CASE STUDY

GLOBAL JUSTICE

Introduction
In our discussions on the concept of justice, we came to the conclusion that while there is
widespread agreement about the desirability of justice in a society, there is no consensus on
precisely what it means. Within the domain of distributive justice, also there is widespread
disagreement about both the content and criteria of justice.
Another important debate that has acquired relevance is regarding the scope of distributive
justice. is the scope national or global? Put simply, when we raise the question of who gets
what, and on what basis, and whether or not it is fair and just, should these questions be
applied to bounded political communities such as the nation state, or to global human
population at large?
To understand the implications of these questions, we need to step back and ask a more
fundamental question. What is the scope of our moral obligation to other human beings? Are
national borders relevant in determining the extent of these obligations? Do we have
obligations of justice only towards fellow citizens, or also towards others? If we do, then to
what extent? Are our obligations to non-citizens identical to our obligations to fellow
citizens? Or do we have greater obligations to fellow citizens, and lesser ones to non-
citizens?
All these questions are central to the debates on Global justice. these questions are also
deeply pertinent today than ever before, given the unprecedented interconnectedness of the
globalised world that we inhabit, as well as the horrific inequalities that characterise our
world.
Let us look at the debate.
When John Rawls proposed his theory of justice, it was meant to govern closed communities.
Relying upon a hypothetical ideal choice situation, Rawls endorsed the famous principles,
one protecting, equal basic liberties, the other ensuring fair equality of opportunity for all and
benefit to the worst off. These principles came to be known as the principle of liberty,
difference principle and principle of fair equality of opportunity.
Some theorists, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, argued that these principles should apply
on the global scale, because the same kind of reasoning that led to their endorsement at the
domestic level should apply to the global case. Both Beitz and Pogge are cosmopolitans.

What is Cosmopolitanism?
The word ‘cosmopolitan’, derives from the Greek word kosmopolitēs which means ‘citizen of
the world.’ It refers to a variety of views in moral and socio-political philosophy, all of which
share the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and
should be) citizens in a single community. In most versions of cosmopolitanism, the universal
community of world citizens functions as a positive ideal to be cultivated. Cosmopolitans
believe that all individuals have equal moral worth and that the strength of our moral
obligations to others is not importantly diminished by national borders.
Cosmopolitans do not dismiss the state as unimportant or irrelevant, they concede that states
are hugely important vehicles to aid the delivery of public goods, but they refuse to consider
states to be ontologically privileged. Cosmopolitans see themselves as citizens of the world –
as members of a global community of human beings, with robust responsibilities to others in
the global community. Cosmopolitans believe that all individuals have equal moral worth and
that the strength of our moral obligations to others is not importantly diminished by national
borders.
As stated earlier, Cosmopolitan theorists argued in favour of applying Rawls’ principles of
justice globally. However, Rawls himself was not in favour of the idea. He argued that
although the two principles should apply within liberal societies, they should not apply across
them. He believed that in the international context, different principles would be chosen.
In 1999, Rawls published his final work Law of Peoples in which he set out his what he
believed to be a realistic utopia at the international level.

Law of Peoples
Rawls presents a conception of liberal justice applicable at the level of international norms
and practice. In order to arrive at it, Rawls’ derivation occurs in several stages. He employs
two original positions.
The first stage is one that we are familiar with. What would people in the original position,
behind the veil of ignorance choose? This is the social contract of the liberal political
conception of a constitutionally democratic regime, set out in detail in The Theory of Justice.
we know that the two principles of justice will be chosen. Rawls does not believe that these
principles can simply be extrapolated to the global level in order to arrive at a conception of
justice globally. For this he employs a second original position. In the first original position,
parties must decide the fair terms of cooperation that will regulate the basic structure of
society. After the principles governing the liberal society have been derived, Rawls moves to
the international level. The second original position is employed to derive the foreign policy
that liberal peoples would choose. Before going any further, let us explore what Rawls means
by ‘peoples.’
A ‘people’ is a group of persons that are united by sufficient commonalities in areas such as:
culture; tradition; a sense of kinship; history; sentiments; world views. Although they may be
politically organised, they may or may not occupy a distinct state.
In the second original position, the representatives of peoples are subject to an appropriate
veil of ignorance for the situation. The veil of ignorance hides information regarding the size
of territory or population, the relative strength of the people, the extent of natural resources,
the level of economic development and so on. In this situation, Rawls believes that eight
principles and three organisations will be chosen.
The eight principles to be chosen are –
1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be
respected by other peoples.
 2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4) People are to observe the duty of non-intervention (except to address grave violation
of human rights).
5) Peoples have a right of self –defense, but no right to instigate war for reasons other
than self-defense.
6) Peoples are to honour human rights.
7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.

In addition to these eight principles, three organisations will also be chosen. They are –
1) One aimed at securing fair trade amongst peoples.
2) One that enables peoples to borrow from a cooperative banking institution.
3) One that plays a similar role to that of United Nations, which he refers to as a
Confederation of Peoples (not states).

Having established that liberal peoples will choose the above, Rawls goes on to make another
claim – decent hierarchical people/ well-ordered hierarchical would select the same
principles and organisations.
What is a decent people? Rawls specifies that for a people to be counted as decent, at least
four central conditions must be met.
1) The society must not be aggressive. It must conduct its affairs in ways that are
peaceful and respectful of other societies.
2) The system of law and idea of justice must secure basic human rights for all the
members of its peoples. (Rawls thinks that all peoples – whether liberal or not - will
be able to endorse this very limited list of human rights). These are –
a. The right to life, which encompasses the right to means of subsistence and
security.
b. The right to liberty, not just liberty from slavery and forced occupation, but
also liberty to conscience (enough to ensure freedom of religion and thought).
c. The right to personal property
d. The right to formal equality.
3) Judges and others who administer the legal system must believe that the law
incorporates an idea of justice that includes the common good.
4) A decent people must have a ‘decent consultation hierarchy,’ in which the significant
interests of all members of the people are taken into account.
Rawls believes that such decent hierarchical non-liberal peoples would also choose the
principles and organisations detailed above. To explain in greater detail what he means by
this, Rawls uses the example of the hypothetical country of Kazanistan (See chapter on
Global Justice by Gillian Brock in Catriona MacKinnon edited Issues in Political Theory)
Let us now look at the question of justice again. Having established that both liberal peoples
and decent hierarchical peoples will abide by rules necessary for a peaceful and stable order,
Rawls then raises the question of those who do not fall into these categories. They neither
well organised, nor decent. Obviously, the situation involves human rights abuses. What are
duties of well-ordered peoples towards those who are not? This is where the primary
difference between the cosmopolitans and Rawls emerges most sharply.
According to Rawls, ‘some societies lack the political and cultural traditions, the human
capital and know how, and often, the material and technological resources needed to be well
ordered.’ Rawls believes that well ordered peoples have a duty to assist such societies to
become part of the society of well ordered peoples. The scope of this assistance is to help the
burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and
eventually become a part of the well ordered peoples. This is all that assistance aimed to do.
Even if the society continues to be poor and relatively unequal, Rawls feels that the need for
assistance is at an end. He does not endorse any further duty of distributive justice towards
poor societies. He argues that wealth owes it origin and maintenance to the political culture of
a society, rather than to its stock of resources. A country may well be poor despite having a
good stock of resources and vice versa, simply because of how they are managed. Therefore
he believes that the best assistance is to enable peoples to best manage their affairs,
reasonably and rationally, in context of political autonomy.

Critique
Cosmopolitans have disagreed strongly with Rawls over some of his fundamental
assumptions.
1) Rawls has advocated very limited duties of assistance to other peoples and refused the
application of the difference principle at the global level on the grounds that peoples
are responsible for well being of their citizens and that differences in levels of health
and prosperity are largely attributable to differences in political culture and the
virtuous nature of its citizens. Critics point out that Rawls fails to take into account
the extent to which unfavourable conditions may result from factors that are external
to the society. States exist within an international order that perpetuates the interests
of wealthy developed states, while ignoring those of the poor and developing.
Therefore, those living in the wealthy parts cannot absolve themselves of
responsibility towards the worse off, because they are complicit in keeping them in a
state of poverty. If we take into account the experience of colonialism historically,
which involved nut just drain of wealth from the subjugated countries, but also
stunted the organics growth of their political, social and economic institutions, or in
more contemporary times, the international borrowing privilege and the international
resource privilege, then it becomes clear that countries cannot simply be held
responsible for their own state of poverty without taking into account external factors.
According to Pogge, oppressive governments may borrow freely on behalf of the
country or dispose of its natural resources, and these actions are legally recognised
even though they can have severe adverse effect for the people. He argues that our
failure to reform key aspects of the international order, implicates us in the misery of
those suffering from poverty in developing countries. Those in affluent developed
countries must also make amends for the harm already inflicted.
2) Critics have also argued that in the second original position, Rawls has placed behind
the veil of ignorance, the representatives of the peoples, rather than the peoples
themselves and that this has direct bearing on the principles that are likely to be
chosen. If the people themselves were making the choice, they would perhaps not
choose such a stunted and limited duty of assistance.
3) Critics question whether the arguments for the eight principles are persuasive,
especially those concerning limited assistance, the very short, basic human rights list
and the omission of democratic rights.
4) Critics have argued that Rawls has not offered a realistic utopia as he had claimed.
His account is neither sufficiently realistic, nor utopian. Also, he has sacrificed full
justice for wider agreement.