Issues of Identity in Globalization - 1st Review Assignment Name : Andhyta Firselly Utami Department / NPM : International Relations / 0906550373

Primary resources : 1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? in The National Interest, (Summer 1989), pp. 2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Basic Books, 1992) 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Council on Foreign Relations, Summer 1993), pp. 22-49 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (1996)

An End to the Clash of Fukuyama and Huntingtons Thoughts? A dichotomy of ideal and material world has existed long before the first philosophers questioned in what way our mind and being influenced each other. Rooted back as far as Platos Academia to Castells network society, many scholars have contributed their uniquealthough sometimes similarperspectives into the grand concept upon how identity has shaped the globe. In 1989, Fukuyama has taken part through his famous article The End of History?subsequently expanded in The End of History and the Last Manwhich argued that liberal democracy had appeared as the only champion in worlds ideological contests and thenceforth history has arrived in an end where no significant conflicts will emerge in the future. Four years later, Huntington conveyed his disagreement through The Clash of Civilizations? further elaborated in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Orderstating that conflicts between culture differences would remain there, specifically dividing the world into 8 distinct parts. This review is going to compare arguments coming from both thinkers about identity homogenization and/or heterogenization, concluded by offering an alternative end to the perpetual clash of thoughts between them. Fukuyama, whose propositions astonished the world more than a decade ago, sets his thesis firmly on the ground of Hegels idea in seeing history as a dialectical process which has a start, middle, and consequently an end. He affirms Hegels claim that the contradictions driving history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousnessin the sense of large unifying creed or might best be understood under the rubric of ideology.1 This means that under a universal, homogenous identity, all prior contradictions will be resolved and human needs can be catered. Thenceforth, liberal democracys triumph over fascism in World War II as well as communisms defeat in the Cold War yield an end point to humankinds ideological evolution or, as he refers it, history where states will no longer encounter conflicts over "large" issues; what remains is primarily economic activity. However, Fukuyamas confidence in the course of historical progress towards a common destination seems to emit a bit of equivocal doubt, considering his analogy of a wagon train in the last paragraph of his book:
Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey. 2

1 2

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? in The National Interest, (Summer 1989), pp. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: The Free Press, 1992), page 339

This doubt is twice evident in Huntingtons piece which implicitly states that Fukuyama (as intellectuals proliferating visions of what the end of history will be) has missed a crucial aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.3 Proclaiming that fundamental source of conflict will not be primarily ideological nor economic but rather cultural, his book tries to convince the world that different civilizations (highest cultural entities comprising of languages, historical background, religion, customs, institutions, and self-identification) are not on their way to be universalized, but rather in their efforts to coexist with one another internationally. These civilizations are namely Western, Latin American, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, African, Sinic, Buddhist, and Lone States. Huntington's core claim testifying clashes of civilizations as the greatest threat to world peace is indeed a bold statement and, if true, clearly does not provide a sound prediction to the future.4 To profess that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to be involved in conflict with one another requires evaluation of its empirical accuracy. According to Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker:
we also find that for the pre-Cold War period (1816-1945) states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other than were those of different civilizations, which contradicts Huntington's thesis. Most importantly, our analysis reveals that during the post-Cold War era (1989-1992), the period in which Huntington contends that the clash of civilizations should be most apparent, civilization membership was not significantly associated with the probability of interstate war.5

This is a proof that, as Braudel demonstrated6 in his book, civilizations are more fluid, more complex and less singular than Huntington's rigid Cold War style of thinking believes.7 In fact, the first eight years of the post-Cold War era has also failed to give support to Huntington's thesis. While the civilization factor modifies the effects of border relations and regime type, this is not sufficient to generate conditions under which differences in civilizational heritage are associated with greater risks of conflict.8 Fukuyamas claims leave just as many flaws and rooms to scrutinize. According to June Carbone, since Fukuyamas definition of human mind and essence affected by a certain ideology is also elusive, it can be used to oppose anything that changes worlds societies.9 If human values reflect the on-field condition, then only preserving human conditions in all their misery will preserve those values. Hence, he believes, if Fukuyama wishes to defend the essence of mankind ideology itself, it is necessary for him to be dogmatic and thus become a fundamentalist in his own defense of secular humanism.
3

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? in Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 3, (Council on Foreign Relations, Summer 1993), page 22, downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045621 on October 6th at 17:06 4 Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Dj Vu? Some Evidence in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5 (Sage Publications, Ltd ., September 2000), pp. 583-608 downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/425280 on October 6th at 17:00 5 Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker , Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association , June 2001), pp. 317-338 downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096113 on October 6th at 16:59 6 Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations (New York: A. Lane, 1994) as quoted in Stephen Gill, Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations in International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association, Summer 2002), pp. 47-65 downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186353 on October 6th at 16:59 7 Stephen Gill, Op. Cit. 8 Giacomo Chiozza, Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International ConflictInvolvement, 1946-97 in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 6 (Sage Publications, November 2002), pp. 711-734 downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555255 on October 6th at 17:08 9 June Carbone, Review: Toward a More Communitarian Future? Fukuyama as the Fundamentalist Secular Humanist in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 6, (The Michigan Law Review Association, May 2003), pp. 1906-1924 downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595336 on October 6th at 16:51

A crucial historical event that will later establish a huge impact towards not only both perspectives but also international relations study as a whole is the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. It suggested that Fukuyamas idea has been repudiated while Huntingtons claim is somehow confirmed. Binoy Kampmark in Fukuyama Down Under: Revising the End of History after 9/11 offers three propositions to demonstrate that Fukuyamas thesis is unworkable: 1) it overlooks the passions that govern historical action vis-a-vis agents desire for social recognition, 2) it ignores the conduct of states and the pursuit of foreign policy goals, and 3) the concept of liberal democracy itself is still unclear to its content.10 Huntington, on the other hand, offers a corrective notion to Fukuyamas assertion of universal modernity while taking into account the realpolitik behavior of civilizations that produce conflicts on cultural fault lines.11 Reflecting from the aforementioned critiques and empirical cases, the writer suggests that arguments contained in both The End of History and the Last Man and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order consist of an empirical and a normative part. One should not have confused the two and their proper relationship. The so-called end of history and clash of civilizations must be perceived not as statements about the empirical condition of the world, but rather a normative argument concerning non-physical institutions. Thenceforth, the writer believes that assessments and inquiries should not be created based on the workability of these two theses, but rather in the normative, extra-empirical realm. To this extent, for instance, is there any possibility that both bottom-up and top-down arrows of identity processes occur in two parallel lines? While identity homogenization is developing on the nation-state level, identity heterogenization does not stop from progressing on the society. Bearing in mind Fukuyamas own hesitation in the end of his book and Huntingtons similar nature, the writer believes that although such notion requires further elucidation, it is still valid to take the assumption into account.

10

Binoy Kampmark, Fukuyama Down Under: Revising the End of the History After 9-11 in AQ: Australian Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 6 (Australian Institute of Policy and Science, November-December 2002), pp. 33-36, 40 downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20638136 on October 6th at 16:53 11 Ibid.