Pakistan Military
Pakistan Military
Pakistan Military
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Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
Introduction
In the past two decades considerable research has appeared, which
provides perspectives on Pakistan’s military is impacts politics and socio-
economic development in the country. The military’s role and relationship
with the civilian leadership remains tenuous. Most of these studies provide
insightful analysis of Pakistan’s political history but generally reinforce
*Saeed Shafqat, PhD, is Professor and Founding Director at the Centre for Public Policy
and Governance, Forman Christian (college) University, Lahore. In 2018 he was awarded
the Tamgha-e-Imtiaz in recognition of his services. He is a member of National School of
Public Policy and a regular guest speaker at the National Defence University and National
Management College. He has been Quaid-i-Azam Distinguished Professor and Chair
(March 2001-May 2005), Pakistan Center at the School of International Affairs and Public
Policy (SIPA), Columbia University and continued to be Adjunct Professor at SIPA until
2010. For spring 2012, he was a Visiting Professor South Asian Studies, at the College of
Wooster, Ohio. His research articles on culture, politics, security and various aspects of pub-
lic policy and governance, demographic change and civil service reform in Pakistan have
been published in several journals. His books include: Political System of Pakistan and Public
Policy (1989) Civil- Military Relations in Pakistan (1997), Contemporary Issues in Pakistan Studies
(2000, 3rd edition) and New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2007). He has also co-authored two monographs: Pakistan, Afghanistan and
US Relations: Implications for the Future (Lahore: CPPG, 2011) and Electoral Politics and
Electoral Violence in 2013 Elections: The Case of Punjab (Lahore: CPPG, 2014). His recent pub-
lications includes: “China’s Rise: How Is It Impacting the Gulf, Iran, Pakistan and Beyond?”
Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, March 2017. China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor: Demands, Dividends and Directions by Saeed Shafqat & Saba Shahid, (Lahore: Centre
for Public Policy and Governance, 2018).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ms. Saba Shahid, Research
Associate, Centre for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) in conducting research for the
paper. I am equally indebted to Dr. Ali Saleem Raja, Assistant Professor, CPPG for valuable
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
20
1
Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2014), Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan
(Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2014) Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords:
Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008) Anatol
Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011 paperback edition), Christophe
Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Stability and Resilience (Gurgaon: Random House India, 2015)
2
Aqil Shah, pp 215-253, Christophe Jaffrelot, pp 197-297
3
Christine Fair pp 136-173
4
Ibid pp119-129, pp 278-281, Fair conclusively asserts: that Pakistan Army will continue
to “manipulate events in Afghanistan” and that it views “India as existential threat”. P281.
5
Aqil Shah, pp 215-253, Christope Jaffrelot, pp197-297, Shuja Nawaz, pp 465-502, for a
perceptive nuanced and more balanced view, see Anatol Lieven (2011), pp 161-203
21
6
For a perceptive and detailed discussion on this point see, Phil Oldenburg, “Loyalty, dis-
loyalty and semi loyalty in Pakistan’s hybrid regime” in Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, published online, http//dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2017.1261650. pp 11-23, pp 6-7.
22
7
Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan (Boulder/ Lahore: Westview Press and
Pak Book Corporation, 1997)
8
Ibid, pp 7-10
9
For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of U.S Pakistan relations, see, Dennis Kux,
The United States and Pakistan 1947- 2000 (Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Press, 2001.
“A Ride on the Roller Coaster: US-Pakistan Relations 1947-1997” in Hafeez Malik (Ed) Pakistan:
Founder’s Aspirations and Today’s Realities (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp287-312.
23
10
Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, (Yale: Yale University Press,2002, Zahid
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York, Columbia University
Press, 2007)
11
See, for example, Humaira Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists?: Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-
Da’wa in Urban Pakistan. (University of Chicago Press, 2011). S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State
and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan”. Also, Saeed Shafqat, “From Official Islam to
Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba”, pp138-148,In Christophe Jafferlot,
Pakistan: Nationalism withouth a Nation. (Zed Books, 2002).
24
12
Steve Coll, Ghost wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghnaistan, and bin Laden from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. (Penguin Books, 2004). pp 63-69, 120-130 Ahmad
Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Central Asia (London/New York: Allen Lane, 2008, pp. 24-43, pp 125-144.
13
For a detailed analysis on the subject, see, John K.Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan,
America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 1999) pp 57-64 ad for post 2001 peri-
od, see Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortyfying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security
Assistance (Washington, DC: USIP Press Books, 2006)
14
Carlotta Gall,” Musharraf lifts State of Emergency in Pakistan” New York Times, 16 December, 2007.
25
For an informative analysis on this point, see Christine Fair and Peter Chalk (2006), For
15
formative phase on this point, see Saeed Shafqat, Pakistan and the United States: A Future
Unlike the Past (Occasional Paper Series, Center for the Study of Pakistan, SIPA, Columbia
University, New York, 2005) pp 1-30, In addition US-Pakistani Military Consultative
Committee (MCC) is forum that meets annually to review military to military relations,
which aims at strengthening these bonds, despite serious differences.
26
16
In an interview to Imtiaz Gul, the then ISPR chief, Major General Athar Abbas, stated
that, 30% of the officer corps hails from the sons of the NCEOs, see Imtiaz Gul,
“Reinventing the Army”, NewsLine, July 2011, pp.15-19. P.18, Shuja Nawaz (2008), op cit,
provides a detailed analysis on this, see pp 570-572
17
General Sharif hailed from a family who had strong martial tradition…his elder brother
was martyred in the 1971 Indo- Pakistan war, similarly General Bajwa belongs to traditional
military family.
18
Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Pres, 2007),
She provides an estimate of 10 billion US dollars, however, my recent conversations with
retired civil servants, military officers and real estate developers estimate it to 15 billion dollars.
27
19
For killing and executing of Osama Bin Laden, see, https://tribune.com.pk/story/160560/
the-operation-what-exactly-happened-in-abbottabad/, accessed on February, 10, 2018. The inci-
dent hurt the reputation of Pakistan’s military and also roused a debate on national sover-
eignty and role of agencies. For explanation by the government, see an interview of Ahmed
Mukhtar, Federal Minster of Defence Pakistan, “The US cannot dictate that the government
open up new fronts in Pakistan”, Newsline, July 2011, pp 25-26.
28
20
Muhammad Feyyaz, “Winning Hearts and Minds in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: A Personal
Recollection of a Peace-Building Effort with the Taliban” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 10, Issue
3, June 2016, pp 53-58. This is a personal narrative of the Brigadier who was conducting an
operation in the area.
21
Aqil Shah, op.cit. and Shuja Nawaz, op.cit.
29
1. The Ideologicals
The antecedents of this group’s outlook, orientation and worldview can
be traced back to former Generals like Zia-ul- Haq, Akhtar Abdul Rehman,
Gul Hamid and Nasir Javed who were ideologically driven and believed in
cultivating and mobilizing religious groups to wage Afghan and Kashmir
Jihad. The Ideologicals consider India as an existentialist threat and
therefore advocate Kashmir Jihad as an appropriate tool to rattle India.
They were opposed to the Communist ideology of the Soviet Union and
also opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Given these two
considerations they were willing to collaborate with the US in countering
and containing the Soviet invasion. They reluctantly supported the Geneva
Peace Process (1988), and equated the culmination of Afghan Jihad as a
‘callous neglect’ of Afghanistan and ‘abandonment’ of Pakistan by the US.
Eventually they became disillusioned with the US and in subsequent years
officers belonging to this school of thinking became vociferously anti-
American. In 1998 as Pakistan carried out its nuclear bomb tests, they
became further convinced that the US and Israel aimed to disrupt,
dismantle and destroy Pakistan’s nuclear program and nuclear weapons.
Even today, there is a small group of officers in the armed forces of
Pakistan, who agrees with this thinking. What their size and strength is,
however remains unclear. Under President Donald Trump, the US policy
towards Pakistan has acquired adversarial overtones,22 while under Prime
Minister Modi, India’s policy towards Pakistan has become belligerent.23
This has given boost to a sentiment of religious militancy and religious
populism at the societal level and the Ideological types within the military
find it morale enhancing to identify and cultivate such sentiments. This
22
President Donald Trump gave speech on August, 21, 2017, outlining the broad features
of US, Afghanistan Policy, and called Pakistan a ‘terrorists havens’ and urged India to play
an active role in Afghanistan to curb Pakistani sponsored terrorism. https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-afghanistan-pakistan/trump-talks-tough-on-pakistans-terrorist-havens-but-
options-scarce-idUSKCN1B21NW, accessed on February 10, 2018.
23
https://www.dawn.com/news/1095710, accessed on Februrary 25, 2018. Modi Lauches anti-
Pakistan campaign.
30
2. The Professionals
The antecedents of this group can be traced from Generals like Asif Nawaz
Janjua, Waheed Kakar, Jehangir Karamat and Ali Quli Khan who placed
high premium on military professionalism, showed respect for civilian
supremacy (in the sense of keeping the military distant from politics), concen-
trated on building the capacity and modernization of the military and in this
regard showed preference for acquiring weapons from diverse and techno-
logically superior sources. Unlike the Ideologicals, the professionals view
India as a ‘challenger and adversary’. Since political leadership in both India
and Pakistan has not been able to forge a consensual framework on how to
seek peace, despite Kashmir, therefore this group relies on enhancing the
professional capabilities of the military. In subsequent years, Generals
Kayani and his cohorts, Raheel Shareef and his contemporaries followed the
same tradition. This group of officers have sought balanced relations with the
US and China and shown a strong tendency to maintain the ‘autonomy’ of
the military in its professional and operational work. This group of officers is
the lifeline of Pakistan’s military and gives credence to its professionalism
and preparedness in situations of adversity.
3. Praetorians
Among the military there continues to be a group of officers who view
any political process with disdain and abhor the idea of politicians
governing the Pakistani state. So, they remain potential interveners
although their size may not be significant. The background of this outlook
and orientation among the officers of the Pakistani military gets inspiration
from Generals like Ayub Khan, Fazl-e- Haq, Faiz Ali Chistie and Pervez
Musharraf. Among this cohort, Ayub Khan is the only pre-1971 General
mentioned, he was the one who eliminated any prospects of democracy by
staging a coup in 1958. In the military Ayub Khan remains one of the most
respected Generals, yet he was ‘contemptuous’ about politicians and any
democratic process and both Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf followed
that path.
31
32
24
“Kayani to stay on as COAS till 2013: The night of the quiet general” Dawn, 23 July
2010. https://www.dawn.com/news/852503. The extension actually showed military hege-
mony is still intact. The extension announcement was done at 2am in the morning. The
corp commanders apparently backed the decision of extension as they met a week before
the extension on the day Kayani met President and Prime Minister. And Clinton was in
Pakistan on the night of extension.
25
For an informative analysis on General Kayani and his views from an Indian perspec-
tive, see, Praveen Swami, “General Kayani’s quiet coup”, The Hindu, 3 August 2010
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article548266.ece?homepage=true, (accessed on 11
February, 2018).
26
For a sympathetic assessment General Kayani, see, Raheem ullah Yusufzai, “General
Kayani’s rise from humble backgrounds”, The News, 28 November 2007, www.thenews.
com.pk/top=11425, (accessed on 11 February, 2018).
33
27
Time Magazine, May 1, 2009, listed General Kayani among the top 100 most infuential
leaders of the year.
28
For an insightful and critical assessment on this point and Kayani’s tenure and Raheel’s
succession, see Omar Waraich, “Pakistan’s Next Top General” New Yorker, 3 December,
2013 https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/pakistans-next-top-general (accessed on 25
February, 2018).
29
General Qamar Javed Bajwa, current Chief of Army Staff appeared before the Senate,
he was invited by the Chairman of the Senate to give briefing on the security situation pre-
vailing in the country. General Bajwa assured the parliamentarians that the military is sup-
portive of the democratic process and believes in the supremacy of the parliament. See for
instance Irfan Ghauri, “You make policy, we follow it, Gen Qamar tells parliament” The
Express Tribune, 19 December 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1587001/1-army-chief-arrives-
parliament-brief-lawmakers-security-situation/ (accessed on 10 February 2018).
34
Franscis Fukiyama, “The End of History” The National Interest (16): 3–18. ISSN 0884-
31
35
36
32
Joshua Partlow, “Pakistani Ruling Rebukes Ex-Leader”, Washington Post, 1 August, 2009.
33
Saeed Shafqat,” Praetorian and the People” in Maleeha Lodhi(ed), Pakistan Beyond the Crisis
State (London: Hurst, 2011) pp95-112, p105.
34
Ibid
35
Ibid
37
38
36
Salman Masood, “New Pakistan Army Chief Orders Military out of Civilian
Government Agencies, Reversing Musharraf Policy” New York Times, 13 February, 2008.
37
For a detailed overview, see: Centre for Civic Education Pakistan, “The 18th
Constitutional Amendment”, http://www.civiceducation.org/federalism-news/18th-consti-
tutional-amendment/ (accessed on 25 February, 2018).
38
Salman Masood, “Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Is Toppled by Corruption
Case”, New York Times, 28 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/world/asia/pakistan-
prime-minister-nawaz-sharif-removed.html (accessed on 2 February 2018).
39
39
Saeed Shafqat (2009), op.cit
40
Ibid
41
Saeed Shafqat, “Pakistan: Militancy, Transition to Democracy and Future of U.S.
Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, No,1, Volume ,63 Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 89-110
42
Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014) for a
detailed and informative discussion on this point and U.S policy towards Pakistan under
Zardari, see pp 170-201, pp 189-190 also see the Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin,
Commander U.S CENTCOM, before The House Appropriations Committee-Defense
Committee on the Posture of U.S Command, March 5, 2015.
40
43
Admiral Mullen met military and civilian leaders and demanded that Pakistan must curb
all forms of terrorism and also applauded the efforts of military in combating Al-Qaeda mil-
itants in its tribal belt. “Admiral Mullen demands action against Pak-based extremists”. Asia
News International, December 4, 2008.
44
Saeed Shafqat (2009) p.97
45
Ibid
46
Following the Mumbai attacks by the Lashkar-e-Taiba in December 2008 President
Zardari announced that he would be sending the DG ISI to India but General Kayani
quickly quashed the move and the visit never materialized. See Sumit Ganguly, “General
Kayani- A Musharraf in the Making?” https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pak-
istan/General-Kayani-A-Musharraf-in-the-making/articleshow/5704978.cms 20 March
2010, (accessed 11 February, 2018).
41
47
Omar Wariaich, op.cit
48
On 18th Amendment has brought fundamental changes in the 1973 Constitution. to
mention a few, it took away the power of the President to dismiss the Parliament, it has
empowered the Provinces both for legislation and financial resource allocation. It has made
Prime Minister the appointing authority for the selection of all Services Chiefs, the President
is to only retify it.
49
Policy analysts and Op-Eds were extremely critical how the civilian government handled
the flood situation in the country; see for example, S. Akbar Zaidi, “A Drowning State”, Dawn,
August, 20, 2010 and Mushtaq Gaadi, “Engineering Failures”, Dawn, 16 August, 2010.
42
For details of election results, see: “The Election Score”, Dawn, https://www.dawn.com/
51
43
52
Launch of Dharana.
53
In 2013, the PM made eight visits abroad, including US and China, in 2014, twelve,
including US and China and in 2015, Ninteen.
54
Calculated by the author along with dates
44
55
Ali Haider Habib, “Person of the Year 2016”, Herald, 50(1), January 2017, 71. Also see
Omar Wariaich, op.cit
56
Suroop Ijaz, “Raheel Sahrif: for dominating the polity and public imagination”, Herald,
50(1), January 2017, 76.
57
Ali Haider Habib, “Person of the Year 2016”, Herald, 50(1), January 2017.
58
Ahsan Chaudhary, “Who Leads Coups in Pakistan: the Military or the Establishment?”,
The Diplomat 28 July 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-leads-coups-in-pakistan-
the-military-or-the-establishment/ (accessed 12 February 2018).
45
59
Suroop Ijaz, “Raheel Sahrif: for dominating the polity and public imagination”, Herald,
50(1), January 2017, 77.
60
“We selected the army’s school for the attack because the government is targeting our
families and females,” said the Taliban spokesman Muhammad Umar Khorasani. “We want
them to feel the pain.” Web desk/Correspondents (2016). “132 children killed in Peshawar
school attack”, The Express Tribune 16 December, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/807564/
gunmen-target-school-in-peshawar/ (accessed 17 July 2016).
46
61
National Action Plan, established National and Provincial Apex Committees, which
were headed by the PM and Chief Ministers in the provinces—where Corps Commanders
and DG Rangers, Frontier Force routinely met but action on the ground remained limited
in respect to the promised 20 points.
62
Number of officers killed from Okara, Multan, Swabi.
63
See Shuja Nawaz, op. cit
64
For details on this point, see: “Modi makes surprise visit to Pakistan, attends Nawaz’s
grand-daughter’s wedding” Rediff News 25 December 2015. rediff.com/news/report/surprise-
modi-to-drop-in-for-nawazs-birthday-in-lahore/20151225.htm, (accessed 25 February, 2018).
47
65
Ibid
66
Mohammad Feyyaz,
48
67
For an informative analysis, see, Saloni Salil,,”Role of Pakistan’s Armed Forces in 2010
Floods”, https://www.academia.edu/2000105/Role_of_Pakistan_s_Armed_Forces_in_2010_Floods,
accessed on 25 February, 2018
68
The report alleged that the civilian leaders were critical of the military and its intelligence
agencies role in politics and reprimanded military leaders of the consequences. This was sup-
posedly a secret meeting and the military took exception as to who leaked it to the media.
49
Summary Conclusion
As noted above the paradox of Pakistan’s turbulent political history is
that the military has demonstrated institutional resilience, while the parlia-
mentary institutions remain feeble and the civilian leaders continue to
fumble. As an organization, the military has built its image as the counter-
vailing force capable of challenging ‘Belligerent India’; providing relief
during natural disasters, intervening in times of political anarchy and
playing an undeniably crucial role in the fight against terrorism. This has
helped the armed forces to earn a tangible place within Pakistani society.
Yet the paradox is that Pakistani society continues to show immense
capability to participate in a rapidly evolving and internationally connected
economic structure. In this context, the military’s role is one that will
naturally be scrutinized and assessed by the people of Pakistan. The
challenge for the armed forces today is that on one side it is carefully
cultivating a co-equal relationship with the dithering civilian leadership and
on the other hand continues to strive maintaining its hegemony and
influence over a population that is increasingly politically aware,
expressive and recognizes the values of democracy, accountable
governance and participatory and representative leadership.
In this context, the nature of civil-military relations has changed, yet the
military continues to exert its strength and remains a strategic, alternative
point of contact for foreign powers, non-state actors and political leaders of
diverging dispensations. This effective portrayal of ‘unity of command’ and
politbureau style, allows the military to convey a sense of strength and
resilience as an institution in Pakistan’s political setting. As discussed
50
51