66 ST Louis ULJ99
66 ST Louis ULJ99
66 ST Louis ULJ99
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FAKE NEWS & INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
SARA L. OCHS*
ABSTRACT
* Sara L. Ochs is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law.
99
100 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 66:99
INTRODUCTION
1. Danial Kaysi & Charles Faint, Political Will and Multilateral Cooperation in
InternationalJustice: An Interview with RichardGoldstone, 7 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 90, 91 (2012).
2. H.E. Judge Dr. jur. h. c. Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice President Int'l Crim. Ct., Keynote:
The International Criminal Court-Current Challenges and Perspectives 8 (Aug. 8, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-3b7d0a4b9f06/283740/0109
11 salzburglawschool.pdf.
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 92-93, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4. In defining "perceived legitimacy," this essay adopts the definition articulated by
Professor Stuart Ford, as "how audiences subjectively perceive the legitimacy" of the ICC. Stuart
Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the PerceivedLegitimacy of InternationalCriminalCourts:
Implicationsfor the Success of TransitionalJusticeMechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405,
406 n.1 (2012).
5. See C. Cora True-Frost, Weapons of the Weak: The Prosecutor of the ICC's Power to
Engage the UN Security Council, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 261, 315 (2016) (recognizing that States'
"perceptions of the ICC's legitimacy affect their willingness to cooperate with the ICC").
6. See Yvonne M. Dutton, Bridging the Legitimacy Divide: The International Criminal
Court's Domestic Perception Challenge, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71, 77 (2017) ("When
levels of domestic [perceived] legitimacy are high, individuals tend to comply, and push others to
comply, with institutional orders because they view the norms advanced by their institution as their
own.").
2021 ] FAKE NEWS & INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 101
7. ASP 2017: State Cooperation Crucialfor an Effective ICC, COAL. FOR INT'L CRIM. CT.
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.coalitionfortheice.org/news/20171107/asp-2017-state-cooperation-
crucial-effective-icc#:-:text=With%20no%20enforcement%20mechanism%20of,to%20cooperate
%20with%20the%20ICC (highlighting the detrimental impact on investigations of state non-
cooperation by explaining the challenges the ICC Prosecutor has faced in investigating crimes
within the Situation in Darfur, Sudan).
8. Sara L. Ochs, Propaganda Warfare on the International Criminal Court, 42 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 581, 582 (2021).
9. Press Release, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affs., Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement
regarding the ICC decision (Feb. 6, 2021), https://mfa.gov.ili/MFA/PressRoom/2021IPages/State
ment-by-PM-Netanyahu-regarding-the-ICC-decision-6-February-2021.aspx [hereinafter
Netanyahu Statement Regarding ICC Decision].
10. Full Text ofJohn Bolton's Speech to the FederalistSociety, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech-federalist-society-180910
172828633.html [hereinafter Bolton Speech to FederalistSociety].
11. Reuters Staff, Pompeo on ICC: US. won't be threatenedby 'kangaroocourt,'REUTERS
(June 11, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-afghanistan-trump-pompeo/pom
peo-on-icc-u-s-wont-be-threatened-by-kangaroo-court-idUSKBN23I2AJ (quoting then Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo).
12. Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the
United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2018), https://usoas.usmission.gov/remarks-by-
president-trump-to-the-73rd-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/
[hereinafter Trump Remarks to U.N. General Assembly].
102 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 66:99
law more generally, Part II will present two ongoing case studies in which
powerful state governments have utilized fake news pertaining to the ICC's
jurisdiction to undermine the legitimacy and functions of the Court. The first
will analyze the United States Government's use of fake news in responding to
the ICC Prosecutor's investigation into Afghanistan, while the second will detail
the Israeli Government's ongoing use of falsehoods to derail the Prosecutor's
investigation into crimes committed in Palestine. Part Ill will argue for the need
for greater clarity and widespread global knowledge of the ICC's powers and
jurisdictional reach to best combat the fake news to which it is routinely
subjected.
action. 20 This gravity requirement, pursuant to which the ICC considers factors
including the scale, nature, and impact of the crimes upon which a case is
premised, guarantees that the ICC will hear only cases involving "the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." 21
Moreover, the Rome Statute further limits ICC authority by mandating that
the Court exercise its jurisdiction over admissible cases under only three
circumstances: when a State Party refers a situation to the ICC Prosecutor; when
the United Nations Security Council refers the situation to the Prosecutor; or
when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation into crimes on his or her own
propio motu authority. 22 These strict restrictions on the ICC's reach render it
"deferential and non-invasive to its member States, especially those with highly
sophisticated and international justice conscious domestic judiciaries." 23
Several recent decisions have clarified the bounds of the ICC's jurisdiction,
namely as it applies to State Party-referred or Prosecutor-initiated Situations.
The first came in 2018 with the Pre-Trial Chamber's jurisdictional decision in
the Prosecutor-initiated Situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar. 24 In that decision,
Pre-Trial Chamber I determined that it had jurisdiction over the alleged crime of
humanity of deportation of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar-which is not a
State Party to the Rome Statute-to Bangladesh-which is a State Party. 25 The
judges reasoned that because an element of the crime of deportation-the
crossing of a border-occurred on the territory of Bangladesh, the alleged crime
fell within the Court's jurisdiction. 2 6
Following this decision, the Court also confirmed that it had jurisdiction
over nationals of two other non-States Parties, each of which holds significant
geopolitical power on the world stage. First, in March 2020, the ICC Appeals
national criminal jurisdictions"); see also Akande, supra note 15, at 314 (recognizing the ICC as a
court is premised upon "principle of complementarity").
20. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 17(1)(d).
21. Rome Statute, supranote 3, at art. 5; Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy
of the InternationalCriminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1400, 1450-56 (2009).
22. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 13, 15(1).
23. Christopher "Kip" Hale & Maanaska K. Reddy, A Meeting of the Minds in Rome: Ending
the Circular Conundrum of the U.S.-ICC Relationship, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 581,
599 (2013).
24. Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18,
Decision on Prosecution's Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.pdf [hereinafter Decision on
Bangladesh Jurisdiction].
25. Id. at ¶ 73. This conclusion was later reaffirmed by ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III. Situation
in the People's Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the
Situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ¶ 62 (Nov.
14, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_06955.pdf.
26. Decision on Bangladesh Jurisdiction, supranote 24, at ¶ 73.
104 SAINTLOUIS UNIVERSITY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 66:99
Chamber considered whether the ICC Prosecutor could move forward with a
propio motu investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Afghanistan, as well as related crimes committed in other States
Parties' territories since 2003 by the Taliban and affiliated terrorist groups, the
Afghan National Security Forces, and members of the U.S. Armed Forces and
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). 27 With respect to U.S. military and
intelligence personnel, then Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 28 sought to investigate
alleged war crimes committed both in Afghanistan and at CIA "black sites" in
countries including Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. 29 The Appeals Chamber
ultimately authorized Prosecutor Bensouda to proceed with the investigation,
finding that the crimes at issue "may constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court." 30 Although this finding in and of itself was largely unremarkable,
given that Afghanistan is a State Party to the Rome Statute, its practical impact
was significant in that it authorized the Prosecutor to pursue an investigation
against nationals of one of the most powerful non-States Parties: the United
States.
Then, in February 2021, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a ruling
declaring the ICC has territorial jurisdiction over alleged war crimes falling
within the open Situation in Palestine.31 Palestine had referred the Situation to
27. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17 OA4, Judgment on the
appeal against the decision on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 4 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020
_00828.pdf [hereinafter ICC Appellate Decision on Afghanistan Investigation]. The Appeal
Chamber's decision reviewed Pre-Trial Chamber HI's April 2019 decision rejecting Prosecutor
Bensouda's request to proceed with an investigation into Afghanistan. Situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute on
the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Apr.
12, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.pdf.
28. Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda of The Gambia concluded her nine-year tenure as ICC Chief
Prosecutor on June 16, 2021, and was replaced in this role by International Lawyer and UK
Barrister Karim Khan. Karim Khan sworn in as new ICCchiefprosecutor, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June
16, 2021), https://www.dw.com/en/karim-khan-sworn-in-as-new-icc-chief-prosecutor/a-57916
216.
29. David J. Scheffer, The ICC's Probe into Atrocities in Afghanistan: What to Know,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 6, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.cfr.org/article/ices-probe-
atrocities-afghanistan-what-know.
30. ICC Appellate Decision on Afghanistan Investigation, supra note 27, at¶ 62. The Appeals
Chamber specifically authorized the Prosecutor to investigate alleged war crimes related to the
Afghanistan situation even when the capture of a victim and the alleged criminal act occurred
outside Afghanistan. Id. at ¶ 76. However, the Court was cautious to note that to determine whether
the ICC had jurisdiction over these specific crimes "a careful analysis of the circumstances of each
case will need to be carried out to establish whether there is a sufficient nexus" to the armed conflict
in Afghanistan. Id.
31. Situation in the State of Palestine, ICC-01/18, Decision on the Prosecution request
pursuantto article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court's territorialjurisdiction in Palestine (Feb. 5, 2021),
2021 ] FAKE NEWS & INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 105
Disinformation campaigns against the ICC are not new. 36 Yet, the recent
decisions finding that ICC jurisdiction extends to crimes committed by nationals
of powerful non-States Parties has generated fake news campaigns against the
ICC by the United States and Israel. These campaigns involve highly publicized
statements made by U.S. and Israeli leaders and the dissemination of anti-Court
propaganda misrepresenting the ICC's authority, intent, and jurisdiction in
efforts to weaponize public opinion against the Court. Both the fake news
campaigns initiated by the United States and Israel pose significant concerns to
the ICC's effectiveness given the Court's extreme reliance on perceived
legitimacy.
had taken decisive action against the ICC, utilizing the media to launch a fake
news campaign aimed to discredit the Court. Interestingly, the Trump
Administration's public defense did not proclaim U.S. troops' innocence in
committing alleged war crimes, but instead spread widespread disinformation
about the Court's jurisdictional reach.
In September 2018, several months after Prosecutor Bensouda filed her
request to open the investigation in Afghanistan, then National Security Advisor
John Bolton gave a widely publicized speech to the Federalist Society in which
he lambasted the ICC as a "free wheeling global organization" that claimed
"automatic jurisdiction" over crimes with "disputed and ambiguous
definitions." 37 Bolton's statements were supplemented both by the United States
Government's revocation of Prosecutor Bensouda's entry visa into the United
States3 8 and by repeated claims from high-ranking U.S. leaders, including then
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and President Donald Trump, exaggerating
the reach of the ICC's jurisdiction. 39 For instance, in a speech before the United
Nations General Assembly in 2018, President Trump falsely declared that the
ICC "claims near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of every country,
violating all principles ofjustice, fairness, and due process," 40 a statement which
is categorically false, as evidenced by the limitations imposed by the Rome
Statute.
Following the ICC Appeals Chamber's ruling authorizing Prosecutor
Bensouda's investigation, the Trump Administration amplified its use of fake
news with significant action. After Secretary Pompeo publicly denounced the
ICC as an "unaccountable political institution masquerading as a legal body,""
President Trump signed an Executive Order on June 11, 2020, which declared a
national emergency arising from the "unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States" posed by the ICC's
investigation of U.S. personnel. 42 In light of this national emergency, the
Executive Order authorized the imposition of sanctions against ICC personnel
37. Full Text ofJohn Bolton's Speech to the FederalistSociety, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech-federalist-society-180910
172828633.html.
38. Bolton Speech to FederalistSociety, supra note 10.
39. See e.g., Trump Remarks to U.N. General Assembly, supranote 12; News Wires, US bars
entry to ICC investigators, says 'attackingAmerica's rule of law', FRANCE 24 (modified Dec. 4,
2019, 7:44 PM), https://www.france24.com/en/20190315-usa-icc-investigators-afghanistan-
pompeo (detailing a speech by Secretary of State Pompeo in which he described the ICC as having
"broad unaccountable prosecutorial powers," and pursuing "politically motivated prosecution of
Americans").
40. Trump Remarks to U.N. General Assembly, supra note 12.
41. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, ICC Decision
on Afghanistan (Mar. 5, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/icc-decision-on-afghanistan
/index.html.
42. Exec. Order No. 13928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139 (June 11, 2020).
r
and those non-U.S. nationals who assisted the ICC in its investigation into
Americans.43 On September 2, 2020, Secretary Pompeo formally announced the
issuance of sanctions pursuant to the Executive Order against Prosecutor
Bensouda and Phakiso Mocochoko, the ICC's Head of Jurisdiction,
Complementarity and Cooperation Division, which had the effect of freezing
any assets they had in or which transferred through the United States.44
While the controversial Executive Order has since been revoked by current
President Joseph Biden, with the effect of terminating the national emergency
and lifting sanctions, the Biden Administration has maintained its opposition to
the ICC's Afghanistan Investigation.45 Specifically, in revoking the Executive
Order, President Biden wrote that the United States sustains its objections to the
ICC's "assertions of jurisdiction over personnel of such non-States Parties as the
United States and its allies absent their consent or referral by the United Nations
Security Council."'
Yet, the text of the Rome Statute, with which the United States Government
is undoubtedly familiar, having initially signed the treaty under the Clinton
Administration, despite not ratifying and incorporating it into U.S. domestic
law, 47 clearly disputes both the Trump Administration's and President Biden's.
categorization of the ICC. United States nationals allegedly committed war
crimes on the territory of Afghanistan, a State Party to the Rome Statute, and in
doing so, rendered themselves susceptible to ICC jurisdiction. Moreover, the
United States could avoid ICC prosecution by conducting a domestic
investigation and prosecution of its own officials, thereby preempting the Court
from moving forward in cases against U.S. nationals pursuant to the
43. Id.
44. Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the InternationalCriminal Court
Designations, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Sept. 2, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20200902; Laurel Wamsley, Trump Administration
Sanctions ICC ProsecutorInvestigatingAlleged U.S. War Crimes, NPR (Sept. 2, 2020, 6:27 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/02/908896108/trump-administration-sanctions-icc-prosecutor-
investigating-alleged-u-s-war-crim.
45. Press Release, The White House, Executive Order on the Termination of Emergency with
Respect to the International Criminal Court (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/presidential-actions/2021/04/01/executive-order-on-the-termination-of-emergency-with-
respect-to-the-international-criminal-court/.
46. Id.
47. While President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute, he later recommended that his
successor, President George W. Bush not submit the statute to the Senate for ratification. Press
Release, William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International
Criminal Court (Dec. 31, 2000), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-01-08/pdf
/WCPD-2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf. President Bush complied with the recommendation, and in 2002,
John Bolton, in his role as U.N. Ambassador under President Bush, wrote to U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan, expressing the United States' intent to "unsign" the Rome Statute. See Letter from
John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y of State for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y
Gen. (May 6, 2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
108 SAINTLOUIS UNIVERSITY LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 66:99
complementarity principle. Yet, the United States has still failed to do so. 48
Instead, U.S. leaders and government officials have engaged in widespread
rhetorical attacks against the Court, misrepresenting the Court's jurisdiction and
intent in front of a U.S. audience that is relatively uninformed about the ICC's
procedural reach.
Likewise, among those more familiar with the ICC, many want the Court to
continue its work in prosecuting atrocity crimes that would otherwise go
unpunished. For instance, in a 2020 online survey of 1,009 Canadians, ninety-
five percent of respondents agreed that the ICC should "investigate alleged war
crimes wherever they may occur." 67
Given these views, it reasons that if the public were more familiar with the
ICC, its mandate, and the Prosecutor's reasons for pursuing the cases before the
Court, the public would be supportive. However, this support is impossible when
the public is only exposed to the bombastic, misleading narratives woven by the
Trump and Netanyahu Administrations. Accordingly, the ICC, and specifically
the Office of the Prosecutor, need to devote more resources and effort to
fostering public knowledge and understanding of the ICC-including its
jurisdictional reach and limitations-to cultivate greater legitimacy. Only
through the spread of truth and knowledge can the ICC effectively fight against
fake news campaigns.
While the ICC is perpetually constrained by limited resources, to recover
from the potential impact of the ongoing fake news campaigns, the Court must
dedicate time, funds, and effort to spreading knowledge and information about
the Court throughout both States Parties and non-States Parties-especially
those currently subject to investigation. This requires a more effective use of
public relations, an area in which the Court has previously fallen flat. 68
Specifically, the Court must work to more widely and clearly disseminate
information pertaining to ICC processes and procedures to the public and
effectively promote its accomplishments. Additionally, greater attention must be
devoted to outreach, in which the Court connects with and seeks cooperation
from the victims of the crimes it is investigating. 69
CONCLUSION
67. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, et al., No Double Standards:
Canadians Expect Greater Impartiality vis-a-vis Israel, 8 (Sept. 16, 2020), https://d3n8a8pro7
vhmx.cloudfront.net/cjpme/pages/5082/attachments/original/1600108564/Survey_2020_Release_
two_%E2%80%93_Final.pdf?1600108564 (emphasis in original).
68. Bartram S. Brown, The International Criminal Court in Africa: Impartiality, Politics,
Complementarity and Brexit, 31 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 145,155 (2017) (critiquing the ICC for
"bad public relations" in the context of the Kenya Situation).
69. Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute
System Final Report, at 125-26, ICC-ASP/19/16 (Sept. 30, 2020) (defining outreach efforts as
opportunities for the ICC to "win the confidence, support, and cooperation of people and
communities that have often been traumatized and scarred by the events the ICC is investigating").
2021]1 FAKE NEWS & INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW 113
also provided the Court with some unanticipated benefits. Through highly
publicized comments and controversial sanctions, the United States and Israel
have opened a public dialogue around the International Criminal Court-an
entity which relatively rarely graces the pages of widely read international news
sources-and in doing so, have offered the Court public fora in which to explain
its operations to the public and tout its accomplishments. This presents the
perfect opportunity for the ICC to educate the public about its work and
limitations and to cultivate public support.
Moreover, as journalist Thierry Cruvellier has recognized, political leaders'
recognition of the ICC as a threat to superpowers like America and its allies,
gives the Court "some of the stature it lacks."7 0 At the same time, the United
States' and Israel's current predicaments highlight their state leaders' failure to
prosecute their own nationals for the commission of internationally recognized
crimes-an action which would effectively shut down any opportunity for ICC
investigation and prosecution. This perspective both shames these nations for
their failure to prosecute heinous atrocities by their nationals and drives home
one of the primary goals of the ICC: to achieve justice for terrible crimes that
would otherwise go unpunished.
The ICC, as an institution dedicated to prosecuting "the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole," 71 will always be
controversial and will constantly bear the brunt of fake news and false claims.
However, if handled correctly, the ICC just may be able to utilize this misleading
rhetoric for its own benefit.
70. Thierry Cruvellier, Why the LC.C. Should Rejoice when America Attacks It, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/opinion/international-criminal-court-icc-
bolton-us.html
71. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 1.
114 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 66:99