Topic: ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (WARRANTLESS SEARCHES)

Title: PEOPLE vs RAMOS

Reference: G.R. No. 85401-02 June 4, 1990

FACTS
On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo City and
reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the
corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes, and
arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her
wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found among her possessions and were
confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana
cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares she was selling.
Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a statement confessing to
her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the
Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana.
The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for
investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She
claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to
be the same money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her money being
saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscal’s Office after investigation, where she signed a
document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation, neither during the time
she signed the document at the Fiscal’s Office. Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale
(Criminal Case 5991) and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC
Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating
Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and
was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal of the decisions with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES
Whether or not Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can, where illegal
drugs were found, under her control?

RULINGS
YES. The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her legitimate
wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had access to the trash can. The same was under
her immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to
the exclusion of all other persons.
In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party.
But this is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for
conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive
as well as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over the contraband.
These requirements are present in the situation described, where the prohibited drugs were found inside the
trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos.
In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask Ramos to stand so
that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way that
it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her
customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding
that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.
People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992]

FACTS
Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152 nd PC Company at Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay
Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina
Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed
that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with
the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. After the raid, the group proceeded
to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of
Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie
Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the
house rented by Damaso. When they reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by the
occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso, the group looked for the
Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by Damaso. The group
again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco
outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she
denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the
house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco. The
group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of
the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items.
They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise
brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation.
Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel,
Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @
Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such information was later
amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and
offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the
prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused. The trial court
rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damaso appealed.

ISSUES
Whether or not there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house?

RULINGS
No. Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact
that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other
subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except
the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her. The records
show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open
his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the
search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded
urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent
on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go
inside his house.
CASE TITLE: TERRY VS. OHIO
392 US 1 1968– December 12, 1968]
TOPIC: Stop and frisk PONENTE: Chief Justice Warren

FACTS:
• A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years,
observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner.
• He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store
window, which they did for a total of about 24 times.
• Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which
they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly.
• Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the
third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store.
• The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men
"mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing,
and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol.
• The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and
ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and
Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the
outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or
under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police
station.
• Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress
the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a
search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into
evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting
suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, had the
right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
• The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer
clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found
guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.

ISSUE(S):
1. WON the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against him and thus his conviction of carrying
concealed weapon was proper?

HELD:
YES. The gun seized from Terry was admissible in evidence against him; thus, his conviction of carrying
concealed weapon was proper.

RATIO:
• The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search which he made
were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that
they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the
men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting
himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons.
• The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him, since the search
which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
• For this purpose, it is urged that distinctions should be made between a "stop" and an "arrest" (or a
"seizure" of a person), and between a "frisk" and a "search." Thus, it is argued, the police should be
allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be
connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should have
the power to "frisk" him for weapons. If the "stop" and the "frisk" give rise to probable cause to believe
that the suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make a formal "arrest,"
and a full incident "search" of the person. This scheme is justified in part upon the notion that a "stop"
and a "frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and petty indignity," which can properly be
imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police officer's
suspicion.
• When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear
to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
• Next, on the distinction between protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk on one hand, and
arrest (and the search incidental thereof) on the other hand, it was declared:

An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for
weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial
stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed,
and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement,
whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other
hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It
does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is
equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.

Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed
of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a
crime. Petitioner’s reliance on cases which have worked out standards of reasonableness with regard to
seizures constituting arrests and searches incident thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests
sought to be vindicated and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases, and
thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of conduct under
the [right against unreasonable search and seizure.
 • Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the [contest of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure], and any
weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
PEOPLE V. SOLAYAO G.R. No. 119220. September 20, 1996

FACTS:

⚫SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to conduct an investigation
regarding reports on the presence of armed men roaming around barangays of Caibiran.
⚫Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became suspicious to the group of Solayao because the
accused-appellant himself is drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. What’s more suspicious
is when they noticed the team of SPO3 Nio, the group fled leaving behind Solayao, herein accused-appellant.
⚫According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is carrying a “latong” (49-inch firearm) wrapped in dried coconut
leaves. He thought that it’s only a torch which Hermogenes Cenining gave to him and that he is not aware that
there’s a concealed weapon inside. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the
others had been used up.
⚫Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC of Biliran, with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition defined and penalized under PD No. 1866.
⚫The lower court found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm
from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible
accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon
reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie
Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful
warrantless search.

HELD:

NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence nor
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be likened to the Posadas case where the
suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a probable
cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as
a government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing,
the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men
roaming around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the
group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves
which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without
first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions
fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-appellant has no license to carry the
firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-appellant admitted to them
during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to carry such weapon.

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine
National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have
sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm.

Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

Manalili v. CA
G.R. no. 113447
Searches and Seizures
October 9, 1997

DOCTRINES:
(1) The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stopand-frisk
was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s).
(2) In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
(3) Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a
“fruit of the poisonous tree,” falling under the exclusionary rule.
(4) Five Recognized Exceptions to the Rule Against Warrantless Search and Seizure. The recent case of People
vs. Lacerna enumerated five really exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: “(1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search,
and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.”
(5) Definition of Probable Cause. In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that “[i]n these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term
eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.”
(6) Stop-and-frisk adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and
seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In
said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri
bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner’s bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live
ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the
search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a
search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a
situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
(7) Court concurs with the Solicitor General’s contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility
of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid
waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had
knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
(8) Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence
from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have
waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the
appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for
the first time on appeal.

FACTS:
-At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance along
A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug
addicts were roaming around said area. -Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male
person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes
and was walking in a swaying manner.
-Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked
him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what
the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it.
Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
-The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis. And after conducting
examinations of the specimen, it was found out to be positive for marijuana.
-RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue. CA affirmed RTC's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

HELD:
-No. It is admissible as evidence.
-The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise,
such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of
this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding. The exceptions to the rule are:
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs
search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases,
the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched. Additionally, stop-and-frisk has
already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. -In the
present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed
to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.
-The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the ruling of CA.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK,"
accused-appellant.
[G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000]

Facts:
• Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements of the Special Operation Unit, Narcotics
Command, apprehended a suspected drug courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a
transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of
NARCOM agents. When questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government
agents and revealed the name of Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs.
• On 27 June 1996 NARCOM deployed a team of agents for the entrapment and arrest of Che
Chun Ting.
• Mabel, along with NARCOM agents, proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden. Mabel honked
twice upon arriving at the said place and went to Unit 122. NARCOM agents parked 2 meters
away saw the door of the unit open as a man went out to hand Mabel a transparent plastic bag
containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents immediately alighted and
arrested the surprised man who was positively identified by Mabel as Che Chun Ting.
• Unit 122 was searched by the agents, where a black bag with several plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance in an open cabinet in the second floor was seized. The bag was
examined in the presence of Maj. Garbo, the accused and his girlfriend. The accused and the
evidence were brought to Camp Crame. The contents of the bank were tested and found
positive for shabu. The Defense alleged otherwise.
• He alleged that it was Noli Ortiz, the brother of Che Chun Ting’s girlfriend who rang the doorbell
of Unit 122. When Nimfa opened the door, 2 NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside
and searched the premises. Noli alleged that he did not see any black bag seized but saw his
sister’s video camera being carted away by the NARCOM agents.
• Defense further contends that Unit 122 is owned by Nimfa Ortiz and that Che Chun Ting lived at
1001 Domingo Poblete St., BF Homes, Parañaque. Che Chun Ting was found guilty by the trial
court on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit 999.48 grams of
shabu; and, having in his custody, possession and control 5,578.68 grams of the same
regulated drug.
• He was meted two (2) death sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of
Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended). He was
likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first case, and P12,000,000.00 in the
second. He is now before the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Issue: WON the search of Unit 122 is within the purview of the warrantless search incidental to an
arrest.

Held: No, the court hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of
shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for being violative of ones basic constitutional
right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense, without a search warrant. The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the permissible area or surroundings within his immediate control.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the
exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest.
As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and
things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless
search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search
must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the
place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Herein, although the case falls within the exception, Che Chun Ting was admittedly outside unit 122,
which was not his residence but a sojourner thereof, and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung Mei
Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. The inner portion of the house
can hadly be said to constitute a permissible area within his reach or immediate control, to justify a
warrantless search therein.
The search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu were illegal for being
violative of one's basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and thus are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. The inadmissibility of such however
does not totally exonerate the accused. The illegal search in Unit 122 was preceded by a valid arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of an entrapment conducted by NARCOM
operatives on the basis of the information provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po regarding the accused's
illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla saw him handing over a bag of
white crystalline substance to Mabel Cheung Mei Po. His arrest was lawful and the seized bag of shabu
weighing 999.43 grams was admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.

Case Title People v Musa

G.R. no. G.R. No. 96177
Main Topic SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View Doctrine;
Other Related Topic Limitations of Warrantless Searches incidental to lawful arrest
Date: January 27, 1993

DOCTRINES
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH & SEIZURE; SEARCH
INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF "PLAIN VIEW". — The warrantless search and seizure, as
an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain
view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. — The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used
to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object… It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
 crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.

FACTS:
Mari Musa, seeks the reversal of the decision of the (RTC) of Zamboanga City finding him guilty
of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, (AKA Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972)
- Narcotics Command (NARCOM) to conduct surveillance and test buy on Mari Musa;
There was info that Musa was selling Marijuana (MJ)
- Sgt. Ani bought 1 newspaper-wrapped MJ for 10Php, turned it over and confirmed it was
MJ.
- A buy-bust was planned the next day, Sgt. Ani told Musa he wanted more MJ,
and gave 20Php(marked money); Musa gave the MJ to Sgt. Ani;
- Sgt.Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The team, sped
towards Sgt. Ani and returned to Musa’s house.
- Musa was at home with wife, their child, cousin Abdul, and a manicurist. Three
NARCOM agents introduced themselves as NARCOM agents
- the agents moved in and arrested Musa inside the house Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari
Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. He told the NARCOM
team he has given the money to his wife but she slipped away from the house.
- They searched the house; Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. They were just
silent.
- Sgt. Belarga went to the kitchen and noticed a "cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen." They asked the appellant about its contents
but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried MJ leaves.
At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it
contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence.
RTC: Mari Musa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana.
The appellant now assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag
containing marijuana, which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen.
 ISSUE:

1. W/N a warrantless search is valid after arrest- YEPP, BUT WITH LIMITATIONS.
2. W/N the MJ found in Musa’s kitchen (plain view doctrine) was admissible evidence. - NOPE

HELD:
The Constitution provides guaranty on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
AND Stonehill v. Diokno declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be
effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized:
- Alvero v. Dizon: "The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the
right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested.

As early as 1909, the Court has ruled: "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the
crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause."
Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement
agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after
the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting
him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen,
found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. >> Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
Ker v. California: police officers, without warrant, but with information that defendant sells MJ from
his apartment, obtained a passkey to defendants' apartment from he building manager, and
entered it… one of the officers observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small
scale atop the kitchen sink, laid a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance
which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in
prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law.
The admissibility of the package was challenged, and US SC held that it was not
unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the
defendant wife emerge, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a
search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view." The
U.S. SC ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the
"plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the
prosecution's evidence.
BUT!!! >> The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.

The U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges."
--- it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing
to retrieve the marked money which, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and
found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was not within their "plain view" when
they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure.
The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted
the plastic bag. Unlike Ker v. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway
of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in
this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag, they had no clue as to its
contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana
was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it.

-- The object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain
view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents... or that
its contents are obvious to an observer.
Therefore, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

RULING:
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not diminish the damaging effect of the other pieces
of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The guilt of the appellant of the crime
charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
DISMISSED, and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HUANG ZHEN HUA
G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004

The Case for the Prosecution

Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and
appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also
learned that Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking
activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations
and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They were
able to secure search warrants, one for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession
of firearms and explosives) and two for violation of R.A No. 6425, as amended otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drug Act.

The implementation of the first Search Warrant, no persons were found in the are, however the policemen
found two kilos shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently used for the
production of fake credit cards. Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan
would be delivering shabu. The policemen rushed to the area and saw Chan and Lao on board the latter’s
car. Thereafter, the shoot-out resulted to death of the two suspect during the encounter. The policemen
found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car.

The policemen then proceeded to the area where to enforce the other search warrant. The policemen
coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the building. The policemen, Pangan
and two security guards proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front
door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door, until Lee peeped through the window
beside the front door. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language
and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The Lee then opened the door and
allowed the team into the condominium unit.

The policemen conducted the search in all the rooms within the unit. The team proceeded with the search
and found other articles not described on the the search warrant. Huang Zhen Hua was found sleeping in
one of the rooms during the search and was surprised to see police officers. Anciro, Jr. found two
transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and assorted
paraphernalia. Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied
Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr. told Lee to
bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC headquarters. Lee did as she was
told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the master’s bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found
the shabu.

Appellant’s Version:

At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the masters bedroom at the
condominium unit. She had closed all the windows because she had turned the air conditioning unit on.
Zhen Hua was sleeping in the other bedroom in the second floor beside the masters bedroom. Laos Honda
Civic car and Chans Nissan car were in the garage beside the condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard
someone knocking on the bedroom door. When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the
bedroom and at the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was not among the men. Lee
did not hear the policemen knock at the main door before they entered. The policemen were accompanied
by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who told her that the policemen were going to search the house.
Appellant Lee saw a policeman holding two papers, but no search warrant was shown to her.
The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the masters bedroom. Appellant
Lee went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and when she returned to the masters bedroom, she saw
shabu on the bed. The policemen took her ring, watch and the P600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier
been placed in the cabinet, her papers and documents, and those of Laos as well. She had never seen any
shabu in the room before the incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC
headquarters where they were detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter, informed her that shabu had
been found in the condominium unit and that the policemen were demanding P5,000,000 for her release.
She was also told that if she did not pay the amount, she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that
the leader of the group who arrested her would be promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no
money. Since she could not pay the amount, she was boarded on a PARAC owner-type jeep and returned
to the condominium unit where the policemen took all the household appliances, such as the television,
compact discs, washing machine, including laundry detergent. Only the sofa and the bed were not taken.
About ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the services of counsel.

Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the condominium unit but that
no one responded. He shouted, Sir Henry, referring to Lao, but there was no response from inside the
condominium. After about three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they
entered the house. They went to the second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.

Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen. He learned that shabu
had been found and taken from the condominium unit only when he saw someone holding up the
substance on television during the daily news program TV Patrol.

RTC: Convicted both Lee and Zhen Hua. OSG Comment:

Zhen Hua should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of appellant Lee
should be affirmed.

Issue:

Whether the implementation of the search warrant was highly irregular, dubious and unreasonable as the
search warrant did not contain any particular description of the room to be searched.

Whether the articles procured by the policemen on the occasion of the search of the condominium unit
are inadmissible in evidence.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Huang Zhen Hua should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt,
but that the conviction of Lee should be affirmed.

Ratio:

Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or
any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that
they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute
the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of
directed search. This is known as the knock and announce principle which is embodied in Anglo-American
Law. The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as
important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally
reasonable. In Gouled v. The United States, it was held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of
a reasonable search. A search would violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether
accomplished by force, by illegal threat or mere show of force.

Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify themselves to
the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show
to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or
dialect known to and understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of
the essence of the substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty. No precise form of words is
required. It is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the
search and the object to be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only
for the protection of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his property but also the safety and
well-being of the officers serving and implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom the
warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified of the search warrant and apprised
of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the
premises as an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the process,
may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he would not be
criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the search
warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations.
Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an
unannounced intrusion. Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A
search would violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry
were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by stealth, or
coercion.

Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to
the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already
knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in
the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware
of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then
engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence.
However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight
and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an
unannounced intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement
interest may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Indeed, there is no formula for
the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. In
determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the existence of probable cause, the courts are
concerned only with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry.

In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the
police officers were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his
companions were police officers and had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that
the officers were going to search the condominium unit. The appellant was sufficiently aware of the
authority of the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose.
Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with her as she was to be
brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being interpreted to the appellant, the latter did
as she was directed and took some clothes from the cabinet atop the headboard.

Inadmissibility of the things seized

Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao which
were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant
does not render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render
inadmissible in evidence. Such articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search
warrants and was authorized to seize the said articles because of their close connection to the crime
charged. An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police
have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across
some other article of incriminating character. An object that comes into view during a search incident to
arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally,
the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the
policemen have an intimate connection with the crime charged. The passport of the appellant would show
when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would
indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or earned the
same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her relationship to
Lao and Chan.

Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July 1975]

First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 62 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Facts: On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila a civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing
vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by the Fisheries Commissioner through the
Philippine Navy. On 10 April 1964, the company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with
the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the CFI set aside its order of 10 April 1964 and
granted the company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the
company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the Philippine Fisheries Commission and the
Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil Case 56701 for
failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the Navy to appear on the
scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of
the company.
On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex
VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some
provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. On August 5 or 6,
1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with
dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. On 18 August 1965, the
Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew
members of the fishing vessels. On 30 September 1965, there were filed in the CFI of Palawan a couple of
informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of
Tony Lex VI — both for violations of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e.,
for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the
boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries
Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the
Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila against the
Commission and the Navy. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats
in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of
the offer of compromise dated 13 September 1965 by the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels
were settled. On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a
bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on the
ground, among others, that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan CFI two
orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and
directing that the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the
bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which
are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as
instruments of the crime. On 23 November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to
restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction thereunder issued.

Issue: Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the
vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.

Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to
carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in
accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as dynamites and the like; including fishery
products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws";
and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing." Paragraph 5 of
Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries
Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs,
Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with dynamites or
other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more
than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five
(5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and
other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries
Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and
stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite,
blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite
and/or blasting caps and explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that
the possession or discover in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other
explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing
boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives." Under Section 78 of the
Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the
corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or
regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than
P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided,
That in case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible for the
acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the
responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of a
known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for
any violation of this Act: and Provided, further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with
its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government." Under Section 13 of
Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine
Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of
laws and regulations pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD
34 of 27 October 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of
the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on
board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws. Herein,
when the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6,
1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta.
Winnie, these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and
illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries
Law. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the
vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such
search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing
vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to
elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
PEOPLE V. JOHNSON
G.R. No. 138881 DECEMBER 18, 2000

Mendoza, J:

Doctrine:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.

Facts:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a
resident of California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American and had
since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimers disease,
in convalescent homes in the United States.
 Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to
frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger
bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. She is not satisfied with the explanation,
Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. She was directed to take
accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest
room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women’s room,
accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the
thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to
Embile, outside the womens room. The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a
total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st
Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where
accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her
personal belongings were itemized.
On the other hand, Leila Reyes Johnson contended that she was standing in line at the last boarding
gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and
taken to the women’s room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She
insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and
a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no
receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo. Col.
Castillo. She told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the
packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a
fiscal for inquest. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until
June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her
relatives in the Philippines.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty.

Issue:
1.Whether or not there is a valid search and seizure on the shabu?
2.Whether or not the rights of the accused were violated when an extra-judicial admission was done?
3.Whether or not the other articles seized is inadmissible?
4.Whether or not the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua?
5. Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the information that she did
not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu?
6. Whether or not the prosecution failed to proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused?

Held:
1. Yes, there is a valid search and seizure on the shabu.
2. No, the rights of the accused were violated when an extra-judicial admission was done.
3. No, the other articles seized are not inadmissible.
4. No, the prosecution did not fail to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to
justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
5. No, the prosecution did not fail to prove the negative allegation in the information that she did not
have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
6. No, the prosecution did not fail to proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.

Ratio:
1. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of
the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless
search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.

2. A custodial investigation has been defined as the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This
presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or a confession from him.
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused are not to to elict information. She was caught
in flagrante delicto, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from
being accurate. Thus, Nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her
signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony
to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.

3. However, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage, and
other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.

4. Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of

The Crime The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
xxx
3) 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
xxx
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis
requires the determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a
qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a
quantitative analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine.
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2
and C-3. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a
mixture. It is particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in
a crime lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any material that is
at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective
customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the aid
of chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its components.
At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the
results, it would have been a simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by
another chemist. This she did not do.

5. R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a
certification that accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the
prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has
a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.

6. Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on
the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial
of accused-appellant, no other witness was presented in her behalf. Her denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of
defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding
accused-appellant guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on
accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant. The passport, airline ticket, luggage,
girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO,
defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Doctrine: exception to the issuance of search warrant: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) search of
moving vehicle; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view

Facts:

-Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were charged with a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. Their
co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness.

-In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in
the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of
the information thus received, a project was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.

-As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried
out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia.

-On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they
departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the
Philippines.

-The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the
People's Republic of China. The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin
cans of tea in which the Chinese drugs were placed.

-The next day, the two returned to Manila via aChina Airlines flight. The plane landed at the NAIA on
schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. After which, appellant and Tia boarded a
taxicab. Lim followed in another taxi cab.

-On the expected date of arrival, the team headed by Captain Palmera proceeded to the NAIA. Upon seeing
appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda
Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path
forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an
attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the
driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back
compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects permission to search their
luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the bag owned by appellant. One of the operatives, pried the lid
open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some
crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea
bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he
had the three bags opened for inspection. From one of the bags, a total of six (6) tin cans were found,
including the one previously opened.

-Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street,
Quezon City. Lim was likewise apprehended.

-The trial court convicted them and stated that the search and seizure was valid.

-On appeal, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the accused is illegal
for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers concerned
could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of
arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the
search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not automatically
make the warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the
necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents had
both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.

Issue: WON the search and seizure made against the accused was illegal.

Held: No. The contentions are without merit.

Ratio: Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3]
seizure of evidence in plain view. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question
was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search
on appellant and his co-accused.

The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the
use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 4

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought."

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it
within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on
the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also
certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was
clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and
all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must
still be present in such a case.