Tac Attack

February 1979
 TAC ATIACK FEBRUARY 1979 VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2

READINESS IS OUR PROFESSION

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

GENERAL W. L. CREECH
COMMANDER

CONTENTS LT GENERAL JAMES A. KNIGHT, JR.

VICE COMMANDER

Angle of Attack 3
The F-16 Emergency Power Unit 4
Weapons Words 8
TAC Professiona Is 10
Aircrew of Distinction 13
Writing for TAC ATIACK 14
Down to Earth 18 COL RICHARD K. ELY
TAC Tips 20 CHIEF OF SAFETY
SPO Corner 22
After the Fall 24 CAPT PETE ABLER
Chock Talk 28 EDITOR
Letters 30
Safety Awards 31
STAN HARDISON
ART EDITOR

SGT DAVID GARCIA

S TA FF A RTIS T

TACRP 127- 1
Material in this magazine is nondirective in nature . All suggestions and recommendations are intended to remain with in
the scope of existing directives. Articles published in this magazine represent the opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the posit ion of Tactical Air Command or the USAF. Information used to brief accidents and incidents does
not identify the persons. places. or units involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the Un i-
form Code of Military Justice. Written permission must be obtained from HQ TAC before material may be republished by
other than Department of Defense organizations. '
Contributions of articles and photos from personnel in the field are encouraged, as are comments and criticism . We
reserve the right to edit all manuscripts for clarity and readability. Direct communication is authorized with the Editor, TAC
ATIACK, HQ TAC/ SEPP, Langley AFB , VA 23665; AUTOVON 432 -2937 .
Distribution FX. Controlled by SEPP
Authority to publish this periodical automatically expires on 26 Jan 1980 unless its conti.nuance is authorized by the ap -
proving authority prior to that date .
 Angle
of
Att ___

assume that we've gone as far as we can to

provide an optimum balance between combat ef-
fectiveness and safe operations. 1978 proves that
we're a long way from reaching that goal.
Our Safety Investigation Boards continue to
identify causes for mishaps which are under our

THE FINAL LINK control-- -improper design---lack of quality con-

tra 1--- poor su pe rvis ion- - -inadequate training---
disregard for established directives---the list goes
last December marked the 75th anniversary of on.
powered flight . The F-16 is but our latest accom - The common thread among all these causes is
plishment in aircraft design--- a quantum step that they all involve people---the individual---you
from the days of Kitty Hawk. Unfortunately, and I and our co-workers . We must concentrate
December also closed out the worst year for on people. If we are the workers, we must
destroyed aircraft in Tactical Air Command since concentrate on our own responsibilities to do the
1969. In 1978, we destroyed 34 aircraft---in just job right. We can 't take shortcuts; we can't let
over 500,000 hours flying time . TAC-gained units any pressure prevent us from doing the job cor-
added another 18 aircraft to the destroyed rectly . We as the supervisors must insure we
column . By contrast, in 1970, we destroyed 33 lead and direct by example . There is no peace-
aircraft, but flew almost 300,000 hours more fly- time mission that requires or justifies a disregard
ing time . for established tech data and procedures . We
From the time of the first powered flight, we can't allow the way we lead to give any other im-
have used our ingenuity and technology to pression .
improve airframes, engines, flight controls, avio- We are the final link. It is up to us to make
nics and all other aircraft components. Advance- 1979 the best year in this decade. If we don't
ments have also been made training our flight succeed, our loss rate will continue and the
and support personnel. We barely pass each readiness of TAC will suffer . It's our choice . ~
month without a new concept in simulator
design , training devices, or tactics. These

~K?h
improvements have allowed us to do our job bet-
ter, faster, and safer .
These advances- -sophistication in training and
hardware, the advancing level of education of RICHARD K. ELY, CQl~,-USAF
nearly all of our personnel -- might lead us to Chief of Safety

TACATIACK 3
 The F-16 Emergency Power Unit

to do and secondly. we 'll cover what you need

Capt Roy A. Hodges, HQ TAC/ SM0 -16 to know before an F-16 stops by your base . In
F- 16 Aircraft Maintenance Officer this discussion we will refer to the fluid used in
Langley AFB VA the F-16 system (70% hydrazine and 30% water)
as " H-70. " It is not the same as the neat ( 100%)
Capt James F. Dugan, 12AF/ RT hydrazine used in missile programs. but the
chemical properties and handling precautions
Aircraft Maintenance Conversion
are basically the same .
Project Officer
Figure 1 is a schematic of the F-1 6
12AF Ready Team , Bergstrom AFB TX Emergency Power System . Note that the EPU
and H-70 fuel tank are located on the right top
side of the aircraft. just below and behind the
I n last month 's edition of TAC ATIACK you canopy. Also . take a look at the danger areas in-
were introduced to hydrazine (N 2 H4 ) and its dicated in Figure 2 .
physical characteristics and chemical properties . The F-16 EPU was designed to provide
You may now be wondering why this toxic emergency electrical and hydraulic power in the
propellant must be used in the flight line envi - event of primary power system or engine failure .
ronment on an aircraft that will be deployed In the F- 16's "fly-by-wire " flight control system
worldwide in large numbers. the familiar mechanical linkages between the
To answer this question. let's break this article side stick controller (control stick) and the flight
into two parts : First. we'll consider what the F- control surfaces are eliminated. This leaves the
16 Emergency Power Unit (EPU) was designed pilot no way to maintain aircraft control without

4 FEBRUARY 1979
 TURBINE FIG 1
DECOMPOSITION CHAMBER
AUTOMATIC START
SIGNAL
Low Hydraulic
Pressure :FUEL TANK -I-1-"1e
Electrical Power
Fluctuations
Low Engine Speed
FUEL CONTROL
r ir
it1111
Stage
I Engine
113th Bleed
--to
/11GI II Fuel lOe irl

COCKPIT CONTROL Air

Air Control $11611 I
ELECTRONIC Hydraulic Pump Genera or
I
CONTROLLER Speed Sensor

immediate emergency electrical power. The horsepower within 2-3 seconds to drive a 23
conventional Ram Air Turbine (RAT), used on GPM hydraulic pump and a 5 KVA generator.
other aircraft to provide emergency power, does The system activates when hydraulic pressure
not spin up rapidly enough or operate efficiently falls below 1000 psi or when the main genera-
enough at all airspeeds, aircraft attitudes, and tor disconnects. The EPU operates in any one of
altitudes to meet performance requirements for three modes depending upon availability of
the F-16. engine bleed air: (1) Monopropellant (hydrazine)
The F-16 EPU gives the pilot excellent flight alone; (2) Bleed air alone; and (3) Augment
control and landing stability under emergency (bleed air augmented by hydrazine). EPU start-up
conditions. The unit develops about 55 shaft is accomplished in the monopropellant mode.
TAC ATTACK 5
 Cap t Roy A. Hodges a nd

THE F-16 EMERGENCY Capt James F. Dugan

a r e th is month 's

POWER UNIT Fleagle T -s h i rt w i nners

MONOPROPELLANT FUEL HIGH ENERGY GASES

•
70% HYDRAZINE . . .
(Nz H4)

30% WATER (H 2 0)
CATALYTIC
DECOMPOSITION
CHAMBER
..: •

•
NITROGEN (N2.J
HYDROGEN (H:t)
AMMONIA (NH3 )
STEAM (H2 0)
... TO
TURB INE
NOZZLE

FUEL DECOMPOSES
INSTANTANEOUS'L Y
CATALYST
ON CONTACT
IRIDIUM DEPOSITED ON
ALUMINA OXIDE BASE FI G 3

Normal operation after start-up is sustained by heed" before an F-16 arrives at your base . Now.
bleed air augmented by hydrazine as necessary maybe an actual in c ident will illustrate what can
to drive the EPU at constant speed (70.000 "i- happen to you given the right condition s.
2000 RPM) . The bleed air mode can also be Early in 1978. an F- 16 air c raft landed fo llow-
operated on the ground to check out the EPU . ing a test flight whi c h required intentional
Lights on the cockpit control panel indicate the engine shutdown and airstart. The EPU had
mode in which t he EPU is ope rating and a worked perfectly in flight . After landing. the end -
cockpit gage indicates the percentage of hydra- of-runway check appeared normal and the air-
zine remaining in the system . The EPU is craft taxied back to the hangar . After the aircraft
designed to provide monopropellant power for was parked . a maintenance technician noticed a
ten minu tes . Longer EPU operation is possible in fluid dripping from the belly of the aircraft . He
the augment and bleed air modes . performed the old trusty "feel . smell and taste
The principle of operation is simple . When the test" to determine what the liquid was . He knew
system is activated by the EPU controller. H-70 the fluid was not water. JP-4 . or hydrauli c flu id.
monopropel lant fuel is forced by gaseous but could not identify it . So he notified his
ni t rogen pressu re through an iridium ca talyst supervisor and repeated the test for him . As you
c hamber w here th e H-70 is converted from might have guessed . the unknown fluid was
liquid form to high-energy gases . These gases hydrazine . Fortunate ly. no one was ir1jured .
spin a turbine. provid ing power to turn the though the individual did have to report to the
eme rgency hyd rau lic pump and generator (see hospital for evaluation . I hope this eliminates
Figure 3) Turbine speed is maintained by the any fear that "one drop kills" or "if you can smell
EPU control ler which intermittently injects fuel it. it's all over ." It is the large dose or repeated .
and/or bleed air . By the way. the exhaust vent prolonged exposure to hydrazine which causes
for these gases (on the lower inboard side of the the damage to your bod. Nevertheless. conta ct
right st rake) is an F-16 danger area (see Figure with hydrazine should be avoided . All contacts .
2) w hich may p roduce up to 1600°F tempera- no matter how small. should be reported and
t ures near t he aircraft surface. Avoid this dange r medica l evaluation obtained immediately.
area. The incident we described was caused by a
Now t hat yo u kn ow how the EPU ope rates. you damaged a-ring in the hydrazine tank quick dis-
may be wonde rin g. "W ha t does all th is mea n to connect which al lowed hydrazine to spray the
mel" Th ough most of you won't work with the F- EPU compartment during the test flight. As a
16 in th e im media te fu t ure. it is still important to result of this failure. a number of improvements
unde rstand th e pr ecautions . This informa t ion have been made in aircraft design to prevent
can preven t some prob lems if you "read and leak migration into adjacent compartments.

6 FEBRUARY 1979
 You shou ld understand that. while initial esti- vapor. seek medical assistan ce.
mates cite an expected 4 to 10 EPU firings per g. Contact the F-16 's home base for repair .
. wing per month , the probability of a hydra zine servicing and turnaround support or for other
leak is remote . Safeguards make leaks un likely if assistan ce / information .
the system hasn 't functioned in the hydrazine Hopefully, by the t1me you get to the aircraft
mode . But. don 't become complacent . Watc h for recovery and isolation stage . you will have
and be suspicious of fluid leaks . When the H-70 contacted the F-16 home base command post
tank is pressurized following operation of the for further instructions. This call will also alert
EPU. the pilot must make the end -of-runway home base to put together a team of spe cialist s
crew aware of it before they approa c h the air- to support aircraft repair operations . Remember.
craft. So. don 't get caught off guard . EPU system maintenan ce requires proper tech
A base which has F-16 's will use procedures data. support and servic ing equipment. and
similar to the following in responding to a leak thorough training.
aboard the airc raft : For your referen ce. the following techni cal
a. The agen cy identifying the leak will no- orders . audio-visual programs, and safety
tify job control . They will immediately notify the publi ca tions will provide the detail you need for
fuel systems maintenance shop . the shop your lo cal action . AFOSH Standard 161-13 is
respons ible for the system . Then. if necessary. the primary referen ce for hydrazine safety; it
base disaster preparedness . bioenvironmental should be available by the time you read this
engineering. safety. and other support agencies arti c le . Two audio-visual aids have been pre-
will respond . pared for Air Force use and can be ordered now
b. If possible . the aircraft will be moved to for your base film library . They are: TS-1188A
a designated . isolated location to limit exposure " F- 16 Hydrazine Hazards ." a 16mm film
to personnel or pre c lude envi ronmental hazard . designed for general audien ces (should be ex-
c. All personnel approa c hing the aircraft cellent for Commander's Calls) and TS-11888.
will wear approved protective clothing, in c luding " F-16 Hydrazine Hazards--Emergency Spill
self-contained breathing appara tu s. Procedures ." a 35mm slide / tape presentation
d. Action agencies will contain the spill. for use by agencies involved in spill control. _...;::::....
stop the leak and decontaminate the aircraft us-
ing approved procedures . T.O. 00-1 05E-9 provides fire fightmg and crash
So. what should you know when an F- 16 visits recovery mformation . Trainmg programs and other
your base? films may soon be generated to train transient
First. realize that H-70 leaks or spills present alert personnel A1r Force-w1de . With these aids
medical. environmental and logistics support you should be able to handle the emergency ac-
problems . So . if an F-16 lands with the EPU tions required to stop a leak or clean up a spill.
operating, here's an initia l shot of wha t you The important thing to remember is that the F-
should do at your base : 1 6 has a hydrazme EPU on board and when an
a. Notify the command post. job control , F-1 6 arrives. the H-70 fuel must be treated With
and end-of- runway crew. respect. So. be ready for the Air Force's newest
b. Park the airc raft in an isolated area away fighter--and hydrazine .
from traffic and buildings .
c. Clear all nonessential personnel from
the area.
d. Ask the pilot to assist in sa f ing the
weapon system and remain avai lab le for further
support as required .
e. If a leak is discovered, notify the bioen-
vironmenta l engineer and disaster preparedness
office . Clean up actions should be performed
IAWAFOS H Std 161-13.
f . If anyone expe ri ences direct skin
contact. remove clothin g and flush exposed skin
wi th clean water for 1 5 minutes. Seek medical
assistance . If exposed to elevated levels of H-70

TACATIACK 7
DID YOU KNOW?
By Capt Fred Higaki
HQ TAC / SEW

• The primary reason for requiring fire extin-

guishers on vehicles carrying explosives or at
explosives storage sites is to stop a fire from get-
ting to the explosives material. In other words . it
is simply "first-aid" fire fighting equipment.
Once the fire reaches the explosives . you've
done all you can and it's time to get out of most storage areas. the haza rd is normally grass
Dodge . The base fire department is trained to fires or fires in dunnage / packi ng ma terial .
fight fires involving explosives and will hopefully • Occupational Safety and Hea lt h Act (OSHA)
arrive on the scene before the explosives are en- Standard 1926 . 900. General Provisions .
gulfed in flames . One other point. make sure the Subpart U-Biasting and the Use of Explosives.
extinguishers you select are suitable for the contains a restriction on the use of mobile radio
potential fire hazard . On a motor vehicle. the transmitters within 100 feet of electric blasting
hazard is usually electrical or gasoline / oil . In caps that are not in original shipping containers .

Weapons words

8 FEBRUARY 1979
However. AFR 127-100. Chapter 6. is more
definitive . The distance between exposed
electro -explos ive devices (EED) and the radio
transmitter may be reduced to less than 100
feet depending on the transmitter frequency and
radiated power . The reduced distance may be
calculated by using the nomograph on page 6-
1 5. AFR 12 7-1 00 . You can use the nomograph
in lieu of guidelines set in the OSHA Standards
because AFOSH Standards or other Air Force
guidance takes precedence . However . in the
absence of either AFOSH Standards or other Air
Force guidance. applicable OSHA Standards will
be used .
• The reason for having grounding points in
the Arm / Dearm area is for munition loading /
unloading or certain types of aircraft
maintenance that may be required in that area .
Aircraft do not need to be grounded for normal
arm / dearm operations.
• Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
personnel are trained at the Naval Ordnance
School in Indian Head. Maryland . This is a Joint
DOD ordnance school managed by the Navy and
staffed by all branches of the armed services .
DOD personnel receive initial training of over 20
weeks and must attend refresher courses every
three to four years to keep current on changes
in the munitions environment. EOD units are
responsible for safing and disposing any
potentially hazardous explosives. They can take
care of items ranging from old war souvenirs to
modern . sophisticated weapons . Moreover. they
are fam iliar with explosives of both US and
foreign orgin . The improvised explosive
(homemade bomb) is the most hazardous to sive devices and their support equipment. The
EOD personnel because the devices come in all board normally meets four times a year to de-
sizes. shapes. and types of explosives. However. termine how well new. or modified munitions.
EOD personnel train extensively to handle all meet the limits of safety criteria. standards. and
types of explosives. So. if you have an explosive requirements . This evaluation is based on a
item that you know is unsafe. or even have the comparison of data obtained from engineering,
slightest doubt. clear the area and call the development and operational testing .
experts . EOD can handle the problem . Whenever a new munition is slated to come
e The Air Force has a Nonnuclear Munitions on board. a Technical Munitions Safety Study
Safety Board (NNMSB) to review and establish (TMSS) is established . This is a detailed safety
design safety criteria . standards. and require- analysis of a nonnuclear munition and is used to
ments for nonnuclear munitions being document safety engineering findings and
developed by the Air Force or procured from recommendations . After complete testing.
other sources . It also evaluates how well new or evaluation . and analysis of data. the report is
modified munitions meet the limits of safety cri- forwarded to the Director of Aerospace Safety
teria . The board is made up of technically for coordination and submission to the Air Staff .
qualified safety personnel . with members from For any further information on the Nonnuclear
every command that has a direct interest in veri- Munitions Safety Board. its purpose. composi-
fying the safety of nonnuclear munitions . explo- tion and responsibilities. consult AFR 127-16 .

TACATIACK 9
 TAC PROFESSIONALS
Each month we honor lAC's Ai rcrew of Distinction for a feat of outstand ing
airmanship . Too often we overlook the other aircrews who were nominated for
this award and but for the keen compet ition would have won the award also .
Here are some of the most noteworthy accompl is hments of the runners -up ...

inputs and to guide the aircraft into a general

upward ve ctor . Gyrations were of such intensity
that he was thrown violently around the cockpit.
and the sharp pitch oscillations caused his
shoulder harness to lock and the G meter to peg
at both the positive and negative limits .
At approximately 6000 feet. the gyrations
lessened slightly. an emergency was declared .
and the climb was continued so that a con-
trollabil ity check might be made . Wing ro c k
continued with the air c raft control augmentation
system in either the engaged or disengaged
Capt lee Whitaker position . and he found that it increased in
353 TFS / 354 TFW severity as the angle of bank was increased .
Myrtle Beach AFB. SC Capt Whitaker carefully configured the A-70 for
landing and successfully guided the aircraft to a
On 18 January 1978 Capt Whitaker was flying straight-in full-stop landing .
number four in a flight of four A-7s on a live The superior airmanship. prompt reaction to a
close ai r support mission and fire power grave inflight emergency . and professional
demonstration . competence displayed by Captain Whitaker
Two BLU - 27 delivery passes were completed resulted in the saving of a valuable tactical
and normal recoveries were accomplished . He fighter and averted possible injury or loss of life .
then climbed to 6000 feet and commenced a
high angle strafe pass . He initiated a 4 1 / 2 G •••
recovery. and as the nose of his airc raft rose Capt Deane T. Gordon
slightly above the hor izon. the right w ing 76 TFS/ 23 TFW
dipped. and the aircraft yawed and rolled to England AFB. LA
the left . Capt Whitaker immediately released
back stick pressure and attempted to level the On 27 December 1977 . Capt Gordon was
wings . but the aircraft then started a violent leading a four-ship weapons delivery flight to
wing rock with severe pitch transients. The stick Claiborne Range. Louisiana . On recovery from
was moving laterally with such force that he was his second 30-degree rocket pass . he
physically unable to control its movements. so experienced an irregular. loud banging as the
he used both hands to dampen the control throttle was advanced t hrough 80 pe rcent . Capt

10 FEBRUARY 1979
 •••
Gordon zoomed the aircraft. using his 400 KIAS Capt Gary A . Voellger
to gain altitude . whi le he simultaneously
Lt Richard P. Cashman
retarded the throttle to idle . Faced with a
523 TFS / 27 TFW
compressor stall at a power setting which would
Cannon AFB , NM
not allow level flight with his aircraft configura-
tion . he elected to select manual fuel. As the On 15 November 1977. Capt Gary A. Voellger .
throttle was advanced through 78 percent. the an F- 111 D Instructor Pilot. and 2/Lt Ri cha rd P.
compressor stall reoccurred . Cashman. a student Weapons Systems Officer.
Capt Gordon began a turn toward England averted the loss of their disabled F-1 11 D over a
AFB. 10 NM away. He reselected normal fuel populated area and successfully landed at Kirt-
and set the power just short of the stall condi- land AFB. Albuquerque. New Me xico.
tion . His zoom had carried him to approximately The mission was scheduled as a night low-
4500 feet AGL. but he was now in a controlled level syllabus training sortie. Shortly after enter-
descent . He elected not to jettison his stores ing the low- level route and while flying in auto
due to the populated areas along his flight path . terrain following flight. the right primary hy-
He maneuvered the descending aircraft to a draulic caution light illuminated. An immediate
3000 foot base leg for a precautionary landing climb to altitude was initiated and checklist
approach. When landing was assured. the air- procedures were accomplished . An emergency
craft was configured for a cable engagement . was declared with Albuquerque Center. and the
Capt Gordon touched down in the first 1000 aircraft was cleared direct to Cannon AFB . At
feet of the runway and performed a successful level-off. the wings were slowly moved forward
engagement. Investigation conducted by to prepare for landing . At 20-degree wingsweep.
Oklahoma Air Logistic Center revealed extensive the left primary hydraulic caution light began to
damage in the engine comp ressor section due flicker and minor pitch transients were en-
to internal vane failu re. countered . Furthe r fo rward movement of the
The su peri or ai rma nship. prompt reaction to a wings was terminated ; and as a result of the
grave inflight emergency. and professional pitch transients . the aircrew elected to proceed
competence demonstrated by Capt Gordon to the nearest suitable emergency airfield . Kirt-
resulted in the successful recovery of a valuable land AFB (Albuquerque) Shortly after turning
tactical fighter. toward Albuquerque. the left pr ima ry hydraulic

TAC ATIACK 11
TAC Professionals
caution light came on steady and the primary
hydraulic pressure dropped to zero psi . Ap-
proximately three minutes later. moderate pitch
transients were again encountered. As power
was reduced the left and right utility hydraulic
caution lamps flickered and utility pressure fluc-
tuated between 3000 and 1000 psi. Moderate
pitch transients were again encountered . and
the control stick pulsated back and forth . Power
was immediately reapplied . and a turn away
from populated areas was initiated in anticipa-
tion of ejection Keeping flight control inputs to a
minimum and utilizing trim to the greatest
extent. the aircrew continued the approach into
Albuquerque .
Each time power was reduced below 90
percent or demands put on the utility hydraulic
system. the utility hydraulic lights would flicker
and pitch transients would occur . In an attempt froze in a slightly nose up pitch condition. Lt
to slow the aircraft for descent and configura- Thomas selected military power and initiated a
tion . Capt Voellger elected to place the right climb. using rudder and aileron for control .
engine at 93-95 percent and reduce the left while accomplishing all checklist procedures for
engine to idle . Following gear down and locked flight control malfunction . The aircraft was
indication . a left 10 -degree bank turn to final leveled at a safe ejection altitude of 10.000 feet
was started. Approximat'ely 20 degrees from by reducing power and an emergency was
rollout heading. pitch and stick transients were declared with Eglin Approach Control . Eliminat-
again encountered with additional utility hy- ing fault in all the hydraulic and stability
draulic pressure fluctuations . With complete hy- systems. the aircrew began searching for possi-
draulic failure and loss of control imminent. the ble foreign objects in the area inside the boot at
aircrew seriously considered the possibility of the base of both sticks . Finding nothing and de-
ejection . After four or five cycles . the transients termining that the aircraft could not be landed
ceased as abruptly as they had started and Capt without pitch control. Lt Thomas attempted to
Voellger was able to roll the aircraft out on a forcefully free the stick . After several attempts .
four-mile final approximately 1000 feet AGL. the stick abruptly broke free and near normal
The approach was continued to an uneventful pitch control was regained . The aircraft was
landing and rollout . The superior airmanship headed toward Eglin and the inactive runway
displayed by Capt Voellger and Lt Cashman was opened to allow minimum maneuvering for
resulted in the sa fe recovery of a seriously a straight-in landing . The aircraft was configured
disabled aircraft. before descent and a shallow controlled ap-
proach was made . The stick became jammed
••• momentarily during the approach . but control
Capt Dean Edgerton was rapidly regained and an uneventful landing
lt George E. Thomas accomplished. Investigation revealed that a
335 TFS / 4 TFW foreign object in the form of an AIM-7 umbilical
Seymour Johnson AFB , NC connection disk had come loose and lodged in
the pitch control bell crank cables jamming the
On 4 February 1978. Lt Thomas and Capt stick.
Edgerton were leading a three-ship flight of The rapid appraisal and accurate handling of
F-4Es on ' a cross-country. low-level training this potentially disastrous inflight emergency by
mission between MacDill AF8 and Eglin AFB . Lt Thomas and Capt Edgerton prevented possi-
During easy maneuvering at 500 feet AGL. 420 ble aircrew injury and loss of a valuable combat
knots ground speed. the control stick suddenly aircraft .

12 FEBRUARY 1979
 AIRCREW of DISTINCTION

Captain Frederick L. Ashler

355th TFW
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ

On 26 October 1978, Captain Frederick L. Disregarding his own personal safety, he

Ashler was returning from PDM in an A-7D. Ap- remained with the airplane well below the
proximately eight miles from Davis-Monthan on recommended minimum ejection altitude to ma-
TACAN final approach his aircraft suddenly lost neuver and prevent its impact in an area with
thrust---over a densely populated area of Tucson, great potential for high loss of life. Capt Ashler
Arizona. He selected an alternate fuel control and sighted an athletic field and aimed the aircraft to
moved the throttle to try and correct the engine impact in that area. At approximately 200' AGL,
-stagnation with no results. Capt Ashler im- with total loss of lateral control, Captain Ashler
mediately raised the landing gear and selected an ejected, the aircraft landing in a street adjacent
intermediate flap setting to extend his glide to the field.
distance. By this time engine RPM had decreased Captain Ashler's disregard for his own personal
below that necessary to maintain altitude and the safety while continuing to fly a crippled aircraft
engine temperature rose above 1000 degrees. He below safe ejection altitude prevented a greater
selected the emergency flight control system and tragedy and minimized loss of life, injury and
while flying at minimum control airspeed realized property damage. His selfless performance and
he would be unable to clear the populated area exemplary airmanship qualify his as the TAC Air-
of Tucson. crew of Distincti

TAC ATTACK 13
 WRITING How many times have
FOR to yourself, Hlhis turk

lAC ATTACK
By Capt Pete Abler
weapons systems are working -- the problems
and the sol'utions . TAC ATIACK is an important
communications medium in getting your ideas
to others within the command and the tactical
Editor
aviation community. Enough philosophy -- let's
talk about writing an article for the magazine .
SUBJECTS
TAC ATIACK is the command safety magazine.
and we definitely lean in that direction -- but not
exclusively. Any article on how we can improve
our operation is bound to have additional safety
benefits . etc . Some potential subjects include
Maintenance. operations . safety practices that
save time . lives. money. and materiel.
Personal flight experiences with a lesson are a
real favorite .
Resea rch and deve lopmen t projects / resu lts .
Recent activities -- successful dep loyments --
how you did 1t and how other units can do the
same job -- or even better .
Humorous articles- - with a teaching point.
All mishaps have morals . or is it the other way
around! At any rate . have a clea r-cut "bottom
line" for your article . If it's hidden deep amongst
your similes. metaphors. etc .. we might not find
it . Better to tell the reader right off so he knows
w here you 're coming from . Now. how about the
w riting side of the story?
First. state the purpose of " bottom line" fo r
you r article or story. Secondly. determine how
you want to tell your. story -- the steps you will
take to develop your article . This will give you
your major divisions . Next. outline each separate
division within the article including the material
you wil l use to support your ideas and voila --
your outline is finished . The real key to the out-
line is to keep your objective / subject in mind. If
materia l doesn't suppo rt you r subject -- th row it
out . It wi ll probab ly o nl y detract f rom th e article
here to te ll you t hat you've got a or confuse t he reade r. Once t he out line is com-
prove it. TAC ATTACK relies mainly on you. the plete to you r satisfaction (you 'll probably revise
fliers. maintaine rs. and support personne l to it a few times). all that's left is to add the verbs .
produce much of each magazine. adjectives. and adverbs sprinkled wit h humor.
After all. this is your magazine . Only you can etc .. and you have an article to rival Hem-
tell the fu ll story of how TAC's programs and ingway's best-- even his worst wasn 't too bad .

14 FEBRUARY 1979
 flares were stored in wooden crates weighing etc .. in a conventen t . accessible place . Nu -
1.500 pounds each and stacked two high in the merous methods are used to secure the equip-
munitions storage igloo. The forklift was too ment to large boards. but in some cases the
large to fit through the igloo door so a pallet methods used require excessive removal time in
jack was used to move the crates to the door. an emergency.
With the forklift outside the igloo and the double To provide for easy equipment storage and re-
stack inside. the top crate was raised and the moval. Sgt Larry Jensen of the 67th AMS .
bottom crate was moved to the side. The middle Bergstrom AFB. TX. devised a method to use
runner of the lifted crate broke during lowering hook and pile (Velcro) tape. The advantage of
and the c rate shifted forward . The handler in the using the Vel cro tape is that it permits quick re-
igloo tried to stabilize the load but it fell rmd moval of the item in an emergency . Th e
knocked him to the concrete floor. pinning his photograph shows the methods of attachment to
head and upper body . The crate on the forklift the board . Anyone interested in using this quick
was not strapped . The load was not stable. The removal process can obtain the tape under the
forklift did not have extenders . The forks following stock numbers:
reached only halfway under the load . Hook Tape NSN 8315-00-926-4931
To say that we are extremely concerned with Pile Tape NSN 831 5-00-926-4930
the safety of munitions personnel (all personnel .
for that matter) wou ld be an understatement .
But. we can only make so many rules . The safety
folks can only make so many rules . For us in the
business of working with explosives ordnance.
the "rules " seem to go on and on . The real idea
behind "Safety Training " and "Accident Preven-
tion Programs " is to make people aware of
specific. known hazards and motivate people to
use common-sense approaches to their work
and play.
Want to make a lot of money? Come up with a
way to motivate all personnel in such a way that
they won 't make mistakes. Invent a system that
will prevent people from hurting themselves and
destroying equipment. while still allowing us to
perform our mission . Find a method for making
people pay attention ... to what they're doing
and what situations exist around them . Use an
AF Form 1000 . If you can stop accidents. we
guarantee you 'l l make a lot of money. Thou-
sands of people are trying to find the answer.
They make up rules people won 't follow ... They
change equipment to make it harder for people
to break ... They invent protective clothing/
equipment that people won 't use ... They give
briefings people won 't listen to ... They print
posters people won 't think about .. . They write
articles like this that supervisors won 't talk
about. They keep trying to do the impossible:
Make people be careful . What are YOU doing? The tape can be used for many objects as the
TAC MUNITIONS INFORMATION LETTER. 15 SEP 78 photo shows . Simply attach a length of each
type tape to the board with glue and nails and
then secure the object. One caution. this tape
SAFETY E~UIPMENT BOARDS will wear out with repeated use . Also. don't try
to secure excessively heavy objects--the
Many Air Force activities need to maintain chances of them breaking loose outweigh (no
emergency equipment or tools. first-aid kits. pun intended) the advantages of quick access .

TAC ATIACK 19
 ...interest items,
Tac tips
mishaps with
morals, for the
TAC aircrewman
DISCONTENT IS THE FIRST STEP IN THE
PROGRESS OF A MAN OR A NATION. All aircrewmembers must recognize this situa-
WILDE tion and question ATC for information and/or
vectors necessary to insure separation after a
traffic advisory. Operating under the present
ATC environment, this is the only practical
SEE AND AVOID method of preventing similar situations in the
future.
Not too long ago, 2 F-15s recovering at a When was the last time you ignored a traffic
strange field had a minor midair collision while advisory assuming you were clear of the other
maneuvering to avoid a light aircraft. Luckily the aircraft 'cause the controller never mentioned it
pilots saw the civilian plane in time to take eva- again?
sive action or the incident could easily have
been a major bash. The investigation turned up
the fact that aircrews might not fully understand CHANNEL /ZED ATTENTION
the responsibilities of air traffic control facilities.
In this case, a traffic advisory on the bug- The F-5E pilot was flying a VFR overhead
smasher was issued by the controller as an addi- landing pattern with approximately 4-5000'
tional service. The light aircraft was VFR, altitude spacing behind an F-4. The F-5 had 500 pounds
unknown, and was not under the terminal of fuel on board---the pilot had previously
facility's control. There is no requirement to declared minimum fuel. While in the flare, the F-
further pursue the convergence of radar targets 5 encountered wake turbulence and the pilot
unless there is a known conflict. The controller was forced to add power to maintain control.
was busy and did not give any more advisories, The aircraft ballooned slightly and the touch-
and the aircrew failed to ask for more informa- down was firm, delaying getting the nose back
tion. up for aerobraking. The pilot decided not to
aerobrake because if he had brought the nose
back up he would have lost sight of the F-4 he
was rapidly overtaking---but he also failed to de-
ploy the drag chute.
As the F-5 closed within 1 500' of the F-4, the
Tiger pilot came down on the binders. Both
wheels locked up--followed by both tires blow-
ing. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway,
the pilot shutdown the engines and egressed.
The concern caused by being minimum fuel
may have caused the pilot to fly too short a pat-
tern and end up too close to the F-4. A little more
spacing, even though fuel was tight, would defi-
nitely have helped. Concern for one bad situa-
tion can push you into one which is worse.

20 FEBRUARY 1979
HEAR MISS--THIS TIME
The F-4 pilot was on a TACAN approa c h to his
home field . Shortly after breaking out of the
clouds . the pilot sighted a Cessna in his one
o 'c lock position---2-300' away on a co llision
course . The F-4 pushed over and missed the
bugsmasher by 1oo·.
Investigation revealed several things. First. the
F-4 altimeter system had a "massive" leak which
could have placed the F-4 lower than the indi-
cated altitude . Secondly , the Cessna was
actually 200 ' above his traffic pattern altitude at
a nearby civilian field . The most important thing
whi c h came about from this incident was the The se ctor controller as working 5 aircraft .
realization that there was still a potential conflict one of which was an emergen cy-- so guess who
between military aircraft at the base and civil got th e short end of the stick? (Remember
traffic at the local municipal airport. The air- minimum fuel impl ies that you can land in
space folks were under the impression that they normal traffic sequen ce) The Photo Phantom
had taken care of all potent ial conflicts . re ce ived an unusually long pattern to get spa c-
Have you noticed any tight spots around your Ing behind the eme rgen cy air c raft. At 12NM of
airdrome that you never bothered to mention ? downwind . the pilot told RAPCON if they did not
There 's no time like the present to bring them turn final they would be emergen cy fuel. The air-
up . craft turned final with 1000# of fuel remaining .
The rain removal was turned on and a normal
ON WHERE ON WI(ERE PAR f lown . Fuel on short final was 600# and
touchdown was normal. After 6 .000 ' of roll .
HAS MY JP-If GONE ? both engines qu it running-- -indicated fuel was
The RF-4 was on a low level pilot upgrade 320# .
sortie . The mission went as briefed except the Now figure out how long it takes to roll 6 .000 '
last target was aborted due to fuel considera- and you 'll know how close we came to another
tions. There was sufficient fuel for RTB and the smokin' hole . There 's at least one more aircrew
aircraft arrived on GCA f inal with 2500# of fuel. in the Air Force who realized that "minimum fuel "
On short final. the aircraft entered a light rain doesn 't guarantee you a thing. If you want traffic
shower and flew too low for a safe approach . priority and really need it. there's only one thing
The crew could not see the runway so they went to do---declare an emergency. Don 't try to be a
missed approach---with 2000# of fuel remain- nice guy and not rock the boat . If you have a
ing . The pilot decla red "minimum fuel " and problem --- let someone know about it. The right
requested a minimum fuel pattern . people can 't help if you don 't let them.

Hey! pass it along ... nine others are waiting.

TACATIACK 21
SPO
CORNER

DO YOU KNOW HOW YOUR EXCEEDANCE +6G.or+7.5G.

COUNTER COUNTS ? The exceedance cou nt er set counts
electronically and records only the highest read-
ing . In other words. if you pull 6 .5 Gs . only the 6
By Maj Skip Weyrauch G counter will trip . The +3 G and +4 .5 G
HQ TAC/ SEF counter will remain the same . Do not expect all
Comm ents from th e flightline indicate some counte rs to trip as you go up and down the "G"
reluctance to trust th e reliability of the F-1 5 loads scale .
exceedan c e c ounters . Jo c ks and wren c h
benders alike can benef it from the following in - NOTE : Reading the exceedance counter will not
formation . For those who are in a hurry (or don't tell you if the "G" excursion was symmetrical .
care) . the bottom line is -- when you pull to 5 unsymmetrical . or what the gross weight was
Gs. only the 4 .5 G exceedance counter will ad- during the excursion . These are very important
vance one unit; the 3 G counter will remain un - factors in computing "over-G " and the aircraft
changed . damage index in the aircraft structural integrity
For you whiz-bang s who care to look up the program .
technical data . refer to T.O. 1 F- 15A- 2 - 17 . page
6-1 . There you can learn about how your
seismic masses flex their silicon beams which WRENCH WRENCHES A-10
vary the piezoresistor signal through the
wheatstone br idge and thereby activate the a- By Maj Gerry Felix
eromotor output to the quantizer circ uit which HQ TAC/SEF
advances the appropriate discrete c ounter We recently had an A-1 0 flight control FOD
(whew!) . incident that deserves attention . The pilot. jink-
About all the rest of us need to know is that ing away after his first dry strafe pass. noted a
behind door 6R of all F-15A / B aircraft. there is restriction in aft-stick movement. During the
an exceedance counter with seven windows . The subsequent controllability check. the stick froze
accelerometer measures the aircraft vertical-axis in pitch control . Switching to manual reversion .
acceleration force and counts occasions when the pilot could move the stick but pressures re-
the force exceeds - 2 G. - 1 G. 0 G. +3 G. +4 .5 G. quired were excessive . Reverting back to normal

22 FEBRUARY 1979
yielded the same pressures . Prior to landing, the allowed to continue unchecked . A bad case of
pilot braced his feet on the rudder pedals and sh1mmy can cause severe vibration of the instru-
gave a healthy pull . The stick broke free. and the ment panel and may cause pilots to abort at
landing was uneventful. high speeds because they think their Eagle is
The investigation revealed a wrench in the gun giving a dying gasp!
bay. Scratches and gouges confirmed that the Fortunately, even in its worse case. nose strut
wrench was lodged in the pitch control shimmy is not likely to progress into divergent
bel/crank assembly. If a wrench can get hung up vibrations ; which means it won't drive you off
in th is assembly, it's reasonable to assume that the runway in an ever-increasing fishtail ma-
anything flopp1ng around in that gun bay is a neuver.
hazard . Hopefully, we can catch shimmy in its early
We've had several prev1ous gun jams in the A- stages and eliminate unnecessary h1gh speed
10 resultmg 1n FOD in the gun bay. Should this aborts which place a maximum amount of stress
happen to you. think twice about how you are on the nose gear strut and t ire . Differentiating
gomg to fly the aircraft until mission completion . between shimmy and other nose gear problems
Personally, I would keep that hummer at 1 G facilitates proper corrective action by
with gentle turns until I got it on the ground . maintenance. A shimmy will cease as soon as
the nose gear liftoff is achieved. If your nose
gear vibration sounds more like a rumble . and
HOW'S YOUR SHIMMY ? continues to wind down after liftoff. then the
problem is a nosewheel--out of round , out of
By Maj Skip Weyrauch balance. or an inadequate nose gear axle
HQ TAC/ SEF preload. In e1ther case. write 1t up thoroughly
and get 1t f1xed . Afterwords you can rendezvous
This is not a reference to the fine art of belly
danc1ng but a discussion of the F- 1 5 at the local pub and watch the belly dancers do
phenomenon of nose wheel shimmy. Either the1r own sh1mmy. (Note : A polishmg rework of
you've experienced "the shimmy," or you're one the finish on the struts is being accomplished by
of the lucky few who have that experience ahead the contractor. Previous struts will be reworked
on an attntion basis .)
of you -- 1n either case. read on because we
have some information that may help you
properly diagnose your "shimmy."
First of all. a little explanation of why nose
gear sh immy exists in the first place . Inside the
nose gear strut there are four plates that sup -
port the inner rail so it can move up and down .
These plates are appropriately called wear
plates; and as the wear increases, the amount of
nose gear shimmy also increases . The rate of
wear depends upon the finish of the rail; the
type of material in the wear plates (two versions
are in the field) ; environmental conditions inside
the strut; operating hours; and, of course,
operator techniques. (Since MCAIR insists there
is no need to baby the nose gear, it is not a
question_. of right or wrong but just different
operator techniques .)
Shimmy will first be noti ced as the aircraft ac -
celerates through the higher speeds just prior to
nose wheel liftoff -- about 120 KIAS . Probably
only the jocks with senses tuned for a shimmy
will be able to identify it at these early " develop-
ment stages ." The shimmy will begin appearing
at lower and lower speeds during subsequent
flights; possibly starting as low as 60 KIAS. if

TAC ATIACK 23
 AFTER
THE FALL

~::M!!l~~~
;;;~
~
By Majpr Ken Krause ~
HQ TAC/ SEP ~
......_,.

~~~~~,..,__ tew events in the aviati;;- co~~ity spur as'

much interest and as many questions as an air-
craft accident. And. because of the nature of the
beast---unrecoverable or destroyed parts and
often fatalities---answers seldom come easy. The
emotions and concerns of all associated with
the unit. crew. or weapons system come into
sharper focus; and any probing into "the cir-
cumstances surrounding" meets with a strange
mixture of the desire to know all about what
happened. and the desire to forget the whole
thing. As with most othe r situations which pre-
·sent extreme alternatives. the desirable and ac-
eptable modus operandi lies somewhere in be-
tween . W ith t he preceeding in mind . I shall at-
pt to explain. and perhaps clarify. the pur-
poses of. and relationsh ips between a few of the
actions taken following an accident.

24 FEBRUARY 1979
 First comes the invariable definition of terms. I
will be using mishap and accident (small " m"
and " a" ) interchangeably and in this article will
be talking about the biggees --DOD Class As . The
investigation by the Safety Investigation Board
(SIB) refers to the safety investigation directecl
by AFR 127-4. An Aircraft Accident Investigation
(AAI) refers to the investigation directed by AFR
11 0-14---previously known as the "collateral ."
These are two of the actions I will be discussing .
The third is the Commander 's Accident Assess-
ment Briefing provided for in TAC Supplement
1. AFR 127-4.

MISHAP INVESTIGATION

"Air Force mishaps are investigated to find

their causes and take preventive actions ." Seems
pretty simple doesn't it? Well for those of you
who have served on SIBs . you know how dif-
ficult and agonizing it can be . For those of you
who haven't. but have a mind's eye picture of a
bunch of guys sitting around trying to figure out
how to hang it on the aircrew. let me reassure
you. For every person who may try to criticize
the aircrew actions. there are 50 guys like you
and me in the reporting and reviewing process
who will insist that every allegation is substan-
tiated to the highest degree possible . Every
criticism of maintenance is scrutinized similarly . reporting units. it will be either a center com-
I say "to the highest degree possible" because. mander or COMTAC . The Investigating Com-
again. it is the nature of the beast that conclu- mander is the convening authority for the board
sive proof---based on fact---is often impossible and is responsible for insuring all factors are
to come by. When all you have to go on is thoroughly investigated and the report "meets
molten metal that has seeped between the the requirements of the Air Force mishap pre-
rocks. who can say what all the switch positions vention program ." By regulation. before the
were or what all the gauges read; let alone what report is released. he must determine whether or
the crew was doing or thinking in those last few not the SIB adequately investigated the mishap
minutes? anEI the findings and recommendations were
The investigators often have to put all their drawn according to specific criteria.
collective knowledge of. and experience with. Each finding is a statement of an event or
airplanes . humans . psychology, regulations . and condition. based upon the weight of the evi-
the mission to come up with their best shot. And dence -- not conclusive proof -- which leads to
there are several folks around who will question . the mishap . The first finding is the first event or
probe. and press them to make sure it is the condition in the accident sequence . Each sub-
best shot. Let me name a few of these folks. sequent finding is listed in chronological order
The first person in the chain who takes a hack and must be logically connected to the one
at the SIB's effort is the Investigating Com- preceding it. The findings are carried through
mander . For those mishaps occurring to units until all damage or injury has occurred . The
under a numbered air force. that person will be CAUSE tag on a finding implies that had the
the numbered air force commander . For direct event not occurred or that condition not existed.

TAC ATIACK 25
AFTER THE FALL
the mishap sequence could have. or would have . failure or tech order deficiency or AFCS for a
been broken . and the mishap would not have communications problem.
occurred . The Investigating Major Commander has final
Recommendations . on the other hand. " are responsibility for the adequacy of the investiga-
actions which should either prevent a similar tion and for developing the command position
m1shap or reduce its effects. " Every cause does on concurrence or nonconcurrence with the
not require a recommendation and vice versa . findmgs . causes. and recommendations. Let me
Once the Investigating Commander is satisfied assure you again that this process is taken
the mvestigat1on is complete and thorough. his seriously by everyone involved to find out what
subsequent concurrence or nonconcurrence is happened. or why. and what can be done to
addressed in his endorsement of the report dur- prevent recurrence or mitigate the effects of
ing review pro cess . recurrence .

- - -

""':lili~e!""'""~"::~~~
--------
- -- --=~~-

~--- -

Before the final report is released. any voting Accident prevention {safety) is the sole pur-
member of the SIB may submit a minority report pose of the report. and privileged information
if that member disagrees with the board ma- contained in the SIB report may not be used as
jority. Likewise. anyone who was identified by a basis for punitive actions {court- mart1al.
the board as causing the mishap is given a Article 1 5. UCMJ) nor in adverse administrative
chance to submit a rebuttal which becomes an proceedings {Flying Evaluation Boards. dis-
attachment to the formal report. charge actions. line of duty determinations.
When the formal report is released. it then etc). Let's face it. if we did use information in
enters the chain of command for review . the report for punishment. the whole program
Everyone. from the squadron to the Air Force In- would come to a screeching halt. Commanders
spection and Safety Center at Norton AFB. picks know it. and the safety folks know it . Damage to
it apart and hacks on it. Also. the MAJCOMs the flight safety program would be significant.
hack on the portions of -the report which have to You don't want that and neither do I. Portions of
do with them---AFLC. for instance. for materiel the investigation report must be releasable to

26 FEBRUARY 1979
the public under the Freedom of Information COMMANDER 'S ASSESSMENT BRIEFING
Act. These would include such things as aircrew This action is provided for in TAC Supplement
records. aircraft records. unstaged photos (ones to AFR 127-4. This briefing results from no
which could have been taken by anyone walking formal investigation but is. as the name implies.
through the wreckage). voice transcriptions. etc. the unit commander's personal assessment of
Not included are privileged documents such as the mishap-- what happened. why, and what the
testimony. witness statements. analyses done by unit commander is domg to prevent recurrence .
private manufacturers. staged photographs. etc. Since this briefing to the NAF and TAC com-
That all clear? The matter now comes to: manders may be given days or weeks before
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS either of the aforementioned investigations is
Aircraft Accident Investigations under AFR completed. these questions often arise. "Why so
110-14 (formerly called "co l laterals " ) are soon? Why not wait until the investigations are
designed to preserve all available evidence for completed and resist the temptation to jump to
use in claims. litigation. disciplinary actions. conclusions/"
administrative proceedings and may be used for The answers to these questions become fairly
all purposes except safety or accident preven- evident when the alternative is considered. and
tion. the implication of that alternative is pondered.
Air cra ft Accident Investigations must be The alternative would be to do nothing until the
conducted whenever a fatal or permanently investigations are finished . The implication is
disabling injury occurs to any person (including that the unit commander wouldn't have a good
military. civilians. and government civilian em- idea about what happened ; why. or what he
ployees) as a result of an accident. If there is no should be doing about it. By briefing the com-
death or permanently disabling injury. an manders and staffs at NAF. TAC. and / or NGB.
investigation must also be conducted unless it quite often problems areas and effective fixes
can be reasonably determined that claims are identified and formulated early. Whether or
aga1nst the government will not exceed $50.000 not the problems and fixes have anything to do
for private property damages and that litigation with the final board determinations. we still
will not be instituted against the government or make money preventing mishaps -- that's the
a government contractor (either present or name of the game.
former). Even when litigation or a claim is not RELATIONSHIPS
considered likely. and investigation may By now. the relationships of these three ac-
nevertheless be directed by the appointing au- tions should be coming into focus . The Com-
thority or higher headquarters. manaer's Assessment Briefing is a "best guess"
Witnesses testify under oath before the Inves- by the unit commnder to get the NAF/TAC/ ANG
tigating Officer or Board. are not offered confi- commanders and staffs in tune with the mishap
dentiality. and may only refuse to testify (under and start the ball rolling on fixes to readily iden-
Article 31. UCMJ or the 5th Amendment) if their tifiable problem areas. The Mishap Investigation
testimony would tend to incriminate themse lves . Report is a forma lized. detailed. product . which
Witnesses do not testify before the AAI until they identifies. as well as possible. all causes of the
have completed their testimony before the SIB. mishap and assigns action on the recommenda -
and have been released. tions to fix all identified problems -- all with an
After the Aircraft Accident Investigation is eye toward preventing recurrence or mitigating
completed. the report is reviewed by all affected effects. The Aircraft Accident Investigation
staff agencies. who provide the appointing au- protects the government. crews. and supervisors
thority with comments and recommendations re- in the event of litigation or claims against them
garding disciplinary actions or administrative ac- by pre se rving evidence in a form which can be
tions . The Investigating Officer or Board is used for most any purpose .
concerned only with factual matters and If your steely eyes were not overgrossed 1 7
therefore does not state opinions nor draw con- paragraphs ago. you should have a better
clusions. The comments and recommenda t ions understanding, in thumbnail. of the major ac-
of other staff agencies do not become a part of tions taken in response to an aircraft accident;
the AAI report. and are not released even though how they each serve a definite purpose. and
the report itself is released in its entirety. what the relationship is between them . ___::::....

TAC AITACK 27
 ... iltddeltu utd iltude~ttalt
lllitl a lltaittteM~Ut dattt.
Th1s safe "RPM" l1m1t has been establ1shed by
chock talk
tes tm g and IS only val1d when th e correc t s1ze
(dash number) chock IS used and pos 1t1oned and
Interconnected as illustrated Don't underesti-
ma te the chock secunty that IS obta1nable when
the mterconnect1ng system IS used . Not1ce agam
1n F1gure 2 that th ere are s1x d1fferent s1ze
JUMPING THE CHOCKS chocks l1sted consult the char t to be certam
the chocks you are usmg agree w1 th your air-
By Harold Poehlmann
Fairchild Republic Co craft's maintenance mstructlons . Do not sub-
sti tut e. espec1ally for engme run purposes .
Recen t m1shaps 1nvolv1ng <:mcraf t "jumpmg the A good subst1 tu te for a med1cal coronary sus-
chocks" IS ev1dence that we may not be util1z1ng c ep t1bil1t y test IS to run up an a1rcraft while de-
th e USAF #42D6594 standard wheel chocks
properly . In fact. th e co rr ect procedures may not PART NO . I HEIGHT 8 WIDTH CLENm ROPE LENGMIM
be w1dely known . If you bel1eve the rope handles
are pr1marily for conven1ence of pull1ng th em ·1 6 8 20 92
free of th e t1re and draggmg th em around the ·2 4 6 14 60
ramp. I d1rect your attent1on to F1gure 1. As you -3 6 8 56 44
can see. when the chocks are pos1t1oned and 1n-
-4 6 8 36 92
-8 2 4 16 60
-10 4 6 24 60
Figure 2

votmg your attentiOn to recordmg engme InStru-

ments. and suddenly you feel an odd v1b rat1on .
Th1nk1ng 11 IS your ass1stant bangmg on the fuse -
lage to get your attention. you pay no attent1on
until you real1ze the v1brat1on IS not your buddy
but th e a1rcraft " tax1mg " across the ramp . My
exper1ence had a happy endmg because luckily
we towed the a1rcraft to an unmhab1ted ramp lo-
Figure 1
ca ti On before the engme run . Any m1shap you
ter con ne cted as shown. the mam cause of may be unfortunate enough to have could be
"jumpmg the chocks" (the c hocks not f1rmly "un reportable " 1f you request that the a1rcraft be
seated under the wheels) can be avo1ded . towed to the proper runup area . It IS mterest1ng
"Jumpmg the chocks" 1s a m1snomer. In most to note that mamtenance mstruct1ons usually
mstances. th e c ho ck d1splaces Sideways and neglect to men t 1on that you "sho uld " be holdmg
k1cks out of pos1t1on. particularly when bemg the brakes when you are accompl1shmg all
used under cond1t1ons of runnmg engmes. It l1m1ted power engme runs The chocks are a
goes w1thout say1ng that the A1rcraft secondary safety 1tem Remember. 1f park1ng
Ma1ntenance Handbook restr1ct1ons on the brakes are mstalled and requ1red to be set. they
max1mum power allowed when restra1ned only can have a hab1t of releasmg when you least ex-
by chocks must be followed closely. pect· it. So don't trust them .

28 FEBRUARY 1979
 SHfflY HlUHROS
individual
safety award
Airman First Class John C. Haynes, 834th
Equipment Maintenance Squadron, Eglin AF
Auxiliary Field #9, Florida is the winner of the In-
dividual Safety Award for February 1979. Airman
Haynes instituted several improvements in wash
rack procedures at his unit. He suggested the use
of creepers with spark resistant casters which
increased productivity by 10% and reduced man-
A 1 C John C. Haynes hours by 24 hours per month. He also recognized
834th EMS/1st SOW a gun blast residue problem and adopted clean-
Eglin AF Aux Fld #9, FL ing procedures which alleviated this corrosion.
His wash rack safety program has resulted in
729 days of accident-free operattons.

crew chief
safety award
Airman First Class Refugio Salas, 9th Aircraft
Maintenance Unit, 49th Tactical Fighter Wing,
Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, 1s the
winner of the Crew Chief Safety Award for Feb-
ruary 1979. Airman Salas was one of the first
crew chiefs from the 9th AMU to participate in
quick turn exercises. He was able to perform in
any of the 3 crew chief posittons based on
observation only. His can--do attitude and per-
sonal pride have been an inspiration to his co-
workers. Additionally, Airman Salas' displayed an
exceptional level of safety consciousness.

A 1 C Refugio Salas
9th AMU / 49th TFW
Holloman AFB. NM

TACATTACK 31
1:1: U.S. GOVERNMENT PAINTING OFFICE: 19~9-635-037/9