Individual Research Paper

India and Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrines: A Comparative Analysis

27th Mid-Career Management Course

(MCMC)

National Institute of Management, Lahore

By

Muhammad Farooq Anwar - Inland Revenue Service

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the National Institute of Management (NIM),

Lahore, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 27th Mid-Career Management
Course.

The paper is the end product of my own efforts, research and writing and its
contents are not plagiarized. The paper reflects my own views and is not necessarily
endorsed by the faculty or the NIM.

Signature
Date: 29-04-2019

Paper supervised by:

Mr. Kashif Mumtaz
 Preface
Nuclear weapons have transformed the conventional military strategy. The concept of
'Balance of Power' which guided the military strategies of major powers till the second World
War, was replaced by concepts like 'Nuclear Parity' and 'Balance of Terror' after the emergence
of nuclear weapons, the so called weapons of mass destruction. On one hand, nuclear weapons
gave unmatchable destructive capability to the existing major powers, and on the other, small
and weak states viewed them as the strategic equalizer against the conventional superiority of
their adversaries. The Cold War established the utility of nuclear weapons in preventing a major
war between USA and Soviet Union. Besides this, nuclear weapons became a symbol of prestige
in the international community. India and Pakistan's nuclear programs are also the result of these
developments.

The author was first introduced to the subject of nuclear weapons while pursuing the
Masters Degree in International Relation at Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, and since then
has been fascinated by the subject especially the nuclear issues of India and Pakistan. The author
is extremely grateful to the NIM, Lahore for offering an opportunity to contribute to the literature
on the subject.

This work could not have been completed without the supervision and guidance of
faculty advisor Mr. Kashif Mumtaz. He not only provided technical guidance for writing this
paper but also pointed out the relevant literature and prominent writers on the subject. He
patiently reviewed the initial drafts and highlighted the areas requiring improvement.

i
 Executive Summary
India and Pakistan became nuclear powers in 1998 and immediately felt the
need for their respective nuclear doctrines for effective management and
deployment of nuclear weapons. In response to this need, the strategists on
both sides began to conceptualize their nuclear doctrines. India initially
adopted the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and minimum credible
deterrence, but with the passage of time there appears to be a shift taking
place in this policy. Due to conventional superiority of India, Pakistan
declared a policy of first use and minimum credible deterrence. Pakistan
considers the nuclear weapons to be integral part of Pakistan's security
strategy and has declined the Indian offer for a no first use agreement. In
order to neutralize Pakistan's threat of first use, Indian doctrinal thinking has
been focused on fighting a limited war by launching punitive conventional
strikes against Pakistan without crossing its nuclear threshold. In response to
India's limited war doctrine, Pakistan has introduced tactical nuclear weapons
and moved towards a policy of full spectrum deterrence. India now feels an
urge to decapitate Pakistan's nuclear deterrent by preemptive nuclear strikes.
But still India has neither the capability nor is there a broad based political
support to pursue this goal.

ii
 Abbreviations

NSG: Nuclear Supplier Group

CSD: Cold Start Doctrine

FSD: Full Spectrum Deterrence

PNE: Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

DND: Draft Nuclear Doctrine

FMCT: Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty

CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

TNWs: Tactical Nuclear Weapons

SRBM: Short Range Ballistic Missile

BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense

MIRV: Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles

MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction

iii
 Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................................1
Statement of the Problem.............................................................................................................2
Significance and Scope of the Study............................................................................................2
Review of Literature....................................................................................................................3
Method.........................................................................................................................................3
Organization of the Paper............................................................................................................4
Section 1: Nuclear doctrine - A conceptual overview.....................................................................4
Section 2: A comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrines....................6
Section 3: Nuclear Use Options of India and Pakistan and Issues of Credibility.................12
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................16
Recommendations..........................................................................................................................18
Bibliography..................................................................................................................................19

iv
 Introduction
The geostrategic environment of South Asia has predominantly been shaped and defined by the
hostility between India and Pakistan. The longstanding issue of Kashmir, the war of 1971 and
consequent dismemberment of Pakistan fed a deep sense of mistrust between the two countries.
Security situation in the region became more volatile amidst the constant Indian allegations
against Pakistan regarding cross border infiltration and support of armed groups in Indian
Occupied Kashmir. This has resulted in various low intensity conflicts along the Line of Control.
The conventional arms race and ultimately nuclearization of the region is the consequence of this
continual enmity.
With the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan in 1998 and growing concerns of
international community with regard to non-proliferation and safety and security of nuclear
weapons, both countries felt a need to come up with clear guidelines which provided for
effective management of nuclear arsenal and to outline the mode, manner and the circumstances
in which the nuclear weapons will be used. These guidelines are commonly referred to as the
nuclear doctrine of a country. Nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan have constantly been
evolving since 1998 to meet the emerging threats.
As per India's public stance its major threat emanates from China and its nuclear program
is meant to neutralize China's conventional superiority. However evidence does not support this
proposition. As per Times of India, despite bilateral tension over a number of issues including
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China blocking India's efforts to bring about a UN ban on
Jaishe-i- Muhammad leader Masood Azhar, and Chinese efforts to block India's entry into the
Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries first time
touched $80 Billion in 2017 with 40% increase of India's exports to China 1. This indicates that
India does not perceive China posing any existential threat to it. The main purpose of the
increasing nuclear stockpile of India seems therefore to establish regional dominance and to get a
permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council and to establish itself as a world power.
Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 was viewed by the policy makers of Pakistan as a
strategic nightmare in view of conventional asymmetry with India specially when memories of

1
Bradfo Geo," India-China bilateral trade hits historic high of $84.44 Billion in 2017 ,"Times of India(March7, 2018
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-china-bilateral-trade-hits-historic-high-of-84-44-billion-in-2017/
articleshow/63202401.cms Accessed on 23-03-2019

1
dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 were still fresh. The nuclear program of Pakistan was
therefore solely India specific and was designed to deter India to exploit the conventional
asymmetry with Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan's nuclear doctrine has been driven by the principle
of Credible Minimum Deterrence which means Pakistan does not intend to enter into nuclear
arms race with India but will ensure minimum credible nuclear stockpile sufficient to offer war
denying deterrence to India along with political resolve to inflict unacceptable damage to India in
case it seeks to undermine the security of Pakistan. To achieve the objective of credible
minimum deterrence Pakistan has opted the policy of First Use of nuclear weapons and
maintains that nuclear weapons are integral part of Pakistan's defense strategy. On the other hand
India initially declared No First Use policy but with the passage of time this policy seems to have
significantly been diluted. Besides this India's strategic thinking has been focused on fighting a
limited war with Pakistan under the nuclear threshold. The much debated 'Cold Start Doctrine' of
India has compelled Pakistan to make necessary adjustments to its nuclear posture by
introducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons. In this way Pakistan has now switched to a policy of
'Full Spectrum Deterrence' (FSD) which aims to counterbalance the conventional war fighting
capabilities of India.

Statement of the Problem

Through a comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines with a special focus on
'First' or 'Second' use option as espoused by these doctrines, the study aims to know whether
these doctrines serve the purpose of credible deterrence between India and Pakistan.

Significance and Scope of the Study

The present study is intended to conduct a comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's nuclear
doctrines to discern the differences in the nuclear use options adopted by India and Pakistan and
how effectively these options serve the purpose of credible deterrence. This study is significant
due to the reason that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine has not been released in any documentary form.
Although India released its Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 and then in 2003 but various features
of these doctrines remain shrouded in ambiguity. Various studies conducted on the subject have,
therefore, more or less focused on unraveling the broad principles of these nuclear doctrines with
little attempt to minutely examine the issues relating to the first or second use of nuclear options
as espoused by these doctrines and their effectiveness to achieve the desired goals.

2
Review of Literature
A lot of research work has been done in Pakistan, India and USA on the subject of nuclear
doctrines of India and Pakistan. Pakistan and India's retired military officers and strategic studies
experts have explored various dimensions of the two nuclear doctrines. For the purpose of this
paper, extremely useful insights were provided by the paper written by Air Commodore (R)
Khalid Iqbal namely India and Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrines and Postures: A Comparative
Analysis which covers both the functions and purpose of nuclear doctrines, and various concepts
like Credible Minimum Deterrence, issues of clarity and ambiguity, the Cold Start Doctrine and
Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Dr. Adil Sultan's work, India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Case of Strategic
Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity was also quite though provoking and provided a lucid
analysis of doctrinal issues relating to India and Pakistan's nuclear programs. 'The Evolution of
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine' by Brigadier (R) Naeem Salik is also an important piece of work
especially his discourse on the peculiarities of South Asian nuclear environment helps to better
understand the nuclear weapons issues in India and Pakistan. The research work of Mahesh
Shankar and T.V. Paul on the security implications of nuclear doctrines is also very informative.
A detailed perspective on Pakistan's nuclear doctrine has been provided by Khalid Kidwai in his
interview at Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015. The sources cited by the
above studies were also quite useful to explore the subject further. Rajesh Rajagopalan's article
"India's Nuclear Doctrine Debate" helped in understanding various issues confronting India to
develop its nuclear doctrine. Brigadier Kuldip Singh's essay on Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear
Doctrine highlights various shortcomings in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine as perceived in India.
Then Vipin Narang's work "Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture" and works of Bhumitra
Chakma and Shyam Saran were also consulted for this paper. All these sources provided
important clues to derive answer to the statement of the problem.

Method

A comparative and analytical method will be utilized to conduct the study. Pakistan has not
released any official nuclear doctrine in the form of a document. Though India released its Draft
Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 and then in 2003, it is continuously evolving. Practically both the
doctrines have mostly been expressed in fragmented pieces at various fora, research journals,

3
debates and discussions and to some extent in press releases in both the countries, therefore
mostly secondary sources shall be utilized to analyze the problem and draw conclusion.

Organization of the Paper

This paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 is dedicated to a conceptual overview of
nuclear doctrine including the definition, purpose and function of a nuclear doctrine. Section 2
deals with the comparative analysis of salient features of India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrine
and provides a critical evaluation. Section 3 conducts an evaluation of first or second use option
as espoused by India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrine with the aim to know whether these options
constitute a credible deterrence between the two adversaries. Section 3 is followed by conclusion
and recommendations.

Section 1: Nuclear doctrine - A conceptual overview

Any state that has developed a nuclear capability for military purposes needs to address
some fundamental issues. First it has to outline the objectives and goals which it seeks to
achieve through its nuclear weapons. Second, it has to define the circumstances under which it
is likely to employ its nuclear forces. Besides this, it has to develop an elaborate system for the
management of its nuclear arsenal. In other words a nuclear state has to develop a framework
for employment of nuclear weapons and at the same time establish an efficient and effective
command and control structure to ensure the safety of the nuclear weapons and their use as per
the predefined policy.
A nuclear doctrine is basically a set of beliefs and principles held by a nation regarding
utility of its nuclear weapons. It is formulation of a strategy to develop and employ nuclear
forces to deter a perceived adversary in response to a crisis situation 2. The basic purpose of a
nuclear doctrine is to translate nuclear power into policy 3 by envisaging a role for the nuclear
weapons in the overall security strategy of a country. A well constructed nuclear doctrine
assigns a role and purpose to the nuclear weapons and also recognizes the limitations attached
with them. Another important area of doctrinal thought process is to determine whether clarity
and specificity or a degree of ambiguity in expressing the nuclear doctrine will best serve the

2
Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal," India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis,
"Criterion Quarterly, 11 no. 3 (September 9, 2016) http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/india-and-pakistans-nuclear-
doctrines-and-posture-a-comparative-analysis/(Accessed 24 March, 2019)
3
Riffat Hussain,"Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia,"SASSU Research Report no. 4 December, 2005)
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99918/RR%20No%2004.pdf (Accessed 25 March, 2019)

4
 security interests of the country. Ambiguity in a nuclear doctrine may become a source of
nuclear instability as it may lead to miscalculation by the adversary and escalate the situation to
a dangerous point. However young nuclear states tend to employ ambiguity as a means to
enhance the deterrence.4
In order to evolve a viable nuclear doctrine a state has to clearly identify and define its
security threat parameter within the prevailing regional and global security frameworks 5,
because the security and stability of the concerned country and the region at large depends much
on the way the nuclear doctrine has been conceptualized. Once these provisions have been
made, the country has a standard operating procedure which not only guides the country for
effective use of nuclear weapons but also makes its actions more predictable to its adversaries
and other important actors, as it serves to enhance their understanding of broad goals of the
country behind possession of nuclear weapons. This element helps maintain strategic stability in
the region.
Another important function of a nuclear doctrine is to draw a redline. A well thought out
doctrine will clearly define the limits of nuclear restraint crossing of which by an adversary may
lead to use of nuclear weapons, and what will be the magnitude of nuclear response. During the
Cold War period, the United States and the Soviet Union followed a policy of Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD) which meant that in case of a nuclear strike by one country, the other will
respond with massive retaliation by inflicting unacceptable damage. These red lines or nuclear
threshold is, however, determined by various factors including the strength of conventional
forces, capability to survive a nuclear attack and launch retaliatory strikes, geographical location
and size of the country and operational strategies of other countries. This outlining of nuclear
threshold and the level of response serves the all important purpose of credibility which is
integral part of deterrence strategy.
Although nuclear doctrines may provide valuable information about the nuclear strategies
of a country regarding development and deployment of nuclear weapons, but the best indication
of intent and policy come from country's nuclear posture i.e. the actual practice in deployment
of nuclear weapons. The nature and number of warheads deployed, the degree of alertness, and

4
Mahesh Shankar and T.V. Paul,"Nuclear doctrines and stable strategic relationship: the case of South
Asia,"International Affairs 92 no.1 (2016) https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/92/1/1/2199928 (Accessed 25 March,
2019)
5
Dr.Shireen M Mazari,"Doctrine and deterrence:Pakistan and India,"Journal of Strategic affairs".
https://ssii.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Doctrine-and-Deterrence-Pakistan-and-India-Shireen-Mazari.pdf

5
 the robustness of command structures, are therefore more informative about the actual nuclear
policy of a state.6
One of the most important element which features in a nuclear doctrine is the choice of
first or second use of nuclear weapons. This choice depends upon the overall national security
strategy, capabilities of conventional forces, a country's threat perceptions and the requirements
of maintaining a credible deterrence. Majority of the nuclear states maintain first use policy.
Where a country, for example India, has made No First Use pledge, adversaries do not consider
it credible. United States, despite its formidable conventional forces, has maintained the policy
of first use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical, biological or cyber weapons and to
reassure its commitment to European Allies against the conventional superiority of Russia in
European theater. Various members of Obama Administration in 2016 including Defense
Secretary Ash Carter, Secretary of State John Kerry opposed the No First Use declaration by the
United States on the same grounds as they believed that such a policy will weaken allied
commitment and encourage the enemies for brinkmanship.7

Section 2: A comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's Nuclear

Doctrines
Unlike the Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, the Indo - Pakistan
relations have been marked by major wars and numerous low intensity conflicts. The
outstanding issue of Kashmir and alleged role of non state actors in carrying out subversive
activities in both countries is constant source of acrimony between India and Pakistan. China's
nuclear capabilities and India-US cooperation in nuclear field is also a major factor in the
security calculus of both the countries. It is in this environment that nuclear doctrines of India
and Pakistan have taken shape.

2.1 Nuclear Doctrine of India It was as early as 1950s that India started planning for its
nuclear program i.e. well before the Sino-Indian war of 1962. 8 It clearly indicates that India did
not face any existential threat from any country that could justify its nuclear program. India

6
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky and George Bunn, ‘The doctrine of the nuclear-weapon states and the future of non-
proliferation’, Arms Control Today 24: 6, July–Aug. 1994 https://www.osti.gov/biblio/45390-doctrine-nuclear-
weapon-states-future-non-proliferation(Accessed 27 March, 2019)
7
Ankit Panda," No First Use of nuclear weapons,"Council on Foreign relations" 27July, 2018
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons (Accessed 27 March, 2019)
8
Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2009), 15

6
conducted its first nuclear test, the so called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974.
However it was not before the nuclear tests of 1998 that India declared itself as a nuclear power.
While addressing the Indian Parliament on 27 May 1998, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee expressed his disappointment on the reluctance of five nuclear states to move towards
a nuclear weapon free world and said "India is now a nuclear-weapon State... It is India's due, the
right of one-sixth of human-kind."9India's nuclear program is mostly viewed as prestige driven
rather than as a result of any genuine security concern. After the losses suffered in Kargil war of
1999, India felt a need to reassert its deterrence capability. 10 Therefore on 17 August, 1999
India's National Security Advisory Board unveiled what was called Draft Nuclear Doctrine
(DND). Its salient features were as under:

 Deterrence against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against India is basic
objective of nuclear capability.
 While India will observe a policy of no first use but will respond to nuclear attack on
India or it forces with punitive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage.
 India will follow a policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and to make it effective
survivability of nuclear arsenal shall be ensured through mobility, deception and
dispersion. Secondly India has the resolve and the will to retaliate through its nuclear
forces.
 India will rely on land, air and sea based launching capabilities along with early warning
systems.
 C4I2(command, control, communication, computers, intelligence and information)
systems will ensure the flexibility and responsiveness. Authority to launch nuclear
weapons shall be vested in Prime Minister of India.
 Strong conventional forces shall be maintained to raise the level of nuclear threshold.
 India will not accept any restriction on its nuclear research and development.

9
Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, “Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament”
(speech, New Delhi, 27 May, 1998) http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/spind.htm (Accessed 29 March, 2019)
10
Dr Adil Sultan,"India's Nuclear Doctrine: A case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity,"IPRI Journal,
August 2018http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Article-2-8-Aug-2018.pdf(Accessed 29 March,
2019)

7
  India shall strive for a nuclear weapons free world and till that end is achieved, it will
make efforts for an international treaty to ban nuclear weapons use against non nuclear
states11.

This document however could not find its way through the Indian Parliament. India again found
itself in eye ball to eye ball situation with Pakistan after attack on Indian Parliament on 13
December, 2001. Despite huge military mobilization by India, no punitive strikes could be
launched against Pakistan. Thereafter, in January, 2003 India released its official nuclear
doctrine. This doctrine maintained the most of the features of the DND of 1999 but there were a
few new dimensions12 which included the following:

 The concept of punitive retaliation introduced in DND of 1999 was replaced with the
doctrine of massive retaliation.
 In contrast to DND, it expanded the use of nuclear weapon against attack by chemical
and biological weapons and in this way practically negated the policy of no first use13.
 It expanded the geographical extent of nuclear use by asserting that use of nuclear
weapons against Indian forces anywhere in the world will trigger nuclear response.
 India will observe unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and will participate in FMCT
(Fissile Material Cut off Treaty) negotiations.

2.2 Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan

Z. A. Bhutto, in his book the myth of independence expressed the need for Pakistan to acquire
nuclear deterrent to prevent a total war against Pakistan 14. The war of 1971 and the
dismemberment of East Pakistan justified his fears and compelled Pakistan to start a nuclear
program that could serve as a strategic equalizer against the conventional superiority of India.
Another factor that led to Pakistan's nuclear program, was the example of the Cold War between
the two nuclear countries USA and USSR. Pakistan concluded that despite their active
11
Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on India Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August 199
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/990817-indnucld.htm (Accessed 29 March, 2019)
12
Rajesh Rajagopalan,"India's Nuclear Doctrine Debate,"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,"30June,
2016 Regional Insight https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-
63950(Accessed 29 March, 2019)
13
Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal," India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis,
"Criterion Quarterly, 11 no. 3 (September 9, 2016) http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/india-and-pakistans-nuclear-
doctrines-and-posture-a-comparative-analysis/(Accessed 24 March, 2019)
14
Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, (Oxford University Press, Lahore, 1969), 153.

8
engagement against each other through their proxies, the nuclear weapons prevented a direct
military confrontation between the two superpowers. 15So Pakistan initiated its nuclear program
that enjoyed nationwide support and with the nuclear tests of May, 1998 Pakistan overtly became
a nuclear power. Unlike India, Pakistan has not released an official doctrine in the form of a
document. Pakistan is following a deliberate policy of ambiguity to prevent the exploitation, by
India, of any gaps in its nuclear threshold policy.16However the broad contours of Pakistan's
nuclear policy have been discerned by the experts from the statements of Pakistan's civil and
military officials and can be outlined as under:
 Pakistan's nuclear program is India specific and forms the integral part of Pakistan's
security strategy.
 Pakistan follows policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and does not intend to enter
into nuclear arms race with India.
 Pakistan has adopted the policy of First Use of nuclear weapons. However nuclear
weapons will be used as a last resort to inflict unacceptable damage to India if it threatens
Pakistan's sovereignty with conventional or nuclear forces.
 Pakistan advocates non discriminatory arms control regimes at international level and to
be part of FMCT negotiations.
 Pakistan will continue to observe unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.
 Stringent measures, both legal and administrative shall be put in place to prevent the
export of technology and material relating to development of nuclear weapons.
 Pakistan maintains an effective command and control system.17

2.3 Critical evaluation of the two doctrines

The nuclear doctrines of both India and Pakistan, as summarized above, reveal various
complexities and inconsistencies when placed in operational scenarios. This aspect is indicated
by the ever changing military and nuclear postures of the two countries. India has maintained

15
Brigadier Kuldip Singh (retd)," Evolution Of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine – Analysis,"Pakistan Defence,
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/evolution-of-pakistans-nuclear-doctrine-analysis.531928/(Accessed 30 March, 2019)
16
Khalid Kidwai,"A Conversation with Khalid Kidwai",interview by Peter Lavoy (Carnegie International Nuclear
Policy Conference 2015) 23 March, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-
230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf(Accessed 30 March, 2019)
17
Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal," India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis,
"Criterion Quarterly, 11 no. 3 (September 9, 2016) http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/india-and-pakistans-nuclear-
doctrines-and-posture-a-comparative-analysis/(Accessed 24 March, 2019)

9
that China is its principal adversary. Even if this proposition is accepted, the continuous nuclear
build up by India represents for Pakistan a clear departure from avowed Indian policy of
Credible Minimum Deterrence.18This fact is substantiated by Indian efforts for development of
nuclear submarines, Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and effective
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.19
This paradox is inherently destabilizing for effective nuclear restraint between India and
Pakistan. This situation has led Pakistan to believe that India might be aiming at decapitating
Pakistan's second strike capabilities. To prevent this eventuality, Pakistan is developing sea
based nuclear launch facilities to survive a surprise first nuclear attack by India. In this way
Pakistan faces a dilemma to stick to its avowed minimum deterrence policy and need to maintain
viable nuclear forces which effectively leads it to arms race with India. 20 Besides this, India's
continued improvement of its conventional capabilities is lowering the nuclear threshold of
Pakistan who, due to economic difficulties, cannot compete in conventional arms. To maintain
the strategic stability Pakistan introduced Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) such as Nasr,
and developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) to deter a conventional military attack by
India. In this way Pakistan has moved away from minimum nuclear deterrence to Full Spectrum
Deterrence (FSD).21
Both India and Pakistan have not signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and
FMCT. Although both countries are observing unilateral moratorium on nuclear test but in the
absence of a bilateral or multilateral agreement to ban nuclear testing there cannot be an effective
check on building next generation of nuclear weapons. Similarly both countries are continuously
building stockpiles of fissile material. An Indian analyst Bharat Karnad suggests that India
should sign these agreements only if they allow for India the accumulation of sufficient fissile
material and additional thermonuclear tests22. It is clear that both countries believe that minimum

18
Vipin Narang," Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture," Washington Quarterly 36,no.3 (Summer 2013)
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/TWQ_13Summer_Narang.pdf
(Accessed 30 March, 2019)
19
Dr Adil Sultan,"India's Nuclear Doctrine: A case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity,"IPRI Journal,
August 2018http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Article-2-8-Aug-2018.pdf(Accessed 29 March,
2019)
20
Bhumitra Chakma," Pkistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System:Dilemma of Small Nuclear
Forces in the second Atomic Age," Security Challenges," 2, no.2 Available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26459035.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6bd705c3da44234b42267cd1a2f59f51
(Accessed 30 March, 2019)
21
Iqbal," India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis,"Criterion Quarterly,11no. 3
22
Ibid

10
deterrence cannot be defined in static terms and needs to be adjusted in view of changing
postures of the adversaries.
Both the nuclear doctrines aim at massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage.
Initially in the DND India had provided for punitive retaliation but in 2003 it also shifted to
massive retaliation. Both the massive and unacceptable are extremely elusive concepts when
applied into operational scenarios. The Cold Start Doctrine (CDS), the India's plan to fight a
limited war with Pakistan under a nuclear hangover through integrated and rapidly deployable
battle groups, exposes the gaps in India's massive retaliation policy. If India launched a limited
conventional war and Pakistan employs its Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) through its Short
Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), Nasr, India is highly unlikely to launch massive nuclear strike
against Pakistan as it will immediately escalate the conflict to a Strategic Level. 23 Similarly by
introducing the TNWs and SRBMs, Pakistan has practically moved away from massive
retaliation policy to make its nuclear response more flexible. Neither India nor Pakistan has the
sufficient intelligence and information to have sufficient insight as to what level of damage will
be unacceptable to the other. Any miscalculation on this account can be devastating.
Another dilemma which emerges from these doctrines is regarding respective nuclear
thresholds of both the adversaries. General Khalid Kidwai, the former head of Pakistan's
Strategic Plans Division, outlined four scenarios in which Pakistan will use its nuclear weapons.
1. If India captures large portion of Pakistan's Territory. 2. If India destroys major portion of
Pakistan's military forces. 3. If India seeks to strangulate Pakistan economically. 4. If India
engages in creating a major internal subversion in Pakistan. An examination of these conditions
reveals that these are quite ambiguous.24 Given the lack of strategic depth of Pakistan and the fact
that its major urban centers and strategic infrastructure such as roads, railway lines and bridges,
is located near the border, it shows that Pakistan will use nuclear option very early if India makes
some territorial gains. India may not consider this threat of nuclear use credible in view of the
fact that Pakistan does not possess the nuclear capability to deny India a second strike against
Pakistan.25 India's nuclear threshold is also lurking in mystery. Although India has purportedly
23
Sultan,"India's Nuclear Doctrine: A case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity,"IPRI Journal, August
2018
24
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery," Calling The Nuclear Bluff: A Case For Pakistan's War Fighting Nuclear Doctrine,"South
Asian Voices", 20 January, 2018 https://southasianvoices.org/calling-the-nuclear-bluff-case-for-pakistans-
warfighting-nuclear-doctrine/ (Accessed 31March, 2019)
25
Toby Dalton and George Perkovich," India's Nuclear Option and Escalation Dominance," Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace," May, 2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_273_India_Nuclear_Final.pdf

11
adopted a No First Use policy, but at the same time it has committed itself to use of nuclear
weapons if its military forces are attacked with nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. These
conceptions appear to be extremely destabilizing in view of India's CSD and Pakistan's TNWs.
The above analysis shows that the policies adopted in both the nuclear doctrines do not
reflect the hard and fast rules to be observed by the respective countries, rather these policies are
quite dynamic and subject to changes to meet the requirement of credible deterrence and
strategic stability of the region. Therefore these policies are constantly evolving. The most
elusive of the choices made in these doctrines is the nuclear use options adopted by India and
Pakistan. This aspect shall be explored in the next section.

Section 3: Nuclear Use Options of India and Pakistan and Issues of

Credibility
Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as central part of its defense strategy and as protectors

of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, as pointed above, Pakistan's nuclear
doctrine provides for First Use of nuclear weapons as a means to deter military aggression by
India. Given India's conventional superiority, Pakistan has not committed itself to the policy of
No First Use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear First Use option suits Pakistan as it is financially
more viable and easy to build. Besides this a small nuclear arsenal serves the purpose and it
involves less complicated command and control system than required for second use option. 26
Pakistan is also compelled to opt for First Use of nuclear weapons since it has no sufficient
strategic depth and most of its military assets such as air bases, missile sites etc are within the
range of Indian preemptive strikes. Pakistan rejected Indian offer for an agreement against first
use by contending that such an agreement did not resolve the security dilemma faced by Pakistan
due to Indian conventional superiority. As long as war remains a possibility in the Sub-Continent
Pakistan will pursue its First Use nuclear doctrine.27

(Accessed 31 March, 2019)

26
Bhumitra Chakma," Pkistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemma of Small Nuclear
Forces in the second Atomic Age," Security Challenges," 2, no.2 Available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26459035.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6bd705c3da44234b42267cd1a2f59f51
(Accessed 22 April, 2019)
27
Ibid

12
 However, Pakistan's First Use policy faces various dilemmas at operational level which
pose challenge to its credibility. First of all, due to the huge size of India, it has the capability to
absorb the first nuclear strike by Pakistan. Therefore in the absence of a capability to disarm
India through the first strike, Pakistan is likely to face retaliatory nuclear strikes with devastating
consequences.28Secondly even if Pakistan employs its TNWs inside its own territory against the
invading Indian forces, India might escalate the nuclear ladder by retaliating through its strategic
nuclear weapons with the aim to destroy Pakistan's nuclear assets to prevent a nuclear attack on
Indian territory. India may assume that these calculations will considerably bear upon the minds
of Pakistani strategists and in this way make the threat of first nuclear use less credible to India.
Another factor forcing Pakistan to desist from first nuclear use against India could be the huge
Muslim population of India. Besides this what makes the use of TNWs by Pakistan on its own
territory unlikely, is the fact that a lot of collateral damage will be suffered by the people and
armed forces of Pakistan. Keeping in view the pattern of winds the Pakistan will suffer most of
the nuclear fallout29.
As mentioned above in Section 2 General Khalid Kidwai, the former head of Pakistan's
Strategic Plans Division, outlined four scenarios in which Pakistan will use its nuclear weapons,
but the same are very ambiguous. In a war situation major strategic dilemma of Pakistan remains
as to when and at what stage it would use nuclear weapons first. Pakistani officials maintain that
nuclear weapons are the weapons of last resort and would be used only for defense purpose when
the very existence of Pakistan as an independent state is threatened. But this is a subjective
notion and susceptible to different interpretations in the time of peace and during war 30. Besides
this, employment of nuclear weapons by Pakistan when it has been defeated in conventional war,
can be counterproductive and without any strategic gains. India may retaliate by nuclear strikes
and cause more damage to Pakistan, or it may chose not to retaliate with nuclear weapons. In the
second scenario, India will get tremendous international support being victim of nuclear weapons

28
Brigadier Kuldip Singh,"Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine - Analysis" Pakistan Defence",5 January, 2017
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/evolution-of-pakistans-nuclear-doctrine-analysis.531928/(Accessed 22 April, 2019)
29
Ibid
30
Bhumitra Chakma," Pkistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System:Dilemma of Small Nuclear
Forces in the second Atomic Age," Security Challenges," 2, no.2 Available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26459035.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6bd705c3da44234b42267cd1a2f59f51
(Accessed 22 April, 2019)

13
and may be even successful in invoking collective UN Security Council action against
Pakistan.31
What emerges from the above discussion is that Pakistan's best hope is that the threat of
First Use of nuclear weapons will deter India to launch a large scale conventional war against
Pakistan. But if the deterrence fails Pakistan will follow a policy of mutually assured destruction
to deny India any meaningful victory. The question is that whether India can be made to think
that it cannot achieve its political goals through the use of military force against a nuclear
Pakistan. It seems that Pakistan's nuclear capability and declared First Use option does
significantly affect the decision making in New Delhi. Notwithstanding the Indian claims that it
successfully conveyed a strong message to Pakistan regarding activities of Pakistan based
terrorist groups, the fact remains that despite general mobilization in 2002 India did not launch a
full-fledged attack on Pakistan. President Pervez Musharraf insisted that it was the warning of
unconventional retaliation that deterred India from initiating a war with Pakistan. He further
asserted that "we have defeated our enemy without going into war". 32 The Pulwama incident of
February 14, 2019 resulted in war mongering by Indian media and leadership against Pakistan.
The logic of nuclear parity, however, again worked against the large scale military conflict.
Therefore, as long as Pakistan maintains a sufficient nuclear arsenal to inflict significant damage
to India, its deterrence capability is likely to hold.
India on the other hand, as discussed earlier, has declared policy of No First Use of
nuclear weapons. India's nuclear doctrine of 2003 says that nuclear weapons will be used only in
response to nuclear attack on Indian Territory or its armed forces anywhere in the world.
However there was a provision that India might use nuclear weapons in case of attack by
chemical or biological weapons. This provision has practically nullified the No First Use pledge
of India. Pakistan's policy makers believe that India is not committed to No First Use policy and
has declared it only to get higher moral ground and to project itself as a responsible nuclear
power.33 Another motivation to declare No First Use policy could be to project India as a great
power that could take up security challenges on its own. Many highly placed Indian officials

31
Rasul Bakhsh Rais," Conceptualizing Nuclear Detterence: Pakistan's Posture",India Review,"2, no.2 Available
athttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14736480500225632 (Accessed 22 April, 2019)
32
Ibid
33
Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal," India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis,
"Criterion Quarterly, 11 no. 3 (September 9, 2016) http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/india-and-pakistans-nuclear-
doctrines-and-posture-a-comparative-analysis/(Accessed 24 March, 2019)

14
have also shown skepticism about India's No First Use declaration. Shivshankar Menon, the
former National Security Adviser, has said that India may use nuclear weapons first against a
nuclear state that has declared that it will use nuclear weapons, especially when India believes
that the nuclear strike by the other state is imminent. 34 He further argues that if Pakistan employs
its TNWs, India may retaliate through a full force first strike against Pakistan. This indicates a
possible shift in India's nuclear strategy from retaliation to preemptive counterforce strikes to
decapitate Pakistan's nuclear strike capability.
These scenarios are extremely destabilizing since India does not possess the required
surveillance and reconnaissance capability to verifiably conclude that a nuclear strike by
Pakistan is imminent.35 Similarly Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal the former commander of India's Strategic
Forces Command and Manohar Parrikar the former Defense Minister of India have given
indications regarding the possible shift in the strategic thinking of India. 36 While urging India to
abandon the policy of No First Use, Bharat Karnad has argued that No First Use option could be
exercised only if India not only had full confidence to survive the first nuclear use by the enemy
and to launch devastating retaliatory strikes, but it should also have a strong crisis management
system. He concludes that India has none of the two.37
However some high ranking former officials of India have forcefully opposed the
contemplation by India of any preemptive nuclear strike against Pakistan. Shyam Saran a former
diplomat and Chairman of National Security Advisory Board argue that the prerequisites for a
First Use option are quite different from what India has invested in so far. Besides this it also
involves a completely different command and control structure. Therefore, India should focus on
enhancing the capabilities associated with India's present No First Use nuclear doctrine. He
further argued that debate on abandoning the No First Use policy will tantamount to giving in to
Pakistan's propaganda that India's No First Use policy is not credible.38
34
Dr Adil Sultan,"India's Nuclear Doctrine: A case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity,"IPRI Journal,
August 2018http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Article-2-8-Aug-2018.pdf(Accessed 29 March,
2019)
35
Ibid
36
Rajesh Rajagoplan," India's Nuclear Strategy: A Shift to Counterforce ?",Observer Research Foundation, 30
March, 2017 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-nuclear-strategy-shift-counterforce/ (Accessed on 23-04-
2019)
37
Kumar Sundaram & M.V.Ramana,"India and the Policy of No Fist Use of Nuclear Weapons",Journal for Peace
and Nuclear Disarmament, 22 February, 2018
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737(Accessed on 23-04-2019)
38
Shyam Saran," The dangers of Nuclear Revisionism", Business Standard, 22 April, 2014 https://www.business-
standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-saran-the-dangers-of-nuclear-revisionism-114042201335_1.html (Accessed on
23- April, 2019)

15
 In the light of above it is understood that an order to launch preemptive nuclear strikes
against Pakistan and subsequently avoid retaliatory strikes, India will have to massively enhance
its nuclear arsenal to take out widely dispersed nuclear assets of Pakistan. India shall also have to
develop fool proof intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities to complete this mission. Since
India does not possess these capabilities, encouraging such debates will send negative signals to
both the friends and foes of India and can harm credible deterrence in the region. It was only
logical that after listening to the above advice of Shyam Saran, even a hardliner like Narendra
Modi stopped his advocacy for First Use option by saying that "No First Use was a great
initiative of Atal Bihari Vajpayee – there is no compromise on that. We are very clear. No first
use is a reflection of our cultural inheritance”39

Conclusion
Security environment of the Sub-Continent is dominated by rivalry between India and
Pakistan. India's nuclear tests of 1974 were perceived by Pakistan as a strategic nightmare
especially in view of the existing conventional asymmetry in favor of India. Therefore, Pakistan
initiated its own nuclear program to acquire a strategic equalizer against India. After the nuclear
test in 1998, India and Pakistan became nuclear powers and felt a need to develop their nuclear
doctrines for effective management of their nuclear arsenal and to outline the mode, manner and
circumstances in which these nuclear weapons will be used. An important function of a nuclear
doctrine is to draw the redlines crossing of which by the adversary may entail use of nuclear
weapons and in this way it serves the purpose of credibility.
Nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan share many common features. Both the doctrines
seek to maintain Minimum Credible Deterrence and a policy of massive retaliation. Neither
India nor Pakistan is the member of CTBT, however both are observing unilateral moratorium
on nuclear test since 1998. Both countries advocate global nuclear disarmament. Similarly, both
India and Pakistan claim to have put in place effective command and control structures for
security and deployment of nuclear weapons. However there are certain divergent features of
the two countries' doctrines. India maintains a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons and
maintains that its nuclear weapons are meant to deter the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.

39
Reuters, 16 April, 2014https://www.ndtv.com/elections-news/narendra-modi-says-committed-to-no-first-use-of-
nuclear-weapons-557628 (Accessed on 23 April, 2019)

16
Pakistan on the other hand considers the nuclear weapons to be integral part of its defense
strategy against India and maintains the policy of First Use.
However, a continued nuclear build up by India and its efforts to develop Ballistic
Missile Defense systems signify a departure from the policy of Minimum Credible Deterrence
and raised Pakistan's apprehensions that India might be seeking to decapitate Pakistan's Second
Strike capabilities. Similarly, continued improvement of conventional capability of India is
lowering the nuclear threshold of Pakistan which has responded by introducing Tactical Nuclear
Weapons to deny India a limited war as indicated in India's Cold Start Doctrine. In this way
Pakistan has moved towards a Full Spectrum Deterrence. The Cold Start Doctrine and Tactical
Nuclear Weapons have also put in doubt the policy of massive retaliation espoused by both the
countries. This development is also dangerous in view of India's policy of nuclear retaliation if
nuclear weapons are used against its armed forces anywhere in the world. Similarly, by
committing it to use of nuclear weapons against chemical and biological weapons India has also
drifted away from policy of No First Use.
Pakistan's policy of First Use of nuclear weapons also faces various dilemmas. Despite
various indications given by the Pakistani officials regarding the First Use of nuclear weapons,
it is not clear at what stage Pakistan will use the nuclear option. Pakistan's incapability to deny
India a retaliatory nuclear strike, and the high cost of possible international reaction creates
doubts about Pakistan's First Use option. Pakistan's best bet is that threat of First Use of nuclear
weapons will deter India to launch a full-scale conventional attack against Pakistan. But if the
deterrence fails Pakistan will use nuclear weapons only as a last resort to deny India any
meaningful victory. This logic of nuclear parity has so far served the purpose of deterrence as is
evident from the military standoff of 2002 and Pulwama Incident of 2019, and is likely to hold
in the near future.
In order to defeat this logic of nuclear parity, India developed its Cold Start Doctrine, a
doctrine to achieve its political objectives by fighting a limited war with Pakistan without
crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold. Pakistan responded by developing its Short Range
Nuclear Capable Missile and Tactical Nuclear Weapons to deter Indian conventional invasion
on Pakistan. Despite its declared policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, India has also been
contemplating preemptive counterforce nuclear strikes to destroy Pakistan's nuclear deterrent.

17
However due to lack of India's technological, reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities to
achieve this objective, the idea still does not enjoy wide political support in India.

Recommendations
In order to achieve the goal of strategic stability in the region in the nuclear context, following
recommendations are made.
 India should revisit the basic purpose of its nuclear weapons to avoid a drift towards
postures that go beyond its security goals. It should adhere to its stated position of
minimum deterrence and should not seek to expand its nuclear arsenal and acquire
MIRVs and should stop its BMD program which increase Pakistan's apprehensions.
 Although Pakistan, having a conventional disadvantage against India, is justified to
follow a policy of First Use, but it should take practical steps to address Indian
apprehensions that Pakistan is using its nuclear cover to destabilize India by employing
non state actors.
 Both the countries should minimize the elements of ambiguity in their nuclear doctrines
to develop a better understanding of each other's nuclear doctrines, postures and
policies.
 Confidence building measures such as early warning of missile launch and nuclear tests
can contribute towards enhancing stability.
 Pakistan should continue to maintain sufficiently equipped and modern conventional
forces to increase its nuclear threshold.
 Both the countries should discourage the debates regarding preemptive nuclear strikes to
decapitate the nuclear deterrent of each other.

18
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20