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    19 Republic Vs Vda de Castellvi

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    Bernard Beldad
    The Supreme Court ruled that the taking of Castellvi's property by the government through eminent domain should not be considered to have occurred in 1947 when the government first occupied the property under a lease agreement. For a taking to occur under eminent domain, the occupation must deprive the owner of all beneficial use and enjoyment of the property, which did not happen under the terms of the lease agreement. As such, just compensation should be determined based on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking, which was in 1959 when the government filed its complaint initiating expropriation proceedings. The Court held that the requisites for eminent domain taking were not fully satisfied until 1959, so compensation must also be calculated from that date rather

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    19 Republic Vs Vda de Castellvi

    Uploaded by

    Bernard Beldad
    30 views2 pages
    The Supreme Court ruled that the taking of Castellvi's property by the government through eminent domain should not be considered to have occurred in 1947 when the government first occupied the property under a lease agreement. For a taking to occur under eminent domain, the occupation must deprive the owner of all beneficial use and enjoyment of the property, which did not happen under the terms of the lease agreement. As such, just compensation should be determined based on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking, which was in 1959 when the government filed its complaint initiating expropriation proceedings. The Court held that the requisites for eminent domain taking were not fully satisfied until 1959, so compensation must also be calculated from that date rather

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    The Supreme Court ruled that the taking of Castellvi's property by the government through eminent domain should not be considered to have occurred in 1947 when the government first occupied the property under a lease agreement. For a taking to occur under eminent domain, the occupation must deprive the owner of all beneficial use and enjoyment of the property, which did not happen under the terms of the lease agreement. As such, just compensation should be determined based on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking, which was in 1959 when the government filed its complaint initiating expropriation proceedings. The Court held that the requisites for eminent domain taking were not fully satisfied until 1959, so compensation must also be calculated from that date rather

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    30 views2 pages

    19 Republic Vs Vda de Castellvi

    Uploaded by

    Bernard Beldad
    The Supreme Court ruled that the taking of Castellvi's property by the government through eminent domain should not be considered to have occurred in 1947 when the government first occupied the property under a lease agreement. For a taking to occur under eminent domain, the occupation must deprive the owner of all beneficial use and enjoyment of the property, which did not happen under the terms of the lease agreement. As such, just compensation should be determined based on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking, which was in 1959 when the government filed its complaint initiating expropriation proceedings. The Court held that the requisites for eminent domain taking were not fully satisfied until 1959, so compensation must also be calculated from that date rather

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
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    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
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    19 Republic Vs Vda de Castellvi

    Eminent Domain
    The requisites for taking are:1. The expropriator must enter private property;2. The entry must be
    for more than a momentary period;3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;4. The
    property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
    affected; and5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
    owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
    FACTS:
    In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
    agreement over land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis.
    Before the expiration of the contract of lease in June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the
    same but Castellvi refused. When AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the
    termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff demanding that the
    property be vacated in 30 days for they had decided to subdivide the property to sell to the
    general public; hereafter, the Chief of Staff answered her saying that it was difficult for the army
    to vacate the premises given the permanent installations and other facilities and worth Php
    500,000.00 and there is no recourse to acquire her property other than expropriation proceeding
    to be recommended to the president. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the Phil Air Force from
    her property. While the ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation
    proceeding the Republic was placed in possession of the lands on Aug. The trial court appointed
    3 Commissioners to determine the actual fair market value of the lands sought to be
    expropriated. The Commissioners recommended unanimously that the lowest price was Php 10
    per square meter for both the lands of Castellviand Toledo
    –
    Gozun. But the Defendants contended that it should be are

    15 per square meter, on one hand, the Republic averred that the fair market value of the lands of
    the appellees was 20 or at P2000 per hectare, as the lands in the year 1949 were valued at such
    ISSUE:
    Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
    HELD:
    The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947 and that just
    compensation should not be determined based on the value of the property that year.The
    requisites for taking are:
    The expropriator must enter a private property;

    2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

    3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;

    4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated orinjuriously
    affected;

    and5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the ownerand deprive
    him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
    Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
    purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947when the republic
    commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

    Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
    possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period”-- not
    indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
    year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The
    fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter
    the fact that the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
    year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
    republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time
    the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy
    the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
    “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. The 5th requirement is
    also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same
    for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi
    remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
    renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
    Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
    Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to
    pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint
    for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

    It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
    considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
    thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined
    on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when
    it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint
    in this case. Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of
    the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the
    property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
    proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
    compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

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