BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Wassmer v. Velez
12 SCRA 648

Nature A suit for damages for a breach of promise to marry

Facts - Velez and Wassmer decided to get married on September 4, 1954 but Velez left a note for Wassmer 2 days prior, saying they have to postpone the
wedding because his mother opposes it, will be leaving the Convair and to not ask many people why since it would only create a scandal.
- On September 3, he sent a telegram saying that nothing changed and he assured to return soon
- Velez wasn’s heard back nor appeared, Wassmer sued for damages
- Velez was declared in default for no answer
- Defendant petitioned for relief from orders, and motioned for new trial and reconsideration
- Defendant failed to appear again
- Defendant appealed again and argued that his failure to marry was due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control
- Asserts that the judgement is contrary to law since there is no provision of the Civil Code that authorized an action for breach of promise to
marry

Issue Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case

Ruling RTC Ruling:

- Judgement rendered ordering defendant to pay for damages
SC Ruling:
- Affirmed lower court’s decision

Rationale The case is not merely a breach of promise to marry – records reveal that the plaintiff and defendent applied for a license to marry on August 23, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed, apparel and matrimonial bed were bought. Bridal showers given and gifts were received. Then 2 days after,
defendant left a note to postpone the wedding with another message a day before that nothing changed and shall return soon but never returned and heard
from again.

Mere breach to marry is not an actionable wrong but a wedding was formally set and prepared for and there was publicity, just to walk out of matrimony to
be solemnized is different. It is contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held answerable to damages under Article 21.

Tajanco v. CA
18 SCRA 994

Nature Suit for support and damages

Facts - Defendant Tajanco courted plaintiff Santos, to which feelings were reciprocated. Both are of legal age
- In consideration of marriage, plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant’s please for carnal knowledge. Resulted in the conception of a
child
- Due to pregnant condition and to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, plaintiff resigned as secretary from IBM Philippines, Inc. and was unable to
support herself and the baby due tot he defendants refusal to marry as promised
 - Plaintiff informed defendant of pregnancy but defendant stopped and refrained from seeing plaintiff and broken engagement and promises of
marriage
- Suffered mential anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation
- Compelled defendant to recognize unborn child, pay in support for her and baby, and for moral and exemplary damages

Issue Whether or not the breach of promise to marry constitutes a cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the Family Code

Ruling RTC Ruling:

- Dismissed for complaint’s failure to state a cause of action
CA Ruling:
- Supported RTC decision that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unicorn, nor for its support. But decreed that the
complaint did state a cause of action for damages premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code
- Set aside the dismissal and directed RTC to proceed with the case
- Found defendant’s appeal that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction to be of merit

Rationale Although grievous moral wrong has been committed, and have suffered incalculable moral damages, plaintiff cannot bring any action for damages. She is
of age and consented to carnal lust and intercourse, there is no seduction. Mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. There was
voluntariness and mutual passion. No case is made under Article 21, there is no error from the RTC. Furthermore, the child’s own rights are not here
involved.

De Jesus v. Syquia
58 Phil 866

Nature Suit for damages for the breach of a promise to marry and to recognize natural children

Facts - Plaintiff and defendant met at the defendant’s brother-in-law’s barber shop where plaintiff was a cashier. They were acquainted and amorous
relations resulted into a pregnancy of a baby boy in 1931
- In the early months of pregnancy, defendant wrote directed to the pdre expected to christen child, saying he should like for his name to be given to
him
- When christened, the baby was named Ismael Lanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr. as first planned
- Defendant wrote several letters while he was abroad, showing paternal interest, cautioning plaintiff to keep herself in good condition in order for
junior to be strong, and promising to return soon
- Defendant employed his friend to arrange hospitalization. After the birth, Defendant took her and the baby and lived together in a regular family
style, all house expenses defrayed by defendant.
- When plaintiff showed signs of a 2nd pregnancy, defendant’s arbor abated and is now married to another woman.
- Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages from defendant from breach of a marriage promise and to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael
and Pacita as his natural children with plaintiff

Issue 1. Whether of not the note to the padre, in connection with letters weritted by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgement of paternity within the meaning of subsection Art. 135 of the Civil Code
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified
by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael
Loanco under No. 2 of Art. 135
 3. Whether or not plaintiff can be granted payment for damages because of breach of promise to marry

Ruling RTC Ruling:

- Erred a decree requiring defendant to recognize Ismael Lanco as natural child and pay maintenance for him, dismissing the action in other
respects

Rationale 1. Admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padres and other letters suffice to connect the admission with the child carried by the plaintiff.
The words of recognition contained in the note are not capable of two construction, acknowledgement is clear to identify the child as his. Although
there is no requirement in the law that the writing be addressed to one, it is merely required that the writing shall be indutitable.
2. Facts are sufficient to justify the conclusion of the trial court. It is undeniable that the defendant supplied a home for the mother and child until the
plaintiff became pregnant the 2nd time. The law fixes no period during which the child must be in continuous possession of the status of a natural
child, concession of status shall continue forever, but only that is shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
3. RTC was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff for supposed breach promise to marry, it was not satisfactorily proved and has no
standing in civil law apart from the right to recover money or property . Case exhibits no features necessary to maintain such action. Furthermore,
there is no proof to require the defendant to recognize the 2nd baby, Pacita Loanco

Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA

219 SCRA 115*

Nature Complaint for damages for violation of agreement to get married

Facts - Respondent and petitioner met as medical students at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
- Respondent was courted and was proposed to get married by Iranian exchange student, accepted his love on the condition they would
get married. Agreed to get married after the end of the school semester
- Petitioner has visited respondent’s hometown at least thrice and sought parent’s approval of marriage
- Respondent was forced to live with him in the Lozano Apartments, was a virgin before she began living with him
- A week before filing complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards the plaintiff changed.
- He maltreated and threatened to kill her, sustaining injuries as a result
- Petitioner (Baksh) repudiated their marriage agreement during a confrontation with a barangay representative and asked not live with him
anymore as he is already married to someone from Bacolod City
- Respondent prayed for judgement ordering petitioner to pay for damages, reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney’s fees and costs, granting
her such other relief and remedies
- Petitioner claimed he never proposed marriage, agreed to be married, sought consent and approval of parents, forced her to live with him in his
apartment, nor did not maltreat her
- Only told her to stop coming to his place since he discovered she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. Claimed no
confrontation with a barangay representative happened
- Insisted in counterclaim that complaint was baseless and has suffered mental anxiety and besmirched reputation, praying for an award for
misc expenses and moral damages
- Alleged that he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways, alluding to Muslim Code that allows a Muslin to take 4 wives

Issue Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to mary on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code

Ruling RTC Ruling:

- Decision favored the private respondent and ordered petitioner to pay damages and attorney’s fees
 CA Ruling:
- Held lower courts decision under Art 21 to compensate for moral damages and injury caused to plaintiff
SA Ruling:
- Found no error in the challenged decision, petition is denied

Rationale - Court ruled on the basis on petitioner and respondent were lovers and respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to secual advances, petitioner promised to marry respondent through deceit which allowed her to be deflowered, parents made
some preparations for wedding, petitioner did not fulfil marriage promise and has abused Philippine hospitality on morality, good customs, culture
and traditions.
- Petitioner appeared not to be a man of good faith since he had admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City, he had a common-law wife,
meaning he also lived with another woman but did not marry her just like what he did to respondent, having little respect and disregard for Filipino
women, felt so little remorse in pretending to love and promise marriage to respondent in order to satisfy his lust on her

Constantino v. Mendez
209 SCRA 18

Nature Action for the acknowledgement, support, and damages

Facts - Constantino met Mendez at the restaurant she was working at, and the day after their first meeting, Mendez invited Constantino to dine with him
- He professed his love and courted her, Constantino asked for time to think about the proposal.
- Constantino asked Mendez to take her home and under the pretext of getting something, he brought her inside his hotel room and
through a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse and confessed after that he is a married man
- Sexual contact continued whenever Mendez was in Manila in the months of September to November and as a result, Constantino
became preganant
- Constantino pleaded for help and support – no response from Mendez
- Claimed she had no sexual relations with other men except Mendez, because of pregnancy was forced to leave work
- Because Mendez was a prosperous business man of Davao City, she prayed for recognition of unborn child and for the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees plus costs
- Mendez admitted to meeting Constantino but denied sexual relations and denied Michael Constantino as his illegitimate son, prayed for dismissal
of complaint for lack of cause of action

Issue 1. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled for damages under Articles 19 and 21
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the RTC and in dismissing the complaint

Ruling RTC Ruling:

- Judgement rendered in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay Constantino for actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees
- Reconsideration: judgement in favor of plaintiff and plaintiff-minor, ordering to pay for damages and to recognize illegitimate son, and give support
CA Ruling:
- Set aside RTC ruling and dismissed complaint.
SC Ruling:
- Held the CA ruling, and dismissed petition for lack of merit

Rationale Whether entitled for damages under Articles 19 and 21

- Based on evidence on record, Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mendez is the father of her son. Testimony
 during cross-examination is inconsistent – sexual contact in the 1st/2nd week of November is inconsistent with her response that she could not
remember the date of their last sexual intercourse November 1974. She merely testified to have sexual intercourse with him in the months of
September, October, and November. Michael Constantino was born on August 3, 1975, conception must be 267 days prior which must have taken
place sometime in the 2nd week of November 1974. Letter addressed in February 1975 informed Mendez Constantino was 4 months pregnant,
meant the child was conceived in or about October 11, 1974.
- Assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend – Constantino revealed that her attachment to Mendez was that he possessed traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. Clear and convincing proof establishing paternity is absent.
- Sexual intercourse is not by itself a bsis for recovery under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code through Mendez’s promise of marriage to which
she surrendered her virginity. Damages may only be awarded when sexual intercourse is not voluntary or of mutual desire. Attraction to Mendez
was the reason why she surrendered her womanhood, their sexual intercourse only indicated that passion and not the alleged promise of
marriage was the moving force to her submission.
Whether CA committed an error in setting aside RTC decision
- Factual findings of the RTC have only a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. Duty of the CA is to review and rectify
errors of the RTC. Factual findings of the CA and not of the RTC are considered final and conclusive on the SC. As a petition for certiorari, SC will
only review errors of the CA, it is not the function of the SC to re-examine all over again the evidence submitted by the parties.

In Re Santiago
70 Phil 66

Nature Administrative case on the legal malpractice

Facts - Baniquit has been bent at contracting a 2nd marriage, and has been living separately with his wife, Colares, for some 9 years sought legal advice
from Santiago
- Santiago assured Baniquit that he can secure a separation from his wife and can marry again, asked to bring his wife in the afternoon of
the same day
- Prepared the document (Exhibit A), stipulating that the contracting parties authorizing each other to marry again, and at the same time,
renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying
- After execution and acknowledgement of Exhibit A, asked spouses to shake hands and assured them they were single and could
contract another marriage.
- Santiago assured Baniquit pointing to his diploma that he will tear it off if the document is invalid when it was asked if there would
be no trouble.
- Baniquit contracted a 2nd marriage with Aurelio, relying on the validity of Exhibit A on June 11, 1939
- No evidence to show Santiago collected payment for service
- Santiago put up the defense that he had the idea that 7 years of separation of spouses entitles them to contract a 2nd marriage, to which he
prepared Exhibit A, but realized he made a mistake and sent immediately for contracting parties to afterwards came to his office and signed the
deed to cancel Exhibit A on June 30, 1939

Issue Whether or not Roque Santiago be suspended for malpractice

Ruling Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of 1 year

Rationale Baniquit and Colares executed Exhibit A upon the advice of the respondent, to which such execution is contrary to law, moral, and subverts the vital
foundation of the family. The preparation and acknowledgement of the contract constitutes malpractice, justifying disbarment from the practice of law.
Respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice, to which he is unfit or
 unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer and the right to continue should be declared terminated. Though the fact that
he discovered his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document to cancel the previous one.

Selanova v. Mendoza
64 SCRA 69*

Nature Extrajudicial contract on conjugal partnership

Facts - Judge Mendoza prepared and ratified a document extrajudically liquidating the conjugal partnership of complainant and his wife.
- One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse could withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed
against the other, and that they waived their right to prosecute each other of whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against
each other
- Mendoza claimed he was aware of the invalidity, but nevertheless ratified it, giving his nihil obstat on the assurance of the spouses that they
would ask the RTC of Negros Oriental to approve the agreement
- Relied on the provision on Article 191, Par. 4 of the Civil Code
- Argued that to give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the marriage “an unqualified and
literal legal construction” would lender nugatory the provisions of Art. 191, citing Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson as authority for the propriety
of an extrajudicial agreement for the dissolution during the marriage fo the conjugal partnership as long as the agreement is approved by
the court
- Overlooked the ruling of the Lacson case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage must be
secured beforehand
- Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 and asked for a compassionate view of his case in his letter in April 8, 1975.
- Case was not referred to a Judge of the RTC since no factual issues necessitate a hearing and question of evidence
- Mendoza admitted he was responsible for the execution of the document
- Mendoza divided 2 pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses – allocating 13 hectares of rice land to Selanova and residential house and
lot to Ceniza
- Last paragraph that licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity is a ratification of their personal separation and is void since it
contravenes Art. 221 of the Civil Code

Issue Whether or not the extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void

Ruling - Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, the court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval was void.
- Respondent is severely censured

Rationale - Contract is void under Article 221 of the Civil Code. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they still remain crimes, and a contract
legalizing their commision is contrary to law, morals, and public order, and is not judicially recognizable.
- Disciplinary action is taken against notaries who authenticate agreements for the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was
permitted to commit acts of infidelity. Those covenants are contrary to law, morals, and good customs and tend to subvert the vital foundation of
the legitimate family. Respondent was unaware of the legal prohibition against contracts for the personal separation of spouses and for the
extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership.

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
 Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General
GR No. 217910

Nature

Facts -

Issue

Ruling -

Rationale

People v. Santiago
51 Phil 68

Nature

Facts -

Issue

Ruling -

Rationale

Navarro v. Domagtoy
129 SCRA 259

Nature

Facts -

Issue

Ruling -

Rationale