Hazid Hazop Sil PPT - Rev1.1

Tunisia Tataouine Gas Project
HAZID/HAZOP/SIL Workshop
Tunisia Tataouine Gas
Project
HAZID HAZOP, SIL Determination Workshops

Agenda
 Introduction
 HAZID
 HAZOP
 SIL
Introduction
 Safety Briefing
 Safety Moment
 Project Manager Speech
 Team Introduction
 Overall Schedule
4
Safety Briefing
5
EMERGENCY ESCAPE ROUTE FROM MEETING ROOM
If fire alarm sound or earthquake happen

during the meeting:
Follow the guidance of the hotel staff. Don’t
push and stay in order.
Immediately escape, don’t head to your
bedroom for taking “important” issue, which
should be never more important than your
life.
Keep your head in low level if there’s smoke
in the escape stairwells.
Head to muster point outside of the building.
Safety Moment:
What does the
coronavirus do to your
body?
About coronaviruses
The natural reservoir for coronaviruses is thought
to be animal hosts.
New strains emerge from this reservoir, infect an
'intermediate' host, and from there infect people.
The viruses may then be capable of being
transmitted from one person to another.
Some are efficient at human-to-human
transmission, while others are not.
8
Most cases are mild. Symptoms start like
many other illnesses and include:
Symptoms of COVID-19
Symptoms may appear as
early as one day after
exposure but may take as
long as 14 days. Monitor Fever Sore Cough
your health. throat
Some patients may not

show any symptoms.
Severe disease can occur
in people with underlying
conditions like diabetes Shortness Muscle
and high blood pressure. of breath aches Diarrhea
Seek immediate medical attention if

you think you have been exposed or
develop symptoms 9
How is it spread?
Investigations are ongoing
Most people are infected by other people.
It probably spreads the same way as cold and
flu – through droplets which are created when
we talk, cough and sneeze.
People can get infected when these droplets
enter the nose, eyes or mouth.
Touching contaminated objects puts the
droplets onto your hands. If you touch your
face the droplets can then enter your nose /
eyes / mouth. • Stay home if you are sick.
• Cover your coughs and sneezes.
10
Other modes of spread
Travellers brought the virus into other
countries. Some people who were in
contact with these travellers also got
infected.
Like other coronaviruses, originally the
virus probably spread from a
“reservoir” in animals in the Wuhan live
animal market, to people.
Some other coronaviruses have spread
through feces, and COVID-19 might also
spread this way.
11
How is it diagnosed and treated?
As symptoms resemble other illnesses, tests are
needed to confirm diagnosis – blood test and
throat swab.
There is no specific treatment.
Patients receive supportive care to relieve
symptoms and prevent complications.
Severe cases require hospitalization.
No specific antiviral therapy.
No vaccine.
12
Prevention
Avoid potential exposure. Ensure good hygiene measures and safe food practices.
Maintain good personal hygiene Keep some

• Wash your hands frequently with soap and water. distance from
• Use alcohol-based hand sanitizer when soap and water are people who are
not readily available. obviously sick –
• Cover your coughs and sneezes.
• Avoid touching your face (eyes, nose and mouth).
don’t let them cough
or sneeze on you. Do
not share food, drinks
and personal items.
Avoid activities
where you are likely
to be exposed to
large groups of
people.
13
Project Manager Speech
& Team Introduction
14
Overall Schedule
Overall Schedule
Workshop Schedule
HAZard IDentification 15 September 2020 – 16 September 2020
HAZard and OPerability 17 September 2020 – 18 September 2020
21 September 2020 – 23 September 2020

SIL Classification 24 September 2020 – 25 September 2020
HAZID Review
17
HAZID Review – Objectives
 Identification of all foreseeable hazards associated with the facilities that can potentially
impact safety, environment, asset and reputation.
 Identification of potential causes and consequences associated with the hazards;
 Identification of safeguards (engineering or operational controls) that are in place to prevent
the causes or mitigate the consequences of the identified hazards;
 Identification of any recommendations required to reduce the risk, if the controls and
safeguards are found to be insufficient to prevent or mitigate the consequence of the hazard
and demonstrate As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
18
HAZID Review – Approach
19
HAZID Review – Guidewords (Typical)
Hazards Category Guidewords
External and Environmental Hazards Natural Hazards Extreme Weather including high temperature,
very low temperature, high wind speed,
extreme fog levels
Lightning
Seismic Activity
Sand Storm
Erosion
Corrosion
Subsidence
External & third-party Hazards Terrorist Activity
Third Party Activities
Social Movements
Main Gate Blocking
Helicopter/ Aircraft Crash / Vehicle Crash
Environmental Issues Continuous facility discharge to soil/water/air
High noise level
Toxic release
20
HAZID Review – Guidewords (Typical)
Facility Hazards Fire and Explosion Hazards Stored Flammable
Sources of Ignition
Smoke ingress
Gas ingress
Hydrocarbon release
Equipment Layout
Fire Protection and Response
Operator Protection
21
HAZID Review – Guidewords (Typical) cont’
Facility Hazards Process Hazards Inventory
Toxic Substances
Cold Fluids
Hot/ Cold Surfaces
Utility Systems Failure of Firewater Systems
Failure of Fuel Gas
Failure of Heating Medium
Failure of Diesel Fuel
Failure of Power Supply
Failure of Steam
Failure of Drains
Failure of Inert Gas
Failure of Waste Storage and Treatment
Failure of Chemical/fuel Storage
Failure of Potable Water
Failure of Sewerage
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Facility Hazards Maintenance Hazards Access Requirements
Bypasses Required
Commonality of Equipment
Heavy Lifting Requirements
Transport
Adequate Lighting
Construction/ Existing Facilities Tie-ins (shutdown requirements)
Common Equipment Capacity
Interface - Shutdown/blowdown/ ESD
Dropped objects
Skid Dimensions (weight handling)
Equipment (congestion)
Others Others Contagious Diseases/ Epidemic
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Subsea Pipeline Free span
Crossing
Seabed/Slope/Land slide
Installation
Internal Corrosion
External Corrosion
Anchor drag and drop
Fishing boats and trawl nets
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HAZID Review – Worksheet
25
HAZID Review – Nodes
Node No. Node Description
1 General, including External and Environmental Hazards
2 Administration area
Include:
-Administration area
-Water well area
3 Utilities area
Include:
-Ware House
-Workshop
-Laboratory
-Electrical room
-Control room
-Instrument air and nitrogen system
-Fire water pumping station
26
4 Process area
Include:
-GTPT-X-410-01 area
-Raw gas separation area
-Mercury removal area
-Sale gas compressor
-Raw gas booster compressor
-Receiving facilities
-Fuel gas system
-Regeneration area
-Methanol injection package
-Gas dew point area
-De-C2 process
-De-C3 process
-De-C4 process
-Condensate stabilization
-Oily water treatment 27
5 Storage, metering and loading
Include:
-Tank Storage area
-LPG Truck Loading Station
-Condensate Loading Station
-Bottling area
-Metering and loading station
6 Flare Area
Include:
-Flare system
-Oily Water Treatment
28
29
HAZID Review – Schedule
Workshop Schedule
Tunis Time Beijing Time
8:00am 3:00pm Arrival of participants
Start of Session - safety briefing, team introduction and introduction to
8:15 am 3:15pm workshop methodology Note 1
8:45am 3:45pm Begin Workshop
9:50am 4:50pm Morning coffee/ tea break
10:00am 5:00pm Continue Workshop
11:30pm 6:30pm Lunch break / Supper
12:00pm 7:00pm Continue Workshop
1:30pm 8:30pm Coffee / tea break
3:00pm 10.00pm End Session
Note: Applicable only for Day 1 of each separate workshop. Workshop which will continue on the subsequent day
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will commence at 8:00am.
HAZID Review – Schedule
Workshop Schedule Node
Day 1 Moring Briefing, Node 1 General, including External and Environmental Hazards
Node 2 Administration area
Afternoon Node 3 Utilities area
Day 2 Moring Node 4 Process area
Node 5 Storage, metering and loading
Afternoon Node 6 Venting and firefighting
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HAZOP Review
32
HAZOP Review – Objectives
 Identify potential deviations from normal operating conditions that will cause hazardous
events or operability issues associated with the design;
 Assess the consequences of the identified deviations/ hazards and operability concerns;
 Identify safeguards that are in place to prevent the causes or mitigate against the hazards and
operability issues; and
 Evaluate the adequacy of the safeguards in place and identify actions where existing
safeguards are found to be inadequate
33
HAZOP Review – Approach
34
HAZOP Review – Guidewords (Typical)
Guidewords for Review of Pipeline Guidewords for Review of Process Vessel
No Flow High Level/ Overflow
Low Flow Low Level/ Empty
High Flow
Reverse Flow
Mis-directed Flow
High Pressure
Low Pressure
High Temperature
Low Temperature
Change of Phase
Wrong Concentration/ Contamination
Operation
General Comment
35
HAZOP Review – Definition of Primary Guidewords
Guidewords Definition
No or Not Complete negation of the design intent
More Quantitative increase
Less Quantitative decrease
Reverse Logical opposite of the design intent
As Well As Note 1 Qualitative modification / increase
Part of Note 1 Qualitative modification / decrease
Other than Note 1 Complete substitution
Notes:
1. For better understanding of the deviation by using primary guidewords and secondary words and assist the
discussion during HAZOP study, the guidewords (after combination of primary and secondary guidewords) are
phrased using process languages, such as:
a. Mis-directed flow = Other than + Flow
b. Wrong concentration = As well as / Part of + Concentration 36
HAZOP Review – Definition of Guidewords
Guidewords Definition
No/Low Flow Identifies the causes for increment, reduction, reverse and wrong flow direction in
High Flow the node.
Reverse Flow
Mis-directed Flow
High Level/ Overflow Identifies the causes for increment or reduction of liquid level in the node.
Low Level/ Empty
Low Pressure Identifies the causes for over pressurization or loss of pressure in the node.
High Temperature
High Temperature Identifies the causes for overheating, loss of heating/tracing, low/high environment
Low Temperature temperature, etc in the nodes.
Change of Phase Identifies the causes of condensate formation, flashing of liquids
Wrong Concentration/ Identifies the causes for wrong composition, low/high concentration of a
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Contamination composition or ingress of foreign materials.
HAZOP Review – Definition of Guidewords (cont’)
Primary
Definition
Guidewords
Operation Identifies all the operation related issues, which include various stage of operation and
activities, such as:
- Start-up/ commissioning
- Shutdown
- Electrical / ignition
- Utilities requirements
- Maintenance - Testing / Isolation Requirements
- Sampling requirements
General Comment Overall comments which may be relevant to the entire node and on top of the discussion
above.
38
HAZOP Review – Worksheet
39
HAZOP Review – Assumptions
 The intent of a HAZOP is to identify hazards and significant operability problems associated
only with abnormal operations. The study is not a design review and as such the focus is on
abnormal modes of operation;
 This HAZOP will focus on main hazard and operability issues only;
 In case of two (2) or more similar trains or equipment of a system, only one (1) train will be
assessed during the review. The relevant recommendations raised for a typical train/
equipment shall be applicable for the other similar trains/ equipment;
 The HAZOP review analyses deviations within the Node but causes or consequences can be
anywhere, i.e. within the node, upstream and/or downstream of the node;
 Double-jeopardy events will not be considered unless it is reasonable to assume that a process
condition or failure could be in place and undetected between periods of regular maintenance;
 Consequences shall be considered without safeguards;
40
HAZOP Review – Assumptions (cont’)
 All spectacle blinds are considered to be in the position shown on P&IDs;
 Equipment/component within vendor package will not be reviewed in this stage, e.g. Nitrogen
Generation package and Nitrogen Compressor package will be considered as a box and only
interface will be reviewed.
 With the exception of valves in routine use or critical operating procedures, all manual valves
are considered to be in the position shown on Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and
inadvertent movement of these valves will not be considered. Assumed that the operator is
trained to follow procedures as written; and
 Locked Open/Car Seal Open or Locked Closed/Car Seal Closed (LO/CSO or LC/CSC) valves are
considered as such and the frequency for inadvertent movement is very low. These cases will
not be considered in this HAZOP review, unless specific concerns are raised.
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HAZOP Review – Nodes
No. Node Node Description
1 Raw Gas Inlet Raw gas from TBL will be received at the inlet separation unit. The pressure of the raw
Separation gas is 29 barg and the temperature is 16.1～27℃. The slug from TBL will be separated
though slug catcher,
the slug volume for design is 10 m3 with a pigging frequency of 6 month. The slug
catcher is horizontal 3-phase separator. After separating, filtering and heat exchanging
the raw gas is sent to the Raw Gas Booster Compressor.
2 Raw Gas The raw gas is compressed to 65 barg by the booster compressor and cooled to 57.5 ℃
Booster by air cooler.
Compressor
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3 Gas Three molecular-sieve columns will be set in the Gas dehydration unit. This system is
Dehydration complex with numerous switching valves working in unison for each section of the
dehydration/ regeneration process. Molecular sieves adsorb water at moderate
temperatures and then release water at high temperatures thereby allowing
regeneration. The 10% volume of the treated gas is the regeneration gas, and the
temperature of regeneration gas will be 290℃, which is heated by hot oil.
4 Mercury The dry gas with water dew point below 80 ppm will be routed to the Mercury removal
Removal bed, which is activated carbon type. The mercury will be removed from 100 ng/m3 to
less than 10 ng/m3. The gas will enter the Gas dew pointing unit after pass through the
dust filter.
43
5 Gas Dew The natural gas enters the Raw Gas Exchanger, and is cooled to about -25.5 ℃. The
Pointing cooled gas enters the Low Temperature Separator for gas-liquid separation. The liquid
returns to Raw Gas
Exchanger and enters the middle of the deethanizer. The top gas of Low Temperature
Separator enters the expander end of the Expander-Compressor expanded to about 23.2
barg and the temperature drop to about -63 ℃. The expanded gas goes into bottom of
the Absorber, and top gas of the Absorber goes into the Raw Gas Exchanger reheated
and then goes to the compressor end of the Expander-Compressor and is compressed
from about 22 barg to 28 barg. The liquid at the bottom of the Absorber is boosted by
the Absorber Bottom Booster Pump, which is reheated by the Raw Gas Exchanger and
enters the top of the Deethanizer.
The top gas of the Deethanizer enters the Raw Gas Exchanger and cooled from about -9
℃ to -65 ℃, then enters the top of the Absorber as a reflux for heat and mass transfer
with the expanded
gas. The heavy hydrocarbon in the expanded gas phase is absorbed into the reflux and
the light hydrocarbon in the reflux is vaporized into the expanded gas phase.
44
6 De-ethanization The C2+ riched gas is produced from the top of the Deethanizer, the mixed liquid of
propane and above (C3+) is produced at the bottom of the Deethanizer, the mole
fraction of ethane is not more than 2% to meet the quality of Butapro. The C2+ riched
gas from the top of Deethanizer enters the Raw Gas Exchanger, and then goes to the
Absorber after being cooled.
Bottom liquid is propane and above (C3+), flows to the kettle reboiler. The reboiler
temperature is about 90.2 ℃. Necessary vapour flow for the Deethanizer is generated
heated by the hot oil in the tube side.
7 Sale Gas The dried gas from the Turbo expander-compressor will be boosted to 76 barg by the
Compressor sales gas compressor and cooled to 57.5°C by air cooler. The sales gas will be exported to
STEG, where the pressure is 75 barg (at the STEG delivering point).
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8 De- The vapour from the depropanizer is condensed by an air cooler to 57.5°C. The
propanization condensed liquid, propane, flows to the Depropanizer Reflux Drum from there which of
it is pumped and refluxed back to the Depropanizer.
Another part of the condensed liquid is pumped to the Propane Product Cooler as
propane product, where exchanges heat with the raw gas and transports to Propane
Storage Tanks under levelcontrol of Depropanizer Reflux Drum.
9 De-butanization The bottom liquid of the depropanizer enters the debutanizer and the top vapor of the
debutanizer is totally condensed by the Debutanizer Air Cooler.
The liquid from column bottom flows to the kettle reboiler, and is heated by hot oil on
the tube side.
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10 Condensate Unstabilized condensate from the Debutanizer enters the Condensate Stabilization
Stabilization Column. The top vapor is totally condensed by the Stabilization Column Air Cooler. The
condenser temperature is 57.5 °C.
The condensed liquid is pentane. It flows to the Stabilization Column Reflux Drum and a
part of it pumped and refluxed back to the Condensate Stabilization Column. Another
part of the condensed liquid is pumped to the Pentane Storage Tanks as pentane
product under level control of Stabilization Column Reflux Drum.
Bottom liquid is stabilized condensate, which flows to the kettle reboiler. The reboiler
temperature is about 89.6 ℃. Necessary vapour flow for the Condensate Stabilization
Column is generated and heated by the hot oil in the tube side.
The stabilized condensate in bottom of Stabilization Column Reboiler enters to the
Condensate Product Air Cooler where is cooled to 57.5°C and is transported to
Condensate Storage Tanks.
47
11 Pentane Pentane storage, metering and loading.

Storage Tank
12 Condensate Condensate storage, metering and loading.
Storage Tank
13 Propane Storage Propane storage, metering and loading.
Tank
14 Butane Storage Butane storage, metering and loading.
Tank
15 Butapro Storage Butapro storage, metering and loading.
Tank
48
16 Flare System Collecting low pressure vents and reliefs from the low pressure vessels, tanks, etc.
The inlet gas stream and liquid processing streams have warm hydrocarbon streams
operating at medium to high pressure. A Warm HP Flare operating at ~5 barg will accept
flows from all these users whilst reducing the flare header size for the high capacity
reliefs and blow downs.
Collecting high pressure low temperature vents and reliefs from the chilling package,
absorber and deethanizer, etc.
17 Fuel Gas System Providing fuel gas for the related system
18 Closed Drain Collecting the drain of the whole facility

System
49
19 Butane Storage The instrument and service air come from the air compressor, the air will be pre-filtered
Tank and will be boosted to 10barg, and then the air will be dehydrated by absorber.
The service air is used for surging of equipment and pipes and will not be dehydrated.
The service air is stored in the service buffer drum and the operating pressure is from 10
barg to 5 barg.
The nitrogen will be produced by process of “Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA)” which
adsorption and regeneration are switched automatically.
20 Oily Water Oily water drains shall be collected to an underground sump and pumped to the CPI for
System treatment. The treated effluent from separator shall discharge into the evaporation
pond.
21 Hot Oil and Hot oil will be used as heating medium for process units including High Temperature
Waste heat system and Low Temperature system. The design temperature of supply oil and return
recovery System oil is 315/285 ℃ for High Temperature system and 170/140 ℃ for Low Temperature
system.
Each gas Engine generator will be equipped with 1 set waste heat recovery unit. In
normal operation, the hot oil shall be heated by waste heat recovery units as priority 50
heating source.
HAZOP Review – Schedule
Workshop Schedule
51
Day 1 Moring Briefing, Node 1 Raw Gas Inlet Separation
Afternoon Node 2 Raw Gas Booster Compressor
Day 2 Moring Node 3 Gas Dehydration
Afternoon Node 4 Mercury Removal
Day 3 Moring Node 5 Gas Dew Pointing
Afternoon Node 6 De-C2 unit
Moring Node 7 Sale Gas compressor
Day 4
Node 8 De-C3 unit
Node 9 De-C4 unit
Afternoon Node 10 Condensate Stabilization
52
Moring Node 11 Pentane Storage Tank
Node 12 Condensate Storage Tank
Day 5 Node 13 Propane Storage Tank
Node 14 Butane Storage Tank
Node 15 Butapro Storage Tank
Node 16 Flare system
Node 17 Fuel Gas system
Node 18 Closed Drain System
Node 19 Instrument Air and Nitrogen System
Node 20 Oily Water System
Afternoon Node 21 Hot Oil and waste heat recovery system
53
SIL Classification
54
SIL Classification – Objectives
 Identify the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) for all Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
within the facilities;
 Systematically assess and determine the required Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the identified
SIFs;
 Evaluate the criticality of the SIF with regards to safeguarding: personnel, environment and the
facility itself, by taking into consideration of the other available protection layers; and
 Propose additional or improved protection layers, if necessary.
55
SIL Classification – Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Approach
56
SIL Classification – Target Mitigated Event Likelihood (TMEL)
Severity Level Target Mitigated Event Likelihood (per year) for Health & Safety and Environment, Financial
5 1E-05
4 1E-04
3 1E-03
2 1E-02
1 1E-01
57
Risk Assessment Matrix
58
Severity Level Definition
Consequence Category
Severity Level Health & Safety Environment Financial Reputation
(H&S) (ENV) (FIN) (REP)
5 Fatality-death/ National / international TND 10M+ International public attention.
permanent disability impact Negative attention from national
or total inability to and international media.
work
4 Injury / Major Regional impact TND 100K-10M Public concern at the regional
Disease-illness level. Large negative attention
from local media
3 Injury / Serious Limited local impact TND 10K-100K Some local public complaints,
Illness (4 to 100 days weak attention of the local
off days) media.
2 Injury / slight Illness Minimal local impact TND <10K Minor complaint from local
(days off 1 day to 3 stakeholders unlikely to attract
days) media attention.
1 No injury / sickness No environmental risks No damage No complaints from the public 59
(days off <1 day)
Likelihood Definition
Likelihood Description Frequency (per year)
5 Happened more than once a year in a specific location >= 0.1
4 Happened more than once a year in the company 0.01 – 0.1
3 Incident happened in the company 0.001 – 0.01
2 Heard of in the oil industry 0.0001 – 0.001
1 Never heard of in the industry < 0.0001
60
Risk Criteria
Risk Level Definition
Risk level I: Criticality from 1 to 6 Low risk (negligible / tolerable)
Risk level II: Criticality from 7 to 12 Medium risk (ALARP, reduce to the minimum possible)
Risk level III: Criticality from 13 to 25 High risk (intolerable, significant and urgent actions)
61
SIL Classification – Frequency and Probability Data
Initiating Event Basis
BPCS Control Loop Failure 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.1.
Pressure regulator failure 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015) [Ref. 5], Data Table 4.6.
SDV (Ball Valve) spurious operation 4.0E-02 OREDA.

Operator error (routine task > 1/month, 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.4.
< 1/week)
Operator error (non-routine tasks) 1.0E-02 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.5.
Pump seal failure 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.14.
Cooling Fan Failure 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.9.
Dual diverse check valves failure 1.0E-02 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.12.
Premature opening of spring-loaded 1.0E-02 CCPS (2015) [Ref. 5], Data Table 4.16
relief valve
Rotating equipment (pump) failure 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 4.9.
Other Initiating Events Per LOPA team experience 62
SIL Classification – Frequency and Probability Data
Operation Frequency Major Process 97%

Truck loading operation frequency On hold
Pentane truck loading On hold
Condensate truck loading On hold
Propane truck loading On hold
Butane truck loading On hold
Butapro truck loading On hold
63
SIL Classification – Frequency and Probability Data (cont’)
Conditional Modifier Basis
Probability of Ignition
No Reduction 1.0E+00 -
Gas LPG release at process area-outdoor 3.75E-01 OGP 434-6 [Ref. 7], Scenario 8, Gas, LPG release at large gas plant (Plant
Leak rate: 150kg/s @ RAW Gas 8” inlet area above 1200 m2, site area above 35,000 m2).
line rupture
Gas LPG release at process area-indoor 6.5E-01 OGP 434-6 [Ref. 7], Scenario 11, Gas, LPG release at large confined or
Leak rate: 200kg/s @ SALES Gas 6” congested onshore plant (Releases of flammable gases, vapour or
outline rupture liquids significantly above their normal (NAP) boiling point from large
onshore plants (plant area above 1200 m2, site area above 35,000 m2),
where the plant is partially walled/ roofed or within a shelter or very
congested.
Condensate tank overflow 1.2E-01 OGP 434-6 [Ref. 7], Scenario 9, Liquid release at large gas plant (Plant
Liquid release area above 1200 m2, site area above 35,000 m2).
Frequency Modifier
Personnel exposure at process area 1.0E+00 100%
Personnel exposure at loading area 3.0E-01 30% 64
Protection Layer Basis
Basic Process Control System
No Process Control 1.0E+00 -
BPCS 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.12.
Operator Response
No Operator Response 1.0E+00 -
Operator Response
Trained and competent operator
Enough response time > Process Safety time 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.46.
PST > 10 min CCR intervention or
PST > 30 min site intervention
65
SIS
No SIS Available 1.0E+00 -
SIL 1 dangerous failure 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.14.
Process Design
Not relevant 1.0E+00 -
Loss of containment is not considered credible based on

design pressure/design temperature 00E+00 allowable accumulation pressure when protection is
provided by multiple relief devices.
66
Relief Devices
No Mitigation 1.0E+00 -
Relief Valve (100%, Clean Service/Plug with
1.0E-02 CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.15.
purge facility)
Relief Valve (2x50%, Clean Service) 2.0E-02 2 nos of Relief Valve from CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.15.
Relief Valve (3x33.3%, Clean Service) 3.0E-02 3 nos of Relief Valve from CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.15.
Rupture disc/ Buckling Pin 1.0E-02 CCPS (2015) , Data Table 5.19.
67
SIL Classification – SIL Rating
Probability of Failure on Demand, PFD
SIL Rating
High (or Continuous) Demand Modes of Operation Low Demand Mode of Operation
1 < 10-5 to 10-6 < 10-1 to 10-2
2 < 10-6 to 10-7 < 10-2 to 10-3
3 < 10-7 to 10-8 < 10-3 to 10-4
4 < 10-8 to 10-9 < 10-4 to 10-5
68
SIL Classification – Worksheet
69
SIL Classification – Assumptions
 The SIF associated with only one (1) train will be assessed for two (2) or more identical trains
or equipment;
 No credit will be given for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) during the evaluation of
whether personnel is able to avert danger;
 No credit will be given to a process alarm provided to alert an operator to respond unless the
process safety time is justified to be sufficient for successful operator intervention; and
 No credit will be assigned to a Basic Process Control System (BPCS) function if failure of the
BPCS function will cause a demand on the particular SIF.
70
SIL Classification – Schedule
Workshop Schedule
71
Workshop Ground Rules
72
Ground Rules
• Every idea is a good one. Feel free to ask, there is no “Stupid question”.
• Be active, ask questions, you are the experts, everybody’s contribution is important.
• Facilitator’s main role 1: encourage/promote/ask questions
• Avoid discussing solutions in detail.
• Be focused; remember the purpose of the meeting

• Facilitator’s main role 2: stop lengthy solution discussions
• Clearly statement
• Short question or answer, no need to introduce the background, stories

• Facilitator’s main role 3: decide when to conclude the discussions
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Ground Rules
• Only one English meeting, no French discussion and no Chinese discussion
• Do not assume
• Please turn off mobile phones or switch to SILENT mode.
• Be patient with the person recording
• One conversation at a time – only have one person talking at a time
• Speak loudly and slowly to make sure everyone can hear about you
• Listen to what others have to say without criticism.
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&
DISCLAIMER
This presentation has been prepared by a representative of Worley.
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Hazid Hazop Sil PPT - Rev1.1

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Tunisia Tataouine Gas Project

HAZID HAZOP, SIL Determination Workshops

If fire alarm sound or earthquake happen

Some patients may not

Seek immediate medical attention if

Maintain good personal hygiene Keep some

21 September 2020 – 23 September 2020

11 Pentane Pentane storage, metering and loading.

18 Closed Drain Collecting the drain of the whole facility

5 Happened more than once a year in a specific location >= 0.1

4 Happened more than once a year in the company 0.01 – 0.1

3 Incident happened in the company 0.001 – 0.01

2 Heard of in the oil industry 0.0001 – 0.001

1 Never heard of in the industry < 0.0001

Risk Level Definition

Risk level I: Criticality from 1 to 6 Low risk (negligible / tolerable)

SDV (Ball Valve) spurious operation 4.0E-02 OREDA.

Operation Frequency Major Process 97%

Basic Process Control System

No Process Control 1.0E+00 -

BPCS 1.0E-01 CCPS (2015), Data Table 5.12.

No Operator Response 1.0E+00 -

Loss of containment is not considered credible based on

• Be focused; remember the purpose of the meeting

• Short question or answer, no need to introduce the background, stories

• Please turn off mobile phones or switch to SILENT mode.

• Be patient with the person recording

• One conversation at a time – only have one person talking at a time

• Listen to what others have to say without criticism.

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