Philosophy The Power of Ideas 9th Edition Moore Solutions Manual

Philosophy The Power of Ideas 9th Edition Moore Solutions Manual
Philosophy The Power of Ideas 9th Edition Moore

Solutions Manual
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Instructor's Manual | Chap. 6: The Rise of Modern Metaphysics and Epistemology
CHAPTER 6: THE RISE OF MODERN METAPHYSICS AND

EPISTEMOLOGY
Main Points
1. Historical developments after the Renaissance, especially the growth of

science, led to the shaping of metaphysics and epistemology, including the
commonsense view of today that reality has a dual nature of physical objects
and mind.
2. Important (and conflicting) metaphysical perspectives: dualism (what

exists is either physical or mental, or, in the case of human beings, some
combination of both); materialism or physicalism (only the physical exists);
idealism (only the mental or spiritual exists); and “alternative views”: a
“neither-nor” view (what exists is ultimately neither mental nor physical); a
“both-and” view, often called double aspect theory (what exists is
ultimately both mental and physical—the mental and physical are just
different ways of looking at the same things, which in themselves are neutral
between the two categories).
3. Though dualism continues to command the assent of common sense,

increasingly a scientific understanding of the world has brought materialism
into prominence. Along with idealism and alternative views, the outcome of
the competition will have profound implications for how the following three
questions are answered: Does an immaterial God exist? Do humans have
free will? Is there life after death?
Descartes and Dualism
4. René Descartes began modern philosophy and in metaphysics

employed skepticism to arrive (he thought) at truth and knowledge. If
anything is beyond doubt, it can provide a criterion of truth and knowledge.
5. Skepticism as the key to certainty. Two famous conjectures he employed

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were the dream conjecture and the evil demon conjecture.
6. He could doubt at first everything except the truth expressed in “cogito,

ergo sum.”
7. The “clear and distinct” litmus test. From cogito, ergo sum Descartes
worked his way to the clear and distinct criterion of truth: anything that was
as clear and distinct as his own existence would pass the litmus test and
would also have to be certain. This doubting methodology was like
geometry, using as an axiom “I think, therefore I am” to prove true what at
first only seemed true.
8. Using the “clear and distinct” criterion, Descartes found that he had a
certain knowledge of God’s existence and, from knowledge that God would
not deceive him, Descartes concluded that he also had certain knowledge
that there existed a world of objects outside his mind.
9. The essential attribute of material substance is extension (occupancy of

space); the essential attribute of mind is thought. Mind and matter are
totally independent of each other.
10. Difficulties in dualism include reconciling the belief that material things
are completely subject to physical laws with the belief that the immaterial
mind can move one’s body.
11. Some of Descartes’ followers proposed parallelism as a possible

solution to the problem of how an immaterial mind can interact with a
material body. The mental and physical involve two parallel series of events
that coincide, so that it only appears that my act of willing my hand to move
is causing my physical hand to move. God is the divine coordinator. (A
variant called occasionalism suggests that when I will my hand to move,
that is the occasion God causes my hand to move.)
12. Descartes took an epistemological detour in trying to discover

metaphysical truth about what is through epistemological inquiry about
what can be known.
Hobbes and Materialism
13. Thomas Hobbes in his natural philosophy thought that all that exists is
bodies in motion, this being true not only of what ordinarily is viewed as
physical bodies but also of mind and emotion.
14. That is, all mental phenomena derive from perception, that is, “sense.”
Thus, Hobbes espoused materialism.
15. Perception. All mental phenomena are derived from perception, which is
itself nothing but “matter in motion.” Motions outside us cause motions
within us. Hobbes tried to establish that every aspect of human psychology,
including memory and imagination, thought, reasoning, and decision
making, are all a product of perception.
16. The theory that all is matter in motion expresses in a rudimentary way
the view held by many contemporary philosophers and brain scientists that
every mental activity is a brain process of some kind.
The Alternative Views of Conway, Spinoza, and Leibniz
17. The Metaphysics of Anne Conway. A forerunner of Leibniz’s monadology,

Lady Conway’s view was that all things are reducible to a single substance
that is itself irreducible but that there is a continuum between material and
mental substances so that all created substances are both mental and
physical to some degree or other.
18. All “Creatures” (i.e., created substances) are dependent on God’s

decision to create them. All such creatures have an individual essence and an
essence common to all. The latter came to be known as de re modality—
meaning that a property (in this case, the property of being both mental and
physical) must be a property of anything that is created by God. Everything
(other than God) is a substance and must of necessity exist as partly physical
and partly mental.
19. Conway’s God is nonmaterial, nonphysical, all-perfect, and exists

outside the dimension of time. God is the eternal creator; the universe has
always existed because God has always existed and he has always been
creating. Past and future are all God’s present.
20. Conway’s book, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern
Philosophy, begins with a series of assumptions (in the same manner as
Spinoza’s Ethics and Leibniz’s Monadology) from which are derived various
philosophical conclusions.
21. Spinoza. He regarded thought and extension as different attributes of

one basic substance equated with God. A living person is not the composite
of mind and matter, but rather a “modification” of the one substance. The
mind and body are the same thing, conceptualized from different
viewpoints. Thus, there is no problem explaining how the mind interacts
with the body: they are one and the same thing.
22. Spinoza was a pantheist: God is all. There is no personal immortality

after death, and free will is an illusion.
23. Though both Hobbes and Spinoza believed there was only one
substance, Hobbes had the problem of explaining away the mental.
24. Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibniz. Leibniz and Newton,

independently of each other, developed the calculus.
25. For Leibniz, reality consisted of monads, indivisible units of force or

energy or activity. They are entirely nonphysical.
26. His metaphysical system took advantage of certain basic principles.

One, the principle of the identity of indiscernables, says that if two beings
have exactly the same set of properties, then they are identical with one
another; the principle of sufficient reason says that there is a sufficient
reason why things are exactly as they are and not otherwise.
The Idealism of Locke and Berkeley
27. John Locke and Representative Realism. Locke’s fundamental thesis is

that all our ideas come from experience and that the human mind at birth is a
tabula rasa (blank slate).
28. Nihil in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu (“nothing exists in
the mind that was not first in the senses”).
29. Locke’s representative realism—we perceive objects indirectly by our

ideas or representations of them—is now thought to be so much common
sense.
30. George Berkeley. If representative realism is correct, Berkeley argued,

then we cannot know that any of our ideas or perceptions accurately
represent the qualities of sensible things because we cannot compare the
ideas we have of an object with the object itself. We do not experience the
object itself but only our perceptions or ideas of the object.
31. The objects of human knowledge consist of “ideas” (1) conveyed to the
mind by the senses, (2) perceived by the mind when the mind reflects on its
own operations, or (3) compounded or divided by the mind with the help of
memory or imagination. What exists, therefore, are ideas and the minds that
have them. It is contradictory to suppose that material substances exist
outside the mind that perceives them.
32. If secondary qualities (e.g., tastes, odors, colors) exist only in the mind,
then so do primary qualities (e.g., extension, figure, motion), because they
are all relative to the observer.
33. Material things as clusters of ideas. Berkeley’s view is one version of

idealism. He maintains that sensible things are not material things that exist
outside the mind but are directly perceived clusters of ideas within the mind.
34. Berkeley believed that the perceiving mind of God makes possible the
continued existence of sensible things when we are not perceiving them.
35. Berkeley and atheism. Esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”).
36. He believed the greatest virtue of his idealist system was that it alone
did not invite skepticism about God. If the existence of sensible objects was
undeniable, then the existence of the divine mind, in which sensible objects
are sustained, was equally undeniable.
37. God’s existence, thought Berkeley, is shown by the fact that sensible
things continue to exist when we do not perceive them; and from the fact
that we do not ourselves cause our ideas of sensible things.
38. Commonsense objections that Berkeley’s idealism renders the physical

world intangible or imaginary are based on a misunderstanding of Berkeley.
Boxes
The Scientific Revolution
(Copernicus ushers in a new era of discovery and a new worldview)
Chronology of Postmedieval History
(From the Renaissance to the Age of Technology)
Profile: René Descartes
(He founded analytic geometry and did work in optics)
Descartes’s Conjectures
(Descartes’s two skeptical conjectures explained)
Oliva Sabuco de Nantes and the Body–Soul Connection
(The connection between body and soul occurs throughout the brain)
Profile: Anne Finch, The Viscountess Conway
(She grew up knowing some of the most influential English intellectuals of her time)
Profile: Benedictus de Spinoza
(A gentle man, he was widely misunderstood)
Newtonians, Metaphysicians, and Émilie du Châtelet
(The conflict between Newtonian empirical science and speculative metaphysics)
Profile: George Berkeley
(He had an enthusiasm for tar water)
Rationalism and Empiricism
(An important box on the difference between the two)
Mind-Body Theories
(Summarizing the views of Descartes, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Spinoza in a simple

chart)
Readings
6.1 René Descartes, from Meditations on First Philosophy
The excerpt contains both of Descartes’s skeptical conjectures and his

explanation that he is a thinking thing—a mind—a thing that is one and
indivisible but is intermingled with something entirely different, a body—
something that is divisible and has parts.
6.2 Benedictus de Spinoza, from Ethics
The excerpt demonstrates Spinoza’s use of his “geometric method” in which

metaphysical cer- tainties (“propositions”) are deduced from a group of
“definitions” and self-evident “axioms.”
6.3 George Berkeley, from Treatise Concerning the Principles of

Human Knowledge
Berkeley notes that the objects of human knowledge are ideas and that these
ideas can only exist in the mind that perceives them. He then observes that
there is a contradiction in the view that sensible objects exist outside the
mind. He goes on to argue that all the qualities we experience when we
experience a sensible object (not just the so-called secondary qualities) are
ideas that exist in the mind and that the existence of things outside the mind
cannot be proven by reason; in fact, Berkeley argues, it is impossible even to
conceive of a sensible thing existing outside the mind.
Lecture and Discussion Ideas Related to Selected Questions
5. “Material things, including one’s own body, are completely subject to physical
laws.” “The immaterial mind can move one’s body.” Are these two claims
incompatible? Explain.
It’s dead certain that your class will accept both these ideas. They really
should be aware of the problems.
Can the body be subject to physical laws while being moved by something
that is nonphysical? Perhaps, but there is this difficulty: if a nonphysical
something moves the body but only in such a way that the body is always
subject to physical laws, then the nonphysical something seems eliminable
by Ockham’s razor. A car analogy may be useful: when you depress the gas
pedal the pistons move faster and the crankshaft rotates faster and the wheels
turn faster, and it all happens in accordance with the principles of internal
combustion engine mechanics. Maybe something nonphysical causes the
pistons to move faster and the crankshaft and wheels to turn faster when the
gas pedal is depressed, but why suppose this?
Further, if the immaterial mind’s moving the body entails that a person
could have acted differently in the same circumstances, there is this
difficulty: if the person could have acted differently in the same
circumstances, then his or her body could have moved differently in the
same circumstances. But if a physical thing could have moved differently in
the same circumstances, it is not governed by physical laws.
Various suggestions have been made as to how a nonphysical mind might

interact with a body that (presumably) nevertheless is completely subject to
physical laws, and one of them might be discussed. One suggestion came
from John Eccles (with Karl Popper), The Self and Its Brain (New York:
Springer International, 1977).
Eccles theorized, in effect, that the mind (not his word) may affect the
patterns of discharge of neuron populations in the brain. The trouble with
this is that nothing that happens in the brain seems to require the
nonphysical mind as its explanation, and it does not seem possible either to
confirm or to disconfirm Eccles’s theory. The theory, in short, seems
gratuitous. One of us discussed this elsewhere, briefly: see Brooke Noel
Moore, The Philosophical Possibilities Beyond Death (Springfield: Charles C.
Thomas, 1981).
Other Lecture and Discussion Ideas
Do we have knowledge of external objects? Explain.
Rather than provide a general answer to this question, we want to focus on a

subsidiary question: Could the universe exist even in the absence of thought
about it?
We hear a lot these days to the effect that contemporary astrophysics lends
support to idealism through something called the anthropic principle. We
cannot help you very much with this principle, but we would like to make
you aware of it, in case you are not.
There are evidently at least two versions of this principle, a weak version and
a strong version. A weak version, as set forth by Brandon Carter, is that a
complete account of the universe must explain the fact that the universe
contains observers. A stronger version is that the universe must have such
properties as to admit observers to exist in it at some stage in its
development. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the constants and

laws of nature must be such that life can exist.
A very strong version of the principle, associated with the physicist J. A.

Wheeler, is to the effect that the production of observers at some stage in the
universe is essential to bringing it into being. Proponents of this very strong
version, if we understand them correctly, theorize that the universe acquires
reality back to its beginning in the Big Bang only when after eons it brings
about observership. The theory is illustrated by the “double-slit”
experiment, in which the experimenter decides, after a photon has passed
through a screen with two slits, whether it will pass through both slits or only
one. The experimenter makes this decision by opening or closing a venetian
blind beyond the screen after the photon has already passed through the
screen but before it reaches the blind. If he opens the blind, he records
through which slit the photon passes; whereas if he closes it and uses it for a
photographic plate, the interference pattern reveals that the photon went
through both slits. In the first instance the photon behaves as a particle, and
in the second its behavior is wavelike. Similarly, it is theorized, the reality of
the universe in the Big Bang and since is dependent on the occurrence of
observers now.
We do not really feel competent to comment on the experiment or on its

application to the very strong anthropic principle. [If you want to pursue the
subject, see John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic
Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). We also like John
Leslie’s book, Universes, (New York: Routledge, 1989, Chapter 6).] This
much at least can be said: the first two versions stated above certainly are not
equivalent to idealism. The third version also is not equivalent to idealism,
though it certainly assigns an importance to observation that exceeds that
suggested by common sense; and in any case it seems to be pretty
speculative at this point.
Psychokinesis is the mental power by which psychics claim to make changes in the
external physical world—to bend spoons, to cause balls to roll, and so on. Is there any
difference between using your mind to bend a spoon and using your mind to bend
your arm? Explain.
(This question might also be discussed in connection with Chapter 17.)

We think there is no difference, and we think that our students should
recognize this, because it will help them appreciate that ordinary, everyday
mind–body interaction is a pretty mysterious business, if you think the mind
is nonmaterial. (You may disagree with us on these points.)
It only seems as if there is a difference because there is direct physiological

linkage between a psychic’s arm and brain, whereas (assuming that there is
psychokinesis) any balls the psychic causes to roll or spoons he or she causes
to bend through “psychokinesis” are not linked with his or her brain. So
psychics seem to be much “closer” to their arms than to the balls and spoons
they manipulate through psychokinesis.
Of course, if the mind is the brain, then the psychic’s arm, unlike the balls
and spoons, really is linked to his or her mind. But if the mind is nonphysical,
then the psychic’s arm is no closer to his or her mind than are the spoons and
balls. If the mind is nonphysical, then the mind’s moving an arm (or causing
brain neurons to fire) is no more mysterious than psychokinesis. In fact, it is
psychokinesis.
And that means that any skepticism someone has about psychokinesis should
be equally felt relative to the idea that the nonmaterial mind causes the limbs
to move.
It’s too bad you can’t move a ball with psychokinesis to add a little color to
the discussion (if you can, we’d like to hear from you). What you can do is
point out that, if you were to give a dem- onstration of psychokinesis,
everyone in the class would suspect a trick. So shouldn’t they respond with
the same skepticism when you claim that you used your immaterial mind to
raise your arm?
Philosophers’ Principal Works
Oliva Sabuco de Nantes (1562–?)
New Philosophy of Human Nature (1587)

René Descartes (1596–1650)
Discourse on Method (1637)

Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)
Principles of Philosophy (1644)
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
De Cive (1642)
De Corpore Politico (1650)
Leviathan (1651)
The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (1656)
De Corpore (1665)
Behemoth (1682)
Anne Finch, The Viscountess Conway (1631–1679)
The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1671–1674?

1677–1679?)
Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677)
Ethics (probably finished 1665; published 1677)
John Locke (1632–1704)
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689)

Two Treatises of Government (1690)
George Berkeley (1685–1753)
Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709)

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)
Philosophy The Power of Ideas 9th Edition Moore Solutions Manual
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713)
Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibniz (1646–1716)

The Theodicy (1710)
Monadology (1714)
Émilie du Châtelet (1707–1749)
Institutions de Physique (1740)
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CHAPTER 6: THE RISE OF MODERN METAPHYSICS AND

1. Historical developments after the Renaissance, especially the growth of

2. Important (and conflicting) metaphysical perspectives: dualism (what

3. Though dualism continues to command the assent of common sense,

Descartes and Dualism

4. René Descartes began modern philosophy and in metaphysics

5. Skepticism as the key to certainty. Two famous conjectures he employed

were the dream conjecture and the evil demon conjecture.

6. He could doubt at first everything except the truth expressed in “cogito,

9. The essential attribute of material substance is extension (occupancy of

11. Some of Descartes’ followers proposed parallelism as a possible

12. Descartes took an epistemological detour in trying to discover

Moore, Philosophy, 9e IM-6 | 2

Hobbes and Materialism

The Alternative Views of Conway, Spinoza, and Leibniz

17. The Metaphysics of Anne Conway. A forerunner of Leibniz’s monadology,

18. All “Creatures” (i.e., created substances) are dependent on God’s

19. Conway’s God is nonmaterial, nonphysical, all-perfect, and exists

Moore, Philosophy, 9e IM-6 | 3

21. Spinoza. He regarded thought and extension as different attributes of

22. Spinoza was a pantheist: God is all. There is no personal immortality

24. Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibniz. Leibniz and Newton,

25. For Leibniz, reality consisted of monads, indivisible units of force or

26. His metaphysical system took advantage of certain basic principles.

The Idealism of Locke and Berkeley

27. John Locke and Representative Realism. Locke’s fundamental thesis is

Moore, Philosophy, 9e IM-6 | 4

tabula rasa (blank slate).

29. Locke’s representative realism—we perceive objects indirectly by our

30. George Berkeley. If representative realism is correct, Berkeley argued,

33. Material things as clusters of ideas. Berkeley’s view is one version of

35. Berkeley and atheism. Esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”).

Moore, Philosophy, 9e IM-6 | 5

38. Commonsense objections that Berkeley’s idealism renders the physical

The Scientific Revolution

(Copernicus ushers in a new era of discovery and a new worldview)

Chronology of Postmedieval History

(From the Renaissance to the Age of Technology)

Profile: René Descartes

(He founded analytic geometry and did work in optics)

(Descartes’s two skeptical conjectures explained)

Oliva Sabuco de Nantes and the Body–Soul Connection

Profile: Anne Finch, The Viscountess Conway

Moore, Philosophy, 9e IM-6 | 6

Profile: Benedictus de Spinoza

(A gentle man, he was widely misunderstood)

Newtonians, Metaphysicians, and Émilie du Châtelet

(The conflict between Newtonian empirical science and speculative metaphysics)

Profile: George Berkeley

(He had an enthusiasm for tar water)

Rationalism and Empiricism

(An important box on the difference between the two)

(Summarizing the views of Descartes, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Spinoza in a simple

6.1 René Descartes, from Meditations on First Philosophy