Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Pineda, JR., 874 SCRA 529, July 30, 2018

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SECOND DIVISION

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE G.R. No. 227147


COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,


PERALTA,
ALFONSO 0. PINEDA, JR., and PERLAS-BERNABE,
JOSEPHINE C. PINEDA, CAGUIOA, and
Respondents. REYES, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

x-----------------------------------------------------"---------------

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 (RTC), through a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Amended Order 1 dated July 21, 2016 and the Order2
dated September 1, 2016 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM which
dismissed petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. 's (petitioner)
complaint for sum of money against respondents Alfonso 0. Pineda, Jr. and
Josephine C. Pineda (respondents) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

In its Complaint3 dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on


October 23, 2014, it extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a

1
Rollo, pp. 21-22. Penned by Presiding Judge Beatrice A. Caunan-Medina.
2
Id. at 23.
3
Id. at 26-31.

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Decision 2 G.R. No. 227147

Promissory Note, 4 in the amount of P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal


monthly installments of P23,242.00, which was secured by a Chattel
Mortgage 5 constituted on a vehicle owned by respondents. Notably, the
Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums
due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within
[the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth
Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option." 6 Due to
respondents' default, petitioner demanded payment of the whole remaining
balance of the loan, which stood at P510,132.00 as of June 8, 2015,
excluding penalty charges. As the demand went unheeded, petitioner filed
the instant suit for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of
Replevin before the RTC, further alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo,
Rizal. 7

The RTC Proceedings

In an Order 8 dated March 28, 2016, the RTC issued a Writ of


Replevin, due to respondents' continued failure to pay their monetary
obligations to petitioner and/or surrender their vehicle subject of the Chattel
Mortgage.

However, in an Amended Order 9 dated July 21, 2016, the RTC


recalled the Writ of Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that since: (a)
petitioner's principal place of business is in Mandaluyong City, Metro
Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in Porac, Pampanga, it has no
jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the dismissal of the
complaint. 10

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 11 which was,


however, denied in an Order 12 dated September 1, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC
correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

4
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 38-39.
6
Id. at 37.
See id. at 26-30.
Id. at 42.
9
Id. at 21-22.
10
See id.
11
See motion for reconsideration dated August 15, 2016; id. at 43-46.
12
Id. at 23.

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Decision 3 G.R. No. 227147

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

"Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause


or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the·
Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint,
the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief
sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted." 13 This is markedly different from the concept of venue,
which only pertains to the place or geographical location where a case is
filed. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services,
Inc., 14 the Court exhaustively differentiated these concepts, to wit:

Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. In City


of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority:

On the one hand, jurisdiction is "the power to hear


and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the
court or tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it
can be brought. Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived
and may be brought at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. When a case is filed with a court which has no
jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu
proprio dismiss the case.

On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or


geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of
procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be
brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be
deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is
improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the
case.

Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional


impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a
matter of procedural law. 15

In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money
involving the amount of P510, 132.00. Pursuant to Section 19 (8) of Batas·
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, 16 as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No.

13
Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-11 Builders, Inc., 660 Phil. 517, 529 (2011 ).
14
G.R. No. 188146, February l, 2017, 816 SCRA 379.
15
Id. at 396-397; citations omitted.
16
Section 19 (8) of BP 129, entitled "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980," reads:

v
Decision 4 G.R. No. 227147

(RA) 7691, 17 the RTC irrefragably has jurisdiction over petitioner's


complaint. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground
of its purported lack of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue


which, as already discussed, are not synonymous with each other. Even
assuming arguendo that the RTC correctly pertained to venue, it still
committed grave error in dismissing petitioner's complaint, as will be
explained hereunder.

Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil


actions, to wit:

Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or


possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and
tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried


in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Section 2. Venue of personal actfons. - All other actions may be


commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the


defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xx xx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind. attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (Pl00,000.00) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items, exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
17
Section 5 of RA 7691, entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDl1'!G FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 1980,"' reads:

Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) ofBatas Pambansa Big.
129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted
further to Three. hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided. however, That in the
case of Metro Manila, the abovementioncd jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after
five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

I\ I
Decision 5 G.R. No. 227147

action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said
defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and
tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply -

(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides


otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before
the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

In Briones v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court succinctly discussed the


rule on venue, including the import of restrictive stipulations on venue:

Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is
the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal
actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. [(581 Phil. 381, 386
[2008])] instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either
introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may
be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue, viz. :

The parties, however, are not precluded from


agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by
Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as
to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only
in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by
law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue,


jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such
stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this
purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the
designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts,"
or words of similar import, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. 19
(Emphases and underscoring in the original)

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory


Note - which reads "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under
this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the]

18
7 50 Phil. 891 (2015).
19
Id. at 898-899; citations omitted.

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Decision 6 G.R. No. 227147

National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance


Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option" 20 - is indeed
restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the
actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial
Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office. In light of
petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it
appears that venue has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been
disputed and successfully rebutted later on.

Finally, even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is


well-settled that the courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the
ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity,
as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived. 21 The
Court's ruling in Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v. Nolasco 22 is
instructive on this matter, to wit:

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is


cert:iinly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
Courts of Fi.rst Instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or
impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he
cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge
belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a


motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
improperlv laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue,
though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of
the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case. 23 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In sum, the RTC erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's


complaint before it. As such, the complaint must be reinstated, and
thereafter, remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

WHERE~ORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order


dated Jµ]y 21, 2016 and the Order dated September 1, 2016 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No.
2814-15 SM is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the RTC for further
proceedings.

20
See rollo, p. 37.
21
Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v. Nolasco, 799 Phil. 598, 605 (2016).
22 Id.
23
Id. at 605-606,. citi.ng Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 273 Phil. 1, 6-7 (1991 ).

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Decision 7 G.R. No. 227147

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA MP~-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

az:~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justi
Chairperson

~
DIOSDAD°' M. PERALTA
Associatle Justice

ANDRE
Asso ~ YES, JR.
Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that


the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARP
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, Republic Act No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

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