissed him.
The error was serious, for upon such observations depended the
calibration of the clock, and upon the clock depended all other
observations of place and time. (Boring, 1957, pp. 134–135)
The problem for astronomers is to achieve consistency in their observations

because of the importance their measures have for navigating ships at sea,
calibrating clocks, and studying astronomy. Finding differences in recording
times between individual astronomers introduces an unwelcome element of
inconsistency, but raises interesting questions for all scientists, especially for
those who study the mind. For example, how can a study of objective reality
be conducted at all if reality can only be known through unreliable human
observations? Equally of interest and concern are questions about how and
why individual differences in observation occur and if human observations
can be adjusted so as to accurately measure objective reality. Astronomers
attempt to solve the problem by determining a personal equation for each
observer, a factor used to equate observations across individual observers.
For later students of the mind, the personal equation becomes the study of
individual differences in reaction time.
✔ Stop and think.

If subjective experience is not a direct reflection of reality, how does it
differ?
Beginning in the 19th century, the process by which the physical world
becomes transformed into thoughts begins to be explored scientifically. The
questions about psychology do not change, but the method for finding
answers does. Instead of relying on trust or the word of authorities and
instead of coming to conclusions through reason, speculation, and argument,
answers are sought through systematic observations and measurement of
nature. In psychology, observations are conducted on sensory and nervous
systems in both human and nonhuman animals.
Experimental psychology conducted in the last half of the 19th century
has important roots in the scientific studies of animal physiology conducted
during the first half of the century, mostly in German laboratories, but in
France, Italy, and Spain as well. German universities are state-supported
during this time and are thus less constrained by religious authorities than
in most other countries in Europe. Researchers and scholars are provided
with funding and equipment for experimental research, and they are given
the freedom needed to pursue the questions that interest them without
interference from those who disagree with their methods.
Vitalism and the Study of the Human
Although philosophers have speculated for centuries about mechanical

determinants of thoughts and behaviors, those ideas are no more popular in
the early 19th century than they were for the Greeks. The search continues
for the mysterious and metaphysical force that begins and directs life and
that is the “self” that continues on after the physical death of the body. The
conviction that there must be such a force is so strong that the conviction
alone seems to constitute sufficient evidence for its existence. Although it is
generally acknowledged that the actions of all other forms of life are
directed by mechanical principles, the study of human physiology is largely
directed toward finding the vital soul.
Respiration and Digestion

Among the physiological functions that seem to be directed by a soul are
involuntary behaviors, such as breathing and digesting food. In Greek and
Roman times, the belief was that vital spirits were present in the air and
drawn into living bodies through the process of respiration. In support of
this idea, for example, Galen points out that fire needs air to burn and that,
like living beings, fire dies if deprived of air. This is why the Greek word
psyche, the “breath of life,” is translated by early Christian theologians as
“soul” and interpreted as a vitalistic spark of a divine spirit that gives life.
During the 19th century, the discovery is made that turning food into
nutrients and then into energy is a purely chemical process. In the middle of
the century, the chemical, and thus material, basis of respiration also comes
to be understood. These findings link the study of the physical sciences to
the biological sciences and begin the blurring of the distinction between
organic and inorganic matter.
✔ Stop and think.

What does distinguish living things from nonliving things? What do all
living things do that no nonliving thing does?
Reproduction
Another physiological function that seems to have ties to some

mysterious force is the process of the reproduction of life. Throughout
history, there has been much speculation about how new life begins. With
the invention of the microscope, it becomes possible for the first time to see
individual cells. In the 17th century, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723)
uses a microscope to see human spermatozoa (sperm cells) for the first time.
Philosophers speculate that sperm cells contain a homunculus, or fully
formed human in miniature, which is planted into the uterus. The uterus is
nothing more than a vessel in which the homunculus gains size and weight
until it is ready to be born. By the 19th century, with the coming of
microscopic biology, the chemical and thus material bases of fertilization
and germination are better understood (Kantor, 1963–1969). Thus, empirical
observations of developing organisms during the 19th century reveal the
inorganic, or chemical, basis of life. Speculations about vitalism are
eliminated from biology, and biology is transformed to the study of matter
and the mechanics of natural laws. In spite of this, theories about vital forces
continue to influence early 19th-century speculation about the human mind.
Electricity and Magnetism as the Vital Force
Probably because they can mysteriously influence objects across empty

space, both electricity and magnetism are mistaken for vitalistic forces,
sometimes, quite literally, the spark of life. This perception is exploited by
Mary Shelley, who has Dr. Frankenstein use the electricity generated by a
thunderstorm to bring his monster to life. Late in the 18th century, the
discovery is made that nerves in organic tissue communicate through
electricity and that electrical stimulation can trigger muscular responses. In
this era, a variety of physical and mental ailments are attributed to the need
for electricity to boost the vitalistic force, thus providing increased energy.
In Fig. 6.1, a patient receives electrical current through his bare feet to cure a
headache in a common 19th-century procedure.
FIG. 6.1. Electrical curing (Beard & Rockwell, 1871, p. 192).
Mesmerism
The mystery of magnetism has inspired “miracle cures” since the earliest
days of physiology. Mesmerism is good example of this phenomenon. In 1766,
Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815) graduates from the University of Vienna
Medical School after completing his dissertation about planetary influences
on human physiology. He develops an interest in magnets and begins to use
them in treating his patients with, he believes, some degree of success. Later,
he decides that his own body generates sufficient magnetism, so that instead
of using magnets he can effect cures and place his female patients into
altered states of consciousness simply by waving his hands over them and
pressing down on an unidentified body part he calls the “ovarium.” In
Mesmer’s view, his work provides evidence that mind influences body.
Later practitioners of scientific experiments in hypnotism suggest that
their ability to induce altered states of consciousness in subjects by the
application of magnetic energy is clear evidence that consciousness itself is
made only of matter. During the early years of the 19th century, there are no
distinct lines between what might be science and what might not be, and
Mesmerism is a good example of the resulting confusion (Winter, 1997).
Although Mesmer is ridiculed by many of his contemporaries, his work is
carried on by a few of his followers. The influence of Mesmer’s work can be
seen in 19th- and early 20th-century approaches to psychotherapy that use
hypnotism and trance states to effect their cures.
Neurophysiology
Built from associations of cells, powered by the functioning of a pump-like

heart and circulatory system, and working by the pulleys and levers of
muscles andbones, Descartes’ and earlier philosophers’ mechanical human
reappears in the study of physiology in the early 19th century. Popular
culture reflects this in Offenbach’s opera, Tales of Hoffman. The protagonist
Hoffman falls in love with Olympia, the perfect woman, who later turns out
to be only an automaton operated by springs (Offenbach, 1881/1959).
Microscopic observation has long revealed that earlier theories about the
nerves as hollow tubes through which some substance travels were
incorrect. As the following quotation shows, the theory that nerves carry
information by vibration is also not compatible with the evidence:
We are informed by anatomists, that although the two coats which inclose a nerve, and which it
derives from the coats of the brain, are tough and elastic, yet the nerve itself has a very small
degree of consistence, being almost like marrow. It has, however, a fibrous texture, and may be
divided and sub-divided, till its fibres escape our senses; and as we know so very little about the
texture of the nerves, there is great room left for those who choose to indulge themselves in
conjecture.
The ancients conjectured that the nervous fibres are fine tubes, filled with a very subtile spirit or
vapour, which they called animal spirits; that the brain is a gland, by which the animal spirits are
secreted from the finer part of the blood, and their continual waste repaired; and that it is by these
animal spirits that the nerves perform their functions. Des Cartes has shewn how, by these animal
spirits going and returning in the nerves, muscular motion, perception, memory, and imagination,
are effected. All this he has described as distinctly as if he had been an eye-witness of all those
operations. But it happens that the tubular structure of the nerves was never perceived by the
human eye, nor shewn by the nicest injections; and all that has been said about animal spirits,
through more than fifteen centuries, is mere conjecture.
Dr. Briggs, who was Sir Isaac Newton’s master in anatomy, was the first, as far as I know, who
advanced a new system concerning the nerves. He conceived them to be solid filaments of
prodigious tenuity; and this opinion, as it accords better with observation, seems to have been
more generally received since his time. As to the matter of performing their office, Dr. Briggs
thought that, like musical cords they have vibrations differing according to their length and
tension. They seem, however, very unfit for this purpose, on account of their want of tenacity,
their moisture, and being through their whole length in contact with moist substances; so that
although Dr. Briggs wrote a book upon this system, called Nova Visionis Theoria, it seems not to
have been much followed. (Reid, 1785/1969, p. 84)
✔ Stop and think.

How do the nerves transmit their information to the brain?
The means by which information is carried from the sensory organs to the
brain remains a mystery in the early 19th century. By midcentury,
physiologists are trying to understand the neurological bases of perception,
and it is through the medium of this physiological research that psychology
as a science eventually emerges from philosophy.
The work of the German physiologist Franz Gall (1758–1828) serves as an
example of this transition from philosophical speculation to the
experimental study of the brain. Trained as an anatomist, Gall begins his
study of the brain in an effort to substantiate the theological claim that
objects in the physical universe are translated into mental events through
faculties of the mind. According to this perspective, mental faculties are
given by God, and “each faculty makes manifest a God-given correlation
between mental and physical processes” (Reed, 1997, p. 28). Philosophers, on
the other hand, are uncomfortable with the notion of an immaterial mind
being divided. Gall takes an empirical approach to the question.
Early in his career, Gall makes significant contributions to understanding
brain functioning. He is among those who identify the brain as an organ
that carries out specific bodily functions. Just as the stomach is an organ that
digests and the lungs are organs that breathe, the brain is the organ that
thinks. Gall recognizes that the cerebral cortex is not a rind, or protective
covering, for the lower structures of the brain, as was previously believed,
but has important intellectual and emotional functions of its own. Further,
based on the evidence from brain dissections, he comes to believe that the
various intellectual and emotional faculties of the mind are localized in
specific parts of the cortex, so that the cortex is really a set of several organs,
each with specific functions. In Gall’s view, the mind and brain are related to
one another in that the brain is the tool of the mind, but he still thinks of the
mind as something metaphysical and thus independent of the brain.
Because intellectual and emotional functions occur in physical organs of
the body, Gall believes that these psychological functions should be
observable and measurable. If this is true, then at least some aspects of the
mind become primary qualities. Thus, there may finally be a way out of
philosophical speculation about mind and a beginning to a science of the
mind.
To many, Gall’s work seems to imply that psychological functions may be
like other physiological functions, such as digestion or respiration. This
suggests that it is the functioning of organs, not a freely willing soul that
causes thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. This threatens the Christian
doctrine of free will, and Gall’s work is denounced by theologians as well as
by his colleagues. His lectures are banned in some countries as a threat to
religion and morality, and his book, published in 1819, is placed on the
Roman Catholic Church’s Index of Forbidden Books.
Gall speculates that cortical organs can be developed through intellectual
exercise in the same way that heart muscle may be developed through
physical exercise. This suggests that the relative size of these organs both
determines and is determined by the degree to which those faculties are
used. Furthermore, the size of these organs differs from one individual to
another, and this difference explains personality differences. Thus, Gall is
among the first to propose the importance of individual differences in brain
functioning and the relationship between those differences and variations in
personality.
This recognition of the importance of individual differences gives rise to
the comparative study of brains. The brains and skulls of many different
animals and of humans from a variety of races and geographic locations
begin to be compared with one another. Not surprisingly, these early
comparative studies find evidence that Caucasian Western European males
of the educated upper classes have larger brains and thus more fully
developed intellectual faculties than any other humans.
Phrenology and Pseudoscience
Gall asserts that differences in the size of cortical organs might be

determined by examining the shape of the head. Nineteenth-century science
is always looking for ways to observe and measure, and these individual
differences in head size and shape prove to be irresistible objects of
measurement. Gall calls his new technique cranioscopy, but much to his
consternation, his colleague Johann C. Spurzheim (1776–1832) quickly
renames the technique phrenology, which means the science of the mind,
and popularizes its practice throughout Europe and North America.
Scientific observations comparing skull size and shape to underlying
cortical structures soon show that Gall’s ideas are false (Gross, 1998).
However, the idea has widespread public appeal. In the West, there is intense
interest in trying to understand human motivation and personality
differences and in being able to predict and possibly control psychological
characteristics. Phrenology seems to offer a powerful tool toward achieving
those ends. The size and shape of the skull presents easily accessible,
observable, measurable, and highly personal evidence. The idea that the
organs of the brain shape the outside of the skull is simple and easily
understood, contains strong elements of cause and effect, and has high face
validity. Even more importantly for those living in the 19th-century era of
scientific progress, phrenology seems like science. Thus, phrenology becomes
wildly popular among the general public and remains so even until the early
20th century.
Evidence for and Against the Localization of Brain Function
Gall’s ideas about the localization of brain function stimulate research

into relationships between brain injuries and specific psychological deficits.
By 1848, it is known that damage in the front part of the brain often results
in language deficits. This is an indication that there is a specific location for
language functions. Then, in April 1861, French physician Paul Broca (1824–
1880) presents a case study in which he observes a language deficit in a
living patient and later, after the patient’s death, locates the damaged part of
the brain that caused the deficit. This work thus supports the contention that
specific functions of the mind are conducted in specific locations in the
brain. The real significance of Broca’s work lies in his demonstration that a
whole function, that of language production, is localized in a specific part of
the brain.
However, there is also support for the contrary belief that the cortex
functions in a more unitary way and not as a set of discrete organs. The
French physiologist, Jean-Pierre Flourens (1794–1867), provides experimental
evidence to support a more limited model of localization. Over several years,
Flourens conducts a series of vivisection (live dissection) experiments on the
effects on behavior of brain lesions, mostly in birds. He observes that the site
of the lesion is mostly irrelevant because a lesion almost anywhere in the
cortex results in devastating effects on behavior. The evidence from these
studies leads to his conclusion that the cortex functions in a holistic or
unitary way, with only limited localization of function (Gross, 1998). This
conclusion is also in keeping with Flourens’ philosophical and theological
convictions. He is a Cartesian dualist who views the soul as residing in the
cerebral hemispheres and believes that, because the soul is unitary, the
functions of the cerebral hemispheres must also be unitary.
The Sensory System
✔ Stop and think.

Do visual perceptions happen immediately, as soon as the eyes are
opened, or does it take some time for the images to reach the brain?
At about this same time, two laboratories, one in England headed by Charles
Bell (1774–1842) and one in France headed by Francois Magendie (1783–
1855), publish evidence that there is more than one kind of nerve cell. These
researchers independently establish that there are sensory nerves that carry
impulses from the sensory organs to the brain and motor nerves that carry
impulses from the brain to the muscles of the motor system. This discovery
is called the Bell-Magendie law.
The functioning of sensory and nervous systems seems like the place to
begin to explore questions about how reality is transformed into subjective
experience. How do the various sensory systems receive information, and
how and where is that information transmitted to motor nerves?
The first modern physiological laboratory is established by Czech
physiologist J. E. Purkinje (1787–1869) at the University of Breslau, in
Poland. He conducts research on the nerves and organs of vision between
1823 and 1850. Within a few years, German universities follow with their
own laboratories.
This is not to suggest that physiologists have given up the notion of an
immaterial human mind, only that nervous and sensory systems are
increasingly viewed as material and measurable. For example, one of the
earliest professors of physiology with whom many others study, Johannes
Muller (1801–1858), believes that even human organs are endowed with a
vital nonmaterial force that coordinates their operations. Many of Muller’s
students, however, reject these vitalistic convictions.
Hermann von Helmholtz, mentioned earlier in connection with the
principle of the conservation of energy, is one of Muller’s students.
Helmholtz rejects physiological vitalism. Helmholtz believes instead that all
aspects of physiology are material and operate according to laws in nature.
He is trained as a surgeon, but is inclined toward physics, and he eventually
extends the principle of conservation to living organisms. Helmholtz states
that the amount of energy consumed by organisms is equal to the amount of
energy expended by them. He thus applies a law governing the physical
universe to the biological universe and contributes to the movement toward
blurring the distinction between living and nonliving matter.
Like other physiologists of the era, Helmholtz conducts experimental
research on living organisms. In 1850, his findings on the rate of nerve
conduction are published, demonstrating that when a nerve in a frog’s leg is
stimulated, it takes a measurable amount of time for the muscle to respond.
After further study, he concludes that nerve conduction travels at the rate of
90 feet per second. According to Boring (1957, p. 42), “This established the
disturbing idea that to move your finger voluntarily was not an act of mind
in itself, but was a later event caused by a previous act of mind.” Helmholtz’s
findings also refute Professor Muller’s conviction that nerve transmission
travels at the speed of light.
✔ Stop and think.

What implications does this have for the theory of mind as will?
Helmholtz also finds significant differences between individuals in their
reactions to sensory stimulation, but it is not until much later in the century
that these differences are explored. Helmholtz himself concludes that
because reaction time varies among individuals, it must be an unreliable
measure of physiological functioning and abandons this line of research.
The Tactile Senses
The study of the tactile senses does not receive the same attention in the
19th century as does vision and audition, where the main question concerns
how visual and auditory information in the physical world is transmitted to
the sensory nerves. No similar transmitting mechanism is needed for tactile
sensations because the physical stimuli causing them act directly on the
nerves of the skin. However, the German physiologist Ernst Weber (1795–
1878), who publishes his most important works in 1834 and 1846, devotes
almost his entire career to the experimental study of the tactile senses. He
studies both the external sense of touch and something he calls common
sensibility, defined as internal physical sensations, like pain and muscle
movement. In his investigations, Weber begins by noting that the external
sense of touch is made up of a combination of pressure, temperature, and
location. Commonly, the experience of pressure and location would seem to
be indistinguishable, so that pressure applied to a finger is experienced as
both a pressure and a location. Similarly, pressure applied to two different
fingers at the same time is experienced as two pressures at two locations.
But, Weber asks, what about when two fingers are touched together? This is
experienced as two pressures but only one location. It is this kind of
experience that leads Weber to conclude that pressure and location are
separate aspects of the sense of touch.
Weber also conducts research into the “two-point threshold.” This involves
placing two stimuli on the skin so close together that the subject identifies
only one location, then moving the stimuli in a series of steps further and
further apart until the subject reports feeling two locations. When this
distinction is made, the two-point threshold has been reached. Weber
discovers that the threshold for the perception of two points varies on
different parts of the body, meaning that some places on the skin are more
sensitive to tactile stimulation than others. The degree of perceived weight
also varies with different parts of the body, as does the capacity for
discrimination between temperatures. These differences lead Weber to
conclude that sensitivity to touch is determined by the density of nerve
fibers, and the density of nerve endings varies on different parts of the skin.
Weber is also interested in the conscious experience of differences
between closely related stimuli. For example, he presents research subjects
with two weights, one in each hand, systematically varies the relationships
between the weights, and asks the subjects to report their perception of the
weights. He explores the point at which subjects are able to discern a
difference between the weights. How much more must the weight in one
hand be than the weight in the other before the subject will report feeling a
difference? The point at which the subject will report a difference Weber
calls the “just noticeable difference” (jnd). He is then able to identify a
mathematical relationship between changes in the weights and perceptions
of those changes. The smallest perceptible difference between two weights is
not absolute—the same for each difference—but is a relative difference
between the weights. An increase of only a gram over the standard weight
will be perceived if the standard weight is 40 grams or less. But if the
standard weight is more than 40 grams, an increase of only a gram will not
be perceived at all. This ratio of 1:40 holds across all variations in standard
weights. In finding this ratio, Weber brings mathematical relationships to
the study of psychological experience and provides a foundation for the
further systematic study of such relationships. Weber’s studies may be
described as true psychological research because he is measuring conscious
experience (Brauns, 1997).
Vision
From the time of Aristotle, people believed that visual sensation was a
result of tiny copies of the physical object being transmitted to the eye. By
the mid-19th century, it is understood that the nerve fibers of the retina
respond in a patterned way to visible patterns encountered in the
environment. In this way, conscious experience results from the patterned
responses of nerve fibers in the retina. The question about how physical
sensations are transformed into mental events is thus moved closer to the
brain, although there is as yet no understanding about how patterned
electrical responses on the retina become conscious thoughts.
✔ Stop and think.

Why is only one image seen when there are two retinas, each
transmitting a different image to the brain?
For example, consider the case of the ability to perceive how close or far
away an object is using only visual sensation. Helmholtz points out that the
brain actually receives two images, one from each retina. Gradually, he says,
the ability to coordinate these two images into a single one is learned. This
learned ability then becomes unconscious. An unconscious inference of
depth is made from comparisons of the two images and the angles at which
they are received. Thus, Helmholtz concludes, depth perception is an innate
consequence of the way in which the visual system is built and the way that
unconsciousness functions.
There are also theories about how color vision functions. Johannes Muller
argues that there are specific nerves responding to specific types of
stimulation, such as visual nerves that respond to light and auditory nerves
that respond to sound. The research of Thomas Young (1773–1829) provides
evidence that there are three types of substances on the back of the eye, each
chemically sensitive to different wave lengths of light. Helmholtz applies his
theory of specific nerve fibers to conclude that, instead of substances, there
are three types of nerve fibers on the retina. All of these ideas are combined
into the Young-Helmholtz theory of color vision. This theory states that
color vision is a result of three types of receptors, each responsive to
different wavelengths of light.
This theory provides a structural explanation for a vision deficit like color-
blindness. If a person cannot see red, it must be that the nerve fibers
sensitive to that wavelength of light are missing or inoperative. As is also
true in research on language functions, this method of coming to understand
how a system must operate by examining cases in which there is a deficit
has been and still is a very important method in psychological research.
The time has come when the many striking discoveries of the Physiologists relative to the nervous
system should find a recognized place in the Science of Mind, I have devoted a separate chapter to
the Physiology of the Brain and Nerves. (Bain, 1885, page iii)
Audition
Physiologists also try to identify the specific structures or nerve fibers that
account for hearing and for the hearing of different pitches. Helmholtz, for
example, speculates that, just as a piano string will vibrate in response to an
external source of sound waves of the same frequency to which the string is
tuned, there may be specific nerve fibers in the ear that vibrate in response
to specific sound waves. Later researchers explore these questions more
fully.
Taste and Smell
The senses of taste and smell do not receive any significant attention until
late in the 19th century. Smell, in particular, remains baffling throughout this
period because the mechanisms by which smell is perceived are not obvious.
Aristotle’s theory was that smells result from tiny copies of the object of
perception traveling through space to the sensory organ. Although this idea
is discredited with regard to visual images, it persists about smells. Some
classification systems of smells and tastes are proposed, but the aspects of
the physical stimuli that cause the sensations, and the physiological
structures that produce the perceptions of taste and smell, remain
mysterious.
Physiological Conclusions
The match between what is physically present and what is consciously

experienced is often not good. Discrepancies between the physical and the
mental can be explained in terms of two factors. The first is the operation of
the sensory receptor system. The second is what Helmholtz calls the
unconscious inferences of the observer. According to Helmholtz, these
inferences are learned, complex, and difficult, if not impossible to measure. It
takes more than 100 years before many psychologists begin to acknowledge
the powerful role played by unconscious processes in perception.
Psychophysics
As long as consciousness remains impossible to measure and psychology is

the study of consciousness, there can never be a science of psychology. The
task of those studying consciousness in the 19th century, then, is to find
ways to measure. Psychophysics is the first effort to systematically measure
relationships between the external physical world and the internal world of
consciousness. Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) reasons in 1858–1860
that if a systematic relationship can be found between known changes in
physical stimuli and changes in the conscious experience of those stimuli,
that would be a measure of consciousness. These kinds of discriminations
are similar to those explored by Weber in his laboratory.
Fechner wants to measure relationships between the physical or objective
world and the mental or subjective world. He is interested in the
relationship between physical stimuli and both the underlying physiological
mechanism of sensation and the subjective experience. The interest in
physiological sensations becomes a part of physiological study, whereas the
subjective or conscious experience becomes the province of psychology.
Aside from his career as a physicist and scientist, Fechner is something of a
mystic, fascinated with a spiritual reality, and interested in finding
connections between the physical and the metaphysical. He is described as a
panpsychic (Boring, 1957), believing that everything that is physical has a
soul, including inanimate objects.
Following Weber’s work, Fechner finds that weights varied systematically
are perceived in systematic ways, but not in a one-to-one ratio. Instead,
weights varied geometrically are perceived arithmetically. This relationship
is stated mathematically as:
S = k log R
What this formula means is that, for conscious experience S (mental

sensation) to change arithmetically, the stimulus magnitude R must change
geometrically. This is more complex than Weber’s ratio and extended to
other sensory modalities. Fechner has found a mathematical formula that
explains a systematic relationship between physical objects and conscious
experience. A part of consciousness has thus been measured, demonstrating
that a science of consciousness may be possible after all. Psychophysics is a
first step in the transition of the study of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
from philosophical speculation to science. Those who follow build on these
foundations supplied by physiologists.
ROMANTIC IDEAS
In the mid-19th century, those who ponder the questions of psychology take
many paths. Many, including writers, artists, philosophers, and even some
scientists such as Fechner, continue to believe that the human experience
cannot be fully understood through the methods of science alone. The thesis
that true knowledge about an objective reality can be achieved only through
systematic observation and measurement is attacked from a variety of
perspectives. Both Catholic and Protestant religious authorities assert the
insignificance of human knowledge against that of the divine. Romantic
thinkers view emotion, intuition, and other subjective ways of coming to
believe as superior to observation and experience.
Art and Literature
Romantic ideas pervade the cultural life of the 19th century. Early 19th-
century literature explores beauty, love, and sensual pleasures. This is the era
of exciting and romantic novels, such as Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility
and The Three Musketeers by Alexandre Dumas.
Romantics assert that there are aspects of abeautiful sunset, apiece of
heartrending music, or a delicious meal that cannot be measured. Similarly,
these romantic expressions explore aspects of the human experience that
cannot be measured. The creators of these works and those who read and
view them are exploring human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Exploring is not the same as explaining, however, and the distinction is an
important one. Nineteenth-century romantics are content to explore and
describe the human experience, whereas scientists seek to explain and
answer questions. Thus, when studying the human experience, both the
methods and goals of the humanities differ categorically from those of
science.
Romantic Philosophy
The distinction between science and philosophy remains a fuzzy one,

because many scientists espouse philosophies and are influenced by
philosophers. The distinction between philosophy and science is exemplified
by the writings of Dr. Mises, a pseudonym created by Fechner to express his
more mystical and philosophic views. Dr. Mises writes of his beliefs that
everything in the universe, including the universe itself, has consciousness.
Fechner himself believes that there is unity between science and philosophy,
but his creation of Dr. Mises illustrates the growing distrust philosophers
have of the narrowness of science and the concern that scientists have with
what they see as the vague and abstract nature of philosophy.
Like their counterparts in the humanities, romantic philosophers
emphasize the intuitive or emotional aspects of human experience over the
rational mind. They argue that there are aspects of human nature and
human experience that are not observable to others and cannot be reduced
to measurable phenomena. They assert that humans are not primarily
rational but are motivated first by emotions. Human behavior is often
motivated by irrational emotions, like the desire to continue surviving, even
in situations where the more rational thing might be to die.
According to the philosopher Schopenhauer, the most intelligent humans
become quite adept at surviving. Having met their survival needs, these
people become bored. The only way to escape this boredom is in the pursuit
of interests not related to survival, such as art, music, poetry, or philosophy.
Nineteenth-century romantic philosophy is a short-lived movement,
culminating with the writer and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)
later in the century. However, romantic philosophy does influence scientific
psychology. Wilhelm Wundt, for example, often described as the founder of
modern psychology, gives the preeminent place in his psychological theories
to volitional motivation, which is the desire to act to achieve some goal.
Sigmund Freud claimed to have come to his conclusions independently, yet
the connections between Freud, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche are
undeniable. For example, Schopenhauer, writing 50 years before Freud,
argues that human behavior is motivated by irrational forces, much like
Freud’s later idea of the “id.” Schopenhauer also argues that the will actively
represses ideas that might cause insanity if allowed to become conscious,
presaging Freud’s ideas about repression and defense mechanisms. Also,
Schopenhauer calls the human will the wellspring of culture because it
forces humans to pursue art, poetry, and philosophy to escape the tyranny of
irrational forces. Freud calls this process sublimation. Similarly, Nietzsche
argues that basic human nature, which is irrational, must be controlled and
modified by rationality. These romantic ideas are mirrored in many aspects
of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Finally, Freud, Schopenhauer, and
Nietzsche are all accurately described as unusually pessimistic about human
nature.
Hope is the result of confusing the desire that something should take place with the probability
that it will. Perhaps no man is free from this folly of the heart, which deranges the intellect’s
correct appreciation of probability to such an extent that, if the chances are a thousand to one
against it, yet the event is thought a likely one. Still in spite of this, a sudden misfortune is like a
death stroke, whilst a hope that is always disappointed and still never dies, is like death by
prolonged torture. (Schopenhauer, 1844/1942, p. 45)
In many ways, both Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s ideas form bridges

between speculation and empiricism, and thus between philosophy and
science. Schopenhauer claims, for example, that all of his psychological
theories are derived from the observation of human behavior. He urges
philosophers and scientists to interpret the world as it really is and is
constant in his appeals that conclusions should be based on personal
experience. He does not want to be a “conjuror of ideas” like other
philosophers (Schopenhauer, 1841–1852/1994, p. viii). Like his scientific
contemporaries, Schopenhauer rejects a philosophy of abstract ideas in favor
of one based on observation and experience.
For his part, Nietzsche accepts the evidence of science while at the same
time arguing that the knowledge that science is uncovering has taken
meaning from human lives. Rationalist philosophers and scientists, for
example, have killed God by providing natural explanations for natural
phenomena. Evolutionary theory is “true but deadly,” having placed us not
at the top of some hierarchy of life but alongside all of the other animals on
Earth in an evolutionary sense (Golomb, 1989).
Hard Times
The 19th century’s passion for measurement for the purpose of
ascertaining “facts” is satirized by Charles Dickens in his 1854 novel,
Hard Times. Here, we are introduced to Mr. Gradgrind, “a man of
realities. A man of facts and calculations. A man who proceeds upon
the principle that two and two are four and nothing over” (p. 16).
Grangrind approaches all questions “with a rule and a pair of scales,
and the multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh
and measure any parcel of human nature, and tell you exactly what it
comes to” (p. 16). He argues that life is “a mere question of figures, a
case of simple arithmetic” (p. 16). To his children’s teacher he asserts,
“Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted
in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only
form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever
be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my
own children” (p. 15). And yet, in spite of Gradgrind’s careful bringing
up of his own children to seek out only measurable facts, they insist on
sneaking away to watch the antics of a traveling circus, a fancy that
Gradgrind can find no way to comprehend. (adapted from Dickens,
1854/1987)
The Rejection of a Science of Consciousness
✔ Stop and think.

If only matter is observable, can consciousness be studied by
observation? If it can, does that mean that consciousness is made of
matter?
Suggesting that consciousness can be studied by observation implies that
consciousness is as material as all other aspects of nature. An early 19th-
century philosopher Johann Herbart (1776–1841), for example, suggests that
there may eventually be a mathematics of consciousness (Leary, 1978). If
consciousness can be explained as matter acting on matter, then where is the
nonmaterial and transcendent human will? Trying to imagine that
consciousness is nothing more than matter in motion violates the human
intuitive sense of a self that is distinct from the material body. Imagining
that others may, by the simple observation of matter, be able to peer inside
the supposed private domain of others’ minds makes many people
uncomfortable. Through most of the mid-19th century, it is accepted, even
by many scientists, that human consciousness will never be observable and
that questions about consciousness must remain forever the province of
speculation.
Spiritualism and the Occult
In 1850, in upstate New York, a movement called Spiritualism appears and

spreads rapidly throughout the United States and Europe. Spiritualism is the
belief that it is possible to communicate with the spirits of animals and
people who have died. These spirits might be the self, a will, the mind, or
even some mysterious nonphysical form of energy (Porter, 1972). This notion
of a type of energy that is psychic, rather than physical, is expressed in the
writings of Johann Herbart. He argues that thoughts and ideas have a force
or energy of their own, and it is this energy, rather than laws of association,
that cause ideas to attract one another to form complex ideas. According to
Spiritualists, psychic energy transcends physical death. Only very special
people, called mediums, have the power to perceive this type of energy and
mediate between the living and the dead.
Communication with the dead becomes popular among a wide variety of
people (Conan Doyle, 1930). In the United States alone, millions of people
spend millions of dollars to visit mediums and attend seances. Some of the
most learned scholars and prominent individuals in the country are among
those attending Spiritualist performances and professing to hold Spiritualist
beliefs (Moore, 1977; Marshall & Wendt, 1980; Coon, 2002). As the
movement spreads, prominent scholars associated with the study of
psychology take differing positions on Spiritualist beliefs. Wilhelm Wundt
and G. Stanley Hall, discussed in succeeding chapters, attack Spritualism,
whereas the philosopher and psychologist William James comes under attack
for his interest in Spiritualism (Coon, 2002).
Historians offer a variety of explanations for the appearance and
popularity of Spiritualism at this time in history. Often, it is assumed that
Spiritualism is a rejection of the growing presence and power of science and
technology, but there is not much evidence to support this argument.
Spiritualism is not a rejection of science, but “thought of itself as an
empirical, scientific attempt to prove the real existence of that other realm”
(Moore, 1977, p. 7). Nineteenth-century Spiritualists are typically well
educated, often even antireligious, and usually firm believers that science is
the only reliable way to gain true knowledge (Moore, 1977).
By the 19th century, science and technology are producing their own
miracles, like vaccines and locomotives, and turning them into everyday
experiences. Technological miracles, like the telegraph, allow for
communication in real time with people who are very far away, even across
the ocean. It is no great leap to imagine that someday technology will allow
for communication with the dead (Coon, 2002). What a comfort to be able to
believe that a loved one lives on, even after death, in another realm and can
be contacted almost as easily as sending a telegram.
Spiritualism withers almost as quickly as it appears. Many mediums are
exposed as frauds and hucksters, producing their illusions by using common
magic tricks, such as hidden mirrors and accomplices in adjacent rooms.
Their tricks are perpetrated on people who want very much to believe, as
Francis Bacon warned might happen. When the methods of scientific testing
are brought to bear on Spiritualist claims, no evidence is found of contact
with any nonphysical realm.
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION: MEASURING
MIND
As 19th-century physiologists observe and measure relationships between

reality and consciousness, anatomists and physicians weigh and measure the
structures of the brain. At the same time, naturalists look for ways to
explore the evolutionary origins of mind.
The Origin of Human Mind
When applied to living organisms, the principle of the conservation of

energy eliminates the foundations of vitalism. By mid-19th century,
biologists understand that life arises not from some mysterious life-force but
from combinations of chemicals under favorable conditions. Darwinian
principles of evolution by natural selection, now widely accepted, provide
explanations for the physical characteristics of all life forms.
One problem with accepting evolution in the animal kingdom is the
unavoidable conclusion that humans have also evolved from some different
life form. Particularly unacceptable is the idea that humans have evolved
from something like present-day chimpanzees or gorillas. In other words,
humans are not some special case endowed by their creator with certain
inalienable rights and abilities that no other animal has or is capable of
having. Instead, humans are just another form of life. Thus, although
humans may have taken dominion over all other animals, they are not given
that right by a divine creator. This conclusion violates religious doctrines
and is demeaning and dehumanizing.
✔ Stop and think.

What does it mean to suggest that the mind is subject to the principles
of natural selection?
A related problem has to do with accounting for human mind using the
same principles of natural selection that account for the evolution of
physical structures. If mind is merely a function of physical structures in the
brain that have evolved over time, does this mean that other animals also
have minds? This becomes a central question for psychologists over the next
several decades.
Recognizing the evolutionary links between humans and other animals

increases interest in comparative psychology, which is the study of the
psychological characteristics of animals of all kinds, both human and
nonhuman. In the 19th century, it is widely believed that nonhuman animals
are less highly evolved than humans. Thus, in this era, comparative
psychology is studied because of the belief that human thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors may be understood by examining those characteristics in “less
highly evolved,” or “less complex,” species. The underlying assumption is
that both physical and psychological characteristics have evolved.
Evolutionary ideas also give rise to the comparative study of humans.
Anthropologists and many others of this era believe that humans with
different skin colors and physical characteristics actually belong to distinct
species of humans. Furthermore, these different species of humans can be
ranked in terms of their level of evolution, with those claiming origins in
northern Europe being ranked as the most highly evolved.
It should be noted that the idea that some animals are more highly evolved
than others, including that some humans are more highly evolved than
others, is not supported by the principles of natural selection, nor by
anything that Charles Darwin wrote or said about evolution. These beliefs
arise out of a preexisting Western worldview that certain people of northern
European descent are superior to all other peoples. These beliefs provided the
philosophical foundation for slavery, as well as for many other forms of
Western imperialism and the exploitation of other peoples around the world.
In the late 19th century, scientific support for these beliefs is sought and, in
one of science’s more embarrassing chapters, found.
Mental Measurement
Although most 19th-century physiologists, anatomists, and philosophers of

nature hold firmly to the conviction that the human mind transcends mere
matter, they nevertheless struggle to find some aspect of consciousness that
can be measured. One clear difference between one human consciousness
and another is intellectual capacity. Some people achieve more than others
within a particular cultural definition of achievement. Some people become
learned, articulate, and renowned university professors, whereas others
merely cook and clean. Some people make a great deal of money, whereas
others barely eke out a living. If these differing levels of achievement are due
primarily to differences in intellectual capacity, then it would be interesting
to be able to measure intellectual capacity. The anatomists who attempt to
answer this question begin with three convictions. First, they share the
widespread Western belief that there are at least four, or maybe five, distinct
races of humans. Second, they are convinced that brain size is directly
related to intellectual capacity. And third, they believe that of these distinct
races of humans, males of northern European descent have the largest
intellectual capacity.
All scientists in every era begin their investigations from within particular
paradigms that shape the questions they ask and the methods they use to
answer those questions. It would be easy to dismiss the work of the 19th-
century physiologists who begin their work measuring intellectual capacity
with these three erroneous convictions. However, simply dismissing this work
on those grounds might further blind us to how preexisting worldviews
influence the science of psychology, even as it is conducted in the present
day. Better to examine psychology’s whole history than to avoid those
aspects that current paradigms find unacceptable.
Racial Distinctions
Based on encounters with cultures around the globe, the four distinct
races or species of humans identified by anthropologists are Caucasians,
American Indians, Asians, and Africans. Later, others add Malaysians as a
fifth. In both cases, humans are thought to have originated from a single
northern European prototype, the Caucasoid male, named after a mountain
range in Russia, where the most beautiful people are said to live and from
where human life is first believed to have originated (Gould, 1996). Thus, all
other humans are degenerations of the ideal type.
✔ Stop and think.

Are individuals with bigger brains smarter than those with smaller
brains?
Brain Size and Intellectual Capacity
The assumption that intellectual capacity is related to brain size is a

natural one to make. The idea is simple and has good face validity.
Nineteenth-century anatomists have access to data that would refute such
an assumption; for example, they know that elephants and blue whales have
larger brains than humans. They even know that brain size is really a
function of body size, so that individuals with bigger bodies also usually
have bigger brains. In spite of this, many ignore these data and maintain the
conviction that brain size is directly related to intellectual capacity.
Northern European Male Superiority
Many of these upper-class northern European males also believe that, as a

group, they possess a superior intellectual capacity to any other race of
humans, superior even to the women of their own group. After all, no other
group has as well-developed a culture, as productive an economy, nor as
superior a civilization as has been created in the West. Although women
have sometimes achieved great things, and it is often recognized that they
have been educationally disadvantaged, still, as a group, the achievements of
women pale in comparison with those of men.
Some conclude that, because women and people of other races have lesser
abilities, they should play lesser roles in society. Others argue that, even
though these other people are lesser, they deserve the same rights as the
superior group. But nearly all agree that women and people of other races
are inferior (Gould, 1996). To be sure, they do have important roles to play.
For example, they are unsurpassed at providing for the needs of the superior
group. If it can be established by scientific evidence that these other groups
do indeed have less intellectual capacity, then it will be clear to all that the
supporting roles they play are destined by nature itself. Thus, measuring
intellectual capacity becomes an important goal.
✔ Stop and think.

How would you measure brain size?
Measuring Brain Size
Attempts are made to measure brain size and to make comparisons across
gender, race, socioeconomic status, occupation, and lifestyle. To establish the
expected superiority in Caucasian male brain size, anatomists like French
physician Paul Broca use a variety of techniques, such as the actual
weighing of dead brains removed during autopsy. They also try measuring
the skulls of people still living. Neither of these techniques provides reliable
evidence of a difference in brain size between groups. Eventually, anatomists
settle on measuring the capacity of empty skulls, collected from graves and
medical schools, as the best way to determine brain size. These skulls are
filled with birdseed or lead shot, and the amount of seed or shot that can be
fitted into the skull is weighed.
After collecting data from a variety of sources, anatomists decide that
their hypothesis is supported. Educated upper-class Caucasian males do
indeed have the largest brains. Women’s brains are equal in size to men’s
when the difference in body size between women and men is corrected for,
but, Broca argues, there is no need to make this correction in the data, nor to
conclude that women’s brains are equal to men’s brains because:
… we must not forget that women are, on the average, a little less intelligent than men, a
difference which we should not exaggerate but which is, nonetheless, real. We are therefore
permitted to suppose that the relatively small size of the female brain depends in part upon her
physical inferiority and in part on her intellectual inferiority. (Broca, 1861, p. 153, as cited in
Gould, 1996)
Today a number of irregularities with these 19th-century attempts to

measure brain size are recognized. For example, in cases where group
differences were found, the researchers were aware of which group each
skull belonged to before they began their measurements. Thus, if they
expected to find that one skull held more than another, it was not hard to
find ways to fit more into that one. This is why researchers should be blind
to the variables and hypotheses during data collection. Also, although a
program ofresearch is always begun with a hypothesis, the goal in science is
supposed to be to test the hypothesis in whatever way will be required to
prove it wrong, not to prove it right. That is why the null hypothesisis
tested for, which is the hypothesis that there are no differences between
groups. Today, blind and double-blind (meaning that both those who collect
the data and the participants are unaware of the hypothesis) designs are
used, tests are made for the null hypothesis, and students are required to
study experimental research methods during their earliest undergraduate
training.
Statistics and Mental Measurement
The role played by statistics in 19th-century mental measurements can be

illustrated by the work of Francis Galton (1822–1911), a cousin of Charles
Darwin. Galton, like many of his contemporaries, has a passion for
measuring. He measures variables like the weather, fingerprints, and
psychological variables like the effectiveness of prayer, perceptions of
beauty, or degree of boredom. Charles Darwin emphasizes the importance of
variations among individuals in the process of natural selection, and after
reading Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection,
published in 1859, Galton becomes fascinated with measuring these
differences. He sets up a laboratory to measure every conceivable difference
among individuals, from head circumference and socioeconomic status to
sensory sensitivity. He collects data from more than 17,000 participants,
amassing a huge set of data on individual differences that has not even yet
been fully analyzed. As Galton makes comparisons among these many
measurements, for example, by comparing arm length with leg length, he
develops a measure he calls the co-relation. Among the co-relations Galton
explores in his data are relationships between the sexes on a number of
variables. Most psychology students today are familiar with Pearson’s r, a
measure of correlation developed by a follower and student of Galton’s, Karl
Pearson (1857–1936).
Galton assumes that intellectual capacity is a consequence of sensory
acuity, not brain size, that is, the better the sense of hearing or the better the
ability to see, the higher the intellectual capacity. This is why he includes
sensory acuity among the measures that he makes. Because sensory acuity is
an inherited physical characteristic, Galton and others naturally conclude
that intellectual capacity is also an inherited characteristic and not subject to
the effects of learning and interactions with the environment. If intellectual
capacity is an inherited characteristic and those who are brighter rise to
higher levels of eminence in society, then it stands to reason that eminence
should run in families. To explore this question, Galton examines lists of
people who have achieved some degree of recognition. He discovers that it is
common to see multiple members of the same family reaching higher levels
of eminence (Galton, 1869). His own family is a good example of this, with
his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, being a recognized biologist; his cousin,
Charles Darwin, the naturalist; and, of course, Galton himself. In examining
the records to establish that eminence runs in families, Galton is conducting
what is referred to as archival research, in which data are collected from
the historical record.
In a further effort to understand the origins of intellectual capacity and
achievement, Galton also develops a questionnaire and distributes it to 200
of his fellow scientists, initiating the use of survey research in psychology.
In the title of the book reporting the results of this survey, English Men of
Science: Their Nature and Nurture (1874), Galton gives a name to an area of
inquiry that proves historically important to psychology. The study of the
relative importance of inherited characteristics and learning, and
relationships between the two, is referred to as nature versus nurture.
Galton notes that most of the scientists surveyed said they had been
interested in science “for as long as they could remember,” supporting his
belief that intellectual capacity is inherited. Eventually, Galton decides that,
although the potential for high intelligence is inherited, it is only fully
developed in the proper kind of environment.
To further explore relationships between nature and nurture, Galton
collects data from monozygotic (identical, or single-egg) and dizygotic
(fraternal, or separate-egg) twins, some raised together and some in different
homes. He finds that identical twins are more similar to each other than are
fraternal twins, even when the identical twins are raised apart. This adds
evidence to his conviction about the importance of inherited characteristics.
In his passion to measure the naturally occurring individual differences
that are both the raw material for and the products of natural selection,
Galton brings psychological research closer to its present-day form in a
variety of important ways. He measures psychological variables widely
regarded in the 19th century as unmeasurable. For example, he measures
how much his colleagues “fidget” at scientific meetings, arguing that this is a
measure of boredom. In measuring an aspect of consciousness, Galton is
participating in experimental psychology, just appearing in the latter half of
the 19th century in German laboratories.
EXPLORING THE CONTENTS OF

CONSCIOUSNESS
Examining and measuring the anatomy of the brain may be one way to
bring the methods of science to bear on the questions of psychology, but in
the mid-19th-century physiologists, following in the tradition of Weber and
Fechner, advocate a different approach. They are more concerned with
finding ways to measure the contents of consciousness than with the
anatomy of the brain.
✔ Stop and think.

Why do you have the thoughts you have? Why those thoughts and not
others?
Because the consciousness of others cannot be observed, mind must be

inferred only through the subjective testimony of introspection (Daston,
1982). The mind directs thoughts and behaviors and makes individuals
responsible for their choices. Thus, the search for mind is closely tied with
Christian religious doctrines. In fact, in the 19th century, these studies are
referred to as “moral philosophy.” On the other hand, if mind is not
metaphysical but is instead as material as the rest of our physiology, what, if
anything, is free will? Are attention and volition empirical questions or
ethical questions?
✔ Stop and think.

How does suggesting that free will is a physiological question, and not
a moral one, threaten the traditional foundations of ethics and Western
law?
Some of psychology’s questions lead to testable hypotheses. For example,

associationists say that humans begin life with a consciousness that is like a
blank slate. Sensory systems then provide a variety of experiences that,
through repeated exposures, become meaningful basic elements of
perception. The laws of association then explain how these basic elements of
perception are slowly assembled together into complex thoughts and ideas.
If associationism explains where thoughts come from, then understanding
consciousness becomes a matter of first understanding how the sensory
systems work to provide those simple sensations. Then the laws of
association that allow simple sensations to be built into complex thoughts
must be understood. Thus, during the last half of the 19th century, studies of
how sensory systems work are brought together with philosophies about
how complex ideas are built up. The new discipline of science that emerges
is psychology, defined as the study of consciousness through the methods of
natural science.
German Experimental Psychology
✔ Stop and think.

Can consciousness ever be inspected?
Within German universities, a few individuals begin to believe that

consciousness can be measured. Among these is Wilhelm Wundt (1832–
1920), who holds a chair in philosophy at the University of Leipzig in
Germany. Trained as a medical doctor, Wundt knows about Fechner’s work
in psychophysics, has studied physiology under Muller at the University of
Berlin and served as a research assistant for Helmholtz for 8 years. Wundt
teaches courses, including one called Psychology as a Natural Science, even
before accepting the position at Leipzig. He believes that consciousness can
be studied by using many of the scientific methods learned while conducting
physiological research. Although consciousness itself may not be observable,
Wundt believes that conscious functioning might be measured. For example,
one might observe and describe how much time is required to complete
various mental tasks.
Wundt calls his technique “experimental introspection.” For Wundt,
psychological study has two goals. The first is to discover the basic elements
of consciousness (sensations), and the second is to discover the laws of
association that govern how those basic elements are combined into
perceptions, thoughts, and complex ideas.
More in agreement with Lamarck’s theory of the inheritance of acquired
characteristics than with what he sees as Darwin’s very passive theory of
natural selection, Wundt views all animals, including humans, as actively
striving to adapt successfully to their environments. Thus, the basic elements
of consciousness are combined into complex thoughts for the purpose of
achieving some desired goal that will enhance adaptation. Because this is a
willful effort directed toward a goal, Wundt calls his theory of psychology
“voluntarism.” By this, he does not mean to imply that behavior is freely
willed. He only means that, driven by some biological need, humans actively
and even creatively engage in behaviors that are intended to help fulfill that
need.
On the strength of his conviction, but with little support from his
university, in 1879, Wundt sets aside some space in which to conduct the
kinds of studies in standardized introspection that he believes will be useful
(Bringmann, Voss, & Ungerer, 1997). Although others set up psychology
laboratories elsewhere, both in Europe and the United States, Wundt is
traditionally credited with the formal founding of the discipline of
experimental psychology.
The model established for experimental psychology in Leipzig would
hardly be recognizable to present-day students of psychology. To overcome
objections to introspection as a scientific method, Wundt advocates the
method of standardized introspection. This makes the role of the observer as
central to the method, as in astronomy and all other sciences. The observer
(in today’s language, the subject or participant) must know how to observe
and what to observer, whereas the experimental manipulator is only there to
ensure that the conditions for observation are right (Fuchs & Milar, 2003).
Thus, the issue of individual differences in reliability of observations and the
astronomers’ personal equation becomes a critically important question for
psychologists.
In Wundt’s laboratories, research is conducted collaboratively among
many students. To amass sufficient reaction time data to draw meaningful
conclusions, students sometimes serve as observers and sometimes as the
manipulators of the stimuli. Because he is a trained observer, Wundt’s own
reactions to the experimental stimuli are often collected. Unlike the
physiologists alone in their laboratories, dissecting and testing dead or dying
specimens, these students of psychology are cooperatively observing and
measuring one another’s reactions to answer their hypotheses. A major goal
is to explain consciousness on the basis of underlying mental functions, such
as attention. The objects of attention explain, in part, the contents of
consciousness. Wundt’s laboratory is a lively place, and by 1897,
experimental psychology has expanded at Leipzig to fill an entire building.
The questions of psychology also quickly come to differ from those of
physiology. Whereas physiological studies continue to focus on how the
various sensory systems operate, psychological questions begin to be more
about attentions and other mental functions.
Wundt believes that experiments alone will never provide a full
understanding of human consciousness. A second explanation for
consciousness lies in examining aggregate human behavior in the context of
culture and the various forces working to drive human evolution. For
example, Wundt believes that language and its role in shaping consciousness
can only be understood through studies of cultural contexts, such as those
conducted by anthropologists. He believes that understanding these
influences are also necessary if we are to fully understand consciousness and
motivation (Wundt, 1916). Most of his later career and writings are focused
on these interests.
In addition to having established a laboratory, Wundt holds a place in the
history of psychology by virtue of his perseverance, organizational skills,
and the sheer volume of his work. During the 45 years that he holds an
academic position at Leipzig, from 1875 to 1920, he supervises 186 doctoral
dissertations by students from countries all over the Western world and
publishes more than 491 books, journal articles, book chapters, lectures, and
reviews (Wundt, 1927). In 1881, he establishes psychology’s first academic
journal, Philosophical Studies, as a forum for his students’ papers. The
movement toward the scientific study of the questions of psychology is
already “in the air” at the end of the 19th century, but would most likely not
have proceeded so rapidly without the energy and direction of Wilhelm
Wundt. Although most of his students eventually adopt theoretical
perspectives divergent from his, there is no argument that Wundt’s career
has had a powerful influence on shaping present-day Western psychology.
Experimental Psychology Outside of Germany
At the University of St. Petersburg, the Russian physiologist Ivan Sechenov

(1829–1905) also advocates coming to understand psychology through the
use of the methods of natural science, not surprisingly because he, like
Wundt, worked with and studied under Muller and Helmholtz. In his book
Reflexes of the Brain, published in 1863, Sechenov argues that consciousness
does not represent a metaphysical soul, but results from muscular and
material movements (Yaroschevskii, 1982). Reflexes of the Brain is banned by
the Catholic government of Russia, and Sechenov’s influence on 19th- and
early 20th-century Western psychology is thus limited (Frolov, 1937).
At Cambridge University in England, an attempt is made to promote
experimental psychology as a discipline in 1877 and to establish a laboratory
there. But the University Senate turns down the proposal on the grounds
that it would “insult religion by putting the human soul in a pair of scales”
(University College London, 2004). England is one of the last Western
countries to institute the formal study of experimental psychology.
European-type physiological psychology travels rapidly to North
America, where it finds fertile ground in a more pragmatic and less
religiously dogmatic intellectual environment. In 1875, the philosopher
William James (1842–1910) establishes a teaching laboratory at Harvard
University after traveling to Germany to hear the lectures of Wundt and
others. Experimental psychology in North America takes on a very different
character than that in Europe, more concerned with function than structure
and with practical applications over purely academic questions.
Unconscious Mind
Both ordinary daily experience and the experimental study of consciousness

leads to the belief that there must be another aspect of mind beyond
consciousness. For example, it is possible to respond to hearing one’s own
name spoken while still asleep. Dreams can often only be called into
conscious awareness with difficulty later. Under hypnosis, memories can be
retrieved that are not available to consciousness. In experimental studies,
people are influenced by stimuli, even though the exposure is so brief that
they insist they have no memory of them (Marcel, 1983).
To the 19th-century scholar, these kinds of experiences suggest the
existence of two minds, one conscious and one unconscious. Even Fechner’s
psychophysics suggest the existence of unconscious mental processing. If
mind is soul, and there is more than one mind, which of these minds is soul?
Is soul the conscious and rational mind or the largely unconscious mind? Is
the unconscious mind also rational, or do the roots of irrational thoughts
and behaviors lie somewhere in its dark mysteries? Questions like these
haunt physicians and psychologists of the late 19th century, like Sigmund
Freud. Along with the loosening of religious grip on intellectual concerns,
these questions may help account for the declining focus toward the end of
the century on psychology as the study of the human soul. Like a prism with
many sides, psychology is a discipline with many facets as it moves into the
next century.
The Times
The early 19th century sees the Industrial Revolution beginning with
the machine production of textiles followed by the mass production of
a wide variety of consumer goods. Machine industry provides jobs and
creates a middle class, which provides the market for these goods. By
midcentury, there have been many improvements in the daily lives of
ordinary people. For almost the first time in human history, many
people can afford more than one set of clothes. Famine is no longer a
constant threat, and instead of day after day of potatoes and bread,
ordinary people can enjoy an occasional fruit or vegetable and maybe
even a little meat.
There are downsides to this revolution as well. These include not just
the terrible air and water pollution, or the mind-numbing and even
life-threatening nature of the jobs in the factories, but also the
psychological consequences of this new kind of life. Men, women, and
even children provide the power that makes the factories run, so people
are literally part of the machine. Humans have become cog-like parts of
the industrial machine. Work lives are separated from personal lives,
and jobs become less about the completion of meaningful projects and
more just the means to get money. Late in the century, the exploitation
of the working classes collides with political ideas of individual
freedom and explodes into movements to organize workers into
unions.
The 19th century also sees a phenomenal expansion in systems of
transportation. New railroads carry the raw materials needed by
industry and deliver the finished goods. Steamships ferry people to
new jobs while trolleys and omnibuses move them around the growing
cities. Families who have never been more than walking distance from
home and each other suddenly find themselves scattered and living
days’ or even weeks’ travel away. A massive network of new
communication technologies begins to emerge. Radio messages travel
across the ocean, and the telegraph and telephone are invented and
come into widespread use by the end of the century. In midcentury,
huge rotary presses are publishing daily papers.
European powers continue to claim territories and colonies
throughout the world, taking over and occupying previously
independent peoples in the political and economic movement referred
to as imperialism. These occupied territories become increasingly
impoverished while providing the resources needed to supply Western
industry and sustain the increasingly rich standard of living in the
West. The slave trade is active, bringing mostly people of color to take
agricultural jobs in the rapidly industrializing West and enslaving
workers in Western colonies as well. It is not until 1848 in Britain and
1868 in the United States that slavery in the home countries is
outlawed.
Seven hundred years after the establishment of universities in the
West, the first women are admitted. In 1837, Oberlin College in Ohio
admits women to study with men, the first institution of higher
learning in the country to do so. But as late as 1868, there are still only
four women’s colleges in the United States authorized to grant the
bachelor’s degree (Sklar, 1971). Women are actively fighting for the
same rights as men throughout the 19th century. These include the
right to own property, the right to divorce, the right to make decisions
about their children’s lives, the right not to be treated as property, the
right not to be legally beaten and raped by their husbands, the right to
an equal education, the right to equal job opportunities and pay, and
the right to vote in national elections. Women are granted the right to
vote in Germany at the conclusion of World War I in 1919, in the
United States in 1920, in Italy in 1925, in England in 1928, in Spain in
1933, and not until 1945 in France.
7
A Divided Discipline: What Is the
Function of Mind?
In this chapter, we explore the differing sets of assumptions about the origins, nature, and
functions of psychological characteristics that divide scholars in the final quarter of the 19th
century. These differing assumptions lead to different questions and diverse approaches to the
study of psychology. Prominent among these approaches is the study of those individuals who
exhibit behavior indicative of disturbances in thought, the mentally ill. Later in the chapter, the
influences of Western culture on psychology are examined as the new science embarks on its
journey across the Atlantic, where a uniquely North American landscape of empirical psychology
is discovered.
DIVISIONS CREATED BY IDEAS
By the end of the 19th century, most who call themselves psychologists are
united by allegiance to empirical scientific methods. They adhere to the
methods of standardized observation and experimentation that have proven
so successful in the other sciences. Even though united by methods, these
psychologists typically adopt one of three sets of differing assumptions about
what motivates thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. These sets of assumptions
shape the intellectual landscape of psychology at the end of the 19th century.
Elementalism
Among these is an elementalist psychology based on the assumption that
conscious mind is made up of basic mental elements associated together.
Elementalists embrace positivistic research methods. They conduct careful,
systematic observations of mental operations and experiment with
manipulations of stimuli. They hope to reveal important and previously little
understood characteristics of the basic mental elements and to uncover the
laws by which the elements are combined or associated into complex
thoughts. A few elementalist researchers, notably Wundt, prefer research
methods that, they argue, preserve more of the environment or context.
Wundt, for example, is concerned that isolating variables of interest away
from the context in which they ordinarily occur will not result in useful
knowledge.
Holism
Taking into account the context in which an organism functions forms the
basis of another major influence on psychology at the turn of the century.
Holism, or dynamic psychology, is the perspective that any real
understanding of psychological characteristics must take into consideration
the whole organism or person in interaction with a whole environment. The
person is imbedded in a network of dynamic or constantly changing
interactions. Holistic psychologists also recognize the possibility that
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors may be caused by both conscious and
unconscious motivators. According to dynamic psychology, the whole being,
both conscious and unconscious, in constant interaction with the
environment, is what determines thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Mind is
constantly changing in response to changing needs and the changing
environment. Empirical research methods are used in holistic approaches to
psychology, primarily to provide the evidence needed to support intuitions
and rationally derived principles.
Evolutionary Principles
The principles of natural selection are embraced by many psychologists and

become a third major influence on the development of psychology as a
science. The assumption is that useful explanations for thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors lie in understanding better the context in which humans
evolved as a species. For example, in the late 19th century, Northern
Europeans commonly believe that they are more peaceful than other ethnic
groups. This conviction is based on the belief that these other groups are not
as fully evolved.
Those who favor evolutionary assumptions collect anecdotal observations
of animal behavior and then draw comparisons between those and human
behavior. These researchers are often accused of attributing human
characteristics to nonhuman animals, or anthropomorphizing. Darwin
himself points out, however, that attributing certain characteristics, like
conscious thought, only to humans is also a kind of anthropomorphizing
(Darwin, 1916).
As the various domains of psychology are considered through the
remainder of this journey, the intellectual paths of elementalism, holism, and
evolutionary principles will often be encountered.
PSYCHOLOGY FOLLOWS MANY PATHS
On the next part of this journey through the history of Western psychology,
several different paths will be explored, all of which lead from the late 19th
century to the discipline recognized in the present day as psychology. At its
beginning, the science of psychology has a slightly different focus in each
country in which it is studied. As seen in the previous chapter, experimental
psychology first begins to appear during this era, led in large part by the
establishment of research laboratories at German universities. German
students usually attend German universities, read journals published in
German, and typically follow the interests inspired by their German
professors. The same is true for French students, English students, and
eventually for students in North America as well.
The focus on experimental psychology predominates in Germany for
many years. Late 19th-century German elementalist interest in the contents
of consciousness influences all of Western psychology as students from
many other countries study in German universities and take what they have
learned home with them.
In France, the medical profession influences the institutional treatment of
the mentally ill, and this becomes a focus for French psychologists. These
French psychologists are reputed to be more interested in providing therapy
and in clinical applications of psychological study than they are in
laboratory experiments (Goldstein, 1987).
As the British Empire expands its colonial holdings throughout the world,
British philosophers and naturalists pursue their interests in comparing all of
the various forms of life encountered in their travels. Thus, for many years,
British psychology has a comparative focus and claims roots in the earlier
work of philosophers like Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer.
Russian physiologists and physicians follow a different path, strongly
influenced by materialist philosophies and by the work of German
physiologists like Muller and Helmholtz. It is only after the turn of the
century that the findings of Russian physiological psychologists become
important to the development of Western psychology.
These geographic or cultural differences in psychology are by no means
absolute. French researchers like Theodule Ribot (1835–1916) engage in the
experimental study of psychology, and Germans like Johann Langermann
(1768–1832) are concerned with the treatment of the mentally ill. Italian,
Danish, and Swiss scholars and psychologists are also active in both
experimental and therapeutic psychologies.
The Study of Consciousness

The principal proponents of the elementalist paradigm in psychology are the
Germans. The legacy of the empirical study of human consciousness that
grows out of Wundt’s laboratory at Leipzig is far-reaching.
Structuralism and Titchener
Only a few of the students coming out of the German universities

continue to study the basic mental elements and the laws of association that
so fascinated Wilhelm Wundt early in his career. Among those who do
pursue elementalist assumptions is Edward Bradford Titchener (1867–1927),
a British student who receives his doctorate at Leipzig in 1892. Titchener
then returns to England, where he hopes to continue his experimental study
of psychology. Finding, to his dismay, that universities in England oppose
experimental psychology, Titchener reluctantly accepts a position at Cornell
University in New York State. Here, James Angell (1869–1949), an American
who also studied at Leipzig, has recently established a laboratory for the
experimental study of psychology. Titchener spends the remainder of his life
in the United States. He is often thought of as Wundt’s only loyal disciple,
but as his career progresses, even his work moves away from Wundt’s more
holistic concern with the contents and operations of consciousness.
Titchener’s work is designed to illuminate the nature of the basic elements
of consciousness and the mechanisms or laws of association by which
complex thoughts are formed. He does not share Wundt’s willingness to try
to explain consciousness, saying instead that consciousness can only be
described, not explained. Titchener also does not accept Wundt’s idea that
consciousness is shaped by concepts, like attention, that cannot be further
broken down. He believes instead that consciousness is made up only of
basic elements associated together. He assumes that eventually the
physiological bases of both the elements and the mechanisms of association
will be discovered and described (Leahey, 1981). Titchener calls his search for
the functions and structures of mind structuralism.
Titchener employs the same methods of standardized and controlled
introspection in his laboratories that he learned as a graduate student in
Leipzig. The difference between observations in physics and those in
psychology is that conscious mind is both the subject of observation and also
the observer. Thus, in psychology the observation is called introspection,
rather than inspection. In all other regards, structuralists believe, the
scientific investigation of psychology should be conducted using exactly the
same methods used in any other study of nature. Just as in chemistry,
psychologists should attempt to isolate the basic elements, vary them
systematically so as to understand how they are related, and be able to
replicate the same findings when the experiments are repeated. The
structuralists believe that the only way to gain a true understanding of how
consciousness is structured is by following these methods.
Titchener is convinced that this type of investigation will make it possible
to arrange “the mental elements precisely as the chemist classifies his
elementary substances” (Titchener, 1912, p. 49). The basic mental elements
consist of all sensory experiences, images (ideas, memories, and thoughts),
and affections (emotions). These basic mental elements vary along the
dimensions of quality, intensity, clearness, and duration. Structuralism is the
attempt to identify and measure these basic mental elements and their
attributes and to understand how those elements combine to produce
complex conscious thought. Structuralists are not opposed to attempts to
understand the functions of consciousness, but they believe that
hypothesizing about the functions of consciousness before the structures of
consciousness are understood will lead to beliefs that structures exist for the
purpose of performing some function, that is, that function precedes
structure. “There is, further, the danger that, if function is studied before
structure has been fully elucidated, the student may fall into that acceptance
of teleological explanation which is fatal to scientific advance” (Titchener,
1898, p. 453).
Over his years at Cornell, Titchener admits many students to graduate
study in his laboratory, including many women. For example, his first
doctoral student is Margaret Floy Washburn, an animal psychologist whose
work is discussed later in this chapter. Titchener is one of very few
psychologists to accept women into graduate study in the late 19th century.
Almost half of his graduate students are women, and more women complete
their doctoral studies with him than with any other psychologist of the time.
A few of Titchener’s students continue to pursue the structuralist
paradigm in their careers, but by the early 20th century, elementalist
questions are considered irrelevant by many North American psychologists.
Introspective research about the basic elements of consciousness and the
laws by which those elements are combined diminishes after Titchener’s
death in 1927.
The Imageless Element
Other students from the laboratory at Leipzig take the search for the
elements of consciousness in different directions. Oswald Kiilpe (1862–1915),
for example, a graduate from Leipzig who accepts a position at the
University of Wurzburg in Germany, begins to believe that conscious
thought might not always be a result of the combination of sensations,
images, or affections. Instead, he suggests, thought might occur even in the
absence of any image at all. This might happen, as Kulpe and other
researchers demonstrate, when people are asked to judge the relative weight
of two objects. Most people have no difficulty making the judgment, but
when asked to describe the elements of thought experienced while making
the judgment, most people are unable to provide any description. Kiilpe and
his colleagues suggest that thought processes like judging are a previously
unidentified basic process of consciousness they call “imageless thought.”
✔ Stop and think.

Can you think a thought that is not accompanied by a mental image?
Holistic Consciousness
The legacy of the laboratory at Leipzig is not limited to those who

continue the program of research that originates there. Psychologies that
oppose elementalist theories and ideas are equally a part of that legacy.
Although just as concerned with the contents of consciousness, some
psychologists are skeptical that psychological characteristics can be
explained by laws governing how basic elements are combined. They argue
that making that assumption makes humans more like machines than like
freely willing, morally responsible people. For example, Franz Brentano
(1838–1917), at the University of Vienna, suggests that consciousness
operates in a more holistic manner by carrying out whole “acts” of thought,
like judging, visualizing images, or experiencing emotions and desires. These
psychological acts are intentional, not mechanical. They are not automatic
but are directed at achieving some purpose. Thus, Brentano asks questions
about how consciousness helps humans to function in the world and not
about basic elements and laws of association (Baumgartner & Baumgartner,
1997; Brentano, 1874/1981).
Unconscious Motivation
Other late 19th-century researchers of mind oppose the elementalist

paradigm because of its focus on conscious mind alone as the motivator of
behavior. These psychologists argue that this leaves too many thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors unexplained. Like romantic philosophers, they argue
that it often feels as though emotions have more to do with motivating
behavior than does rational thought.
The heart has its reasons which reason cannot know.
(Blaise Pascal, Pensees IV)
In the late 19th century, psychologists increasingly look for unconscious

motivators of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. These nonconscious
motivators might be other aspects of mind, so that mind is actually made up
of both conscious and nonconscious minds, or the motivators might be
something widely viewed as something entirely different from mind, such as
emotion.
In 1872, Darwin publishes The Expression of the Emotions in Man and

Animals, in which he argues that emotion has been selected for during the
evolution of both human and nonhuman animals because the ability to
express emotion has survival value. For example, the feeling of fear in a life-
threatening situation may facilitate adaptive responses, such as fleeing the
situation. The facial expression of fear may communicate the need to flee to
one’s companions. Similarly, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving also
might increase an organism’s chances of survival in difficult situations. In
the same way that certain physical characteristics aid survival in particular
environments, psychological characteristics also facilitate survival and
reproduction.
This idea is evident in the work of Francis Galton, who suggests that
psychological characteristics are as measurable as physical ones and as
subject to the laws of inheritance (McClearn, 1991). Darwin also argues in
1859 in On the Origin of Species that characteristics that have been selected
for during evolution will show continuity across all species. This idea is
misrepresented by others to mean that humans are more highly evolved
than other animals, primarily by Spencer, but also by Wundt. The
implication is that the history of the evolution of, human mind can be traced
by examining the less evolved minds of other animals. This may explain
why the study of animal mind becomes popular at this point in the history
of psychology.
The Anecdotal Method

Darwin’s friend and fellow naturalist, Canadian George Romanes (1848–
1894), is among those who pursue the study of animal mind late in the 19th
century. Romanes collects hundreds of anecdotes about interesting and
amazing animal behaviors from which he infers intelligence and complex
emotions in nonhuman animals. In 1882, he publishes Animal Intelligence,
which is a collection of these descriptions of animal behavior. For example,
he has collected stories about scorpions that sting themselves to death when
surrounded by fire. He then speculates that the scorpions experience despair
at finding themselves in such dire straits and decide to commit suicide rather
than face burning to death.
Romanes’ first book is only descriptive and is a first step in coming to
understand mind, both human and nonhuman. He publishes two more
books, Mental Evolution in Animals in 1884 and Mental Evolution in Man in
1888, both of which explicate the methods he proposes for the study of
human and nonhuman mind. Romanes names his study comparative
psychology and describes it as the study of similarities and differences in
psychological characteristics across species. He likens comparative
psychology to the already existing field of comparative anatomy in
physiology.
Unfortunately for Romanes and for the subsequent study of animal mind,
most of the attention is directed at his first book, made up mostly of
anecdotal descriptions. He is attacked from two directions. First, he is
accused of drawing conclusions about the causes of behavior from the
anecdotes he describes. Because in this first book he only describes behavior
and conducts no controlled experimental study, he is attacked for drawing
causal conclusions from descriptive data. Second, he is accused of
anthropomorphizing. The scorpion stinging itself out of despair is behaving
as a human might in similar circumstances. Theologians, in particular, are
disturbed by the growing interest in attributing higher level abstract thought
to nonhuman animals. They are concerned about comparisons that seem
either to elevate nonhuman animals to the level of humans or to lower
humans to the level of all other animals.
✔ Stop and think.
If nonhuman animals think, do they have free will? Do they also have
souls?
How Should Animal Mind Be Studied?
In response to these objections, other students of animal mind clarify the

field and suggest more scientific methods. Fellow British scientist C. Lloyd
Morgan (1852–1936), for example, believes animal mind is an important area
of study but reminds scientists to be careful of how they interpret animal
behavior: “In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted as the outcome
of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be fairly interpreted as
the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological
scale” (Morgan, 1904, p. 59).
Morgan then gives an example of what he means. While teaching in
South Africa, Morgan has the opportunity to observe the behavior of
scorpions himself. He notes that Romanes’ description that some scorpions
sting themselves to death when surrounded by fire is accurate, but it may
not be accurate to conclude that scorpions experience despair and
intentionally kill themselves. Morgan suggests that instead of a higher
faculty, such as a complex emotion like despair, scorpion behavior may be
explained in terms of a lower faculty, such as a reflex—stinging—that is
exercised more or less automatically in threatening situations.
Given the state of technology in the late 19th century, the study of any
mind, human or nonhuman, is limited to either introspection in the case of
one’s own mind or inference in the case of the minds of others. Morgan
points out that there are really two kinds of inferences that can be made
when studying the minds of others. The first is projective inference, in
which one’s own mental experiences are projected onto the other. Thus, we
can imagine the despair we might feel on finding ourselves surrounded by
fire, knowing that we will inevitably burn to death. In such circumstances,
and with means of a quick and painless death readily at hand, we might
indeed commit suicide. But to conclude that these feelings are also the
subjective experience of the scorpion is a projective inference.
There is a scientifically valid way to make inferences about the minds of
others, and this is what Morgan calls objective inference. An objective
inference is one that infers only those mental powers that may be verified by
public observation and measurement. Thus, objective inferences may be
drawn about an animal’s perceptual capabilities or its capacity to attend to
stimuli. For example, do scorpions have the ability to recognize and retreat
from fire? This testable objective inference is potentially informative in the
study of animal mind. As a further illustration of the need to avoid
projective inferences when describing animal mind, Morgan offers the
following story of how his terrier learned to open the gate and escape from
the yard.
Story of Tony, the Fox Terrier

Tony, when he wanted to go out into the road, used to put his head
under the latch of the gate, lift it, and wait for the gate to swing open.
Now an observer of the dog’s intelligent action might well suppose that
he clearly perceived how the end in view was to be gained, and the
most appropriate means for effecting his purpose. Once more,
therefore, I must draw attention to the canon of interpretation adopted
at the outset of our inquiries concerning minds other than ours,
namely, that in no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms
of higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms
of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution
and development. The question is therefore whether Tony’s behavior
can be fairly explained without his forming any conception of the
relation of the means employed to the end attained. It appears to me
that it can. I watched the development of the habit. The latch of the
gate is at a level just above the reach of Tony’s head. When the latch is
lifted, the gate swings open by its own weight. When Tony was put out
of the front door, he naturally wanted to get out into the road, where
there was often much to interest him. He ran up and down the fence,
and put his head out between the iron bars, now here, now there, now
elsewhere, keenly gazing into the road. He did not specially look out or
near the gate, nor did he seem to be trying to get out. He appeared only
to be looking restlessly and wistfully at the familiar road. At length it
so happened that he put his head beneath the latch. The latch was thus
lifted. He withdrew his head and began to look out elsewhere, when he
noticed that the gate was swinging open, and out he bolted. After that,
gradually he went, after less frequent poking of his head in the wrong
place, to the opening from which the latch could be lifted. But it took
him nearly three weeks, before he went at once and without hesitation
to the right place and put his head without any ineffectual fumbling
beneath the latch. Why did he take so long? I think partly because
there was so little connection between gazing out into the road and
getting out into the road. He did not, at first at any rate, seem to do the
former in order to effect the latter. The relation between means and end
did not appear to take form in his mind, even subconsciously as means
to the end. And I take it that he never had the faintest notion of how or
why looking out just there came to mean walking forth into the road.
(adapted from Morgan, 1904, pp. 292–293)
Comparative psychologists bring positivistic experimental methods to

their study of animal mind. The American psychologist Margaret Floy
Washburn (1871–1939), the first woman to receive a PhD in psychology,
makes major contributions to the experimental study of animal mind. For
example, she establishes that fish have the ability to perceive color and uses
experimental methods to explore other questions about perception,
attention, and consciousness in nonhuman animals. In 1908, she publishes
The Animal Mind, which becomes the standard textbook for comparative
psychology for many decades.
✔ Stop and think.

What really distinguishes human animals from nonhuman animals? Is
there anything that any normal human can do that no other animal
does?
Washburn points out that the only way anyone can attempt to understand
the subjective experiences of another is through inference from behavior. We
each infer that others experience similar thoughts and emotions as our own
by observing their behaviors. This is why we often infer that nonhuman
animals also experience similar thoughts and emotions. For example, from
their behavior we infer that nonhuman animals must at least experience
emotions like fear or even anger:
✔ Stop and think.
What must the experience of emotion be like for a nonhuman animal?
We speak, for example, of an “angry” wasp. Anger, in our own experience, is largely composed of
sensations of quickened heart beat, of altered breathing, of muscular tension, of increased blood
pressure in the head and face. The circulation of a wasp is fundamentally different from that of
any vertebrate. The wasp does not breathe through lungs, it wears its skeleton on the outside, and
it has muscles attached to the inside of the skeleton. What is anger like in the wasp’s
consciousness? We can form no adequate idea of it. (Washburn, 1908/1936, p. 3)
The common goal pursued by early comparative psychologists is to

explain and understand animal mind, but for a variety of reasons, others
reject the very idea of animal mind. They point out that animal mind must
always be inferred from watching animal behavior. Thus, parsimony
requires giving up the assumption of animal mind. Of course, as Washburn
and many others have suggested, skepticism requires that any mind other
than one’s own must be inferred by observing behavior. Thus, parsimony
would also require giving up assumptions of any mind other than our own.
Because it is always necessary to infer mind in others from their behavior,
the possibility always exists that there is no mind there. Early in the 20th
century, some psychologists reject inferences about the existence of animal
mind. They argue that scientific explanations for the behavior of others,
including animals, can be found in behavior alone. The major paradigm of
early 20th-century North American psychology called behaviorism
originates in part from the rejection of comparative psychology’s study of
animal mind.
The Development of Human Mind
Many of the same forces that lead to an interest in animal mind also
result in an increased interest in comparing the psychological characteristics
and development of infants and young children with those of adults. In
particular, beliefs in something called recapitulation drives the interest in
studying early development. Recapitulation is the 19th-century theory that,
during prenatal development and even after birth, the human goes through
each successive stage of evolution experienced as the human species evolved.
So it is believed that, early in prenatal development, the human embryo is a
fish, later mammalian, and at birth like a primitive human. Thus, by
studying infants and young children, one might come to better understand
the processes by which adults have become fully human.
The earliest systematic observations of development in infancy in the
West are conducted by the German physician Adolf Kupmaul (1822–1902).
The results of his carefully conducted experiments on the sensory and
perceptual capabilities of infants are published in his book Investigations of
the Mental Life of Newborn Human Children in German in 1859. On the
basis of his experiments, Kupmaul concludes that Aristotle’s findings
attributing significant abilities to young infants are more compatible with
the experimental results than are John Locke’s, who theorizes that infants
are born as blank slates with few abilities. For example, Kupmaul finds that
within a few hours of birth, even before they have been fed anything,
infants show distinctive facial expressions to sweet and bitter tastes, that
these expressions are specific to each taste, and that they are the same
expressions seen when adults experience the same tastes. Thus, infants do
not exhibit one vague response that gradually differentiates when
associations are formed, as is commonly assumed. Instead, they exhibit
specific unlearned responses to a large range of stimuli.
Kupmaul’s findings are published in English in 1863 and are later used by
others who also conduct observations of early development. For example,
Charles Darwin, not only a noted naturalist, but also a devoted father,
carefully observes and then publishes notes on his son’s early development.
William Preyer (1841–1878) publishes The Mind of the Child in 1882.
Milicent Shinn (1858–1940), the first woman to earn a PhD in psychology
from the University of California (Clemens, 1998), publishes a detailed diary
of one infant’s physical and mental development as her doctoral dissertation
in 1898. This work is reissued for the lay audience in 1900 as The Biography
of a Baby (Stevens & Gardner, 1982).
American psychologist G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924) is usually credited
with founding the scientific study of child development, despite the fact that
these other studies are published long before his and he conducts very little
science himself. Hall’s work in developmental psychology is concerned
primarily with the education of young children. For example, early in his
career, he uses questionnaire and interview techniques to collect data about
what young children just entering kindergarten know about the world. He
concludes that 5-year-old children do not know much. What is referred to as
child study eventually becomes a popular field in North America, one that is
relatively open to study for women scholars, and one that has a variety of
clinical and other applications.
As seen earlier, Russian physiologist Ivan Sechenov’s work is influenced by

his studies in Helmholtz’s laboratory in Berlin, by Spencer’s philosophy, and
by ideas about the evolutionary bases of what Sechenov calls “psychical”
faculties. His research supports the belief that the evolution of sensory
organs was accompanied by the evolution of psychological characteristics
(Frolov, 1937). This belief leads Sechenov to conclude that psychological
phenomena can be studied and will best be understood not through
introspection, but in terms of the physiological functioning of the brain and
nervous system. For Sechenov, consciousness is not a mysterious inner spirit
that directs behavior but, instead, both thoughts and behavior are caused by
external events:
Let us then enter the world of phenomena engendered by the functioning of the brain. It is
generally said that this world embraces the entire psychical life; few people can be found now who
would not accept this idea with greater or lesser reservations. The differences in the views of the
various schools consist merely in the fact that some regard the brain as the organ of the spirit, thus
divorcing the latter from the former, while others declare that the spirit is the product of the
functioning of the brain. Not being philosophers, we shall not discuss these differences here.
(Sechenov, 1863/1965, pp. 2–3)
✔ Stop and think.
If thoughts cause behavior, then what causes thoughts?
Using a variety of nonhuman animals, Sechenov demonstrates that even

reflexes can be inhibited in a variety of ways. Sometimes, this inhibition of
reflexive response occurs because of some external or physiological event
that is not under conscious control. Other times, it is possible to exert
volitional control over a reflex, such as when you stop yourself from
sneezing. Sechenov also demonstrates that reflexive responses are not
always directly related to the intensity of the stimulation. Inhibition explains
this discrepancy. Sechenov views development, particularly human
development, as a process of learning to inhibit and thus control reflexive
behaviors. In other words, Sechenov argues, thoughts are nothing more than
reflexive responses to external stimulation, just as are behaviors. In fact,
behaviors are reflexive responses with motor activity exhibited, and
thoughts are reflexive responses with motor activity (behaviors) inhibited
(Brozek, 1972).
Prior to this explanation of inhibitory processes, it was hard to
understand how all behavior might be explained in terms only of
physiological reflexes. But Sechenov’s demonstration of the inhibition of
reflexes provides a physiological explanation for why behavior appears to be
so complex. In his book, originally titled An Attempt to Bring Physiological
Bases Into Mental Processes, Sechenov seeks to explain how all thoughts and
behaviors can be reduced to the expression or inhibition of physiological
reflexes in the cortex, eliminating the need for a directing mind.
These ideas are considered subversive of faith and religious beliefs. To
avoid offending those with strong religious beliefs, the censor at the
University of St. Petersburg requires Sechenov to change the title of his book
so that it sounds more technical and uninteresting (Boakes, 1984). In 1863,
Reflexes of the Brain is published. In spite of the name change, Sechenov’s
work is banned and has little influence in the West until the mid-20th
century. It is not until after the Russian Revolution in 1917 that his writings
are revived and his work goes on to influence other Russian scientists,
including Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) and Vladimir Bekhterev (1857–1927).
At the turn of the century, the Russian physician and physiologist Ivan
Pavlov is deeply immersed in his research on the functioning of the digestive
system. In 1904, he receives the Nobel Prize for the development of surgical
techniques and for contributions to the understanding of digestion. Pavlov is
unimpressed with the introspective methods of psychologists and convinced
that psychology could never be an objective science. Pavlov’s work on
animal physiology does eventually come to have a powerful influence on the
science of psychology, as becomes clear when our path crosses Pavlov’s
again later on this journey.
Medical Psychology
The workings of the human mind, conscious or unconscious, are mysterious

and never more so than when the mind seems to malfunction, or even
vanish completely, leaving its former owner to suffer in lunacy or madness.
Even here, however, the movement of Western intellectual thought toward
objective observation, description, and measurement begins to override
religious doctrines about the influence of demons or punishment by God.
MADNESS
The recognition of mental malfunctioning is not new in the 19th century.

Various forms of psychological and behavioral dysfunction are noted in the
earliest medical writings. Throughout most of Western history, little
distinction is made between those with limited intellectual capacity and
individuals whose views of reality differ dramatically from most others’.
Until very late in the 19th century, both of these populations are treated in a
similar manner. Even in the early days of institutionalization, these people
are often housed in the same asylums and sometimes on the same wards.
Similarly, for most of this time, little distinction is made between those with
what are called neurotic symptoms and those suffering from the complete
break with reality referred to today as psychosis.
Early Explanations
Long after the natural causes for many physical illnesses begin to be
identified, religious doctrine, philosophical speculation, and the assumptions
of folk psychology shape understandings about the causes of mental
differences.
Ancient Assumptions
Greek and Roman physicians describe a variety of mental differences,

including depression, mania, paranoia, and schizophrenia, as well as
noticeable differences in intellectual capacity. They also suggest causes for
these conditions related to imbalances in the bodily “humors” or sometimes
resulting from the interventions of gods, demons, or other supernatural
powers. Cures are also recommended based on the assumptions about cause.
When the cause is presumed to be biological, such as an imbalance in the
humors, the cure is a physical one. Rest, a balanced diet, massage, soothing
music, and healthy living are prescribed to return the humors to their proper
balance, just as in the case of a physical illness. When the cause is presumed
to be supernatural, the cure involves making the proper supplications to the
gods. Assumptions about madness being caused by supernatural powers are
shared by ancients throughout the world (Howells, 1975).
The Medieval View
If reason is what distinguishes humans from other animals, then those

who have lost their reason are like animals (Scull, 1993). Furthermore, the
Christian doctrine of free will holds that each mind is “free and responsible
for its own states and acts” (Boring, 1957, p. 694). Thus, the mad have been
deprived of their reason by God (Scull, 1993), or they are choosing to behave
inappropriately. If the mad are believed to be suffering from demonic
possession or divine retribution, they are very likely to be persecuted and
even executed as witches. Untold thousands of the insane, mostly women,
but also some men and children, are convicted of witchcraft and burned at
the stake during this era (Russell, 1972).
Some families seek out magical cures, and a few exorcisms are attempted
to drive demons away. In most cases, though, treatment consists of prayer or
physical punishment. In fact, the Bible reports that God encourages the
stoning to death of those who are possessed by spirits (Lev. 20:27; Miller,
1975). Even in the present day, the doctrine of free will continues to influence
many assumptions about a variety of mental states and about the
individual’s ability to control thoughts and behavior (Seligman, 1994).
Enlightened Lunacy
By the middle of the 16th century in the West, the term insanity is used to
describe those whose thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are significantly
different from those of most other people. These individuals are believed to
be suffering, experiencing disordered states of mind, and even “mad” from
unrestrained emotions.
What Life Is Like for the Mad
Prior to the 18th century, individual families are responsible for the care
of family members with any kind of illness, including insanity. Kept locked
away from the public eye, the insane are chained in back rooms, in holes dug
in the dirt floors of the family hovel, or staked behind the house day and
night, in good weather or bad, just as they are today in undeveloped parts of
the world. The insane who have no family live in the streets in the company
of and indistinguishable from other indigents and common criminals (Scull,
1993). They wander the countryside, making a living by begging or stealing,
and often becoming the victims of violent crime. They move into large urban
areas during the Industrial Revolution, joining farming families forced off of
their land as large agricultural enterprises grow.
Speculations About Causes and Cures
By the 18th century, speculation begins about natural causes of madness.

Astrological influences, imbalances among the humors, or a combination of
these may be blamed (MacDonald, 1981). The moon is presumed to cause an
episodic type of madness known as “lunacy,” that waxes and wanes with the
phases of the moon. People are warned not to allow the light of the full
moon to fall on their heads and faces during sleep, lest they succumb to
lunacy.
Modern Madness
The insane begin to be moved from family homes and streets into “mad
houses.” At first, these mad houses are simply private homes where the
proprietor, called a “mad doctor,” takes responsibility for as many individuals
as can be kept on the premises. Mad doctors usually have no medical
training, do nothing except provide minimal custodial care for the
inhabitants, and are not subject to any kind of oversight or regulation. Mad
doctoring could be a very lucrative business, as anxious as most families are
to keep their insane relatives out of sight (Scull, 1993).
Institutions Appear
The first institution in the West to house the insane is established in 1247
in Bethlem, England, later acquiring its colloquial name “Bedlam” (Digby,
1985). Until the 18th century, Bedlam is one of only a few such institutions.
Although Christian doctrines include charity for those in need, insanity is
believed to be a punishment sent by God. So for hundreds of years, very few
Christian congregations provide any aid for the insane. As religious
institutions lose their authority during the 17th and 18th centuries, however,
and secular powers grow, other charitable and political powers begin to
assume responsibility for those in need, including the insane (Scull,
McKenzie, & Hervey, 1996).
The real growth in the establishment of institutions for the insane and
those of diminished mental capacity occurs during the late 18th century, so
that by 1850, many more are housed in institutions than with their families
or on the streets. The new middle class in the West has the money to pay for
a variety of services, including for the care of an insane family member. As
the 19th century goes on, more and more people are confined to institutions.
Public facilities paid for with tax dollars are established in England and in
several countries in the West (Scull, 1993).
In the late 18th century, large “asylums,” “almshouses,” and “workhouses”
are established by local governments to house landless indigents, the
mentally deficient, and the insane. Gradually, the mad begin to be separated
out as a distinct population from other poor folks. Asylums house only a
fraction of the insane, but they quickly become overcrowded, understaffed,
filthy, dangerous, and ridden with vermin and disease. Some historians
argue that the conditions in the institutions for the insane are not much
different from the conditions of any of the workhouses for the poor.
Nevertheless, descriptions made by some of the thousands of curious people
who pay a small fee to visit Bedlam and similar institutions suggest that the
conditions are nothing short of appalling.
Inside the Mad House

Imagine yourself as a resident of a damp, crumbling, cold stone ward
in Bedlam in the mid-18th century, infested with rats. If you are lucky
enough to have any clothing at all, it is made from something like
burlap, scratchy and uncomfortable, with no undergarments provided.
On a good day, you will be brought a small bowl of watery cereal a
couple of times, enough to keep you alive, but not enough to prevent
disease and never enough to fill you. All day, you are chained to the
wall, strapped in a restraint, or manacled to one or more of your fellow
prisoners. Dirty straw serves as both bedding and latrine. Because there
are only two or three keepers for over 100 of the insane and no one to
work the night or weekend shifts, you are locked in wooden cribs at
mid-afternoon and left there until mid-morning the next day with no
food, water, or way to relieve yourself. Routinely, you are whipped or
beaten to drive the sinfulness out of you and cure you of madness.
Drugs are administered to many of you that cause violent vomiting or
worse, and you are left to sit in the mess. The screaming, moaning, and
hysterical laughter of your companions is rarely interrupted. All the
while, curious visitors pay your keepers for the privilege of being
allowed to wander through the ward to laugh at the amusing spectacle
presented by you unfortunate creatures (Scull, 1993).
As if that is not frightening enough, imagine that anyone can be
declared insane and locked up in such an institution. As late as 1851,
for example, statutes are being passed in the United States to allow that
married women can be committed to asylums “at the request of the
husband” with no other evidence of insanity required (Szasz, 1970).
Tye them Keeper in a Tether,
Let them stare and stink together;
Both are apt to be unruly,
Lash them daily, lash them duly,
Though ’tis hopeless to reclaim them,
Scorpion rods perhaps may tame them.

(Swift, 1736/1966, pp. 835–836)
The insane are still seen in this era as more like animals than humans
because they have been deprived of reason, the very thing that makes them
human. The reign of King George III from 1760 until 1820 in England brings
particular interest to the question of madness. Although it is clear today that
King George III was suffering from an intermittent form of a metabolic
disorder, porphyria,during his reign, he is believed to be mad. By 1810, he
becomes completely incapable of logical thought. The plight of King George
III brings madness into the public eye and raises new questions about the
causes of insanity.
Two thousand years after Greek assertions of physical causes, biology
again is identified as a possible cause of insanity in the 18th century.
Discoveries about the natural causes of physical illness in medical science,
empiricist notions about the importance of learning in shaping our thoughts
and behaviors, and positivist faith in scientific progress each play a role in
bringing the methods of science to bear on questions about mental
differences. In 1716, masturbation and “involuntary nocturnal emissions” are
suggested as causes for mental illness (Szasz, 1970). This idea has widespread
appeal and is a popular theory well into the 20th century. No effort is spared
in preventing children from masturbating. Sermons are preached in
churches, parents are urged to lecture their children on the evils of “abusing
themselves,” and mechanical devices to prevent children from engaging in
such acts while asleep are widely advertised. In the late 18th century, Anton
Mesmer asserts that madness is caused by the misalignment of the animal
magnetic forces in the body. He recommends magnetic treatments to bring
these forces back into the proper alignment. His followers continue to offer
mesmeric, hypnotic, and magnetic cures for various mental states, even
today.
Early 19th-century physiological assumptions about the causes of some
kinds of madness also include the belief, held by ancient Egyptians and
written about by the Greek physician Hippocrates, that “hysteria” is caused
by the wandering of the uterus (hyster) inside the body or by disturbances in
the uterus. Hysteria is characterized by paralysis in various parts of the
body, the loss of sensation or disturbances in sight or hearing, severe
headaches, palpitations of the heart, abdominal pain, or even a stubborn
cough (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). Because of its cause, hysteria is
thought to be a uniquely female affliction. The Greeks recommended vaginal
fumigation to bring the uterus back into position and proper function and
advocated marriage and regular heterosexual activity as a cure. Late in the
19th century, the cause of hysteria is expanded to include malfunctions in
the ovaries and genitalia, and surgery to remove the diseased organs is
recommended as a cure. As a result of this belief among the (almost
exclusively) male medical profession, thousands of women in the United
States and Europe are operated on to remove their ovaries, and many more
have their clitorises removed as well (Knoff, 1970; Lerman, 1996).
Assumptions are still made about balancing the bodily humors in mild
cases. One treatment often recommended includes the then-common
technique of “bleeding” to drain excess fluid. For example, the physician
Benjamin Rush (1745–1813), remembered today as a signer of the
Declaration of Independence, believes that deranged thoughts result from
high blood pressure in the brain and advocates bleeding as a cure. Cold-
water treatments are thought to cool the blood and thus reduce the fever
that is causing the madness. Rush also invents a “tranquilizing chair” to treat
even the most incurable of the mad:
I have contrived a chair… to assist in curing madness. It binds and confines every part of the body.
By keeping the trunk erect it lessens the impetus of blood toward the brain. By preventing the
muscles from acting, it reduces the force and frequency of the pulse, and the position of the head
and feet favors the easy application of cold water or ice to the former and warm water to the
latter. Its effects have been truly delightful to me. It acts as a sedative to the tongue and temper as
well as to the blood vessels. In twenty-four, twelve, six, and in some cases four hours, the most
refractory patients have been composed. I have called it a Tranquillizer. (1810, as cited in
Butterfield, 1951, p. 1052; Rush, 1811)
Placement in a swinging chair also becomes a popular treatment for the

institutionalized insane. The chair can be whirled about violently, and the
direction changed suddenly, eventually resulting in an “instant discharge of
the contents of the stomach, bowels, and bladder, in quick succession”
(Burrows, 1976).
Some treatments are directed toward restoring reason. Various kinds of
restraints (similar to the present-day “straitjacket”) are used. These help the
mad regain control during passionate outbursts. A variety of methods for
inducing fear are also used, either by startling the patient with a sudden
fright or by “staring down” the patient. Water treatments, such as a near-
drowning or pouring a steady stream of water on the head while the patient
is tied securely in position, are popular. If the mad think and behave the way
they do because of having formed incorrect associations, as suggested by
John Locke 200 years before, then treatment should involve clearing the slate
and having them form new associations. Many doctors who use Rush’s
Tranquillizing Chair attribute its success to the breaking of learned
associations and restoring the individual to the “blank slate” so that new and
more appropriate associations may be taught (Burrows, 1976).
The Reformers
In Catholic countries, especially Spain, France, and Italy, there is another

tradition of care for the insane. Here, Catholic orders of nursing sisters have
been providing humane institutional care and treatment for the insane since
the 16th century. These orders emphasize that the insane should be treated
with gentle kindness and patience. Talking to the insane to console and
comfort them, sympathizing with them, encouraging them about the future,
and ministering to their spiritual as well as physical needs are widely used
to treat the mad and found to be effective (Jackson, 1999). In Italy, asylum
physician Vincenzio Chiarugi (1759-ca. 1820) recommends a form of “moral
therapy” in the treatment of depression that involves talking with patients
about their problems: “It will be necessary in cases of true melancholia
especially to promote and encourage hope, which is completely opposite to
sadness and fear” (Chiarugi, 1793/1987, p. 137).
As modern medical practice appears in the West, and biological
explanations for madness come to be more widely accepted (Scull, 1993),
conflicts begin to arise between religious traditions and medical physicians
(Goldstein, 1987). French physicians, like Pierre Cabanis (1757–1808) and his
friend Philippe Pinel (1745–1826), advocate “moral treatment” of the insane.
Their treatments are derived from observations in hospitals for the insane
operated by the Catholic orders and also from Pinel’s observation of the
wife of the administrator at Bicetre asylum, who calms “maniacs” with only
words of consolation (Shorter, 1997). Pinel recommends similar kinds of
talking therapies to the ones he has seen the Catholic sisters practicing with
their patients. Because he writes and publishes, and because his training as a
physician and his status as an upper-class man give him credibility among
the powerful men of the era, Pinel’s work is recognized by his peers. He is
remembered in present-day history texts as one of the first to recommend the
humane treatment of the insane and the reform of institutional practice,
whereas the Catholic nursing sisters and the wife of the hospital
administrator from whom his ideas originate are mostly forgotten.
Late in the 18 th century, a movement begins to improve the lives of
residents of large institutions for the insane in England. Driven mostly by
reformers associated with the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), this
movement grows in influence throughout the early part of the 19th century.
The York Retreat, where humane treatments are employed, is founded by
Quakers in 1796. Treatments are based on the Quaker belief that kindness,
attention, and persuasion will return lost reason to the insane (Digby, 1985).
The York Retreat becomes the model for at least half of the private mental
hospitals created in the United States in the first quarter of the 19th century
(Grob, 1994). Inmates are more often released from their chains, although
still likely to be restrained with devices like straitjackets. Hygiene, staffing,
and diet are improved. Beating and whipping are replaced by other forms of
treatment.
In the United States, Dorothea Lynde Dix (1802–1887) of Massachusetts is
credited with the establishment of more humane institutions for the care of
the insane and the mentally deficient, and reform in the treatment of these
individuals (Viney, 1996). Although in frail health herself, Dix devotes her
life to improving the lives of the insane. She travels, writes, and testifies on
their behalf, and she successfully lobbies state legislatures, Congress, and the
governments of several other countries. In the United States, Benjamin Rush,
who is often also considered a reformer, urges that the insane be released
from their chains; be allowed fresh air, sunshine, and exercise; and not be
put on display for the amusement of others. As a result of the efforts of Dix
and other reformers, for a time during the 19th century, conditions do
improve. However, overcrowding becomes a serious problem later in the
century as the numbers of insane individuals increase dramatically.
Science and Insanity
As the insane are gathered together and housed in larger numbers, scientists
establish classification systems and research the causes of insanity. Pinel and
French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) pursue clinical interests
in individual differences, emotions, and personality. Charcot’s students
include the French testing psychologist Alfred Binet, the American
philosopher and psychologist William James, and the Viennese neurologist
Sigmund Freud. Russian asylum doctor Sergei Korsakoff (1853–1900) notes
the chronic memory loss and psychosis that result from the
overconsumption of alcohol, and Karl Wernicke (1848–1905), a German
professor of psychiatry, lists other psychological consequences of alcoholism.
Changes in the care of the mentally ill in the West follow what is often
the pattern in science: first description, then prediction, and then attempts at
control. Early reforms in the care of the mentally ill are accompanied by the
description of cases, and then by the classification of types of mental illness.
Hypotheses about probable causes are proposed. Finally, treatments are
devised based on the hypothesized causes.
Increase in Numbers
The 19th century sees a dramatic increase in the number of mentally ill
throughout the West. This increase is attributed to three causes. First, more
of the mentally ill appear as they are moved from family care to institutional
care. Second, a worldwide epidemic of syphilis beginning early in the
century results in large numbers of (mostly) men with degenerative forms of
mental illness. The third reason for the increase in the number of mentally ill
is the increased use of alcohol. There is a sharp rise across this period in the
numbers of people, again mostly men, suffering from the forms of mental
illness associated with chronic alcohol use (Shorter, 1997).
Classification
Both mild mental illnesses, such as anxiety or mild depression, and more
serious psychoses are of concern in the 19th century, but little is understood
about either. In 1883, the German physician Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926)
publishes a classification system for the identification and treatment of the
mentally ill. This occurs at the same time that medical doctors are
developing classification systems for the diagnosis and treatment of physical
illnesses. Prior to this time, health and illness were viewed as integral to an
individual’s character. But during this era, illness begins to be viewed as a
result of a condition that can be isolated from the person. Thus, medicine
becomes the treatment of conditions and not of people (Burke, 1985).
Kraepelin classifies mental illnesses according to the presumed cause of
the illness, the degree of involvement of the brain and nervous system, the
observed symptoms, and the recommended treatments. In the last edition of
his classification system, published in 1899, Kraepelin divides psychotic
illnesses that have no known organic cause into two broad categories. The
illnesses characterized by disturbances in emotions or mood he labels
“manic-depressive psychoses,” and he predicts that these patients will
recover with the proper treatment. The psychotic illnesses characterized by
little or no emotion or mood are labeled “dementia praecox,” and Kraepelin
predicts that these patients will most likely not recover. Kraepelin provides a
set of diagnostic criteria for each affliction. Among the symptoms seen in
those suffering from dementia praecox are hallucinations, which he
describes to help physicians recognize the disorder:
By far the most frequent are hallucinations of hearing. At the beginning these are usually simple
noises, rustling, buzzing, ringing in the ears, tolling of bells (“death knell”), knocking, moving of
tables, cracking of whips, trumpets, yodel, singing, weeping of children, whistling, blowing,
chirping, “shooting and death-rattle”; the bed echoes with shots; the “Wild Hunt” makes an uproar;
Satan roars under the bed. (Kraepelin, 1911/1971, p. 7)
During this period, the belief that mental illness results from the
intervention of supernatural powers continues to decline, and the belief that
physical disease is at the root of insanity grows. By the late 19th century,
psychoses are usually assumed to arise from brain disease or degeneration.
Thus, mental illness becomes medicalized, and treatment comes under the
authority of medical doctors, neurologists, and alienists, a new specialty for
the treatment of those alienated from their reason. Supernatural
explanations for mild mental illnesses, on the other hand, are replaced by
explanations having to do with weaknesses of will or some other character
flaw on the part of the afflicted individual.
Treatment
In this era, treatments for the mentally ill are often based on the idea that
restoring a person to more normal functioning requires allowing them to
gradually relearn to use their rational powers of mind and thus regain the
will to overcome their irrational emotions. Patients are removed from their
restrictions and given more responsibilities as they demonstrate the ability
to maintain control over their emotions.
For many, this more humane treatment results in dramatic improvements
in behavior. Unchained and treated like reasonable people, many exhibit
more rational behavior. Pinel suggests that mild mental illness may be
caused by psychological factors (Pinel, 1801/1962). For example, the
confusion and stress induced by poor living conditions and the illogical or
irrational thoughts caused by chaotic surroundings might cause mental
illness. Alienists who are trained to help people who have been alienated in
some way from their rational selves begin to work with the mentally ill, first
in France and later throughout the West. But this treatment does not work
for everyone, and even some of those who exhibit signs of recovery for a
time later seem to fall back into depression or mania. These failures of moral
therapy spur the search for better explanations and treatments.
Although Mesmer’s ideas about magnetic treatment are discredited, they
never fully disappear. Particularly in France, followers of Mesmer continue
to practice “magnetism” (Shorter, 1997) and claim some success in the
treatment of neurotics. For example, Marquis de Puysegur (1751–1825)
discovers that after being “magnetized” into a peaceful trance, people
respond to his suggestions and follow his commands. For example, if they
are told that they feel pain, they report that they do indeed feel pain. If told
that they do not feel pain, they not only report no pain, but they also do not
respond even when pricked with pins. In a “magnetized” state, people can
even be induced to exhibit symptoms very similar to those seen in mental
illness. If the symptoms of mental illness can be induced in normal people
through “magnetism,” some doctors wonder if those same symptoms can be
relieved by magnetism in the genuinely mentally ill.
✔ Stop and think.

If symptoms of mental illness can be induced through magnetism,
could those symptoms also be cured that way?
In the 1880s, hypnotism, a more modern form of “magnetism,” is revived

by the French medical community. This revival takes two very divergent
paths. The neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot believes that hypnotizability is a
sign of a weakened nervous system and evidence of a neurotic disorder.
People who are easily hypnotized are neurotics. He argues that hypnosis can
be used only to diagnose nervous disease. Opposing this view is Hippolyte
Bernheim (1837–1919), an internist, who argues that hypnotizability is not a
sign of disease because even normal people can be hypnotized. He believes
that mental disease is sometimes a consequence of suggestion. Because
suggestion can cause mental illness, it might also be used to cure mental
illness. Patients could be hypnotized, and physicians could suggest that
patients recover from symptoms. Later, Bernheim decides that nonhypnotic
suggestion from an influential doctor, that is, the doctor simply talking with
the patient, is just as effective for some patients, marking the beginning of
modern psychotherapy (Shorter, 1997).
More and more attention is focused on disorders of the nervous system,
defined as the nerves, nervous fluids, and nervous energy. Overactive
nerves, a depletion of nervous fluids, or an exhaustion of nervous energy
can lead to neuroses. Nervous exhaustion is presumed not to be either
hereditary or contagious. By accepting this diagnosis, families can avoid the
stigma of degeneration, and individuals can escape charges of being weak-
willed. Having an organic nervous disease is seen as far preferable to
madness and significantly less likely to get one confined to a dreaded
asylum. “True!—nervous—very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am,
but why will you say that I am mad?” (Poe, 1842/1992, p. 657).
There is increasing interest in the late 19th century in physical treatments,
particularly for the nervous system. Another medical specialist appears, the
neurologist, who is trained to treat disorders of the nervous system. These
treatments include electrical stimulation of the body designed to spark life
back into an inactive nervous system. Patients who complain of lethargy or
depression have their nervous systems re-energized by the application of
electrical stimulation to various parts of their bodies. Electrotherapeutics is
very popular in the mid-19th century for all manner of nervous disorders
(Beard & Rockwell, 1871) and keeps alive the ancient Greek tradition of
physiological treatments for illness (Stone, 1997).
Also beginning in midcentury, then increasing dramatically toward the
end of the century, “water treatments” are sought for mild nervous ailments.
Especially in France, spas provide curative mineral waters for the treatment
of nervous symptoms, and people travel to these spas from all over Europe.
In addition to drinking the water, neurotics bathe in it and are offered other
forms of “hydrotherapy,” including cold showers and douches. By the end of
the century, French spas are treating 300,000 to 400,000 visitors a year,
providing cures at healthy profits for spa owners and the doctors who
prescribe the treatments (Shorter, 1997).
Unfortunately, even by the end of the 19th century, the medical treatment
of all forms of mental illness has proven mostly ineffective. No form of
treatment is found to consistently cure any condition or reliably reduce
symptoms. Those patients who do recover probably owe their recovery to
spontaneous remission rather than to anything doctors have done for them
(Howells, 1975).
EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY: A UNIQUELY NORTH

AMERICAN BLEND
Although Wundt, in Germany, is given credit as the founder of modern

experimental psychology, the science is also growing in importance in North
America. For example, G. Stanley Hall receives his doctorate in philosophy
from Harvard in 1878, but because his topic is related to those explored in
experimental psychology, Hall is often credited with having received the first
doctorate in the United States in psychology. Hall establishes and maintains
an active graduate program in psychology at Clark University from 1888
until his death in 1924 and promotes the study of psychology as a science. In
fact, from 1893 until at least 1898, most of the graduate degrees awarded in
psychology in the United States are awarded to students from Hall’s
program.
Among the doctoral candidates Hall accepts is Francis C. Sumner (1895–
1954), an African American student who has applied to other universities in
the United States but never been admitted. In June 1920, Sumner becomes
the first African American to earn a doctorate in psychology. He goes on to
found a graduate program in psychology at Howard University in
Washington, D.C., where he provides graduate opportunities for many other
African Americans. Despite of his own achievements, Sumner repeatedly
expresses the opinion, controversial even at the time, that nearly all other
African Americans should receive only vocational training (Sawyer, 2000).
By 1895, there are dozens of laboratories of experimental psychology at
universities across North America and thousands of experimental, clinical,
developmental, physiological, comparative, and other types of psychologists
engaging in the scientific pursuit of answers to questions about thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors. A few of the “brass instruments” typically found in
a turn-of-the-century psychological laboratory are shown in Fig. 7.1. These
include “a sonometer [center] and a few tuning forks for audition [lower
left], a color-mixer [upper right] and Wheatstone stereoscope for vision
[upper left], and stop watch [lower center] for time measurements.”
FIG. 7.1. Brass instruments (Sanford, 1893, p. 436, as cited in Popplestone & McPherson,
1994, p. 16; photo courtesy of the Archives of the History of American Psychology-The
University of Akron).
The Women
Personal Struggles
It is not until the mid-19th century that women are admitted to higher
education in the United States, and even through the end of the century,
there are many fewer places where women are able to obtain a college
degree than there are for White men. To address the problem, several
women’s colleges are established at about the same time colleges are being
established for Americans of African descent (Pifer, 1973). Both women’s
colleges and colleges for African Americans are smaller, significantly less
prestigious, and not as well funded as institutions open to White men. As
women increasingly seek higher education and begin to compete
intellectually with men, concerns begin to be raised about the effects of such
rigorous study on the delicate health of upper- and middle-class White
women. Fears are voiced regarding possible detrimental consequences for
the reproductive capacity and inclination for marriage of educated women
and about their increasing economic independence (Winter, 1998). Hall, for
example, argues in his influential textbook on adolescent development that
intellectually oriented women become “functionally castrated,” rendering
them unsuitable as wives and mothers (Hall, 1907).
The movement of women into graduate study is slow. For example, in the
United States, doctoral degrees in several fields of study are offered after the
Civil War, beginning at Johns Hopkins University in 1876. By 1890, there are
3,382 graduate students enrolled in these programs. Only 409 of these
students are women, however (Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).
It is not until the 1890s that graduate programs are offered in psychology.
In these programs, students are trained to conduct rigorous experimental
research and to be scholars and professors of psychology. Yet, very few of
these new graduate schools in psychology are open to women, and even
those that allow women to attend classes often will not grant them degrees,
even after they have completed all of the required coursework. For example,
William James at Harvard University admits Mary Calkins to his courses in
the 1890s, and she completes all of the coursework required for the PhD.
Although her professors enthusiastically recommend her, Harvard
authorities refuse to grant her the degree because she is a woman (Calkins,
1961; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).
Despite the obstacles, the experimental work being conducted by the
women who are able to find a place in the graduate study of psychology is
similar to that being conducted by the men. For example, mathematician
and physiological psychologist Christine Ladd-Franklin (1847–1930) at Johns
Hopkins and later at Columbia University researches and publishes on visual
perception and makes major contributions to understanding the process of
color sensation (O’Connell & Russo, 1990).
Professional Lives
After completing graduate study, the challenges for women in psychology

only increase. Finding an academic position is difficult, especially for those
who, although fully qualified, have been denied the degree. In many cases,
finding a position commensurate with their training proves impossible, and
women leave the field. Some accept positions as teachers in secondary
schools, and some of the more fortunate find academic positions in women’s
colleges or as part-time instructors at universities. Throughout the early part
of the 20th century, it is considered unseemly for an upper- or middle-class
White woman to be employed outside the home after marrying. Therefore,
to hold onto even part-time academic positions, these women must forgo
marriage.
Most of the women who are employed in academia are hired by the few
women’s colleges that exist (Woody, 1929/1966). Here, they find significantly
heavier teaching loads than at the universities where only men are
employed. The laboratories for conducting research at women’s colleges, if
they exist at all, are smaller and less well equipped. And because there are
no graduate programs at these universities, there are no graduate students to
train. With no students to carry on their work and reputations, women
psychologists’ contributions and ideas are less likely to continue on to
influence new generations of scholars.
In 1904, E. B. Titchener organizes a new professional meeting of
psychologists called The Experimentalists. This group holds regular meetings
at different graduate universities. Here, the latest in experimental work is
presented and discussed, and graduate students can be introduced into the
discipline. Titchener and the other men forming this organization
specifically exclude women from membership or participation (Furumoto,
1988). Apologists for Titchener and his friends argue that women are
excluded from these meetings because the men would be smoking. In a letter
written in 1912 challenging The Experimentalists’ policy of excluding
women, Christine Ladd-Franklin says, “Have your smokers separated if you
like,” goes on to inform them that “I for one always smoke when I am in
fashionable society,” and concludes by reminding them that “a scientific
meeting is a public affair” and should thus not exclude women who are
fellow scientists (as cited in Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987, p. 125).
Despite these criticisms, The Experimentalists continue to exclude women
until 1929,2 years after Titchener’s death. For many years after this, women
are still not well represented among its members. Exclusion from
professional organizations of scientists has continuing repercussions for the
careers of women. It is often in just such organizations that graduate
students are recognized and meet those who are in positions to further their
careers. For example, a young John Watson, later credited as the founder of
behaviorism, first comes to the attention of established scholars at the
meetings of The Experimentalists (Larson & Sullivan, 1965). At the same
time that Watson is being introduced and mentored into the field, it is
rumored that women graduate students resort to hiding under the tables to
hear the proceedings (Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).
Forced out of mainstream experimental work after the turn of the century
and denied university positions and research facilities, many women trained
in psychology move into clinical and applied work instead (Capshew &
Laszlo, 1986; Furumoto, 1987; Koppes, 1997; Milar, 2000; Stevens & Gardner,
1982). Thus, in the early decades of the 20th century, women are more likely
to make major contributions in the fields of clinical, developmental, and
testing psychology than in experimental research.
Functionalism
When psychology makes the journey across the Atlantic to North America,
both its questions and its methods take on a uniquely American flavor,
reflecting the political, economic, social, and cultural values of the late 19th
century in the United States and Canada. In this rapidly industrializing part
of the world, the values of business and industry become the values of the
culture. Without a heritage of either strong religious powers or secular
authority (a monarch), the values of business and industry dominate
political and cultural ethics. Americans are pragmatic, seeking practical
answers to questions about how to produce more products at lower costs
and maximize profits. The questions of psychology are important only if the
answers will have some practical application. Basic research is seen as
irrelevant. What is relevant is applied research that will help to solve
problems of human conduct and explain the functions that consciousness
serves. This set of values is called functionalism.
Higher Mental Functions
While structuralists are concentrating on the basic mental elements,

functionalists are more concerned with how whole minds function to help
organisms adapt to their environments. Functionalists assume that
consciousness exists for the purpose of helping organisms to survive and
adapt to the physical world. They understand the importance of
experimental control, but they also want to understand higher mental
processes, such as learning, memory, problem solving, motivation, emotion,
the formation and maintenance of beliefs, and concepts of a self. The goal is
to find a way to understand these higher processes using experimental
methods.
After reading Wundt’s assertion that it will never be possible to study
higher mental processes experimentally, the German philosopher Hermann
Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) decides to find a way. He rejects philosophical
speculation as a productive way to study consciousness and argues that
psychology must be conducted scientifically if it is to provide valid
information. He selects memory as a higher function that he will study
experimentally. He embarks on an experimental research program designed
to study how and why memories are formed and what is more or less likely
to be remembered.
Ebbinghaus maintains strict experimental controls in his studies of
memory. For example, in his studies of verbal memory, he recognizes that if
his subjects have had some prior exposure to a stimulus word, they will be
more likely to remember that word in the experimental situation. For that
reason, he uses “nonsense” syllables instead of real words. He also carefully
measures his results and is thus one of the first to present quantitative data
on higher mental functions. Other researchers also conduct experimental
studies of memory. For example, American Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–
1930), who establishes one of the early psychology laboratories in North
America, uses what she calls the “paired associates” technique. She discovers
that a numeral is better remembered if it is presented along with a color. She
also finds that pairing the numeral with a vivid rather than a neutral color
makes it even more likely to be remembered.
Ebbinghaus also argues that basic research is distinguished from applied
research only by the context (Postman, 1973). Basic research is conducted
just to know why or how, whereas applied research is done for the purpose
of solving some problem. So, Ebbinghaus concludes, what is learned in basic
research may have application later, if the context changes, and sometimes
research conducted to solve a problem results in a new understanding of the
process being investigated. Thus, the line dividing scholarly pursuits driven
by pure curiosity from practical research done to provide solutions is not a
distinct one.
Pragmatic American Functionalism

Until late in the 19th century, the psychology taught in universities in North
America is a form of “moral philosophy” grounded in the philosophical and
theological search for the human soul. This is because these universities are
founded by churches, some Catholic but mostly Protestant.
Theories of evolution also influence psychology in North America. The
principles that have so eloquently explained biological evolution are adopted
by American functionalists and applied to a variety of domains, from
economics, politics, philosophy, and science in general to the science of
psychology. For example, when applied in business, these principles mean
that the businesses that survive are the ones that are stronger and better.
Thus, an economic system should be designed to ensure that businesses that
are stronger will survive and prosper and any business practice, no matter
how ruthless, should be judged only by how that business prospers.
Pragmatism intersects with psychology in defining the questions that are
considered important. American pragmatic psychologists seek solutions to
practical problems. Pragmatism also intersects with philosophy and
psychology in defining the nature of reality. For pragmatists, how well an
idea works or how adequately a concept explains an experience or
observation is one measure of its validity. If, for example, believing that life
is good increases happiness and leads to a more satisfying life, then the
belief that life is good is a valid one. William James argues that the truth of
an idea is not inherent in the idea. Instead, an idea is made true by events.
“You can say of it either that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it is true
because it is useful.’ Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing”
(James, 1907/1948, pp. 161–162).
Rejection of Elementalism
Except for Titchener, who is an immigrant from across the Atlantic, and a
few students he influences, North American psychology rejects elementalism
as not useful. The experimental study of the structures of consciousness
makes the mind seem static or unchanging, and makes human thought and
behavior seem mechanical. To the Americans, structuralists’ questions about
the contents of consciousness are less important than functionalists’
questions about the purposes served by mind.
The New Psychology
North American psychology retains the empirical approach so important

in European psychology. In 1885, Hall refers to this empirical approach to the
study of mental functions as the “new psychology,” to distinguish it from
the older moral philosophy (Hall, 1885). Thus, this uniquely American blend
is a psychology that is practical, that seeks to understand function, and that
is discovered through empirical study.
The Methods of Functionalism
The application of empirical methods requires breaking the problem of

consciousness down into small enough pieces to examine experimentally.
Without doing that, there is too much danger of finding only the evidence
that supports what is already believed, seeing patterns where there are none,
falsely assuming causation, or any of the other errors in thinking to which
humans are all too prone. The problem for American functionalists is that
the functions of mind are less easily broken down and experimentally
manipulated than are sensations or reaction times.
For philosopher William James and psychologist G. Stanley Hall, the
solution is to redefine empiricism. Instead of experimental manipulation,
they define empiricism broadly as all aspects of experience, including
experience that is not publicly observable (Viney, 2001). James especially
believes that scientists must remain open to the possibility that all
experience, both objective and subjective, may reveal aspects of individual
reality, so that the contents of consciousness include both kinds of
experience.
A good example of the rejection of elementalism and the functionalist’s
definition of empiricism is William James’ philosophy with regard to the
nature of consciousness. James argues that consciousness is not made up of
discrete elements associated together, but is instead a constantly flowing
dynamic stream of thoughts, all connected with and dependent on those
coming before and after. The strongest evidence in support of this idea is
that this is how consciousness is experienced: as a flowing stream of
thought. James’ empiricism does not necessarily require measurable
experimental evidence to support its contentions, but it does require logical
coherence and the evidence of experience.
As to the contents of the stream of consciousness, James’ arguments are
strictly functional. From a vast array of incoming sensory information,
attention selects based on “consequential utility,” mirroring biological
principles of natural selection (Leary, 1992). Thus, what is in consciousness
are ideas that are or may be useful. This notion influences many
psychologists who follow.
The Heart Rejects Determinism
Recall that the scientific search for the laws that govern nature requires
first the assumption of materialism. The inevitable conclusion, then, is that
whatever happens in the universe is determined by how matter interacts
with matter. Translated into psychology, what this means is that thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors can be reduced to matter and are determined by
matter acting on matter. A scientific psychology is the search for the laws
that govern the matter that makes up thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
The problem with this is that, intuitively, most people feel that they have
an internal will, a directing consciousness, or “a ghost in the machine.” Thus,
the idea that what feels like freely willed choices are really matter acting on
matter is disturbing and makes some people uncomfortable with scientific
psychology.
As the story goes, William James is disturbed by this deterministic
account of psychology. In fact, on recognizing the conclusion of determinism
that must be drawn from materialism, James falls into a deep depression.
Coming to believe that he has no free will, he finds himself feeling hopeless
and unable to work for weeks. After reading the work of French philosopher
Charles Renouvier, James decides that it is the belief that he has no free will
that has made him so depressed. Therefore, he must change this belief. He
makes his first act of free will the choice to believe in free will. James is
better able to function in his professional life after making this choice
(Fancher, 1996). This story illustrates the functionalist attitude that the
evidence of subjective experience and the utility of an idea can be enough to
establish its validity. It also shows why James is often described as the
founder of American functionalism in psychology. “We cannot live or think
at all without some degree of faith. Faith is synonymous with working
hypothesis. The only difference is that while some hypotheses can be refuted
in five minutes, others may defy ages” (James, 1896/1956, p. 95).
Interestingly for the student of psychology, James’ choice to believe in free
will applies only to his personal life. In his professional life as a scientist, he
continues to advocate a methodological form of determinism. That is, when
doing science, a psychologist must assume that thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors are caused, and psychology is the search for those determining
causes.
✔ Stop and think.

Is the existence of free will an empirical question? If free will exists,
what are its limits (if any)?
William James has great influence over psychology in North America at

the turn of the last century. He writes a textbook, The Principles of
Psychology, that is used in psychology courses across North America for
many decades. His philosophical speculations about the nature of
consciousness, the self, habits, and emotions form the central questions for
many research programs in the field. But James himself becomes
disillusioned with psychology. It is alleged that he refers to it in later years
as a “nasty little science” (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 155). Eventually, he returns to
the formal study of philosophy.
The Limits of Introspection
In the early years of the 20th century in North America, psychology turns
away from James’ form of empiricism toward experimental science.
Comparative psychologists are accused of anthropomorphizing (Dewsbury,
1992). The narrative and descriptive methods of “child study” suffer from a
lack of adequate controls (Zenderland, 1988). Introspective methods reveal
much, but are limited. Introspection can reveal only our own minds,
whereas the minds of others can be known only through inference. By the
early 20th century, most psychologists in North America accept only
objective methods in the search for explanations for psychological
characteristics.
The Times
At the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, North Americans are
committed to the path of modernism. Modernists believe that the
natural world can be understood and even controlled through the
application of scientific methods. By 1900, public education becomes
compulsory in the United States, in the belief that the continued
progress of a scientific society requires that everyone be able at least to
read and write.
Astronomers find and name the eighth planet in our solar system,
Neptune. Physicists discover that the atom is not indivisible but is
made up of even smaller particles of matter. Electrical and magnetic
fields are found, certain kinds of cathode rays are discovered to
penetrate skin and tissue, resulting in “X-rays,” and radioactivity,
named by Marie Curie, is found to generate electricity.
Technological marvels rival religious miracles. In 1903, Wilbur and
Orville Wright get an airplane off the ground. Although Morse code
remains the most common means of instantaneous long distance
communication, passenger and freight trains are traveling at 60 miles
an hour on over 200,000 miles of track in the United States.
Automobiles with internal combustion engines are beginning to appear
in urban areas where there are roads.
Since midcentury, chemists have been able to create organic
substances from inorganic chemicals. Thus, it appears that life is not
some special exception to the laws of nature that govern the rest of the
universe but is also a consequence of matter acting on matter.
At the same time, humans remain at the mercy of many of nature’s
powers. In 1906, a major earthquake in San Francisco kills over 3,000
people. In 1918, an epidemic of influenza sweeps around the world,
killing more than 20 million people, including 675,000 in the United
States. In 1900, the median life span in the United States is only 47
years. Clearly, modernity still has a long way to go.
8
A Science of Behavior: Is Consciousness a
Myth?
This chapter begins with an exploration of the transition in psychology from the introspective
study of mental events to behaviorism and the description of observable behavior in the first few
decades of the 20th century. The intensive study of relationships between physiology and
psychology are covered, including the application of biology’s principles of natural selection to
psychological characteristics. In this context, the history of the testing movement is explored in a
variety of domains. The impact of ideas about psychology at the turn of the century on popular
culture and the future direction of psychology as both an academic and an applied discipline are
also examined.
THE LANDSCAPE CHANGES
On entering the 20th century, it is clear that the landscape of psychology is

undergoing dramatic changes. In fact, the very scope of what psychology is
in the West is being redefined. From the study of a transcendent and
immaterial psyche, psychological studies are beginning to focus on
observable behavior. Although this may seem somewhat limiting, there are
good reasons for this transition. Let’s explore some of these reasons.
Elementalism and Evolution

Elementalist theories of consciousness regard learning as the primary source
of thoughts and feelings among all animals. Even domestic and circus
animals can be taught a variety of behaviors through association. All
organisms seem to learn in the same way, by forming associations between
sensory experiences. It also does not matter where the learning is occurring:
The principles of learning remain the same. Learning can be studied by
observing instances of learning in real-world settings, but learning can also
be studied in the more controlled environment of a laboratory.
Also, it seems that more complex animals are capable of forming more
complex associations. It is widely believed, for example, that humans are the
most complex animals and that humans are capable of the highest level of
thought, as evidenced by civilization itself. Therefore, the only important
mental difference among species is a quantitative difference, or one of
measurable complexity. The mind of any other animal is just like a human
mind, just less complex. Thus, animal learning can be used as a model to
understand the more complex learning that takes place in the human mind.
The process of forming associations and the capacity for complex thinking
result from physiological differences in the structure and functioning of
human and animal brains. As a consequence of these assumptions, the major
theories of learning that appear in early 20th-century Western psychology
are derived from the study of learning in animals.
An illustration of early attempts to reduce learning to a simple level is the
doctoral dissertation research presented by Edward L. Thorndike (1874–1949)
at Columbia University. Thorndike places food-deprived cats into cages,
called puzzle boxes. The cats can only escape by stepping on a flat lever. He
then measures how long it takes the cats to escape. Thorndike finds a good
deal of variation across cats, and across trials, but for each cat, the time to
escape gradually becomes shorter and shorter. Each cat begins by engaging
in many random movements, clawing and scratching inside the cage, before
accidentally stepping on the lever that causes the cage to open. As they are
placed again and again in the cage, they engage in fewer and fewer random
movements, more quickly happen upon the lever, and escape from the cage
in less time. Thus, the behavior of Thorndike’s cats is much like that of
Morgan’s fox terrier, Tony.
By the beginning of the 20th century, significant advances have been
made in understanding the physiology of the brain. The brains and nervous
systems of many animals have been dissected, researchers have
experimented with the intentional creation of lesions in the brains of
animals, and the results of accidental lesions in human brains have been
studied. The work of various scientists, including Italian physician Camillio
Golgi (1843–1926), Spanish neurologist Santiago Ramon y Cajal (1852–1934),
and German anatomist Wilhelm Waldeyer (1836–1921), extends cell theory
to the brain itself. These scientists demonstrate that the brain is made up of a
vast collection of individual neurons connected in some way to one another.
Later in his career, Thorndike develops a physiological explanation for
association. He suggests that associations occur when new connections are
established between neurons in the brain.
Thorndike proposes two laws of learning to explain the gradual
elimination of random movements when the cat is placed in the cage
(Thorndike, 1898).
The Law of Exercise or Repetition
The more often an association, meaning a neural connection, is practiced,

the stronger it becomes. Similarly, the longer a neural connection remains
unused, the weaker the connection becomes.
The Law of Effect
If an association is followed by pleasure, satisfaction, or reward, it will be

strengthened and will be more likely to reoccur. If an association is followed,
instead, by pain, punishment, or annoyance, it will be weakened and will be
less likely to reoccur. Thus, learning is determined by its consequences.
Most comparative psychologists in the early 20th century do not believe
that animals escaping from puzzle boxes are thinking about how to solve the
problem and get out. Instead, the animals are engaging in random
movements, called “trials,” and making many unsuccessful responses, called
“errors,” before successfully escaping. Thus, animals are not capable of
thinking about how to solve problems; they are only engaging in “trial-and-
error” learning.
✔ Stop and think.

What do you think about the ability of nonhuman animals to solve
problems?
All of this research on animal learning and animal mind must be

conducted by observing the behavior of animals. Whereas psychologists who
conduct introspective studies with humans can talk with their subjects, the
psychologists who study animals can only draw inferences about animal
mind from watching animal behavior. The need to infer mind from the
observation of behavior is part of what gives rise to behaviorism in the early
decades of the 20th century.
From Introspection to Experimentation
Recall that Wundt assumes, along with many philosophers down through
the ages, that thoughts, feelings, and behaviors originate in one of two ways.
First, there are physical experiences, the elements of sensation, and the
forces in nature that form the contents of consciousness. Wundt calls these
physical causes. Second, there are mental forces that direct attention, and
there are unique and creative ways that each individual synthesizes physical
sensations and gives value and meaning to experience. Wundt calls these the
psychical causes (Wundt, 1897/1969).
This dualistic explanation for thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is rejected
as metaphysical by succeeding generations of psychologists, people like
Ebbinghaus and Titchener. These people want to turn psychology into a
natural science defined in the same positivistic terms as physics and the
other natural sciences. Doing this will require abandoning Wundt’s
emphasis on the dynamic nature of psychological processes and accepting,
instead, the study of sensory processes and the mechanics of association.
Observation of behavior must be conducted rather than introspection about
mental forces. Defining psychology in the same terms as physics means that
the task of psychologists should be to describe only that which is publicly
observable and accept only the most parsimonious explanation of the
relationships seen among observations that is consistent with the evidence.
“Ah, that is metaphysical speculation, and like most metaphysical
speculations has little reference at all to the actual facts of real life, as we
know them” (Wilde, 1899/1992).
Wundt argues that although the physical causes are open to experimental
investigation, the psychical causes are not. The “new” psychologists insist
that the proper method for explaining thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is
through experimentation. Even complex mental phenomena can be
explained only to the degree that those processes can be defined in terms of
behaviors and thus made subject to experimental investigation. Any
knowledge not acquired in this way should be considered mere speculation
and fantasy, just as it is in physics.
✔ Stop and think.

Is mind real or only an idea?
The new psychologists argue that there are no mental forces independent
of nature, no psychical causes qualitatively different from physical causes,
no experiencer independent of the experience. So-called psychical causes,
they say, are mere metaphysics, driven by the human desire to set ourselves
above nature. Such speculations about mental forces have no place in
psychology. To suggest that there is an experiencer that is independent of the
experience is not parsimonious. What Wundt calls the experiencer is not a
real thing, but only the name given to associations of sensations. Recall that
the empiricist philosopher David Hume suggested this when he said that the
experience of personal agency is illusory or just a comfortable way to
understand the combination of certain sensations. According to Hume, the
self as agent has no place in scientific psychology. Titchener echoes Hume
when he says that the idea of a “knower” is merely a convenient fiction that
refers to certain combinations of sensations, and he points out: “Our own
position has been that mind and body, the subject-matter of psychology and
the subject-matter of physiology, are simply two aspects of the same world
of experience. They cannot influence each other, because they are not
separate and independent things” (Titchener, 1912, p. 13).
Instead of having two kinds of experience, mental and physical, the
mental is only a result of the physical. The task of psychology, therefore, is
to explain the mechanics of how mental phenomena depend on physical
processes.
In reply, Wundt argues that if it is true that there is nothing but physical
causality, nothing but the biological organism, this reduces or subordinates
psychology to biology: “If knowledge of all of reality devolves upon natural
science… then psychology finds its work done before it has started with it”
(Wundt, as cited in Danziger, 1979, p. 211).
According to Wundt, the psychical causes give value and meaning to
experience. The problem for new psychologists is that value and meaning
have no place in natural science. For example, the biologist describes what is
observed in nature, but does not assign meaning to what is observed. If
psychology is to be a natural science, the positivists argue, then it must also
avoid making judgments about value or meaning. Those kinds of judgments
should be left to the humanities, art, literature, music, and philosophy.
By the second decade of the 20th century, positivistic values have replaced
mentalistic notions in Western psychology. Ebbinghaus’ nonsense syllables,
for example, are chosen on the basis of having no value or meaning.
Titchener even provides a positivistic theory of meaning based on the
context of experience. Titchener’s idea is that the phenomenon that has been
referred to as “purpose” or what Wundt calls “will” is only a matter of
learned “habit mechanisms,” and value is a matter of “preferential response,”
based on past experiences. Although Titchener himself would likely have
objected, others later suggest that Titchener’s context theory of meaning and
his emphasis on controlled laboratory methods facilitate the emergence of
the next paradigm for Western psychology, behaviorism (Tweney, 1997).
PHYSIOLOGICAL BASES FOR PSYCHOLOGY
By the 20th century, the movement is under way to turn psychology into a
natural science. The underlying assumption of this movement is that
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors originate in and are determined by the
physiology of the material body. The research methods employed are
observation and measurement, just as are used in the other natural sciences.
If the content of consciousness is made up of sensory experiences, then
the goal of psychology should be to observe, measure, and describe the
functioning of the various sensory systems and the transformation of
sensory experience into meaningful perceptions. Fechner’s methods of
psychophysics have been refined and are used in psychology laboratories
throughout the West to measure perception in all sensory modalities. These
are the psychophysical methods.
1. Just noticeable differences (jnd). The experimenter adjusts the

magnitude of the stimulus in incremental steps until the subject
reports a difference. The goal is to identify the range of stimuli that
are perceived as equal to the standard.
2. Method of constant stimuli. The experimenter presents pairs of
stimuli, one being a standard and the other varying in magnitude at
each presentation. The subject reports whether the varied stimulus
appears greater than, less than, or equal to the standard. This same
type of test is used today in optometrists’ offices.
3. Method of adjustment. The subject adjusts the stimulus to bring it
above or below threshold or to a level that matches a standard. A
typical weight-judging experiment is illustrated in Fig. 8.1.
FIG. 8.1. Experimenter and subject in weight-judging experiment (reprinted

from A Pictorial History of Psychology by H. Brauns et al., copyright 1997,
with a permission from Quintessence Publishing Co., Inc., p. 99).
The Physiology of Vision
The physical organs of vision are dissected to understand their structure, and
psychophysical studies are also under way to explain the transformation of
physical visual stimuli into visual perceptions. Introduced earlier, the study
of the perception of color provides a good example of efforts to understand
how a material body can create mental events.
Modern studies of the perception of color begin in the 17th century using
prisms. Isaac Newton is usually given credit for noting that light rays can be
broken into colors and for pointing out that color does not reside in the rays,
but comes instead from something in the perceiver. In the early 19th century,
researchers find that all colors can be derived from three standard
wavelengths of light: red, green, and blue. The English physicist Thomas
Young concludes that there must be three different types of cells in the
retina responsive to these three wavelengths (Helmholtz, 1856–1866/1961).
Christine Ladd-Franklin suggests an evolutionary explanation for this
ability to perceive color. Any highly evolved system such as the eye exhibits
differences across species. These differences result from different needs in the
different environments to which animals must adapt and survive. Ladd-
Franklin first suggests, and then demonstrates with evidence collected in the
laboratory, that color vision has evolved in three stages. The ability to
perceive light and dark evolved first, because it is the most necessary for
survival. Next appeared blue-yellow sensitivity. The last cells to appear in
evolution were those sensitive to red-green wavelengths. The most recently
evolved cells are the most fragile, and this explains why color-blindness is
more common to red-green wavelengths than to blue-yellow wavelengths
(Ladd-Franklin, 1929).
The significance of these discoveries for psychology is that Ladd-Franklin
demonstrates a clear connection between physiology and the contents of
consciousness. Humans do not see a red apple or a blue flower because of
some immaterial psyche. Humans perceive color because seeing some color
aided in survival and adaptation.
Psychological Characteristics
Physiological psychologists suggest that sensory systems furnish

consciousness with the basic mental elements of perception, and learning
transforms sensory experiences into complex thoughts. In addition to a
physiological basis for the functioning of sensory systems, therefore, there
must also be a physiological basis for the process of learning. Thorndike
(1898) suggests that mental associations are the result of connections
between neurons in the brain. Although there are technological limitations
to understanding brain functions, a number of theories about relationships
between the physiological and the psychological are proposed at this time.
William James, for example, proposes a physiological theory of the origin
and reason for the existence of emotions. He proposes that mental states, like
fear, anger, or sadness, do not cause physiological changes but they are
instead a result of physiological changes. For example, he suggests, imagine
that you are walking in the woods one day and you come upon a bear on
the trail ahead. Folk psychology says you would first become frightened and
then turn and run. But, based on the work of Danish physiologist Carl G.
Lange (1834–1900), James proposes that we first begin running, and it is the
awareness of our pounding heart and rapid respiration that causes us to feel
fearful. Thus, the psychological state of emotion is really only the awareness
of a physiological state. This idea is called the James-Lange motor theory
of mind.
✔ Stop and think.

Try to describe the feeling of a strong emotional state you have
experienced without referring to any bodily changes.
At about the same time, Margaret Washburn also proposes a motor theory
of psychological states in her book Movement and Mental Imagery: Outline
of a Motor Theory of Consciousness (1916). In this work, she explains
consciousness as the consequence of stimulation that sets off two or more
competing motor responses. All of this activity takes place at the level of
neurons, thus providing a physiological explanation for mental images.
Physiological states may give rise to mental images, but how could the
psychological process of learning be described as the result of physiological
functioning? Thorndike’s hypothesis that learning is a process of forming
connections between neurons is difficult to examine empirically, given the
technology available in this era.
Eventually, the question falls to another young American psychologist,
John B. Watson (1878–1958). Early in his career, Watson studies comparative
psychology using a variety of species. In his work with white rats, he
develops a kinesthetic theory of maze learning. He suggests that the rat does
not learn to run the maze by thinking about and remembering correct and
incorrect turns but that it is the rat’s muscular, or kinesthetic, system that
“learns” to run the maze.
Several other theorists propose other ideas about the physiological basis
of learning. German physician and former student of Wundt’s, Hugo
Munsterberg (1863–1916), is hired to take over the psychology laboratory at
Harvard when William James returns to his interests in philosophy.
Munsterberg suggests that discovering that physiological systems
adequately explain psychological characteristics like emotions and learning
is an indication that even the “will” may have a physiological basis. If the
brain and central nervous system shape behaviors by associating sensations
with effective responses, what is the will doing? Maybe the will is only a
concept used when the physiological processes that produce behavior are
not fully understood. Munsterberg explains that the human sense that
choices are freely made may be really nothing more than an awareness that
the body is getting ready to act. Awareness of the body getting ready to
behave makes humans feel as though they have willed that action.
Echoing many of his contemporaries, American philosopher and educator
John Dewey (1859–1952) argues that our sense of self, our sense of having
will, even consciousness itself, are nothing more than the reflex functioning
of the brain. Furthermore, the brain is an evolved organ like any other and
both it and its functions exist for the purpose of allowing the human
organism to adapt to changing environments.
These and other physiological explanations for psychological states give
rise to serious skepticism about the very existence of a mind that is
independent of the body. More accurately, there is such skepticism when it
comes to the question of animal mind. After all, as comparative
psychologists have been careful to point out, animal mind must be inferred
from animal behavior because no direct testimony of mind can be gathered
from animals. If animal mind must be inferred from behavior, there is
always the chance that the inference is incorrect and that, beyond a complex
relay station for neural impulses, animal mind does not exist at all.
Instincts and Habits
✔ Stop and think.

If instincts explain much of animal behavior, how much do they
explain of human behavior?
The term instinct is used to refer to a set of species-specific behaviors that

do not appear to be a consequence of learning. Instincts are presumed to
arise from the pressures of natural selection during evolution. Instincts are
proposed to account for much of both nonhuman and human behavior.
According to early 20th-century philosophers, instincts explain many
aspects of human behavior. The argument about the existence of human
instincts raises several interesting questions, not the least of which are
questions about nominalism (Beach, 1955; see also Diamond, 1974).
✔ Stop and think.

If you explain that a certain behavior is the result of an instinct, have
you explained the behavior?
Additionally, the argument in support of human instincts assumes that

these instincts exist as a result of biological evolution, so that whatever is
instinctual is not subject to either free will or learning. Several theorists
propose solutions to the dilemma of how to accept the existence of
instinctual pressures and still maintain a belief in free will and learning.
Some suggest that instincts account for reflexes among very young humans,
such as sucking and grasping, but learning takes over from these early
instinctual responses. The learned responses are labeled habits.
Habits are conceived of as strongly ingrained patterns of behavior that
allow the individual to respond without thinking. Borrowing largely from
British philosopher Alexander Bain and many others, William James
speculates that habits are formed as a result of repeated experience that is
recorded in neurons. Thus, neural pathways are actually built by experience.
Habits are formed because each time those pathways are activated, they
become more and more easily activated. Furthermore, once acquired, habits
are extremely resistant to change because they are part of how the brain has
become structured.
✔ Stop and think.

If learning is a consequence of neuronal pathways being built, and this
learning is resistant to later change, what does this imply about what
you should or could do if you have acquired a habit you would prefer
not to have acquired?
According to James, the way to change habits is to avoid activating the

brain pathways to be eliminated and actively exercise the pathways to be
created and strengthened. Thus, James recommends that to change habits
you must behave as though you already are the person you wish to be
(James, 1892/1985).
The Behaviorists’ Manifesto
In a series of lectures at Columbia University in 1912–1913, John Watson,

who is a professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins University, delivers what
has come to be called the behaviorists’ manifesto, Psychology as the
Behaviorist Views It. In these lectures, Watson proposes at least three major
revisions to the traditional study of psychology. First, he questions
assumptions about the existence of a nonphysical consciousness or any other
nonmaterial mental event. Next, he proposes that psychologists’ goal should
be to predict and control behavior, not to understand the structure, contents,
and functioning of consciousness and mental life. “Psychology as the
behaviorist views it is a purely experimental branch of natural science. Its
theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior” (Watson, 1913, p.
158).
Finally, Watson proposes that only publicly observable evidence, meaning
behavior, be allowed in the study of psychology. He criticizes introspection
as a subjective, unobservable, and mostly unmeasurable method of study.
Watson rejects both the study of mental elements and associations and also
the study of the functions of consciousness and other mental events. Both
structuralism and functionalism suffer, in Watson’s view, from vague and
indefinable terms. Furthermore, the assumptions of both will remain forever
subject to debate and confusion. The scope of natural science should not
extend beyond the publicly observable, and both the goals (understanding
consciousness) and the methods (introspection) of structuralism and
functionalism violate that scope. Watson argues that if psychology is to be a
natural science and provide real explanations, it must be the study of what is
publicly observable, meaning behavior. Thus, the only dependent variable
for psychologists, the only variable that can be measured, is behavior: “I
believe we can write a psychology… and… never use the terms
consciousness, mental states, mind, content, introspectively verifiable,
imagery, and the like. … It can be done in terms of stimulus and response, in
terms of habit formation, habit integrations and the like” (Watson, 1913, pp.
166–167).
At the time that Watson delivers this address, most of his contemporaries
in psychology regard the observation of behavior as an alternative to
introspection or a supplemental method for studying mental life and do not
regard his proposal as anything radically new in the field (Samelson, 1981).
They see their carefully designed and measured laboratory methods of
standardized introspection as just as scientific and objective as any
observation could be and more direct evidence of mental life than any
description of behavior. Thus, in their view, objective and positivistic
methods are not new to psychology in 1913.
For these reasons, Watson’s manifesto makes few waves when it is issued.
However, on careful reading, some of his ideas are unusual. For example, at
the time behavior is thought of as a clue to underlying mental processes.
Mental events are assumed to exist, and they are qualitatively different from
physical events. Even animals and human infants are assumed to have
consciousness. Because it is impossible to ask them to introspect, researchers
using animals and human infants as subjects are forced to observe behavior
instead, but even here, behavior is observed for the purpose of illuminating
underlying mental processes. The goal for psychologists is an abstract one, to
understand mental life, presumed to exist, but directly observable only
through introspection. For most psychologists, behavior is an indirect clue to
consciousness. For Watson, the very existence of consciousness is in some
doubt.
A second way in which Watson’s ideas are different has to do with
applications. Watson’s goal, to predict and control behavior, is concrete, with
many immediate applications to solving real-world problems. The idea that
psychologists should find ways to solve problems is not new, but most of
Watson’s contemporaries are satisfied with seeking understanding through
basic research and are not as concerned with practical applications:
In the main, my desire in all such work is to gain accurate knowledge of adjustments and the
stimuli calling them forth. My final reason for this is to learn general and particular methods by
which I may control behavior…. If psychology would follow the plan I suggest, the educator, the
physician, the jurist and the business man could utilize our data in a practical way, as soon as we
are able, experimentally, to obtain them. (Watson, 1913, p. 168)
Watson furthers the movement toward finding practical applications for

psychology. The rumblings of a Western world moving inexorably toward a
terrible great war, World War I, also provide reasons for psychology to be
useful.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING
Histories of testing for psychological characteristics in the West usually

begin with the work measuring sensory acuity done by Francis Galton and
Paul Broca’s studies of skull capacity. By the end of the 19th century, it is
understood that intellectual capacity is not related to brain size, and many
even question its relationship to sensory acuity. Instead, some now argue
that intellectual capacity may be equated with, or is at least related to, the
learned ability to reason about and solve practical and abstract problems.
Ways to test individual differences in acquired knowledge and reasoning
ability are being devised. By the early decades of the 20th century, there is
much interest in testing for intellectual capacity.
✔ Stop and think.
What is intelligence? How could it be measured?
Research on testing for intellectual capacity is carried out primarily on

two fronts, one in the United States and one in France. Galton’s assumption
that intellectual capacity is related to sensory abilities is pursued by James
McKeen Cattell (1860–1944), an American who earns his doctorate from
Wundt at Leipzig. A professor of psychology at the University of
Pennsylvania and later at Columbia University, Cattell uses measures of
sensory acuity and reaction time to test for individual differences in
intellectual capacity from about 1888 until about 1901.
In France, researcher Alfred Binet (1857–1911) begins his study of
intellectual capacity by measuring skulls, but he soon rejects this as an
unreliable measure. Then, as a devoted father, Binet becomes interested in
the development of intellectual capacity by carefully observing his two
daughters, Madeleine and Alice. He investigates their intellectual growth by
devising simple tasks, some of them very similar to those later developed by
a later Swiss researcher, Jean Piaget (Cunningham, 1997). Binet concludes
that intellectual capacity consists of the learned ability to reason. Working
first with his colleague Victor Henri (1872–1940) and then later with
Theodore Simon (1873–1961), Binet develops tests of the ability to reason. At
the request of the French minister of public education, Binet and Simon
devise a way to evaluate the intellectual capacities of school students. The
purpose of such testing is to identify those students who are in need of
special help in developing their intellectual capacity. Binet and Simon
assume that intellectual capacity is reflected in basic processes of reasoning
and the ability to solve problems encountered in everyday life. The processes
of reasoning assumed to underlie intelligence are memory, imagery,
imagination, attention, comprehension, suggestibility, aesthetic judgment,
moral judgment, force of will, and judgment of visual space (Cunningham,
1997).
The test devised by Binet and Simon consists of many different tasks
using these skills and is administered to individual students by trained
examiners. The test measures children’s abilities in relationship to their age
and results in an average score on the many tasks, useful for identifying
students who are in need of some additional training in using their
reasoning skills. Binet firmly believes that all students can improve their
reasoning ability and advocates training all students to increase their desire
to learn, their ability to pay attention, and their intellectual self-discipline.
He calls this training “mental orthopedics” and even includes physical
exercises in the program.
The test Binet devises has two serious problems. First, it takes a great deal
of time to administer and requires highly trained people to give the tests and
evaluate the results. This makes the test not very useful for assessing large
numbers of students. Second, as Charles Spearman (1863–1945) argues, if the
skills demonstrated on the tasks all reflect a single underlying variable, like
intellectual capacity, then scores on all the various tasks should be
statistically related to one another, but they are not (Spearman, 1904). For
example, in 1899 American psychologist Stella Sharp publishes findings
showing no correlation among the various skills measured on the test of
intellectual capacity developed by Binet and Henri. This is evidence that
there is no single factor underlying all of these skills. Thus, the assumption
that intellectual capacity is reflected in these several basic processes of
reasoning remains in doubt (Sharp, 1899).
In North America, Cattell’s tests of sensory acuity and reaction time
suffer a similar fate. These measures are not related to one another, do not
predict success in college, taken to be a real-life measure of intelligence, and
in fact are not correlated with any other measure (Sokal, 1980).
✔ Stop and think.

Is intelligence a single characteristic or the sum of several?
Despite these problems, the interest in measuring differences in

intellectual capacity continues. The idea that intelligence results from the set
of the skills measured by Binet and Simon proves a popular one. They
continue to revise their scale to make it easier to administer, they collect
data to provide age comparisons, and they make the test useful for
measuring differences in intellectual capacity, even among normally
achieving students. Once age norms are established, individuals’ scores on
the test represent their intellectual age, which can then be compared with
their chronological age to determine if the individual scores above, below, or
on a par with age-mates. At the time of Binet’s death in 1911, the Binet-
Simon scale of intellectual age has become a relatively quick and easy-to-
administer measure, has been translated into English, and is used in several
countries in Europe and North America.
After Binet’s death, his measurements of intellectual capacity are taken
over by others. German psychologist William Stern (1871–1938), for
example, argues successfully that children’s measures of intellectual age
should be divided by their chronological age, resulting in their intelligence
quotient (IQ). When the intellectual age is exactly equivalent to the
chronological age, the IQ is 100.
In the United States, Henry Goddard (1866–1957), the director of a
psychological laboratory at a school for mentally retarded youngsters,
translates the Binet-Simon scale into English and begins to use this English
version with his students. He also tests students at nearby public schools and
makes the shocking discovery that a significant number of those students
test below normal in intelligence. Shortly after this, Goddard’s English
translation of the Binet-Simon scale comes to the attention of Lewis Terman
(1877–1956) at Stanford University, who revises it to provide more reliable
results with children in the United States. First published in 1912, Terman’s
version of the scale is revised in 1916, 1937, and again in 1960 (Minton, 1988).
Still used today, Terman’s scale is called the Stanford-Binet.
Terman, Goddard, and Cattell are among many in this era who believe,
like Galton, that intelligence is an inherited characteristic. In 1912, Goddard
publishes the results of his research, The Kallikak Family, a Study in the
Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness, supporting the popular belief that
intelligence is inherited. When combined with Herbert Spencer’s earlier
argument that societies degenerate if the wrong kinds of people are allowed
to have children, Goddard’s work becomes a powerful argument for the
20th-century movement to control reproduction called eugenics.
Immigrant Testing
The widespread belief that lower intelligence leads to criminal behavior adds
fuel to the fire to control the reproduction of anyone deemed to be below
average in intelligence or undesirable for other reasons. Ultimately, this
leads to an invitation for Goddard to administer intelligence tests to
thousands of immigrants entering the United States from Europe. Beginning
in 1912, he and his associates give the English version of the Binet-Simon
test to immigrants as they disembark from their journey in crowded ships
across the Atlantic. Many, if not most, of these immigrants do not speak
English, have never gone to school, and have not even held a pencil before.
Not surprisingly under the circumstances, up to half of these immigrants test
in the range of intelligence Goddard calls “morons.” Thousands of
immigrants are deported back to their countries of origin solely on the basis
of these tests (Shapiro, 1991).
Army Testing During the Great War
Paper-and-pencil testing for individual differences in intellectual capacity

begins in schools and institutions for the purpose of evaluating children’s
needs for remedial education. But the real growth in testing for intellectual
capacity occurs at the entry of the United States into the Great War, later
called World War I, in 1917. In an attempt to establish their new science as
both a practical field and a respectable science, psychologists volunteer to
help with the war effort:
As mobilization for World War I approached, Yerkes got one of those “big ideas” that propel the
history of science: could psychologists possibly persuade the army to test all of its recruits? If so,
the philosopher’s stone of psychology might be constructed: the copious, useful, and uniform body
of numbers that would fuel a transition from dubious art to respected science. (Gould, 1996, p. 223)
Thus, Robert Yerkes (1876–1956), a comparative psychologist at Harvard

University and the president of the American Psychological Association,
sees a chance to finally establish psychology as a useful science. In 1917, the
United States Army asks him to test recruits to help identify those with
mental deficiencies and those who have sufficient intelligence to profit from
officer training. Less than 2 years later, the Army testing program is
terminated, but during this time, more than 1.75 million recruits and
civilians are tested. Although the results are mostly ignored by Army
officers, the data collected have a significant impact on the history of
psychology after the war.
The Great War

In the late spring of 1914, war breaks out in Europe after the
assassination of the Archduke and Archduchess of Austria-Hungary by
a Serbian loyalist. The war quickly engulfs most of continental Europe,
from France to Turkey and Russia. Shortly after, Britain is also drawn
into the conflict. The war drags on for more than 4 years, with the
United States entering the conflict in April 1917. Although more than 5
million men and women in the United States are in some form of
military service by war’s end, it is Europe that suffers the most
devastating human and economic losses. By November 1918, when the
Armistice is finally signed, monarchies all across Europe have
collapsed. Whole industries and transportation systems have been
destroyed, and huge areas of farmland and forest have been left
uninhabitable by chemical weapons and unexploded armaments. More
than $337 billion has been lost, causing countries across Europe to
incur crippling debts. More than 31 million soldiers have been killed or
wounded, and even today no one knows how many civilian lives are
lost in this Great War.
The consequences of the war on intellectual life are even harder to
measure. The brutality of the carnage shatters faith in the superiority of
European culture, although people in the United States emerge with an
increased sense of the power and prestige of their nation. German
universities and laboratories no longer draw as many students from
other countries, and there is increasing respect for doctoral degrees
granted from universities in North America. After stepping in to fill the
civilian roles in business and industry vacated by men recruited into
the military, women enjoy an increase in status, opportunity, and
earning power. It is shortly after the end of this war that women are
given the right to vote in most Western countries.
Army Testing After the War
In the decade after the Great War, the massive data on intellectual capacity
collected during army testing have a significant impact on the history of
psychology and on society in general in the United States. As the data are
compiled and published, the findings are shocking. The data reveal that the
average intellectual age of those tested in the Army is just 13 years.
Furthermore, the average intellectual age of European immigrants to the
United States is even lower than that. More recent immigrants, especially
those from southern and eastern Europe, have even lower averages. The
lowest averages of all are found among those citizens of the United States of
African descent, particularly those who live in states in the South.
As disturbing as these data are, there is little effort made at the time to
validate these results, to consider whether these scores represent actual
ability, or to consider the conditions under which the tests were
administered. Instead, because most people believe that intellectual capacity
is determined by inheritance, these results only serve to empower the
growing eugenics movement.
The second decade of the 20th century sees the introduction of
sophisticated statistics to determine the validity and reliability of
psychological tests. In spite of this, when problems are found with the Army
intelligence tests or with the conditions under which they are given, the
proponents of the tests ignore these problems. For example, significant
correlations are found among African Americans between place of residence
and score on the test such that those who live in the North, where they have
had access to more and better education, score better than those who live in
the South, where they are mostly uneducated. This is a correlational finding;
thus, as any undergraduate knows, great caution should be taken in
assuming the direction of cause and effect. Nevertheless, one could easily
infer from this finding that living conditions and years of education play an
important role in influencing test scores. And there are plenty of data
available to test this hypothesis, even in the 1920s. Instead, psychologists
argue that those who are more intelligent have moved to the North and
sought out education, whereas the less intelligent have stayed in the South
laboring in the fields (Gould, 1996).
Beliefs that intelligence is inherited have more pernicious results when it
comes to the findings about immigrants. The fear is already widespread in
the United States that immigrants from Europe, particularly those with
darker skins from southern Europe, those speaking strange-sounding
languages from eastern Europe, and those of Jewish descent, will weaken the
“pure” White American stock. Many believe that these immigrants have
already had an impact on lowering average intelligence. Allowing more of
them into the United States will lead inevitably to the further decay and
degeneration of American intellectual and moral fiber. The test results
increase pressures to sterilize and segregate undesirables. In 1924, the
Immigrant Restriction law is passed, establishing quotas limiting
immigration from certain European countries to no more than 2% of 1890
levels (Snyderman, & Herrnstein, 1983).
Eugenics
In the early decades of the 20th century in the United States, support for
eugenics finds many educated adherents. James Cattell, for example, argues
in support of providing incentives for intelligent people to marry other
intelligent people and even offers $1,000 to each of his children if they will
marry the child of a college professor. Goddard, Terman, and many others
argue in favor of the sterilization or segregation of the feeble-minded to
prevent them from having children. This movement gains steadily in
popularity. By 1928, there are 376 courses in eugenics being offered in
colleges across the United States, and 28 states have passed laws allowing for
the surgical sterilization of the feeble-minded, mentally ill, and criminally
insane (Proctor, 1991).
At this time, it is widely believed that lack of intelligence is the chief
cause of criminal, antisocial, and immoral behavior. Terman writes
extensively on the social consequences of allowing the feeble-minded to
reproduce: “Not all criminals are feeble-minded, but all feeble-minded
persons are at least potential criminals. That every feeble-minded woman is
a potential prostitute would hardly be disputed by anyone” (Terman, 1916, p.
11).
Fed by beliefs such as these, between 1907 and 1945, more than 73,000
people in the United States are sterilized (Proctor, 1991), many for no reason
other than having been caught drinking alcohol, violating curfew, or
engaging in some other minor misbehavior during adolescence. Some are
sterilized simply for belonging to families looked down on by neighbors.
Voices in support of the practice of euthanasia on these same populations are
also growing louder in the United States.
School Testing
Although the testing program during World War I proves less than useful to
the Army, intelligence testing in other settings increases in popularity
during the years after the war. It is in this period between wars that
psychology expands from being strictly an academic discipline pursued in
laboratories on university campuses to also being a profession practiced in
schools, businesses, and industrial settings. The testing programs instituted
in these places are based on assumptions that intelligence is inherited and
that scores on the tests reveal innate ability that can only be slightly altered
by environmental factors.
By 1900 in the United States, compulsory education laws are enacted in
every state, and public schools are established to ensure that every citizen is
taught basic skills. A new political movement emerges, the Progressive
Party, which encourages the application of scientific findings to improve
society and advocates widespread testing for intelligence in public schools.
By 1921, 2 million school children in the United States are being tested for
intelligence annually (Snyderman & Rothman, 1988), and students are
“tracked” into high-, average-, and low-achieving classrooms based on the
results of these tests. The purpose of tracking is to ensure that those with
high innate ability are given the best education possible so as to maximize
their potential as leaders. Because other students have less innate ability,
educational advantages would only be wasted on them. Those in the lowest
tracks will be provided only with vocational training, as this is the level of
education from which they will profit most. The Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) is introduced in 1926 as a tool to aid in college admissions decisions,
although it does not gain widespread acceptance until after World War II.
Industrial Applications
Testing for the purpose of making employment decisions has been practiced
for much longer than just the past century. The Chinese have been using
civil service tests for government employment for more than 2,000 years. In
the West, Miinsterberg and other psychologists practicing industrial
psychology have used tests since the 19th century. With the advent of
intelligence testing for innate ability, the tools are now available to identify
the right applicant to fit each job. With employees assigned to jobs for which
they are innately suited, American industry has the power to maximize
productivity and become the economic giant that it is destined to become.
Unfortunately for employers, it soon becomes evident that testing for
placement is not working. Employees placed into positions based on their
test scores do not reliably perform any better than those assigned to
positions based on the judgments of supervisors. Other studies, explored in
the next chapter, establish that motivational and social factors are as
important to productivity as intelligence. Employment testing becomes very
popular in the United States, but not until after World War II, when more
valid and reliable tests are available.
BEHAVIORISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR
Behaviorists assert that, because consciousness must be inferred from

observations of behavior, it is inappropriate as an object of study in the
natural sciences. Furthermore, nothing can be understood by studying mind
that cannot be understood just as well by studying behavior. Therefore,
mind does not matter.
Later in John Watson’s career, as behaviorism becomes more accepted and
the physiological origins of psychological characteristics are better
understood, Watson and other behaviorists deny the very existence of
consciousness as anything other than physiological functioning. Thus, for
the behaviorists, the ancient mind-body problem vanishes. No longer must
philosopher/scientists struggle to find where and how the material body
communicates with the immaterial mind. There is no immaterial mind, only
body. There is no immaterial aspect of the human. There is only matter, just
as is true for all other animals. Consciousness is nothing more than an
awareness of what the body is doing and has no place in science. Behavior is
the mechanical functioning of a mechanical body. All that remains to
understand is how this very complex machine, the human, works.
Stimulus-Response Theory
Recall that behaviorism requires that the variable to be measured be publicly

observable. The research method in all forms of behaviorism is the
observation, measurement, and description of behavior. Behaviorists assume
only one psychological process, and that is learning. If humans begin life as
blank slates and behavior originates in the association of stimuli with
responses, then it is important to understand the process of how and why
those associations are formed. Like many other psychologists and
philosophers, Watson assumes that learned associations cause behavior.
This view stands in stark contrast to that of hereditarians, who argue that
innate limits on intelligence determine each individual’s destiny. Watson’s
assertion that, given the right conditions, he can raise any healthy infant to
fulfill any role in society (Watson, 1930, p. 104) is much more in keeping
with traditional values in the United States. In the United States the belief is
common that, with enough effort “any boy can grow up to be President.”
✔ Stop and think.

Why assume that learning causes behavior? What is the evidence?
How could this hypothesis be tested?
It is at this point that Watson’s speculations diverge from the

structuralists, the functionalists, and even from most of his contemporary
behaviorists. Watson argues that the independent variable, that which causes
behavior, should be as observable as the dependent or outcome variable. He
has read some of the work of the Russian physiologists Pavlov and
Bekhterev reviewed in the following section and eventually settles on the
conditioned reflex as the cause of behavior. In other words, in Watson’s
view, behavior is not caused by mental events like desire, will, motivation,
or consciously thought-out plans. An organism begins by emitting a reflex
action in response to environmental stimulation. The reflex action may then
be associated with a satisfactory outcome or not and thus may be more or
less likely to be repeated in the future. It is always an environmental
stimulus (S) that becomes associated (-) with an observable response (R). For
this reason, Watson’s form of behaviorism is called S-R theory.
Russian Physiological Associationism
During the late 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, Russian
physicians Ivan Pavlov and Vladimir Bekhterev are conducting experiments
on human and animal physiology. Like their older colleague Sechenov,
Pavlov and Bekhterev share the materialist assumption that all mental
experience is reducible to the functioning of matter. Consciousness is only
the awareness of sensory experience and physiological reflexive responses
(Joravsky, 1989).
For example, it is as Pavlov is carrying on his research into the reflexes of
the digestive system that he almost accidentally makes the discoveries that
have led to such renown in the West. Initially, he is seeking only to
understand the functional relationships between a sensory experience, like
the taste of food, and a physiological reflex, in this case, salivation. Instead
of asking human subjects to introspect, or report on their sensory
experiences, as the Germans have been doing, Pavlov elects to examine what
he views as a more objective measure, the amount of salivation and gastric
fluids produced when a hungry animal is presented with food. This is a more
invasive procedure, requiring the surgical implantation of tubes and shunts
into his canine subjects, but Pavlov views this as a more direct and
defensible measure of the physiological reflexes. His goal is to know more
about how the amount and quality of stimulation affects the reflexive
response.
After a time, researchers in Pavlov’s laboratory notice that the food-
deprived dogs begin to salivate as soon as they hear the lab workers coming
into the laboratory and when they see the dishes in which the food powder
is stored. Salivation when food powder is put into the mouth is viewed as a
direct physiological reflexive response to the food. But salivation in response
to the sound of the lab workers or the sight of the food dishes requires
another level of explanation. How could a sound or a sight trigger the
physiological response of salivation? To Pavlov, this seems very similar to
the “action at a distance” problem of magnets or gravity faced by the
physicists of an earlier era. What is the mechanism that allows an auditory
or visual sensation to trigger a response that was previously only seen to the
sensory stimulation of taste?
At first, Pavlov calls this mechanism a “psychical” reflex, argues that it is
the psychical reflex that sets off the physiological reflex, and then sets about
attempting to understand the functional relationship between the two types
of reflexes. However, as he soon realizes, calling salivation to an auditory or
visual stimulus a psychical reflex is only a form of nominalism, that is,
giving the phenomenon a name and doing nothing to explain it. Thus,
Pavlov begins to think in terms of the excitation and inhibition of cortical
responses. By this time, it is known that neurons in the nervous system and
brain respond to physical stimuli by electrical firing, so that when food
powder is placed in the mouth, sensory neurons fire, sending that
information to the brain. This information is then sent by electrical signals
to the muscles and physiological systems governing the production of
salivation and gastric fluids. When visual and auditory stimuli occur at the
same time as taste stimuli, neurons in all those parts of the brain are excited.
With enough pairings of the sound of the lab workers approaching, the sight
of the food dishes, and the presentation of the food powder, this spread of
electrical activation eventually causes these auditory and visual stimuli to
result in salivation. To distinguish salivation to auditory or visual
stimulation from the unconditioned physiological response of salivation to
the taste of food, Pavlov calls the former the “conditional response.”
Salivation to an auditory or visual stimulus is conditional on the previous
pairing of those sights and sounds with the presence of food.
Vladimir Bekhterev, the Russian physiologist who establishes the first
Russian experimental psychology laboratory, is working at about the same
time as Pavlov. Bekhterev’s work also focuses on relationships between
physical events and psychological characteristics, and, well ahead of his
colleagues in the United States, he emphasizes observable behavior as the
object of study in psychology. Bekhterev differs from Pavlov by asserting
that the study of associations between environmental stimuli and motor
reflexes is more directly relevant to human behavior than Pavlov’s study of
gastric secretions. Bekhterev should also be noted for his establishment in
1908 of an institute for the graduate study of psychology that allows
unrestricted access to both women and Jews, the first of its kind in the
world.
Personality
As Pavlov works with many different breeds of dogs, he notices that some
breeds are more excitable and nervous, whereas others are calmer and
quieter. His increased understanding of cortical functioning leads him to
speculate that these personality differences are grounded in differing levels
of cortical excitation and inhibition. Thus, Pavlov suggests, the basis of
personality or temperament is a result of innate differences in physiological
responses to the environment. Some individuals are more likely to respond
to even very low levels of environmental stimulation, whereas very high
levels of stimulation are required to elicit a response in others. Most
individuals fall somewhere between the two extremes in responsiveness.
Later in his career, Pavlov becomes interested in the clinical applications
of his research. He speculates that some individuals are more prone to
succumbing to neuroses than others. Continuing his experiments with dogs,
he produces what he calls “experimental neuroses” by presenting the dogs
with ambiguous stimuli. For example, a dog might be trained to respond to a
picture of a circle, but to inhibit any response to a square. After the dog is
trained, a picture of a square with very rounded corners is presented,
making it hard for the dog to know whether to respond or inhibit a
response. Under these circumstances, many dogs exhibit nervousness and
anxiety, similar to the characteristics labeled neuroses in humans. This work
leads Pavlov and many others to hope for a scientific explanation of
personality based on measurable physiological differences. Pavlov also
argues that eventually scientific theories of interpersonal relationships will
be grounded in the individual differences found in physiological responses
to environmental stimulation.
The Conditioned Reflex
Although neither Pavlov’s nor Bekhterev’s writings are widely available in

English until 1927–1928 (Samelson, 1981), this is some of what Watson reads
as he is developing his ideas about behaviorism. For Watson, Pavlov’s
conditional response is the piece he has been looking for to establish the
purely physiological basis of behavior, the piece that eventually allows him
to speculate that consciousness is nothing more than an awareness of the
body’s reflex responses to external stimulation. Watson argues that Pavlov’s
conditional response is the physiological explanation for the philosophers’
concept of association. According to Watson, learning is the basis of all
behavior, but it is not some mysterious conscious effort of a metaphysical
will. Learning is based on the spread of cortical activation in response to
sensory stimulation.
John Watson firmly believes that the process of association, what he calls
the conditioned reflex, explains nearly all of behavior. In the case of
emotions, for example, he speculates that only fear, rage, and love are innate
emotions. The full range of adult emotions can be explained by conditioned
reflex. Furthermore, from previous work with infants, Watson concludes that
there are only two environmental stimuli that innately cause the experience
of fear. Specifically, human infants are innately fearful of sudden loud noises
and of a sudden loss of physical support. All other fears are learned by
association with these two innate triggers of fear. To establish the
experimental evidence to support his speculations, Watson and his graduate
assistant, Rosalie Rayner, attempt to condition an infant, known since as
“Little Albert,” to be afraid of a variety of stimuli to which he initially shows
no fear.
The Story of Little Albert

Although Albert is a normal infant, he has been reared almost from
birth in the Harriet Lane Home for Invalid Children, where his mother
is employed as a wet nurse. He is described by Watson and Rayner as
being, on the whole, stolid and unemotional, and they decide that they
can do Albert relatively little harm by their attempts to condition him
to be afraid of additional stimuli.
First, they must establish whether or not Albert has already been
conditioned to be fearful of other stimuli. When Albert is about 9
months old, the researchers confront him suddenly, and presumably for
the first time, with a white rat, a rabbit, a dog, a monkey, masks with
and without hair, cotton wool, burning newspapers, and other objects.
According to their descriptions, Albert’s most common response is to
attempt to reach out to touch and handle these objects. At no time does
he show fear of any of the stimuli.
Albert is also tested to see if he exhibits the expected innate fears.
The researchers try dropping Albert a short distance and jerking a
blanket on which he is lying, but Albert shows no fear. Watson
speculates that this innate fear may be effective only in younger
children, may be experienced only by less placid infants, or may be
already lost due to previous conditioning. Albert is also tested to see if
he exhibits fear of a sudden loud noise. Directly behind his head, a
steel bar is struck with a hammer. For the first time Albert shows a
fearful response. He startles to the sound, then, after the second strike
of the hammer on the steel bar, his lips begin to pucker and tremble,
and on the third stimulation, he begins to cry.
Watson and Rayner express some reluctance to cause Albert
experimentally to develop a new fear, but they eventually conclude
that he will develop other fears sooner or later anyway. What might be
learned about how fear responses can be conditioned overrides their
concern about the consequences for Albert. At about 11 months of age
Albert is returned to the laboratory, and it is determined again that he
shows no fearful responses to any of the neutral stimuli. Thus, they
begin attempting to condition a new fear in him.
A white rat is taken suddenly from a basket and presented to Albert.
He reaches for the rat and just as his hand touches the animal the steel
bar is struck immediately behind his head. Albert startles and falls
forward, but does not cry. Again the rat is presented, and again, just as
he touches the rat, the bar is struck. Albert again falls forward and
whimpers.
No further tests are made for 1 full week. Then, Albert is brought to
the laboratory and presented with the rat again, this time with no
sound. He looks at the rat but does not attempt to touch it. When the
rat is brought nearer, Albert begins tentative reaching movements, but
when the rat noses his hand, Albert pulls it away. A second trial is then
conducted, jointly presenting the rat and the sound. At the sound,
Albert again falls over but does not cry. A third and then a fourth trial
result in the same response. On the fifth trial, the rat is presented
without any sound. Albert whimpers and withdraws his body from the
rat. Only after the sixth trial, presenting the rat and striking the steel
bar together, does Albert whimper, and on the seventh trial he begins
to cry. At the eighth trial, the rat is presented alone. Albert begins to
cry immediately, turns, and crawls away. Watson and Rayner conclude
that they have successfully conditioned Albert to be afraid of a
previously neutral stimulus.
Five days later, the researchers test to see if the fear will transfer to
other objects. They present Albert with a rabbit, a dog, a fur seal coat,
cotton wrapped in paper, Watson’s hair, the hair of other observers,
and a Santa Claus mask. Between each of these trials, they give Albert
his blocks to play with. Albert expresses mild fearfulness of almost all
of the stimuli, but readily calms down when given the blocks. Watson
and Rayner conclude that Albert’s conditioned fear of the rat has
transferred to these other objects.
Five days after this, at 11 months and 20 days, Albert is again
brought to the laboratory. He is presented with the rat, rabbit, and dog
again. Sometimes, the steel bar is struck at the time the animal is
presented and sometimes not. Albert’s response is again to withdraw,
sometimes to attempt to crawl away, but rarely to cry.
Albert is moved to a different room and again presented with the rat,
rabbit, and dog. The steel bar is struck again just as the rat is presented.
Albert’s responses to all three animals are again mildly fearful,
although he calms immediately when presented with the blocks.
Curiously, no description is given of the response of the rat, rabbit, or
dog to the sudden loud sound of the steel bar at the time they are
placed in front of Albert, although on one occasion, the dog does bark
loudly, startling everyone in the room.
Watson and Rayner wish to determine the effect of the passage of
time on the fear they believe they have conditioned in Albert. So
exactly 1 month later, just before Albert’s mother leaves her
employment and takes Albert out of the hospital, they test him again.
Albert still shows mildly negative responses to being forced to touch
the Santa Claus mask, fur coat, rat, rabbit, and dog. Watson and Rayner
conclude that conditioned fears persist, although with a certain loss of
intensity across time. They further speculate that these conditioned
fears modify personality throughout life. (Watson & Rayner, 1920)
Even though they know well in advance that Albert will be leaving the
hospital, and they have some interest in the process of the “detachment” or
removal of conditioned responses, Watson and Rayner make no effort to
decondition Albert’s experimentally induced fears. This may be for the best,
given their proposal for how to remove these fears. If fear of the rat can be
conditioned by pairing its presentation with an innately fear-causing
stimulus (a loud sound), they suggest that fear of the rat might best be
removed by pairing the rat with an innately love-causing stimulus. For a
behaviorist like Watson, the emotion of love is caused by physical
stimulation. He thus suggests pairing the presentation of the rat with
simultaneous stimulation of Albert’s erogenous zones, beginning with the
lips, then the nipples, and finally the sex organs (Watson & Rayner, 1920).
Although they do not attempt to decondition Albert, Watson and Rayner
do make a presumably tongue-in-cheek guess as to what his Freudian
psychoanalyst might say some 20 years hence when Albert presents himself
to be cured of his lifelong fear of furry objects. They also suggest that
Freud’s assertion that sex (what Watson and Rayner call love) is the primal
emotion is not supported by this study of conditioned fear. Fear, they say, is
just as primal an emotion as love in influencing personality.
Shortly after the Little Albert study is concluded, Watson and Rayner
become embroiled in a personal scandal when their illicit romantic affair is
discovered and Watson’s wife divorces him. Watson is fired from his faculty
position at Johns Hopkins University, never holds another academic
position, and his research with infants comes to an end. Later researchers
repeatedly attempt to replicate his findings on conditioned fears, but are
largely unsuccessful. Thus, one study with one infant serves as Watson’s
only experimental support for his assertion that conditioned reflexes form
the basis of human behavior.
Despite this, behaviorism in its various forms comes to dominate
experimental psychology during the first half of the 20th century in the
United States. This dominance is sometimes explained as a consequence of
the strength of John Watson’s personality and the inferences he draws for
many years from the study of Little Albert. Others attribute the popularity
of behaviorism to its reliance on observable evidence and rejection of
metaphysical assumptions.
Until the 1960s, most experimental psychologists in the United States
share the assumptions of behaviorism. These include assumptions that
humans begin life as blank slates, that behavior is a consequence of learned
associations, that learning can be defined as the gradual appearance of a
predicted response to a specific stimulus, and that behavior, not
consciousness, is what psychologists should explain. Furthermore, they
adopt positivism as their shared method of research. Both the stimulus and
the response must be publicly observable.
WEIRD SCIENCE
Throughout history, science and magic are easily confused, and
technological achievements can seem like magic, from long distance
communication to human flight. These advances in technology accelerate in
the 20th century.
Physical Science and Science Fiction
At the same time that mechanistic ideas and positivistic methods are taking
over psychology, the other sciences are having second thoughts about both.
Physics, for example, has moved beyond positivistic methods by early in the
20th century. In 1905, Albert Einstein publishes his special theory of
relativity. In developing this theory, Einstein relies not so much on
observations and measurements as he does on logical deduction. In his
special theory of relativity, Einstein asserts that time and distance are not
absolutes but appear to vary depending on the speed of the observer. Thus,
time slows down the faster one moves through space. In fact, this theory
suggests, if one could move fast enough, time would move backwards.
Subsequent observations have proven Einstein’s theories of relativity to
be more accurate throughout most of the universe than were Newton’s
notions of absolute time and space, but the idea that time and space are
relative sounds like pure comic-book science fiction to many nonscientists.
Thus, the literary genre of science fiction is born from scientific and
technological changes occurring during the last few decades of the 19th
century (Fayter, 1997). Stories like H. G. Wells’ The Invisible Man, published
in 1895, or Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland, published in 1915, explore
the blurry boundaries between science and fiction.
Psychic Research
The distinctions between science and pseudoscience are likely to be confused

in the study of consciousness as well (Leahey, & Leahey, 1983). In 1882, the
Society for Psychical Research is founded in England for the purpose of
investigating phenomena that may be beyond the scope of nature, but
somehow still within the reach of the by now well-respected methods of
science. These phenomena include claims of telepathic communication and
clairvoyance, as well as the Spiritualists’ interests in hauntings and
communication with the dead. In 1884, William James helps found a similar
organization in the United States, the American Society for Psychical
Research. Popular interest in telepathy and clairvoyance far exceeds popular
interest in experimental psychology. Most people are clearly “more
interested in whether people could communicate with the dead, and ESP,”
than they are with “the ‘range of perception’ and the ‘timing of thought’”
(Coon, 1992).
William James is fascinated with the possibility of telepathy. In 1902, he
writes in The Varieties of Religious Experience about elements in the
universe that humans cannot grasp through either sensory or rational
powers, but that can be glimpsed through the window of mystical
experience. Because, for James, the authority of experience is absolute, he is
reluctant to dismiss entirely accounts of mystical experience. Although
mystical experiences represent reality for the individual who has the
experience, James recognizes the existence of hallucinations and delusions.
Thus, some experiences represent a reality that is not external to the
individual. James also has doubts about the possibility of communication
with the dead. After attending a number of seances, he expresses concern
that the spirits of those who had passed over have nothing of much interest
to report about their afterlife. Instead, they only communicate such trivial
facts as that the still-living wife has moved the place of their photograph.
Despite this, James does believe that if communication with the dead could
be achieved, it would be found to be explicable in natural terms and would
thus yield to scientific investigation (James, 1902).
William James is not alone in hoping that the methods of science will
reveal that there is more in the universe than nature and that humans are
more than well-developed apes, as Thomas Huxley once referred to them.
One leading 19th-century researcher in psychical phenomena is Fredric
Myers (1843–1901), who argues that within each individual, there is a
“subliminal self” that is powered by psychical energy. It is this subliminal
self, Myers believes, that allows for communication with the dead.
Psychologists study claims of communication with the dead and the
possibility of telepathy through the early decades of the 20th century. By
midcentury however, the complete lack of publicly observable evidence for
any of these phenomena has caused most psychologists to lose interest.
Parapsychology, as the field comes to be known, is a largely discredited and
somewhat embarrassing stepchild of psychology in the last half of the
century.
The Times
By 1900, unregulated business and industrial expansion in the United
States is coming to an end. In response to public outrage, President
Theodore Roosevelt pushes for the enforcement of antitrust legislation
and succeeds in breaking up business monopolies, culminating in the
dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911. Labor unions gain power and are
able to improve working conditions, shorten working hours, and
significantly increase wages for their members.
In the decade after the end of the Great War, the economy expands
rapidly as the growing middle class pours money into the stock market.
Stock prices soar, unrelated to the actual value of the investments. A
very small number of families amass huge fortunes. They build homes
modeled after European palaces, import millions of dollars worth of
European art and ancient artifacts from around the world, and
generally do their best to imitate the now mostly vanished European
aristocracy.
The power of electricity is harnessed for human use in the 19th
century and by the early 20th century is a common feature of everyday
life in the West. The electric light bulb, for example, transforms night
into day and changes the daily rhythm of life for nearly everyone.
From 1920 to 1930, the number of automobiles on roads in North
America triples from 8 million to 23 million, spawning whole new
industries in road construction, gasoline and service stations, and
tourism. Urban populations continue to grow, while the percentage of
people living on farms and in rural areas declines. The middle classes
enjoy a prosperity that brings them radios and a vastly expanded
selection of radio programming, telephones to maintain contact with
ever more widely scattered family members, and electric “labor-
saving” devices, such as washing machines. On the newly invented
“weekends,” even working people can afford to seek urban
entertainment, such as professional sporting events, and worship sports
heroes like Babe Ruth and boxer Jack Dempsey. They can go to the new
motion picture shows called “movies” and admire glamorous film stars
like Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks, Sr.
In January 1920, Prohibition is passed in the United States, outlawing
the sale of liquor. Illegal “speakeasies” spring up in urban centers,
catering to what are referred to as the “Flaming Youth.” Young people
thrill to the increasingly fast pace of life, speeding around in
automobiles, drinking bootleg liquor, dancing the Charleston, and
listening to jazz. Also in 1920, conservative Warren G. Harding is
elected to the presidency by promising to return the country to
“normalcy,” pursue an isolationist foreign policy, reduce government
regulation of business, and decrease the power of organized labor.
Throughout the United States, the Ku Klux Klan grows stronger and
blames modern problems on a variety of scapegoats, from Bolsheviks
to Jews to Roman Catholics.
In late October 1929, the entire economic house of cards collapses
with the crash of stock markets in the United States and around the
world. The popular culture that emerges during the Great Depression is
a sharp contrast to the optimistic, but now disappeared, Roaring
Twenties.
9
Paradigms Proliferate: Is There an
Unconscious Mind?
In this chapter the various domains of psychology that begin to emerge in the West during the first
half of the 20th century are explored. The chapter begins in Germany with Gestalt psychology. Its
proponents are then followed across the Atlantic. In North America, the various practical
applications found for psychology are examined, including early industrial psychology, clinical
applications, child study, and social psychology. Psychoanalytic theory is also covered, especially
as it affects psychology and popular culture.
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
During the early decades of the 20th century, psychology in Germany is

prospering. Brentano’s “act” psychology provides a precedent for
psychologists who doubt that consciousness can be fully explained by a set
of basic elements of mind associated together through a set of laws. This
new way of viewing the contents of consciousness is named “Gestalt”
psychology. Gestalt ideas are influenced by arguments that consciousness is
directed toward achieving goals, by the increasing focus in physics on fields
of force, by anomalies in research, and by common experience. Gestalt
psychologists argue that the contents of consciousness cannot be adequately
explained by cataloging a set of basic elements and laws of association.
Instead, they argue, holistically perceived sensory information is given form
by fields of force in the brain. These fields of force create perceptions that
are not only more than the sum of the individual sensory elements, but also
are often completely different than the sum of the parts.
The need for a Gestalt explanation for the contents of consciousness is
made apparent as a result of several experimental anomalies for which
structuralists have no explanation. Two examples will serve as illustrations.
The Phi Phenomenon
In 1910, German psychologist Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) asks a

provocative question that throws doubt on the entire structuralist paradigm.
Wertheimer notices that if two lights placed close together are lighted, first
one and then the other, they will be perceived as two lights, just as an
elementalist psychology would predict. And if the two lights are shown at
exactly the same moment, they are usually perceived as one light. But if the
two lights are shown successively with a very brief interval between them,
the phi phenomenon occurs: They are perceived as one light moving across
space.
✔ Stop and think.

Why would motion be perceived when there really are two separate
lights?
Wilhelm Wundt has an explanation for why motion is perceived when

there are really two separate lights. He suggests that when the two lights are
flashed with a brief interval between them, the eyes travel quickly from one
light to the next. It is eye movement, the same movement that the eyes make
when an object really is moving across the visual field, that causes the
perception of two lights as one light moving.
✔ Stop and think.
How could you test Wundt’s explanation?
Wertheimer finds a way to test Wundt’s explanation for the illusion of

movement by using two pairs of lights instead of one pair. For each pair, one
light is flashed just slightly before the other, but in one pair, the right light is
flashed first and the left one second, and in the other pair, the left light is
flashed first and the right one second. Using this design, motion is still
perceived. Because the eyes cannot move in both directions at the same
time, the illusion of movement that is perceived cannot be a result of eye
movements (Wertheimer, 1912/1968). It must be a phenomenon of
perception. It is a phenomenon that is familiar today in the form of motion
pictures which, although made up of a series of still pictures, are perceived
as moving images.
The phi phenomenon is important for the science of psychology for
several reasons. It is an anomaly that cannot be explained by an elementalist
account of perception. More importantly, perceiving movement where there
really is none means that perception does not represent reality perfectly.
Perceptions are thus not reducible to elements of sensory information.
✔ Stop and think.
What does it mean for science, and for the science of psychology, to
suggest that perceptions, although originating in reality, are not perfect
representations of reality?
Max Wertheimer continues to be fascinated with thinking throughout his

life. He and Albert Einstein become good friends, and the last major
substantive chapter of Wertheimer’s posthumous book, Productive Thinking
(1945/1959), based on extensive interviews of Einstein by Wertheimer, deals
with the thought processes Einstein used to come up with the theory of
relativity (M. Wertheimer, personal communication, March 31, 2005).
Animal Insight
The second set of experimental anomalies that illustrate a weakness in the

elementalist paradigm are the findings on animal insight made by German
scientist Wolfgang Kohler (1887–1967). Kohler’s work challenges Edward
Thorndike’s conclusion that animals can only solve problems through trial
and error. Kohler observes that animals in the real world appear to be
solving problems using a variety of techniques. He therefore sets similar
kinds of problems for the apes he studies at the Anthropoid Research Station
in the Canary Islands off the West Coast of Africa. His hypothesis is that
being able to see the whole problem is key to being able to use alternative
problem-solving strategies. Animals—even humans—use trial and error
when only a small part of the problem can be seen, but having a wider
perspective of the problem may influence the strategies used to solve the
problem. In one of Kohler’s studies, a banana is placed outside of a wire
enclosure. The ape inside, Sultan, is provided with two bamboo sticks,
neither of which is long enough to reach the banana. Sultan attempts to
reach the banana with first one stick and then the other, but fails. Then,
apparently having lost interest in the banana, he sits and idly manipulates
the sticks. After a short period of this, he discovers that the two sticks can be
joined by pushing the thinner stick into an opening in the end of the thicker
stick, creating a much longer tool. Almost before he has them fully together,
Sultan is racing toward the railing where he reaches through and retrieves
the banana with his new invention. Kohler calls this behavior “insight.”
Insight is differentiated from trial and error, first because it is not
incremental learning. Insight occurs suddenly in a kind of “aha” flash of
understanding. Insight is also differentiated from trial and error because it
does not require reward. Although putting the sticks together enables Sultan
to reach the banana, he solves the problem before he actually retrieves the
reward. Finally, as Kohler points out, solutions reached through insight are
generalizable to similar problems encountered later, because these solutions
are not dependent on a series of trials and errors (Kohler, 1917/1925).
✔ Stop and think.

How would you test whether animals learn by just “getting the idea,”
the way Gestalt psychologists would predict or whether they learn to
respond to specific stimuli through trial and error?
An Experimental Test of Gestalt Theory
Köhler tries an experimental study to test whether insightful learning or

trial and error best explains how animals learn. He designs a study that
allows him to test whether learning is a response to a specific stimulus or to
the relations among stimuli.
First, he trains two hens to peck grain only from the darker of two papers
(one dark and one light) glued side by side on a wooden board outside their
cage. As a control, he trains two other hens to do just the opposite. Grain is
scattered in equal amounts on both papers. Whenever a hen in the first pair
pecks at the grain on the dark paper she is allowed to eat, but the grain on
the light paper is glued down. After from 400 to 600 trials, in which the
positions of the papers are frequently switched to prevent any association of
the stimulus with the right or left side, the experimental hens at last learn to
select the dark stimulus and to avoid the light stimulus most of the time.
Next, Kohler changes the papers. He keeps the dark paper on the board,
but substitutes an even darker paper for the light one. The question is
whether the hens will continue to peck at the specific paper from which they
have been laboriously trained to eat or whether they will respond to the
brightness relationship and select the new darker paper from which they
have never eaten grain before.
✔ Stop and think.

Which do you think they will do?
Kohler’s results are conclusive. The hens select the darkest paper in about
70% of the trials. What this means is that the hens have not learned to
respond to a specific stimulus and eat only from paper of a certain degree of
darkness. Instead, they have learned to respond to the relationship between
stimuli, that is, they have learned a rule: to eat only from the darkest paper.
Kohler finds the same pattern of results with the control hens. He also tries
similar experiments with chimpanzees and even with a 3-year-old child,
with similar results (adapted from Garrett, 1951, pp. 70–71).
✔ Stop and think.
What does this finding mean for the assumptions of behaviorism?
Gestalt psychologists, along with others, suggest that animals demonstrate

trial-and-error problem solving and learning when experimenters present
them with a problem that can only be solved through trial and error. In
other words, by placing them in puzzle boxes, Thorndike has required the
cats to accidentally solve the problem through random behavior. To then
conclude that animals can only solve problems and learn through trial and
error is fallacious reasoning based on insufficient evidence. Kohler’s chickens
provide evidence that animals are capable of more sophisticated problem-
solving strategies.
Gestalt psychologists use a fundamentally different approach to
understanding the contents of consciousness than do elemenentalists and
structuralists and are able to explain real-world observations for which
others have no explanation. Gestalt approaches to consciousness owe much
to developments in the science of physics at the turn of the century, as is
acknowledged by Kohler. The ideas of Gestalt psychology are first made
available in English in the writings of Kurt Koffka (1886–1941), who
becomes the spokesperson for Gestalt psychology in North America. Because
Koffka’s first paper in English focuses on Gestalt theories of perception
(Koffka, 1922), the influence of Gestalt ideas on North American
psychologists early in the 20th century is limited primarily to these theories
of perception.
Gestalt Principles of Perception
The principles of perception developed in the Gestalt school are grounded in

the belief that, as is true in the physical universe, the mental universe of the
brain is a dynamic arena of self-organizing force fields. All sensory stimuli
entering consciousness are organized by mental forces into meaningful
wholes. In the same way that a set of iron filings will be organized in a
characteristic pattern around the pole of the magnet, sensory stimuli will be
organized into patterns in consciousness.
The law of Pragnanz explains Gestalt principles of perception. This law
states that the mind organizes perceptions into as complete and as
meaningful wholes as conditions will allow. It is the law of Pragnanz that
explains why the human mind perceives patterns, even in very jumbled
stimuli, such as perceiving a face from the shadows thrown by craters on the
surface of the moon. Human minds are drawn toward simple meaningful
patterns that form complete wholes.
Gestalt Notions of Consciousness

Gestalt psychologists also propose some ideas about how consciousness
functions that diverge from the elementalist tradition. Most of these ideas
are based on the same behavioral evidence used by past philosophers of
nature, but Gestalt psychologists test these ideas experimentally. German
psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) suggests that humans are motivated by
fields of force in the mind. According to Lewin, at any given time,
consciousness is influenced not just by elements of past experience, but also
by dynamic forces, both internal and external.
For example, one of Lewin’s students, Bluma Zeigarnik (1890–1990), who
goes on to have an illustrious career as a clinical psychologist in the Soviet
Union, is remembered in the West for her experiments concerning the role
of tension in motivating learning and problem solving. She hypothesizes
that the need to solve a problem creates tension in consciousness that is only
released once the problem is solved. It is this tension that motivates the
organism to seek a solution. The idea that this tension is only relieved when
the problem is solved or the task is completed is referred to as the “Zeigarnik
effect.” Later psychologists of consciousness conclude that the release of this
tension alone can serve as reinforcement that cements learning.
Just prior to his death, Lewin also begins a research program exploring the
implications of Gestalt principles for interactions among people in small
groups. In Lewin’s view, the behavior of individuals in any given group is
shaped by the complex interactions of the fields of force brought to the
group by the individuals. Additionally, various aspects of the structural
organization of the group, such as the leadership style exercised in the
group, also influence the behavior of the individual members.
By the mid-1930s, all of the Gestalt psychologists discussed earlier have
left Europe for the United States. They leave because of the increasing
persecution of Jews in Germany during this time and the social and
academic disruption caused by the rise to power of the Nazi party. Even
Kohler, who is not Jewish, leaves because of the increasingly chilly
atmosphere at the universities and in German society in general toward free
thought and speech. Unfortunately for these psychologists, the academic
community in the United States is only marginally more welcoming. These
German, mostly Jewish, Gestalt psychologists find positions only at private
liberal arts colleges or in private research institutions, neither of which have
graduate programs.
A variety of reasons are offered for the fact that Gestalt ideas have little
influence on psychology early in the 20th century in North America,
including the lack of graduate students to train at the institutions where
Gestalt psychologists are employed. Additionally, behaviorism is entering its
heyday in the United States, becoming a paradigm that then dominates
psychology for many decades. Gestalt theories stand in opposition to the
more accepted behaviorist ideas, and Gestaltists’ experimental findings often
present anomalies to this more dominant paradigm. It is not until the 1940s
that Gestalt ideas begin to influence social psychology and the 1960s before
Gestalt theories begin to influence clinical and cognitive psychology.
APPLICATION VERSUS PURE SCIENCE
Early 20th-century psychologists are not just concerned with the structure
and contents of conscious mind. In the West, many psychologists in this era
are more concerned with solving practical problems. One major battle
defining the intellectual questions of psychology early in the 20th century is
the debate between academic and applied psychologists. Academics argue
that psychology should uphold its future as a pure science by focusing on
basic research. In contrast, applied psychologists argue that psychology can
also make major contributions to solving real-world problems.
The conflict is exemplified by Titchener’s organization of The
Experimental-ists in 1904. In forming this group, he hopes to distinguish
those conducting basic experimental research into the structures of mind
from the “functionalists.” Those who argue in support of psychology as a
pure science are concerned that the “premature” application of psychological
findings will result in failures that will cause the brand-new science of
psychology to lose the respect of the other sciences. They are also
embarrassed by programs in psychical research, by William James’ broad
application of psychology to religious and spiritualistic questions, and by
what they see as the movement of psychology away from pure science,
toward becoming just a technique for solving problems. Having only
recently extricated themselves from 19th-century philosophy, academics are
afraid that the new psychology will disappear into 20th-century technology.
In fact, Titchener refers to John Watson’s behaviorism as a technology, not a
science (O’Donnell, 2002), and in Germany, applied psychology is referred to
as “psychotechnics” (van Drunen, 1997).
By the 1920s, academic experimental psychologists, who are nearly all
male and are mostly employed in university faculty positions, are concerned
with preserving what they view as their higher status over those engaged in
the applied aspects of the field. Although women are now admitted to
graduate study in psychology, and although compared with the other
sciences women constitute a larger proportion in this field (Furumoto, 1987;
Koppes, 1997), they are significantly less likely to be employed in academic
positions than are men. Instead, the women are found in applied settings,
where women constitute the majority (Capshew & Laszlo, 1986; Koppes,
1997).
Those favoring an applied approach to psychology argue that the other
sciences are providing solutions to important problems. Even the purest
science, physics, is solving problems of aerodynamics and allowing humans
successfully to take flight in aeroplanes. There appears to be no end to the
applications that practical chemistry is finding. Why should psychology not
also participate in helping to solve problems, especially when there are so
many in need of solution?
Five decades ago the psychologists began to devote themselves to the most minute description of
the mental experiences and to explain the mental life in a way which was modeled after the
pattern of exact natural sciences. Their aim was no longer to speculate about the soul, but to find
the psychological elements and the constant laws which control their connections. Psychology
became experimental and physiological. For more than thirty years the psychologists have also
had their workshops. Laboratories for experimental psychology have grown up in all civilized
countries, and the new method has been applied to one group of mental traits after another. And
yet we stand before the surprising fact that all the manifold results of the new science have
remained book knowledge, detached from any practical interests. Only in the last ten years do we
find systematic efforts to apply the experimental results of psychology to the needs of society.
(Miinsterberg, 1913, pp. 4–5)
INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Nowhere is the distinction between scientific research and applied

technology more blurred at the turn of the century than in the field of
industrial psychology. In 1917, the Journal of Applied Psychology begins
publication, reporting the results of research in this field. The editors hope
that the application of scientifically derived knowledge will result in
“increasing human efficiency and human happiness by the more direct
method of decreasing the number of cases where a square peg is condemned
to a life of fruitless endeavor to fit itself comfortably into a round hole”
(Hall, Baird, & Geissler, 1917). This movement is facilitated by the
Progressive Party’s encouragement to use scientific advances to improve
everyone’s quality of life. At the same time, business owners are also hoping
that the application of psychological knowledge will lead to increased profits
for their new and growing manufacturing industries.
Psychologists’ Advice for Increasing the Supply
Management
Psychologist May Smith places the beginning of industrial psychology in

the 16th century with a book by Spanish natural philosopher Juan Huarte
(ca. 1530-ca. 1592; Smith, 1944). Huarte was concerned with vocational
guidance and selection. More recent historians give credit for founding
modern industrial psychology to German experimental psychologist Hugo
Münsterberg. In 1913, Münsterberg publishes Psychology and Industrial
Efficiency, in which he discusses psychology and the scientific selection of
workers, the proper design of work environments to maximize productivity,
and the use of psychology in promoting sales. The ideas expressed in this
book are based on his experimental study of the working conditions in
several industries, including electric railway and telephone service.
The assumption is that psychological principles might be of value in
helping management to make decisions that might increase profits. One of
the earliest applications of psychological testing to business is in the
selection of salesmen. Some people seem to be able to sell just about
anything, are able easily to persuade others, and can make successful careers
in sales, whereas many other people have none of these skills.
✔ Stop and think.

Among a group of applicants, what would be the best way to identify
those who will be successful in sales?
Business leaders believe that there must be some reasonably easy way to
identify those who will make good salesmen, and late in the 19th century,
they find a shortcut in physiognomy. Physiognomy is the belief that it is
possible to identify people’s character, to test the limits of their intellect, and
to foreordain the career that they are suited for by observing their facial
appearance. Physiognomy enjoys a brief but widespread popularity,
primarily in the United States, at about the same time that phrenology is
popular. Like phrenology, physiognomy is a pseudoscience that has all the
trappings of a science without any of the evidence to support its contentions.
Needless to say, both phrenology and physiognomy fail to identify
successful salespeople. Thus, the establishment of the Bureau of
Salesmanship Research at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1916 is a
welcome addition to the effort (Katzell & Austin, 1992). Funded by 27
national organizations, the establishment of this institute represents an early
example of the kind of cooperation between academia and industry that
comes to have increasing influence over research universities in the later
part of the 20th century.
Work Efficiency
Management is also concerned with worker morale. Although labor is

cheap in this era, training new employees is expensive. Keeping trained
workers happy and on the job, preferably without paying them more, is an
important goal. The major concern of owners of manufacturing plants is to
increase profits by increasing productivity and lowering production costs.
Frederick Taylor, who is not a psychologist but a former manufacturing
employee and might best be described as an early sort of management
consultant, argues that there is a “best way” to perform every job. He
suggests that “the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly
defined laws, rules, and principles as a foundation” (Taylor, 1911, p. 7). If
there is one best way to perform each job and if jobs can be broken down
into their component parts, Taylor argues, then it should be possible to
identify the most efficient way, both in time and energy, to perform each job.
Thus, the assembly line is introduced to industrial production.
After the introduction of assembly lines, engineer, industrial psychologist,
and management consultant Lillian Gilbreth (1878–1972) advocates for what
are referred to as “time and motion” studies. In these studies, the time it
takes to perform each segment of a job and each movement required is
carefully measured, and all unnecessary effort is systematically eliminated.
The results of these time and motion studies are responsible for the creation
of assembly lines and the subsequent mass production of consumer goods
from textiles to automobiles. In some instances, production is increased
fourfold by the establishment of assembly lines, substantially increasing
profits for the owners of the manufacturing plants. Initially, when workers
are still being paid “by the piece,” their income also goes up as productivity
increases, but within a short time, the owners begin paying workers an
hourly wage instead, thus reaping greater profits for themselves.
Gilbreth’s distinguished career in industrial management is made all the
more remarkable by her personal accomplishments. She publishes her
dissertation The Psychology of Management in 1914 (Gilbreth, 1914/1973)
and earns a doctorate in psychology in 1915, the same year that she gives
birth to her seventh child (Koppes, 1997). The Gilbreths eventually have 12
children, and the principles of scientific management she advocates in
industrial settings are also used in the Gilbreth home (Kelly & Kelly, 1990).
One set of classic studies in industrial psychology conducted during the
1930s is commonly referred to as the Hawthorne studies because they are
carried out at the Western Electric assembly plant in Hawthorne, Illinois. In
cooperation with management at the plant, psychologist and professor of
industrial research Elton Mayo (1880–1950) and his colleagues from the
Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University conduct
a series of experiments. Their goal is to identify optimal working conditions
in the assembly rooms. Systematically, the researchers vary conditions such
as the level of lighting and the lengths of the breaks the women workers are
allowed to take. Curiously, productivity increases no matter what change is
made in the working conditions.
✔ Stop and think.

Why do you think productivity increases?
A variety of explanations are offered for this finding. Perhaps the workers
are flattered at the attention they are receiving from researchers at
prestigious Harvard University. Maybe the workers are trying to help the
researchers be successful or maybe they are responding to the mere presence
of the researchers. The increase in productivity is transient, and productivity
returns to normal levels after periods ranging from a few days to 2 years.
Thus, the psychologists conclude that the workers are responding to novelty,
so that any change in the workplace will increase productivity. This is
referred to as the “Hawthorne effect” (Mayo, 1933).
Today, researchers know that at least some of the increase in productivity
reported in the Hawthorne studies can be attributed to the replacement by
management of two less efficient workers with more efficient workers
midstudy (Gillespie, 1988). Also, the reputed improvements in productivity
have recently been found not to be statistically reliable (M. Wertheimer,
personal communication, November 8, 2004). Despite these problems, it is
widely believed that these studies have a significant impact on
understanding the importance of psychological factors in the workplace (see
Bramel & Friend, 1981). Most agree that, prior to these studies, industrial
managers generally regard workers as human capital, part of the machinery
needed to produce goods. Managers’ efforts focus on finding the right piece
of machinery, meaning the right person to do the job, and the one best way
to assemble the product. After the Hawthorne studies, there is recognition
that there are a variety of psychological factors that must be taken into
consideration before optimal production can be achieved. For example, the
influence and social dynamics of employee work groups is recognized. The
importance of employee attitudes is more likely to be considered, along with
the interpersonal relationships between employees and supervisors. In short,
managers are reminded of the need to treat workers as people, rather than
part of the machinery (Baritz, 1960).
The increase in productivity that results in part from the efforts of early
industrial psychologists yields an increase in the supply of consumer goods
and a satiation of demand, sometimes even requiring the lowering of prices.
Industrial managers discover that they can produce more goods than can be
sold.
Increasing the Demand: Advertising

As a consequence of the increased supply of products, psychologists discover
that they also have a role to play in increasing consumer demand. By
applying psychological principles to the new field of advertising,
psychologists attempt to increase demand, both for products and for their
own services. In the 19th century and before, advertising consisted mostly of
informing potential consumers about the qualities of the products available,
but by the early 20th century, the idea emerges that there are powers of
persuasion that can be brought to bear to convince people to buy things they
never even knew they needed or wanted.
In the 20th century, psychologists find that hypnotic-like states can be
exploited to tap the power of unconscious influences, and suggestion can be
used as a means to influence people. Early in the century, suggestion is used
in medicine to influence states of mind and improve health. As advertising
develops, the power of suggestion is exploited to create demand and
convince consumers that they need the products that the increasingly large
manufacturing sector can produce. Early advertising psychologist Walter
Dill Scott (1869–1955) suggests that, through clever means of suggestion,
people can be persuaded that their purchases are rational when in fact they
have only been manipulated by advertising:
In the same way we think that we are performing a deliberate act when we purchase an advertised
commodity, while in fact we may never have deliberated on the subject at all. The idea is
suggested by the advertisement, and the impulsiveness of human nature enforces the suggested
idea, hence the desired result follows in a way unknown to the purchaser. (Scott, 1913 p. 83)
In the 1920s, large advertising firms, employing many psychologists, are

established to persuade consumers to purchase products. For example, after
losing his professorship at Johns Hopkins University, the behaviorist John
Watson is employed in 1921 by the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency
to use learning techniques to influence consumer buying habits. Within 3
years, he is made a vice president of the firm and is considered a leader in
the field of advertising. Although employed in the lower-status field of
applied psychology, by 1930, Watson is making $70,000 a year, more than 10
times what his academic salary had been at Johns Hopkins (Hergenhahn,
2005).
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS
Mental Hygiene
By early in the 20th century, the serious disturbance in thoughts and

behavior referred to in earlier times as madness is mostly attributed to
organic causes. The psychological effects of morphine addiction, alcoholism,
and syphilis are documented and well established. There is even a new
branch of medical science, psychiatry, which is charged with developing and
administering treatments for psychoses and neuroses. Unfortunately, there
are no effective treatments. Still, for organic problems, there must be organic
solutions, and in these early days of psychiatry, desperate interventions are
tried. It is during this period that the mass sterilization of psychiatric
patients occurs, mostly in the United States. This “treatment” is based on the
assumption that future generations may be protected from insanity by
preventing the insane from reproducing. Rudimentary forms of brain
surgery are also practiced. If the mind is ill, and the brain is the location of
the mind, then it seems logical that mental illness can be treated by brain
surgery. Hundreds of psychiatric patients have all or part of their prefrontal
lobes removed in attempts to control their psychotic illnesses. This very
radical form of treatment is practiced significantly more often on women
than on men (Braslow, 1997).
In 1896, psychologist Lightner Witmer (1867–1956) founds a clinical
training program at the University of Pennsylvania, mostly for the treatment
and care of mentally defective children (McReynolds, 1987). Witmer is
trained as a research scientist in Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig and
continues throughout his career to advocate a good background in
experimental research for all psychologists, even for those wishing to apply
their psychological training to providing treatment for the mentally ill. In
1907, Witmer names the field of treatment “clinical psychology.”
Psychoanalysis
At about the same time on the other side of the Atlantic, Viennese
neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) presents his explanation for mild
mental illnesses and proposes the treatment called psychoanalysis. The
practice of psychoanalysis thus begins as a method to treat neuroses,
primarily hysteria. Throughout the 20th century, psychoanalytic theories of
personality continue to have a powerful influence on psychology, as well as
on popular culture.
Hysteria
Just before the turn of the century, the respected German neurologist and
researcher Josef Breuer (1842–1925) and his younger colleague Sigmund
Freud conduct their studies on hysteria. As explained earlier, hysteria is the
term used to describe a wide variety of behaviors and complaints. In the late
19th century, the cause of hysteria is a matter for speculation, but some
believe it to be employed, usually by otherwise powerless women, as a
devious method to gain attention. Others believe there must be physical
causes, but many, like Breuer and Freud, suggest instead that hysteria results
from disordered psychological functioning.
Suggestion and Hypnosis
At this point in medical history, there are no agreed on techniques for the
treatment of hysteria, although successes are claimed for suggestion. This
technique requires the therapist to talk in a positive and supportive manner
to the patient and suggest recovery from the symptoms. Various people,
including Charcot, are using suggestion performed during hypnosis and
reporting some successful findings with hysterical patients.
In his Principles of Psychology, published in 1890, William James argues
that through hypnosis the physician might be able to reach a secondary
personage, or nonconscious level of mind. After a good talking to, this
secondary personage might be persuaded to release control of the affected
part of the hysteric and allow the primary personality to regain normal
control. French physician Hippolyte Bernheim demonstrates that if a highly
suggestible person believes the physician’s suggestion that symptoms will
improve, they often do. He also shows that suggestions made to a patient
during hypnosis can influence behavior after the therapeutic session, even if
the patient has no conscious memory of the suggestions made while under
hypnosis. Furthermore, memories of the suggestion can be brought to
conscious awareness if the patient is strongly encouraged to remember
them. As a part of his medical training, Sigmund Freud attends some of
Bernheim’s lectures on hypnosis.
The Talking Cure
Back in Vienna, Breuer is using hypnosis to help one of his patients, a

brilliant and insightful young woman, Bertha Pappenheim (described as
Anna O. in the literature). During his sessions with her, Breuer attempts to
relieve Ms. Pappenheim of her symptoms through posthypnotic suggestion,
but these efforts prove unsuccessful. Breuer and Pappenheim do discover,
however, that, after a session in which Ms. Pappenheim is allowed simply to
talk about her various symptoms while under hypnosis, her memories of the
first time the symptoms appeared, and her feelings at the time, the
symptoms disappear. Much to their surprise, just talking about the memories
and the feelings associated with them while hypnotized seems to cure the
symptoms. Pappenheim calls this “the talking cure.”
✔ Stop and think.
Can you develop a theory of hysteria that explains the effectiveness of
the talking cure? In other words, if talking about problems while under
hypnosis results in a relief from symptoms, what do you think might
be causing the symptoms?
There is controversy about the effectiveness of the talking cure.

Pappenheim herself eventually gives it little credit, and she continues to
receive other forms of care after her experience with Breuer. Recent
scholarship and newly recovered medical records suggest that many of
Pappenheim’s symptoms should be attributed to drug dependence and her
later relief from those symptoms to the recovery from that dependence
(Ramos, 2003). Nevertheless, Pappenheim’s successes as she goes on to have
a distinguished career in the field of social work, as an author, and in
feminist activism are sometimes held up as evidence of the efficacy of the
talking cure. Breuer tells his colleague, Freud, about the apparent cure that
he has stumbled on for hysteria. In 1895, 13 years after Pappenheim’s
treatment has ended, Breuer and Freud publish their research attributing
hysteria to disturbing memories trapped somewhere in mind that are
manifesting in physical symptoms. The cure they propose is to bring the
intense feelings associated with certain memories to conscious awareness.
This allows for a “cathartic” release and a subsequent relief from neurotic
symptoms (Freud & Breuer, 1895/1966).
The Structures of Mind
Philosophers and psychologists have long been concerned with the nature
or structure of mind or consciousness. Many have noted that even everyday
experience leads to a belief that there must be aspects of mind that are, at
least at times, not available to conscious awareness. Thus, there must be at
least two minds, a conscious mind and an unconscious mind. To these two
structures of mind Freud eventually adds a third, which he calls
preconscious mind. These three minds are defined on the basis of the
activities occurring in each. Conscious mind contains everything in current
awareness. Preconscious mind contains that which can be thought about,
but which is not being thought about in the moment. The existence of the
preconscious mind is made necessary by the functions Freud assigns to
unconscious mind. Unconscious mind is where all thoughts and ideas
originate, and the contents of unconscious mind must, by definition, always
remain unavailable to conscious awareness. According to Freud’s theory, the
thoughts and ideas originating in unconscious mind are what motivate
humans. Freud’s theory of unconscious motivation reflects the ideas of
many others at this time, that the reason behavior is sometimes so
inexplicable is that it is often motivated by thoughts and ideas that originate
in an aspect of mind that is unavailable to conscious awareness.
✔ Stop and think.

If Freud is correct, that certain thoughts are unavailable to conscious
mind, what might be different about those thoughts?
Revealing the Secrets of the Unconscious
According to Freud’s theory, the thoughts, memories, and feelings that are
causing hysterical symptoms must be so upsetting that they are
unacceptable to conscious mind. Conscious mind must actively try to defend
itself against the intrusion of these unacceptable thoughts into
consciousness. To relieve hysterical symptoms, Freud must bring these
thoughts into consciousness, even while the patient’s unconscious mind is
actively trying to prevent the thoughts from entering consciousness. Freud
must find a way to circumvent the patient’s own defenses. Hypnosis seems
to be one way, but not all patients can be hypnotized. Beyond that, given its
questionable roots in Mesmerism and its very unscientific flavor, hypnotism
seems mired in spiritualism. Freud begins to experiment with other
techniques for getting around patients’ defenses.
One technique he finds effective he calls free association. Here, the
patient is placed in a quiet and restful setting with all distractions removed.
The patient is asked to report out loud whatever thoughts pass through
conscious mind without trying to screen or make sense of them. By listening
carefully, Freud believes he may be able to identify hidden thoughts or
symbols of memories and feelings buried in unconscious mind. Another
technique Freud uses is dream analysis. His hypothesis is that the threshold
between conscious and unconscious mind weakens during sleep, and the
secrets of the unconscious sometimes slip into dreams. Often, however, these
thoughts during sleep are so disturbing that they would awaken the sleeper
(which they sometimes do during nightmares, for example). To preserve
sleep, the unacceptable thoughts are usually disguised as symbols in a
dream. For example, a dream in which you find yourself wandering through
a half-constructed house might really represent your concerns about what
sort of a person you are becoming, or, if you are a man, concerns about your
ability to achieve and maintain an erection, according to Freudian
interpretations.
As Freud listens to his patients, and as they bring into conscious
awareness previously unremembered thoughts, many of them do experience
some relief from their symptoms. For Freud, this is strong evidence that he is
on the right track about the origins of hysteria. Unfortunately, he also finds
that even when the symptoms initially disappear they often return. He
concludes that the thoughts being unearthed only reflect even earlier and
even more disturbing memories. As he delves deeper and deeper into his
patients’ thoughts, he begins to hear about disturbing sexual thoughts or
minor sexual experiences during puberty. Unconvinced that these minor
events could cause serious hysteria, he delves deeper into their memories.
Eventually, in all 18 of the cases he is treating, he uncovers memories of
terrifying sexual abuse and rape, usually violent and brutal, experienced at
2, 3, and 4 years of age. Equally shocking is the fact that, in most of these
cases, it is the patient’s own biological relative, a brother or a father, who is
remembered as the perpetrator of this abuse. Memories of these experiences
are so troubling, even (literally) paralyzing to these young adults, that
patients are only able to recall them after many sessions of sensitive and
careful analysis.
The Abuse Hypothesis
Freud concludes that his patients are experiencing symptoms of a serious

mental illness that can be directly attributed to having been sexually abused
when they were only toddlers. In April 1896, Freud presents his findings at
the meetings of the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology in Vienna, his first
major address to this group. His audience is made up of his colleagues,
fellow physicians, neurologists, and researchers (Freud, 1896/1984).
Freud’s initial presentation is not well received. Freud himself describes
the reaction to his paper as “icy,” and reports that the noted sex researcher
and chair of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Vienna, Dr.
Richard von Krafft-Ebing, comments, “It sounds like a scientific fairy tale”
(Freud, 1917). Nine years later, in 1905, Freud retracts the hypothesis of early
sexual abuse as the cause of hysteria. He replaces it with the Oedipal theory
of neurosis, which is more readily accepted.
A variety of explanations have been offered for why Freud abandons the
hypothesis that neuroses may have origins in early sexual trauma and
abuse. No explanation is accepted by all, and even a careful analysis of
Freud’s personal papers does not yield a final answer to the question. It has
been suggested that Freud never really gives up the belief that the sexual
abuse of children is common and that this abuse is the real explanation for
adult neuroses. Some say that because the abuse hypothesis is unacceptable
to most, Freud adopts the Oedipal story out of a desire to be accepted back
into the professional circles that have ostracized him (Masson, 1984). This
assertion is, however, quite controversial (Gleaves & Hernandez, 1999).
The Story of Oedipus Rex

In the 5th century BCE the Greek playwright, Sophocles, produces a
stage version of the story of Oedipus. The prophesy at Oedipus’ birth is
that he will someday kill his father, King Laius, and marry his mother,
Queen Jocasta. After being adopted as an infant into another family, a
series of convoluted twists in the plot, and without realizing
consciously what he is doing, Oedipus does eventually kill Laius and
wed Jocasta. He then becomes Oedipus Rex, the King.
Sigmund Freud is an aficionado of archeology and ancient history,

particularly Egyptian, Greek, and Roman mythology. When he realizes that
he must give up the abuse hypothesis but still account for the thoughts
about early sexual abuse that his patients are having, Freud adopts the story
of Oedipus Rex. He concludes that the disturbing thoughts of incest that his
patients are having are not real memories of real events but are incestuous
wishes and desires. Instead of having been childhood victims of sexual
abuse, it is the patients’ own childhood desires to sexually possess the parent
of the opposite sex and eliminate the same-sex parent that are appearing in
hypnotic trances, free association, and their dreams. It is the patients’
attempts to repress these memories of sexual desire and hostility that are
causing the neurotic symptoms.
Freud hears these stories of childhood sexual experiences from his
neurotic patients but, after much thinking about it, he also recovers a
memory from his own early childhood about his mother. In addition, he
realizes that at least minor forms of neuroses are widespread in the
population of Vienna. If neurotic symptoms are common, and even normal
people like himself can recall memories of a very early interest in sexual
activity with his mother, he concludes that sexual desire for the opposite-sex
parent must be a normal experience for every child.
Freud asserts that from birth every child is motivated by strong sexual
desires. Children seek pleasure from their erogenous zones, which, in normal
development, change from age to age as children progress through what
Freud calls psychosexual stages. At first, in the oral stage, sexual desires are
gratified by sucking on objects. Next, during the anal stage, sexual desires
are gratified by learning to control the functions of the bowel. By age 5 or 6,
these sexual desires become focused in the desire for genital sex with the
opposite-sexed parent. The boy child wishes to have sexual intercourse with
his mother and sees in his father a frightening rival, one who may even be
the agent of the boy’s own castration. In normal development, it becomes
clear to the boy that the father is too formidable a foe and that the boy will
never realize his desire to sexually possess his mother. The boy must then
learn to identify with the father, to want to be as much like the father as
possible, and to regard women as inferior because of their castrated and
powerless state. By identifying with his father, the boy will escape the
father’s wrath and may someday possess a woman of his own. Freud is
never as clear about the story for young girls and women. He thinks even
very young girls would be unlikely to want to identify with women who
they see as castrated and therefore powerless. In Freud’s version of
psychoanalytic theory, learning to resolve the conflicts associated with
sexual desire for the opposite-sex parent is the major developmental task for
every young child. Failure to resolve these conflicts results in neurotic
symptoms that emerge later in life.
✔ Stop and think.

Imagine that this story seems implausible to you, that you personally
have no memory of wanting to have sexual intercourse with your
parent, and in fact you cannot even imagine that you ever felt that
way. Why is that not evidence that the theory is incorrect, at least in
your case?
Although these early sexual desires are a normal part of development for
every child, almost no one has any memory of these feelings. Freud’s
explanation for this is that the memories of these feelings are hidden in
unconscious mind. Even with his neurotic patients, Freud finds that he must
delve deeper and deeper into earlier and earlier memories. Psychoanalysis
must proceed session after session, week after week, constantly encouraging
patients to recall more and more disturbing experiences and helping them to
analyze the hidden sexual meanings of free associations and dream symbols.
Only after many sessions are patients finally able to produce some memory
of early sexual desire. It is not surprising that most people have no conscious
memory of these feelings because the theory predicts that. Even many of
Freud’s own patients remain resistant to the idea.
Instincts and Personality
Psychoanalysis begins as a treatment for hysteria, but as psychoanalytic

theory is developed over the course of Freud’s life, it becomes a theory about
how even normal personality is formed. Freud is a medical doctor and is
convinced throughout his lifetime that the theoretical constructs of
personality he proposes will eventually be found to have a basis in
physiology. He also accepts the principles of evolution by natural selection,
so he looks to nature for an explanation for why infants have sexual
motivations. Adults’ interest in sex can be explained on the basis of the
instinct to reproduce. On what similar instinct might an infant’s interest in
sex be based? According to Freud, the first instinct is the desire to seek
pleasurable and gratifying states of being. This he identifies as Eros, the
instinct to achieve physical pleasure. The fact that infants receive nutritional
sustenance by sucking is secondary to the oral gratification achieved by the
act of sucking. All humans are born with a variety of impulses that promote
survival, including the impulses to eat and to have sex. Freud locates the
origins of these impulses in the unconscious mind and calls this set of
impulses the “id.” The id is the first major component of personality and is a
set of unregulated impulsive energies, incapable on its own of realistically
achieving its ends. Thus, Freud postulates there must also be regulatory
functions that both keep the impulses of the id under control and help the id
to achieve its goals. These regulatory psychological functions might include
the ability to delay gratification, skills at problem solving, or being able to
remember a set of behaviors. Freud calls this set of regulatory functions the
“ego.” The ego is developed as realistic and successful strategies for
controlling the impulses of the id and achieving its goals are learned.
Because most people are not consciously aware of them, Freud concludes
that most functions of the id and the ego must be performed in the
unconscious mind.
Much later, in 1923, Freud adds the “superego” as another set of functions
conducted in unconscious mind. The superego is a set of moral values and
attitudes learned from parents and the surrounding culture, including
attitudes about the self. Poor self-esteem, for example, derives from having
adopted the attitude of a parent who disapproved of or felt ashamed of the
child, according to Freud’s theory.
Also according to psychoanalytic theory, personality is shaped by the
dynamic ways in which the boundaries are negotiated between the id, the
ego, and the superego. For example, a strong ego has a variety of
mechanisms or defenses available to prevent itself from being overwhelmed
by the id. One of these is what Freud calls “sublimation.” The id’s
inappropriate but procreative sexual impulses may be sublimated by the ego
into other forms of creative activity such as writing a novel, designing a
building, or becoming a respected leader. According to Freud, sublimation
provides the foundation of culture and civilization.
As long as these ego defense mechanisms are working, the personality
continues to function as it should. Neuroses appear when the defense system
breaks down, and the id threatens to overwhelm the ego. At that point, the
person develops neurotic symptoms. Therapy involves a controlled release of
unacceptable thoughts from unconsciousness in the presence of a competent
analyst.
Secessions From Freud
Even early in the psychoanalytic movement, other theorists, many of whom

worked with Freud earlier in their careers, develop revisions to the theory.
The theories of personality development and the ideas about the origins of
neuroses developed by these later thinkers are consistent in only one regard:
They deny that it is the resolution of early childhood desires for sexual
intercourse with adults that is the major developmental task. These
alternative theories are sometimes referred to as psychodynamic theories,
because they posit that it is dynamic interactions between psychological
factors internal to the child and the external rearing environment,
particularly the parents, that sets the stage for personality development. The
psychodynamic theorists who follow Freud include Alfred Adler, Carl Jung,
Karen Horney, and Margaret Mahler. All of them agree that the origins of
neuroses lie in psychological conflict and its resolution, but they disagree
about what might be the basis of that conflict (Hoffman, 1994; Horney, 1945).
Although these later theorists call themselves psychoanalytic theorists,
Freud insists that they are not practicing true psychoanalysis. He calls their
revisions of his theory “secessions,” and he has one explanation for why
these people refuse to recognize the sexual basis of personality. He charges
that, like many of his patients, these theorists suffer from their own
unconscious mechanisms of resistance. Freud is disappointed, but not
surprised, at the popularity of these secessions because unconscious
resistance is widespread, and most people are both unable and unwilling to
recognize their own sexual thoughts and memories. But Freud regards this
resistance to the sexual basis of personality as the best evidence of the truth
of his theory (Freud, 1917).
Relations Between Psychoanalysis and Psychology
From the first, psychoanalytic theory proves problematic for the new science
of psychology. By Freud’s own admission, his work is “not in the reviewed
professional literature of the day” (Freud, 1917, p. 15). Although this might
be interpreted to mean that his peers are unwilling to examine his evidence,
it is hard to imagine how they could, because his evidence consists only of
the memories he is able to evince through long hours of private analysis
with individual patients. Even through the 1930s, there is little or no
coverage of psychoanalysis in psychology textbooks (Hornstein, 1992).
For most experimental psychologists, psychoanalysis is just one of many
“mind cures” popular in this era, none of which are based on scientific
evidence. Early on, it is regarded as mildly amusing and an innocent
diversion for the easily titillated and gullible. As psychoanalysis becomes
more widely known, psychologists become more alarmed. The distinction
they draw between psychology and psychoanalysis is lost in popular culture.
It is a source of frustration to psychologists that everywhere outside of
psychology psychoanalysis is confused with psychology—as remains true
even in the present day (Morawski & Hornstein, 1991). During the last half
of the 20th century, Freud’s picture appears no fewer than three times on the
cover of Time magazine, which declares him one of the 20th-century’s
greatest minds (Fancher, 2000).
Experimental Tests of Psychoanalytic Theory
Is it possible to validate psychoanalytic theory using the scientific method

in experimental tests? If Freud could be asked this question today he would
insist, as he did when the theory was developed, that he already had all of
the empirical support for psychoanalysis that will ever be needed. His
evidence is gathered from the many psychoanalytic sessions where, after
much work, memories of infant sexual desire do eventually emerge (Freud,
1917).
A key element of experimental science is that it seeks to predict, on the
basis of theory and hypotheses, what will happen next. It is exactly this
element that is missing from psychoanalysis and from most of the tests of
the theory. Psychoanalytic theory draws conclusions about what must have
been so in the past to explain current conditions (postdictions), but
predictions often fail. For example, no evidence can be found that children
who have certain kinds of experiences early in life will, later in life, exhibit
certain types of neurotic symptoms (Eysenck & Wilson, 1973).
It is true that many psychoanalytic terms are vague or hard to define
operationally. Despite that, it is also true that hundreds of studies of many
major psychoanalytic constructs are published. The majority of these studies
are conducted in the 1930s through the 1960s. The results of these studies are
somewhat ambiguous, with a few claiming to find support for Freud’s
theory, but not most. In general, researchers looking for support for
psychoanalytic theory tend to find support, and those looking to refute the
theory find evidence to refute it (see Eysenck & Wilson, 1973).
American Psychology, Behaviorism, and Psychoanalysis
Although the practice of psychoanalysis in clinical settings spreads

rapidly around the developed world, it is in North America that the theory
receives the warmest reception. As the popularity of psychoanalytic ideas
spreads, they begin to be co-opted into the language of behaviorism. Thus,
Freud’s impulses of the id become, in behaviorists’ terms, the reflexes, which
are gradually shaped by learning into effective behaviors, or what Freud
calls ego (Horowitz, 1994).
Psychoanalytic Influences on Clinical Psychology
Psychoanalysis begins as a method of treatment and, in that capacity, makes

many inroads into clinical psychology. This is reflected even today among
the current membership of the American Psychological Association (APA),
the organization founded in 1892 by G. Stanley Hall and others as a forum
for furthering the science of psychology. Today, APA membership is made
up primarily of clinical and counseling psychologists. Even as early as the
1930s, many of these psychologists identify psychoanalytic theory as a
preferred approach to treatment: “Today there is hardly a corner of
abnormal psychology into which psychoanalytic interpretations have not
penetrated. No symptom is too trivial, no disorder too formidable for the
zeal, the industry, and the all but incredible ingenuity of those who try to fit
the Freudian key into every lock” (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 396).
Many attempts are also made to test the efficacy of psychoanalytic clinical
treatments, also finding mixed results. The techniques employed by
psychoanalysts are variable, and a large percentage of people recover
spontaneously from neuroses, making evaluation of the effectiveness of any
one treatment difficult. Again, those researchers who support psychoanalytic
theory generally find that psychoanalytic therapies are slightly more
effective than no therapy, but no more effective than other approaches
(Fisher & Greenberg, 1985; Fisher & Greenberg, 1996). And those researchers
who do not support the theory find that the patients of psychoanalytic
therapists show an even lower recovery rate than neurotics who receive no
treatment at all (Eysenck & Wilson, 1973). These researchers go on to
conclude, “For all intents and purposes, psychoanalysis has been shown to
have little if any effect on neurotic or psychotic disorders” (Eysenck &
Wilson, 1973, p. 374).
Although for the first few decades Freud’s theories do not have much
impact, they do eventually capture the imagination of the public. In the
popular culture of the West during the 1920s and 1930s, the Oedipal story,
and especially Freud’s focus on sex, generate a good deal of excitement.
Identifying and remarking on behaviors like “Freudian slips,” making jokes
about women who smoke cigars, and allusions to hidden thoughts and
desires, become standard party conversation in this era, much as they
continue to be today. The public loves Freud’s narrative of the dynamics of
unconscious mind, and many of his ideas do seem to explain much about
social discourse. Freud himself regards his dream interpretation as the most
significant part of his work (Mitchell & Black, 1995), and that also remains a
favorite in popular culture.
By the end of Freud’s life, his theory of personality remains, as it was
when he first proposed it, a narrative or a story. Several psychologists refer
to it not as anything resembling a science but, instead, as a literary form,
much like a novel. The literary nature of psychoanalytic theory doubtless
explains why today it has a major impact in literary criticism and popular
culture or in some forms of clinical practice, but no more influence in the
science of psychology than it ever had.
Freud’s Cultural Context
Throughout his career, Freud’s professional and personal ambitions are

thwarted by anti-Semitism. Although he does not engage in religious
practice and is often critical of organized religion (Freud & Pfister,
1918/1963), he is repeatedly denied research opportunities and academic
positions because he is of Jewish descent. Late in his life, he is forced to
leave Vienna for England as the Nazi party rises to power in Austria.
✔ Stop and think.

How might these frustrations have influenced Freud’s thinking about
psychology?
After experiencing the brutality of World War I in Europe, Freud expands

his theory to include a human instinct for aggression or destruction (Freud,
1920/1950). Both the aggressive instinct and the sexual or procreative
instinct serve the ends of self-preservation. For example, the instinct to
procreate may be served by using aggression to acquire the desired partner.
These instincts may also oppose one another in that the destructive instinct
may trigger actions that drive potential partners away (Freud, 1932/1964).
In one of his last works, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930/1961),
Freud considers the role played by civilization in helping individuals
mediate between constructive and destructive instincts and the antagonism
between the instincts that impel us toward individual freedom of expression
and the restrictions imposed by living with others in a civilized society.
CHILD STUDY AND DEVELOPMENTAL

PSYCHOLOGY
At the turn of the century, the study of the mental and physical development
of children is important in mainstream psychology. There are several
questions that form the core of early child study. These include the debate
concerning the relative importance of biological or evolutionary bases of
psychological characteristics referred to as “nature” and environmental
influences referred to as “nurture,” and how each of these may be
manipulated to optimize outcome. An objective measure of “will,”
“persistency,” “determination,” and “spunk” is shown in Fig. 9.1. The child is
instructed to raise his heels 1/4 inch off of the platform. When the heels
touch the platform, a buzzer sounds. Questions about how many and which
aspects of development can be described in universal terms and which show
significant individual differences also become more important. This leads to
questions about the progress of intellectual development, both normal and
abnormal.
FIG. 9.1. A measure of “spunk” (Popplestone & McPherson, 1994, p. 69). Photo courtesy
of the Archives of the History of American Psychology. J. E. Wallace Wallin papers.
Questions about the universal features of development are reflected in

theories such as those proposed by Canadian psychologist J. Mark Baldwin
(1861–1934) in his book Mental Development in the Child and the Race
(Baldwin, 1895). Baldwin proposes a stage theory of intellectual
development, suggesting that children pass through three qualitatively
different ways of logical thinking as they grow up. Questions about the
universality of developmental issues also fuel interest in studying child
development and child-rearing practices across cultures. Anthropological
studies such as those conducted by Franz Boas (1858–1942) among native
Americans in the Pacific Northwest provide evidence in support of
behaviorists’ theories that cross-cultural differences found in psychological
characteristics are primarily the result of environmental factors.
Also early in the century, a variety of social causes and movements play
important roles in changing the direction of the study of psychological
development in children (Cahan, 1997). As ever larger numbers of immigrant
families enter the United States, there are movements to provide quality
early education to all young children and to provide day nursery care for the
children of mothers who must work outside the home. Reforms are sought in
the treatment of orphans and in other aspects of child welfare based on solid
scientific evidence. The child labor movement, in particular, draws attention
to children and their physical and psychological needs (Cahan, 1997). In
1912, the Children’s Bureau is founded as a federal agency to provide
advocacy for children. The Children’s Bureau bases its policy
recommendations on facts known about children through the application of
scientific study. The child study movement continues to grow in power and
prestige through the 1930s.
In spite of this, the applied child study movement has a “long and
entangled history of relations between reformers, advocates, and
developmental psychologists” (Cahan, 1997). Again, experimental
psychologists are in conflict about how much to associate themselves, and
their high-status academic experimental work, with those who seek to apply
science to the resolution of problems.
By the 1920s, behaviorism and the movement in psychology away from
descriptive study and toward experimental study are coming to influence the
field of child development. Behaviorism’s assumption of learning as the
primary, if not the only, influence on psychological characteristics dictates
studies that explore the processes of learning, both in humans and animals.
Even after Watson loses his academic position at Johns Hopkins, he
continues to be interested in the psychological development of children and
publishes several government pamphlets and one book in which he provides
advice for parents on how to raise infants and children.
Behaviorist assumptions about learning are presumed to hold true across
all species. Thus, although there are differences in biologically based
capacities to learn across species, or even between individuals in the same
species, the principles of learning are the same in all species. Differences
between individuals in psychological characteristics like personality are
presumed to be primarily the result of individual differences in experience.
For behaviorists, the goal is not to describe and explain psychological
characteristics but to predict and control observable behavior.
No one today knows enough to raise a child. The world would be considerably better off if we were
to stop having children for twenty years (except those reared for experimental purposes) and were
then to start again with enough facts to do the job with some degree of skill and accuracy.
Parenthood, instead of being an instinctive art, is a science, the details of which must be worked
out by patient laboratory methods. (Watson, 1928, p. 16 [italics in original])
Psychoanalytic theory also makes contributions to the study of child

development. Psychoanalytic theory acknowledges the importance of
biologically based patterns of behavior at the very earliest stages of
development, but it focuses primarily on learned bases of behavior in the
first few years of life. Even the processes theorized to be occurring in an
unconscious mind are derived from interactions between early biologically
based patterns and experiences with the caregiving environment.
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY/SOCIOLOGY
If the definition of social psychology requires that the positivistic methods of

science be brought to bear on questions about how psychological
characteristics interact with the social environment, then the beginnings of
the field are usually traced to the late 19th or early 20th century (Jones,
1998). It is not until then that the need for the controls of science on
speculation about the social environment, and the power of these methods
to provide useful information, begins to be recognized by psychologists
(Morawski, 2000).
Just at the turn of the century, for example, functionalist principles inspire
an interest in the influence of social relationships on athletic performance.
French scholar Philippe Tissie (1852–1935) publishes two studies on the
physiological and psychological aspects of competitive bicycle racing
(Baumler, 1997). At about the same time, Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso
(1846–1910) publishes the results of his studies on the physical and
psychological functioning of mountain climbers. Among his observations is
the “competition effect,” a condition of enhanced performance which appears
only when the climbers are training in groups, as opposed to individually
(Baumler, 1997).
One experimental study, often cited as the beginning of the field of sports
psychology, is published about this time by Norman Triplett (1861–1934) at
Indiana University. Triplett tests the competition effect by constructing an
apparatus that allows two participants to observe one another while
competing to roll up ropes. Triplett finds that the act of observing the
performance of another person leads to increased performance by most
people (Triplett, 1897). The question of interest for Triplett, and other early
social psychologists, concerns “what change in an individual’s normal
solitary performance occurs when other people are present” (Allport, 1954, p.
46).
In the ensuing several decades, strong cultural and social forces shape the
progress of social psychology. During the 1920s and 1930s, the questions
asked by social psychologists reflect major social, political, and economic
developments in the world at large. Research interest in work-related and
social attitudes continues to increase during the 1930s.
The Times
The collapse of Western economies in 1929 signals the beginning of
worldwide economic depression. In North America, this period, which
lasts more than 10 years, is referred to as The Great Depression. At its
height in 1933, more than 25% of the workforce is unemployed,
millions of farmers are losing their land, and thousands of middle-class
people in the United States lose their homes and life savings in bank
failures. Extreme poverty is widespread. Millions are forced by hunger
to visit soup kitchens and wait in bread lines, and many others die of
malnutrition and disease. Shanty-towns, where entire families live in
anything they can find, from rusting car bodies to flimsy packing
boxes, spring up all over the United States. These towns are called
“Hoovervilles” after wealthy President Herbert Hoover does little to
help the economy recover. Some Hoovervilles are as large as 10 miles
wide and 10 miles long. In the 1930s, overgrazing and a prolonged
drought across the Great Plains states creates a giant dust bowl, wiping
out entire communities of farmers and ranchers and further tightening
food supplies.
Some people can still afford to go to movies, and for a few pennies
misery can be escaped for a couple of hours. Moviegoers are charmed
by little Shirley Temple or by handsome Ronald Reagan on the big
screen. The 1936 Summer Olympics go on as planned, held in Berlin,
where African American Jesse Owens stuns the world with his
achievements in track and field events. On the “Left Bank” of the Seine
in Paris, philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre sip coffee and discuss
existential philosophies with artists like Pablo Picasso, writers like
Gertrude Stein, and other American expatriates, even as France
crumbles around them.
In Europe, life is grim. In addition to widespread poverty,
international war looms again. In 1933, the Germans, who have never
really recovered from the devastation of the Great War, elect Adolf
Hitler to lead them. Germany rebuilds its military and, in 1939, invades
first Czechoslovakia, then Poland. In April 1940, German armies march
into Denmark and Norway, and by June they have conquered France.
An official government policy of anti-Semitism is adopted in
Germany, stripping Jews of their citizenship, seizing their property,
incarcerating them in concentration camps, and eventually murdering
over 6 million, along with at least 4 million mentally ill or physically
disabled people, gypsies, gays and lesbians, and political dissidents.
Scapegoating Jews for the economic depression is not limited to
Germany. Massacres of Jews in Russia occur during this time as well.
The United States is not immune to the evils of anti-Semitism, fueled
by attacks against Jews in the popular media led by public figures like
Henry Ford, founder of the Ford Motor Company (Dinnerstein, 1994).
At colleges and universities across the United States, the sons and
daughters of Jewish immigrants excel academically. By the mid-1920s,
this leads to official quotas limiting the number of Jewish students
admitted to many universities. The fear is that if college admissions are
based on merit alone, the Jewish students will be very nearly the only
ones admitted. Faculty positions at universities in the United States are
similarly routinely denied to Jewish scholars during this period
(Dinnerstein, 1994).
10
Age of Theory: Why Are There So Many
Different Psychological Theories?
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the landscape of Western psychological theories from
about the 1930s until the mid-1950s. This period marks the peak of psychologists’ conviction that
learning answers all of psychology’s questions. Thus, it is characterized by theories and research
about when, why, and how learning occurs, schedules of reinforcement, and if and how learning is
extinguished. Nearly all domains of psychology are influenced by learning theories. In the second
half of the chapter, personality, social, developmental, and clinical psychology are viewed through
the lenses of the prevailing paradigms of this era, behaviorism and psychoanalytic theory.
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
North American psychologists in the 1930s resolutely embrace the method of

logical positivism as a means to conduct their science, even as the physicists
who first advocated it are moving away from the method. Positivism
requires that all of the terms included in a body of research refer to
observable aspects of nature. The number of hours since the rat last ate is an
example of an observational term. The introduction of logic enlarges the
scope of positivism by allowing the inclusion of theoretical terms, as long as
those terms are defined in publicly observable ways. For example, hunger is
an internal and not publicly observable state that is theorized to exist in
organisms that have not eaten for some time. Positivism would reject the
concept of hunger as an explanatory variable because it is both theoretical
and subjective. Logical positivism, however, accepts the theoretical term
hunger as long as it is defined as, for example, “number of hours since the
rat last ate.” That definition turns the theoretical and subjective term hunger
into a publicly observable variable and thus makes “number of hours since
the rat last ate” into an operational definition for the concept hunger. The
adoption of logical positivism opens up many more aspects of behavior to
scientific exploration.
As is true in all branches of science, measurement remains of paramount
importance in psychology. It is the requirement that the variables of interest
be both publicly observable and measurable that distinguishes the science of
psychology from other ways of exploring thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Developments in Statistics and Measurement
During the first half of the 20th century, statisticians and mathematicians
develop a variety of new statistical methods that enable psychologists to
analyze data, revealing much about the nature of relationships among
variables. One particular challenge for psychologists is that often their
variables cannot meaningfully be said to fall along a measuring scale that
begins at zero.
✔ Stop and think.

Can you measure a variable for which there is no zero point, such as a
personality trait like sociability? How would you measure such a
variable?
Intelligence is a good example of a psychological characteristic for which a

zero point is meaningless. Psychologists measure intelligence by comparing
the performance of one person to the performance of others. Using this
method, any psychological characteristic can be measured. Thus, scores on
tests of psychological characteristics represent an individual’s score in
relationship to the scores of others.
Another approach to the problem of measuring a psychological variable
that has no zero point is a technique called factor analysis, developed early
in the century by Charles Spearman (1863–1945). Factor analysis allows a
complex set of correlations to be mathematically reduced to a small number
of dimensions or factors (Hornstein, 1988; Spearman, 1904). To perform a
factor analysis, the researcher must first develop a large set of survey items
or tasks believed to be related to the variable in question. In Spearman’s
case, that variable is intelligence. Correlations are then calculated among the
scores of a large number of subjects on all of the items. In any such analysis,
sets of items will always emerge as correlated with one another. If
researchers can make logical sense of the sets of correlated scores that
emerge, they may then theorize that an underlying factor exists that unites
those items that are correlated. As an example, on the basis of his factor
analytic studies, Spearman concludes that there is a higher-level factor
explaining scores on all items on his test of intelligence. He calls this factor
“g” for general intelligence. In other words, he concludes that there is really
just one kind of intelligence, so that individuals who are high in “g” will do
well on almost any kind of a task that requires intelligence.
With the development of these statistical techniques, even hard-to-define
variables like intelligence are transformed from subjective, or what Galileo
called secondary, qualities into objective, or primary, qualities, and
psychology becomes a true science. Once intelligence tests are developed,
questions about the definition of the word intelligence or about the function
of intelligence are increasingly ignored in favor of pursuing more and more
sophisticated ways of measuring intelligence. This focus on statistical
technique over definition becomes an enduring issue in the field of
psychological measurement. For example, in the 1940s, critics complain that
social psychologists too often focus on “segmental bits of behavior” simply
because those are easier to measure. In doing so, they are accused of
ignoring the study of large-scale social movements, contributions to
understanding made by those in other disciplines, and the meaning of social
behavior (Cottrell & Gallagher, 1941). Similar transitions to measuring
variables rather than defining variables occur in a variety of other domains
of psychology as well.
Charles Spearman is also credited with the addition of the “error term” to
psychological measurement in his investigations of intelligence. Including
this error term makes it clear that intelligence is now defined only as a score
on a test.
One of the most significant developments in testing in the early decades
of the 20th century is the appearance of large group testing and comparisons
of sets of scores from one group with sets of scores from other groups on the
same test. With group testing, the more individuals that contribute a score to
the group, the lower the error variance. Whole new sets of statistics are
needed to determine how many scores are needed from each group, to
understand the results of these group tests, and to draw meaningful
comparisons between groups.
Early in the 20th century, psychologists are using measures of central
tendency, fitting curves to normal probability distributions, and calculating
measures of correlations, including multiple correlations (Kelley, 1923). By
midcentury, psychologists have added such sophisticated statistical
techniques as a variety of analyses of variance including F and t tests,
numerous additional measures of correlations including regression
equations, and methods to test the reliability and validity of tests and test
items (Garrett, 1947; Goodenough, 1949). These are all tools that are needed
to understand the results of group measures of psychological variables.
Weber, Fechner, and other psychophysicists measure the ability to
discriminate among changes in a physical stimulus. Even nonhuman animals
may be taught to make discriminatory responses, helping scientists to
understand more about the range of perceptual abilities in animals. As
Pavlov demonstrates, teaching a dog to respond differently to a circle than a
square allows for the determination of just how much a square has to be
changed before the dog will perceive it as a circle. Discriminations can also
be made with human subjects by having them assign numbers to a set of
stimuli. This technique works as well in measuring attitudes and opinions as
it does in measuring sensory perceptions.
In 1932, Rensis Likert (1903–1981) publishes a doctoral dissertation in
which he refines earlier techniques for the measurement of attitudes. Instead
of comparing an individual’s response on an item to the responses of others,
Likert’s technique asks subjects to indicate the extent of their agreement
with the item (Likert, 1932). This eliminates the need for a comparison group
and works well enough that “Likert scales” are still a popular method for
measuring attitudes and opinions today.
LEARNING THEORIES
✔ Stop and think.

If humans start out as blank slates, and everything is learned, can you
design a research study to answers questions about human behaviors?
The assumptions that all organisms begin as virtual blank slates and that
learning explains everything have important consequences for experimental
psychology early in this century. One may infer, for example, that there is
continuity across all species such that what is understood about learning in
one species may be applied across all species. According to this law of
phylogenetic continuity, species differ only in the number and complexity
of learned associations that can be made. Thus, it makes no difference what
organism is studied; the findings about learning will apply across all species.
Similarly, it should also make no difference whether the learning is
occurring in a complex real-world environment or in a more easily
controlled laboratory setting. The principles of learning will remain the same
across all environments. This belief in the continuity of the principles of
learning is partly what accounts for the wholesale adoption of the Norway
white rat as the almost exclusive representative of all phyla and the
laboratory as the domain of experimental psychologists for many decades.
Rats are relatively inexpensive to keep, are easy to care for, and breed
readily in captivity. By 1949, more than half of all studies published in
journals of comparative psychology are conducted on white rats, and more
than half of the experimental studies published are reports on conditioning
and learning (Beach, 1950). Psychologists disagree about how completely the
questions of psychology may be answered using only operational terms or
how much of the human experience might be reducible to mere statistics.
But there is general agreement in this era that experimental psychology
using rats and conducted in laboratories can at last be defined as a true
natural science with many of the explanatory and predictive powers of the
other sciences.
✔ Stop and think.

If learning explains everything, then what is mind?
Learning Theorists’ Goals
The goal for mid-20th-century experimental psychologists, immersed as they

are in the behaviorist paradigm, goes far beyond the simple description of
psychological phenomena. If learning explains thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors, then a complete understanding of learning should be sufficient to
predict these phenomena. If people do what they do because of what they
have learned, then knowing what they have learned should, at least
theoretically, allow for a prediction about what they might do in the future.
So if psychologists understand what kind of learning leads to which
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, they should be able to control
psychological phenomena by controlling learning.
Questions About Learning
If learning explains thoughts, feelings, behaviors, motivations, and

relationships, what are the important questions to ask about learning? In
their laboratory work, experimental psychologists uncover a number of
characteristics of, and influences on, learning. Sets of theories are developed
to explain why and when learning occurs, what it is that is learned, and
whether learning can be unlearned, or extinguished. These are the questions
about reinforcement and extinction that are explored in experimental
psychology in the 1920s through the 1940s. Recall, for example, how the
“radical” behaviorist John Watson (Calkins, 1921; Jastrow, 1927; Wheeler,
1923), explores how fear of a previously neutral stimulus could be learned
and reinforced by pairing with an innately fear causing stimulus. In 1924,
Mary Cover Jones (1896–1987) publishes her studies with a baby named
Peter demonstrating how conditioned fears may be extinguished in the
laboratory using the same principles of learning (Jones, 1924).
Much of the experimental work that is done from the mid-1930s until well
into the 1950s within the behaviorist paradigm begins to diverge in
important ways from Watson’s radical behaviorism. Many experimental
psychologists of this period are referred to as neobehaviorists.
Neobehaviorists share the basic underlying assumptions of behaviorism:
that individual organisms begin life as virtual blank slates and that learning
shapes thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Neobehaviorists also believe that
useful information about learning can be gleaned from carefully controlled
studies with animals in laboratories, that well constructed operational
definitions and precise measurements will yield truth, and that the
prediction and control of behavior are the rewards to be gained from this
research. Neobehaviorists, like radical behaviorists, thus admit only a very
narrow scope of explanation for psychological characteristics. Their
questions are mostly ones about the nature of reinforcement and about
extinguishing the connections between stimuli and responses.
Neobehaviorists are distinguished from behaviorists by being more open to
explanatory variables that might not be publicly observable.
✔ Stop and think.

Is reinforcement necessary for learning to occur, or is mere contiguity
sufficient?
Three general ways to answer these questions about learning predominate

during the heyday of behaviorism. The first set of answers is physiological
and is exemplified by the work of neurophysiologist Karl S. Lashley (1890–
1958) at Harvard University and the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology.
The second set of answers is mechanical and mathematical, and posits that
learning occurs in response to the need to reduce motivating drives within
the organism. This set of answers is represented by the theories developed
by psychologist Clark L. Hull (1884–1952) of Yale University. The third set of
answers is closely related to Gestalt theories of self-organizing perceptions
and is illustrated by the ideas expressed by psychologist Edward C. Tolman
(1886–1959) at the University of California at Berkeley.
Learning Theorists’ Answers
Physiological Answers
According to Pavlov’s theories, what is traditionally referred to as a

psychological characteristic may be reduced to reflex mechanisms in the
brain. Conditioning consists of a connection formed between centers of the
brain. Extinction refers to the dying back of such a connection. Radiation is a
situation in which a stimulus similar to the conditioned stimulus causes a
response and refers to the excitation of nearby centers of the brain.
Inhibition refers to the suppression of excitation between centers. This
Russian tradition of reflexology thus seeks to explain all behavior in these
neurophysiological terms. Radical behaviorist John Watson finds this
physiological explanation for learning convincing, and he popularizes these
ideas in Western psychology.
Karl Lashley begins with the assumption that the connection between
stimulus and response is an actual physiological connection formed in the
brain of the organism. Thus, a stimulus-response connection is very much
like the connection on an old-fashioned telephone switchboard. When
something is learned, the connection is plugged in; when learning is
extinguished, the connection is broken. Thus, Lashley reasons, surgically
cutting connections in an organism’s brain should result in the loss of
learning. He trains rats to run mazes in the laboratory and then surgically
destroys various parts and amounts of the animals’ cortexes. After the rats
have physically recovered from the surgeries, he returns them to the maze to
see if the learning has indeed been broken along with the physiological
connections.
✔ Stop and think.

Learning should have extinguished along with the destroyed brain
matter, right?
Lashley’s results are surprising. He finds that fairly large amounts of the
cortex must be destroyed before there is any loss in the rate, efficiency, or
accuracy of maze learning. This does not support the theory of the cortex as
a set of neural switches. Lashley calls his finding the “principle of mass
action,” meaning that, for complex learning like that required in running a
maze, the cortex operates as a unified whole rather than as a set of discrete
switches. Instead of finding neurophysiological support for the behaviorists,
Lashley’s evidence is more supportive of Gestalt theories of a holistically
functioning brain.
Second, Lashley’s experimental findings demonstrate that within a
functional area of the brain, such as within the visual cortex, an undamaged
part of that area will take over if part of the area is destroyed. Lashley calls
this “equipotentiality,” meaning that, within a given functional area of the
cortex, all cells have an equal potential to perform that function. Lashley’s
findings thus raise more questions than they answer about the nature of the
physiological connections between stimuli and responses (Lashley, 1923a,
1923b).
Perhaps because of Lashley’s results, fewer psychologists pursue research
into the mechanisms of sensation and perception in the early decades of the
20th century. Throughout this era, the Harvard psychologist S. Smith Stevens
(1906–1973) preserves the study of relationships between the physical
properties of stimuli and the perception of those stimuli. It is not until late in
the century that research into sensation and perception regains its
importance in Western psychology.
✔ Stop and think.

What is extinction? Is it the dying back of a stimulus-response
connection? Or is it, as psychologist Edwin Guthrie suggests, the
overlaying of a previous stimulus-response connection by a newer one?
Mathematical/Mechanistic Answers
Other neobehaviorists take the position that, although an environmental

stimulus may be necessary, it is not necessarily sufficient to cause a
response. These theorists suggest that the stimulus together with a whole set
of other variables, including many internal to the organism, come between
the stimulus and the response. These variables might include an organism’s
intention, purpose, or motivation in making a response. They might also
include mental events not available to public observation.
One set of theories of behavior that uses variables intervening between
stimulus and response is illustrated by the work of Clark Hull and his
students. Hull’s mathematical/mechanistic behaviorism views the organism
as though it is a machine executing responses as a function of the strength of
various stimuli. Thus, a given response may be predicted from the intensity
of the environmental stimulus, the strength of a previously acquired habit,
and the degree of an unsatisfied internal drive, such as hunger. Each of those
variables may be assigned a weight, allowing for the mathematical
calculation of the likelihood that a response will be made.
This approach to behaviorism operationally defines all of the theoretical
terms and provides more flexibility in explanations for behavior than does
the strictly stimulus-response explanation offered by Watsonian
behaviorism. For example, mathematical/mechanistic behaviorism offers an
explanation for very complex behaviors and for sets of responses. Stimuli
and responses can be associated together, creating chains that explain
complex sets of behaviors. In this way, experimental anomalies, research
findings that appear to violate the assumptions of the behaviorist paradigm,
may be explained. For example, studies in which rats are found to
consistently run only part of the maze or where they repeatedly turn down
blind alleys present apparent anomalies to the behaviorist. But if running to
the goal box is described as a “goal response,” then running partway to the
goal box could be described as a “fractional goal response.” A rat that turns
down a blind alley before reaching the goal box might be said to be
anticipating the goal box and thus exhibiting an “anticipatory goal response”
(Hull, 1943). Using the term “fractional anticipatory goal response,” Hull is
able to explain a variety of behaviors exhibited by rats in experimental
situations that are not predicted by stimulus-response theories of learning
without giving up the assumptions of behaviorism.
✔ Stop and think.
What can serve as a reinforcer? Does it need to be publicly observable?
Or can learning be reinforced by something intangible?
Purposive Answers
Edward Tolman and his students offer a third set of answers to questions
about what learning is and what it is that is learned. They suggest that the
behavior of organisms is not caused just by environmental stimuli, but it
also looks as though it is intended to achieve some purpose. In making this
suggestion, they are sometimes accused of reintroducing subjective and
mentalistic terms into what is struggling to be a purely objective psychology.
“Purposive” behaviorists, as Tolman calls them, defend their theories by
insisting that their data are as publicly observable and objective as any and
their theoretical terms equally as operational. The purposive behaviorists
suggest that what is ultimately to be understood is the molecular level of
behavior, the smallest discrete unit of behavior. However, before that level
may be understood, they argue, one must first examine the molar level, or
whole purposive acts. What is learned to accomplish molar behavior is a
complex set of bits of knowledge about the environment and the learner’s
relationship to it (Gleitman, 1991). These sets of pieces of knowledge become
available to the learner as fields of information that can be accessed and
used, even when there are small changes in the environment or in the
learner’s internal motivation. In other words, behavior is a consequence of
both publicly observable environmental stimuli and internal variables
representing these previously acquired sets of knowledge that intervene
between stimulus and response.
As Tolman points out, at any given time, there are myriad environmental
stimuli available to a learner, but only a few are selected for and acted on.
That process of selection must somehow be explained, and it can only be
explained on the basis of internal variables. As evidence in support of these
theories, Tolman offers a series of research findings from the laboratories of
purposive behaviorists that he applies to issues of learning in both rats and
humans (Tolman, 1948). For example, in traversing a previously encountered
maze, rats give clear evidence of having formed a “mental” representation of
how the maze goes, so that if one pathway is blocked, they can find
alternative routes to the goal. Tolman calls this mental representation of the
maze a “cognitive map.” He refers to the following anecdote from Lashley’s
lab, in which the rats appear to have formed not just a cognitive map of the
maze, but also of the entire room.
… the case of a couple of his rats who, after having learned an alley maze, pushed back the cover
near the starting box, climbed out, and ran directly across the top to the goal-box where they
climbed down in again and ate.
(Tolman, 1948, p. 203)
The more conservative learning theorists have their doubts about

purposive theories of cognitive processes in learning. The behaviorist Edwin
Guthrie (1886–1959), for example, accuses Tolman of “leaving the rat buried
in thought” at each choice point in a maze (Guthrie, 1952, p. 143).
Tolman is not dissuaded from his purposive ideas and goes on to offer
explanations for a variety of psychopathological behaviors in humans and
for some phenomena from social psychology. He suggests, for example, that
racial prejudice might be exhibited by people who have formed only narrow
cognitive maps about groups other than their own or that under conditions
of high stress humans all tend to use only a small part of the information
they actually possess (Tolman, 1948).
One of the most intriguing sets of findings from the laboratories of the
purposive behaviorists concerns the evidence they uncover for the existence
of latent learning, defined as learning that occurs in the absence of
reinforcement. Latent learning is only demonstrated when conditions
favoring its appearance occur. For example, if nonhungry rats are put into a
maze, they wander around with little direction. Later, when they are food-
deprived, these rats show clear evidence of having learned the layout of the
maze by heading for the goal box. Latent learning violates Thorndike’s law
of effect and is one among several of the anomalies that behaviorism has
difficulty explaining.
Comparative Psychology and Learning
During the 1920s to 1940s, comparative psychologists share the assumption

that learning shapes psychological characteristics. For example, during this
era, comparative psychologists consider questions about how a species
having a close genetic relationship to humans, like the chimpanzee, might
respond if exposed from earliest infancy to the same environmental
experiences as a human infant. To test this question, Luella and Winthrop
Kellogg and their 10-month-old son Donald adopt a 7½-month-old female
chimpanzee, Gua, into their home. For 9 months, Gua and Donald are
exposed to the same experiences, and Gua is treated as much like a human
infant as the Kelloggs are able. She is even dressed like a human infant, as
can be seen in Fig. 10.1. At the end of the study, the Kelloggs conclude that
Gua learns a wide variety of behaviors during her experience that she would
not otherwise exhibit. Some of these behaviors Gua learns even more
successfully than does Donald, such as being able to eat using a spoon, but
much of her behavioral repertoire is still strongly influenced by apparently
innate chimpanzee typical behavior (Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933/1967).
FIG. 10.1. Gua and Donald (Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933/1967, Frontispiece).
During these decades, the agenda of comparative psychology is focused

on the study of animals for the purpose of more fully understanding and
improving the human condition. This is clearly the agenda for one of the
most influential comparative psychologists, Robert Yerkes (1876–1956).
Yerkes promotes the study of primates, almost exclusively chimpanzees, and
in 1930, establishes a research facility for the study of his captive animals.
Although no single research question dominates the studies conducted at
this facility, the hope is that the body of information gathered about
chimpanzees will be “of service to humanity through the discovery of more
rational ways of living” (Dewsbury, 1996, p. 100).
Learning Theory and the Psyche
✔ Stop and think.

If our choices can all be explained as a result of the mechanics of
learning, what is free will?
Mind
If mind is only a collection of learned associations or an awareness of

what the body is doing, where is the inner-directing self? Where is the
captain of the ship? Is the “ghost in the machine” really only just a ghost, a
metaphysical apparition, as the radical behaviorists suggest? Do the causes
of behavior lie only in the mechanical functioning of the laws of nature?
Radical behaviorists have no qualms about eliminating consciousness and
free will from the discussion. In their view, imagining that there is a freely
choosing self is only wishful thinking borne out of an unwillingness to
recognize humans’ own true natures as evolved organisms. Eventually, the
radical behaviorists deny the very existence of mind as anything other than
perceptions and learned associations.
✔ Stop and think.

If mind really is a set of learned associations, could a machine that can
make associations be said to have a mind?
Is there evidence that humans are anything more than just very complex
organic machines? This question has haunted philosophers at least since the
time of Descartes. Since the 17th century, mathematicians, philosophers, and
psychologists have attempted to answer this question by designing machines
that “think” like humans. If a mechanical mind could be created that could
engage a human in a conversation indistinguishable from one with another
human, what would that mean about the possibility that humans might be
merely biological machines? If a form of artificial intelligence could be
created that would be indistinguishable from human intelligence, would we
be justified in saying that that machine could think?
In 1642, French mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) invented a
mechanical calculator. By the 19th century, mathematical philosophers were
working out how machines might be built that could perform a variety of
analytical operations. Their designs hinged on the possibility that not just
arithmetic calculations but even problems in logic might be represented as a
series of “if/then” operations. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to
construct the machines they envisioned using the cog wheels and steam
power technology of their times. It was not until 1888 that a punch-card
system for data entry was developed.
Joseph Jacquard developed a punch-card system in 1801 for the purpose of
automating the manufacture of complex patterns in fabric. Jacquard later
joined the cards to form an endless loop that represented the program for
repeating patterns. Based on Jacquard’s system, Herman Hollerith developed
a counting machine that revolutionized the compilation of large and
complex data sets later in the century. It took over 7 years to compile the
1880 census in the United States, but using Hollerith’s punch-card system,
the 1890 United States census data were compiled in only 6 weeks (Russo,
2003).
In 1937, British mathematician Alan M. Turing (1912–1954) describes a
hypothetical computing machine that would do much more than compile
data. A few years later, during World War II, an electromechanical rotor
machine is invented by an obscure British postal worker. This machine is
used by the British military to decode secret messages sent by the German
“Enigma Machine” and helps the Allies to win the war in Europe. At war’s
end, work continues to create a form of mechanical intelligence based on
this electromechanical model. These efforts are so successful that, by 1951,
the Universal Automatic Computer (UNIVAC), a machine so large that it fills
an entire room at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, can be used to call the
election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower just 45 minutes after the polls
have closed.
Psychologists working in the field of artificial intelligence ask questions
about the possibility of creating machines that will demonstrate powers of
reasoning, have visual or auditory awareness of the world, and be able to
learn from previous experience. If a machine could do those things, would it
be different from human intelligence in any important way? In 1950, Alan
Turing proposes and funds a contest to find a form of artificial intelligence
that can conduct a conversation indistinguishable from one that might occur
between two people (Turing, 1950). Each year, more and more sophisticated
and successful computer programs are entered in the Turing Test, so that
today, more than one computer program exists that can reliably pass the
Turing Test. Developments in artificial intelligence continue to have a major
impact on Western culture and psychology in the decades that follow.
SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY THEORY
A serious argument may be made that all of psychology is social psychology,

because it is very nearly meaningless to talk about psychological
characteristics without reference to interactions with others. Russian
psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), for example, argues that
consciousness itself originates in the processes of social interaction that
humans are a part of from the moment of birth, and thus consciousness
cannot be understood without reference to the social environment
(Vygotsky, 1930/1978).
✔ Stop and think.

Can you define a psychology that does not refer in any way to the
actual, imagined, or implied presence of others? What would be
studied in such a psychology?
Theories about social interactions that comprise social psychology are

inextricably interwoven with theories about the origins and nature of
personality that comprise personality psychology. That these two domains
have been bound up with one another from the beginning and remain closely
connected even in the present day, is illustrated by the title of the most
prestigious journal in this field, The Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, established in 1965.
Methods in Social Research
Social psychology is distinguished from other disciplines that observe social

interactions by positivistic methods of research. Like other psychologists,
social psychologists come to their conclusions by operationally defining, in
advance, a specific set of variables to be measured and by recording their
measurements in a publicly verifiable way. There are many aspects of
human social behavior that, on the basis of personal anecdotes or
experience, seem like they must just be a certain way, but that the careful
measurements of social psychologists find not to be the case. For an example
of this, see the box titled “Attitudes and Behaviors.”
Social Theorists’ Questions
As in all fields of science, social psychologists are on a quest to find a few

laws in nature. Can a few universal principles be found to explain human
social interactions? A variety of candidates are offered in the theories of
social psychologists.
Most personality psychologists’ theories about motivation postulate
causes that lie primarily within the individual. Freud’s idea of an
unconscious motivation directed to serve the pleasure principle, for example,
is an idea about a motivational mechanism that operates from within the
individual. The learning theorists’ contention that reinforcements are
important in shaping behavior is another example. Both of these
mechanisms are theorized to operate similarly in any environment, social or
otherwise.
Social psychologists however, are more likely to focus on variables that
arise from or are related to interactions with others. Even terms referring to
internal personality variables derive most of their meaning from social
interactions. For example, introversion/extraversion is one dimension of
personality theorized by social psychologists to motivate much of human
social behavior. In other words, the degree to which an individual needs or
wants the company and attention of others shapes many of their behaviors.
Group Mind
Social philosophers have also long been interested in the influence of

others on individuals’ thoughts and feelings. Introduced in the previous
chapter, Kurt Lewin asks questions about group dynamics, both in and out of
workplace settings, and the effects of different leadership styles on group
dynamics. Earlier, Wilhelm Wundt argued that there really must be two
psychologies: one physiological and internal to the individual, and one social
and built up out of interactions with others. In the early decades of the 20th
century, social theorists ask about the existence and definition of a “group
mind.” There is no question that the culture in which people grow up
influences many of their beliefs. Does that mean that there exists a cultural
group mind that is made up of, but more than, the sum of the individual
minds of its members? Wundt, for example, suggested that the existence of a
shared and dynamic language is sufficient evidence to prove the existence of
group mind. Cultural anthropologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917)
nominated religion as evidence of the existence of group mind (Allport,
1954). If there is a group mind, where does it come from, and how can it be
influenced? More interesting still from the standpoint of the psychologist,
what is the nature of the relationship between the group mind and
individual minds? How much influence can one person, maybe a very
charismatic leader like Adolph Hitler, have on the group mind? How easily
influenced is the individual by the group mind?
Questions such as these are explored not just by social psychologists, but
by cultural anthropologists as well. It seems clear to many that the only way
really to answer these questions, indeed the only way to find the universal
principles that govern human social behavior, is by conducting comparative
research studies across a variety of cultures. Beginning in the 1930s and
1940s, cultural anthropologists, like Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret
Mead, publish a steady stream of ethnographic descriptive research. These
studies are conducted in cultures around the world, focusing on questions
about how much of human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors can be
attributed to universal laws of nature and how much is shaped by the
surrounding culture.
Attitudes
At the same time that industrial psychologists become interested in
workers’ attitudes toward their jobs in the early decades of the 20th century,
social psychologists also become interested in the impact of attitudes on
behavior. As measurement techniques such as Likert scales become refined,
the measurement of attitudes in a variety of domains begins. Always
interested in more than just overt behavior, social psychologists in the 1930s
ask questions about how opinions and attitudes might influence social
behaviors.
Attitudes and Behaviors

A common assumption is that it is relatively easy to predict how a
person might behave toward someone of a different racial or ethnic
group if that person’s attitude toward people in the different group is
known. Psychologist Richard LaPiere tests the truth of this assumption
in his study of the relationship between attitudes and behaviors.
Prejudicial attitudes toward those of different racial and ethnic
groups are common and commonly accepted in the United States in the
early decades of the 20th century. Among those toward whom such
prejudice is directed are people of Asian descent. In 1930 and 1931,
LaPiere travels throughout the United States with a young Chinese
couple, staying at hotels and dining at restaurants across the country.
In all of their travels, only once do they encounter someone who
refuses them service on the basis of their ethnicity. Thus, widespread
social attitudes of prejudice do not translate into discriminatory
behavior in this study.
Approximately 6 months after their trip, LaPiere mails
questionnaires to the same establishments asking if they would serve
Chinese guests. Nearly all (90%) of the responses state that those
establishments would not serve Chinese guests, even though nearly all
of them had done just that 6 months earlier. This seems to be clear
evidence that attitudes are not necessarily linked directly to behaviors.
Questions like this continue to be explored by social psychologists in
the decades that follow. (adapted from LaPiere, 1934)
In the 1930s, as the West gears up for and enters a second major war,
social psychologists are also concerned about how being a part of a group
might facilitate individual behavior that would never occur in the absence of
the group influence. They want to know how the perceived prestige of a
leader might inspire loyalty and group action. And they are interested in the
impact of group pressures to conform and in what happens to individuals
who express opinions that deviate from the norm in their group (Schacter,
1951; Sherif, 1947; Thomas, 1933). For example, social psychologist Solomon
Asch is interested in how impressions of others’ personalities are formed
(Asch, 1946). His research launches the still-popular field of impression
formation research in social psychology.
As a reminder that prevailing social values influence even the objective
practice of science, the degree to which social psychologists’ questions and
the answers they find are influenced by the values of the surrounding social
environment should be noted. A good example of this, and one that should
help to identify the same forces at work in North American research
agendas, is the work of Russian psychologist Vladimir Bekhterev. As the
historian of social psychology, Gordon Allport, reports, shortly after the
Bolshevik revolution created the socialist Soviet Union in 1917, Bechterev
and his colleagues turn their attention to questions about the relative
efficacy of collective or group judgments versus private or individual
judgments. They find that collective thinking is often superior to private
thinking. The relative merits of competition versus cooperation are also
investigated by Russian psychologists, who find that cooperation is, in
general, superior to competition (adapted from Allport, 1954). At the same
time, researchers in the United States find that competitive thinking is
superior (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939).
Even today, social psychology remains especially sensitive to the agendas
set by prevailing values in the surrounding culture. As the landscape of
social psychology continues to be explored in the next chapter, other
examples of how social, political, and economic events influence the
questions and answers in this field are discussed.
DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY
During the middle of the 20th century, child study becomes developmental
psychology. Developmental psychologists ask questions about changes across
time in a variety of physical, intellectual, and socioemotional domains.
During the 1930s and 1940s in the West, most developmental interest is
focused on documenting the normal experiences of children. The term
“normal children” is defined very narrowly in this era as Caucasian middle-
class European or North American children, usually boys. In general, it is
necessary to look to the work of cultural anthropologists to find
developmental research being conducted in other populations.
Physical Development and Psychology
Previous to this era, the work of physiologists has generally supported

assumptions that neural connections are formed in response to experience in
the environment. The problem with this view is that it does not square with
the evidence that appears in the 1930s and 1940s. In a variety of species,
studies of embryology find that neurological development occurs as a
function of the passage of time, not in response to experience. In fact, there
is even an overgrowth of neural cells during early development, which are
then pared down in response to environmental influences, very nearly the
opposite of earlier ideas. In nonhuman animal studies, researchers find that
it is the maturation of neural systems that allows for the emergence of
certain motor skills, not motor skills that cause neural development (Coghill,
1933). This perspective is called “maturationism,” because of the conviction
that it is maturation occurring during the passage of time that drives
development in all areas, including psychological characteristics. Intellectual
and personality development and even the development of social skills result
from the maturation of the nervous system as the young organism gets
older. Mental functions, in other words, grow along with the nervous system
and are subject to the same principles of natural selection that have shaped
the body during evolution.
Contemporary with both behaviorism and psychoanalytic theory,
maturationism stands in stark contrast to these learning theories.
Developmental researchers like Arnold Gesell (1880–1961) and Myrtle
McGraw (1899–1988) argue that normative behavioral patterns emerge
naturally and in a regular sequence, as the organism gets older. Thus,
development is a consequence of physiological maturation, particularly
neurological growth, and is relatively impervious to learning. From the view
of the maturationist, the role of families and the surrounding environment is
to provide an optimal environment so as to allow children to maximize their
own innate potential (Gesell, 1954).
After years of painstaking observations of children from the earliest
moments of life, Gesell details hundreds of stages of developing physical,
intellectual, and socioemotional skills. From Gesell’s work, for example,
come the basic “motor milestones” of the first few months of life listed in
every developmental psychology textbook. Which is it that drives
development, experience or maturation? In 1935, Myrtle McGraw, research
psychologist at the Normal Child Development Clinic at Columbia Medical
Center, publishes her longitudinal test of this question, the study of Johnny
and Jimmy.
The Study of Johnny and Jimmy

McGraw’s primary subjects in this study are twins (zygosity
undetermined), Johnny and Jimmy. The boys begin their participation
in research at the moment of their births, which are filmed, and
thereafter behavioral data are carefully collected. At 20 days of age, the
boys begin to spend 7 hours a day, 5 days a week in the laboratory.
From these very early days of life, one of the twins, Johnny, who at
birth appears to be physically less well developed than Jimmy, is given
constant exercise and training in a wide variety of physical skills.
Jimmy, on the other hand, spends most of his first 2 years in the
laboratory in his crib, allowed to play with only two toys at a time.
Both boys go home to their large family on evenings and weekends.
Month after month for 22 months, Johnny is provided with practice
and training, whereas Jimmy is restricted to his crib. It seems inevitable
that Johnny will be advanced by all this practice. In the end, however,
although Johnny is somewhat more deliberative about his actions and
Jimmy slightly more fearful, their physical development is comparable.
Johnny is also given training in language comprehension and
eventually shows a slight advancement when Jimmy is first tested. In
general, however, McGraw and her colleagues find little evidence in
this study that practice or experience will accelerate the appearance in
a normal child of either physical or cognitive skills and only meager
evidence for critical periods when a skill must be acquired. On tests of
intelligence (the use of which is highly questionable in infancy), for
example, at 2 years of age, both boys achieve almost the same score.
McGraw concludes that, parents can relax, enjoy their children, and
not to try to push their development ahead of the normal maturational
stage. (adapted from McGraw, 1935)
Another consequence of the view that the development of psychological

characteristics is an aspect of physical maturation and that both are subject
to the principles of natural selection is the conclusion that individual
differences in psychological characteristics like intelligence or personality
may be partly biologically based. Thus, personality differences may be
influenced by differences in the physical constitution of each person. This
idea encounters serious resistance in an era when the practice of eugenics is
falling into disrepute and when behaviorism is preaching the power of
learning to shape personality. The idea that some aspects of personality may
be influenced by individual differences in physiology does not resurface for
several decades, despite strong supporting evidence.
Intellectual Development
Identifying the motor milestones of infancy divides growth into “stages”

of development. That is, if at one age it is normal for a child to exhibit
certain characteristic ways of moving around, like crawling, but at another
age an entirely different way of moving, like walking, is exhibited, it is
natural to describe these as different stages of physical development. The
same may be said of intellectual development. This idea is brought to
fruition in Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget’s (1896–1980) stage theory of the
development of rational thought.
Influenced by Binet (Siegler, 1994), Piaget’s ideas are published in English
in the late 1920s and remain influential in educational psychology even
today. Among his contributions to developmental psychology are his
research methods, which are strictly empirical. Piaget carefully observes and
describes his young subjects. He also creates and presents the subjects with a
variety of problems to be solved, conducts extensive interviews, and engages
the children in question-and-answer sessions (Piaget, 1926).
Piaget provides accurate descriptions of young children’s behaviors as
they solve problems. His descriptions reveal different patterns of behavior
and responses during problem solving for different ages of children. Thus, he
concludes, rational thought progresses through several stages or ways of
organizing information. These stages represent universal features of the
development of rational thought. They emerge as children mature and
engage in interactions with objects and other people in age-characteristic
ways.
Another, and perhaps more enduring, impact of Piaget’s work is his
conviction that these maturationally linked psychological characteristics
cause the child to be an active seeker of knowledge and organizer of
information. Unlike the behaviorist, who views the child as a blank slate
mechanically forming associations and being conditioned by experience,
Piaget’s theories see the child as “a little scientist,” actively seeking out and
interpreting experience.
The Russian social psychologist Vygotsky challenges these notions of
stages of intellectual development by pointing out an interesting finding in
intelligence testing. Typically, a child may achieve one score on a test of
intellectual development if working alone, but if tested with an adult present
who asks questions and interacts with the child, the child’s score may be
pushed to a higher level. Vygotsky calls this the child’s “zone of proximal
development” and demonstrates that even something as internal to the
individual as intellectual capacity is not necessarily limited to definable
stages and not strictly internal, but is also constructed from interactions
with others (Wertsch & Tulviste, 1994).
The Development of Personality
Developmental theories are also closely tied with personality theories and
are influenced in the 1930s and 1940s by both behaviorism and
psychoanalytic ideas. Developmental psychologists adopt the research
methods of the behaviorists, and many developmental psychologists also
adopt behaviorists’ assumption that the environment is the major, if not the
only, influence on personality and psychological characteristics. By the late
1940s, many developmental psychologists assume that each infant begins life
as nearly a blank slate and that personality is molded by the environment.
Experiences within the family are assumed to be the most important
influences on personality development.
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in
and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I
might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless
of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and the race of his ancestors. (Watson
1930, p. 104)
This emphasis on conditioning explains, in large part, the behaviorists’
interest in early infancy. Presumably by carefully observing infants and
experimentally manipulating their environment, one may actually see the
effects of learning and experience on development. Even the appearance of
personality characteristics, such as fearfulness or persistence, are viewed as
the result of conditioning experiences (McGraw, 1935). According to the
behaviorist, developmental progression is linear and cumulative, and does
not occur in stages. Although the radical behaviorist John Watson
contributes little research on development, he has a major impact on the
field by providing rather dogmatic advice on child-rearing (Horowitz, 1994),
disseminated mostly in the popular media. His advice strongly encourages
parents actively to strive to shape their children’s personalities through
reinforcement.
Freudian psychoanalytic theory also influences developmental
psychologists. This theory posits that the way in which a mother responds to
her infant’s needs is of prime importance in shaping the infant’s eventual
personality and characteristic ways of responding to the environment and
other people. This primary relationship that the infant has with the mother
serves as a prototype for all subsequent relationships. The responsibility for
ensuring an optimal outcome falls squarely and completely on the shoulders
of the mother. Her child’s personality is seen as a direct outcome of her skill
as a mother.
According to the psychoanalyst, normal development proceeds through a
series of stages, each characterized by psychosexual conflict centered on a
particular part of the body. The child’s task, with the support of the mother,
is to resolve each set of conflicts in a constructive way that allows for
continued self-preservation. By successfully mastering these conflicts, the
child builds a functioning and healthy ego and avoids a future tormented by
neuroses. Later psychodynamic theories maintain the focus on conflict and
its resolution as the engines of development, but suggest that the conflicts
are more about issues like interpersonal relationships (Horney, 1945; Klein,
1932), overcoming inferiority (Adler, 1929), establishing trust (Erikson, 1950),
or separation and individuation (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1994).
Both behaviorist and psychoanalytic theories of personality acknowledge
that there are individual differences in personality. However, these theories
explain individual differences on the basis of past experience and learning,
not as a result of physiological or innate characteristics. Thus, learning plays
a central role in behaviorist, psychoanalytic, and psychodynamic theories
about the development of personality.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Before World War II, the term clinical psychology refers to all of the
professional applications of psychology, including testing applications in
business, industry, and education, as well as the diagnosis and treatment of
both psychoses and neuroses. It is not until the 1950s that the term is applied
mainly to the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.
Personnel Testing
Personnel and employment tests continue to be refined in business settings

during the middle decades of the 20th century. By the time the United States
enters World War II, psychologists are ready to take up the task again of
testing recruits and officers. By this time, psychologists have also earned the
respect of business, military, and political leaders, and the results of their
tests are taken more seriously. By the end of the war, when thousands of
soldiers return to take up roles in the civilian economy, virtually no
company of any size would consider hiring or placing anew employee
without first administering some sort of psychological test (Napoli, 1981).
Educational Testing
The development and use of tests in educational settings proliferates during
the 1920s and 1930s. As early as the mid-1920s, millions of school children
are tested each year to justify placement in aptitude-related educational
tracks (Hornstein, 1988). The SAT is used extensively in college admissions
decisions. Periodically revised after its introduction in 1926, the SAT remains
under serious criticism for ethnic, gender, and class bias.
Intelligence Testing
Psychologists are increasingly interested in the ways that individuals differ

on these tests and the reasons for those differences. A pioneer in the field of
testing and development, Leta Hollingworth (1886–1939), develops
techniques for identifying and educating intellectually “gifted” children. Her
careful research also helps illuminate some of the “adjustment” problems
faced by many children during adolescence and some of the social factors
that lead to those problems. For example, Hollingworth’s interest in social
factors influencing intellectual functioning is illustrated by her dissertation
research, published in 1914, investigating the then-popular opinion that
women experience “functional periodicity,” a kind of monthly
psychological impairment associated with the menstrual cycle. She
concludes that there are no differences on motor, sensory, or intellectual
tasks at different times of the month, even though there are widespread
beliefs that monthly impairments exists (Hollingworth, 1914). This work is
one of the earliest studies in a field that will later be called the psychology of
women.
✔ Stop and think.

What happens to really intelligent children when they grow up?
In the early decades of the 20th century, it is also widely believed that,
although very intelligent children may “ripen” early at academic subjects,
their lives go downhill from there. They suffer from more physical illnesses,
exhibit a variety of abnormalities such as near-sightedness, are more likely
to fall victim to mental illness, and by early adulthood, have begun to “rot.”
Their adult lives are unproductive and characterized by disappointing
personal relationships.
In 1921, Lewis Terman and his colleagues at Stanford University begin a
study to determine the truth of these common beliefs. Also motivating
Terman in this study is his conviction that to be successful, a society needs
the leadership that only the highly intelligent can provide. Thus, it is in
society’s best interests to identify the intellectually gifted and to nurture
their well-rounded development. Intended at first only to examine the
characteristics of intelligent children across a 10-year period, the study
eventually expands into one of the most extensive longitudinal studies of
development ever undertaken. This research follows most of the 1,470
subjects for nearly 60 years.
From the first round of data collection to the last, the evidence supports
Terman’s hypotheses. As children and adolescents, the gifted show high
academic achievement and well-rounded personalities, and are popular with
their peers. Curiously, the gifted girls do not maintain their early intellectual
promise, a fact that Terman attributes to an “earlier cessation of mental
growth” (Minton, 1988). As adults, the gifted show higher levels of
achievement in their careers than those of average intelligence, healthy
physical and mental well-being, and average or above-average happiness in
their personal relationships, including in marriage. At midlife, many of the
men have gained respect and public recognition in their chosen careers and
report happy and satisfying marriages and family relationships. The gifted
women in the study, unfortunately, are not able to report the same level of
career success or recognition, a fact that even Terman must admit may be
due to external factors, such as expectations of gender-role conformity and
discrimination in employment (Burks, Jensen, & Terman, 1930).
The results of Terman’s study demonstrate that the widely accepted belief
in gifted children’s “early ripe, early rot” is false. Thus, this longitudinal
study is an example of how the methods of careful scientific research have
the power to demonstrate that even what is widely believed is not always
true.
Diagnostic Testing
In the 1930s, a variety of tests are used to diagnose all forms of mental
illness, both neurotic and psychotic. Projective tests, such as the Rorschach
Inkblot Test developed by Swiss psychologist Hermann Rorschach in 1921
and the Thematic Aperception Test created by Christiana D. Morgan and
Henry A. Murray in 1935, are used to get patients to reveal unconscious
thoughts that they might not consciously tell the psychiatrist (Morgan &
Murray, 1935). In general, projective tests present the subject with an
ambiguous stimulus, such as an inkblot, and the subject is asked to interpret
the stimulus. The subject’s mental health is then evaluated on the basis of
the interpretation given. Projective tests are developed for the purpose of
revealing hidden and unconscious thoughts that, in this era, are often
presumed to be causing mental illness and distress.
Psychotic Mental Illness
By midcentury, it is generally agreed that psychotic forms of mental illness

should be treated with medical interventions in the same way that physical
illness is treated. It is assumed that the disordered thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors diagnosed as mental illness have physiological causes. Throughout
the history of the modern era, those entrusted with the care of the psychotic
have had to decide whether they should provide only custodial care or
whether they could offer any actual curative therapies. They have also been
confronted with the task of controlling the disruptive behaviors often
associated with many forms of psychosis. In the early days of institutional
care for the mentally ill, both physical restraint and discipline, are used
liberally but very little is attempted in the way of treatment. It is not until
late in the 19th century that treatments for mental illness are tried.
Early in the 20th century, psychiatrists and neurologists devise a variety
of new physical techniques used both to discipline patients’ behaviors and to
provide physical treatments. For example, sexual sterilization is adopted as a
form of psychosurgery. Sterilization is most often performed on female
mental patients to prevent the complications associated with pregnancy and
parenthood, but for males, it is argued that sterilization is actually
psychologically therapeutic. The belief is that sterilization will allow the
reabsorption of essential male fluids into the body, thus strengthening the
male psyche (Braslow, 1997).
✔ Stop and think.

If you thought mental illness was caused by disorders of the brain,
what would you suggest as a treatment?
Although physical restraints are still used as disciplinary devices, from

the 1920s to the 1950s, barbiturates are available and widely used to sedate
disruptive patients. A variety of hydrotherapies, such as continuous cold
baths, are also used through this period. Beginning in the late 1930s, insulin
injections are used to induce insulin shock in patients exhibiting disruptive
behaviors. Patients are placed into comatose states with insulin, and some
are left in this condition for up to 60 days. All of these procedures are
assumed to have some curative power and are thus used both as therapies
and as discipline for agitated or stubborn behavior.
In the late 1930s, electroshock is introduced in North America to replace
the expensive and time-consuming insulin shock procedure. Causing
patients to have epileptic seizures by sending electrical charges through their
brains is reported in many studies to lessen the behaviors associated with
mental illness and make formerly disruptive patients into docile institutional
residents. By 1949, 60% of psychotic mental patients in the United States are
being subjected to electroshock therapy, and the practice continues well into
the 1950s (Braslow, 1997). Also by the late 1940s, the newest form of
psychosurgery, the frontal lobotomy, is available to treat mental patients. In
1949, Portuguese neurologist Egas Moniz is awarded the Nobel Prize in
physiology and medicine for his work in developing the lobotomy as a
treatment for mental illness. As is true for nearly all of the most invasive
procedures, many more women than men are subjected to the lobotomy in
spite of the fact that more men are admitted to mental institutions (Braslow,
1997).
The popularity of these radical forms of treatment wanes dramatically in
the decades that follow, so that by the 1960s when psychiatrists have
recourse to psychoactive medications, lobotomy and electroshock are rarely
practiced and regarded as somewhat barbaric. Late in the twentieth century,
when some of the drawbacks of medication are better known, more targeted
forms of electroshock begin to show a resurgence in popularity.
Neurotic Mental Illness
The aftermath of World War II is commonly regarded as the beginning of

modern Western clinical practice for the treatment of neuroses. Many young
men returning from military service present themselves at veterans’ clinics
and hospitals with complaints of mild to moderate depression, insomnia,
problems controlling anger, alcoholism, and other conditions related to
stress. There is, thus, growing pressure for the application of psychological
knowledge. The suddenly increased demand for the services of clinical
psychologists results in a significant increase in enrollments in university
and hospital training programs. This increased demand is also largely
responsible for the greater number of practicing psychologists than scientific
and academic psychologists that is apparent in the present-day membership
of the APA.
During the 1930s, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories blossom
into an international movement, and by the end of the war, the term
psychotherapy largely refers to some form of analytic treatment. Veterans
suffering from a general inability to adjust to civilian life, for example, are
asked to talk about their relationships with their fathers and encouraged to
work through their unresolved Oedipal issues. Women, upset and depressed
at suddenly finding themselves unemployed when their jobs are taken by
returning servicemen, are prescribed tranquilizers and encouraged to resolve
their penis envy by having babies rather than wanting to work at men’s
(higher-paying) jobs. The treatment of neurotic symptoms is taken seriously,
but there is little evidence that the treatments available are of much help.
Fortunately for all, neurotic symptoms are typically short-lived and often
subject to spontaneous recovery.
Finally, it is during this era that ethnographic studies done by cultural
anthropologists, particularly the work of Ruth Benedict, raise questions for
psychologists about the dependence of definitions of psychological
abnormality on cultural values. A diagnosis of neurosis, in other words, is
largely dependent on the social expectations of the surrounding culture. For
example, in a culture such as that in North America, where extraversion is
expected, extreme shyness might be seen as neurotic, but in a culture more
accepting of introversion, such as in China, that same degree of shyness
might be seen as much more normative. As Benedict (1934) points out,
culture is one factor influencing the placement of the normative score.
Because psychological characteristics are measured by comparing individual
scores to normative scores, any factor that changes normative scores will
influence the diagnosis of neurosis.
The Times
In 1932, Democrat Franklin Roosevelt is elected President of the United
States, promising to institute a “New Deal” to alleviate the Depression.
The New Deal is a package of financial policies, bank deposit insurance
programs, public works projects for the unemployed, and other types of
government assistance. The late 1930s sees the enactment of laws
governing minimum wages and child labor, and the passage of the
Social Security Act. These measures provide a small degree of
economic security for some, although many people are left out of this
safety net. Roosevelt enjoys widespread popularity and is reelected for
a total of four terms in office, but the nation does not really begin full-
scale economic recovery until after it enters World War II in 1941.
At that time, a collective spirit of nationalism sweeps the country.
Ten million soldiers are drafted in the United States, and millions of
citizens go to work in the plants manufacturing military supplies.
Business, government, and the military cooperate to pump up the
atmosphere of war fever. But there are those who dissent. Nearly
500,000 of those drafted either refuse to fight and are imprisoned or
simply do not show up for service. Labor strikes proliferate, as business
profits soar while workers’ wages are frozen as part of the war effort.
In 1940, the Smith Act is passed to control dissenters, making it a crime
to advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This act of
Congress gives the government broad powers to identify, arrest, and
try anyone alleged to belong to any organization that advocates the
overthrow of the government and leads to a growing atmosphere of
fear. Racism against citizens of Japanese descent leads to the arrest and
detention in camps of Japanese American families in the United States
for up to 3 years. Their homes, businesses, and bank accounts are also
seized by the U.S. government.
It is in this climate that the United States and Britain justify and
begin the “heaviest bombardment of civilians ever undertaken in any
war” in Germany and Japan (Zinn, 1998), climaxing in the firestorm
that kills over 100,000 civilians and destroys the city of Dresden,
Germany, in April 1945. The United States then becomes the only
nation ever to use atomic weapons against humans by dropping a
single bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945,
leaving 100,000 people dead and thousands more poisoned with
radiation. This is followed 3 days later with another atomic bomb over
the city of Nagasaki, killing 50,000 people.
Wartime manufacturing weakens the power of the labor unions and
concentrates wealth into the hands of fewer and more powerful
companies. By the end of the war in 1945, British imperial power
throughout most of the world has collapsed, and the United States has
moved in to take its place. Business interests in the United States
dominate oil in the Middle East, and foreign markets around the world
are opened for goods manufactured in the United States.
In addition to dramatic increases in the number of people seeking
help for mental illness, research agendas in social and developmental
psychology are also affected by the events of the war, leading to the
increasing importance of these fields during the latter half of the
century
11
When Motivation Is the Question: Why
Do We Do What We Do?
In the mid-1950s continuing through about 1975, psychology is not a single unified landscape.
Instead, it is more like a large rambling house with many rooms, as psychologists pursue many
interests. Behaviorists take up questions about learning and motivation: Physiological
psychologists study the role of the brain in leaning, Hull’s hypothetico-deductive theory of
motivation is widely accepted, and Skinner’s radical behaviorism explores the contingencies of
reinforcement. Comparative, developmental, social, and clinical psychologists also explore
questions about motivation within their domains. A mechanistic model of thinking called
information processing appears and grows in importance at the same time that
humanistic/existential forms of psychology become popular.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
During this period, experimental psychologists spend most of their time

elaborating on the theories of learning developed before World War II, and
providing experimental evidence in support of their ideas. For the most part,
white rats are used as models to understand the processes of learning in
many settings such as the radial arm maze seen in Fig. 11.1.
FIG. 11.1. Training the laboratory rat (photo courtesy of Heather Butler).
Learning and Motivation
By the early 1950s, learning theorists have settled on “the science of

behavior” as their definition of psychology. By science they mean the
attempt to “bring order to the world of observable events” (Kimble, 1953, p.
156). What makes an event observable is not just the scientists’ sensory
experience, but also their “report of such experiences” (p. 156). By behavior,
they do not mean whole sets of activities, but a “limited portion of behavior
called responses” (p. 156). The definition of responses is some further
“abstracted characteristic like the speed or the magnitude of the response” (p.
156).
A primary assumption of this paradigm is that responses are “related to
events in the person’s past and present environment” (Kimble, 1953, p. 157).
These events are the stimuli. For example, the response “the efficiency of a
learned reaction” depends on “the number and spacing of practice trials,”
“the amount of reward,” and other environmental stimuli (p. 157). Note that
these stimuli are just as quantifiable as are the responses. The task for
experimental psychologists is to identify the relationships that exist between
responses and stimuli: “What psychologists are after is a set of laws of the
general type: R = f (S), where R is some aspect of a response, S is a stimulus
event and f represents the functional relationship” (Kimble, 1953, p. 157).
Theories of learning take the form of hypotheses about variables
intervening between S and R. Some suggest that it is physiological processes
that intervene between S and R. Others argue that a variety of mechanical-
like psychological processes serve as intervening variables. Still others insist
that the intervening variables are more like whole thought processes. There
are some behaviorists, however, who suggest that not only are there no
intervening variables, but theorizing itself leads us away from a true
understanding of the laws of conditioning.
Physiological Learning
Physiological psychologists make the assumption that stimuli produce

physiological changes in the organism, and it is these physiological changes
that explain the response. Recall that in the previous chapter, Karl Lashley
hypothesizes that it is the functioning of the cortex that explains behavior.
He concludes that in cases of complex learning the cortex must operate in a
unified way, through mass action. He also concludes that, within a given
functional area of the cortex, all cells exhibit equipotentiality in performing
that function. Having come to these conclusions, Lashley expresses the
opinion that attempting to explicate further the exact mechanisms by which
the nervous system accomplishes its tasks is “futile” (Lashley, 1930, p. 1).
Itremains to Lashley’s student Donald O. Hebb (1904–1985) to explore the
implications of Lashley’s research. One quarter of a century after Lashley’s
search for the physiological mechanisms of learning is abandoned, Hebb
revives the search in his book, The Organization of Behavior (1949), based on
his work with animals. Hebb argues that the mass action and
equipotentiality of the cortex can be explained by “cell assemblies.” A cell
assembly is a set of cells connected to one another into neural circuits.
Events or images are represented in the cortex by activity in these cell
assemblies. Cell assemblies are formed in the cortex when sensory
stimulation sets up a pattern of reverberating neural activity: “When an
axon of cell A is near enough to excite cell B and repeatedly or persistently
takes place in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place
in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is
increased” (Hebb, 1949, p. 62).
Furthermore, clusters of cell assemblies are linked together into “phase
sequences” that form the bases of thoughts and ideas. Phase sequences are
fired when one or more associated cell assemblies are activated, and the
firing of a phase sequence leads to a whole series of ideas. It is the activation
of cell assemblies triggering the firing of whole phase sequences that causes
thoughts to seem like what William James called a flowing stream of
consciousness. After cell assemblies are formed, the activation of cell
assemblies and phase sequences may be triggered either by external sensory
stimulation or by internal processes, such as associated thoughts and ideas.
The next goal is to identify the growth processes or metabolic changes
that cause the formation of cell assemblies and phase sequences. The
functioning of the cortex as it causes thoughts, feelings, and behaviors must
also be explained. Roger Sperry (1913–1994), for example, explores the
nature of cortical connections by cutting the bundle of nerve fibers that
connect the right and left hemispheres of the brain (Sperry, 1964). Later in
his career, Hebb provides fascinating data on the effects of rich versus
deprived sensory environments on the density and complexity of neural
circuitry in developing cortexes (in rats).
Mathematical/Mechanistic Learning
Clark Hull’s theory that what intervenes between stimulus and response are
variables that can be assigned mathematical values is pursued by his
students, including Kenneth Spence (1907–1967). Hull is convinced that
learning can be explained better by reinforcement than by motivation, and
by the early 1950s, his theory is the most widely cited in the field of learning
and motivation (Glickman, 1996). Hull calls his theory a hypothetico-
deductive system because he recommends beginning with a set of
hypotheses and then deducing an expected response from these hypotheses.
Hull argues that the potential that the response will occur (reaction
potential) can be predicted if the organism’s biological need (drive) and the
number of previous times the drive has been satisfied by that response (habit
strength) is known. Each of these variables can be assigned a mathematical
value, so that the reaction potential is some function of the number of hours
of food deprivation times the number of previous trials in which that hungry
rat pressed the lever and was fed. The importance of drive in this model is
illustrated by a study in which rats will turn toward a goal box with food in
it when they are food-deprived but, in the same maze, will turn the opposite
direction toward water when thirsty.
The concept of drive as a motivator of behavior was formally introduced
into psychological theory by Robert Woodworth (1869–1962) in his
“dynamic psychology” in 1918. By 1950, motivation is a variable of primary
significance in animal learning laboratories, social psychology,
psychoanalytic theories, group dynamics, and developmental theories.
Spence and other learning theorists answer questions about motivation
using rats in laboratories. It is possible to test a dizzying number and variety
of hypotheses about motivation with rats in mazes, puzzle boxes, and
operant conditioning chambers. For example, support for various
psychoanalytic concepts, like repression, is sought in rat models, although
little evidence is found. Animal models of intrapersonal conflict are tested
by presenting barriers and noxious stimuli between the motivated rat and
the goal box. Ambivalence is examined by presenting the rat with two
equally attractive but mutually exclusive goals.
The definition of motivation changes as it becomes clear that animals are
motivated by more than just biological needs for food and water. In 1939, for
example, O. Hobart Mowrer shows that a reduction of fear serves as a
motivator. Daniel Berlyne (1966) finds that rats can be motivated solely by
curiosity. Harry Harlow (1905–1981) and his colleagues propose a
“manipulation drive” after finding that monkeys are motivated to take
latches apart for no reason beyond the satisfaction of solving the problem
(Harlow, Harlow, & Meyers, 1950).
What unites this research is the conviction that no matter how motivation
is defined, whatever reduces drive (or motivation) reinforces habit strength
and thus increases the likelihood of that response when motivation is again
present. Reinforcement depends on the reduction of motivation. This makes
a fuller understanding of reinforcement an obvious next step for learning
theorists.
The Contingencies of Reinforcement
Several years before, in 1938, B.F. Skinner (1904–1990) publishes The

Behavior of Organisms, in which he argues for the primacy of reinforcement
in understanding behavior, but it is not until the early 1950s that the book
has much influence over popular learning theory. Skinner’s point in this
book is that it really does not matter if a stimulus triggers the firing of sets
of cell assemblies, or if an organism seeks to reduce drive, or even if the
organism has developed a cognitive map of the situation. What matters is
understanding the conditions under which reinforcement will occur. If the
conditions under which reinforcement will occur can be identified, what
Skinner calls the “contingencies of reinforcement,” the response can be
predicted. Because behavior is correlated with reinforcement, if the
reinforcer can be controlled, the behavior can be controlled. Skinner defines
a reinforcer as anything that increases the probability of a response.
Skinner’s major concern is with behaviors that are emitted by the
organism and then reinforced. He calls these behaviors operants because
the organism is operating on the environment. Skinner feels that operant
behaviors are far more common, and thus more important to understand,
than simple associations between stimuli. Besides, describing operant
behavior does not require one to identify the exact stimulus that caused the
response, so these studies should be easier to conduct.
The thousands of studies prompted by Skinner’s system of psychology are
conducted in operant conditioning chambers, small boxes equipped with
only a device for recording responses, such as a lever, and a food dish or
other place to deliver the reinforcer. It is in these operant chambers that
studies on the effects of various schedules of reinforcement are conducted.
Skinner argues that he is not studying learning because what happens in the
operant chamber is not learning, but only the gradual “shaping” of behaviors
the organism already knows how to perform. Thus, Skinner rejects
Thorndike’s theory that practice alone improves performance, arguing
instead that performance improves only as closer and closer approximations
of the desired behavior are reinforced.
✔ Stop and think.

Reread carefully “The Story of Little Albert.” Is that a study of classical
conditioning, as Watson said, or of operant conditioning?
Skinner also rejects the label “theorist” because he claims that he does not
engage in theory making. All he does is describe organisms’ responses under
varying contingencies of reinforcement. Unlike other behaviorists, Skinner
denies the existence of theoretical “fictions” like Thorndike’s satisfying
consequences, Hull’s drive reduction, or Tolman’s cognitive maps and
expectancies. None of those internal variables are necessary to predict the
rate of response (Skinner, 1938). Because in this view the organism brings
nothing important to the situation, Skinner is accused of studying the
“empty organism.”
His interest is focused mainly on the effects of positive reinforcement,
because he believes that this is the most effective way to shape desired
behaviors. Even extinguishing undesirable behaviors may be accomplished
most effectively by positively reinforcing alternative behaviors. He finds that
punishment will cause undesirable behaviors to be suppressed, but not
extinguished, because they very often return after punishment is removed.
Operant conditioning finds many real-world applications, including
behavior modification techniques, found to be especially useful in the
reduction of phobic responses. Token economies, in which desired behaviors
are reinforced with tokens exchangeable for merchandise or other treats, are
useful in controlling behaviors in classrooms and group-home settings.
Skinner’s opponents refer to his work as merely “a technology for modifying
behavior” rather than a contribution to psychological theory.
Skinner popularizes the principles of operant conditioning with his novel
Walden Two (1948), and with his later work Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(1971). Walden Two is the fictional story of a Utopian community founded
on principles of positive reinforcement and has become something of a cult
classic among college students in the years since its publication. Beyond
Freedom and Dignity is Skinner’s very controversial argument in support of
applying operant conditioning to contemporary society.
Learning and Loss of Motivation
Among the issues addressed by psychologists in this era are questions about
when and why motivation is lost. To understand motivation, it is also
necessary to understand the lack of motivation.
✔ Stop and think.

Explain why organisms sometimes do not move away from a noxious
stimulus, even when they can.
In the mid-1960s, psychologists Martin Seligman and Steven Maier

wonder why organisms who find themselves in the middle of an
uncomfortable situation sometimes appear not to be motivated to move.
Seligman and Maier begin a series of experiments to test these questions.
They put a dog into a small cage, flash warning lights, and then electrify the
floor of the cage, delivering a painful shock to the dog. No matter what the
dog does, it cannot escape. Later, the same dog is put into a similar cage, but
the new cage has a nonelectrified section where the dog will not be shocked.
Again, the warning lights are flashed, but even though the dog could escape
merely by running into the safe section of the cage, it sits and receives the
shock. Seligman and Maier call this response learned helplessness
(Seligman & Maier, 1967). The dog has learned that it can do nothing to help
itself so that later, when escape is possible, it is helpless to respond.
Psychologist Carolyn Rovee-Collier tests similar questions with human
infants but without electrical shocks. She ties one end of a ribbon to the
bootie of an infant’s sleeper and the other end to a mobile over the crib.
Infants quickly learn that they can make the mobile move by kicking their
feet, and most infants respond with a significant increase in kicking behavior
and excited interest in the mobiles. For other infants in other cribs, there are
no ribbons. The mobiles are moved, but not in response to the infants’
efforts. These infants do not engage in as much kicking behavior and are less
interested in the mobiles. Up to 2 weeks later, when the infants are returned
to the laboratory, the infants who previously learned that they could control
the mobiles again began to kick, but the infants who learned that they had
no control lie quietly in their cribs, even after they are outfitted with ribbons
to control the mobiles (Rovee-Collier & Fagen, 1981).
✔ Stop and think.

What do the findings in the research described previously imply about
when and why motivation is lost?
INFORMATION PROCESSING
Recall that Tolman hypothesized that animals engage in purposive behaviors

in learning situations. In other words, the behavior of rats in the maze looks
as though it is directed toward achieving some goal. The idea that rats are
behaving with intent violates the assumptions of the radical behaviorist
paradigm. Then, in 1948, mathematician Norbert Wiener publishes
Cybernetics, a treatise in which he explains the mechanism by which any
machine may be built so that it looks as though the machine is behaving
purposively. This mechanism is the feedback loop and is familiar in the form
of thermostats on heaters. The thermostat causes the heater to turn on and
off, making it look as though the heater intends to maintain temperature at a
given level.
The Gestalt notion that the mind actively categorizes information is
another concept that violates the behaviorist assumption that the mind
passively makes mechanistic-like associations. After World War II,
researchers working on telephone technologies develop mechanical means of
transforming communications into bits of information that can be
transmitted electronically and then turned back into communication at the
receiving end. Based on emerging computer technologies, these
communication machines take in and process bits of information and
produce meaningful output. Some begin to argue that the brain is a similar
information-processing device.
Research programs are launched in efforts to understand the mechanisms
by which the brain processes information. These include mechanisms for the
short-term retention of information, for placing some information into
longer-term storage, and for formulating and executing responses to
information. In 1956, for example, psychologist George A. Miller (1920-)
presents his finding that the average human short-term memory mechanism
is capable of processing seven plus or minus two pieces of information at
one time (Miller, 1956). If the pieces of information can be organized into
meaningful “chunks,” short-term memory can still handle seven chunks of
superordinate information. So although a shopping list of 10 items would be
hard to hold in short-term memory, a list of 4 categories, such as dairy, fruit,
bread, and meat, with only 2 or 3 items in each, would be easily
remembered.
By the late 1960s, human information processing is becoming an area of
active interest in psychology. In 1967, Ulric Neisser (1928-) publishes
Cognitive Psychology, in which he defines cognitive psychology as the study
of “all the processes by which … sensory input is transformed, reduced,
elaborated, stored, recovered, and used” (Neisser, 1967, p. 4). In 1969, the first
cognitive psychology journal begins publication.
There are three major organizing principles that define the scope of
cognitive psychology as it continues to develop through the remainder of
this century. The first of these takes its cue from Piaget’s notions of the mind
as sets of schemata representing information encountered in the
environment. The brain is viewed as a mechanism that actively organizes
information using hierarchical structures to create schemata and place
information into them. The second principle uses the metaphor of the brain
as a complex computer. Even the jargon of computer technologies becomes
the language of the psychologist, so that, for example, stimulus becomes
input and response becomes output. Psychologists studying human cognition
find themselves aligned with other disciplines, including computer science,
mathematics, engineering, and neurophysiology. Together, these are referred
to as cognitive science. Finally, the third major organizing principle for
cognitive psychologists is the adoption of strict positivistic methods of
observation and measurement so that research in cognitive psychology is
laboratory based. By 1975, psychology is clearly heading in the direction of
cognitive science.
COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
By about 1950, there are two separate fields in the study of animal behavior:
ethology and animal psychology (Dewsbury, 1978).
Ethology
Those engaged in ethological study are typically European and usually

trained as zoologists. Their methods of study concentrate on the description
of sets of behaviors in natural habitats. They observe a wide variety of
animal species from paramecia, insects, and birds, to all kinds of mammals.
The questions that concern ethologists have to do first with evolution, or
trying to understand the effects of natural selection on shaping behaviors.
Second, ethologists seek to understand the function that behavior plays in
the ability of organisms to adapt to the environment and to changes in the
environment. During this era, ethologists look for instincts, or what they call
“fixed action patterns” of behavior, in each species that explain why each
species behaves as it does in its environment.
Animal Psychology
Animal psychologists, on the other hand, are typically found in North

America and have usually received their education in the field of
psychology. In fact, they are the same scientists found in experimental
psychology laboratories. They accept Edward Thorndike’s assertion that the
principles of learning are the same across all species and in all situations
(Thorndike, 1911). This allows them to conduct their studies in carefully
controlled settings in laboratories. Animal psychologists expect to find a set
of general laws or principles of learning that apply across all species in all
settings. Thus, they look first for the immediate cause of behavior, meaning
the stimulus that caused the response. Second, they look for how
experiences across the life-span of the individual organism have shaped
behaviors.
Interactions
The study of both ethology and animal psychology as separate disciplines

peaks in the early 1950s, and most interactions between them are quite
contentious (Dewsbury, 1978). Scientists within each discipline believe they
are focusing on the questions that will eventually provide the most complete
answers as to why behaviors occur. As research continues, however,
anomalies appear that throw doubt on each of these paradigms.
Ethological studies find that fixed action patterns, or instincts, are often
inadequate to explain the behaviors being observed. Instead, organisms are
seen changing behaviors in response to changes in the environment. The
environment thus provides something like feedback to the organism, which
results in a change in behavior that allows for adaptation. An assumption
that behavior occurs as a result of fixed action patterns leaves no room for
the ongoing changes in behavior in response to a dynamic environment
called learning.
Animal psychologists also find that they often cannot identify the
stimulus that caused the behavior or that a single stimulus alone is often not
adequate to explain the behavior. For example, psychologists attempting to
operantly condition some animals have only partial success and see some
animals engaging in behavior patterns that are never reinforced. Often, these
behaviors seem specific to the species of animal being observed.
Psychologists and animal trainers, Marian and Keller Breland, for example,
report that their trained raccoons, after being conditioned to put coins into a
piggy bank, begin rubbing the coins together before putting them into the
bank in species-typical washing behavior. The Brelands are both students of
B. F. Skinner and are trained in the radical behaviorist tradition, but they
conclude that explanations for behavior that rely on learning alone do not
adequately take into account the organism’s “instinctive patterns,
evolutionary history, and ecological niche” (Breland & Breland, 1961, p. 684).
The animal, it seems, is not an “empty organism” after all.
✔ Stop and think.
If you give rats flavored water to drink and later they get sick, how
soon after drinking the water do the rats have to get sick for them to
learn not to drink that water?
Equally disturbing to animal psychologists, and equally ignored at the

time, are the findings of aversion learning by psychologist John Garcia.
Garcia and Koelling (1966) find that if rats receive a warning signal while
drinking water and are immediately given a foot shock, they will avoid the
water again when the warning signal is presented. This finding is consistent
with those of many other behaviorists. But Garcia and his colleagues also
find that if rats drink flavored water and are then exposed to radiation,
causing them to become nauseated about one half hour later, they will
refuse, in the future, to drink the flavored water. Furthermore, rats learn not
to drink the flavored water again in only one trial. Animal psychologists
have previously reported that rats need immediate contiguity between
stimulus and response before an association will be formed and that several
trials are necessary before learning will occur. Thus, Garcia’s finding that
rats learn flavored water will make them sick one half hour later, and
learning this in only one trial, are ignored by his senior colleagues. Journals
in Garcia’s field even refuse to publish his findings (P. Worden, personal
communication, April 25, 2003).
As if this is not enough to get Garcia into trouble among established
psychologists, he includes two other conditions in his study. One group of
rats is made sick one half hour after drinking unflavored water. Another
group receives the foot shock while drinking flavored water (without the
warning light). Garcia reports that neither of these groups learns to avoid
the water.
✔ Stop and think.
How do you explain why rats learn to avoid flavored, but not
unflavored, water after they get sick? How do you explain why rats
avoid unflavored water paired with a warning signal after receiving a
foot shock, but do not avoid flavored water after receiving a foot
shock?
Garcia and his colleagues argue that they have found evidence for two
separate learning systems in the rat, one for learning about events in the
external world, such as happens in operant conditioning chambers, and one
for learning about internal events, such as illness and taste. Garcia suggests
that although laboratory rats studied by the behaviorists may be able to get
by with only the first learning system, rats living in the real world need both
systems to live as rats (Garcia & Koelling, 1966).
✔ Stop and think.
If rats need these two learning systems, what and how many learning
systems might humans need?
Both animal psychologists and ethologists come under criticism for their
methods. Ethologists are charged with too often anthropomorphizing the
animal behavior they observe and with a general lack of control and
experimental rigor in their research. Animal psychologists are criticized for
their very narrow focus on learning in rats in sterile laboratories. The
importance and usefulness in understanding complex animal behavior from
the results of their studies of very isolated behaviors are criticized.
Integration and Synthesis
By the mid-1970s, these two fields have begun to merge and, with input
from a variety of disciplines, a new set of questions is put forward. These
questions are first about proximal causes of behavior, such as stimuli in the
immediate environment and the developmental history of the organism
under study. Second, they are about more distal causes of behavior, such as
the organism’s evolutionary history and the function that the observed
behavior plays in helping the organism adapt to its environment. These
questions thus set the agenda for comparative psychology through the end
of this century (Dewsbury, 1978).
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
By the 1950s, developmental concerns are focused on the origins and

consequences of individual differences and changes across time.
Furthermore, interest has shifted from an emphasis on physical maturation
to an emphasis on social and emotional development. Piaget’s theories about
how knowledge is organized and new information is assimilated into
existing knowledge structures has increasing importance in developmental
studies. The major areas of study in developmental psychology from about
1950 to about 1975 regard questions about attachment, theories of social
learning, and ideas about how individual differences in temperament might
influence the development of personality.
Attachment and Loss
World War II leaves thousands of orphans throughout Europe, especially in

England, where children were often sent to live in foundling homes in the
countryside during the aerial bombardment of London. What impact does
being left parentless have on the development of an infant’s personality?
Given that most normal infants become attached to their caregivers, what is
the function of this attachment? These are the questions that attachment
theorists, most notably Canadian psychologist Mary Salter Ainsworth (1913–
1999) and Englishman John Bowlby (1907–1990), tackle in the early years
after the war.
From psychoanalytic theory, these researchers adopt the idea that an
infant’s attachment to its caregiver forms as a result of the dynamics of
infant-caregiver interactions. Optimal outcome is predicted by a sensitive
caregiver, one who responds appropriately to the infant’s bids for attention.
The sensitive caregiver’s responses in times of need soothe the infant,
organize the infant’s emotional state, and teach the infant important self-
management skills (Bowlby, 1969).
According to Ainsworth, when an infant has formed a secure attachment
to its caregiver and the attachment figure is available, the infant is more
likely to actively explore the environment. Exploration maximizes
opportunities for learning and finding resources. Thus, the infant who forms
a secure attachment is more likely to survive and prosper, so attachment has
been selected for in evolution. Attachment is also interpreted through Hull’s
drive reduction model of learning, in which the drive to maintain an optimal
level of alert attention and to avoid disorganizing emotional states may be
satisfied by contact with an attachment figure.
Ainsworth’s detailed in-home observational studies reveal significant
differences in maternal sensitivity and responsiveness to infant bids for
attention. Months later, in her innovative “strange situation” laboratory
assessment, infants of more responsive mothers do indeed demonstrate more
secure attachments to their mothers (Ainsworth, 1983).
Social Learning Theory
Social learning theorists are concerned with the influence of the social
environment on shaping behavior and personality. Their questions derive
initially from a combination of traditional Hullian learning theory, in which
behaviors are viewed as directed toward the reduction of primary drives,
and psychoanalytic interests in the dynamics of parent-child interactions.
For example, learning theorists argue that attachment to a caregiver is only a
secondary or acquired drive that results from the reduction of primary
drives. In other words, the child becomes attached to the caregiver because
the caregiver provides food and thus becomes associated with the
satisfaction of the primary drive of hunger.
However, social learning theorists do not believe that stimulus-response
learning theory, either Hullian or Skinnerian, adequately explains how
children come to internalize the values, attitudes, and behaviors of their
cultures. These theorists are especially concerned with how children learn
acceptable expressions of aggression, appropriate sex-role behaviors, and the
ability to regulate their own behavior. There is little evidence, they contend,
that behaviors in these domains are either subject to the pressures of drive
reduction or shaped in successive approximations. Instead, watching
accepted models is a significantly more efficient way to learn these social
behaviors. The acquisition of language, for example, is better explained by
observational learning and imitation than by successive approximations.
Social learning theorists of this era, like Pauline Sears (1908–1993) and
Robert Sears (1908–1989), initially focus on the parents as the most potent
models for observational learning. Research reveals that children are more
likely to imitate the behavior of models they like and respect (Sears, Pintler,
& Sears, 1946). As a result, variables, such as parental warmth, discipline
style, and permissiveness, become important in the agendas of these
researchers. Later, Albert Bandura (1925-) and his colleagues discover that
television is another social influence and is at least as powerful a model as
are parents. Children are as likely, if not more likely, to imitate and learn
from behavior they see on television as they are to learn from parents
(Grusec, 1994).
In 1973, social learning theorist Diana Baumrind publishes the results of
her studies comparing parenting styles and child outcome measures among
nursery school children. She finds significant relationships between warm
versus cold and permissive versus strict parenting styles and children’s
independence, sociability, and self-control (Baumrind, 1973). According to
this research, parents and parenting styles appear to have a major influence
on the development of children’s personalities. Social learning theory plays
an important role in increasing interest in theories about social cognition
and the growth of cognitive psychology.
✔ Stop and think.

If child outcome can be predicted from parenting style, wouldn’t all
children from the same family turn out more or less the same? Do
they?
However, like all learning theories, social learning theory begins to

decline in influence toward the end of the 1970s. This is partly because the
importance of observational learning is widely acknowledged by this time.
No study conducted today would purport to explain childhood outcome
variables without taking into account the models to which the children have
been exposed. The decline in interest in learning theories must also be
attributed to the increasing recognition of the importance of variables
internal to the child and the part played by the child in the dynamic
relationship between parent and child.
The Dangers of Too Little Mother Love: The

Story of Harry Harlow’s Infant Monkeys
Trained as a traditional behaviorist, the psychologist Harry Harlow

wonders about a psychological science that does not ask questions
about love. When he attends graduate school, love is not a variable
studied by psychologists and, in fact, the word itself is suspect.
Organisms may “seek proximity,” an observable behavior; but feelings,
like love, are best left to the poets.
According to the behaviorists, whatever attachment a young
organism, including a young human, may feel for its caregiver is
simply a secondary consequence of drive reduction. The caregiver
provides food, reducing the hunger drive, and thus becomes associated
with the satisfaction of hunger. According to psychoanalysts,
attachment to the one who feeds is secondary to the oral gratification
provided by the act of sucking. But, Harlow asks, might the feeling of
love be a primary motivator? How would one test that question?
After several years of working with infant monkeys and many hours
of conversation among psychologists, graduate students, and others
who work with the monkeys, Harlow’s research team devises a way to
test their hypothesis that a young monkey’s attachment to its mother is
not based either on food or oral satisfaction. They fashion surrogate
monkey mother bodies from wire and terry cloth that allow them to
manipulate the variables in question (Blum, 2002). Their findings
surprise scientists, but not mothers. According to Harlow’s findings,
infant monkeys have a primary need for “contact comfort” and they
will form an attachment to a terry cloth surrogate mother that provides
this soft contact, even when food is provided by the wire monkey
mother. Much like Ainsworth’s securely attached human infants,
monkey infants who have the soft surrogate are more likely to explore
their environments and will return to the soft surrogate for contact
when frightened or stressed.
Infant monkeys who are fed and well cared for but never allowed to
have contact with a comforting soft surface present a very different and
very sad picture. Huddled miserably on the wire floor of the cage, they
shiver uncontrollably when frightened. They lose weight, are not
responsive to gentle attention, and they sometimes die (Harlow, 1958).
The research from Harlow’s laboratory, along with that of Bowlby,
Ainsworth, and others, revolutionizes the care of children in
institutions. Based primarily on Watson’s assertion that cuddling and
physical contact would lead to emotionally dependent children, policy
in most institutions has been to minimize contact with infants and
children. Even when a child must be admitted to hospital, parents are
encouraged cheerfully but quickly to say goodbye, then leave the child
alone, visiting only occasionally. As evidence about the emotional
harm caused by these methods mounts, however, policies are changed.
There are dangers of too little mother love.
In 1946, Dr. Benjamin Spock publishes Baby and Child Care, in
which he argues that parents, not psychologists, are the experts when it
comes to caring for children. Parents should thus trust themselves.
They should cuddle with their children if they wish, feed babies when
they seem to be hungry instead of when the clock says it is time, and
reason with children, explaining rules instead of simply demanding
obedience. The book is a runaway best seller for decades to follow.
✔ Stop and think.

Is it ethical to deprive a healthy infant monkey of contact with its
mother, leave it isolated in a wire cage, or allow it to have no contact
with others, just to see how the infant reacts? Is that ethical if
knowledge is gained, or if it helps humans? Under what conditions
would such a study be ethical?
Temperament
By the 1960s, some psychologists are beginning to question the assumption

that learning is entirely responsible for shaping personality. Parents know
that, even from the beginning, babies play active roles in shaping both their
environments and the relationships that develop with their caregivers. In
1963, psychologists Alexander Thomas (1914–2003) and Stella Chess (1914-)
and their colleagues publish the findings of a multiyear study of infant
temperament. Temperament is defined as “biologically determined innate
characteristics” of personality (Thomas, Chess, Birch, Hertzig, & Korn, 1963).
These researchers find individual differences in the temperaments of infants
who show significant interactive relationships with environmental variables.
For example, some infants cry more readily than others and are difficult to
soothe. If these irritable infants are paired with easily irritated parents
(which they are very likely to be, because infant characteristics are
influenced by genetic inheritance), the outcome is not likely to be good.
Temperament research is the modern exploration of the influence of
interactions between biological and environmental variables on personality.
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Throughout its history, social psychology is closely tied to a number of other

disciplines. For example, in 1935, psychologist Muzafer Sherif (1906–1988)
provides a demonstration of the influence of the social environment on
perception. If research participants are put into a room that is totally dark
except for one small light and asked to focus on the light, they perceive the
light to be moving around, even though it is actually stationary. This effect is
caused by small movements in the neck and eye muscles, the “autokinetic
effect” (Sherif, 1935). But if participants are put into the same room with
several confederates of the researcher, and if the confederates report that
they see the light moving in a particular direction, the research participants
will report that they perceive the light moving in that same direction.
Perception is shaped by what the participants think others are perceiving
(Sherif, 1935).
✔ Stop and think.

What implications do the findings regarding perception have for
understanding how opinions are influenced by the presence of others?
The Zeitgeist
Social psychology’s research themes are more closely tied to the social and
political zeitgeist than are those in other disciplines (Jones, 1998). This is
exemplified by the founding in 1936 of the Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues. During the 1950s and 1960s, social research focuses on
understanding how the German people and their military could have been
persuaded to participate in Hitler’s plan for world domination. Research is
conducted on sthe characteristics, leadership styles, and power of
“authoritarian” personalities. Social psychologists examine social
facilitation effects, in which people can be persuaded to engage in
behaviors with others that they would never engage in when alone. And the
limits of individuals’ resistance to authority are tested in Stanley Milgram’s
famous study of obedience (Milgram, 1963). Milgram’s finding that ordinary
people will deliver painful, even deadly, electrical shocks to an innocent
person if told to do so by an authority is profoundly disturbing to many.
When the United States is rocked by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s House
Un-American Activities Committee’s hearings implicating the loyalty of
thousand of citizens, the fear of communism grips the country. This
culminates in 1953 in the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, a young
couple alleged, on very flimsy evidence, to be spies. Social psychologists turn
their research toward questions of conformity. They try to understand how
suspicion and paranoia can be propagated across an entire nation and to
explain the power of the social group to enforce conformity by rejecting
people who express opinions that are different.
In 1964, 28-year-old Kitty Genovese is attacked by a knife-wielding
assailant while walking toward her apartment in New York City. According
to newspaper reports, she screams for help, and several neighbors look out
their windows, but no one comes to her aid or even calls the police. Mortally
wounded, Genovese crawls into the lobby of a nearby building and dies.
Later, social psychologists conduct numerous studies to try to understand
why and when bystanders will intervene to help a person in need. They also
focus attention on questions related to urban alienation and the
psychological effects of living in crowded, impersonal environments.
During the Cold War, when disarmament is a concern, social
psychologists become interested in how people judge risk, how much they
are willing to risk in order to win, and how they negotiate satisfactory
solutions to disagreements with others. In 1961, Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif
and their colleagues publish the results of the “Robber’s Cave” study. This
study demonstrates how easy it is to create factional competitive groups
within an initially similar population and tests how far an “in-group” will go
to destroy an “out-group.” The studies also show that competition between
warring groups can be decreased by the introduction of a common goal
(Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).
The business climate of the 1960s and 1970s draws social psychologists’
interests to individual differences in achievement motivation. The civil rights
movement and racial strife prompt questions about police brutality. In 1971,
Philip Zimbardo conducts his prison simulation study, demonstrating how
assigned power can negatively influence interactions between former peers.
The Surgeon General’s 1964 report that smoking causes cancer means
smokers must either quit or find a way to convince themselves that
continuing to smoke makes sense. Throughout the 1970s, Leon Festinger’s
research into cognitive dissonance dominates much of social psychological
research. He and his colleagues are concerned with how the dilemma is
resolved when behaviors are not consonant with beliefs (Festinger, 1957).
Social Statistics and Research Designs
Research in social psychology often measures more variables and uses more
subjects than a typical operant chamber conditioning study with rats.
Analyses of variance are required to examine the data in studies measuring
multiple variables. These complex statistics help to interpret the main and
interaction effects found in social psychology’s multifactorial designs
(Harris, 1985). Developments in statistics proceed in a reciprocal relationship
with the creation of complex research designs.
By the mid-1960s, social psychologists are also discovering that productive
research into many of their questions requires manipulating or deceiving
subjects. The 1962 study of the determinants of emotional states by Stanley
Schachter and Jerome Singer is a good example of this research. Emotions
are often assumed to be more or less automatic and also to represent
important internal truths. Thus, decisions based on intense emotions are
bound to be correct. For example, individuals who get nervous and jumpy
every time they think about going to a party may decide on the basis of
those feelings not to go to the party. Going to the party must not be “right.”
The Schachter and Singer study challenges the truth of that common
assumption. In this study, subjects are brought into the laboratory and, after
being deceived into believing that they are participating in a study on the
effects of vitamin injections on vision, are injected with a mild dose of
epinephrine. Epinephrine is a naturally occurring hormone that typically
results in mild heart palpitations, tremors, sometimes flushing of the face,
and accelerated breathing. After waiting a brief period for the effects of the
epinephrine to be felt, research confederates enter the room and exhibit
either joyful or angry emotions. Despite the fact that all subjects experience
the same symptoms of physiological arousal caused by the epinephrine, their
emotional states turn out to be highly dependent on whether they are
exposed to a joyful or an angry confederate. In the absence of any other
explanation for their physiological arousal, subjects assume their heart
palpitations, flushed face, and accelerated breathing are the result of internal
feelings of joy or anger. By deceiving these subjects and giving them an
injection, Schachter and Singer manipulate their subjects’ emotional states,
but they also discover something important and interesting about how
emotions can be influenced by thoughts and physiological states. The finding
that there is a cognitive component to the experience of emotion poses a
serious challenge to common assumptions about the origin of emotions
(Schachter & Singer, 1962).
Ethics in Research
Schachter and Singer could not have conducted this research without
deceiving the subjects. Is what they learn important enough to justify
deceiving the subjects and injecting them with a psychoactive substance? By
this time, medical review boards have been established to approve the ethics
and justifiability of research designs in medicine, where invasive procedures
are often used. Their criterion for approval of a proposed study is to weigh
the importance of what might be learned against the level of potential harm
caused to the subjects. In 1925, the APA adopted the American Medical
Association regulations on the use of animals in experiments. Since 1953, the
APA has also included in its statement of members’ ethical responsibilities a
section detailing experimenters’ responsibilities to human research subjects.
These responsibilities include the removal of experimentally induced
distress.
In the early 1960s, the ethics of studies like Schachter’s and Singer’s, and
especially Milgram’s 1963 study of obedience, are criticized (see Baumrind,
1964). Festinger’s studies, in which subjects are deliberately put into
dissonant cognitive states, are among many where subjects are promised
rewards they never receive, threatened with physically uncomfortable
procedures, or caused to make disturbing decisions, all in the interest of
furthering research interests. APA guidelines encourage researchers to
remove the distress induced by studies such as these.
✔ Stop and think.

Is it really possible fully to remove the effects of this distress? If
subjects are deceived during the study, will they believe the researcher
later when told that it was all a deception? What will their attitudes
toward researchers, or science in general, be in the future?
In the early 1970s, APA guidelines regarding the use of deception in

psychological research are updated. The new principles, published in 1973,
consider all deception and passive withholding of information ethically
questionable. Researchers are required to explain to subjects what will
happen during their participation and allow them to withdraw if they wish.
After collecting data, the researchers must explain the true purpose of the
research to the subjects and must remove all misconceptions.
✔ Stop and think.

Is it ethical to induce high levels of anxiety in students by requiring
them to write difficult course examinations? Is long-term damage to
their self-esteem caused by assigning grades and comparing their
performance to that of other students? Stanley Milgram asks these
questions when confronted with ethical questions about his
experiments on obedience (Blass, 1996).
Kurt Lewin argues that part of the mission of a social psychologist is to go

into the world outside the laboratory for the purpose of causing social
change and building a better world. The research programs engaged in by
the social psychologists in the decades after World War II are directed at
illuminating aspects of human social interactions and the influence of the
social environment on individuals.
Psychologists Change the World

When the United States Supreme Court prepares to write its historic
1954 Brown v. the Board of Education decision against school
segregation, developmental psychologists Mamie and Kenneth Clark
are in a unique position to provide the research evidence that the Court
uses in support of its decision. The Clarks have carefully documented
the negative effects of racial segregation on the identities and self-
esteem of African American children. Educated themselves in
segregated institutions and among the tiny cadre of African Americans
admitted to graduate study in all-White universities, both Clarks
receive their doctorates from Columbia University. Mamie Clark
writes, “My husband was the first black graduate student to earn a
Ph.D. in the psychology department [at Columbia] (in 1940) and in
1943 I was the second and last” (Clark, 1983, p. 270).
Collecting data in both northern and southern states and in urban
and rural locations, the Clarks find that African American children
become aware of their racial identity at about 3 years of age and
simultaneously acquire a negative self-image. The Clarks attribute this
decline in self-image to “negative attitudes” toward Americans of
African descent in the surrounding White culture (Clark & Clark, 1947,
p. 175). They view school desegregation as a first and necessary
corrective step, as does the Supreme Court. For the remainder of their
professional lives, the Clarks devote themselves to efforts to “securing
the self-esteem of children of color” (Lal, 2002, p. 20) and provide
services to improve the lives of all minority children in the United
States. Kenneth Clark also writes extensively on the effects of racism
on both minority and White children. In increasingly pessimistic terms
through the 1960s and 1970s, he writes on the status of race relations in
the United States (Keppel, 2002; see also Jackson, 2000; Scott, 1997).
THE HUMANISTIC/EXISTENTIAL MOVEMENT

During the 1960s and 1970s, approaches to personality theory and clinical
psychology based on humanistic and existential philosophies appear. The
organizing principles of the humanistic/existential movement stand in sharp
contrast to behaviorism and psychoanalysis. At the time of the emergence of
the humanistic movement in the 1950s, however, the contrast is not so
evident. For example, the basic tenets of humanistic psychology echo many
earlier themes. William James’ interest in the role of experience in
understanding psychology, the importance of the self, and his holistic view
of consciousness are all precursors to humanistic ideas. Franz Brentano’s
emphasis on the phenomena of consciousness in shaping experience and
meaning is reflected in Soren Kierkegaard’s 19th-century existential
philosophy and even later in the philosophy of existentialist Martin
Heidegger (1889–1976). Heidegger’s psychological speculations focus on
understanding how individuals bring meaning to their lives. Most people, he
says, tend to plod through life behaving as they are expected to behave and
thus living “inauthentic lives.” Anxiety keeps them from choosing an
“authentic life,” one more in keeping with their own inner values (Heidegger,
1927). All of these themes are reflected in the humanistic movement. Finally,
the psychoanalyst Carl Jung (1875–1961) uses the concept of self as a major
organizing principle of his theory and refers to the development of the self
as a primary goal in life (Jung, 1933). These ideas become central concepts in
the humanistic movement.
Reasons for Humanistic Theory
The reasons for the appearance of the humanistic movement in the middle of
the 20th century in North America usually include disenchantment with the
narrowness of behaviorism and with the focus in psychoanalytic theory on
“crippled” psyches. Because the humanistic movement is viewed as an
alternative to these two major forces in the field, it is referred to as “third
force” psychology. In its original formulations, the humanistic movement is
concerned not with replacing behaviorism or psychoanalysis but with
expanding the scope of what should be considered in the search for the
answers to psychology’s questions.
Basic Tenets
The beliefs of those who adopt a humanistic approach fall into these
categories:
1. Psychology should seek to understand life experiences that are

unique to humans. The human is an experiencing person, not a rat,
not even merely a behaving organism.
2. An individual’s subjective reality, the way that individual thinks
reality really is, is of prime importance in understanding
motivations. For example, most people experience themselves as
having free will. Therefore, their subjective reality includes the
experience of free will.
3. Whole meaningful problems faced by real humans should be the
focus of study. Psychologists should develop and be willing to use a
wide variety of methods to study these problems and not limit their
studies because of adherence to a preferred method.
4. The scope of humanistic study must include seeking to understand
human dignity, helping all individuals achieve their full potential,
and the search for meaning in life.
Humanistic Psychology as Personality Theory
The man who names humanistic psychology in 1954, Abraham Maslow

(1908–1970), is trained as a behaviorist and completes his doctorate in Harry
Harlow’s primate lab at the University of Wisconsin. The theory of
personality that Maslow offers in his 1954 book, Motivation and Personality,
bears many similarities to a Hullian drive-reduction theory of motivation.
Maslow views the human experience as holistic, dynamic, and purposive.
His theory of motivation and personality development takes the shape of a
hierarchy. Maslow speculates that individuals are motivated to meet their
needs in a set of ascending categories.
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
Self-actualization
Need to feel competent and esteemed by others Social needs
Physical safety
Physiological needs
Physiological needs, such as the need for sleep, water, and food, must be
met first before the individual can think about anything else. Once these
needs are met, the need for physical safety from pain or injury, the elements,
or any other danger becomes the organizer of behavior. After safety needs
are minimally met, social needs, such as the need for love, to belong, and to
share one’s life with others takes precedence. Maslow speculates that
unfulfilled needs for love and affection constitute the most common reason
for psychological problems. This is the level where most people remain. If all
of the prior needs have been adequately met, then the need to feel
competent, to feel useful, and to be able to respect oneself, as well as the
need to feel respected and esteemed by others, becomes the primary focus.
People working at this level seek a sense of self-worth and recognition by
others of their accomplishments.
Finally, for the rare individual who has met all of these needs, the major
organizing principle of life becomes the need to self-actualize. Self-
actualization is the process whereby individuals seek to realize their full
potential. This is different for each individual. Scientists, such as the Gestalt
psychologist Max Wertheimer and the cultural anthropologist Ruth
Benedict, make significant and meaningful contributions to science.
Humanitarians like Albert Schweitzer or Jane Addams achieve success in the
field of providing service to those in need. Poets like Ralph Waldo Emerson
or Walt Whitman write superior poetry. Maslow is able to identify only a
few people who he believes are working on self-actualization. They are
people who perceive reality accurately but still maintain a healthy sense of
nondeprecating humor. They accept themselves and others but maintain
social ties with only a few. Their outlook retains a sense of wonder and
excitement. They seek to know themselves, maintain a strong sense of being
inner-directed, and reject meaningless social conventions. They conduct
their lives as though to fulfill a destiny or mission without regard to the
constraints imposed by the external world.
Maslow rejects the behaviorists’ goal of predicting and controlling
behavior. Instead, the goals for humanistic psychologists strongly reflect
Western cultural values of independence and self-determination. They wish
to practice a psychology that will release individuals from external controls
over their lives and make individuals freer, more creative, and more
motivated by inner values. Maslow’s ideas are appealing to many but, as the
next chapter reveals, they do not hold up well under scientific scrutiny.
Humanistic Psychology as Therapy
As a form of psychotherapy, the humanistic approach is one of the first

serious challenges to Freudian psychoanalysis. Humanistic therapists are not
concerned with uncovering unconscious motivations, identifying unresolved
conflicts, getting patients to conform to social expectations, or to engage in a
process of adjustment. Humanistic therapists like psychologist Carl Rogers
(1902–1987) argue that therapies that label patients with a diagnosis or that
try to fix them will only prevent patients from taking responsibility for their
own growth.
Instead, humanistic approaches to therapy begin by respecting
individuals, now referred to as “clients,” and their subjective reality. The root
of clients’ problems can only be found in their own subjective reality.
Humanistic therapists maintain an optimistic view of human nature,
believing that individuals are not motivated mainly by selfishness but are
growth-oriented and seek to exercise their own power to help themselves.
As Rogers argues, if an open, honest, and caring relationship can be
established between client and therapist, and if the therapist can maintain
an atmosphere of unconditional positive regard toward the client and the
client’s subjective reality, then the client will achieve more healthy
functioning. Humanistic counseling techniques are focused on helping
healthy individuals achieve more of their potential.
Carl Rogers is widely respected in both therapeutic and scientific circles,
in part because of his efforts to bring scientific methods to the therapeutic
setting. One example is his series of studies on the effectiveness of therapy.
According to Rogers, individuals who present themselves for therapy feel a
discrepancy between the self they feel they should be, the “ideal” self, and
the self that they really are, the “real” self. Rogers and his colleague Rosalind
Dymond use a “Q-sort” technique in which clients sort a stack of about 100
cards, each bearing a single self-descriptive statement. The client must first
sort the cards to form a representation of the attributes of the ideal self. Then
they sort the cards into a representation of the real self. Theoretically, as
therapy proceeds, the discrepancy between these two views of self decreases.
The decrease in this discrepancy thus may be used as a measure of the
progress and effectiveness of therapy (Rogers & Dymond, 1954).
✔ Stop and think.

When reading over the description of the Q-sort technique, did you
assume that the goal of both client and therapist is to help the client
become more like the ideal self?
The goal of therapy, according to Rogers, is not to become the ideal self. In
fact, the ideal self represents all of the external world’s demands about how
we should be. The goal of therapy is to eliminate these external pressures
and to come to know fully and accept a real self that is inner-valued and
whose choices and actions reflect internal values and beliefs.
The Fate of the Humanistic Movement

The humanistic movement has influenced mostly applied psychology,
especially counseling techniques, in educational settings, and child-rearing
advice. Even in these areas, there is no one approach that can exclusively be
labeled humanistic. Many of the terms used by humanistic therapists have
high face validity and popular appeal. Who would not want to be the
recipient of unconditional positive regard? Who wants to lead an
inauthentic life? The problem is that there is no clear definition or
agreement as to the meaning of those terms. Without agreed on definitions,
coherent theories, or testable hypotheses, the humanistic movement remains
more a philosophy than a psychological science.
Perhaps for this reason, or maybe because the optimistic Zeitgeist of the
mid-1960s dissolves by the end of the decade, the humanistic movement lost
what little influence it had over academic mainstream psychology. However,
humanistic predictions that marital bliss is achievable, that it is possible to
raise happy children, and that personal and professional dreams may be
fulfilled by applying the innate potential for growth and self-actualization
continue to have a major impact on popular culture and the self-help
movement. These promises have also left many people disillusioned and
disappointed. If the goal of the humanistic movement is to release
individuals from external controls over their lives and to make individuals
freer, more creative, and more motivated by inner values, then its promise is
still waiting to be fulfilled.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Like all wars, World War II takes a terrible psychological toll on the victors
as well as the vanquished, on combatants and civilians alike. Returning
Allied soldiers present themselves at hospitals for psychological care in
record numbers, and that is just the beginning. The ink is barely dry on
Japan’s surrender before the Cold War and continuing threats of the further
use of atomic and nuclear weapons instills the fear of imminent destruction
in everyone’s mind. It is ironic that the citizens of the only country ever to
have used atomic weapons against humans, the United States, are the very
ones who should suffer this fear so intensely.
By 1960, competition for enrollment in clinical psychology graduate
programs is fierce, and most students are pursuing the degree because they
hope to become psychotherapists (Reisman, 1991). Clinical training programs
are rushed into place at many universities across North America to help fill
the demand for psychotherapists. Clinicians are trained, but there is no
agreement on what causes mental illness, what constitutes effective therapy,
or how to determine when a cure has been achieved.
Defining Personality
Tests for Intellectual Functioning
Intelligence testing continues unabated throughout this era. Factor

analytic studies of intelligence tests continue to reveal a variety of factors,
and the idea becomes more popular that there must be different kinds of
intelligence. This forms the basis for educational tracking, so that secondary
and even primary students across North America are assigned into academic
or vocational tracks based on the results of these tests. Some psychologists,
like Anne Anastasi (1908–2001), continue to argue that intelligence scores
result from an interaction of both genetic and environmental influences
(Anastasi, 1958), but educators apparently assume that the intelligence die
has already been cast by the time students enter school.
The influence of physiological factors on intelligence and school
performance is also beginning to be recognized. Down syndrome, for
example, is found to be the result of a metabolic abnormality. Certain types
of “learning disabilities” or “dyslexia” are associated with brain dysfunction.
Diagnostic Tests for Mental Illness
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is a test of

personality functioning developed using factor analytic techniques. The
MMPI asks for responses to a large set of potential self-descriptors and
compares an individual’s responses to those of previously identified normal
and pathological norming groups. Projective tests also continue to be
popular for understanding personality and revealing pathologies in mental
functioning. Tests like the Rorschasch inkblots and the Thematic
Apperception Test are still widely used to elicit responses that might reveal
unconscious thoughts.
✔ Stop and think.

What would a mentally healthy person say about an inkblot? In other
words, how is “normal” defined by projective personality tests?
A variety of problems with these projective tests becomes apparent, not

the least of which is that it is never clear what distinguishes the response of
a normal person from that of a mentally ill person. Not only are the results
not useful for diagnosing categories of mental illness, but the tests have no
predictive validity either. The results of these tests do not predict who will
benefit from therapy (Zax & Klein, 1960) or even what sort of therapy to
provide. Carl Rogers claims that the tests hinder therapy by putting the
emphasis on the therapist knowing clients, when it is really the clients who
should be knowing themselves. Later studies reveal that untrained novices
or even a computer program (Kleinmuntz, 1967) are as able as fully trained
clinical psychologists to interpret the results of these tests.
Causes of Mental Illness

By the mid-20th century, the disordered thinking that Kraepelin called
dementia praecox has been renamed schizophrenia and remains among the
most puzzling of the major mental illnesses. Psychologists generally assume
that schizophrenia is the result of disturbed relationships in early childhood.
Repeated childhood traumas that are being repressed, confusing and
contradictory communication patterns, and other failures of the parent-child
relationship are identified as probable causes. Infantile autism is also blamed
on distant, punishing, and emotionally cold parents. The autistic child is
typically delayed in verbal development, makes little eye contact, and
engages in repetitive movement that may be self-damaging. Even parents
who profess genuinely to love their children can cause these reactions,
according to clinicians in the 1960s, because infants are capable of sensing
the parents’ hidden ambivalence. Children are victims of an irrational
environment, where they are told they are loved but yet know that they are
not (Bettelheim, 1967). Depression in all its forms and a wide variety of
anxiety-related neuroses are also attributed to environmental influences.
As early as the mid-1950s, there are known to be physiological markers
for some mental illness, including evidence for genetic-relatedness in
schizophrenia. The zeitgeist, however, so strongly supports the learning
model that any physical correlates of mental illness uncovered during this
era are interpreted as effects that were caused by earlier failures in parenting
and the learning environment.
Therapy
The Medical Model
As always, there are two tasks facing those who must deal with the
mentally ill. First, the frequently disruptive behavior of the mentally ill must
be controlled, and they must be prevented from harming themselves or
others. Only after that is achieved will there be any hope of approaching the
second task, that of finding a cure. The medical response to controlling
behavior is to find a medical solution. At the beginning of the 1950s,
electroshock and insulin-shock are still widely used in hospitals to control
behavior. Some patients undergo “inhalation therapies” of carbon monoxide
or ether. Lobotomies and other psychosurgeries are also conducted, but
outcome studies show discouraging results, and the use of these techniques
declines during this period.
In 1952, a root extract, reserpine, is found to calm institutionalized
psychotic patients and make them more cooperative. In 1954, another drug,
chlorpromazine, is found to reduce the disturbing hallucinations of
schizophrenia. These drugs are relatively inexpensive and easy to administer.
Almost overnight, hospital wards are transformed, as formerly difficult
patients become quiet and manageable. The movement begins to stabilize
patients on medications and release them to the care of their families or
community mental health facilities. One after another, large public mental
hospitals are closed and their patients sent away.
There is no claim that reserpine or chlorpromazine cures mental illness,
only that symptoms are reduced. There are some serious side effects to the
medications, and once released from the hospital, many patients refuse to
continue to take the medications. Families and communities are ill-equipped
to deal with the problems associated with this population, and before long,
the homeless mentally ill become common sights on the streets of large
cities across the United States. It is not until years later that studies reveal
serious long-term and permanent consequences of taking these drugs.
It is not just psychotic patients who are taking psychoactive medications.
In 1961, diazepam, under the trade name Valium, a powerful tranquilizer,
appears on the market and quickly becomes the drug of choice for the
treatment of depression and anxiety. Infamously, Miltown, another
tranquilizer, commonly known as “mother’s little helper,” is prescribed to
millions of housewives having trouble finding satisfaction and fulfillment in
their roles as mothers and homemakers in the 1950s and 1960s. These drugs
also have serious side effects and are found to be highly addictive. The
psychoactive effects of many drugs are explored and one, lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD), is found that mimics some forms of psychoses. Initially,
this drug is used in experiments to explore the neurological effects of
psychosis in unsuccessful efforts to try to find a cure. Later, of course, LSD
becomes a “street drug.”
Children are not immune to drug prescription for the treatment of minor
behavior problems (Reisman, 1991). The stimulant Ritalin begins to be given
to children in the 1960s, when teachers or parents complain of children’s
high activity levels. Ritalin is still widely prescribed to children today, and
its use remains very controversial.
The Psychological Model
In addition to drug treatment, a confusing plethora of psychotherapeutic

techniques appears during this period. If failures in learning and early
relationships have resulted in mental illness, then it stands to reason that a
therapy that can correct those early psychological disappointments might
alleviate mental illness. Psychodynamic therapies in which patients are
regressed to childhood and Rogerian humanistic techniques are joined by
many other treatments. Albert Ellis (1913–) uses a rational-emotive
approach, encouraging patients to challenge the illogical assumptions that
are making them miserable. George Kelly (1905–1967) advocates a fixed-role
strategy, in which the therapist helps the patient identify and adopt a role to
play for several weeks, both in and out of therapy, that will facilitate
personality change (Kelly, 1955). Fritz Perls (1893–1970) leads a therapy
movement, encouraging group participants to get in touch with their deepest
feelings. Perls calls this Gestalt therapy, but it is not related to the Gestalt
theories of perception and thinking discussed earlier.
These therapy movements spread across North America and move far
from the traditional therapeutic settings. Kurt Lewin’s work on group
dynamics gives rise to “t-groups,” or training groups, where coworkers meet
over several hours to share their real feelings about issues in the workplace
and come to better understand both themselves and others in the group. A
variety of “encounter group” strategies gain popularity. Often leaderless,
groups of individuals are encouraged to break down the social barriers
between them by expressing both positive and negative feelings freely. To
facilitate the free release of feelings, participants are sometimes asked to stay
awake and involved in the process for 24 to 48 hours at a time. Abraham
Maslow interprets this interest in group encounters as a symptom of
unfulfilled needs for affiliation. Transactional analysis (TA) theory suggests
that interpersonal interactions are like games that people play, in which the
roles of Parent, Child, or Adult are acted out. These are all part of an
important social transformation that popularizes psychology and encourages
the general public to think of themselves as experts in psychology.
Everywhere people are urged to explore their “true” feelings, both conscious
and unconscious. To “get in touch” with the unconscious, psychologist
Timothy Leary advocates the use of drugs like LSD. By making people
temporarily psychotic, he argues, these drugs can reveal hidden levels of the
mind.
In the late 1960s, after decades of conforming to social conventions, most
Americans over the age of 30 are wary of the message to “tune in, turn on,
and drop out” but many of their children adopt it wholeheartedly. And in
some way rather hard to describe, this message is interpreted by the popular
culture as being rooted in psychology. Enrollments in undergraduate
programs in psychology skyrocket.
The Effectiveness of Therapy
With all of these choices in therapy, questions about the effectiveness of

therapy or the relative effectiveness of one type over another are inevitable.
Numerous studies are conducted to make these comparisons. Nearly all of
these studies, if conducted carefully, find that none of these therapies are
very effective (Zax & Klein, 1960). For example, in 1952, Hans Eysenck
publishes his survey blasting the effectiveness of psychotherapy. Although
highly controversial, his study finds that neurotics receiving no treatment
report more improvement in their symptoms than do neurotics after a course
of therapy (Eysenck, 1952). Other studies find that humanistic therapies,
which are significantly less expensive than psychoanalysis, are about as
effective as talking to an empathic friend. Although individual anecdotal
reports of the positive effects of almost any therapy are not hard to find,
controlled scientific studies documenting effective psychotherapies are rare.
These disappointing results influence insurance coverage for mental health
care, but do not cause any decrease in the public’s demand for services.
One conclusion that can be drawn by the end of this era is that advances
in clinical psychology do not increase understanding or solve the problems
of mental illness. Instead, these advances allow for a greater appreciation of
the complexity of mental illnesses, along with causes and potential cures
(Reisman, 1991).
Learning and the Myth of Mental Illness

In 1960, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz makes the argument that what is
referred to as mental illness is either not mental or else it is not an
illness. If it is an illness, then it is a physical illness, meaning an illness
of the body. In that case, medical doctors should treat the illness using
drug treatments, just as they do with other physical illnesses. If the
problem really is mental, then it is not an illness but only a problem
with learning. Some people have overwhelming problems in their lives.
They need to be taught better strategies for coping with the problems
they face. Everyone is occasionally confronted with more and bigger
problems than they know how to deal with, so everyone could benefit
from learning more effective coping strategies. According to Szasz, the
concept of mental illness is a myth. Therapy is not about curing but is
about teaching (Szasz, 1960). Although many agree that Szasz’s
argument has merit, he finds few advocates among psychotherapists.
The Times
The end of World War II marks the beginning of a long period of anti-
communist fervor in the United States. In 1947, President Truman
issues an executive order authorizing searches for the “infiltration of
disloyal persons.” Eventually, almost 7 million citizens in the United
States are investigated, thousands lose jobs and livelihoods, detention
camps have been reactivated (although not occupied), and two U.S.
citizens are executed.
The manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy enjoys substantial
growth, fed in large part by an increase in military spending and fueled
by the atmosphere of fear. In 1950, military spending consumes about
30% of the federal budget, but by 1960, at a time when the country is at
peace, this has increased to at least 50% of the budget. By 1962, the
United States has more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy every
major city in the world and more than all other countries in the world
combined. This huge arsenal does not lead to a feeling of safety.
Instead, American children are taught to “duck and cover” under their
school desks for protection from enemy attack.
Not everyone enjoys the benefits of the booming economy.
Throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, incidents of lynching against
Americans of African descent increase. At the end of the war, many
African Americans are forced to leave good jobs in defense plants to
make room for returning White men. By the early 1950s, African
Americans’ outrage moves them to take action. In 1955, in
Montgomery, Alabama, housekeeper Rosa Parks is arrested for sitting
on a seat (at the front of the bus) that she paid for, and young Black
Americans begin a nonviolent boycott of the Montgomery bus system.
In 1960, they quietly take chairs reserved for White people in public
restaurants and refuse to leave when they are not served. In 1964,
White and Black college students board public buses and ride together
through the South. They are arrested, beaten, and sometimes murdered
for their offense. Federal civil rights laws are passed in 1957, 1960, 1964,
1965, and 1968, but very little changes. Unemployment for Blacks
continues to be far worse than it is for Whites. By the summer of 1965,
anger in urban ghettoes explodes into riots, repeated again in 1966 and
1967. In April 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., is assassinated. By the
following summer, many young Black males have been drafted and
sent to the growing war in Vietnam. Both urban violence and this very
active phase of the civil rights movement fade.
In 1963, Betty Friedan publishes The Feminine Mystique. A warning
shot across the bow of complacent suburban society, the book is passed
around neighborhoods from housewife to housewife. The revolutionary
message of the book is that Freud was wrong, that not every normal
adult woman feels completely fulfilled by cooking and cleaning for
men and giving birth to and caring for children. Throughout the 1970s,
the message spreads.
In California, small groups of migrant farm-workers try the same
techniques of boycotts and nonviolent demonstrations used by Blacks
in the South. Largely ignored by most labor unions, these workers
achieve some success when laws regulating working and living
conditions in the farm labor industry are passed, but their struggle
continues, even today.
In June 1969, a small group of gay men and lesbians in New York
City refuse to be persecuted by law enforcement any longer. Called the
Stonewall riot, this marks the beginning of the gay rights movement.
After decades of being beaten and arrested for offenses such as not
wearing enough gender-appropriate clothing, gays and lesbians begin
to fight back.
By late 1964, the United States is fully committed to waging war in
the country of Vietnam.
From 1964 to 1972, the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the history of the world
made a maximum military effort, with everything short of atomic bombs, to defeat a
nationalist revolutionary movement in a tiny, peasant country—and failed. (Zinn, 1998, p.
213)
More than 50,000 young Americans die in the jungles of Vietnam, and
several hundred thousand Southeast Asians are killed. Many more,
Americans and Vietnamese, soldiers and civilians, are physically
wounded and emotionally scarred, and no one is ever quite certain
why. At home, millions are involved in what seem like largely futile
efforts to stop the bloodshed. In May 1970, four unarmed students are
shot and killed on the campus of Kent State University in Ohio for
nonviolently protesting the war. Despite the fact that his political
operatives are caught burglarizing Democratic headquarters, Richard
Nixon is reelected president in 1972. Voter turnout among young White
Americans declines to unprecedented levels.
12
The Mind Returns: What Questions Are
Psychologists Exploring Now?
If psychology at midcentury is a big house with many rooms, then at the end of the 20th century,
the doors between the rooms are mostly opened to one another, and there are even conversations
going on in the hallways between the rooms. What’s more, psychologists are also chatting with
the next-door neighbors, biologists; across the back fences with sociologists, anthropologists, and
political scientists; and even with the engineers and computer scientists across the street. The
purpose of this chapter is to explore current issues in cognitive, comparative, social,
developmental, industrial/organizational, and clinical psychology. Recent developments in
statistics are covered, and emerging domains, such as positive psychology, the psychology of
women, and the psychology of religion, are also discussed. Throughout, we try to peer ahead to
the future and think about where psychology may be headed.
FROM LEARNING TO COGNITION
As discussed previously, research reveals a number of anomalies that violate

the assumptions of the behaviorist paradigm. These anomalies help to
explain the shift in the last half of the century away from radical
behaviorism. Animal behaviorists Keller and Marian Breland argue, for
example, that three assumptions of the behaviorist paradigm are violated by
their work in training animals. First, it is clearly not true “that the animal
comes to the laboratory as a virtual tabula rasa” (Breland & Breland, 1961, p.
684), or blank slate. Instead, important differences between individuals, even
within the same species, are apparent. The reasons behind these individual
differences are explored by the work of behavior geneticists, discussed later
in the chapter. Second, the Brelands argue, it is also not true “that species
differences are insignificant” (p. 684). Different species are motivated by, and
react in different and species-specific ways to, similar environmental stimuli.
Comparative psychologists explore these differences, and that work is also
discussed later in the chapter. Finally, the Brelands conclude, it is not true
“that all responses are about equally conditionable to all stimuli” (p. 684).
The evidence gathered in their animal studies violates this assumption. Early
information-processing models based on learning theory also leave many
questions unanswered about mental states and strategies employed in
learning and problem solving. In the view of linguists, behaviorism and
learning theories also fail to explain the acquisition and use of language
(Chomsky, 1972). The rise of cognitive psychology reflects, in part, the failure
of learning theory to explain these anomalies.
Cognitive Science
Information-processing theory is compatible with most forms of

behaviorism (Miller, 2003). Although it is true that information-processing
theory posits the existence of unobservable mental events, the activities of
the mind are limited to the input of discrete units of information, the
sorting, storage, and retrieval of that information, and the output of
observable behaviors. On the other hand, cognitive psychology toward the
end of the century is seen by many as profoundly incompatible with the
behaviorist paradigm.
The topics studied by cognitive psychologists are the same mental
processes studied throughout most of the history of psychology, prior to the
era of behaviorism. These include memory, learning, reasoning, problem
solving, creativity, language, and other mental processes reflecting abstract
thought. The gatekeeper into all of these mental processes is perception, so
mechanisms of attention and perception are an important part of cognitive
psychology.
If cognitive psychology in the 1980s can be said to operate as a paradigm,
the assumptions of the paradigm include first, an assumption that there are
organizing mental structures that allow humans to perceive and process
information. A second assumption is that the individual plays an active role
in the organization of information. Finally, cognitive psychologists share the
empirical research methods of behaviorists, mostly rejecting theoretical
speculation. Although the topics of interest for cognitive psychologists are
unobservable mental events, their methods are objective and require
observation and measurement. Cognitive psychology is interdisciplinary,
readily forming links with the other social sciences, philosophy, linguistics,
physics, engineering, and computer science. These interdisciplinary links are
sometimes referred to together as cognitive science.
In the 1980s, cognitive psychologists generally fall into one of two camps.
Many continue to pursue questions about abstract higher level mental
processes, such as learning, memory, and motivation. Only now, instead of
trying to identify the S-R units, they look for mental mechanisms that
process incoming information and produce responses. Some of these
cognitive psychologists work with other cognitive scientists to develop
machine models of learning, pattern recognition, and other forms of artificial
intelligence. Other psychologists, the neuroscientists, follow the Lashley and
Hebb tradition and try to understand neurophysiology and neural activity.
Artificial intelligence (AI), the creation of mechanical models of thought, is

an engineering branch of computer science focused on answering some of
psychology’s questions. During the last 30 years of the 20th-century,
researchers in AI have worked primarily in two areas. Some of them develop
machine models of human thinking, learning, and perceiving. The belief that
machines can be built that will think the way humans think is referred to as
strong AI. The goal for those who believe in strong AI is to build thinking
machines for the purpose of understanding these processes in human mind.
Others have been trying to develop machines that can perform some
activities as well as or better than a human can. The belief that machines can
be built that will perform some activity as well as a human but that
machines will not ever “think” the way humans think is referred to as weak
AI.
✔ Stop and think.

Can a computer be programmed to carry on a conversation with you
that could not be distinguished from one you would have with another
human, and would that be evidence that human mind is only a
sophisticated program?
To build any machine, the task it will be required to accomplish must be

representable as a series of operations. In the case of AI, the operations of
the model must be computable, meaning that its operations must be written
as a series of mathematical statements.
✔ Stop and think.
Can human thought be reduced to a series of mathematical statements?

If so, can all of human thought be reduced in that way? If only some of
human thought can be reduced to mathematical statements, what is it
that cannot be reduced?
Thus, those working in AI must determine whether it is possible to

represent human thought as a series of mathematical statements, and if so,
whether there are limits to what can be represented in that way.
Information-processing computational models of thinking and learning use
the idea of a single computer, operating in a linear manner, to simulate how
humans might process discrete units of information. Although this idea is
interesting, it is not a very satisfactory explanation for complex human
thought. Later theorists suggest a model using whole banks of computers
operating parallel to one another. In addition, these computers interact with
one another, so that the processing of information is distributed across
computers. This complex model of information-processing is referred to as
parallel distributed processing, or connectionism. Banks of computers
operating in this parallel and distributed manner resemble nothing so much
as mechanical schematics of physiological neural networks. For a time, it is
thought that this connectionist computer modeling is the key to
understanding learning in humans. By the end of the 20th century, however,
many cognitive scientists have given up this idea.
The Chinese Room

In 1982, John Searle proposes an experiment to support his argument
that just because a computer program could produce output that
resembles what a human could produce, that does not mean that the
computer is thinking. Imagine, suggests Searle, that you are locked in a
room with boxes full of cards with Chinese symbols printed on them
and a book of rules in English about when to choose which symbol.
The rules say things like “the squiggle-squiggle sign is to be followed
by the squoggle-squoggle sign.” Someone outside the room passes a
card under the door that shows the squiggle-squiggle sign. Your task is
to look through the book for the appropriate rule and then pass back
out the squoggle-squoggle sign in response. Suppose that, unknown to
you, the signs are actually questions in Chinese, and if you follow the
rules in the book, the signs you pass back are the answers to the
questions. If you become very skilled at following the rules and
knowing which sign to pass out in response to the ones you are given,
you might even be able to respond as quickly as a native Chinese
speaker. Those outside the room might think you actually understand
Chinese, but you are really only following rules.
Searle’s point is that you are only manipulating symbols without
attaching any meaning to them. Furthermore, this is exactly what a
computer does. A human, according to Searle, attaches meaning to
symbols. He concludes that this thought experiment proves that human
mind is more than a sophisticated computer program. As he says, “This
simple observation will enable us to refute the thesis of mind as
program” (Searle, 1982, p. 4).
What cognitive scientists discover is that inventions of the human mind,

like games, or other rule-bound activities, are relatively easy to compute, but
human mental operations, many of which may be largely unconscious, are
difficult, if not impossible, to compute (M. Atkins, personal communication,
April 3, 2003). This is the distinction that Gordon Ryle (1949) made between
“knowing how” and “knowing that.” Knowing how to win a game of chess is
computable, but knowing that the chess pieces represent battling feudal
armies is not.
It seems that the tasks that are easiest for human minds are the most
difficult for computers. Many human mental functions do not operate in
law-like ways as the associationists have long assumed. Thus, some suggest
that the Master Program with which the human mind is programmed will
never be written (Dennett, 1989), and there will never be a unified theory
that explains all of human cognition (Papert, 1989). Isaac Newton thought
God was a mathematician, and thus everything about humans would
function according to mathematical laws. Biologists now understand that
evolutionary pressures act more like an inventor who makes tiny changes in
function until the thing functions well enough. The pressures to evolve stop
when the organism works well enough to survive and reproduce. Thus, there
is no reason to believe that all mental activity is governed by mathematical
laws that are similar to the rules of chess.
Although there now appear to be limits to what is computable, the study
of AI is making important strides in mimicking human activities. Machines
are in use today that recognize and respond to human language. Devices for
the blind, for example, can turn speech into written form, and other
machines can turn the written word into spoken language. The limits of
what can and cannot be computed are not yet known.
Neuroscience
Neuroscientists’ goal is to explain thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in terms

of neurological activity. Mental activity, even very abstract activity, such as
imagination, is presumed to originate in the physiological functioning of the
brain. Neuroscientists are concerned with how the various structures and
systems of the brain work, including the roles played by whole brain
structures and circuitry to individual neurons and even molecules. For
neuroscientists, behavior is of no interest in and of itself, but is only a clue to
what may be going on in the brain. Even the self “is not the infamous
homunculus, a little person inside our brain perceiving and thinking about
the images the brain forms. It is, rather, a perpetually re-created
neurobiological state” (Damasio, 1994, p. 99).
Advances in measurement technology, including brain imaging, have had
a profound impact on this field in the past 30 years. Today, neuroscientists
are able to visualize the metabolic activity in a living brain at the very
moment that information is being processed. Some of their discoveries can
be made sense of in terms of whole brain systems, such as the finding that
criminals incarcerated for committing murder are significantly more likely
than nonhomicidal controls to show a measurable lack of functioning in the
prefrontal cortex (Ishikawa & Raine, 2002; Raine, Meloy, Bihrle, LaCasse, &
Buchsbaum, 1998). Other results are more difficult to interpret, including the
finding that even the firing of a single neuron must be understood as the
consequence of complex electrical and chemical events. These events include
the firing rate and pattern of that cell, the specific chemicals released, the
receptive capacity of the next cell, and the short- and long-term internal
biochemical changes in both cells. Neuroscientists are only beginning to
appreciate these levels of complexity in brain activity (K. Trujillo, personal
communication, April 14, 2003).
Cognitive Neuroscience
By late in the century, a synthesis of cognitive psychology and neuroscience

is emerging. Its proponents are the psychologists who believe that
perception, language, memory, and cognition “cannot exist apart from the
functioning brain” (Sperry, 1993). Cognitive neuroscientists use data from
brain-imaging technologies to support hypothetical models of cognition. So,
for example, a cognitive neuroscientist might hypothesize that the brain uses
two different systems for recognizing natural and manmade objects. A
research subject is placed into a brain-imaging device, presented with
examples of both types of objects, and must make a decision about them.
The researcher looks for different patterns of brain activation associated with
each type of object and, if these are seen, concludes that the hypothesis has
been supported (Joseph, 2001). So the evidence of neuroscience is used to
support models of how cognition happens.
Among the most significant discoveries being made are the many ways
that unconscious mental processes shape perceptions, understandings, and
behavior (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Wilson, 2002). These unconscious
mental processes, for example, cause perceptions to be erroneous in
systematic ways. The availability heuristic, for example, identified by
Tversky and Kahneman (1973), is the human tendency to base estimates of
probability on information that is familiar, vivid, or recent, instead of on
what is most relevant. People are more likely to believe that they may die in
a terrorist attack shortly after such an attack has been in the news than they
are many months after the attack. Sigmund Freud speculated about many of
these unconscious mental processes in psychoanalytic theory, but it is not
until late in the 20th century that cognitive neuroscientists are able to
provide the observational data to support the existence of such processes.
A cognitive model of visual object recognition is shown in Fig. 12.1. A
schematic like this, showing how the process functions in a normal brain,
can be used to construct tests of cognitive function. Thus, this model can
help to determine exactly where in the brain the damage has occurred in the
event of neurological injury or insult. This model also helps to illustrate how
much of visually recognizing and naming an object is carried out by
unconscious mental processes.
FIG. 12.1. A schematic hierarchical model of visual object recognition (photo reprinted
with permission from “Cognitive Neuropsychology,” by P. W. Halligan and J. C.
Marshall. In R. Fuller, P. N. Walsh, & P. McGinley (Eds.), A Century of Psychology,
Progress, Paradigms and Prospects for the New Millennium (p. 274). London: Routledge).
✔ Stop and think.

If thoughts are the results of neural activity, is free will only an
illusion?
Suggesting that decisions and choices are the result of complex brain
activity implies that free will is only an illusion, or “the mind’s best trick”
(Wegner, 2003). Philosophers have been suggesting for centuries that the
conviction that humans consciously and freely choose their actions might
only be the consequence of assuming a causal relationship between thoughts
about an action and the subsequent performance of the action. At the end of
the 20th century, cognitive neuroscientists are collecting evidence that
thinking about an action is not the cause of that action, and thus, that the
experience of free will is only a mental illusion (Wegner & Wheatly, 1999).
COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Why should it be the case, as the Brelands find, that different species
respond in such different ways, even in very similar environments? The
behaviorists thought that, given the same contingencies of reinforcement,
differences between species would not matter, but it turns out they do. Why?
The general answer that the comparative psychologists come up with is that
different species have evolved to fill different ecological niches and so the
contingencies of reinforcement are rarely the same for different species.
Sociobiology
In 1975, the entomologist E. O. Wilson publishes Sociobiology, his analysis of

the biological bases of social behavior as shaped by the pressures of natural
selection among insects and animals. In this book, Wilson explores the
adaptive significance of social behaviors. Adaptive significance refers to the
influence that a given characteristic may have had on survival in the
environment in which the organism evolved into its present form.
Sociobiologists argue that social behaviors exhibited today have their roots
in characteristics that had adaptive significance during evolution. So, for
example, cooperative social behaviors exist today in some insects and
animals because, during evolution, cooperation enhanced survival.
Sociobiologists believe that both physical forms and social behaviors are
shaped by the pressures of natural selection.
✔ Stop and think.

What might be the adaptive significance of happiness or joy?
From its beginning, sociobiology has been controversial in psychology.

Psychologists are initially resistant to extending sociobiological theories to
human behavior. In the 1970s, sociobiologists fall victim to the same
complaints of anthropomorphizing that plagued earlier animal
psychologists. Many are fearful that sociobiological explanations equate
human behavior with, for example, the behavior of insects. It is not until the
end of the century that some psychologists are willing to acknowledge that,
because humans are also an evolved species, explanations for human social
behavior that take evolutionary pressures and adaptive significance into
consideration might be informative. To distinguish this line of inquiry from
the biologists’ sociobiology, psychologists call their new field evolutionary
psychology.
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology represents continuing efforts to understand the

ways that behavior is influenced by characteristics that appeared as the
result of the pressures of natural selection during evolution. All animals,
including humans, show evidence of these adaptive characteristics.
Evolutionary psychologists attempt to overcome the objections that derailed
sociobiology by recognizing the powerful impact that learning has as it
interacts with biologically based traits and by acknowledging that not every
characteristic can be explained on the basis of adaptive significance. As
comparative psychologist Frans de Waal says, some traits are simply part of
“a package, and only the whole leads to survival and reproduction, not only
a single trait” (as cited in Azar, 2001, p. 18). The principles of evolutionary
psychology are influencing all of the domains of psychology, from cognition
to clinical psychology.
A good example of this influence is seen in Fig. 12.1. Each of the various
functions shown in the process of visual recognition is a product of the long
process of shaping by natural selection. Each distinctive mental operation
has evolved as an adaptation to solve specific survival problems (Halligan &
Marshall, 1997). Viewed as the complete mental operation of object
recognition and naming, the event can seem daunting in its complexity, as
though it can only be the product of a planful creator. Reduced to its
component processes, the event seems more comprehensible.
Animal Language Learning
Questions about the nature of language, how it is acquired, and whether or

not other species use language remain fascinating for psychologists. A great
debate rages between behaviorists, who believe that all behavior is learned,
including language, and those who believe that the capacity to acquire and
use language is a uniquely human trait. Several attempts are made to teach
apes to use a human-like language to test the behaviorist assumption.
Earlier on this journey, the Kellogg family compared the early
development of a common chimpanzee with the development of their own
son. By the end of the experiment, the chimp showed signs of language
comprehension for almost 100 English words, but never learned to say a
single word. In the 1950s, another family adopts a newborn chimpanzee and
tries for 7 years to teach her to speak English. Although this effort fails, at
least one observer records that the chimp apparently teaches her human
companions to use a chimp vocalization to communicate danger (Hayes &
Hayes, 1951; Thorne, 1997).
Hypothesizing that earlier efforts have failed because the vocal apparatus
of chimpanzees is different from that of humans, subsequent researchers use
a variety of other methods to teach language to apes. Language is the use of
symbols to represent and communicate shared understood meanings. Thus,
there are attempts to teach apes to use hand gestures as a kind of sign
language (Gardner & Gardner, 1969), to manipulate small chips with pictures
of objects or words on them (Premack, 1976), and even to type signs on a
specially designed computer keyboard (Rumbaugh, 1977). These efforts
produce results that can more easily be explained on the basis of operant
conditioning. That is, some of the apes can use a few of the symbols if their
use has been carefully shaped through reinforcement, leading to the
conjecture that most of what the apes do is the result of operant
conditioning (Gibbons, 1991). Later, work that specifically avoids the use of
operant reinforcement ultimately proves almost as disappointing (Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1988; Wallman, 1992).
Today, comparative psychologist Irene Pepperberg is teaching African
Grey parrots to speak English words and respond to spoken requests in ways
that indicate they understand the meaning of the words they are hearing
and using. In their natural environments, parrots are highly vocally
communicative social animals. They also possess the vocal apparatus needed
to make human-like sounds. Pepperberg’s work raises intriguing possibilities
and questions about cognition, communication, and language use among
nonhuman animals (Pepperberg, 1999, 2002).
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Research programs in social psychology continue to be influenced by current
social problems, and the results of this research continue to be interpreted
through the lens of prevailing paradigms. By the 1970s, this lens is
increasingly a cognitive one. In social psychology, attribution theory
dominates research in the 1970s, influenced by ideas originating in
information processing. Attribution theory is the notion that how we
explain events in the world to ourselves has a great deal to do with what we
believe and how we interact with others.
Social psychologists are receptive to the idea that unconscious mental
processes influence conscious perceptions. Social psychologists have long
known that it is the perceived world, not the objective world, that shapes
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Jones, 1998). By 1980, psychologist Robert
Zajonc states, “cognition pervades social psychology” (p. 181).
Social Cognition
Along with others, social psychologists recognize that unconscious processes

influence conscious interpretations and even influence what is perceived. In
other words, unconscious expectations cause errors in perception.
Unconscious Processes Shape Perceptions

Psychologist Jean Mandler tells the following story about how
expectations and unconscious processes shaped perceptions in her
classroom:
Some time in the 1970s, I decided to cease using masculine pronouns
in my lectures when I wanted to talk about people in general.
Changing wording is easy enough to do when writing, but much more
difficult when lecturing, because one is thinking about what to say
rather than about the vehicle itself. Nevertheless, I tried to use plural
pronouns some of the time, and when talking about an individual in an
example, to say “he” half of the time and “she” the other half of the
time. Toward the end of the course, I happened to mention that this
was what I had done. Immediately I heard a murmur around the
classroom. I stopped and asked what was the matter. Someone raised
his hand and said, “What do you mean you gave ‘he’ and ‘she’ equal
time? You never said ‘he’ once during the entire course.” We discussed
this a bit, and then I asked for a head count. How many students
thought I had always said “she”? The answer was unanimous. Every
student in the class thought I had used “she” 100% of the time. I
protested, of course; after all, I had worked hard to equalize my usage
of the two pronouns. Then I remembered I had taped my lectures. So I
recruited a couple of students to take two lectures at random and to
count the number of times I had used each of the terms. The resulting
count shocked us all. I had said “she” only 20% of the time. I was
chagrined at how badly I had accomplished my mission, but the
students were equally upset at having estimated 20% to be 100% and
80% to be zero (an effect of the magnitude we would always like to find
in the lab). What had happened, of course, was that the students
weren’t paying attention to the language I was using—they were
attending to its content. They probably couldn’t have reproduced
exactly any phrase I had used. They were totally used to hearing “he”
to refer to an individual. But in those days, one simply did not use
“she” to stand for a generic person, and each usage stuck vividly in
their minds. When I asked them to make a conscious judgment of my
uses of “he,” they examined their explicit memory (the only memory
accessible to them), and there they found a great many “she’s” and no
“he’s.” (adapted from Mandler, 2004)
As this story illustrates, errors in perception caused by unconscious

processes do not occur randomly, but are systematic. And that, social
psychologists discover, is part of what accounts for the formation and
maintenance of stereotypes. Expectations about how certain people will look
and behave are based on which group they have been categorized into based
on initial perceptions. Thus, when people in these groups look or behave in
unexpected ways, those behaviors are less noticed and less remembered in
the cognitive phenomena referred to as selective attention and selective
recall.
Thus, like other psychologists, social psychologists are finding “increasing
signs that, in many important respects, we are out of touch with many
determinants of our behavior” (Jones, 1998, p. 43). The mechanisms of
attention and memory that shape social behaviors, relationships, and
interactions with others operate largely outside of conscious awareness.
The ways in which people think about and organize information about
their social world and the unconscious processes that influence those
thoughts is called social cognition. Social cognition dominates social
psychology today. Unconscious perceptions about body language, for
example, influence how we respond to others (de Roten, Darwish, Stern,
Fivaz-Depeursinge, & Corboz-Wanery, 1999; Flack, Laird, & Cavallaro, 1999).
Perceptions of gender result in whole sets of unconscious expectations for
behavior (Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985). To get a sense of how
powerful gender expectations are, for example, recall the experience of
encountering someone whose gender is difficult to determine.
Cultural Influences on Social Behavior
At the end of the 20th century, social psychologists are concerned with how
much the findings from middle-class, educated, European, and North
American populations can be generalized across classes and across cultures.
Are there really universal psychological laws about social life, or is there so
much variability across cultures that the search for universal laws should be
abandoned? A good example of this is the phenomenon called the
fundamental attribution error. This attribution error is the tendency to
explain personal successes in terms of personal characteristics and
dispositions (I got a good grade because I’m smart, and I know how to study
effectively), but failures in terms of the situation (I got a poor grade because
the professor asked picky questions). People making the fundamental
attribution error exhibit the reverse pattern when making attributions about
other people’s successes and failures. Other people succeed because of the
situation (the exam was easy), and they fail because of personal
characteristics (they are stupid or undisciplined). The fundamental
attribution error has been found in many different research studies and has
been assumed to be a universal principle of human social life.
That assumption is challenged by cross-cultural studies. These studies
reveal that it may only be European and North American cultural groups
that exhibit this error in attribution. Among these groups, the individual is
viewed as independent of others, possessing a relatively fixed personality,
and able to choose behaviors freely. In many, in fact most, other cultures, the
individual is viewed as interdependent with others, and any analysis of
behavior requires the consideration of the social roles played by that
individual and the obligations of those roles. Personality in these other
cultures is viewed as dynamic and emerging from the role and situation in
the moment. Research participants in these cultures do not commit the
fundamental attribution error. Thus, social psychologists are now finding
that this error is not a universal principle of social life at all, but is highly
dependent on the culture in which the data are collected (Fiske, Kitayama,
Markus & Nisbett, 1998). Clearly, the future search for universal principles
governing social life will need to take cultural factors into consideration.
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
Since about 1975, the study of developmental psychology has undergone

transformations as well, and many of these have brought the field closer to
other domains of psychology than ever before. For example, developmental
psychobiologists explore links between physical and psychological processes
during development in human and nonhuman animals. Cognitive
developmentalists search for the appearance and development of cognitive
mechanisms of attention, information processing, and problem solving.
Psychologists interested in emotion and motivation seek to understand how
young children come to be able to regulate their own emotional experience
and expression and the processes that allow them to function effectively in a
social world.
Infant Skills
The 1970s and 1980s see an expansion in research with very young infants,
and data are even collected within hours of birth. Study after study reveals
that infants arrive with an impressive array of skills and characteristics,
enabling them to adapt quickly and effectively to the extrauterine
environment and to form essential social connections with their caregivers
(Brazleton, Nugent, & Lester, 1987). Far from being blank slates, human
newborns have remarkably well-formed temperaments and, as is true in
many other species, are actively ready to engage their environment. Because
these characteristics and abilities are present at birth, they most likely are a
result of the pressures of natural selection. The realization that even young
infants play active roles in establishing relationships and creating the
environments in which they learn (Scarr, 1992) raises questions about how
much of any given outcome measure, from intelligence to personality,
results from natural attributes and how much is learned.
✔ Stop and think.

How much of who a person turns out to be is a result of natural
endowments, and how much is learned from the environment?
Behavior Genetics
Like evolutionary psychology, the field of behavioral genetics bridges both

biology and psychology. The difference between the two areas is that
evolutionary psychology is primarily focused on species-typical behaviors
that appear today as a result of the pressures of natural selection during
evolution, and behavioral geneticists are interested in behavioral variability
among individuals that results from genetic influences. During the height of
the rat-learning era, distinct lineages of rats are bred, based on their ability
to run mazes. The breeding of “maze-bright” and “maze-dull” rats, the
earlier eugenics movement, the longitudinal studies of gifted youngsters, and
the large study of temperament conducted by Alexander Thomas and Stella
Chess all contribute to the conviction that genetic variability accounts for
some individual differences in personality and behavior.
Behavioral geneticists explore these questions using comparisons of
adopted infants with their biological and adoptive parents and of pairs of
identical and fraternal twins. When the degree of genetic relatedness
between two individuals is known, as it is with these groups, a numeric
estimate can be made about how much of the variance found between
individuals on observable measures is due to genetic influences. This
numeric estimate is called heritability. Estimates of heritability can range
from 1.0 for a trait that is almost completely due to genes, like fingerprints,
to .0 for a trait over which genes have almost no influence, like the language
the individual speaks.
Many studies of heritability conducted during the 1980s find that
somewhere between 20% and 60% of the variance found between individuals
on any given psychological characteristic can be attributed to genes. For
example, the heritability measure for intelligence is about .70, meaning that
about 70% of the variance between individuals on intelligence scores can be
attributed to genetic influences. Many psychological traits long assumed to
be learned are found to be influenced by genes. In one of the more dramatic
examples, McGue and Lykken (1991) find that the likelihood that an
individual’s marriage will end in divorce is heritable. Because of repeated
findings that “genetic factors play a substantial role in the origins of
individual differences with respect to all psychological traits” (Rutter, 2002,
p. 2), behavior genetics becomes an important area of developmental study
by the end of the century.
The Role of Nurture
By the end of the century, environmental influences on development are

beginning to be viewed more realistically. No longer is maternal deprivation
seen as a sentence to future psychopathology. Even parental disciplinary
styles are no longer seen as crucial in shaping child personality (Maccoby &
Martin, 1983). This does not mean that the social environment does not
influence development. Persistent and continuing negative social
interactions do have long-term consequences for psychological functioning
(Seligman, 1993). These negative social interactions may occur within the
family, but they may also occur among peers, at school, or even in the wider
social community. Children do not completely create the social environment
in which they grow up, and environments sometimes have profound effects
on individual psychological functioning. Research continues today into the
influences on development of the social ecologies in which individuals exist.
✔ Stop and think.

How would you test the question of whether the development of
personality is more strongly influenced by nature or by nurture?
The Story of John/Joan

There is perhaps no more dramatic story of the test of nature versus
nurture than the story of John/Joan. In this case, the outcome measure
of the test is gender identity, the degree to which a person feels like a
culturally stereotypic male or female. Is gender identity a set of learned
characteristics, or is it the consequence of physiological factors, such as
chromosomal make-up, hormones, or genital structures? In the 1960s, a
horrific medical accident gives one psychologist an opportunity to test
this question.
The story begins in August 1965, when John and his identical twin
brother are born. Both boys are healthy and developmentally normal
through the first several months of infancy. At 8 months of age, the
boys are brought to the hospital to be circumcised because their
foreskins are closing, making urination difficult. Although his brother’s
operation concludes normally, John’s penis is completely destroyed by
the electrocautery needle used to perform the surgery. A psychiatrist
consulted on the case concludes that as a result of the loss of his penis,
John “will be unable to consummate marriage or have normal
heterosexual relations; he will have to recognize that he is incomplete,
physically defective, and that he must live apart” (Colapinto, 2000, p.
16). John’s parents are devastated.
Several months later, the parents contact sex researcher Dr. John
Money after hearing about his pioneering work at Johns Hopkins
University with transsexuals. Transsexuals are people whose gender
identity does not match their physical sex. Money believes that gender
identity is not a result of physical sex, but is learned. After examining
both boys, Money convinces the parents that John can be successfully
taught to assume a female gender identity using an intensive program
of social, mental, and hormonal conditioning. For Money, this sad case
presents a nearly perfect opportunity to test scientifically the roles of
nature and nurture in the formation of gender identity. This case makes
it possible to begin his study with an infant, and the identical twin
brother provides a genetically matched control who will be raised as a
normal male.
When John is 22 months old, the study begins. The little boy
undergoes surgical genital reconstruction to make his physical
appearance resemble a female, and John becomes Joan. The parents are
instructed never to talk about the change, not to tell Joan about the
operation, and never to waver in their decision to treat Joan as a girl.
This they try valiantly to do for the next 12 years.
In the professional literature, Money reports the experiment as an
unqualified success. These results have far-reaching consequences. As
many as one in every 2,000 babies is born with ambiguous genitals. For
purely psychosocial reasons, these infants are raised as one sex or the
other, and the results of Money’s John/Joan experiment encourage both
doctors and parents that an arbitrary assignment of gender will work
with these children or any child. Today, genital surgery is often
performed on infants with ambiguous genitals, and they are assigned a
gender.
Told from Joan’s point of view, this is an entirely different story.
From the age of 2 until midadolescence, John tries and fails to form a
female gender identity. He is the victim of ceaseless teasing and is an
outcast among his peers. By age 15, Joan has reassumed a male
identity, and at 16, he voluntarily undergoes genital reconstructive
surgery and becomes a man (adapted from Colapinto, 2000). On May 4,
2004, the man known as John/Joan commits suicide.
One might conclude that gender identity is based in biology, but
there are many transsexuals with the anatomy of one sex and the
gender identity of the other. These people are usually raised in
congruence with their anatomy and treated throughout childhood as
the gender matching their anatomy. Still, their gender identity differs
from their anatomy.
Questions about the relative influence of biological and
environmental factors remain among the most fascinating and
controversial in the field of developmental psychology. This story also
exposes one of the most disturbing scandals in recent psychological
research and one that has not yet been resolved.
The Nature of the Interaction
By the early 1990s, it is clear that both nature and nurture contribute to
development. The real question is not how much is nature and how much
nurture, but how interaction between innate attributes and the learning
environment influence development. Questions about which comes first are
not very meaningful, because both nature and nurture are present from the
first moment of life. And, as Rutter (2002) argues, “Empirical research
findings suggest that genetic vulnerabilities operate, in part, through their
role in bringing about an increased susceptibility to environmental hazards”
(p. 10).
A good example of the influence of genes on developing social
relationships can be found in Dymphna van den Boom’s exhaustive study of
neonatal temperament and infant attachment. Temperament is innate
whereas, according to Bowlby and Ainsworth, attachment is a learned
behavior. Van den Boom finds that, although infant attachment at 12 months
can indeed be predicted by earlier measures of maternal responsiveness, that
same maternal responsiveness during the first 6 months can be predicted
from neonatal measures of infant irritability (van den Boom, 1989). In other
words, at birth, some infants are innately less likely to cry and easier to
soothe than others, and mothers are more responsive to these infants than
they are to infants who are innately irritable and harder to soothe.
✔ Stop and think.

Are infants securely attached because their mothers are responsive, or
are mothers responsive because their infants are easier to care for?
Which comes first?
Future Directions
Longitudinal studies are those that follow participants across long periods of
time, for example, through childhood, adolescence, and even into adulthood.
After many decades of longitudinal study, it becomes clear that stage
theories of development related to specific age groups are inadequate.
Development in all domains, from cognition to emotion, continues
throughout life. The social and historical contexts in which humans live
undergo dramatic changes across the course of a single lifetime, and these
changes influence developmental pathways in both subtle and obvious ways.
By the end of the century, it is clear that emerging concepts of human
development should be ones that can be applied to processes and dynamics
across the entire life-span (Elder, 1998).
STATISTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL

CHANGES
Both developmental and social psychology are plagued by the wish to

uncover causal factors while often constrained by the impossibility of
experimentally manipulating variables. Often, only correlational research is
possible when more powerful causal tests would be more informative. What
might be learned if a developmental scientist could raise a group of children
from birth in a specified environment? What if one could assign infants to
parents who use a specified parenting style to see if parenting style really
makes a difference? What would be learned if a social scientist could
manipulate the socioeconomic level of participants in a study and vary that
with ethnic identity to examine the influence of these variables on attitudes?
Studies in which variables can be systematically manipulated provide the
strongest evidence of cause and effect, but in the developmental and social
realm, these studies are usually unethical, impossible, or both.
Psychologists turn instead to new statistical techniques called causal
models. In causal modeling, the researcher hypothesizes a causal set of
variables and then tests to see if the data are consistent with this model.
Using correlational data, researchers hope to identify the relative amount of
variation in an outcome measure that can be attributed to each variable in
the model. Variance in an outcome measure of child personality, for
example, might be influenced by several variables, including temperament at
birth, sex, birth order, number and sex of siblings, parenting style, and
characteristics of the neighborhood of rearing. A causal model assigns a
value to each of these variables that represents the amount of variance in the
outcome measure that is accounted for by that variable.
These statistical models, as well as a variety of other methodological
developments, result in large part from advances in computer technology.
Faster and more powerful computers allow for more complex statistical
analyses and make possible more in-depth analyses of the responses to items
in survey research. For example, computers can be used more readily to
identify when participants are using some strategy to respond to the survey,
rather than responding to the issues addressed in the items themselves.
Computers can present and measure reaction times to sensory stimuli in a
variety of modalities. The data collected by the computer can then be
transferred directly into statistical software for analysis, thus reducing
human error. Even clinical psychologists are using computers for tasks that
were never imagined a generation ago, such as doing intake interviews,
psychological assessments, and even diagnosing depression. The limits of
computer use in psychology are yet to be discovered.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
At the end of the 20th century, explanations for both psychoses and neuroses
are shifting away from environmental causes and toward physiological
factors. Schizophrenia, for example, is now believed to be primarily a brain
disease that may have origins in prenatal exposure to certain viruses
(Megginson, 1996; Venables, 1996). Various forms of depression are also
strongly influenced by physiological predispositions. For many people, the
symptoms of depression are dramatically relieved by the use of serotonin
blockers and other drugs that influence brain chemistry.
The diagnosis of mental illness remains an inexact art. Clinicians still
must depend on their own assessments of presenting symptoms for
diagnosing and categorizing mental illness, much as they have since the 19th
century. At least one clinical historian refers to the present-day state of the
diagnosis of mental illness as “organized confusion” (Reisman, 1991).
Treatments
Confusion in the diagnosis of mental illness does not preclude the practice of
a wide variety of treatments or the development of new treatments. Among
these are many psychoactive medications that appear in the last quarter of
the 20th century. Targeted at various neurochemical systems that regulate
neural activity, these medications are successfully used to treat mood
disorders, activity levels, hallucinations, and disturbing behavioral
symptoms. Many who use these medications experience dramatic relief from
years of psychological discomfort and even report feeling that their entire
personality has changed (Kramer, 1993). This raises intriguing questions
about what personality really is and where it comes from.
Psychologists also practice many forms of psychotherapy. By 2004, some
states permit appropriately trained psychologists to prescribed medications.
However, many psychologists continue to use “talk” psychotherapies.
Object Relations
Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approaches to therapy are concerned

with interpersonal relationships in the client’s life or how the client relates
to others. This approach requires many sessions over at least several months.
This allows the therapist to learn the client’s social history and patterns of
interactions with others, making it possible for the therapist to offer
suggestions for improving interpersonal relationships. A recent transition in
the practice of object relations therapy is the use of the current interactions
between client and therapist as a model to facilitate change in the client’s
interpersonal relationships (Liff, 1992).
Behavior Therapy
Behavior therapies appear to be effective at helping the client to change a

particular behavior, such as recovering from a fear of flying or to stop
smoking. These therapies are based on operant conditioning techniques,
including the gradual desensitization to noxious stimuli. The legacy of B. F.
Skinner’s form of radical behaviorism is seen in these behavior modification
therapies.
Cognitive Therapies
Several psychotherapeutic approaches that encourage individuals to

restructure their thinking become popular during the 1970s and remain so
today. Both Albert Ellis, who develops Rational Emotive Therapy (RET), and
Aaron Beck, the founder of cognitive therapy, report that they create these
new approaches because they find psychoanalytic methods to be less than
satisfying in their effectiveness with clients (Arnkoff & Glass, 1992). A
therapist practicing RET confronts clients with the irrational beliefs that are
making them miserable. A cognitive therapist usually takes a less
confrontive approach, but still challenges clients with their unrealistic
thoughts and beliefs. Therapists using these approaches assume that helping
individuals to change their thoughts will result in a change in feelings and
behaviors as well. The movement in psychology toward considering the
importance of cognition in motivating feelings and behaviors is seen in this
relatively new approach to therapy.
Eclectic Therapy
Many therapists take an eclectic approach in their practices, meaning that

they use whatever technique they think will be most useful in any given
session. Thus, they may begin with a humanistic, open, and accepting
session, then later introduce some cognitive interventions, getting clients to
recognize irrational thoughts. These therapists may even recommend the
addition of some psychoactive medications to relieve immediate symptoms
while psychotherapy proceeds.
The Efficacy of Therapy
Studies conducted by practitioners of any given form of therapy still tend

to find in favor of the effectiveness of that form of therapy. Studies
conducted by opponents to a particular therapy, or to psychotherapy in
general, tend to find against the effectiveness of therapy. Some studies have
found that professionally trained psychotherapists provide no more effective
therapy than do untrained paraprofessionals (Berman & Norton, 1985). This
leaves both consumers and the insurance companies that pay for these
services at a loss, and the controversy continues to rage (see Perez, 1999;
Schneider, 1999).
Some newer forms of cognitive therapy are proving to be effective, even
for clients suffering from long-standing problems with depression. These
therapies are also effective in as few as five or six sessions (O’Hanlon &
Weiner-Davis, 1989). This is having a profound impact on the practice of
psychotherapy. For example, for clients who have insurance coverage for
mental health care, insurance company rules largely dictate the care
allowed. Because some cognitive therapies are effective in such a short time,
it is now common to permit only five or six sessions of psychotherapy
annually. For psychotherapists, this means that they must constantly be
generating new clients.
The Future of Clinical Psychology
Clinical psychology is taking a number of new directions. For example, in

1980, a new division called health psychology joins the APA. Health
psychologists are interested in the psychological characteristics associated
with both maintaining physical health and preventing illness. They find
medical models of illness that focus exclusively on physiological factors to
be too deterministic and believe that these do not adequately explain the
complexity of even physical illness (Belloch, 1997). Behavioral variables,
such as lifestyle choices, explain more of the variance in physical health than
do biological factors, such as genes (M. Wertheimer, personal
communication, November 8, 2004). Other movements are also influencing
clinical psychology.
Multiculturalism
Clinical psychologists are increasingly interested in cultural influences on

both mental illness and psychotherapy. Individuals from different cultural
groups are differentially likely to suffer from some forms of mental illness.
And, if they want to be effective with their clients, therapists must be aware
of how the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds of both client
and therapist affect the therapeutic setting. The influences of gender, age,
and sexual orientation must also be considered in clinical practice (Pickren,
2004).
A Pluralism of Problems and Solutions

The practice of psychotherapy is moving into new arenas, and
psychologists must be prepared for these changes. In this century, disaster
relief is becoming almost as important a role for psychotherapists as it is for
firefighters. Therapies are needed that include all family members and that
consider the communities in which they interact. As more is learned about
which therapies are most effective for specific problems, therapists need to
become skilled in the practice of a variety of approaches. Also, as economic
pressures increase, and as more is learned about how therapy works,
individuals will be encouraged to engage in more self-help, facilitating the
growth of coping skills and enhancing life experiences for themselves
(Norcross & Freedheim, 1992). This new form of self-help will be clinically
validated and distinctly different from current “popular” psychology and
recovery movements that pathologize and disempower individuals and
encourage them to follow charismatic leaders (Kaminer, 1992).
POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
A recent outgrowth of clinical psychology is the emerging field of positive

psychology. Psychologists working in this area are concerned with the ways
in which individuals can enhance the good in their lives; enjoy mutually
supportive, satisfying, and lasting friendships and love relationships; find
meaning and fulfillment in work experiences; and live a socially “good life.”
Positive psychologists are concerned with human virtues like generosity,
compassion, cooperation, responsibility, creativity, and wisdom. They study
the experiences that make people feel good and the personality traits that
are associated with reports of feeling happy.
This interest in positive psychology may seem like a recent event, but it
has actually been a part of this field for a very long time. Recall that
Aristotle was concerned with the nature of friendship and that William
James provided advice for how to be the person you wish to become.
Psychoanalytic emphases on the dark demands of the id, conflicts in
unconsciousness, and the death instinct have overshadowed positive
approaches since early in the 20th century. John Watson studied how to
induce fear and discouraged parents from showing affection to their
children. And, for many decades after the close of World War II, the
emphasis in clinical psychology has been on healing sick and disturbed
minds.
Credit for reintroducing questions about how to achieve and maintain a
positive life is usually given to the same Martin Seligman who researched
questions about learned helplessness. By early in the 21st century, Seligman
and his colleagues in positive psychology are interested in how some people
are able to maintain an optimistic outlook despite all odds and the degree to
which those skills can be learned. Seligman argues that depression can be
avoided by changing how we explain disappointments to ourselves. People
who explain a recent failure as the result of factors external to themselves
over which they have no control, like blaming a poor exam score on picky
questions or a mean professor, will have negative feelings and are prone
toward depression. Similarly, pessimists, who explain failures as the result of
permanent personal characteristics, such as being stupid, are also prone
toward depression. But optimists, who explain failures as a result of
temporary conditions that are mostly under their control and who believe
that even negative personal characteristics are changeable, have mostly
positive feelings and are significantly less likely to succumb to depression
(Seligman, 1993). There are many questions that remain to be explored about
the experience of happiness and how to enhance positive life experiences.
✔ Stop and think.

Is happiness a means or an end?
PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN
Earlier, the entry of women into psychology resulted in research specifically

aimed at understanding the psychology of women; Hollingworth’s
dissertation refuting the myth of decreased functioning during menstruation
is a good example. Much of this research examined variables internal to
individual women, such as poor self-esteem, to explain psychological issues
related to women. But other early studies took into consideration the
sociopolitical context in seeking to understand why women think, feel and
behave the way they characteristically do. Helen Bradford Thompson
concluded in her 1903 dissertation, for example, that social influences
accounted for the sex differences she found (Milar, 2000). Other women
psychologists pointed out the effect of social forces on the research itself:
“There is perhaps no field aspiring to be scientific where flagrant personal
bias, logic martyred in the cause of supporting a prejudice, unfounded
assertions, and even sentimental rot and drivel, have run riot to such an
extent as here” (Woolley, 1910, p. 340).
By the 1970s, when another wave of feminism inspires more research into
the psychology of women, the focus has moved to trying to document
discrimination against women and to understanding the psychological
consequences of discrimination in women’s professional, social, and
personal environments. Many studies provide clear evidence of pervasive
discrimination against women, both subtle and overt. Among these are a
series of “eye of the beholder” studies, documenting that people of both
sexes judge the same work or the same behavior differently, and usually less
positively, if they believe the work or behavior was done by a woman rather
than a man (Goldberg, 1968; Paludi & Strayer, 1985).
At the turn of the century, there are at least two very divergent views and
research agendas focused on the psychology of women. One sees sex
differences as the essential question. These differences are presumed to arise
from the biological categories of male and female, so that gender differences
are really sex differences. In this view, research involves observing and
describing the emergence of these differences and measuring the nature and
size of the differences at various stages of life. The life experiences of
individuals are seen as a natural consequence of their biological sex. The
ultimate question underlying this view is one about whether equality
between the sexes can ever be achieved, and if it is possible, how it might
happen.
The second view sees gender as a social construction against which
individuals are measured. In other words, the social context has defined a
masculine model and a feminine model. As individuals move through life,
expectations for what characteristics they will exhibit are defined by these
models independently of individuals’ actual characteristics. In this view,
differences between males and females arise from differences in culturally
assigned power. The essential questions here have to do with the same
dynamics between powerful and nonpowerful groups that apply in any
situation where there is a significant power difference. The life experiences
of individuals are a consequence of the cultural role that they have been
assigned. In this view, power is achieved by recognizing the role one has
been assigned and rejecting it when it does not fit. The ultimate question
underlying this view is about how to recognize the role one has been
assigned, rejecting the power difference, and claiming one’s own power, thus
leading to social change (Unger, 1997).
Social cognition research illuminates some of the unconscious cognitive
mechanisms that influence thoughts, feelings, and behaviors about gender,
power, and the self. For example, psychologists have found that, although
many younger women report that they have never experienced sex
discrimination, experimental studies find that “women use selective
awareness to deny personal discrimination” (Crosby, 1984). The role played
by unconscious mechanisms in influencing the dynamics between men and
women continues to be a rich area of exploration.
PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
Another area of interest in psychology that is reemerging at the beginning of
the 21st century is the psychology of religion. This is the scientific study of
how people think about religion, what it means to them, various types of
religious behavior, and how religious beliefs influence other aspects of
people’s lives (Hester, 1998). Religious beliefs are among the most powerful
forces for both good and evil operating in our social environment. The
psychology of religion is one of the oldest topics in the field, but one of
many that were not studied during the height of behaviorism. Given that
differences in religious beliefs are currently among the most important
geopolitical issues, the study of the psychology of religion is today taking on
increasing importance.
INDUSTRIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
The same developments that influence the rest of psychology also find
expression in industrial psychology. After World War II, attention was
focused on motivation in the workplace, applications for operant
conditioning techniques, and how the processing of information influenced
job performance. Today, organizational psychology has much more influence
in the field. Organizational psychologists ask questions about whole work
systems as opposed to individuals’ work lives. For example, the earlier work
of Lewin and social psychologists on leadership styles was followed by
interest in the functioning and effectiveness of teams in the workplace.
Organizational psychologists study the ways in which achievable goals and
objectives are determined and reached in work teams and processes of
strategic planning.
The transition from a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy in
the United States, the positive climate for business during the 1950s and
1960s, and various socioeconomic movements result in near-full
employment among working-and middle-class White males during these
years. Full employment allows employees more flexibility in job selection.
Influenced by humanistic psychology’s emphasis on self-actualization,
employees become concerned about job satisfaction and self-fulfillment.
Industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists are called on to help employers
develop employment situations that provide employees with satisfying
careers that have the potential to meet a wide variety of employees’ personal
and professional needs.
Issues of fairness in hiring, compensation, and promotion also become
important as concerns in the wider world turn first to racial and ethnic
discrimination, and later, to discrimination based on sex, age, disability, and
sexual orientation. I/O psychologists are charged with designing systems
that minimize the influence of prejudice against these now-protected groups
in the workplace.
At the end of the century, sociopolitical forces continue to influence the
emerging questions in I/O psychology. An increasing convergence of work
and nonwork domains raises issues related to the merging of these aspects of
people’s lives. The personal and psychological consequences of
telecommuting, for example, raise concerns as advances in technology make
possible many alternatives to the traditional work model. Sexual harassment
and drug testing create problems for employers and employees alike. The
continued lack of affordable and quality day care for both children and aging
parents creates problems for many families, especially as economic
conditions and expectations of higher standards of living push all able-
bodied adults in the family into the workplace. Economic slowdowns and
“downsizing” create the need for I/O psychologists to help employees adapt
to career changes later in life. The aging of the “baby boomers” creates a
large segment of employees moving into retirement and raises questions
about how to negotiate that transition successfully. In the 21st century, I/O
psychology is a vibrant and dynamic field with many fascinating avenues
yet to explore.
Organized Psychology
In 1892, the APA was founded at a meeting of fewer than a dozen
psychologists held at the home of G. Stanley Hall. The purpose of this
new organization was “to promote psychology as a science.” It was
decided that there would be a new president elected each year, and the
president would be chosen on the basis of having made a significant
contribution to the science of psychology. Hall was elected as the first
president. In 1905, Mary Calkins was elected as the 14th president, the
first woman to be so honored.
From the very beginning, there were tensions between psychologists
with different interests and goals for this new endeavor. A variety of
different organizations have been founded in the years since 1892,
representing these divergent views. Over the years, the most divisive
tensions have arisen between those who view psychology as a purely
scientific discipline and those who view the field as an applied and
helping profession. In 1918, the first division within the APA was
formed to address the interests of those calling themselves clinical
psychologists.
By 1944, a major reorganization of the APA was needed to reflect the
changes occurring in psychology. The goals of the organization were
changed to “advance psychology as a science, as a profession, and as a
means of promoting human welfare.” Eighteen relatively independent
divisions were formed, each with its own mission and president and
each reflecting some aspect of the goals. This reorganization was
undertaken to preserve the unity of the APA in the face of continuing
and growing tensions between those who advocated psychology as a
science and the increasing number of members who practiced
psychology as an applied discipline.
At the end of the 20th century, membership in APA continues to
reflect the changes in the field of psychology, increasing dramatically
from 7,250 members in 1950 to 159,000 members today. The ratio of
scientists to practitioners also changes during these years. In 1940, 70%
of APA members are scientists, but by 1994, 70% of APA members are
health care providers (Wiggins, 1994). In 1988, scientific psychologists
become so disenchanted with the preponderance of practitioners in
APA that they form their own organization, the American
Psychological Society (APS). By the year 2000, nearly 16,000 scientific
psychologists belong to APS.
PSYCHOLOGY FOR TOMORROW
At the dawn of the new century, there are new questions for psychology to
explore. New technologies provide new ways to examine the operations of
the mind. In addition to wondering about relationships between human
animals and non-human animals, scientists also wonder about relationships
between human minds and artificial minds and about how humans relate to
machines in general. Whole new research programs in “human factors” are
opening up to try to understand interactions between humans and machines.
The search for the few laws that govern psychological life must
increasingly take into consideration the generalizability of those laws to a
global population. Those exploring social psychology ask more questions
about the psychological impact of living in a crowded, diverse, and
overpopulated world. As the world becomes more crowded, issues of
interdependence among nations and among individuals take on importance.
Psychologists are challenged to find a culturally universal psychology.
The Western assumption that humans are motivated by self-interest,
greed, or fear are being called into question. Returning to center stage are
questions about motivation based on the desire to be thought of well; the
role of generosity, compassion, and cooperation in our social lives; and our
wish to live in virtue.
The Times
At the end of the 20th century, the term “the West” no longer
accurately identifies a unified geopolitical region. Instead, the
distinction is drawn between the developed world, which includes
Japan, Australia, and Israel in addition to North America and Western
Europe, and the developing world, which includes Central and South
America as well as Africa, most of Asia, most of Eastern Europe, and
the Middle East.
The social environment in the developed world at the beginning of
the 21st century might best be characterized by the twin themes of
connection and consumption. In the same way that the different
domains of psychology increasingly overlap with one another and
psychology is strengthening its connections with other disciplines, the
rest of the world also seems to be becoming more closely connected.
Millions of people in the developed world have access to the Internet,
and information flows freely among individuals and across national
boundaries. Millions carry mobile phones, connecting with friends and
family at any time or place. The advent of cable television in the 1970s
allows for the proliferation of news and entertainment outlets, and
cross-national broadcasts are available to those who seek them out.
Crises also cross national boundaries, such as global warming and the
rapid spread of deadly diseases. Responses can also be mounted
globally through the United Nations and, as information is spread
through the Internet, through the unified actions of millions of
concerned individuals.
At the same time, world population continues to grow exponentially
and natural resources continue to be depleted. Demand for material
goods, personal services, and information skyrockets in the developed
world. By the end of the 20th century in the United States, there is one
automobile for every person in the country, and consumer debt has
increased to an average of $10,000 per person (Brobeck, 1997). At the
same time, the developing world provides cheap labor and natural
resources.
The power of profit-making business also grows and becomes global.
Corporate power is consolidated through the formation of
multinational corporations, the World Trade Organization, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Corporate powers
use computers to connect with consumers by collecting huge databases
on buying habits and personal lives. And, although there may be many
more news outlets, they are controlled by fewer and larger profit-
making corporations.
This era is also characterized by disturbing disconnections. Students,
who used to study between classes, may now chat with friends on their
mobile phones while ignoring potential new friends sitting right next
to them. Since the advent of television, local communities have seen
participation decline in community activities. Suburbs spread for miles,
dotted with identical mini-markets and malls, but without a sense of
connection to the community. Families can live for years in the same
house and never know their neighbors. One in every three marriages
ends in divorce, and even in two-parent families, both parents are
likely to be working and spending many hours a week commuting. The
whole family sitting down to dinner together has become a charming
anachronism from some earlier era.
Glossary
Adaptive significance refers to the influence that a given characteristic may

have had on survival during evolution.
Androcentric means male-centered.
Animism is the belief that humans share the world with extraordinary,
extracorporeal, and invisible beings.
Anomaly is a piece of research evidence that violates one or more of the

assumptions of the paradigm.
Anthropomorphize is to attribute human characteristics to nonhuman

animals.
Archival research is done by collecting data from the historical record.
Associationism is the belief that knowledge about the world is acquired by

associating new information with previously experienced objects and events.
Assumptions are beliefs that are not questioned or tested.
Astrology is the foretelling of the future by the position of planets and stars
during Babylonian times.
Attribution theory is the notion that how we explain events in the world to
ourselves has a great deal to do with what we believe and how we interact
with others.
Availability heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman refers to the
human tendency to base estimates of probability on information that is
familiar, vivid, or recent, instead of on what is most relevant.
Bell-Magendie law is the name given to the discovery that there are
sensory nerves that carry impulses from the sensory organs to the brain, and
motor nerves that carry impulses from the brain to the muscles of the motor
system.
Blind in scientific usage means that the research participant does not know
what variables are being studied or the hypothesis being tested.
Cell assembly is a set of cells connected to one another into neural circuits.
Events or images are represented in the cortex by activity in these cell
assemblies.
Chlorpromazine is a drug used to reduce hallucinations in schizophrenia.
Circular arguments use the premises as evidence of the validity of the

conclusions.
Clinical psychology as named by Witmer is the domain of psychology

related to treatment. Early 20th-century uses refer mostly to institutional
testing.
Cognitive dissonance as named by Festinger refers to the cognitive state

that results when behaviors are not consonant with beliefs.
Cognitive map as named by Tolman refers to a mental representation of the

surrounding environment.
Cognitive science refers to links formed among psychology, philosophy,

linguistics, physics, engineering, and computer science.
Comparative psychology is the study of psychological characteristics
among animals, both human and nonhuman.
Conditioned reflex in John Watson’s view is the result of a reflex action

being repeatedly paired with a satisfactory outcome, thus making the action
more likely to be repeated in the future.
Confirmation bias is the tendency to pay attention only to evidence that

supports an already accepted belief and ignore evidence that refutes that
belief.
Connectionism refers to the belief that banks of computers operating both

parallel and in interaction with one another will simulate the action of
physiological neural networks.
Contingencies of reinforcement named by Skinner are the conditions

under which reinforcement will occur.
Corporeal has to do with the physical body.
Correlation occurs when two or more variables tend to change together in a

way not expected by chance.
Cosmogenic refers to the beginning of the universe.
Determinism in philosophy is the belief that all events are caused by matter
acting on matter, and, in psychology, it is the belief that behavior is caused
(by matter), not freely willed.
Dionysian faith practiced secret religious rites and promised benefits in an

afterlife to believers.
Dizygotic refers to a twin originating from a different fertilized egg cell

than its twin.
Double-blind in scientific usage means that both the researchers who collect
the data and the participants are unaware of the variables being studied or
the hypothesis being tested.
Dream analysis is a technique used in the practice of psychoanalysis to help

the analyst identify patients’ repressed thoughts.
Ego as named by Freud is a set of regulatory functions that both keep the
impulses of the id under control and help the id to achieve its goals. Ego is
the second major component of personality.
Elementalist psychology is based on the assumption that conscious mind is

made up of basic mental elements associated together.
Empiricism is the philosophy that experience should form the foundation

for belief.
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and how knowledge is acquired.
Equipotentiality as named by Lashley means that within a given functional

area of the cortex all cells have an equal potential to perform that function.
Eucharist is the ritualized and figurative sacrifice and eating of the body
and blood of Christ.
Eugenics was a 20th-century movement to control human reproduction so

that only people with desirable characteristics would be allowed to have
children and people with undesirable characteristics would be eliminated.
Experimental science is the systematic observation and measurement of

nature.
Face validity occurs when an answer appears or seems as though it must be

true.
Faculty is a mental power or ability.
Fixed action patterns as named by ethologists refer to patterns of behavior,

sometimes called instincts, and are used to explain why each species behaves
as it does in its environment.
Folk psychology is a set of assumptions derived from superstitions, the

desire to remain affiliated with others, trust, everyday reason, and
unstructured observations.
Free association is a technique used in the practice of psychoanalysis to

help the analyst identify patients’ repressed thoughts.
Free will is the idea that behavior varies as a function of individuals’

choices uninfluenced by any cause.
Functional periodicity was thought to be a kind of monthly psychological

impairment associated with the menstrual cycle.
Functionalism is the 20th-century domain of psychology that seeks to

understand the functions served by consciousness.
Fundamental attribution error refers to the Western tendency to explain

personal successes in terms of personal characteristics and dispositions, but
personal failures in terms of the situation and the reverse pattern when
making attributions about other people’s successes and failures.
Geocentric means the Earth is at the center.
Hawthorne effect refers to any change in the workplace that appears to

increase productivity.
Hedonism is the philosophy that happiness lies in seeking pleasure and

avoiding pain.
Heliocentric refers to the idea that the sun is at the center of the solar
system.
Heritability refers to the numeric estimate that can be made about how
much of the variance found between individuals on observable measures is
explained by genetic influences.
Heterodoxy is the wrong ways to think and believe.
Hindsight bias is the tendency to believe, after learning an outcome, that

one would have foreseen exactly that outcome.
Historical refers to a time when written records were kept.
Holism, or dynamic psychology, is the perspective that a real understanding

of psychological characteristics must take into consideration the whole
organism or person in interaction with a whole environment.
Hominids are erect, bipedal, primate mammals, including ancestral forms of

humans.
Homunculus is a fully formed human in miniature believed to reside in the

sperm cell until implantation in the uterus, where it would grow to full size.
Humanism was a 16th-century philosophical movement that focused on

human powers of reason as opposed to supernatural powers.
Hypothesis is a guess about a relationship between variables.
Hypothetico-deductive system named by Hull begins with a set of

hypotheses from which an expected response is deduced.
Hysteria is a purported neurosis mainly afflicting women and characterized

by paralysis in various parts of the body, the loss of sensation or
disturbances in sight or hearing, severe headaches, palpitations of the heart,
abdominal pain, or a stubborn cough.
Id as named by Freud is a set of unregulated impulsive energies, incapable

on its own of realistically achieving its ends and is the first major
component of personality.
Inauthentic lives as named by 20th-century humanistic psychologists result

when people choose to behave as they are expected to behave rather than
being guided by their own inner values.
Insanity is the term used beginning in the 16th century to describe those
whose thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are significantly different from
those of most other people.
Instinct refers to species-specific behaviors that are not a consequence of

learning.
Intuition is an awareness that seems to arise from within, so that

individuals feel they have direct and immediate knowledge.
James-Lange motor theory of mind makes the argument that the

psychological state of emotion is really only the awareness of a physiological
state.
Latent learning is defined as learning that occurs in the absence of

reinforcement and is only exhibited when needed to achieve an end.
Law of phylogenetic continuity states that there is continuity across all

species such that what is understood about learning in one species may be
applied across all species. According to this law, species differ only in the
number and complexity of learned associations that can be made.
Learned helplessness as named by Seligman and Maier, refers to the

tendency of an organism to passively accept punishment, even when escape
is possible, as a consequence of an earlier learning experience in which
escape was not possible.
Learning can be defined as the gradual appearance of a predicted response

to a specific stimulus, and the behavior, not consciousness, is what
psychologist should explain.
Logical positivism is a form of positivism that accepts an unobservable

theoretical term as long as it is defined as a publicly observable operation.
Materialism is the philosophy that everything is made of matter.
Maturationism is the theory that it is maturation occurring over the

passage of time that drives development in all areas, including psychological
characteristics.
Melancholia is another name for depression.
Mind-body problem is the question about how and where a nonmaterial

aspect of the human interacts with the material aspect.
Misogyny is the hatred of women.
Monozygotic refers to a twin originating from the same fertilized egg cell as
its twin.
Motivational bias is a tendency to answer questions in a particular way

because of a desire or wish to answer them in that way.
Naturalism is the belief that nature is governed by a set of laws and that
those laws also apply to humans and human behavior.
Nature versus nurture is the question of the relative importance of

inherited characteristics and environmental effects on development.
Neobehaviorists share the basic underlying assumptions of behaviorism but
are distinguished from behaviorists by accepting the methods of logical
positivism.
New psychology is the 20th-century term used to distinguish the empirical

approach to the study of mental functions in North America from an older
moral psychology.
Nihilism is the tearing down of all belief systems and the view that
existence has no meaning.
Nominalism is the belief that universal words such as “justice” are just
names given to sets of instances.
Noumena from Kant’s philosophy are the actual objects of reality.
Null hypothesis is the hypothesis that there are no differences between

research groups.
Objective inference occurs when one infers in another only those mental
powers that may be verified by public observation and measurement.
Ockham’s razor refers to the argument that one should accept the
explanation that requires the fewest assumptions.
Oligarchy is a form of government in which a few select wealthy

individuals hold power.
Ontology is the study of what is real and the nature of reality.
Operant as named by Skinner is a behavior in which the organism is

operating on the environment.
Operant conditioning chamber is a small box equipped with a device for

recording responses, such as a lever, and a place to deliver a reinforcer.
Opinio is the Latin term for probable knowledge, or opinion.
Orthodoxy is the right way to think and believe.
Pantheism is the belief that God is present everywhere and at all times
because everything is God.
Parallel distributed processing refers to the belief that banks of computers

operating both parallel and in interaction with one another will simulate the
action of physiological neural networks.
Parsimony is the assertion that explanations that use the fewest

assumptions are the most likely to be true.
Personal equation is a factor used by astronomers to attempt to eliminate

individual differences in reaction time from astronomical observations. Each
observer has his or her own factor of adjustment or personal equation.
Phase sequences are clusters of cell assemblies linked together that form
the bases of thoughts and ideas.
Phenomena from Kant’s philosophy are those aspects of reality that are
known through sensory experience.
Phi phenomenon is the perception of movement that occurs when separate

stimuli are displayed in rapid sequence.
Philosophy is the love of knowledge, typically sought through reason and

logic.
Phrenology, literally science of the mind, is the later name given to

cranioscopy, which is the measurement of the shape and size of the skull in a
living person.
Physiognomy is the study of character, intellect, and future success by
observation of facial appearance.
Placebo effect refers to a neutral treatment that has an effect because the
patient believes that it will.
Positivism is the belief that only those aspects of the universe that can be
publicly observed can be known for certain.
Premises are assertions that are presumed to be true.
Principle of mass action as named by Lashley means that, for complex

learning, the cortex operates as a unified whole rather than as a set of
discrete switches.
Projective inference occurs when one’s own mental experiences are

projected onto another.
Pseudoscience is a field that uses the language of science but is not

supported by evidence based on the scientific method.
Psychoanalysis begins as a method to treat neuroses, primarily hysteria.

Psychoanalytic theory postulates that childhood sexuality in interaction with
the surrounding environment sets the stage for personality development.
Psychodynamic theories are alternatives to psychoanalytic theories because

they posit that it is dynamic interactions between psychological factors
internal to the child and the external rearing environment, particularly the
parents, that set the stage for personality development, rather than
childhood sexuality.
Rationalism is the philosophy that reason and logical argument should form
the foundation for belief.
Realism is the belief that universal words, such as “justice,” represent
something real.
Recapitulation is the 19th-century theory that, during prenatal

development, the human goes through each successive stage of evolution
experienced as the human species evolved.
Reductio ad absurdum is logic that reduces the argument to a level where it

no longer makes any sense.
Reinforcer as named by Skinner is anything that increases the probability of

a response.
Reserpine is a root extract used to calm institutionalized psychotic patients

and make them more cooperative.
Rhetoric is the skillful use of words to outline an argument.
Romanticism is the philosophy that intense emotion is the most important

motivator of behavior and what brings meaning to human experience.
Emotion cannot be known through orthodox religious practice or logic and
is not made of matter.
Schemata refers to Piaget’s notion of the mind as sets of pieces of related

information encountered in the environment.
Scholastics were Christian clerics who attempted to interpret the writings of

Classical Greek philosophers to support Roman Christian orthodoxy.
Scientia is the Latin term for certain knowledge.
Secular powers are those related to the worldly and not associated with the
Church or spiritual.
Selective attention is the tendency to attend to only part of the available
evidence.
Selective recall is the tendency to remember evidence that supports a

preexisting belief and to forget evidence that refutes the belief.
Skepticism is questioning accepted wisdom.
Social cognition refers to the ways in which people think about and
organize information about their social world and the unconscious processes
that influence those thoughts.
Social facilitation effects as named by social psychologists refer to the fact

that people can be persuaded to engage in behaviors with others that they
would never engage in when alone.
Spencer-Bain principle states that when a behavior is followed by a

pleasant or successful outcome, the behavior will tend to be repeated, but
when behavior is followed by an unpleasant or unsuccessful outcome it will
tend not to be repeated.
Strong AI refers to the belief that machines can be built that will think the
way humans think.
Structuralism is the 20th-century domain of psychology that seeks to

identify and measure the basic mental elements and their attributes and to
understand how those elements combine to produce complex conscious
thought.
Sublimation as named by Freud is an unconscious defense mechanism used

to protect the ego from being overwhelmed by the impulses of the id.
Superego as named by Freud is a set of moral values and attitudes learned

from parents and the surrounding culture, including attitudes about the self.
Superstitious belief is formed when a particular response is falsely believed
to be associated with a reward.
Survey research is done by asking participants to supply the data by

responding to researcher’s questions.
Tabula rasa is Latin for a blank slate.
Teleology is the idea that there is design or purpose in nature.
Temperament is defined as biologically based characteristic ways of

responding to the environment that shape personality.
T-groups, named by humanistic or training groups, are groups in which

coworkers meet over several hours to share their real feelings about issues in
the workplace and come to better understand both themselves and others in
the group.
Theories are plausible but hypothetical abstract ideas that are tested
through observation.
Time and motion studies measure the time and motion it takes to perform
each segment of a job and then eliminate all unnecessary effort.
Transactional analysis is a theory that interpersonal interactions are like

games that people play between themselves.
Transformism is the idea that life forms currently found on Earth were not
created in their present form by God, but emerged from primordial matter as
a result of the laws of nature and evolved slowly into those that are present
today.
Transmigration of the soul is the movement of the soul from one body to
another.
Utilitarianism is a doctrine that the goodness of an action is determined by
its usefulness: the greatest happiness for the largest number.
Valid in science means being supported by objective truth.
Vitalism is the discredited belief that living matter possesses a special type
of energy or life-force.
Weak AI refers to the belief that machines can be built that will perform
some activity as well as a human can, but that machines will not ever think
the way humans think.
Worldview is a culturally specific perspective regarding the nature of

reality.
Young-Helmholtz theory of color vision states that color vision is a result of

three types of receptors on the back of the eye, each chemically responsive to
different wavelengths of light.
Zeitgeist is a German word meaning the spirit of the times.

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Name Index
Abelard, P. 65, 66
Abell, G. O. 378
Abu ‘Ali al-Husain 61–62
Abu Bakr al-Razi 60
Adams, G. 378, 379
Addams, J. 314
Adler, A. 258, 287, 362
Adolph, K. E. 382
Ainsworth, M. S. 304, 306, 340, 362
Alcmaeon 41
Alexander the Great 26, 41
Alexander, F. G. 195, 362
al-Farabi, M. b. T. 61–62
Allport, G. 264, 281, 282, 362
Altarriba, J. 379
Amsel, A. 379
Anastasi, A. 317, 362
Anaximander 37
Anderson, J. R. 379
Angell, J. 181
Anselm 64
Aquinas, T. 66–67, 83, 90, 101, 104
Aristotle 21, 22, 27, 35, 40–45, 50, 60, 61, 63, 64, 90, 101, 116, 141, 158, 160, 188, 345, 362
Arnkoff, D. B. 343, 362
Asch, S. 282, 362
Ash, M. G. 383
Atkins, M. 328
Augustine of Hippo 51–52, 54, 64, 83, 362, 379
Austen, J. 162
Austin, J. T. 247, 370
Axtell, J. L. 121, 362
Azar, B. 332, 362
Bacon, F. 90–94, 100, 101, 114, 115, 120, 144, 165, 362, 379
Bacon, R. 65–66
Bain, A. 143, 159, 180, 220, 362
Baird, J. W. 246, 368
Bakan, D. 379
Baldwin, J. M. 262, 362
Bandura, A. 305
Bargh, J. A. 329, 362
Baritz, L. 249, 362
Bark, W. C. 50, 362
Barnes, J. 41, 362
Bates, J. E. 14, 365
Baumgartner, E. 183, 362
Baumgartner, W. 183, 362
Baumler, G. 264
Baumrind, D. 305, 310, 362, 363, 379
Beach, F. A. 219, 270, 363
Beard, G. M. 152, 201, 363
Beck, A. 343
Beers, C. W. 379
Bekhterev, V. 190, 229, 230, 231, 232, 282
Bell, C. 156
Belloch, A. 344, 363
Benedict, R. 281, 291, 314, 363
Benham, J. R. 53
Bentham, J. 138–130
Bergman, A. 287, 371
Bergmann, M. S. 27, 363
Berkeley, G. 126–127, 129, 363
Berlyne, D. 296, 363
Berman, J. S. 343, 363
Bernheim, H. 200, 251–252
Bettelheim, B. 318, 363
Bevan, E. 28, 363
Bihrle, S. 329, 374
Binet, A. 198, 222–224, 285
Birch, H. G. 307, 376
Black, M. J. 260, 372
Blass, T. 311, 363
Blum, D. 306, 363
Boakes, R. 190, 363
Boas, F. 263, 281
Boccacio, G. 77
Boring, E. G. 149, 157, 161, 192, 363
Bowlby, J. 304, 306, 340, 363
Bramel, D. 249, 363
Braslow, J. 251, 290, 363
Brauns, H. 158, 216, 363
Brazleton, T. B. 336, 363
Breland, K. 302, 324–325, 331, 363
Breland, M. 302, 324–325, 331, 363
Bremmer, J. 36, 43, 363
Brentano, F. 183, 239, 312, 363
Bretherton, I. 379
Breuer, J. 251–252, 367
Bridenthal, R. 119, 363
Bringmann, W. G. 173, 363
Brobeck, S. 350, 363
Broca, P. 155, 169, 222, 363
Brock, A. 379
Brown, J. 379
Brozek, J. 190, 364, 383
Bruno, G. 19, 84
Brush, S. G. 379
Buchsbaum, M. S. 329, 374
Buffon, Comte de 142
Burke, J. 198, 364
Burke, R. B. 65, 66, 364
Burks, B. S. 289, 364
Burrows, G. M. 196, 364
Burtt, E. A. 379
Butler, H. 294
Butterfield, L. H. 196, 364
Cabanis, P. 197
Cahan, E. D. 263, 364
Calkins, M. W. 203, 206, 271, 349, 364
Campbell, R. H. 130, 364
Cantor, N. F. 68, 364
Capshew, J. H. 205, 245, 364
Carlyle, T. 379
Carruthers, P. 379
Cattell, J. 222, 223, 224, 227
Cavallaro, L. A. 335, 366
Charcot, J. M. 198, 200, 251
Charlemange 62
Chartrand, T. L. 329, 362
Chess, S. 307, 337, 376, 382
Chiarugi, V. 196–197, 364
Chomsky, N. 325, 364
Clark, C. W. 109, 111, 364
Clark, K. 311–312, 364
Clark, M. 311–312, 364
Clarke, D. 7, 364
Clemens, D. T. 189, 364
Coghill, G. E. 283, 364
Cohen, I. B. 135, 364, 379
Colapinto, J. 339, 364
Comte, A. 140–141, 364
Conan Doyle, A. 93, 165, 364
Constantine 49, 58
Coon, D. J. 165, 236, 364, 365
Cooney, M. P. 119, 365
Copernicus, N. 84
Corboz-Wanery, A. 335, 365
Cottrell, L. S. 269, 365
Cowles, M. 96, 365, 379
Crosby, F. 347, 365
Cunningham, J. L. 222, 365
Curie, M. 210
Cyril 55–56
Da Vinci, L. 77
Damasio, A. R. 328, 365
Dampier, W. C. 107, 134, 141, 365
Dante, A. 77
Danziger, K. 215, 365, 379
Darwin, C. 142, 144–145, 146, 167, 170, 173, 180, 184, 189, 365
Darwin, E. 170
Darwish, J. 335, 365
Daston, L. J. 171, 365
Davidson, H. A. 60, 62, 365
Dawes, R. M. 7, 365
deRoten, Y. 335, 365
deWaal, F. B. M. 332, 379
Deater-Dekard, K. 14, 365
Deaux, K. 335, 376
DeCarvalho, R. J. 379
Demand, N. 27, 365
Dempsey, J. 238
Democritus 37–38, 116
Dennett, D. C. 328, 365
Descartes, R. 82, 89, 100–107, 115, 120, 124, 125, 139, 152, 153, 278, 365
Dewey, J. 219
Dewsbury, D. A. 209, 276, 300, 301, 303, 365, 379
Diamond, S. 219, 365
Dickens, C. 163–164, 365
Digby, A. 193, 197, 366
Dinnerstein, L. 266, 366
Diogenes L. 45, 366
Dix, D. 197
Dodge, K. A. 14, 365
Dolby, R. G. A. 379
Dover, K. J. 56, 366
Dumas, A. 162
Dunlap, K. 380
Durkheim, E. 281
Dymond, R. 315, 374
Ebbinghaus, H. 205–206, 214, 215

Edelstein, L. 28, 366
Ehrenberg, V. 31, 366
Einstein, A. 235–236, 241
Eisenhower, D. D. 279
Elder, G. H. 341, 366
Ellenberger, H. 380
Ellis, A. 319, 343
Emde, R. N. 380
Emerson, R. W. 314
Empedocles 41
Emperor Louis IV 67
Epictetus 47–48, 366
Erikson, E. H. 287, 366
Evans, R. B. 380
Eysenck, H. 259, 260, 320, 366
Fagen, J. W. 299, 374

Fairbanks, D., Jr. 238
Fakhry, M. 59, 60, 62, 366
Fancher, R. E. 208, 259, 366
Farley, R. 380
Fay, J. W. 380
Fayter, P. 236, 366
Fechner, G. 160–161, 162, 171, 172, 175, 215–216, 270
Festinger, L. 309, 310, 366, 380
Fink, R. 3, 366
Fischhoff, B. 7, 366
Fisher, S. 260, 366
Fiske, A. P. 336, 366
Fivaz-Depeursinge, E. 335, 365
Flack, W. F. 335, 366
Flourens, J. P. 156
Flowers, C. 380
Ford, H. 266
Foucault, M. 380
Frame, D. M. 78, 366, 380
Francis of Assisi 75
Fredriksen, P. 49, 366
Freedheim, D. K. 345, 372, 380
Freeman, K. 48, 366
Freud, S. 18, 133, 162–163, 175, 198, 235, 251–261, 280, 322, 329, 366, 367, 380
Friedan, B. 322, 367
Friend, R. 249, 363
Frolov, Y. P. 174, 189, 367
Fuchs, A. H. 173, 367
Furumoto, L. 202, 203, 204, 245, 367, 374
Galen 46, 50, 59, 60, 70, 80, 150

Galileo, G. 83, 84, 94, 120, 122, 269, 367
Gall, F. 154–155
Gallagher, R. 269, 365
Galton, F 170–171, 184, 222, 224, 367
Garcia, J. 302–303, 367
Gardner, B. T. 333, 367
Gardner, R. A. 333, 367
Gardner, S. 189, 205, 376
Garrett, H. E. 243, 269, 367
Gaukroger, S. 104, 367
Geissler, L. R. 246, 368
Genovese, K. 309
Gesell, A. 283–284, 367
Gibbons, A. 333, 367
Gilbreth, L. M. 248, 367
Gillespie, R. 249, 367
Gilman, C. P. 236, 367
Gilovich, T. 5, 367
Ginzburg, C. 109, 367
Gislebertus 53, 367
Glass, C. R. 343, 362
Gleaves, D. H. 255, 368
Gleitman, H. 275, 368
Glickman, S. E. 296, 368
Goddard, H. 224, 227, 368
Goldberg, P. A. 346, 368
Golden, M. 380
Goldstein, J. 180, 197, 368
Golgi, C. 212
Golomb, J. 163, 368
Goodenough, F. L. 269, 368, 380
Goodman, L. E. 61, 368
Gould, S. J. 168, 169, 225, 226, 368
Grant, M. 21, 368
Graunt, J. 100, 368
Green, C. D. 380
Greenberg, R. P. 260, 366
Greene, S. 380
Grimal, P. 21, 30, 368
Grob, G. N. 197, 368
Gross, C. G. 28, 38, 59, 80, 105, 155, 156, 368
Grosseteste, R. 65
Grusec, J. E. 305, 368
Guilford, J. P. 380
Guthrie, E. R. 273, 275, 368
Guthrie, R. V. 380
Gutman, H. 381
Hacking, I. 99, 368

Halborg, J. E. 381
Hall, G. S. 165, 189, 201–202, 207, 246, 260, 348, 368, 380
Halligan, P. W. 330, 332, 368
Harding, W. G. 238
Harlow, H. F. 296, 306, 313, 368
Harlow, M. K. 296, 368
Harris, B. 380
Harris, R. J. 309, 368
Harvey, O. J. 309, 375
Harvey, W. 116
Hawkins, M. 380
Hayes, C. 333, 368
Hayes, K. J. 333, 368
Hebb, D. O. 295–296, 326, 368
Heidbreder, E. 209, 260, 368
Heidegger, M. 312, 368
Helmholtz, H. von 135, 157, 159, 160, 172, 174, 180, 189, 217, 369
Helmreich, R. L. 335, 376
Henle, M. 380
Henri, V. 222, 223
Herbart, J. 164
Herbert, G. B. 121, 369
Hergenhahn, B. R. 250, 369
Hernandez, E. 255, 368
Herrnstein, R. J. 227, 376
Hertzig, M. E. 307, 376
Hervey, N. 193, 375
Hester, M. P. 347, 369
Hilgard, E. R. 380
Hippocrates 28, 195
Hitler, A. 265, 281, 308
Hobbes, T. 119–121, 127, 369
Hoffman, E. 258, 369
Hollerith, H. 278
Hollingworth, L. 288, 346, 369
Homer 21, 27, 28
Hood, W. 309, 375
Hoover, H. 265
Horney, K. 258, 287, 369
Hornstein, G. A. 258, 259, 268, 287, 369, 372
Horowitz, F. D. 259, 286, 369
Howells, J. G. 191, 201, 369
Huarte, J. 246
Hull, C. L. 272, 274, 293, 296, 298, 304, 369
Hume, D. 127–129, 130, 214, 369
Humphrey, N. 381
Hunter, R. 381
Hutton, P. H. 381
Huxley, T. H. 237, 381
Hypatia of Alexandria 55–56
Ibn Sina 61–62

Ishikawa, S. S. 329, 369
Itard, J. M. G. 123
Ivry, A. L. 61, 369
Jackson, J. P., Jr. 312, 369

Jackson, S. W. 196, 369
Jacquard, J. 278
James, W. 165, 175, 198, 203, 207, 208–209, 217–218, 220, 236–237, 245, 251, 312, 345, 369
Jastrow, J. 271, 369, 381
Jensen, D. W. 289, 364
Jones, E. E. 264, 308, 333, 335, 369
Jones, M. C. 271, 369
Joravsky, D. 230, 369
Joseph, J. E. 329, 369
Jung, C.G. 258, 312–313, 369
Kagan, J. 4, 370
Kahneman, D. 329, 376
Kaminer, W. 345, 370
Kant, I. 130–132, 370
Kantor, J. R. 38, 42, 135, 151, 370
Katzell, R. A. 247, 370
Kearney, M. 9, 370
Keller, E. F. 381
Kelley, T. L. 269, 370
Kellogg, L. A. 276, 277, 332, 370
Kellogg, W. N. 276, 277, 332, 370
Kelly, G. A. 320, 370
Kelly, R. M. 248, 370
Kelly, V. P. 248, 370
Kemp, S. 62, 370
Kendler, H. H. 381
Kepler, J. 85
Keppel, B. 312, 370
Keuls, E. C. 56, 370
Kierkegaard, S. 312
Kimble, G. A. 294, 370
King, D. B. 381
King Charles II 115
King George III 194–195
King Henry VIII 73
King, M. L., Jr. 322
Kirsch, I. 13, 370
Kitayama, S. 336, 366
Klein, A. 318, 320, 378
Klein, M. 287, 370
Kleinmuntz, B. 318, 370
Knoff, W. F. 195, 370
Knox, B. 27, 370
Koch, S. 381
Koelling, R. A. 302–303, 367
Koenigsberger, L. 135, 370
Koffka, K. 243, 370
Kohler, W. 241–243, 244, 370
Koonz, C. 119, 363
Koppes, L. L. 205, 245, 248, 370
Korn, S. 307, 376
Korsakoff, S. 198
Kraeplin, E. 198–199, 318, 370
Kraft-Ebing, R. von 254
Kramer, P. D. 342, 370
Kuhn, T. 106, 111, 370
Kulpe, O. 182–183
KuBmaul, A. 188–189
La Metrrie, J. O. de 139, 370

LaCasse, L. 329, 374
Ladd-Franklin, C. 204, 217, 370
Laird, J. D. 335, 366
Lal, S. 312, 370
Lamarck, J. 142, 173
Lane, H. 123–124, 370
Lange, C. G. 218
Langermann, J. 180
LaPiere, R. 281–282, 370
Larson, C. A. 205, 371
Lashley, K. S. 272–273, 275, 295, 326, 371
Laszlo, A. C. 205, 245, 364
Lazarus, R. S. 381
Leahey, G. E. 236, 371
Leahey, T. 181, 236, 371, 381
Leary, D. E. 164, 208, 371
Leary, T. 320
Leeuwenhook, A. van 150
Lerman, H. 195, 371
Lerner, G. 24, 30, 40, 43, 57, 59, 371
Lester, B. M. 336, 363
LeVine, R. A. 382
Lewin, K. 244, 280, 282, 311, 320, 347, 371
Lichtenstein, S. 7, 366
Liff, Z. A. 342, 371
Likert, R. 270, 371
Lippitt, R. 282, 371
Lippmann, W. 381
Locke, J. 121–122, 127, 132, 135, 188, 196, 371
Loftus, E. F. 383
Lombard, P. 64
Lommel, A. 26, 371
Longhi, P. 97
Longino, H. E. 381
Loverance, R. 58, 371
Lowery-Palmer, A. 8, 371
Luther, M. 74–75
Lykken, D. T. 337, 372
Maccoby, E. E. 338, 371

MacDonald, M. 192, 371
Machiavelli, N. 81–82, 137
Magendie, F. 156
Mahler, M. 258, 287, 371
Maier, S. 298–299, 375
Malthus, T. 144
Mandler, J. 334, 371
Marcel, A. J. 175, 371
Margolin, M. 9, 371
Markus, H. R. 336, 366
Marshack, A. 3, 371
Marshall, J. C. 330, 332, 368
Marshall, M. 165, 371
Martin, J. 338, 371
Martin, L. H. 381
Marx, K. 8
Maslow, A. 313–315, 320, 371
Masson, J. M. 255, 371
Mayo, E. 248, 249, 372
Macalpine, I. 381
McCarthy, J. 308
McClearn, G. E. 184, 372
McGraw, M. 283–284, 286, 372
McGue, M. 337, 372
McKenzie, C. 193, 375
McNamara, J. A. 381
McPherson, M. W. 203, 262, 373
McReynolds, P. 251, 372
Mead, M. 281, 381
Medawar, P. B. 381
Megginson H. J. 342, 372
Meloy, J. R. 329, 374
Mencken, H. L. 4
Mendel, J. G. 145
Mesmer, F. A. 151–152, 195, 200
Meyers, D. R. 296, 368
Milar, K. S. 173, 205, 346, 367, 372
Milgram, S. 308, 310, 311, 372
Mill, J. 129, 138
Mill, J. S. 138
Miller, D. T. 120, 372
Miller, G. 300, 325, 372
Miller, L. 192, 372
Minton, H. L. 224, 288, 372
Mireaux, E. 57, 372
Mitchell, S. A. 260, 372
Mohamet 59
Money, J. 339
Moniz, E. 290
Montaigne, M. de 78–79, 101, 372
Moore, R. L. 165, 372
Morawski, J. G. 259, 264, 372
Morgan, C. D. 289, 372
Morgan, L. C. 185–187, 212, 372
Mosso, A. 264
Mowrer, H. O. 296
Mulford, M. 7, 365
Muller, J. 156–157, 159, 172, 174, 180
Münsterberg, H. 218, 228, 246, 247, 372
Murphy, G. 73, 372, 381
Murphy, L. B. 73, 372, 381
Murray, H. A. 289, 372
Myers, F. 237
Napoli, D. S. 287, 372

Neisser, U. 300, 372
Newcomb, T. M. 381
Newton, I. 113–114, 115, 153, 217, 236, 328
Nietzsche, F. 162–163
Nisbett, R. E. 336, 366
Nixon, R. 323
Norcross, J. C. 345, 372
Norton, N. C. 343, 363
Nugent, J. K. 336, 363
O’Connell, A. N. 204, 373, 381

O’Donnell, J. M. 245, 373
Offenbach, J. 152–153, 373
Ogilvie, M. D. 381
O’Hanlon, W. H. 344, 373
Ornstein, P. A. 381
Osborne, M. L. 381
Owens, J. 265
Padua, Marsiglio de 67
Pagels, E. 381
Paludi, M. A. 346, 373
Papert, S. 328, 373
Pappenheim, B. 252
Parke, R. D. 381
Parks, R. 322
Pascal, B. 183, 278
Pavlov, I. 190, 229, 230–232, 270, 272
Pearson, K. 170
Pechmann, C. 5, 373
Penrose, R. 381
Pepperberg, I. 333, 373
Perez, J. E. 343, 373
Perez-Ramos, A. 381
Perls, F. 320
Pettit, G. S. 14, 365
Pfister, O. 261, 367
Piaget, J. 222, 285, 300, 303, 373, 381
Picasso, P. 265
Pickford, M. 238
Pickren, W. E. 344, 373
Pifer, A. 202, 373
Pignatti, T. 97, 373
Pine, F. 287, 371
Pinel, P. 197, 198, 199, 373
Pintler, M. 305, 375
Plato 21, 34, 38–40, 50, 59, 64, 74, 137, 141, 373
Plotkin, H. 382
Poe, E. A. 201, 373
Pope Innocent VIII 109
Pope Urban II 63
Popper, K. 106, 373
Popplestone, J. A. 203, 262, 373
Porter, K. 164, 373
Poseidonus 59
Postman, L. 206, 373
Potts, T. C. 64, 373
Premack, D. 333, 373
Pressman, J. D. 382
Preyer, W. 189
Proctor, R. N. 227, 373
Ptolemy 84
Purkinje, J. E. 156
Purver, M. 94, 373
Puysegur, Marquis de 200
Pythagoras 34–35, 38, 39
Rahman, F. 61, 373

Raine, A. 329, 369, 374
Ramon y Cabal, S. 212
Ramos, S. de Paula 252, 374
Ranke-Heinemann, U. 382
Rapaport, D. 382
Rayner, R. 232–235, 377
Reagan, R. 265
Reed, E. S. 154, 374
Reid, T. 129–130, 153, 374
Reisman, J. M. 316, 319, 321, 342, 374
Renouvier, C. 208
Ribot, T. 180
Richards, R. J. 145, 374, 382
Rieser, J. J. 381
Robinson, D. N. 42, 374, 382
Rockwell, A. D. 152, 201, 363
Rogers, C. 315–316, 318, 374
Romanes, G. 184–185, 374
Roosevelt, F. 291
Roosevelt, T. 237
Rorschach, H. 289
Roscelin 65
Rosenberg, J. 308
Rosenberg, E. 308
Rothman, S. 228, 376
Rovee-Collier, C. 299, 374
Rumbaugh, D. M. 333, 374, 382
Ruse, M. 382
Rush, B. 195–196, 197, 374
Russell, B. 40, 66, 67, 77, 374
Russell, J. B. 83, 109, 110, 111, 192, 374
Russo, M. 278, 374
Russo, N. F. 204, 373, 381
Ruth, G. (Babe) 238
Rutter, M. 338, 340, 374
Ryle, G. 136, 208, 328, 374
Sagan, C. 4, 12, 33, 94, 374

Samelson, F. 221, 232, 374, 382
Sarton, G. 382
Sartre, J. P. 265
Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. 333, 374
Sawyer, T. F. 202, 374
Scaliger, J. 82
Scarborough, E. 202, 203, 204, 205, 374
Scarr, S. 336, 374
Schacter, S. 282, 374
Schachter, S. 309–310, 374, 382
Schneider, K. J. 343, 375
Schopenhauer, A. 133, 162–163, 375
Schwartz, T. 5, 7, 375
Schweitzer, A. 314
Scott, D. M. 312, 375
Scott, W. D. 250, 375
Scull, A. 192, 193, 194, 197, 375
Searle, J. 327, 375
Sears, P. 305, 375
Sears, R. 305, 375
Sechenov, I. 174, 189–190, 230, 375
Selesnick, S. T. 195, 362
Seligman, M. E. P. 192, 298–299, 338, 345, 375
Seurat, G. 137, 138
Sextus Empiricus 79
Shakespeare, W. 133, 375
Shakow, D. 382
Shapiro, M. J. 224, 375
Sharp, S. 223, 375
Shelley, M. 133, 151, 375
Sherif, C. W. 309, 375, 382
Sherif, M. 282, 308, 309, 375
Shermer, M. 4, 5, 375
Shields, S. 382
Shinn, M. 189
Shore, M. 380, 382
Shorter, E. 197, 198, 200, 201, 375
Shweder, R. A. 382
Siegel, R. 382
Siegler, R. S. 285, 375
Simon, B. 382
Simon, T. 222–223
Singer, B. 378
Singer, J. 310, 374
Skinner, A. S. 130, 364
Skinner, B. F. 293, 397–298, 302, 343, 375
Sklar, K. K. 176, 375
Slovic, P. 7, 366
Smith, L. D. 382
Smith, M. 246, 375
Snelson, J. S. 6, 376
Snyderman, M. 227, 228, 376
Socrates 33, 38, 48, 102
Sokal, M. M. 223, 376
Spearman, C. 223, 268–269, 376
Spence, J. T. 335, 376
Spence, K. 296
Spencer, H. 143–144, 180, 184, 189, 224, 376
Sperry, R. 295, 329, 376
Spinoza, B. 124–126, 376
Spock, B. 307, 376
Spurzheim, J. C. 155
Stagner, R. 382
Stein, G. 265
Stern, D. J. 335, 365
Stern, W. 224
Stevens, G. 189, 205, 376
Stevens, S. S. 273
Stone, M. H. 201, 376
Strayer, L. A. 346, 373
Strong, D. E. 382
Stuard, S. 119, 363
Sullivan, J. J. 205, 371
Sumner, F. C. 202
Suplee, C. 382
Swift, J. 194, 376
Szasz, T. 194, 195, 321, 376
Taylor, F. 248, 376

Temple, S. 265
Teo, T. 380
Terman, L. M. 224, 227, 288–289, 364, 376
Thales 36–37, 116
Thelen, E. 382
Thomas, A. 307, 337, 376, 382
Thomas, D. 282, 376
Thomas, K. 111, 376
Thompson, H. B. 346, 376
Thorndike, E. L. 212–213, 217, 218, 241, 246, 276, 297, 298, 301, 376
Thorne, B. M. 333, 376
Thurstone, L. L. 383
Tissie, P. 264
Titchener, E. 181–182, 204, 207, 214–215, 245, 376
Tolman, E. C. 272, 274–275, 298, 299, 376
Triplett, N. 264
Trujillo, K. 329
Truman, H. 321
Tuchman, B. W. 70, 376
Tulviste, P. 285, 378
Turing, A. M. 278–279, 376
Turner, F. M. 383
Tversky, A. 329, 376
Tweney, R. D. 215, 376
Tylor, E. B. 12, 377
Unger, R. K. 347, 377

Ungerer, G. A. 173, 363
van den Boom, D. 340, 377

van Drunen, P. 245, 377
van Gelder, T. 383
Venables, P. H. 342, 377
Vesalius, A. 80, 81, 377
Viney, W. 197, 207, 377
Vives, J. L. 82
Voltaire, M. F. A. 383
Voss, U. 173, 363
Vygotsky, L. S. 279, 285, 377, 383
Vyse, S. A. 5, 12, 377
Wade, N. J. 383
Wagar, W. W. 383
Waldeyer, W. 212
Wallace, A. R. 144–145
Wallach, L. 120, 377
Wallach, M. A. 120, 377
Wallman, J. 333, 377
Washburn, M. F. 182, 187–188, 218, 377
Watson, J. B. 205, 218, 220–221, 229–230, 232–235, 245, 250, 263–264, 271, 272, 286, 297, 345, 377
Watson, R. I. 106, 377
Weber, E. 157–158, 160, 161, 171, 270
Webster, R. 383
Wegner, D. M. 331, 377
Weinberg, J. R. 64, 377
Weiner-Davis, M. 344, 373
Weinstein, N. D. 7, 377
Wells, H. G. 236, 377
Wendt, R. A. 165, 371
Wernicke, K. 198
Wertheimer, M. (Max) 240–241, 314, 377
Wertheimer, M. (Michael) 344, 381
Wertsch, J. V. 285, 378
Whatley, E. G. 381
Wheatley, T. 331, 377
Wheeler, R. W. 271, 378
White, B. 309, 375
White, M. 383
White, R. K. 282, 371
Whitehead, A. N. 383
Whitman, W. 314
Wiener, N. 299, 378
Wiggins, J. G. 349, 378
Wilde, O. 214, 378
Wilford, J. N. 3, 378
William of Ockham 67
Wilson, E. O. 331, 378
Wilson, G. D. 259, 260, 366
Wilson, T. D. 329, 378
Winter, A. 151, 202, 378
Witmer, L. 251, 383
Wogaman, P. J. 8, 378
Wollstonecraft, M. 119, 378
Woodward, W. R. 383
Woodworth, R. 296
Woody, T. 204, 378
Woolley, H. T. 346, 378
Worden, P. 302
Wright, D. B. 383
Wright, W. 210
Wright, O. 210
Wundt, E. 174, 378
Wundt, W. 162, 165, 172–174, 179, 181, 184, 201, 205, 213–215, 218, 222, 240, 251, 280, 281, 378
Wyclif, J. 75
Yaroschevskii, M. G. 174, 378

Yerkes, R. 225, 276
Young, T. 159, 217
Zajonc, R. B. 333, 378

Zahn-Waxler, C. 381
Zax, M. 318, 320, 378
Zeigarnik, B. 244
Zenderland, L. 209, 378
Zeno 16
Zimbardo, P. 309
Zinn, H. 292, 323, 378
Zupan, M. L. 383
Subject Index
achievement motivation 309

acquired characteristics 142, 173
act psychology 183, 239
action at a distance 230
active mind 130, 285, 325
adaptive significance 331–332, 352
aether 135
African-Americans 202, 226, 311–312, 322
alchemy 96, 97
alcoholism 198, 250, 290
Alexandria 55–56, 58, 61
alienists 200
American Medical Association 310
American Psychological Association 22, 225, 260, 291, 310–311, 348–349
American Psychological Society 22, 349
American Society for Psychical Research 236
analysis of variance 309
androcentric 40, 56, 352
anecdotal method 184–185
animal
behavior 179, 184–185
insight 241–242
language learning 332–333
learning 212, 270, 272
mind 184, 187–188, 212–213
psychology 300–303
animism 12, 352
anomalies 113, 352
and behaviorism 276
and Gestalt psychology 240
anthropormorphizing 180, 185, 209, 303, 331, 352
Anthropoid Research Station 241
anticipatory goal response 274
anti-Semitism 261, 265–266
applied psychology 205–206, 221, 245–246, 349
and women 245
archival research 170, 352
artificial intelligence 278–279, 326–328
associationism 121, 135, 137, 172, 212–213, 229, 230, 328, 352
laws of 128
and mental illness 196
assumptions 18–19, 111–112, 113–114, 115, 352
astrology 27, 192, 352
athletic performance 264
atomic theory 37–38, 85, 134–135
attachment 303, 304, 306, 340
attitudes, measurement of 270, 281–282
attribution theory 333, 352
audition 160
authorities 11
autokinetic effect 308
availability heuristic 329, 352
barbiturates 290
basic elements 130, 135, 137, 173, 179, 181
basic research 205, 206, 221, 245–246
Bedlam 193
behavior genetics 325, 337
behavior modification 298, 343
behaviorism 145–147, 188, 215, 220–221, 228–235, 271–272
and psychoanalytic theory 259
and psychotechnics 245
the decline of 324–325
behaviorists’ manifesto 220
Bell-Magendie law 156, 352
Bicetre 197
Bill of Mortality 100
Binet-Simon 223–224
biology 41, 136–137, 140, 150–151, 165, 215, 328, 331, 337
biopsychology 67
Black Death 68, 72
blank slate 121, 188, 229, 270, 272, 285, 286, 324–325, 336
bleeding 195–196
bodily humors 41, 46, 59, 82, 137, 191, 192, 195
brainfunction 59, 145, 154–156, 189, 219, 328–329
brass instruments 202, 203
Brown vs. the Board of Education 311
bubonic plague 68, 72
Bureau of Salesmanship Research 247
Byzantium 46, 50, 58–59
Cambridge University 174

capitalism 75, 138
Carnegie Institute of Technology 247
Cartesian
rationalism 121, 124
science 107, 156
categorical imperative 130–131
categories of thought 130
Catholicnuns 196–197
causal models 341
cause and effect 5, 128
cell assemblies 295, 297, 353
cerebral cortex 80, 154–156, 273, 295
chemistry 134–135, 140, 181–182, 210
child development 188–189, 264–264
child study 189, 209, 261–264, 263
Children’s Bureau 263
Chinese
civil service testing 228
culture 73
prejudice against 281–282
The Chinese Room 327
chlorpromazine 319, 353
Christian doctrine 51–54, 74
and heterodoxies 83
and psychology 54–55
and Scholasticism 62–68
and science 113
Christianity 49, 51–54
circular arguments 16, 353
civil rights movement 309, 322
Clark University 201
clinical psychology 250–251, 287–291, 316–321, 341, 342–345, 349, 353
and Gestalt 245
cogito ergo sum 103
cognitive dissonance 309, 310, 353
cognitive maps 275, 297, 298, 353
cognitive neuroscience 328–331
cognitive psychology 300, 305, 325–326, as therapy 343, 344
cognitive science 300, 325–326, 353
Columbia University 204, 212, 220, 222, 312
common sense 43, 129
comparative psychology 127, 145, 147, 154–155, 166–167, 184–188, 218, 300–303, 353
and learning theory 270, 276, 331, 332
conditional response 231, 232
conditioned reflex 229–230, 232, 353
confirmation bias 6, 353
conformity 308–309
connectionism 327, 353
conservation of energy 135, 157, 166
contact comfort 306
Constantinople 49–50, 108
contingencies of reinforcement 297–298, 331, 353
Cornell University 181, 182
corporeal 61, 353
correlation 170, 268–269, 341, 353
cosmogenic 29–30, 99, 353
cosmology 84
creative synthesis 213–214
cultural anthropology 281, 291
cultural influences 8–9, 26–27, 174, 180, 263, 280–281, 291, 335–336, 344, 347
Cynicism 46–47
deconditioning 234–235, 271

defense mechanisms 257
degeneration 201, 226–227
Delphi 26, 48
dementia praecox 199, 318
depression 191, 196, 198, 201, 290, 318, 319, 342, 345
and William James 208
determinism 54, 116, 125–126, 208, 353
developmental psychology 261–264, 283–287, 292, 303–307, 336–341
and behaviorism 286–287
intellectual development 285
and personality 286–287, 304
and psychoanalytic theory 286–287, 304, 306
Dionysian 27, 30, 49, 353
dream analysis 254, 260, 354
dreams 175
and Aristotle 43–4
drive reduction theory 296–297, 298, 304–305, 306, 313
dynamic psychology 179, 296
educational psychology 285

ego 257, 259, 287, 354
Egyptians 73, 83
electricity 134, 151, 237
electroshock 290, 318
electrotheraputics 151–152, 201
elementalism 179, 207, 212, 240, 354
elements of consciousness 173, 181–183, 205, 217, 239, 241
emotions 183, 187
and Aristotle 44
and conditioned reflex 232
in Epicureanism 48
and memory 82
and mental health 59
motor theory of 217–218
and natural selection 145–146
versus passions 136
and romantic philosophy 132–133, 162–163
empirical psychology 201, 207
empiricism 79, 94, 207, 354
Enigma Machine 279
Epicureanism 48, 138
epistemology 10, 26, 28, 31–34, 64–66, 70–74, 90, 354
equipotentiality 273, 295, 354
error term 269
ethics in research 307, 309–311
ethology 300–301, 303
Eucharist 63, 354
eugenics 224, 226–227, 285, 337, 354
evolution 141–147, 166, 206, 328
of mind 166, 184, 188
and Russian psychology 189–190
theory and Nietzsche 163
of vision 217
evolutionary psychology 145, 147, 179, 332, 337
existential psychology 312–316
experience 16–17, 34, 162–163, 236
in Gestalt theory 239–240
and Schopenhauer 163
sensory 38, 43, 94, 104, 121, 126, 129, 130, 157–160, 172
experimental neuroses 231–232
experimental psychology 131, 173, 174–175, 180, 181, 270, 294
and animal psychology 301
and psychoanalytic theory 259
experimental science 65, 131, 354
Experimentalists 204–205, 245
face validity 4, 71, 82, 142, 155, 168, 316, 354

factor analysis 268–269, 317
faculties 62, 145, 154, 185, 354
feminism 322, 346
fixed action pattern 301, 354
fixed role strategy 320
flatus vocis 65
folk psychology 17–19, 82, 191, 217, 354
fractional goal response 274
free association 253, 354
free will 37–38, 52, 54, 67, 71, 125–126, 137, 154, 172, 183, 192, 208–209, 218, 229, 276, 278, 331, 354
French psychology 139, 180
friendship 44–45, 345
functional periodicity 288, 355
functionalism 143, 147, 205–209, 220, 355
and social psychology 264
fundamental attribution error 335–336, 355
gender identity 338–340, 346

genes 145
geocentric 84, 113, 355
Germanuniversities 149, 156, 171, 172, 180, 225, 244
Gestalt
and fields of force 240, 243
and neobehaviorism 272, 273, 299–300
principles of perception 243–244
psychology 239–245
as therapy 320
ghost in the machine 136, 137, 208, 277
Great Depression 238, 265, 291
group dynamics 244, 280, 309
group mind 280–281
habit 219–220
mechanisms 215
strength 296–297
Harvard University 175, 201, 203, 218, 225, 248–249, 272, 273
Hawthorne
effect 249, 355
studies 248–249
health psychology 344
hedonism 129, 143, 355
heliocentricism 84–85, 86, 113, 355
heritability 337, 355
heterodoxy 63, 355
heterosexuality 56, 195
hierarchy of needs 314
Hippocratic Oath 28
holism 179, 183, 355
Holy Crusades 63, 73
hominids 6, 355
homonculous 151, 355
homosexuals 56
discrimination against 348
gay rights movement 322
persecution of 266
House Un-American Activities Committee 308
Howard University 202
human factors 349
humanism 69–70, 76–83, 355
humanistic psychology 133, 312–316, 348
and behaviorism 313
and psychoanalytic theory 313, 315
as therapy 315–316
Hundred Years War72, 87
hydrotherapy 196, 201, 290
hypnotism 151, 175, 200, 249, 251–253
hypothesis 14, 355
hypothetico-deductive 293, 296, 355
hysteria 195, 251–253, 356
id 163, 257, 259, 356

idols of knowledge 91–92, 114
imageless element 182–183
Immigrant Restriction Act 227
imperialism 176, 292
impression formation 282
inauthentic lives 312, 316, 356
Index of Forbidden Books 81, 124, 154
Indian culture 59
individualism 9, 74–76
inductive reason 93
indulgences 63, 69, 74
industrial psychology 228, 246, 347–348
advertising 249–250
management 246–248
work efficiency 247–248
Industrial Revolution 175, 192
infantile autism 318
inference 209, 213, 219
projective 185–186, 358
objective 186, 357
information processing 299–300, 325–328
inhibitory responses 190, 230–231, 272
innate ideas 104, 121
Inquisition 83, 124
insanity 192, 356
instincts 219, 356
in psychoanalytic theory 256–257, 261
insulin shock 290, 318
intelligence 65, 222, 226
general or “g” 269
gifted 288, 337
heritability 224, 337
measuring 167–170, 268–269
quotient 224
testing 222–224, 226, 285, 317
intervening variables 274, 276, 294, 296
introspection 102, 131, 171, 185, 209, 213, 220–221, 230
experimental 173, 181
intuition 11, 356
Inquisition 83, 124
Islamic
conquests 56
medicine 59
philosophy 50, 59–61
psychology 61–62
religion 59, 64
James-Lange motor theory 217–218, 356

Jews
and Freud 261
persecution against 69, 124, 244, 265–266
in North America 244, 266
John/Joan 338–340
Johns Hopkins University 202, 204, 220, 235, 250, 339
Journal of Applied Psychology 246
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 279
just noticeable difference 158, 216
kinesthetic learning 218

Ku Klux Klan 238
Lamarckian evolution 142, 144

language production 155
law of effect 213, 276
law of exercise 213
law of phylogenetic continuity 263, 270, 301, 356
law of Pragnanz 243–244
laws of association 128, 172, 173, 179, 181
learned helplessness 299, 345, 356
learning theory 212, 217–218, 220, 229, 232, 234, 271, 325, 356
extinction 271–273, 298
and free will 276
latent 276, 356
and machines 326
mathematical/mechanistic 272, 274, 296–297
physiological 272–273
purposive 272, 274–276
reinforcement 271–272, 274, 280, 286, 296–298, 333
social 304–305
versus maturationism 283–285
Likert scales 270, 281
literacy 28, 62
literature 77, 132–133, 161–162, 215
Little Albert 232–235, 297
lobotomy 290, 318
logical positivism 267–268, 356
and cognitive psychology 300
and social psychology 280
LSD 319, 320
lunacy 191, 193
Lyceum 41
magic 107–108, 235

magnetism 108, 135, 151–152, 200
Malleus Maleficarum 109
manipulation drive 296
materialism 115–116, 120, 126, 127, 134, 208, 229, 356
maturationism 283–285, 356
measurement 83–84, 95–100, 268–270
measuring mind 165, 167–170
mechanicalbody70, 104–105, 116, 117, 120–121, 137, 139, 153, 229
mechanical mind 277–279, 285, 300, 326–328
medication 290, 318–319, 342
medicine 29, 40–41, 46, 59, 70, 80, 87, 98
melancholia 46, 196, 356
memory 206
and neuroses 252–254, 255
and paired-associates 206
short-term 300
mental hygiene 250
mental illness 40–41, 56, 59–60, 109, 124–125, 191–201, 289–291, 342
across cultures 344
and free will 192
institutions for 180, 191, 193–194
and intelligence 288
testing for 289
mental orthopedics 223
Mesmerism 151–152, 195, 200, 253
method of adjustment 216
method of constant stimuli 216
Miltown 319
mind-body problem 54–55, 105, 125, 137, 151, 214–215, 229, 357
mind cures 258
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 317
misogyny 40, 52–53, 357
modernity 209–210
monotheism 31, 59
moral philosophy 172, 206
moral responsibility 122, 130–131
moral therapy 196
motivation 271, 296–297, 298–299, 313–314
motivational bias 5, 357
motor milestones 284–285
motor theory of mind 218
multi-factorial design 309
Muslim 59, 73
mystery religion 48
myth of mental illness 321
natural philosophy 92–94

natural selection 144–147, 166, 173, 179, 208, 219, 331–332, 336
in psychoanalytic theory 257
and psychological characteristics 283, 284
naturalism 85, 139, 357
nature versus nurture 55, 171, 261, 338–340, 357
Nazi Party 244, 261
Neanderthal 3
neobehaviorist 271–272, 357
Neo-Platonism 50–51, 61
nerve conduction 105, 157
nervous energy 200
neurologist 201, 289
neurophysiology 152, 212–213, 272–273, 283, 326
neuroscience 328
neuroses 251–257, 258, 259, 290–291, 342
new psychology 207, 214, 245, 357
Newtonian science 113–114
nominalism 64–65, 219, 230, 357
nonhuman animals 44, 55, 149, 166, 184, 187
nonsense
psychology as 140–141
syllables 206, 215
noumena 131, 357
null hypothesis 169, 357
obedience 308, 310, 311

Oberlin College 176
object relations 342
Ockham’s razor 68, 357
Oedipal theory 254–255, 260, 291
oligarchy 45, 357
Olympian religion 30
ontology 25, 28, 51, 357
operant conditioning chamber 296, 297, 303, 309, 357
operants 297, 357
operational definition 268, 271, 272, 274, 275
opinio 96–98, 358
optimistic bias 7
organizational psychology 347–348
orthodoxy 63, 358
Oxford Experimental Science Club 94
paired associates 206

pantheism 124, 161, 358
parallel distributed processing 327, 358
parapsychology 237
parsimony 67–68, 86, 188, 214, 358
passion 126, 129
patriarchy 24, 40, 52–53, 56
pattern recognition 45, 326
Pearson’s r 170
Periodic Table of the Elements 134
personal equation 149, 173, 358
personality theory 41, 46, 231, 263, 280, 336
and behaviorism 263–264
and development 256–257, 258, 263, 283, 304
introversion/extroversion 280, 291
and psychoactive medications 342
and temperament 307
and psychoanalytic theory 256–257
and psychodynamic theory 258
and humanistic/existential psychology 312, 313–314
phase sequences 295, 358
phenomena 131, 358
phi phenomenon 240–241, 358
Philosophical Studies 174
philosophy 35, 358
phrenology 155, 247, 358
physics 36, 134–135, 140, 210, 235, 246
physiognomy 247, 358
physiological psychology 82, 160–161, 174, 189–190, 215–219, 272–273, 295
physiology 140, 151–152, 156, 174
physis 36
pineal gland 105, 125
placebo effect 13, 358
Platonic philosophy 38–40, 83
pointillism 137
political science 137–138
positive psychology 345
positivism 140, 187, 214–215, 235, 264, 267–268, 358
pragmatism 205, 206–207
preconscious mind 253
premises 14, 101–102, 358
primary qualities 94, 122, 125, 126, 154, 269
principle of mass action 273, 295, 358
probability 99, 107
problem of first cause 42
Progressive Party 228, 246
Prohibition 238
Protestantism 75, 83
pseudoscience 110, 155, 236, 247, 358
psyche 20–22, 36, 37, 42–43, 44, 61, 150, 211, 290
and learning theory 276–279
psychiatry 250, 289
psychic
causes 213–214
energy 165, 237
faculties 189
research 236–237, 245
psychoanalytic theory 251–257, 264, 345, 359
and behaviorism 259
and development 254–256, 257, 264, 306
experimental tests of 259, 260
and psychology 258–259
and therapy 260, 291, 342, 343
psychodynamic
theories 258, 359
therapies 291, 342
psychophysics 160–161, 175, 215–216, 270
psychology of religion 347
psychology of women 288, 346, 347
psychoses 191, 199, 251, 289, 319, 342
psychosexual stages 255–256, 286–287
psychosurgery 195, 250–251, 273, 289–290
psychotechnics 245
Q-sort technique 315
racial
distinctions 167–168
prejudice 275, 281–282, 292, 322, 348
segregation 311–312
rational emotive therapy 319–320, 343
rationalism 79, 100–107, 285, 359
reaction potential 296
reaction time 157, 173, 223, 341
realism 64–65, 359
reason 14–16
recapitulation 188, 359
reductio ad absurdum 16, 359
reflexive responses 190, 230–231, 272
reinforcer 297, 359
reliability 114
Religious Society of Friends 197
Renaissance 77, 80, 87
reserpine 319, 359
rhetoric 14–16, 359
Ritalin 319
Robber’s Cave study 309
Roman Catholic Church 117
Roman Christian Church 72, 78, 81
the power of 63, 74–75, 83
Romanticism 132–133, 161, 359
romantic psychology 133, 161, 183
Rome 45–9, 51, 55, 58, 62
Rorschach ink-blots 289, 317
Royal Gardens 104
Royal Society 115
Russianpsychology 174, 180, 230–232
salivation 230
sampling 99–100
schemata 300, 359
schizophrenia 191, 318, 319, 342
Scholastic Aptitude Test 228, 287
Scholasticism 63–67, 73, 75, 90, 92, 112, 121, 359
science 93–94
fiction 236
scientia 96–98, 359
scientific
method 117, 132, 148, 173, 178, 259, 268
paradigm 111–113, 115
progress 134
scorpions 184, 185, 186
Scripture 52, 62, 64, 93, 112, 142
secondary qualities 95, 122, 126, 269
secular powers 70, 359
selective attention 6, 335, 359
selective recall 6, 335, 359
self 128–129, 150, 164, 205, 214, 218, 328
and humanistic/existential psychology 312–313
self-actualization 314, 316, 348
self preservation 126
selfish motive 119–120, 315, 350
sexual abuse 254–255
signs 87, 96
skepticism 19, 46–47, 52, 77–79, 101, 111, 219, 359
religious 126
scientific 117, 188
slavery 56–57, 87, 147, 167
social cognition 305, 334–335, 360
social contract 120
Social Darwinism 144
social facilitation effects 308, 360
social learning theory 304–305
social psychology 264–265, 279–283, 292, 308–312, 333–336, 341
and Gestalt 245
and perception 308
and social change 311–312
and Tolman 275–276
Society for Psychiatry and Neurology 254
Society for Psychical Research 236
Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 308
sociobiology 145, 331–332
sociology 140, 144, 264
special theory of relativity 235–236, 241
Spencer-Bain principle 143, 360
Spiritualism 164–165, 236, 253
sport psychology 264
Standard Oil 237
Stanford University 224, 288
Stanford-Binet 224
statistics 170–171, 268–269, 341
in social psychology 309–310
stereotypes 335
sterilization 227, 250, 289–290
stimulus-response theory 107, 229–230, 272–273, 274, 294–295, 301, 302, 325
story of the two astronomers 148
Stoicism 47–48, 50, 69
strange situation 304
stream of consciousness 208
structuralism 181–182, 220, 240, 360
sublimation 163, 257, 360
suggestion 200, 249–250, 251–252
superego 257, 360
supernatural powers 12–13, 26, 35, 85, 107–111, 191, 199
superstitious 5, 108, 360
survey research 170, 360
syllogism 102
syphilis 250
tabula rasa 121, 324, 360

tactile senses 157–158
talking cure 252
teleology 47, 85, 114, 140, 182, 360
telepathy 236–237
temperament 231, 304, 307, 336–338, 340, 341, 360
testing 222
army 224–227, 287
diagnostic 289, 317
immigrant 224
intelligence 222–224, 226, 269, 288–289
personnel 228, 247, 287
school 227–228, 287
Thematic Apperception Test 289, 317
theory 33, 360
therapy 318
behavior 343
cognitive 343, 344
eclectic 343
effectiveness of 320–321, 343–344
future of 344–345
humanistic 315–316
the medical model 318, 342, 344
moral 196
object relations 342
the psychological model 319
talking 197, 200
time and motion 248, 360
tranquillizing chair 196
transactional analysis 320, 360
transformism 141, 361
transmigration 61, 361
trial and error 213, 241–243
Trinity College, Oxford 90
trust 10–13, 32, 72
Turing test 279
twin research 171
two-point threshold 158
unconditional positive regard 315, 316
unconscious inference 160
unconscious mind 175, 183, 329–330, 333–335, 347
in psychoanalytic theory 253–257
UNIVAC 279
University of
Akron 203
Berlin 172
Breslau 156
California 189, 272
Leipzig 172, 174
Padua 67
Paris 62
Pennsylvania 222
St. Petersburg 174, 190
Vienna 151, 183, 254
Wisconsin 313
Wurzburg 182
unmoved mover 42
Upanishads 59
utilitarianism 138–139, 143, 361
validity 97–98, 114, 207, 361

Valium 319
Vietnam 322–323
vision 158–159, 216–217
color 159, 204, 217
vitalism 21–22, 136, 150–151, 156–157, 166, 361
voluntarism 162, 173
Wild Boy of Aveyron 123

witchcraft 68, 87, 109–111, 115
witch persecution 117
floating test 109
pricking test 109
weeping test 109
women
and education 119, 147, 176, 182, 202–204
and employment discrimination 289, 291
feminism 322, 346
and functional periodicity 288
and intelligence 168–169, 288–289
and mental illness 251, 289, 291, 319
in philosophy 119
in psychology 182, 204, 231, 245, 346
in psychoanalytic theory 256
right to vote 176
in science 115
and sin 53–54
and slavery 87
status of 23, 27, 30, 50, 56–57, 59
and witchcraft 109, 111
world-view 8, 112, 361
Yale University 272

Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology 272
York Retreat 197
Young-Helmholtz theory 159, 361
Zeigarnik effect 244

zeitgeist 80, 82, 308, 361
zone of proximal development 285

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HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

This classic edition includes a new foreword by former APA President

Cherie O’Boyle is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at California State

The Psychology Press and Routledge Classic Editions series celebrates a

The New Psychology of Language (Classic Edition): Cognitive and

Human Cognitive Neuropsychology (Classic Edition)

Essentials of Human Memory (Classic Edition)

Essential Cognitive Psychology (Classic Edition)

Lev Vygotsky (Classic Edition): Revolutionary Scientist

History of Psychology (Classic Edition): A Cultural Perspective

The Psychobiology of Human Motivation (Classic Edition)

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2021 Taylor & Francis

First edition published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2006

Second edition published by Routledge 2011

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: O’Boyle, Cherie Goodenow, 1950– author.

ISBN: 978-0-367-69362-6 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

Foreword to the Classic Edition

List of Photographs and Illustrations

1 Origins of Psychological Thought: Why Do Other People Have Such

The Questions of Psychology

What We Believe and How We Come to Believe

3 From an Age of Spirits to Humanism: How Many Angels Can Dance on

4 The Birth of Science: Is There Anything You Cannot Doubt?

Revolution Is in the Air

5 Philosophical Answers to Psychological Questions: If a Tree Falls in the

Philosophers and Philosophies of the Human

6 Physiological to Experimental Psychology: Can Consciousness Be

7 A Divided Discipline: What Is the Function of Mind?

Divisions Created by Ideas

8 A Science of Behavior: Is Consciousness a Myth?

The Landscape Changes

9 Paradigms Proliferate: Is There an Unconscious Mind?

10 Age of Theory: Why Are There So Many Different Psychological

Psychology and the Scientific Method

11 When Motivation Is the Question: Why Do We Do What We Do?

12 The Mind Returns: What Questions Are Psychologists Exploring Now?

From Learning to Cognition

Professor O’Boyle has authored an imminently engaging and provocative

1.1 Neanderthal Bone Flute

A FEW NOTES ABOUT STYLE LEARNING TOOLS

In embarking on this journey, I wish to achieve four goals. First, I want

This journey began before history and will go on as long as humans

The real origins of psychological thought are lost in prehistoric mystery. In

THE QUESTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY

As the problems of immediate survival become more consistently solved,

Still other questions might have had to do with:

✔ Stop and think.

Perceptual and Cognitive Influences

It is true that the culture an individual belongs to can influence how

For example, humans prefer simple answers that can be readily

Cause and Effect

Biases in Processing Information

Desire for Social Consensus

Evidence is also filtered based on the degree of personal contact. Personal

Another motivational mechanism that influences how questions about

IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS ACROSS TIME AND