The Revocability of Licenses As Applied To Property in Land
The Revocability of Licenses As Applied To Property in Land
The Revocability of Licenses As Applied To Property in Land
1919
Recommended Citation
Harno, Albert J. (1919) "The Revocability of Licenses as Applied to Property in Land," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol7/iss1/2
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IKenturky i[aW 3ournaI
VOL. VII. LEXINGTON, KY., MARCH, 1919. NO. I
could be made to answer for it in tort. But does A have the power
to revoke B's privilege? There was no deed to pass title, nor was
there a contract, nor, from the facts stated, can the doctrine of
equitable estoppel be brought to bear. A, therefore, is under no
legal or equitable duty toward B, and B has no right against A
if A revokes the privilege. In other words, A has the power to re-
4
voke B's privilege, and if revoked a duty is created in B to stay off.
Should B now enter the laud, his privilege having been" revoked
A has the same affirmative right against him as he would have
against X, Y or any one else who enters upon the land without per-
mission. For such entry A may sue B as a trespasser.5
Should we now change the facts to a case where A has given
B the privilege of entering upon A's land, and not only that, but
also has permitted B to erect valuable improvements upon it, and
has stood by while B has spent sums of money on the land, would
the same result, as above, follow? In other words, under these cir-
cumstances, does A still have the power of revocation? As in the
previous case there is no writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Nor is there a contract. Many courts in passing upon this question
have held that this again is but a "revocable license." In a New
York case6 the court in the course of its opinion said:
"There has been much contrariety of decision in the courts of
different states and jurisdictions. But the courts in this state have
upheld with great steadiness the general rule that a parol license
to do an act on the land of the licensor, while it justifies anything
done by the licensee before revocation, is, nevertheless, revocable
at the option of the' licensor, and this although the intention was
to conftr a continuing right and money had been expended by the
licensee on the faith of the license." 7
8streator Ind. Tel. Co. v. Interstate Ind. Tel. Co. (1908), 142 I1. App. 183, 194.
And see in accord: Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Co. (1901), 133 Ala. 411; Hodgkins
v. Farrington (1889), 150 Mass. 19; Johnson v. Stillman (1582), 29 Minn. 95; Foster
v. Browning (185), 4 R. I. 47.
9"The distinction is obvious. Licenses to do a particular act do not in any
degree trench upon the policy of the law which requires bargains respecting the
title or interest in real estate shall be by deed or in writing. They amount
to nothing more than an excuse for the act, which would otherwise be a tres-
pass." Cook v. Stearns (1814), 11 Mass. 533.
"Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. 11y. Co. (1892), 51 Minn. 304.
Revocability of Licenses as Applied to Property in Land. 5
""The English Judicature Act of 1873, already quoted, after uniting all the
higher tribunals into one Supreme Court of Judicature, enacts that, 'in every
civil cause or matter law and equity shall be concurrently administered' by this
court according to certain general rules; and that generally in all matters not
particularly mentioned in other provisions of the act, in which there is a
conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common
law, with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail: 36
& 37 Vict., Chap. 66, Sections 24, 25. This great reform which was inaugurated
by New York in 1848 has been adopted by the states of'Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana,
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, California,
Oregon, North Carolina, South Carolind, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, and
by the territories of Washington, Montana, Idaho, Dakota, Wyoming, Arizona,
Utah. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918), Sec. 40, note.
Revocability of Licenses as Applied to Property in Land. 9
-(1915), 1 XC.B. 1. And see the case of Taylor v. Waters (1816), 7 Taunt. 374,
decided before the case of Wood v. Leadbitter, supra.
14 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
license is unreasonably
30
revoked: a suggestion which surely no play-
goer would accept."
Changes occur; thought slowly progresses; one idea takes the
place of another, and viewpoints vary. It has been one of the sever-
est criticisms of the law that it has not kept abreast with events.
We are not ready to assert that the Statute of Frauds has had its
day and served its purpose. But when a portion of it is so applied
that it is absurd to believe such could ever have been intended by
its framers, and such portion hinders justice, courts should welcome
the opportunity to supplant it with principles of equity and reason.
30(1915), 31 Law Quarterly Review 9. Irving, J. A., in Barnswell v. National
Amusement Co., Ltd. (1915), 21 B. C. 435, 439: "It appears that the plaintiff
entered the building as a spectator who had only paid his money to see the
entertainment. He was therefore entitled to remain. Wood v. Leadbitter
* * * was decided on the ground that the plaintiff had not obtained an instru-
ment under seal granting him the privilege he claimed. But the Judicature Act
has changed all that. The court now gives effect to equitable considerations
and will protect a right in equity, which but for the absence of an instrument
under seal would be a right at law."
Note to Jackson & Sharp Co. v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co. (1871), 4 Del. Ch.
180, 195: "It (the privilege of a ticket holder) would seem to be just such a
privilege or authority as might properly be the subject of a license, and in
that view the objection to the recovery of the plaintiff in Wood v. Leadbitter
would rest, not upon the invalidify of the ticker considered as the grant of an
easement, but upon its revocability as a license. On this point Mr. Baron
Alderson held it revocable at the absolute pleasure of Lord Eglintoun even
though sold for a consideration because he considered that a license to enter
upon land was always revocable except when coupled with an interest in some-
thing upon the land created by grant or duly enacted otherwise than by the
license itself. This opinion is based mainly upon an early judgment by C. J.
Vaughan in Thomas v. Sorrell. * * * But C. J. Vaughan's general statement
of the most common and obvious ground on which a license to enter on land
becomes irrevocable can hardly be taken as sufficient authority to exclude all
other grounds; and certainly the doctrine of equitable estoppel is as clear a
ground for holding irrevocable a license to enter on land temporarily to wit-
ness races as is the right to the deer killed on the land under license to enter
and kill such deer. Laying out of consideration the Statute of Frauds as not
applying in either case, and if it applies to either it must to both, the ques-
tion depends simply upon the revocability of a license; and there is nothing
in the nature of a license to withdraw it from the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel, no more in a license to enter temporarily upon the land than a license
to do anything else, supposing the Statute of Frauds out of the way. Indeed
the cases put by C. J. Vaughan of a license to enter, coupled with an interest,
must, after all, be resolved by this doctrine of estoppel; being upon it,is not a
general right incident to property in the chattel, but it springs from the au-
thority given by the owner of the soil to kill the deer or-to place the chattel
there, which authority he cannot in good faith revoke to the prejudice of the
party who has acted upon it, supposing there be in such a. case no objection to the
validity of the license as passing an interest in land. And it is upon this prin-
ciple of equitable estoppel that in the later cases the irrevocability of a license
to enter on land is coupled with an interest in something upon it, has been
placed."
Compare Metts v. Charleston Theatre Co. (1916), 105 S. C. 19: Boswell v.
Barnum & Bailey (1916), 115 Tenn. 35; Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher (1909), 119 S. W.
(Ky.) 195.