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List of philosophical problems

This is a list of some of the major problems in philosophy.

Philosophy of language

Counterfactuals

A counterfactual statement is a conditional statement with a false antecedent. For example, the
statement "If Joseph Swan had not invented the modern incandescent light bulb, then someone
else would have invented it anyway" is a counterfactual, because, in fact, Joseph Swan invented the
modern incandescent light bulb. The most immediate task concerning counterfactuals is that of
explaining their truth-conditions. As a start, one might assert that background information is
assumed when stating and interpreting counterfactual conditionals and that this background
information is just every true statement about the world as it is (pre-counterfactual). In the case of
the Swan statement, we have certain trends in the history of technology, the utility of artificial
light, the discovery of electricity, and so on. We quickly encounter an error with this initial account:
among the true statements will be "Joseph Swan did invent the modern incandescent light bulb."
From the conjunction of this statement (call it "S") and the antecedent of the counterfactual ("¬S"),
we can derive any conclusion, and we have the unwelcome result that any statement follows from
any counterfactual (see the principle of explosion). Nelson Goodman takes up this and related
issues in his seminal Fact, Fiction, and Forecast; and David Lewis's influential articulation of
possible world theory is popularly applied in efforts to solve it.

Epistemology

Gettier problem

Plato suggests, in his Theaetetus (210a) and Meno (97a–98b), that "knowledge" may be defined as
justified true belief. For over two millennia, this definition of knowledge was accepted by
subsequent philosophers. An item of information's justifiability, truth, and belief were seen as the
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.

But in 1963, Edmund Gettier published an article in the journal Analysis, a peer-reviewed
academic journal of philosophy, entitled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" which offered
instances of justified true belief that do not conform to the generally understood meaning of
"knowledge." Gettier's examples hinged on instances of epistemic luck: cases where a person
appears to have sound evidence for a proposition, and that proposition is in fact true, but the
apparent evidence is not causally related to the proposition's truth.

In response to Gettier's article, numerous philosophers[1] have offered modified criteria for
"knowledge." There is no general consensus to adopt any of the modified definitions yet proposed.
Finally, if infallibilism is true, that would seem to definitively solve the Gettier problem for good.
Infallibilism states that knowledge requires certainty, such that, certainty is what serves to bridge
the gap so that we arrive at knowledge, which means we would have an adequate definition of
knowledge. However, infallibilism is rejected by the overwhelming majority of
philosophers/epistemologists.[2]

Problem of the criterion

Overlooking for a moment the complications posed by Gettier problems, philosophy has essentially
continued to operate on the principle that knowledge is justified true belief. The obvious question
that this definition entails is how one can know whether one's justification is sound. One must
therefore provide a justification for the justification. That justification itself requires justification,
and the questioning continues interminably.

The conclusion is that no one can truly have knowledge of anything, since it is, due to this infinite
regression, impossible to satisfy the justification element. In practice, this has caused little concern
to philosophers, since the demarcation between a reasonably exhaustive investigation and
superfluous investigation is usually clear.

Others argue for forms of coherentist systems, e.g. Susan Haack. Recent work by Peter D. Klein[3]
views knowledge as essentially defeasible. Therefore, an infinite regress is unproblematic, since any
known fact may be overthrown on sufficiently in-depth investigation.

Problem of induction

Scottish philosopher David Hume first formulated the problem of induction,[4] arguing there is no
non-circular way to justify inductive reasoning. That is, reasoning based on inferring conclusions
from specific observations. This is a problem because everybody uses induction on a day to day
basis e.g The sun rose in the east today therefore the sun will rise in the east tomorrow.

Karl Popper argued that science and ordinary life do not use induction, and induction is in fact a
myth. Instead, knowledge is created by conjecture and criticism. The main role of observations and
experiments in science, he argued, is in attempts to criticize and refute existing theories.[5]

Molyneux problem

The Molyneux problem dates back to the following question posed by William Molyneux to John
Locke in the 17th century: if a man born blind, and able to distinguish by touch between a cube and
a globe, were made to see, could he now tell by sight which was the cube and which the globe,
before he touched them? The problem raises fundamental issues in epistemology and the
philosophy of mind, and was widely discussed after Locke included it in the second edition of his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.[6]

A similar problem was also addressed earlier in the 12th century by Ibn Tufail (Abubacer), in his
philosophical novel, Hayy ibn Yaqdhan (Philosophus Autodidactus). His version of the problem,
however, dealt mainly with colors rather than shapes.[7][8]

Modern science may now have the tools necessary to test this problem in controlled environments.
The resolution of this problem is in some sense provided by the study of human subjects who gain
vision after extended congenital blindness. In one such study, subjects were unable to immediately
link objects known by touch to their visual appearance, and only gradually developed the ability to
do so over a period of days or months.[9][10][11] This indicates that this may no longer be an
unsolved problem in philosophy.

Münchhausen trilemma

In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment intended to demonstrate the

theoretical impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics, without
appealing to accepted assumptions. If it is asked how any given proposition is known to be true,
proof may be provided. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three ways of completing
a proof:

The circular argument, in which the proof of some proposition presupposes the truth of that
very proposition
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The dogmatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts which are merely asserted rather
than defended

The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options. Karl Popper's
suggestion was to accept the trilemma as unsolvable and work with knowledge by way of conjecture
and criticism.

Metaphysics

Why there is something rather than nothing

The question about why is there anything at all instead of nothing has been raised or commented
on by philosophers including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,[12] Martin Heidegger,[13] and Ludwig
Wittgenstein.[14]− who called it the fundamental question of metaphysics.[15] The question is
general, rather than concerning the existence of anything specific such as the universe/s, the Big
Bang, mathematical laws, physical laws, time, consciousness or God.

Problem of universals

The problem of universals refers to the question of whether properties exist, and if so, what they
are.[16] Properties are qualities or relations or names that two or more entities have in common.[17]
The various kinds of properties, such as qualities and relations, are referred to as universals. For
instance, one can imagine three cup holders on a table that have in common the quality of being
circular or exemplifying circularity,[18][19] or bear the same name, "circular cup" or two daughters
that have in common being the female offsprings of Frank. There are many such properties, such
as being human, red, male or female, liquid, big or small, taller than, father of, etc.[20] While
philosophers agree that human beings talk and think about properties, they disagree on whether
these universals exist in reality or merely in thought, speech and sight.

Principle of individuation
Related to the problem of universals, the principle of individuation is what individuates universals.

Sorites paradox

Otherwise known as the "paradox of the heap", the question regards how one defines a "thing." Is a
bale of hay still a bale of hay if you remove one straw? If so, is it still a bale of hay if you remove
another straw? If you continue this way, you will eventually deplete the entire bale of hay, and the
question is: at what point is it no longer a bale of hay? While this may initially seem like a
superficial problem, it penetrates to fundamental issues regarding how we define objects. This is
similar to Theseus' paradox and the continuum fallacy.

Theseus paradox

Also known as the ship of Theseus, this is a classical paradox on the first branch of metaphysics,
ontology (philosophy of existence and identity). The paradox runs thus: There used to be the great
ship of Theseus which was made out of, say, 100 parts. Each part has a single corresponding
replacement part in the ship's port. Over the centuries, each part is replaced individually as it
breaks, and eventually, not a single original part of the ship remains. Is this new ship the ship of
Theseus or not?

If yes, consider this: the broken original parts are repaired and re-assembled. Is this the ship of
Theseus or not? If not, let us name the new ship "The Argo". At what point did the crew of the
Theseus become the crew of the Argo? And what ship is sailing when 50 of the parts have been
replaced? If both the ships trade a single piece, are they still the same ships?

This paradox is a minor variation of the Sorites Paradox above, and has many variations itself.
Both sides of the paradox have convincing arguments and counter-arguments, though no one is
close to proving it completely.

Material implication

People have a rather clear idea of what if-then means. In formal logic however, material
implication defines if-then, which is not consistent with the common understanding of
conditionals. In formal logic, the statement "If today is Saturday, then 1+1=2" is true. However,
'1+1=2' is true regardless of the content of the antecedent; a causal or meaningful relation is not
required. The statement as a whole must be true, because 1+1=2 cannot be false. (If it could, then
on a given Saturday, so could the statement). Formal logic has shown itself extremely useful in
formalizing argumentation, philosophical reasoning, and mathematics. The discrepancy between
material implication and the general conception of conditionals however is a topic of intense
investigation: whether it is an inadequacy in formal logic, an ambiguity of ordinary language, or as
championed by H. P. Grice, that no discrepancy exists.

Philosophy of mind

Mind–body problem

The mind–body problem is the problem of determining the relationship between the human body
and the human mind. Philosophical positions on this question are generally predicated on either a
reduction of one to the other, or a belief in the discrete coexistence of both. This problem is usually
exemplified by Descartes, who championed a dualistic picture. The problem therein is to establish
how the mind and body communicate in a dualistic framework. Neurobiology and emergence have
further complicated the problem by allowing the material functions of the mind to be a
representation of some further aspect emerging from the mechanistic properties of the brain. The
brain essentially stops generating conscious thought during deep sleep; the ability to restore such a
pattern remains a mystery to science and is a subject of current research (see also
neurophilosophy).

Qualia

The question hinges on whether color is a product of the mind or an inherent property of objects.
While most philosophers will agree that color assignment corresponds to spectra of light
frequencies, it is not at all clear whether the particular psychological phenomena of color are
imposed on these visual signals by the mind, or whether such qualia are somehow naturally
associated with their noumena. Another way to look at this question is to assume two people
("Fred" and "George" for the sake of convenience) see colors differently. That is, when Fred sees
the sky, his mind interprets this light signal as blue. He calls the sky "blue." However, when George
sees the sky, his mind assigns green to that light frequency. If Fred were able to step into George's
mind, he would be amazed that George saw green skies. However, George has learned to associate
the word "blue" with what his mind sees as green, and so he calls the sky "blue", because for him
the color green has the name "blue." The question is whether blue must be blue for all people, or
whether the perception of that particular color is assigned by the mind.

This extends to all areas of the physical reality, where the outside world we perceive is merely a
representation of what is impressed upon the senses. The objects we see are in truth wave-emitting
(or reflecting) objects which the brain shows to the conscious self in various forms and colors.
Whether the colors and forms experienced perfectly match between person to person, may never
be known. That people can communicate accurately shows that the order and proportionality in
which experience is interpreted is generally reliable. Thus one's reality is, at least, compatible to
another person's in terms of structure and ratio.

Hard problem of consciousness

The hard problem of consciousness is the question of what consciousness is and why we have
consciousness as opposed to being philosophical zombies. The adjective "hard" is to contrast with
the "easy" consciousness problems, which seek to explain the mechanisms of consciousness ("why"
versus "how", or final cause versus efficient cause). The hard problem of consciousness is
questioning whether all beings undergo an experience of consciousness rather than questioning the
neurological makeup of beings.

Cognition and AI

This problem actually defines a field; however, its pursuits are specific and easily stated. Firstly,
what are the criteria for intelligence? What are the necessary components for defining
consciousness? Secondly, how can an outside observer test for these criteria? The "Turing Test" is
often cited as a prototypical test of intelligence, although it is almost universally regarded as
insufficient. It involves a conversation between a sentient being and a machine, and if the being
can't tell he is talking to a machine, it is considered intelligent. A well trained machine, however,
could theoretically "parrot" its way through the test. This raises the corollary question of whether it
is possible to artificially create consciousness (usually in the context of computers or machines),
and of how to tell a well-trained mimic from a sentient entity.

Important thought in this area includes most notably: John Searle's Chinese Room, Hubert
Dreyfus' non-cognitivist critique, as well as Hilary Putnam's work on functionalism.
A related field is the ethics of artificial intelligence, which addresses such problems as the existence
of moral personhood of AIs, the possibility of moral obligations to AIs (for instance, the right of a
possibly sentient computer system to not be turned off), and the question of making AIs that
behave ethically towards humans and others.

Philosophy of mathematics

Mathematical objects

What are numbers, sets, groups, points, etc.? Are they real objects or are they simply relationships
that necessarily exist in all structures? Although many disparate views exist regarding what a
mathematical object is, the discussion may be roughly partitioned into two opposing schools of
thought: platonism, which asserts that mathematical objects are real, and formalism, which asserts
that mathematical objects are merely formal constructions. This dispute may be better understood
when considering specific examples, such as the "continuum hypothesis". The continuum
hypothesis has been proven independent of the ZF axioms of set theory, so within that system, the
proposition can neither be proven true nor proven false. A formalist would therefore say that the
continuum hypothesis is neither true nor false, unless you further refine the context of the
question. A platonist, however, would assert that there either does or does not exist a transfinite set
with a cardinality less than the continuum but greater than any countable set.[21] So, regardless of
whether it has been proven unprovable, the platonist would argue that an answer nonetheless does
exist.

Philosophy of science

Demarcation problem

'The problem of demarcation' is an expression introduced by Karl Popper to refer to 'the problem
of finding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the
one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as "metaphysical" systems on the other'. Popper
attributes this problem to Kant. Although Popper mentions mathematics and logic, other writers
focus on distinguishing science from metaphysics.

A prominent question in meta-philosophy is that of whether or not philosophical progress occurs

and more so, whether such progress in philosophy is even possible. It has even been disputed, most
notably by Ludwig Wittgenstein, whether genuine philosophical problems actually exist. The
opposite has also been claimed, for example by Karl Popper, who held that such problems do exist,
that they are solvable, and that he had actually found definite solutions to some of them. David
Chalmers divides inquiry into philosophical progress in meta-philosophy into three questions. The
Existence Question: is there progress in philosophy? The Comparison Question: is there as much
progress in philosophy as in science? The Explanation Question: why isn't there more progress in
philosophy?

Realism

Does a world independent of human beliefs and representations exist? Is such a world empirically
accessible, or would such a world be forever beyond the bounds of human sense and hence
unknowable? Can human activity and agency change the objective structure of the world? These
questions continue to receive much attention in the philosophy of science. A clear "yes" to the first
question is a hallmark of the scientific realism perspective. Philosophers such as Bas van Fraassen
have important and interesting answers to the second question. In addition to the realism vs.
empiricism axis of debate, there is a realism vs. social constructivism axis which heats many
academic passions. With respect to the third question, Paul Boghossian's Fear of Knowledge:
Against Relativism and Constructivism[22] is a powerful critique of social constructivism, for
instance. Ian Hacking's The Social Construction of What?[23] constitutes a more moderate critique
of constructivism, which usefully disambiguates confusing polysemy of the term "constructivism."

Relationship between science and religion

What is the relationship between science and religion? Philosophers like Paul Feyerabend, A. C.
Grayling, and Alvin Plantinga have debated whether they are in conflict, incompatible,
incommensurable, or independent.

Philosophy of religion
Philosophy of religion encompasses attempts within metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and other
major philosophical fields to philosophically analyze concepts within religion, the nature of religion
itself, and alternatives to religion.

Existence of God

Does God exist? A rich variety of arguments including forms of the contingency argument,
ontological argument, and moral argument have been proposed by philosophers like Aristotle,
Descartes, Leibniz, Gödel, and Aquinas for the existence of God throughout history. Arguments for
God usually refer to some form of metaphysically or logically necessary maximally great being
distinct from individual deities, although philosophers have also proposed different concepts of
God. Wittgenstein and Kant, on the other hand, defended religious belief while doubting that
rational arguments could prove God's existence. Philosophers have also considered objections to
the existence of God like the problem of evil and divine hiddenness.

Nature of God

What is God like? Philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Aquinas addressed the question of what
the nature of God is if God exists. Some of the key disagreements concern the doctrine of
impassibility and the coherency of a maximally great being or properties like omnipotence.

Epistemology of religion

Can religious belief be justified? When? According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,
religious epistemology "investigates the epistemic status of propositional attitudes about religious
claims." Philosophers like Kant, Kierkegaard, William James, and Alvin Plantinga have debated
stances towards the epistemic status of religious belief like reformed epistemology, fideism, and
evidentialism.

Ethics

Moral luck
The problem of moral luck is that some people are born into, live within, and experience
circumstances that seem to change their moral culpability when all other factors remain the same.

For instance, a case of circumstantial moral luck: a poor person is born into a poor family, and has
no other way to feed himself so he steals his food. Another person, born into a very wealthy family,
does very little but has ample food and does not need to steal to get it. Should the poor person be
more morally blameworthy than the rich person? After all, it is not this person's fault that they
were born into such circumstances, but a matter of "luck".

A related case is resultant moral luck. For instance, two persons behave in a morally culpable way,
such as driving carelessly, but end up producing unequal amounts of harm: two people drive while
intoxicated, but one strikes a pedestrian and kills him, while the other does not. That one driver
caused a death and the other did not is no part of the drivers' intentional actions; yet most
observers would likely ascribe greater blame to the driver who killed (compare consequentialism
and choice).

The fundamental question of moral luck is how our moral responsibility is changed by factors over
which we have no control.

Moral knowledge

Are moral facts possible, what do they consist in, and how do we come to know them? Rightness
and wrongness seem to be strange kinds of entities, and different from the usual properties of
things in the world, such as wetness, redness, or solidity. Richmond Campbell has outlined these
kinds of issues in his encyclopedia article "Moral Epistemology".[24]

In particular, he considers three alternative explanations of moral facts as: theological,

(supernatural, the commands of God); non-natural (based on intuitions); or simply natural
properties (such as leading to pleasure or to happiness). There are cogent arguments against each
of these alternative accounts, he claims, and there has not been any fourth alternative proposed. So
the existence of moral knowledge and moral facts remains dubious and in need of further
investigation. But moral knowledge supposedly already plays an important part in our everyday
thinking, in our legal systems and criminal investigations.

See also
Thought experiment
List of paradoxes

References
1. Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), "The Analysis of
Knowledge" (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, retrieved 2023-08-03
2. Reed, Baron (2018), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), "Certainty" (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/su
m2018/entries/certainty/), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 ed.),
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2023-08-03
3. Klein, P. D., “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning,” Philosophical
Studies, 134. 1, 2007, 1-17.
4. Hume, David (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (http://www.gutenberg.org/
cache/epub/9662/pg9662.txt).
5. Popper, Karl (1959). Conjectures and Refutations. ISBN 978-0-06-131376-9.