595

Punishing Corrupt Officials in China*

Lin Zhu†

Abstract
China presents a mixed picture in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. On the
one hand, rampant corruption remains a huge challenge for the party-state
because it not only results in the loss of state assets but also damages the
legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, China’s record of curbing cor-
ruption is not particularly worse than other comparable countries. This
paper explains the reasons behind this mixed picture by focusing on the
anti-corruption strategy employed by the central Party authorities.
Effective anti-corruption measures are determined by the high probability
of detecting corrupt agents and the meting out of effective and warranted
punishment. In China, the central government is unable or unwilling to
investigate a large number of officials, especially high-ranking officials.
However, at the same time, it must impose severe punishment on convicted
high-ranking officials. Although this mode of selective discipline compro-
mises the credibility of the state in terms of anti-corruption efficacy, it
also creates uncertainty for corrupt agents because corrupt officials are
not guaranteed exemption.
Keywords: China; disciplining; corruption; officials; punishment

Both the party-state and general public widely acknowledge that there is rampant
corruption in China. Corruption has permeated all public sectors of the country,
breeding strong resentment among the general populace and undermining
the legitimacy of the Party.1 However, China does not seem to have fared
particularly worse than comparable countries in terms of the degree of corrup-
tion. For instance, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index released by
Transparency International, China has consistently scored higher than other
comparable countries in recent years: in 2012, China scored 39, higher than
India (36), Indonesia (32), Vietnam (31), and Russia (28).2 Over the years, the
Chinese party-state has punished a large number of corrupt officials, including

* Research for this article was supported with funding provided by the Fundamental Research Funds for the
Central Universities, the National Social Science Fund of China (funding grant 13&ZD011), and the “985
Project” at Sun Yat-sen University. The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and helpful suggestions
of Yongshun Cai and the anonymous reviewers. The author is responsible for any remaining errors.
†
Lin Zhu is assistant professor at the School of Government, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou.
Email: [email protected].
1 Gong 1997; Lü 2000; Manion 2004; Sun 2004; Wedeman 2012.
2 Data is from the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, available at: http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2012/results.

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 596 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

high-ranking leaders. From 2000 to 2005, for instance, more than 200,000 corrupt
public employees were disciplined, and some were executed.3 The various mea-
sures taken by corrupt agents to avoid punishment indicate that the punishment
meted out by the state to corrupt officials retains a certain degree of credibility.
The mixed picture of anti-corruption measures in China is related to the
approach employed by the Party authority. Effective anti-corruption is highly
conditional. As Susan Rose-Ackerman writes, the “deterrence of criminal behav-
ior depends on the probability of detection and punishment and on the penalties
imposed – both those imposed by the legal system and more subtle costs such as
loss of reputation or shame.”4 In other words, the timely investigation of corrupt
agents and the meting out of appropriate punishment are crucial for effectively
curbing corruption and enhancing the government’s anti-corruption reputation.
In authoritarian regimes, the anti-corruption efforts of the government can be
compromised because of its political calculations, which compound efforts to
detect and discipline corrupt agents. Authoritarian governments rely on their
agents for political support and policy implementation, and punishing corrupt
officials is costly owing to a variety of considerations, including faction politics,
patron–client relations, and the reliance of the state on agents for governance.
However, exempting corrupt officials only encourages more corruption.
Therefore, the state authority needs to strike a balance between tolerating and
punishing corrupt agents.
This paper explores how the Chinese party-state seeks to balance the cost of
punishment with the need to curb corruption. It focuses on how the Party has
attempted to enhance its credibility in terms of routing out corruption by exam-
ining the punitive measures it takes against those officials convicted of crimes.
Punishing convicted officials has important implications for anti-corruption
efforts because it demonstrates to others the consequences of being caught.
This study reports that when the Chinese party-state is unable or unwilling to
uncover more high-ranking corrupt officials, it tends to punish those who have
been caught and convicted more harshly. The party-state hopes to demonstrate
its political will to clamp down on corruption by showcasing severe punishment
for high-ranking officials.

Rationale for Punishing Corrupt Officials

Authoritarian governments face a dilemma when disciplining malfeasant agents,
including corrupt agents.5 On the one hand, the need for punishment is evident:
tolerating corrupt officials only encourages more corruption, which undermines
both the authority and legitimacy of the state. The malfeasance of government

3 The figures are calculated based on Supreme Procuratorate reports for various years. All these reports
are to be found in the Procuratorial Yearbook of China, various years.
4 Ackerman 1999, 52.
5 Cai and Zhu 2013.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 597

officials weakens the trust of citizens in their regime6 and provides the pretexts for
opposition forces to incite anti-government sentiments.7 In 1989, for instance, the
students in China used the issue of corruption to appeal to and mobilize their fel-
low citizens, legitimize a demonstration, and support the call for political reform
and democracy.8 On the other hand, punishing corrupt officials can be costly. In
an organizational setting, the use of discipline may demoralize disciplined agents
and cause agents to cease their support for the agency. Disciplined agents may
exhibit anxiety and aggressive acts or feelings towards the punishing agent.9
Depressed agents may reduce their productivity and contribution to the
organization.
The government incurs similar costs when it punishes corrupt officials. When
sanctions upset the agents, it is better to emphasize the role of education when
tackling corruption.10 Groenendijk argues that when the authority confronts cor-
rupt agents, it has to minimize not only the harm but also the cost of addressing
corruption.11 The authority needs to determine the extent to which corruption
will be reduced, the costliness of the policy, and the worth of the reduction,
compared to the direct and indirect costs of anti-corruption policies. An
anti-corruption campaign should not be pushed so far that its costs outweigh
the benefits, because it is not the sole outcome sought by the authority.
In authoritarian regimes, the government does not rely on electoral support to
stay in power and to rule. Instead, it relies on its agents for governance and pol-
itical support. Considering that corruption is a crime, an official can no longer
maintain a position of authority if he or she is convicted. In other words, the
investment of the state in the official will be wasted. In China, the state authority
acknowledges that the adoption of anti-corruption measures is to maintain
the well-being of the Party’s organs, and meting out punishment is not the ultim-
ate purpose. The state authority must rely mainly on education to deal with
the majority of cadres who have common problems: “It is not easy for a person
to become a cadre or for the Party to train a cadre. The Party cannot turn a per-
son into an official overnight. Instead, it takes much time, money, and energy to
do so.”12
Naturally, the costs are higher when the government punishes high-ranking
officials; however, tolerating corrupt high-ranking officials is more damaging
to the anti-corruption efforts of the Party. As a result, the Party’s approach to
dealing with corrupt high-ranking officials can better reveal its strategy for curb-
ing corruption.13

6 Mishler and Rose 2001; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Seligson 2006.
7 Sun 2001.
8 Østergaard and Persen 1991; Calhoun 1994; Hsu 2001.
9 Arvey and Ivancevich 1980.
10 Østergaard 1986.
11 Groenendijk 1997.
12 Li 2000, 5–7.
13 I appreciate the reminder from one reviewer that the CCP may not intentionally discipline corrupt

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 598 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

Dealing with corrupt high-ranking officials

In China, similar to elsewhere, more resources and time are generally required to
train high-ranking officials. My data suggest that it generally takes 27 years for a
person to be promoted to prefecture Party secretary, while it takes 26 years to be
mayor, and 36 years to reach provincial Party secretary or governor status.14
Moreover, high-ranking officials are very likely to have contributed to the
Party and state previously and form the key personnel of the state. Therefore,
they have accumulated more of what Hollander terms as “idiosyncrasy credits;”
that is, “an accumulation of positively disposed impressions residing in the per-
ceptions of relevant others; it is … the degree to which an individual may deviate
from the common expectancies of the group.”15 The deviations of high-status
people with more idiosyncrasy credits may be tolerated more than those of others
within their organizations.
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials administer various types of discip-
line based on the seriousness of the malfeasance: (1) Party discipline; (2) admin-
istrative discipline; (3) organizational discipline; and (4) legal punishment. The
severity of the discipline varies from inner-Party warnings to the death penalty.
Legal punishment is meted out when an official commits a criminal offence
and the other types of discipline are inadequate to deal with a crime of that
level.16 Party discipline is executed by the Party’s Discipline Inspection
Commission (DIC). Limited by the available data, this study mainly focuses
on cases which have received legal punishment.
Existing evidence seems to suggest that corrupt high-ranking officials are
less likely to be detected and/or investigated. First, corrupt high-ranking offi-
cials tend to have a longer period of latency (that is, the time span between
when an official commits their first act of corruption and when they are
detected). Yong Guo and Andrew Wedeman both use the latency period of
corruption as an indicator to approximate the likelihood of an official being
caught.17 Following this approach, I use data collected from the
Procuratorial Daily (Jiancha ribao 检察日报, see below) to construct both

footnote continued

officials and that the pattern of disciplining corrupt officials may merely be a policy outcome. As I am
unable to access the leader of the CCP or DIC for interviews on this, I examined DIC reports from
1997 to 2012. Out of the 21 reports reviewed, 18 emphasized dealing with key cases or high-level
officials; 10 emphasized the deterrent effect of key cases or of showing the centre’s determination
to combat corruption; and 6 discussed severely punishing high-level malfeasant officials. To a certain
extent, these official documents indicate the CCP’s intention to discipline corrupt officials, especially
those of high rank.
14 To calculate these figures, I collected the CVs of provincial leaders (both governors and Party secretar-
ies) from 1978 to 2010, and prefectural leaders (both governors and Party secretaries) from 1990 to 2011.
These figures are calculated based on the time taken by these leaders to reach the position of provincial
or prefectural leader from when they assumed their first position.
15 Hollander 1958.
16 Cai and Zhu 2013.
17 Guo 2008; Wedeman 2008.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 599

Figure 1: Latency Period of Officials of Different Ranks

Source:
Procuratorial Daily 1993–2010.

the latency period and the investigation period, which is the time span from
when the investigation begins to when a suspect is initially tried in court.
Figure 1 shows that both the latency and investigation periods increase
along with the rank of the official.
Other types of statistics likewise suggest that high-ranking officials are less likely
to be investigated and punished by the Party disciplining institution or to receive
legal punishment. For example, nationwide in 1996, only 2.5 per cent of the cases
concerning high-ranking officials (i.e. at the administrative level of county magis-
trate or higher) who were accused of corruption and reported ( jubao 举报) to the
DIC were investigated by the DIC, compared with 10.7 per cent of cases concern-
ing lower-ranking officials. Therefore, although reports of corruption involving
high-ranking officials accounted for 16.6 per cent of the total cases reported,
cases involving high-ranking officials only accounted for 4.4 per cent of the
total cases investigated.18 In Liaoning province from 1994 to 2000, the DIC dis-
ciplined approximately 7 per cent of the Party members (including officials and
non-officials) whose wrongdoings were reported. However, a variation was pre-
sented across officials of different ranks. Roughly 16 per cent of the Party mem-
bers who did not hold administrative positions were punished. Meanwhile, of
those who were disciplined and received punishment, 9 per cent were ordinary
cadres, approximately 5 per cent were officials at the level of township head, 3
per cent were officials at the administrative level of county head, and less than

18 Xinhua tongxun she 1997.

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 600 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

1 per cent were officials at the administrative rank of city mayor or higher.19
Moreover, high-ranking officials may be less likely to face legal punishment
after their cases are filed (li’an 立案) by the Procuratorate. According to the
Procuratorate’s annual report, of the cases filed by procuratorates against offi-
cials between 1993 and 2006, approximately 55 per cent of ordinary officials
were criminally penalized, as opposed to 23.5 per cent of senior officials at the
administrative rank of county magistrate or higher.20
When asked about the cause of the rampant corruption in China during an
interview, an official of a city discipline inspection committee responded that
“high-ranking officials are corrupt.” The challenge faced by the party-state is
that its credibility when dealing with corruption is determined by the resolve it
demonstrates in detecting and punishing corrupt officials, especially high-ranking
officials. Therefore, an important issue the Chinese party-state has to address in
terms of tackling corruption is how to deal with corrupt high-ranking officials.
This paper shows that when the party-state is unable or unwilling to uncover
more corrupt high-ranking officials, it must severely punish those high-ranking
officials who are convicted if it still hopes to contain corruption. In China, cor-
rupt high-ranking officials are directly investigated by the central or provincial
authority. The central government demonstrates its determination to curb cor-
ruption to lower-level government officials and the public by severely punishing
convicted officials. Tolerating high-ranking officials results in the “leakage of
authority” at the lower levels of the hierarchy. In Inside Bureaucracy, Anthony
Downs explains how the leakage of authority occurs as orders pass through
the levels of a political hierarchy: official A issues an order to B, but B’s own
goals indicate that his commands to his subordinate C should encompass only
90 per cent of what he believes official A actually has in mind. If C thinks in
the same manner, by the time A’s order reaches officials at level D, these officials
will receive commands that encompass only 81 per cent (90 per cent of 90 per
cent) of what A really intends.21 Such leakages cumulate when several levels
are involved, which can drastically impact the effectiveness of orders issued by
top-level officials.22 In agent management, the leakage of authority results in
the unprincipled tolerance of erring agents at lower levels.
To maximize the effect of punishing high-ranking officials, the government
likewise chooses to publicize such cases and make them high profile. Research
on crime deterrence suggests that highly publicized executions can significantly
reduce homicide cases.23 As Pogarsky suggests, “The formation of the threat per-
ception is central to deterrence and to the society’s ability in deterrence-oriented

19 Liaoning Discipline Inspection Committee and the Supervision Bureau 2005.

20 The figures are calculated based on Supreme Procuratorate reports for various years. See Procuratorial
Yearbook of China, various years. When a case is filed by the Procuratorate, it is also being investigated.
21 Downs 1994.
22 Tullock 1997.
23 King 1978; Bailey and Peterson 1989; Bailey 1990; Stack 1987; Phillips 1980; Phillips and Henlsey 1984;
Cochran and Chamlin 2000.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 601

criminal control.”24 Therefore, when a case attracts considerable public attention,

authorities are more likely to impose a severe punishment, sometimes to meet
the expectations of the public.25 In China, the investigation and punishment of
high-ranking officials are generally given a high profile by the media upon the
instruction or encouragement of the state authorities.
The Chinese party-state’s strategy of severely punishing high-ranking officials
is indicative of its need to balance the punishment against the cost involved.
Although this method of selective punishment compromises the value of the
punishment as a deterrent, it still creates uncertainty for state agents in the country.

Data
Researchers of corruption inevitably encounter the issue of whether the data used
are accurate or representative. Survey data on corruption generally measure the
perceptions of people instead of actual occurrences of corruption. Data released
by the government on corruption cases contain biases that arise from the cen-
sored disclosure of sensitive information; however, the public can only access
information on corrupt agents through government-sanctioned sources. This
study attempts to reduce the biases inherent in the government data used in
this research by collecting the data in a more systematic manner.
The Central Discipline Inspection Commission (Zhongyang jilü jiancha
weiyuanhui 中央纪律检查委员会) (CDIC) and the Supreme Procuratorate
both publish newspapers: News of China’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision
(Zhongguo jijian jiancha bao 中国纪检监察报) and Procuratorial Daily. However,
the CDIC’s newspaper, News of China’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision,
does not publicize corruption cases regularly and is not a good source for system-
atic data on corruption. In contrast, the Procuratorial Daily regularly reports on
corruption cases and serves as an accessible source of systematic data on corruption.
This study is based on the cases reported in this newspaper from 1993 to 2010.
According to Chinese criminal law, an act is defined as corrupt if it involves (1)
accepting or giving bribes; (2) embezzlement; (3) misappropriation; (4) failure to
explain the sources of a large amount of income; (5) concealment of deposits
abroad; (6) dividing state-owned assets; and (7) dividing confiscated property.
For the purposes of the research for this paper, the criterion for including a
case is whether a suspect is convicted of any of these crimes. Moreover, consider-
ing that this study focuses on the punishment of corrupt officials, the data includes
only civil servants and excludes staff members working in non-administrative
public institutions and state-owned enterprises. Finally, since this study is con-
cerned with legal punishment results, it only includes cases that receive criminal
sanctions; cases which were still “under investigation” at the end of 2010 have
been dropped.

24 Pogarsky 2009.
25 Carlsmith and Darley 2002; Carlsmith 2006.

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 602 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

Based on the above criteria, 2,946 cases were recorded, more than 80 per cent
of which occurred after 2000. The data apparently suggest that there were more
corruption cases in some central provinces, such as Anhui, Henan and Hubei,
and a few others in the east, such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang, than in north-western
provinces such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Qinghai. The data are only suggest-
ive of the potential difference in frequency across provinces.
This dataset covers the corruption cases that resulted in criminal penalties.
Thus, this paper only studies a portion of corruption cases, and does not inves-
tigate those cases resulting in Party or organizational discipline. Also, all the
cases in the dataset come from the Procuratorial Daily. Corruption cases not
reported on by this newspaper do not form part of this study. Needless to say,
the limited availability of data means that the findings in this study are explora-
tive rather than conclusive.

Empirical Analysis
As elsewhere, the punishment for a corrupt official in China is generally deter-
mined by the severity of his or her corruption, which is often measured by the
amount of money involved. In China, legal punishment for a convicted official
ranges from a fixed term of imprisonment to the death penalty. My purpose is
to examine the factors that affect the severity of the punishment imposed on con-
victed officials. Therefore, the dependent variable in the analysis is the type of
punishment. The modes or types of punishment are divided into the following
categories from less to more severe: (1) a fixed term of imprisonment; (2) life
imprisonment; (3) the death penalty with reprieve; and (4) the death penalty.
For analytical purposes, the latter three are treated as severe punishments. In
our data, 2,429 cases have information on the legal punishment meted out to con-
victed officials. Table 1 shows that most convicted officials (83 per cent) were
given a fixed term of imprisonment.

Independent variable
This study aims to examine the attitude of the government towards high-ranking
corrupt officials. Thus, it focuses on the relationship between the severity of the

Table 1: Types of Punishment

Punishment Frequency Per cent
Fixed term of imprisonment 2,017 83.04
Life imprisonment 207 8.52
Death penalty with reprieve 135 5.56
Death penalty 70 2.88
Total 2,429 100.00
Source:
Procuratorial Daily 1993–2010.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 603

Table 2: Distribution of Officials by Rank

Rank Rank Code Frequency Per cent
Staff and clerk 1 428 15.00
Deputy township head ( fu ke ji) 2 282 9.88
Township head (ke ji) 3 487 17.06
Deputy county head ( fu chu ji) 4 499 17.50
County head (chu ji) 5 547 19.17
Deputy prefecture mayor ( fu ting ji) 6 371 13.01
Prefecture mayor (ting ji) 7 157 5.50
Vice-governor ( fu bu ji) or higher 8 83 2.91
Total 2,854 100
Source:
Author’s data collected from the Procuratorial Daily 1993–2010.

punishment issued and the administrative rank of a convicted official. According

to Chinese civil service laws, there are 11 categories of administrative ranks for
civil servants. Such categories range from staff and clerk (the lowest) to national
leaders (the highest). The data collected show the number of corrupt officials in
the top three ranks to be very small, and they are therefore included in the admin-
istrative rank category of “vice-governor ( fu bu ji 副处级) or higher.” Thus, in
my analysis, officials are divided into eight categories (see Table 2). Of the
2,854 officials in the data with information about their ranks, those at the
administrative rank of township head (ke ji 科级) or lower account for approxi-
mately 42 per cent of convicted officials, whereas officials at the administrative
rank of vice-governor or higher constitute less than 3 per cent.

Control variables
In the empirical analysis, four sets of control variables are included. First, the
type and the magnitude of corruption are controlled for because the degree of
punishment for a corrupt agent is tied to the amount of money involved. In add-
ition, according to Chinese criminal law, bribery and embezzlement are more ser-
ious crimes than others, such as misappropriation, giving bribes and failing to
explain the sources of a large amount of income. Thus, the empirical analysis
includes both the type of corruption and its magnitude in terms of the amount
of money involved in each type of corruption.
Some officials may have also committed other crimes that can be divided into
three types. Type 1 crimes include dereliction of duty, abuse of power, and vio-
lating laws for personal gain. Type 2 crimes include introducing bribery and div-
iding public property. Type 3 crimes include sheltering criminals and illegally
keeping guns.
A second set of control variables includes the attitudes or attributes of corrupt
officials. They include (1) whether the corrupt official offers concessions, and (2)
whether the official is the major local leader (i.e. the Party secretary or the head

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 604 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables (N = 2377)

Variables Mean Standard Deviation
(10,000 yuan)
Amount of money accepted as bribe 116.2 497.0
Amount of money embezzled 48.3 596.2
Amount of money misused 227.8 4794.4
Unexplained income 39.7 196.3
Amount of money offered as a bribe 1.6 41.1
Per cent
Type 1 crime 4
Type 2 crime 11
Type 3 crime 1
Whether the official is a local leader 19
Whether the official confesses 8
Whether the secretary is in office the 22
first year
Whether the secretary is locally 40
promoted
Hu’s regime 67
Source:
Author’s data collected from the Procuratorial Daily 1993–2010.

of the government). According to the pertinent laws and government regulations,

corrupt officials who cooperate or confess may receive a reduced punishment. It
is assumed that major local leaders will receive a more severe punishment than
other officials who have the same administrative rank but who do not assume
a position as important as that of local leader. This is because punishing high-
profile leaders can produce a stronger deterrent effect.
A third set of variables includes the investigating official’s career information.
One variable involves the career of the provincial secretary. A person in the first
year of his or her term in office is assumed to have a higher level of determination
in terms of anti-corruption efforts because he or she needs to perform well. If this
person has been promoted locally, he or she is likewise assumed to be less willing
to issue harsh punishments to local corrupt officials because of local connections.
I also differentiate if the cases occur under Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 or Jiang Zemin’s 江
泽民 regime. Finally, all the models include the time trend. Table 3 summarizes
the variables used in the statistical analysis.

Model and results

This study aims to examine how the party-state punishes high-ranking officials. Prior
to conducting the statistical analysis, data is presented on the punishment of officials
from different ranks. The punishments are divided into the aforementioned four cat-
egories, namely, a fixed term of imprisonment, life imprisonment, the death penalty
with reprieve, and the death penalty. Figure 2 shows that fewer high-ranking officials
were given a fixed term of imprisonment; instead, more high-ranking officials were

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 605

Figure 2: Distribution of Penalties Imposed on Officials of Different Ranks

(N = 2,377)

Source:
Author’s data collected from the Procuratorate Daily 1993–2010.

given one of the three types of severe punishment. Officials with the highest rank
(i.e. vice-governor or higher) were more likely to be given severe punishments.
The relationship between the severity of punishment and the rank of a corrupt
official presented in Figure 2 is constructed without controlling for other
variables, and the proposed relationship may be superficial or inaccurate.
According to criminal law, corrupt activities are punished mainly according to
the type and magnitude of corruption. High-ranking officials are more likely
to be involved in serious corruption. Therefore, a statistical analysis is conducted
by controlling for the variables discussed above, especially the type and magni-
tude of corrupt activities. Considering that the dependent variable is an ordinal
categorical variable, an ordered logit model is employed to estimate the effect
of administrative rank on the severity of penalty imposed on officials.
The statistical results are reported in Table 4. In Model 1, the rank of the cor-
rupt official is treated as a continuous variable while controlling for the magni-
tude of corruption. Although a positive relationship exists between rank and
the severity of penalty, the relationship is not statistically significant. When the
rank of the corrupt official is treated as a categorical variable (the model is not
shown), the effect of rank on degree of punishment is not linear. Therefore, a
quadratic term of rank is included to estimate the non-linear relationship between
the rank of the corrupt official and the severity of penalty in Model 2. The stat-
istical outcomes indicate that both rank and its quadratic item significantly affect
the severity of the penalty but in a non-linear manner. Specifically, the first order
of rank is negatively associated with the severity of the penalty. Thus, the prob-
ability of receiving a more severe punishment decreases first as the rank of the
corrupt official increases. The probability of receiving a more severe penalty is
lowest when the administrative rank is county magistrate (i.e. chu ji 处级,

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 606 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

Table 4: Ordered Logit Model of Severity of Punishment on Official’s Rank

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank −0.001 −1.013*** −1.014*** −1.024***
(0.043) (0.147) (0.148) (0.149)
Quadratic term of rank 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.111***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Bribe accepted (log) 1.008*** 1.046*** 1.048*** 1.043***
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Embezzlement (log) 0.798*** 0.794*** 0.792*** 0.791***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Misused money (log) 0.045 0.057 0.059 0.060
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Unexplained income (log) 0.083* 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.103**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Bribe offered (log) 0.303** 0.297* 0.296* 0.292*
(0.111) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Type 1 crime 1.726*** 1.822*** 1.802*** 1.779***
(0.401) (0.405) (0.405) (0.405)
Type 2 crime 0.524 0.663 0.641 0.611
(0.454) (0.451) (0.451) (0.451)
Type 3 crime −0.083 −0.099 −0.117 −0.113
(0.241) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239)
Confession −0.451 −0.468
(0.267) (0.268)
Local leader 0.056 0.051
(0.157) (0.157)
Provincial secretary first year 0.005
in office (0.159)
Provincial secretary locally −0.014
promoted (0.136)
Hu’s regime −0.368
(0.252)
Time trend −0.260*** −0.267*** −0.266*** −0.266***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 2,377 2,377 2,377 2,377
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

coded as 5). Among the officials whose administrative rank is at the level of
county magistrate or higher, the probability of receiving a harsher punishment
increases as the rank of the corrupt official becomes higher. The increase in prob-
ability accelerates as the rank becomes higher.
In Models 3 and 4, more control variables are included, and the effect of rank
on the severity of penalty does not change significantly. The control variables,
except for the seriousness of the crime, have no significant effect on the severity
of the penalty. The magnitude of corruption increases the probability ratio of
being more severely punished. For instance, as shown in Model 4, the expected
probability of receiving a harsher punishment increases by 1.83 (e1.043−1 = 1.83)
when the amount of money accepted as a bribe increases by 1 per cent. Corrupt

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 607

officials who commit other crimes are much more likely (five times more) to be
severely punished than those who do not. The effect of the time trend is signifi-
cantly negative, suggesting that the probability of receiving a severe penalty
decreases by 0.234 (1−e−0.266 = 0.234) each year.
To understand the non-linear relationship between the rank of the corrupt offi-
cial and the severity of the imposed penalty better, Figure 3 presents the predicted
probability of the punishment for officials of different ranks. In this analysis, sev-
eral specifications apply to the values of control variables. An official is convicted
of corruption in 2004. They are assumed to have received a bribe amounting to 1
million yuan but to have committed no other crimes, and they are likewise
assumed not to be local leaders or to have confessed. In addition, the provincial
secretary is neither in the first year of office nor locally promoted.
The probability of receiving a “fixed term of imprisonment,” which is the light-
est penalty, is roughly 0.42 for staff or clerks. It increases to approximately 0.75
when the rank of the official is upgraded to deputy county magistrate, and then
decreases to 0.46 when the rank reaches vice-governor or higher. In terms of the
severity of the punishment, compared to officials at the rank of deputy county
head, officials at the lowest and highest ranks are both more likely to receive a
severe punishment. For instance, the probability of staff or clerks receiving the

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Imposing Different Types of Penalties on

Officials of Different Ranks

Notes:
In this analysis, officials are assumed to have received a bribe amounting to 1 million yuan. Additionally, (1) the criminal has com-
mitted no more crimes; (2) the criminal has not confessed; (3) the criminal is not a local leader; (4) the provincial secretary is not in the
first year of office and has not been locally promoted; (5) the criminal is from the Hu regime; and (6) the year is 2004.

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 608 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

death penalty is 0.049 higher than it is for officials at the level of county magis-
trate, and the probability of officials at vice-governor rank or above receiving the
death penalty is also 0.039 higher than it is for officials at the level of county
magistrate.
This pattern shows that the state authority tends to issue stronger punishments
to corrupt officials who are of a higher ranking (i.e. on the right side of the
U-shape curve) to strengthen the deterrent effect. In addition, lowest-ranking
officials are likely to be severely punished (i.e. on the left end of the U-shape
curve), perhaps because to do so is less costly. Officials at the rank of county
magistrate are less likely to be given a severe penalty compared with these two
groups. What can be the rationale behind this U-shape distribution? The follow-
ing section analyses this pattern by examining the political considerations on the
part of the party-state.

State authorities and disparate incentive structures

In China, state authorities at different levels investigate corrupt officials of differ-
ent ranks. According to the Party’s “Regulations on handling violations of Party
discipline,” a malfeasant Party member is to be investigated by the discipline
inspection committee of the next level up.26 Therefore, the provincial or central
authority investigates officials at the administrative rank of prefecture mayor
or higher, and authorities at the city level or lower investigate officials at the
administrative rank of county magistrate or lower. State authorities at different
levels have different considerations when dealing with corrupt agents.
Anti-corruption efforts are tied to the legitimacy of the party-state, but legitim-
acy is of varying importance to state authorities at different levels. In China, the
central government is more responsible for the operation of the political system
and by and large represents the regime. Thus, it has a greater interest in protect-
ing the legitimacy of the regime. In contrast, local officials are more concerned
with policy implementation or task fulfilment and local issues – legitimacy is
not their primary concern.27 Therefore, compared with central or provincial
authorities, lower-level local authorities have less motivation to issue stringent
penalties to corrupt officials in order to produce a deterrent effect.
Nevertheless, if local leaders are more tolerant of corrupt officials, why have
some local officials been severely punished (i.e. at the left end of the U-shape
curve)? One possible explanation is that the connections these officials have
with local leaders may vary, and the willingness of local leaders to protect offi-
cials of different administrative ranks likewise varies. Officials at the lowest
level generally have fewer political resources than high-level officials.
Consequently, if low-ranking officials are very corrupt, local leaders may not

26 “Zhongguo gongchangdang jilü jiancha jiguan anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli,” available at: http://cpc.
people.com.cn/GB/33838/2539632.html. Accessed 1 June 2015.
27 Cai 2008.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 609

be strongly motivated to offer protection. Corrupt officials are sometimes caught

and punished because they lack connections, and the severity of sentences
inversely varies with hierarchical position.28
The different incentive structures of state authorities at different levels affect
their attitudes towards corrupt officials. Of the nearly 2,900 cases in the dataset,
1,308 provided information on the level of the agency responsible for investigat-
ing the reported corruption. Of these cases, approximately 38 per cent were inves-
tigated by county-level agencies, roughly 69 per cent were investigated by
prefecture-level agencies, 26.5 per cent were investigated by provincial-level agen-
cies, and 4.5 per cent were investigated by central agencies. For analytical con-
venience, investigative agencies are divided into two categories, namely,
agencies at the provincial level and higher, and agencies at the prefecture level
or lower. Table 5 shows officials of different ranks and the corresponding inves-
tigation agencies. It reveals that lower-ranking officials are mostly investigated by
lower-level agencies, whereas the majority of officials at the level of deputy pre-
fecture mayor were investigated by provincial or central agencies. The provincial
or central DIC sometimes becomes involved in the investigation of low-ranking
officials when the case is complex or involves other high-ranking officials. Very
few high-ranking officials are initially subject to investigation by lower-level
agencies, but lower-level agencies can receive the authority to investigate higher-
ranking officials if those officials are involved in crimes with low-level cadres.
In China, once the state authorities have decided to investigate corrupt agents,
especially important officials, they have usually already gathered evidence.
Consequently, officials under investigation are very likely to be convicted.
When a discipline inspection committee decides or is allowed to investigate a per-
son, it forms a team and then adopts the so-called shuang gui 双规 (double des-
ignation) approach This means that the detained cadre is required to report to a

Table 5: Agencies Responsible for the Investigation of Corrupt Officials

Officials Below provincial level (%) Provincial or central level (%)
Staff and clerk 92.6 7.4
Deputy township head 94.5 5.5
Township head 92.6 7.4
Deputy county magistrate 80.0 20.0
County magistrate 64.6 35.4
Deputy prefecture mayor 2.7 97.3
Prefecture mayor 0 100
Vice-governor and higher 0 100
Average 67.5 32.5
Source:
Author’s data collected from the Procuratorate Daily 1993–2010.

28 Østergaard and Persen 1991.

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 610 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

designated place at a designated time for questioning. Once a provincial or cen-

tral state agency investigates a high-ranking official, it is likely that that official
will receive a severe punishment if he or she is convicted.
The following statistical analysis demonstrates the intention of provincial
and central authorities to punish high-ranking officials in order to showcase
their determination to crack down on corruption. Table 6 shows the statistical
results. In Model 1, the dummy variable of whether the case is investigated by
a provincial or central agency is included. Holding others constant, if an offi-
cial is investigated by the provincial or central agency, the probability of them

Table 6: Effect of the Level of Investigation Agency on Punishment

Model 1 Model 2
Rank −0.132 −0.678***
(0.081) (0.124)
Investigation agency at the central or provincial level 0.597* −3.936***
(0.274) (0.839)
Interaction between rank and investigation agency 0.975***
at the central or provincial level (0.164)
Bribe accepted (log) 0.992*** 1.086***
(0.085) (0.090)
Embezzlement (log) 0.756*** 0.783***
(0.074) (0.075)
Misused money (log) 0.129* 0.119
(0.063) (0.063)
Unexplained income (log) 0.120** 0.151**
(0.045) (0.046)
Bribe offered (log) 0.164 0.202
(0.154) (0.156)
Type 1 crime 1.360* 1.288*
(0.598) (0.618)
Type 2 crime 0.646 0.934
(0.817) (0.838)
Type 3 crime −0.386 −0.330
(0.398) (0.391)
Confession −0.723 −0.324
(0.455) (0.455)
Local leader 0.029 0.119
(0.221) (0.230)
Provincial secretary first year in office −0.363 −0.448
(0.260) (0.267)
Provincial secretary locally promoted 0.021 0.108
(0.203) (0.206)
Hu’s regime −0.742* −0.712
(0.372) (0.379)
Time trend −0.167 −0.177
(0.043)*** (0.044)***
Observations 1,063 1,063
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 611

being severely punished is approximately 82 per cent (=e0.597−1) higher than

for an official who is investigated by an agency below the provincial level.
In Model 2, an interaction term between the rank of a corrupt official and the
level of supervisory agencies is introduced. The statistical result indicates that the
effect of rank expectedly changes with the change in the level of investigating
agencies. In cases investigated by agencies below the provincial level, the
probability of an official receiving a more severe penalty decreases by 0.492
(=1−e−0.678) per rank. In contrast, in the cases investigated by agencies at the pro-
vincial or central level, when the rank rises by one level, the probability of receiv-
ing a more severe penalty increases by 1.65 (e0.975−1).
A number of cases involving high-ranking officials who received severe punish-
ments have been reported. During the 25 years preceding 2012, authorities from
the central Party disciplined approximately 100 officials at the administrative
level of vice-governor or higher. Among the 90 officials who were legally pun-
ished, 6 were sentenced to death, 26 were sentenced to death with reprieve,
another 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the remaining 42 received
fixed-term prison sentences.29 For instance, Liu Fangren 刘方仁, a former pro-
vincial Party secretary of Guizhou, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2004
for accepting a bribe of 6.77 million yuan. In 2005, Tian Fengshan 田凤山, a for-
mer minister of land and resources, received the same sentence for receiving a
bribe of 4 million yuan. Other officials given the same level of punishment
include heads of provincial government agencies and prefecture leaders.
Officials given the death penalty with reprieve, which means that execution is
commuted, include Li Jiating 李嘉廷, a former governor of Yunnan, who was
found guilty in 2003 of taking 18.1 million yuan in bribes, and Cong Fukui 丛
福奎, a vice-governor of Hebei, who was sentenced in 2002 for accepting bribes
amounting to 9.36 million yuan. Li Jizhou 李纪周, a former vice-minister of the
Ministry of Public Security, was also sentenced to death with reprieve in 2001 for
taking 5.03 million yuan in bribes. Many other high-ranking local leaders
received this sentence for similar misdemeanours.
There have been some high-ranking officials who have been executed, although
the number has decreased in recent years. Zheng Xiaoyu 郑筱萸, the former head
of the National Food and Drug Agency, was executed in 2007 for accepting
bribes amounting to 6.49 million yuan and because the corruption in his agency
distorted the Chinese drug market and angered the central government. Cheng
Kejie 成克杰, a former vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress, was
executed in 2000 for taking 41.09 million yuan in bribes. Hu Changqin 胡长
清, a vice-governor of Jiangxi, and Wang Huaizhong 王怀忠, a vice-governor
of Anhui, were executed in 2000 and 2003, respectively, for corruption.

29 Xinhuanet.com. 2012. “Bai yu ming shengbu ji gaoguan de tanfu zhilu” (The corruption of more than
100 ministry-level officials), 3 March, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-03/29/c_122906150.htm.
Accessed 5 May 2012.

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 612 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

Although it is the central authority’s intention to curb corruption by punishing

corrupt high-ranking officials, inconsistencies have been observed in the disciplin-
ing of government officials at both the central and local levels. The statistical pat-
tern that indicates that corrupt high-ranking officials are more likely to be
severely punished differs from public perception, largely owing to these inconsist-
encies. For instance, Cheng Weigao 程维高, the former provincial Party secretary
of Hebei Province, accepted bribes, protected corrupt subordinates, illegally cre-
ated business opportunities for his family, and forced the local legal department
to put the person who reported his corruption into a labour camp for two years.
When finally punished, Cheng was exempted from criminal charges and was
instead merely expelled from the Party.30
The high-profile corruption cases of top officials naturally catch the attention
of both the general public and officials alike. These high-profile cases tend to
have a disproportionately significant impact on the perceptions of people and
officials regarding the attitudes of the state towards corruption. Inconsistencies
in the punitive measures dished out to corrupt agents not only undermine the
credibility of the punishments31 but also give rise to scepticism about the deter-
mination or motivations of the central authority. Erratic sentencing leads people
to believe that anti-corruption efforts and the punishment of high-ranking offi-
cials are the result of political power struggles at the top rather than evidence
of the determination of the central authority to clamp down on corruption.
For example, in a case similar to that of Bo Xilai’s 薄熙来 fall from grace,
some people, including local officials, view the imprisonment of former
Shanghai Party secretary, Chen Liangyu 陈良宇, as a consequence of his political
defeat in a power struggle leading up to the 17th Party Congress.32

Robustness of results
The previous results find a U-shape relationship between the rank of corrupt offi-
cials and the severity of criminal penalty they receive. Because these findings are
explorative, I conduct additional robustness tests to increase confidence in the
results.33
The first robustness check is to re-categorize the dependent variable, the type of
criminal penalty. Previously, I categorized criminal penalties into four types:
fixed term of imprisonment, life imprisonment, the death penalty with reprieve,
and the death penalty. Now I will re-categorize “fixed term of imprisonment”
into types: less than ten years’ imprisonment, and ten years’ or more imprison-
ment. According to Chinese criminal law, serious corrupt activities receive a

30 Lu, Rong. 2003. “Weile zhengyi, ta yu Cheng Weigao jiaoliang ba nian” (He battled with Cheng
Weigao for eight years for justice), Nanfang zhoumo, 14 August.
31 Trevino 1992.
32 See, e.g., Kahn, Joseph. 2006. “Shanghai Party boss held for corruption in crackdown by president
against opponents,” The New York Times, 25 September.
33 The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for advice on robustness checks.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 613

prison sentence of ten years or more.34 The average fixed-term prison sentence in
the data is 9.14 years. Therefore, the new dependent variable has five types. I con-
duct an ordinary logistic model to examine whether the effect of rank on punish-
ment depends on how many categories the dependent variable has. As Model 1 in
Table 7 indicates, the U-shape relationship between official rank and severity of
punishment remains when categorizing the dependent variable into five types.
The pattern of punishing corrupt officials is also vulnerable to the systematic
selection bias of the dataset. In particular, it is possible that cases where low-
ranking officials receive the death penalty are not systematically covered by the
newspaper, since the Chinese government most likely prefers to lower the profile
of death penalty cases. If this is the case, the argument that the high-ranking offi-
cials receive harsher sentencing could be spurious. I conducted a model excluding
death penalty cases to examine the possible impact from the selection bias of the
dataset. As indicated in Model 2 in Table 7, I confirm that the effect of rank on
penalty does not change when death penalty cases are excluded, except for a
slight increase of coefficients.
I perform two additional tests of the findings to examine other possible expla-
nations for the harsh punitive measures for high-ranking officials. In the first, I
test the other possible explanation that high-ranking officials are severely pun-
ished as a consequence of political power struggles. To examine the effect of a
power struggle, I investigate the disciplining of corruption in the year before or
after the change of the central regime. In the dataset, the central regime changed
only in 2003. Therefore, cases judged in 2002 or 2003, especially those involving
high-ranking officials, are expected to be severely punished. Model 3 in Table 7
reports the results. There is no statistically significant difference in punishment
levels for cases in normal years and those in the years before or after the central
leadership changes. Furthermore, the effect of rank on severity of punishment is
also not significantly enhanced in 2002 or 2003. These findings indicate that a
power struggle could matter, but it does not systematically affect the severity
of punishment.
Finally, I consider the effect of social pressure on the punishment meted out to
officials. Given the same type and amount of corruption, high-ranking officials
are more likely to have a higher profile and generate worse social impacts than
low-ranking officials. In China, the widespread use of the internet, especially
Weibo (a twitter-like microblog which was launched in 2007), provides a
forum for the public to follow and discuss these cases. Thus, high-ranking offi-
cials may receive harsher sentences because the public condemns them more
severely. To examine the effect of social pressure from the internet on the senten-
cing of corrupt officials, I use the year 2007, when Weibo was launched, to proxy
the increased social pressure to punish corrupt officials harshly. Moreover, I use
an interaction term of social pressure and rank, and the quadratic of rank.

34 See the Criminal Law of PRC, Chapter 8.

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 614 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

Table 7: Robustness of Results: Ordered Logit Model of Criminal Penalty on

Selected Independent Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank −0.215* −1.162*** −0.993*** −0.850***
(0.097) (0.166) (0.158) (0.173)
Quadratic term of rank 0.030** 0.129*** 0.109*** 0.086***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Bribe accepted (log) 0.954*** 1.124*** 1.052*** 1.043***
(0.038) (0.066) (0.056) (0.057)
Embezzlement (log) 0.764*** 0.782*** 0.796*** 0.804***
(0.037) (0.055) (0.047) (0.048)
Misused money (log) 0.261*** 0.099* 0.057 0.053
(0.033) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046)
Unexplained income (log) 0.081** 0.057 0.100** 0.103**
(0.028) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034)
Giving bribe (log) 0.209* 0.239 0.290* 0.291*
(0.104) (0.149) (0.115) (0.120)
Type 1 crime 1.378*** 1.143* 1.804*** 1.739***
(0.349) (0.454) (0.407) (0.408)
Type 2 crime −0.186 0.785 0.639 0.589
(0.283) (0.491) (0.453) (0.450)
Type 3 crime −0.025 −0.003 −0.113 −0.142
(0.145) (0.258) (0.240) (0.242)
Confession −1.060*** −0.284 −0.458 −0.415
(0.165) (0.273) (0.269) (0.270)
Local leader 0.084 0.154 0.055 0.085
(0.110) (0.170) (0.158) (0.158)
Provincial secretary first year in 0.044 0.056 0.006 −0.019
office (0.104) (0.174) (0.160) (0.160)
Provincial secretary locally −0.024 −0.034 −0.022 −0.005
promoted (0.090) (0.149) (0.136) (0.137)
Years of regime change 0.897
(0.953)
Years of regime change * Rank −0.328
(0.427)
Years of regime change * 0.022
Quadratic term of rank (0.044)
Weibo 0.530
(0.681)
Weibo * Rank −0.394
(0.305)
Weibo * Quadratic term of rank 0.064
(0.033)
Year trend −0.114*** −0.247 −0.268*** −0.292***
(0.012) (0.021)*** (0.019) (0.025)
Observations 2,377 2,308 2,377 2,377
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

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 Punishing Corrupt Officials in China 615

Corruption exposed in or after 2007, especially if it involves high-ranking offi-

cials, is expected to be more severely punished if the hypothesis of social pressure
is supported. Model 4 in Table 7 reports the results. It indicates that there is no
statistical evidence supporting the effect of social pressure, which is consistent
with existing research.35

Conclusion
The ability and willingness of the government to expose corrupt agents in a time-
ly manner and impose appropriate punishments are fundamental to successfully
curbing corruption. In other words, the government can increase the cost of com-
mitting crimes by reducing the uncertainty of being caught and increasing the
severity of the punishment.36 Authoritarian governments face little electoral pres-
sure and so are less accountable to the public in terms of their anti-corruption
efforts; however, punishing their own corrupt agents can be costly. When the gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to increase the probability of detecting and inves-
tigating corrupt agents, then it has to punish those who have been caught and
convicted severely to achieve a certain degree of credibility in terms of its
anti-corruption efforts.
This paper elaborates the logic of selectively punishing corrupt agents as seen
in corruption cases in China. Widespread corruption persists despite the claims of
the central authority that combating corruption is a primary policy goal. An
important factor behind the rampant corruption is the unlikelihood that corrupt
agents will be exposed and investigated. As this paper has shown, the state
authority has not investigated many government officials, especially those of a
high rank, although reports of their malfeasance abound. The fact that corrupt
agents face little prospect of being exposed can be attributed to the inaccuracy
of information or to the lack of determination or political will of the party-state.
Whatever the reasons, the low probability of being detected and convicted of cor-
ruption undermines the credibility of the Party’s anti-corruption efforts.
Nevertheless, the Party likewise realizes the consequences of tolerating corrupt
agents and is therefore under pressure to protect its reputation for tackling cor-
ruption. In the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 warned that, “if the Party does
not take corruption seriously, [and] stop it resolutely, both the Party and country
will … change face.”37 Consequently, the central authority has to showcase its
commitment to clamping down on corruption. As this paper demonstrates, top
officials are more likely to receive harsher punishment, including life imprison-
ment, the death penalty with reprieve, and the death penalty, if they are con-
victed. Although this approach of meting out severe punitive sentences to
high-ranking officials may, to some extent, protect the reputation of the central

35 Chen n.d.
36 Becker 1968; Pogarsky 2009.
37 Deng 1994, 402–03.

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 616 The China Quarterly, 223, September 2015, pp. 595–617

authority, the deterrent effect remains limited because of the lower probability of
being detected and investigated. For this reason, the new administration under Xi
Jinping 习近平 has increased its efforts to investigate and punish both high-
ranking and low-ranking officials.

摘要: 中国在打击腐败上呈现出两面性。一方面, 腐败仍然是党和国家面临

的严重挑战, 这不仅是因为腐败导致国家资产的流失, 更是由于其对政权合
法性的腐蚀。另一方面, 相比较其他一些国家, 中国的腐败问题并没有显得
极其严重。本研究试图通过考察中央惩治腐败的策略以解释上述问题。反
腐败的有效性取决于惩治腐败的确定性和予以相应的惩罚。在中国, 中央
政府无法也不愿意对大多数的官员, 特别是高级官员, 进行调查, 而是选择
对已经认罪的高级官员予以严厉的惩罚。尽管这一选择性的惩戒策略损害
了国家在反腐问题上的威信, 但这仍意味着腐败官员面临不确定性, 即使高
级官员也并不必然逃脱惩罚。
关键词: 中国; 惩治; 腐败; 官员; 严厉性

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