ST ND
ST ND
ST ND
CIVIL DIVISION
VERSUS
1. KAMPALA CAPITAL CITY AUTHORITY
2. MINISTER FOR KAMPALA CAPITAL CITY
AND METROPOLITAN AFFAIRS-------------------- RESPONDENTS
RULING
The Applicant filed an application for Judicial Review under Article 2(1),
26, 28, 40(2), 42 & 44 of the Constitution , Section 36(1)(b)(c),(e)(3),(4)(5) and
(7), 33, 38 of the Judicature Act as amended, Rules 3(1),2, 4, 6 and 8 of the
Judicature (Judicial Review) Rules, 2009 and 3(A) of the Judicature (Judicial
Review) Rules 2019 for the following of Judicial review reliefs;
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2.) A declaration that the Respondents’ actions of breaking into the
applicant’s office, ejecting the applicant’s officials and workers from
managing Nakasero Market are in contempt of lawful court orders,
irrational, unlawful, illegal, unreasonable and procedurally improper.
7.) That an order for payment of costs of this application issues against
the respondents.
The grounds in support of this application were stated briefly in the Notice
of Motion and in the accompanying affidavit of Kakooza Godfrey, the
Chairperson of the applicant generally and briefly state that;
4. That on 2nd December, 2009 the Applicant applied for a lease for
Plot 4B & 7B Market street, Nakasero Market and it was granted a
sub-lease by the 1st Respondent upon payment of premium of
UGX 1,800,000,000/= (One billion eight hundred million shillings)
ground rent of UGX 45,000,000/= (Forty five million shillings) and
compilation of the register of all individuals working in the market
which were conditions precedent to the grant.
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6. That in its communication dated 10th September, 2015 the 1st
Respondent made further commitment and reaffirmation of the
Applicants exclusive rights of ownership and management of
Nakasero Market.
7. That the Respondents were alive to the fact that the main purpose
and main objective of the Applicant’s incorporation was to own
and manage Nakasero Market in conformity with the Central
government’s policy for sitting vendors to own their markets in
Kampala.
8. That the Respondents are also aware that, the property and
management of the entire market comprised in Plots 4B & 7B
Market Street was lawfully vested unto the Applicant upon its
fulfilment of all conditions and payment of all rates and premium
set by the 2nd Respondent.
9. That the Respondents are aware that there are two Court Orders
maintaining the status quo of the market in favour of M/s
Nakasero Market Sitting Vendors and Traders Ltd as against
attempts by the Respondents to repossess or take over its
management.
10. That on Sunday 15th November 2020, without due process and in
blatant disregard of the Applicant’s rights and court orders, the
Respondents broke into the Applicant’s offices and seized
management of Nakasero Market and also closed the Applicant’s
members Savings and Credit Co-operative scheme (SACCO) and
removed all books of accounts, members savings ledgers, members
cash deposits using the force of armed state security forces,
paramilitary groups and private strangers.
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11. THAT on the 20th November 2020, the 1st Respondent’s Directorate
of Gender, community services and production confirmed the
mayhem that prevailed during the 1st Respondent’s takeover of the
management of the Applicant’s market and closure of the
Applicant’s SACCO.
12. That the diabolical actions of the Respondents are in contravention
of the Markets Act and the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda
and thus illegal, unlawful, ultra vires and unconstitutional.
13. That the Applicant’s economic rights and rights to own property
have been wrongfully affected by the actions of the Respondents.
14. That the actions of the Respondents also amount to detinue,
conversion and trespass by the Respondents and their agents for
which the Applicants are entitled to general damages.
The respondents opposed this application and they filed two affidavits
in reply through the Acting Director Gender, Community Services and
Production in Kampala Capital City Authority-Esau Galukande and Hajj
Kakande Yunus, Secretary, Office of the President and the Accounting
Officer in charge of the 2nd respondent’s affairs.
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legal mandate of the 1st respondent is the establishment and
maintenance of markets in Kampala Pursuant to the Markets Act Cap
94.
3. That on 15th November 2020 the 1st respondent in an effort to fill the
vacuum created by revolting vendors, to ensure continuity of
business and keep order sent a team of technical officials to take
charge of Nakasero market.
5. That following the application for sub lease by the applicant, the
Minister of Lands, Housing and Urban Development advised that the
grant of the lease be conditioned on redevelopment of the market by
the applicant. The lease was awarded for the redevelopment of the
market for an initial conditional period of 5 years commencing on the
20th September, 2016.
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6. The applicant agreed to the terms of the offer in the lease agreement
where they agreed under clause 1.4 to construct a Modern market in
accordance with approved building plans. That clause 5.4 of the lease
agreement provides for re-entry in case the sub-lessee refuses, omits
or neglects to perform the development obligations set out in the
approved plan. The applicant has never carried out any development
on the suit land in accordance with the lease agreement.
7. That in a letter dated 28th April 2010, His Excellency the President
issued a directive that the land for the common user facilities within
Kampala Capital City should be managed by and leased to the
vendors operating in it.
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11. That KCCA held elections for the new market management of
Nakasero Market by KCCA was as a result of a Presidential directive
that was based on the need to prevent exploitation of the vendors
from self-serving association leaders.
12. That the management of Nakasero market and other markets is in line
with the Markets Act, Cap 94
At the hearing of this application the parties were advised to file written
submissions which I have had the occasion of reading and consider in the
determination of this application.
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Whether the suit offends the lis pendens rule?
The 1st respondent submitted that the present suit is directly and
substantially founded on the same subject matter and seeks the same
remedies as in HCCS No. 1141 of 2019, Nakasero Market Vendors &
Traders Limited v Kampala Capital City Authority which is at the
mediation stage at the Land Division before mediator Aphra Mpungu.
The subject matter and remedies prayed for in the matters are substantially
the same and they are that, the Plaintiff/Applicant is;
The 1st respondent counsel contended that this court has jurisdiction to
grant relief sought under Section 33 of the Judicature Act to grant such
remedies sought in this application.
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The parties are the same in the two suits save for the current suit where the
Minister for Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs is the second
party instead of Attorney General. It was the submission of the 1 st
respondent counsel that the Minister and Attorney General are one and the
same person by virtue of Article 119(4)(c) of the Constitution and Section 10
of the Government Proceedings Act.
Secondly, that the earlier suit is about Property rights under Article 26 of
the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as Amended, that’s is why
its in the Land Division-High Court while the instant application is about
the right to be heard and the process by which a body exercising quasi-
judicial powers made the impugned decision affecting the Applicant.
Thirdly, the Minister for Kampala Capital City is not a party to the earlier
suit in the Land division.
It was further their submission that the nature of the reliefs sought, the
matters in issue and the parties in each of the suit differs. That “matters is
issue” [under S. 6 of CPA] does not mean any matter in issue but the entire
subject in controversy.
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cases in question were about property rights whereas instant application is
about decision making process which is a proper case for judicial review as
opposed to one which seeks to determine property rights in Land Division.
Analysis
The lis pendens rule is provided for under Section 6 of the Civil Procedure
Act, thus:
“No court shall proceed with the trial of any suit or proceeding in
which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in
a previously instituted suit or proceeding between the same parties,
or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating
under the same title, where that suit or proceeding is pending in the
same or any other court having jurisdiction in Uganda to grant the
relief claimed. “
The doctrine of lis pendens is only an aspect of the rule of res judicata. Where
a conflict arises between the doctrine of res judicata and lis pendens, the
former will prevail over the latter. In other words, once a judgment is duly
pronounced by a competent court in regard to the subject matter of the suit
in which the doctrine of lis pendens applies, the said decision would operate
as res judicata. See Centenary Rural Development Bank Limited vs Richard
Ivan Nangalama T/A Survesis HCCS No. 116 of 2018
It is not disputed that the applicant as a plaintiff sued the 1st respondent
and Attorney General in HCCS No. 1141 of 2019 at the Land Division
claiming property rights over the suit property acquired by way of a lease
from the 1st respondent.
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The respondent submitted that the same issues arise out of the same
transaction and decisions being taken by the respondent. The subsequent
action by the respondent which the applicant contends that was another
decision was made in compliance with the cabinet decision and this makes
it the same action or a series of actions that have their original root in the
cabinet minute/directive that is under challenge in the land division.
The principle is that the “matters in issue” must be the same in both the
cases and this does not mean any matter in issue but the entire subject in
controversy. In the case of Jadva Karsan v Harnam Singh Bhogal [1953] 20
EACA 74, on page 75 - 76 the Supreme Court of Kenya held that;
“The authorities are clear that “Matter in issue” in section 6 of the Civil
Procedure Ordinance (which corresponds with Section 10 of the Indian Civil
Procedure Code) (equivalent to Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act,
Cap. 71) does not mean any matter in issue in the suit, but has reference to
the entire subject matter in controversy, it is not sufficient that one or
some issues are in common. The subject matter in the subsequent suit
must be covered by the subsequent suit, not vice versa. These conditions
were not met in the instant case and, in my view, section 6 was wrongly
applied”
In this case, the entire dispute or the subject matter arises out of the Cabinet
directive which has changed policy and this is supported by the affidavit of
Hajj Yunus Kakande who stated that:
That in a letter dated 28th April 2010, His Excellency the President issued a
directive that the land for the common user facilities within Kampala Capital
City should be managed by and leased to the vendors operating in it.
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That the Cabinet decided to reverse the policy on common user facilities that
were initially to be managed by sitting tenants and decided that the
Government should repossess all public common user facilities.
That His Excellency the President in a letter dated 14th April 2017 noted that it
was a mistake to privatize the markets and expressed the need to reverse the
Policy.
The decisions taken by the 1st respondent clearly arose out of the decision of
the Cabinet to change its policy on ownership of markets by vendors
associations and the respondents in this matter are merely implementing
agencies of the same cabinet directive.
Secondly, the parties are same and this satisfies the rule of whether the
parties in the previous suit are directly and substantially the same as the
subsequent suit. In the Land division the applicants sued the Attorney
General and in the present application they have sued the Minister for
Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs. It is clear the proper party
to sue in this application for actions of the Minister was supposed to be the
Attorney General under Article 119(4) and 250 of the Constitution.
To this extent the subsequent filing of the instant suit by the applicant
herein amounted to gross violation of the lis pendens rule; a fact which
renders this application wholly untenable. In the case of Springs
International Hotel Ltd v Hotel Diplomate Ltd & Boney M. Katatumba
HCCS No. 227 of 2011 Justice Andrew Bashaija held that; The hearing of the
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same suit would set the concerned judicial officers on a collision course
with the likelihood of arriving at conflicting judgements on the same facts,
which would cause embarrassment and throw the doctrine of precedent
into disarray and create uncertainty.
The filing of this application after filing HCCS No. 1141 of 2019 was also an
abuse of court process since the same remedies are being sought. Section 33
of the Judicature Act enjoins court to curtail abuse of court process and
empowers it as much as possible to avoid multiplicity of suits. In the case of
Attorney General v James Mark Kamoga & Another SCCA No. 8 of 2004
Mulenga JSC(RIP) in his lead Judgment held that; A malicious abuse of legal
process occurs when the party employs it for some unlawful object, not the purpose
which it is intended by law to effect; in other words, a perversion of it”
The applicant having filed this application well aware that it had filed an
earlier suit in the land division was trying to seek the same reliefs or
remedies through a multiplicity of suits which must be discouraged and it
creates a backlog of cases in this strained judicial system with possibility of
having two uncertain and inconsistent decisions by the same court. The
filing of multiple suits is also another form of ‘forum shopping’ that may clog
the judicial system.
The 1st respondent’s counsel submitted that the nature of the alleged
decision and remedies being sought by the applicant point to enforcement
of private law rights in a judicial review application. One of the remedies
sought by the applicant is re-instatement of the applicant’s management
structure in the running of Nakasero Market which is substantially about
management and control of Nakasero Market.
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It was the respondent’s contention that judicial review is only available
against a public body in a public law matter. Not every act of a statutory
body necessarily involves an exercise of statutory power. Some statutory
duties imposed on public bodies may still create private rights in favour of
individuals; enforceable by way of ordinary claim. See Arua Park
Operators and Market Vendors Cooperative Society Limited v Arua
Municipal Council High Court Misc. Cause No. 0003 of 2016
The dispute before the court does not concern the public at large. It is a
dispute based on private ownership and management of Nakasero Market.
The respondent submitted that the nature of the instant case is not
amenable to judicial review. It should be subject to civil suit to determine
ownership and management rights.
The 1st Respondent is a Public body established under the KCCA Act, It
exercised its mandate under the Market Act in public interest. The
Applicants case is that in exercising its mandate under the Acts, the 1 st
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Respondent acted with procedural impropriety, was arbitrary, irrational
and acted unlawfully.
The 1st Respondent decision flows from the administration of the markets
under the Market Act & KCCA Act which vests that administration &
Control to the local authority in public interest otherwise the 1st
Respondent would have no business in running private markets.
The applicant submitted that this is a proper case for judicial review and
prayed that court finds no merit in the second objection.
Analysis
It should be noted that public bodies perform private law acts all the time
in respect of which they can sue or be sued in private law proceedings:
Breaches of contract and covenants in leases and tenancies and negligence,
employment of staff, personal injury etc.
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individuals; enforceable by way of ordinary claim. See Cocks v Thanet
District Council [1983] 2 AC 286; Arua Park Operators and Market Vendors
Cooperative Society Limited v Arua Municipal Council High Court Misc.
Cause No. 0003 of 2016
It ought to be clarified that only because one of the parties to the agreement
is a statutory or public body, the contract cannot be characterised as a
statutory contract. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily
involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies like private parties,
have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise
any issues of public law. The only exception would arise if the terms of a
contract entered into by a statutory body are fixed by statute, the contract
may be regarded as statutory. Statutes may impose a duty on a public
body, but that duty may still create private rights in favour of the
individuals enforceable by ordinary claim. See Public Law in East Africa
by Ssekaana Musa pg39 LawAfrica publishers.
Where there is a concluded contract pure and simple, the parties are then
bound by the contract. The parties can only claim rights conferred on them
by the contract and bound by its terms unless some statute steps in and
confers some special statutory obligations on the part of the administrative
authority in the contractual field. The liability of the statutory body in
contractual obligations is practically the same as that of a private person
enforceable in ordinary claims and not through judicial review.
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analysis, the individual was claiming that some private law right had been
violated. In practice, the courts tend to regard duties imposed on public
bodies alone as primarily public law duties, and the only issue is whether
the duty additionally creates private law rights super-imposed on the
public law duty.
The applicant entered into a sub-lease agreement with the 1st respondent
dated 20th September, 2016 setting out terms and conditions to govern the
relationship of Sub-lessor and Sub-lessee. The applicant and the 1st
respondent further entered into an administrative arrangement with the
applicant to collect revenue from the market on behalf of the Council. The
said transactions are purely contractual and based on the private law rights
that are derived from the said agreements. Contractual obligations should
not be enforced by judicial review, unless the question is whether the
contracting authority has exceeded its powers. Judicial review should be a
remedy of last resort and it is inappropriate where there is another field of
law governing the situation.
This application was not a proper case for judicial review based on the facts
and circumstances of the case.
I so Order
SSEKAANA MUSA
JUDGE
23rd/07/2021
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