MERCADO VS CA, G.R. No.

L-14342, May 30, 1960

FACTS:
A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children
as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a
"pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. ("pitogo"
belonged to Augusto Mercado). The parents of Manuel filed a complaint for damages against the herein
defendant-appellee (Augustu Mercado and his parents). CFI dismissed the complaint. CA awarded P2, 000
as moral damages but denied the prayer for atty fees. Counsel for Mercados argues that since the incident of
the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no
fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of
the latter.

ISSUE: WON the teacher or head should be held responsible? NO.

HELD:
This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but
we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody",
but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school
where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows: ART. 2180. . . . Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where
the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions
of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the
torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated
in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father
or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that
responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.

NOTES
GR NO. L-14342, May 30, 1960 | CIRIACO L. MERCADO VS CA .
Teachers, or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody’, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which
petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” It would seem that the clause
“so long as they remain in their custody,” contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father
and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes
with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does
not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must,
therefore, be held to be without merit.
Phil. School of Business Administration v. CA G.R. No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992

School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be committed
by its students against another student, not by an outsider General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no
pre-existing contract between the parties.

FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista was stabbed to death on the second floor of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) on August 30, 1985. His parents filed a lawsuit against the PSBA and its corporate
officers for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Carlitos was in his third year of a commerce
course at the PSBA when he died. It was found that the people who attacked him were not students at the
school. Instead, they were people from outside the school. The plaintiffs, who are now private respondents,
wanted. to be held responsible for the victim's untimely death because they were allegedly careless, reckless,
and didn’t take security precautions, methods, and means before, during, and after the attack on the victim.
Defendants a quo, who are now petitioners, wanted the suit to be thrown out. They said that since they are
probably being sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint doesn't say why they should be
sued, since case law says that academic institutions like the PSBA are not covered by the rule in that article.
But the respondent trial court didn't agree with petitioners and, in an order from December 8, 1987, denied
their motion to throw out the case. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code talk about the law of quasi-
delicts, which was a big part of why the respondent appellate court made the decision it did. When Article
2180 and Article 2176 of the Civil Code are taken together, they set up the "in loco parentis" rule. Article
2180 of the law makes it clear that the damage must have been done by a student or a student of the
educational institution that is being sued for the actions of its students or students while they were in its care.
But this is not true in this case because the people who hurt Carlitos were not PSBA students, so the school
cannot be held responsible for what they did.

Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second-floor
premises of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic community but were
elements from outside the school. The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the school authorities,
alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security precautions, means and methods before,
during and after the attack on the victim. The appellate court found in their favor, primarily anchoring its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts. Hence, the petition.

A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of PSBA,
prompting the parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers. The private respondents sought
to adjudge them liable for the victim’s untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and
lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The
petitioners sought to have the case dismissed, alleging that they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action as jurisprudence dictates that academic institutions
are beyond ambit of the rule in the aforestated article. The trial court denied their motion to dismiss, and the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)
Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-existing contract
WON PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

HELD:
IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?
It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. The school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a
contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict. In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had
been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. The SC did not agree
with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that
the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought
to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of
PSBA, for whose acts the school could have been made liable.

NO. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
Article 2018 provides that damage should have been caused or inflicted by students of the educational
institution sought to be held liable. This, however, does not exist in the present case as the assailants were
not students of the PSBA. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. (However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract.) In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is yet
no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence
in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a
finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.

NOTES
GR NO. 84698, February 04, 1992 | PSBA CA VS.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

A school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in
the populous student communities of the so-called “university belt” in Manila where there have been
reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable
to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the
security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid
liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence,
here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, Petitioner –versus- ANDION FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 142305, SECOND DIVISION, December 10, 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.
If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only
cause. Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers
safely to their destination lay in the defendant’s failure to provide comfort and convenience to its stranded
passengers using extraordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to
fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant airline could have prevented, defendant becomes
liable to plaintiff."
Indeed, in the instant case, petitioner was not without recourse to enable it to fulfill its obligation to
transport the respondent safely as scheduled as far as human care and foresight can provide to her
destination. Tagged as a premiere airline as it claims to be and with the complexities of air travel, it was
certainly well-equipped to be able to foresee and deal with such situation. The petitioner’s diligence in
communicating to its passengers the consequences of the delay in their flights was wanting

FACTS:
Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano here in the Philippines and abroad. At the time of the
incident, she was availing an educational grant from the Federal Republic of Germany, pursuing a Master’s
Degree in Music majoring in Voice. She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on
February 3 and 4, 1991. For this singing engagement, an airline passage ticket was purchased from
petitioner Singapore Airlines which would transport her to Manila from Frankfurt, Germany on January 28,
1991. From Manila, she would proceed to Malaysia on the next day. It was necessary for the respondent to
pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe; and to rehearse and coordinate with her pianist her
repertoire for the aforesaid performance.
The petitioner issued the respondent a Singapore Airlines ticket for Flight No. SQ 27, leaving Frankfurt,
Germany on January 27, 1991 bound for Singapore with onward connections from Singapore to Manila.
Flight No. SQ 27 was scheduled to leave Frankfurt at 1:45 in the afternoon of January 27, 1991, arriving at
Singapore at 8:50 in the morning of January 28, 1991. The connecting flight from Singapore to Manila,
Flight No. SQ 72, was leaving Singapore at 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991, arriving in Manila at
2:20 in the afternoon of the same day. On January 27, 1991, Flight No. SQ 27 left Frankfurt but arrived in
Singapore two hours late or at about 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991. By then, the aircraft bound
for Manila had left as scheduled, leaving the respondent and about 25 other passengers stranded in the
Changi Airport in Singapore.

Upon disembarkation at Singapore, the respondent approached the transit counter who referred her to the
nightstop counter and told the lady employee thereat that it was important for her to reach Manila on that
day, January 28, 1991. The lady employee told her that there were no more flights to Manila for that day and
that respondent had no choice but to stay in Singapore. Upon respondent’s persistence, she was told that she
can actually fly to Hong Kong going to Manila but since her ticket was non-transferable, she would have to
pay for the ticket. The respondent could not accept the offer because she had no money to pay for it. Her
pleas for the respondent to make arrangements to transport her to Manila were unheeded.

The respondent then requested the lady employee to use their phone to make a call to Manila. Over the
employees’ reluctance, the respondent telephoned her mother to inform the latter that she missed the
connecting flight. The respondent was able to contact a family friend who picked her up from the airport for
her overnight stay in Singapore. The next day, after being brought back to the airport, the respondent
proceeded to petitioner’s counter which says: "Immediate Attention To Passengers with Immediate
Booking." There were
four or five passengers in line. The respondent approached petitioner’s male employee at the counter to
make arrangements for immediate booking only to be told: "Can’t you see I am doing something." She
explained her predicament but the male employee uncaringly retorted: "It’s your problem, not ours."

The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight from Singapore to Malaysia on
January 29, 1991, through the efforts of her mother and travel agency in Manila. Her mother also had to
travel to Malaysia bringing with her respondent’s wardrobe and personal things needed for the performance
that caused them to incur an expense of about P50,000. As a result of this incident, the respondent’s
performance before the Royal Family of Malaysia was below par. Because of the rude and unkind treatment
she received from the petitioner’s personnel in Singapore, the respondent was engulfed with fear, anxiety,
humiliation and embarrassment causing her to suffer mental fatigue and skin rashes. She was thereby
compelled to seek immediate medical attention upon her return to Manila for "acute urticaria."

On June 15, 1993, the RTC awarded damages in favor of respondent. The petitioner assails the award of
damages contending that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law under the given
circumstances. The delay of Flight No. SQ 27 from Frankfurt to Singapore on January 28, 1991 for more
than two hours was due to a fortuitous event and beyond petitioner’s control.

The petitioner further contends that it could not also be held in bad faith because its personnel did their best
to look after the needs and interests of the passengers including the respondent. Because the respondent and
the other 25 passengers missed their connecting flight to Manila, the petitioner automatically booked them to
the flight the next day and gave them free hotel accommodations for the night. It was respondent who did
not take petitioner’s offer and opted to stay with a family friend in Singapore.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner exercise the extraordinary diligence required by law under the given
circumstances. (NO)

RULING:
When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of
carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that
date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of carriage.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the respondent carried a confirmed ticket for the two-legged trip from
Frankfurt to Manila: 1) Frankfurt-Singapore; and 2) Singapore-Manila. In her contract of carriage with the
petitioner, the respondent certainly expected that she would fly to Manila on Flight No. SQ 72 on January
28, 1991. Since the petitioner did not transport the respondent as covenanted by it on said terms, the
petitioner clearly breached its contract of carriage with the respondent. The respondent had every right to sue
the petitioner for this breach. The defense that the delay was due to fortuitous events and beyond petitioner’s
control is unavailing. In PAL vs. CA, we held that:
.... Undisputably, PAL’s diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless,
such occurrence did not terminate PAL’s contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage
and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed to be equipped to deal with situations as in the
case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier’s premises. Hence,
PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort,
convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination......

"...If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only
cause (Art. 1755 C.C., Art. 1733 C.C.). Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common
carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendant’s failure to provide comfort
and convenience to its stranded passengers using extraordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not
solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant airline could have
prevented, defendant becomes liable to plaintiff."

Indeed, in the instant case, petitioner was not without recourse to enable it to fulfill its obligation to transport
the respondent safely as scheduled as far as human care and foresight can provide to her destination. Tagged
as a premiere airline as it claims to be and with the complexities of air travel, it was certainly well-equipped
to be able to foresee and deal with such situation. The petitioner’s diligence in communicating to its
passengers the consequences of the delay in their flights was wanting. As elucidated by the trial court:
It maybe that delay in the take off and arrival of commercial aircraft could not be avoided and may be
caused by diverse factors such as those testified to by defendant’s pilot. However, knowing fully well that
even before the plaintiff boarded defendant’s Jumbo aircraft in Frankfurt bound for Singapore, it has already
incurred a delay of two hours. Nevertheless, defendant did not take the trouble of informing plaintiff, among
its other passengers of such a delay and that in such a case, the usual practice of defendant airline will be
that they have to stay overnight at their connecting airport; and much less did it inquire from the plaintiff and
the other 25 passengers bound for Manila whether they are amenable to stay overnight in Singapore and to
take the connecting flight to Manila the next day. Such information should have been given and inquiries
made in Frankfurt because even the defendant airline’s manual provides that in case of urgency to reach his
or her destination on the same date, the head office of defendant in Singapore must be informed by
telephone or telefax so as the latter may make certain arrangements with other airlines in Frankfurt to bring
such a passenger with urgent business to Singapore in such a manner that the latter can catch up with her
connecting flight such as S-27/28 without spending the night in Singapore.

The respondent was not remiss in conveying her apprehension about the delay of the flight when she was
still in Frankfurt. Upon the assurance of petitioner’s personnel in Frankfurt that she will be transported to
Manila on the same date, she had every right to expect that obligation fulfilled. When a passenger contracts
for a specific flight, he has a purpose in making that choice which must be respected. This choice, once
exercised, must not be impaired by a breach on the part of the airline without the latter incurring any
liability. For petitioner’s failure to bring the respondent to her destination, as scheduled, we find the
petitioner clearly liable for the breach of its contract of carriage with the respondent.