Loloy Unduran, Et Al. v. Ramon Aberasturi, Et Al.
Loloy Unduran, Et Al. v. Ramon Aberasturi, Et Al.
Loloy Unduran, Et Al. v. Ramon Aberasturi, Et Al.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. A court of general
jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In
contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction
expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling
statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised
only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an
administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. Given that the provisions of the
enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers
that an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency, it is apt to
underscore the provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IP groups to the NCIP, as the primary government agency responsible for the recognition of
their ancestral domain and rights thereto.
Facts:
This was a resolution to the Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by the petitioners. In a Decision dated 20
October 2015, the Supreme Court denied the Petition and affirmed that the RTC has the primary jurisdiction over
the action/complaint filed by the respondents before the RTC, and not the NCIP. The case emanated from a
complaint for accion reivindicatoria filed by the respondents. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case,
hence were declared in default for their failure to submit an Answer, as required by the court.
In the present MR, the petitioners contended that the that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations of the complaint, admits of exceptions and can be relaxed in view of the special and unique
circumstances obtaining this case, i.e., the actual issue, as shown by their motion to dismiss, involves a conflicting
claim over an ancestral domain.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has the jurisdiction over properties involving ancestral land.
Ruling
YES. The Supreme Court maintained that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to
claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such
claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper
regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
To begin with, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. A court of general
jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast,
a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly
delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which
could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special
jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute.
After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein that expressly or
impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. What the Court finds instead is
that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed
under Section 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof.
Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with the
regular courts, the Court will now expound on the NCIP's primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether the
parties are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely: (1) adverse claims and border disputes
arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands,(2) cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs, and (3)
disputes and violations of iCCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.
After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein that expressly or
impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. What the Court finds instead is
that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed
under Section 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof.
Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with the
regular courts, the Court will now expound on the NCIP's primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether
the parties are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely: (1) adverse claims and border
disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands,(2) cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs,
and (3) disputes and violations ofiCCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative
body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. Given that the provisions of the enabling statute
are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency, it is apt to underscore the
provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IP
groups to the NCIP, as the primary government agency responsible for the recognition of their ancestral domain
and rights thereto.
xxx the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over those cases indicated in IPRA Law even if one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved
in said cases demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience,
and services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. No less than the IPRA states that
the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies,
plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their
ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto, with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and
institutions. At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that the NCIP's decision shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
NCIP has only primary jurisdiction over disputes among ICCs/IPs as above-stated, but it has no exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the subject instances, as contended by the petitioners.