CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

CASE DIGESTS

Submitted to:

ATTY. SHIENDY LOUFER D. CASAÑA

Submitted by:

Reyes, Jerickson A.
2019-12807-MN-0
PARRICIDE AND DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y

G.R. No. 211062; January 13, 2016
PEREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused

FACTS:

In this case, Manuel Bolasco was married to Auria. On February 12, 2003
accused stabbed his wife, Auria in their bedroom resulting in her death. Thus, he was
charged with crime of parricide. Manuel argued that the stabbing was accidental and not
incidental. The RTC found him guilty and was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is Manuel guilty of the crime of parricide for killing his wife, Auria?
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that Manuel is guilty of the crime of parricide for
killing his wife, Auria. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other
descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is
beyond dispute. The defense already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of the
accused-appellant while the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's marriage
certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the
original. Hence, the key element that qualifies the killing to parricide was satisfactorily
demonstrated in this case. Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide as defined
in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Verily, Manuel is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
COMPLEX CRIME OF PARRICIDE WITH UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PAYCANA, JR

G.R. No. 179035; April 16, 2008
TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The crime of parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased
is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. , the elements of unintentional abortion are as
follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally
exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled therefrom.

FACTS:

Accused Jesus Paycana was charged with the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion for stabbing fourteen times his seven month pregnant wife. Jesus
claims self-defense averring that Lilybeth stabbed him first but he succeeded in
wrestling the knife from Lilybeth. Also, he claims that he was not aware of the number of
times he stabbed Lilybeth due to dizziness and bloodloss. The RTC found him guilty
which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is the accused guilty of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional

abortion?
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Yes, Jesus is guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion as his claim for self-defense is not proven. An
accused who interposes self-defense admits the commission of the act complained of.
The burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong, clear
and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal
liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code13
requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
(2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel it,
and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Here, Appellant’s claim of self-defense was belied by the eyewitness testimony of

his own daughter Angelina, which was corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law
Tito and the medical findings. Angelina’s testimony was very clear on how her father
strangled and stabbed her mother just as she was about to greet him upon arriving
home. She begged her father to stop, and even tried to grab her father’s hand but to no
avail. Tito ran to appellant’s house as he heard his daughter Lilybeth’s screaming for
help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He moved
back as he saw appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the window that
appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her. Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a
defense witness who attended to appellant’s wound, testified on cross-examination that
the injuries suffered by appellant were possibly self-inflicted considering that they were
mere superficial wounds. In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further
negated by the physical evidence in the case. Specifically, the number of wounds,
fourteen (14) in all, indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense
but a determined effort to kill his victim. The victim died of multiple organ failure
secondary to multiple stab wounds.

The crime of parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased
is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken
as an admission against penal interest.

Thus, the case before the SC is governed by the first clause of Article 48
because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony
of parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is
committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
Accordingly, Jesus is guilty of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.
 MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA,

G.R. NO. 202124; APRIL 5, 2016
PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful
killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such
as treachery or evident premeditation.

FACTS:

Sometime on 2002, Ireneo together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
armed with firearms, went to the house of Norberto, where they fired their guns directed
towards the family of Norberto who were resting in their Nipa Hut. After the gunfire
cease, 2 daughters of Norberto were found wounded and later died. Consequently,
Ireneo Jugueta was charged for double murder and multiple attempted murder. The
RTC convicted Ireneo which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is Ireneo guilty of the crimes of double murder and multiple attempted murder?

HELD:
The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that Ireneo is guilty of the crimes charged against
him. Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful
killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such
as treachery or evident premeditation.

Here, Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying
down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening,
when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta,
Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go
out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them
having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed
and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were
shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the
victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they
were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and
unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of
the night. Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to
murder. As held in People v. Fallorina, the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up
a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of
appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the
manner of, the commission of the crime. Here, the perpetrators who acted in concert
commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house,
followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go
out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not
only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would
surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina,
Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only
one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.
 In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime,
thus, and only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first
is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first
kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and
the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto
from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family.
When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group
of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing
not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a
complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. The testimony
of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by
destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the
part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. Ireneo Jugueta is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of murder and four counts of attempted
murder.
ALLEGATIONS OF QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE INFORMATION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO SOLAR Y DUMBRIQUE

G.R. NO. 225595, AUGUST 06, 2019
CAGUIOA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The right to question the defects in an Information is not absolute. In fact, defects in an
Information with regard to its form may be waived by the accused. [F]ailure to object
was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation.

FACTS:

Rolando together with Mark Kenneth hit Joseph with a baseball bat on his nape
and ganged him up when he fell down. Joseph was brought to the hospital but was
declared dead on arrival due to the head injuries inflicted to the victim. Thus, Rolando
and Mark Kenneth were charged for the crime of murder. Rolando claims that it was
Joseph who tried to stab him but fortunately he was able to dodge and ran away from
Joseph. The RTC convicted Rolando. On appeal, the CA downgraded the crime
committed from murder to homicide due to the failure of the prosecutor to set forth the
facts and circumstances how treachery attended the killing. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is Rolando guilty of the crime of murder?

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court (SC) Rolando is guilty of the crime of murder. The rule is
well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably shows
community of criminal purpose or design.

In this case, implied conspiracy between the accused can be deduced from the
mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killing. First, Rolando and Mark
Kenneth were together at the crime scene. Second, Rolando mauled the victim after
Mark Kenneth hit him with a baseball bat. Third, as soon as they achieved their
common purpose, both accused fled together. All these acts point to the conclusion that
the accused conspired to commit the crime.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all. In this
case, it is therefore inconsequential whether Rolando delivered a fatal blow or not.

The SC notes that the right to question the defects in an Information is not
absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be waived by the
accused. [F]ailure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Here, Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the Information filed
against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He
voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus,
he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information, including
the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant circumstances. In
other words, Rolando is deemed to have understood the acts imputed against him by
the Information. The CA therefore erred in modifying Rolando's conviction in the way
that it did when he had effectively waived the right to question his conviction on that
ground. It is for this reason that the Court modifies Rolando's conviction from Homicide
to Murder — he failed to question the sufficiency of the Information by availing any of
the remedies provided under the procedural rules, namely: either by filing a motion to
quash for failure of the Information to conform substantially to the prescribed form, or by
filing a motion for bill of particulars. Again, he is deemed to have waived any of the
waivable defects in the Information filed against him. Accordingly, Rolando is guilty of
the crime of murder.
ELEMENTS AND DEFENSE OF RAPE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX

G.R. NO. 229677, OCTOBER 02, 2019
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 266-A (1)(a), rape requires the following elements: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the offender accomplished such act through
force, threat, or intimidation.

FACTS:

On 17 October 2000, accused XXX succeeded in having carnal knowledge with

AAA inside his apartment and was repeated at around 2:00 in the afternoon of the same
day. Accordingly, XXX was charged with two counts of rape. XXX denied the allegations
and posit that they were sweethearts and that the sex was consensual. The RTC
convicted XXX with two counts of rape and was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Hence,
this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Is XXX guilty of two counts of rape?

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that XXX is not guilty with two counts of rape.

Rape is defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,viz.:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

 b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under Article 266-A (1)(a), rape requires the following elements: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the offender accomplished such act through
force, threat, or intimidation. Here, Appellant does not deny the fact that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA twice. He maintains though that when these happened, AAA was his
girlfriend and they both consented to it.

However, the second element is lacking. The Court find AAA's testimony to be
replete with material inconsistencies and improbabilities. She testified she was locked
inside the room although on cross, she backtracked and said the room was not locked.
In fact, she admitted she could not even remember whether the door had a lock at all.
Granting the room was locked from the outside, she neither knocked nor shouted for
help. Too, AAA confirmed that the windows in appellant's room were open; thus, she
could have easily asked for help from people outside. But she did not. More, AAA did
not testify that she was denied the capacity to move or even shout while she was left
alone in appellant's room. For sure, AAA had the opportunity to call for help and a
chance to escape. But she did nothing.

More, when AAA was allegedly rescued by her mother, she never disclosed to
her about the supposed rape incidents. It was so unnatural for a rape victim who
claimed to have been detained overnight by her rapist not to have immediately if not
spontaneously uttered a single word to her mother right after she got rescued.

The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its
compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.
Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and
experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance. Consistently,
the Court has ruled that evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth
of a credible witness but must be credible in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with
the knowledge and common experience of mankind.45 Here, AAA's testimony is by
itself highly incredible not only for being replete with material inconsistencies but also for
being contrary to the common experience of man and the natural course of things.

Further, BBB's testimony sharply contradicted AAA's testimony that she was
locked inside her room and appellant freed her only when her mother came. BBB
revealed she was the one who opened the door of the room where AAA claimed she
was locked in. In fact, it was appellant who let BBB in, led her to the room, and freely
allowed her and AAA to leave. Surely, the individual testimonies of AAA and BBB lead
to these indubitable conclusion: AAA was not detained and as between AAA and her
mother, only one was telling the truth, the other one was lying.

What is more baffling was, after the supposed rape incidents, appellant went to
AAA's house to propose marriage to her on October 20, 2000. He was allowed to enter
the house without BBB showing any sign of anger toward him. CCC likewise revealed
that AAA had apparently anticipated appellant's visit after AAA left his apartment. In
fact, AAA even forewarned her not to believe appellant if he ever told her they were
romantically involved.

Likewise the following uncontroverted evidence, viz: 1) a 2x2 picture from AAA
with her handwritten note: "This picture is for you so keep this as a simple remembrance
from me, [AAA]; "50 2) AAA's message written on a Jollibee table napkin: "Pa,
Napakaswerte mong lalake ikaw ang nakauna sa akin. Love, [AAA]; "51 and 3)
appellant even left an engagement ring and cash with BBB to be given to AAA.

Also, DDD, an impartial witness, testified that in many instances she witnessed
on her own the sweet romantic gestures of appellant and AAA toward each other.

Notably, the prosecution failed to refute these exculpatory pieces of evidence

including the credible testimony of DDD, an impartial witness. The prosecution's
deafening silence to react toward these vital pieces of evidence speaks volumes of the
weakness of the charges against appellant.
 Time and again, we have ruled that the existence of a romantic relationship
between two (2) persons does not discount the commission of rape for it can be
committed by one spouse against the other. But here, AAA's credibility is seriously
being put in question vis-à-vis the testimony of her mother BBB, her sister CCC, and
DDD, an impartial witness together with her two (2) handwritten messages to appellant
--- plainly indicating she was not honest after all about the rape charges she initiated
against appellant.

In light of the foregoing considerations, appellant's defense of consensual sexual

intercourse was likely to be true than not.

When a witness is untruthful, any other statement that he or she utters becomes
doubtful. For that matter, where the doubt hinges on the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the Court is compelled to acquit and uphold the Constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused.

Accordingly, the appeal is granted. XXX is acquitted of the two counts of rape
charged against him.
PARRICIDE, MURDER WITH UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION, EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS WHEN INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIONISIO MAGBANUA, and RUDY ABA-A
G.R. NO. L-34527-28 JULY 30, 1982
BARREDO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Where the confession is involuntary, being due to maltreatment or induced by fear or

intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion
whether physical, mental, or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is
essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing.

There is the requirement that a confession to be received as evidence must be shown

to be freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat,
menace, or promise or offer of reward or leniency

Involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts — by some on the ground that a
confession so obtained is unreliable; and by some of the grounds of humanitarian
principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness toward the accused in criminal
proceedings. But either theory arrives at the same goal. Such a confession is not legal
evidence and must be rejected. If the accused satisfactorily shows that it was made
involuntarily, the confessions stand discredited in the eyes of the law and is a thing
which never existed.

FACTS:

In this case, Dionisio Magbanua was found guilty of the crime of Parricide (in the
first case) and, together with his brother-in-law, herein appellant Rudy Aba-a, also guilty
of the crime of Murder with Unintentional Abortion (in the second case) in killing Manuel
Magbanua and his 8th month concubine, Anastacia Sayon by the subject Court of First
Instance. The decision was anchored on the failure of the accused to identify their
alleged tormentors, their unexplained silence on their alleged maltreatment by the police
for eight months, their failure to support said maltreatment charges with medical
evidence and the fact that their confessions were detailed, coherent and spontaneous.
On appeal, Accused-appellants maintain that their extrajudicial confessions were
extracted through force, violence intimidations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court correctly relied upon such evidence of the
prosecution as basis for the conviction of herein appellants.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and acquitted
appellants, holding that contrary to the findings of the court a quo (a) appellant Aba-a
identified the policemen who maltreated him while appellant Magbanua satisfactorily
explained his inability to name them; (b) the alleged confessions were identically
drafted, in narration form and not in the usual questions and answer form, without
details and contained material conflicts; (c) the maltreatment suffered by appellants is
supported by the findings and testimony of the prosecution doctor witness, apart from
the fact that, among others, there was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime
charged against appellants, both appellants were arrested without any lawful cause nor
warrant of arrest, and the prosecution did not even care to present as witness the police
officers who took down the extrajudicial confessions of appellants to uphold the integrity
and trustworthiness of such statements.
MURDER, ATTEMPTED MURDER, FRUSTRATED MURDER AND DAMAGES

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANG ANGELES Y GUARIN, JAMES

SANTOS @ "CHITA," DENNIS RAMOS, AND SONNY BAYNOSA @ "JONG,"
ACCUSED, DANG ANGELES Y GUARIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
G.R. NO. 224289, AUGUST 14, 2019
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

DOCTRINE:

For Murder:
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 (RA 7659) provides:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity; xxx
Murder requires the following elements: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
As pronounced in Gervero and People v. Jugueta,"when no documentary
evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00
as temperate damages shall be awarded."

For Attempted Murder:

Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Under the indeterminate
sentence law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the minimum term should be within the
range of prision correccional, which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years, and the maximum term should be within the range of prision mayor in its
medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.

As for civil liabilities, Jugueta decreed:

I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation,

Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
xxxx

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – P25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P25,000.00

Frustrated Murder

Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The

penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the imposable penalty for

frustrated murder is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
 As for civil liabilities, Jugueta decreed:

II. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation,
Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
xxxx

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – P50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P50,000.00

FACTS:

Appellant Dang Angeles y Guarin, James Santos alias "Chita," Dennis Ramos,
and Sonny Baynosa alias "Jong," were charged with murder in killing Abelardo with the
use of a bladed weapons and two (2) counts of frustrated murder in attacking, stabbing
and hitting Eric and Mark Ryan all surname Evangelista. Only Appellant got
apprehended and detained. James Santos alias "Chita," Dennis Ramos, and Sonny
Baynosa alias "Jong" remained at large. After presenting their respective version, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the appellant guilty of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder.

The trial court found that the prosecution witnesses testified in a categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous manner. Their testimonies were consistent on
material points, more particularly, on how each of the victims was stabbed by appellant
and his co-accused. The trial court held that the credible and positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses necessarily prevail over appellant's denial.
 The trial court further held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended
the commission of the crime because the perpetrators, including appellant, suddenly
stabbed the unarmed victims without any warning, thus, totally depriving the victims of
the opportunity to defend themselves.

Finally, the trial court found appellant to have acted in conspiracy with his co-
accused Santos, Ramos, and Baynosa. As established by the evidence on record,
these persons acted in such synchronized and coordinated manner indicating unity of
purpose and design.

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding him guilty as charged in all
three (3) cases. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the said appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modification on the civil liabilities. Hence, appellant seeking
affirmative relief and prays anew for his acquittal in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the verdict of conviction against
appellant for murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder?

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that RTC and Court of Appeals did not erred
in affirming the verdict of conviction against appellant for murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. The CA was correct in sustaining the RTC’s finding that appellant
and his co-accused conspired to slay the Evangelista Brothers. The SC explained that
conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. Proof of express agreement, however,
is not always required to be shown. Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses unequivocally depict one clear picture: appellant, Baynosa, Ramos, and
Santos all acted in a coordinated manner in order to consummate their common desire,
i.e. slay the Evangelista brothers. While there was no express agreement between
appellant and his co-accused, their concerted actions indicate that they did conspire
with each other for the fulfillment of such common purpose.
 The herein appellant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in lieu of treachery
is appreciated against him. Further, he was guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Lastly, he was also guilty of frustrated murder and sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight months (8) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.
With corresponding civil liabilities for each crime.
PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED UPON PRINCIPALS OF A FRUSTRATED CRIME

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL BORCE

G.R. NO. 124131 APRIL 22, 1998
VITUG, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the crime is frustrated the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed;
hence, Article 50 of the same Code states:

Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The

penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1994, Regina Baga went into the forest to collect firewood she was
followed by herein appellant, Samuel Borce, who wrested away the bolo she was
carrying and with the same threatened to kill her. Being of a much bigger and stronger
build, the appellant succeeded in raping the victim despite her efforts to resist. The
appellant then dragged her deeper into the forest where he raped her again for the
second time. The appellant thereafter proceeded to strangle her with the intention of
killing her but the victim regained her consciousness thereafter. She notices the hack
wounds that have been made to her face and called for help. The victim’s son and
daughter were able to locate her and thereafter bring her to the hospital for medical
assistance for the almost fatal wounds she incurred. The accused was found guilty of
two counts of rape and frustrated murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death because the victim had suffered permanent physical mutilation.

ISSUE:

Is RTC correct on imposing the death penalty for each crime of rape which has
been premised on the infliction of three scars on the victim's face?
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that for each count of rape, there being neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance alleged and proved in the commission thereof,
the penalty, conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, that should properly
be imposed on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

The SC explained that the injuries incurred by the victim should not be taken as a
circumstance which would raise the penalty to death for the crime of frustrated murder.
The case had failed to disclose that the accused inflicted the wounds to her face
deliberately to maim her. If such were the case then the circumstance of permanent
physical mutilation would have been considered. But the wounds sustained were a
result of the appellants attempt to kill her and should therefore be absorbed by the crime
of frustrated murder of which he was convicted. The penalty was therefore reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE CASE (DOCUMENTED ALIBI VS. POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION) AND DNA EVIDENCE

ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176389; December 14, 2010
ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:

• The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and

• The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence
that:

• He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and

• That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

FACTS:

In 1991, Estrelita and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at
their home in Paranaque City. The police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom
gave detailed confessions but the trial court smelled a frame-up and ordered them to be
discharged.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced
that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its
informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro’s testimony, on August 10, 1995 the
public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.
 Jessica Alfaro’s testimony stated that after she had a shabu session with Webb
and company at the parking lot of Ayala Alabang Commercial Center, they drove by
convoy to Carmela Vizconde’s house but only Alfaro proceeded to Carmela’s house and
the others parked along Aguirre Ave. upon Alfaro’s arrival, she was seen by Carmela
and told by the latter that she cannot leave yet but instructed Alfaro to return before
midnight as she just got home. Carmela instructed Afaro that she would leave the
pedestrian gate and the kitchen gate unlocked. Sometime later, Carmela drove out of
her house and was followed by Alfaro who saw Carmela drop off her boyfriend at
Aguirre Ave. Alfaro then returned to Webb’s group and informed Webb that Carmela
dropped off her boyfriend then Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the evening and
they all again returned to the parking lot of Ayala Alabang Commercial Center where
they had another shabu session wherein Webb gave out free cocaine. After about 40 to
45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said,“Pipilahan natin
siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna.” Lejano said, “Ako ang susunod” and the others
responded “Okay, okay.” Upon arrival at Carmela’s house, Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the
eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area. As she lost sight of
Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going
and she replied that she was going out to smoke. After 10 minutes, Alfaro decided to go
back in the house where she heard a static like noise which grew louder as she
approached the master’s bedroom. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela
while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano
was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and
in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed. Webb gave Alfaro a
meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area.
He told her, “Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo.” Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the
sidewalk.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and
saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest
since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He
presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to
prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro’s bad reputation
for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Webb and his co-accussed and the same
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under
the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the
Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific
evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the
case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial
record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process citing the case of Brady V. Maryand which acquitted
the accused on the ground of lack of due process given the state’s failure to produce
either by negligence of willful suppression of the semen as DNA evidence.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not failure to conduct a DNA test on the semen specimen found on
Carmela is a ground for Webb’s acquittal.

2. Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given
more credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.
HELD:
1. No, the Supreme Court held that Webb may not be acquitted due to the loss of
DNA evidence. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be
overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen
although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on
the part of the prosecution or the police.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting
the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as
evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial
court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his
co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

And finally, they raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as
an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the
accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending
adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime
passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having
such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

2. For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:

• The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible

witness; and

• The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived.

The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above
criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around the agency for some time as a stool pigeon,
one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And although her
testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators
knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in
her testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door
glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
 To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence that:

• He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the

crime, and

• That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary
alibi presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only
with respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused. For, if the Court accepts
the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony
will not hold altogether. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN RELATION TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED
FROM THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE CASE

ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176389; JANUARY 18, 2011
ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of
being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason
for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is
ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for
the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the
State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in
terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted accused,
namely: Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision,
claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the
facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and
erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of
justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses."
ISSUE:

Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court held that as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be
reconsidered for it places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion
for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion,
resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases,
the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to

bring pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not specify that violations
of due process and acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court
supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also allege that the Court held a sham review
of the decision of the CA. What the complainant actually questions is the Court's
appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility.
That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro as not a credible witness. The
complaint wants the court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment
based on such evaluation which is not constitutionally allowed and therefore, the
judgment of acquittal can no longer be disturbed.
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE, CONSPIRACY AND LEGALITY AND
PRACTICALITY OF IMPOSING MULTIPLE DEATH PENALTIES

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL.,

defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY,"
EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA,
G.R. NO. L-28232 FEBRUARY 6, 1971
PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE:

Under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took
effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:

"ART. 335. When and how rape committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. By using force or intimidation;

"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.
 "When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the

penalty shall be death.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct,
though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is
determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas
service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or
penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does
not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since
actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of
the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into
the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and
number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed
by law.

"Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only
two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively.
The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of
the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said
penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

"The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality,
has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is
an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately
projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of
capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the
convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in
his behalf.

"Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional
power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it
proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the
practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple
life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years
corresponding to a single life sentence."

FACTS:

In this case, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias
“Boy”, Eduardo Aquino Alias “Eddie” and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and Jessie Guion as accomplices, conspired together,
confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la
Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the incident,
where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to
the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction
with Rape.

The Supreme Court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on
the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against them,
the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf was granted, and the case dismissed
against them.

Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and
sentences each of them to the death penalty.

ISSUE:

1. What kind of rape was committed?

2. Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the
element of conspiracy.

HELD:
1. Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion
perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 4111
which took effect on June 20, 1964. Under the law, rape is committed by having canal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force and
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason and otherwise unconscious; and
(3) when the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The
crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is committed
the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first
of the crimes committed, and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the
provision of Art 48 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum
period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this
regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
 However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances:
(a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the
commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been
committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the
appellants in ordering the complaint to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for ten
minutes before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) the use of motor vehicle.

Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Cañal), none of them may
claim aggravating circumstances has been offset by the mitigating circumstance.
Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the
proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three
aggravating circumstances remaining.

2. No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The Supreme Court ruled that since
the element of conspiracy was present, where the act of one is the act of all, each of the
accused is also liable for the crime committed by each of the other persons who
conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants
Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of
three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is likewise
convicted with four death penalties and to indemnify the victim of the sum of P10,000 in
each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio Cañal was dismissed only in so far as
the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to promulgation of
judgment.
RAPE-SLAY CASE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE

MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO
CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT
G.R. Nos. 121039-45; October 18, 2001
MELO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Equally settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
Positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of
the crime, as we have consistently held, demolishes the alibi - the much abused
sanctuary of felons.
Categorical declarations of witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the
crime are more credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused.
FACTS:

In 1993, the country was shocked with the happening of the Allan Gomez –
Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay incident. The case drew strong condemnation from an
outraged populace. The accused charged were Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez,
George Medialdea, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and
Pepito Kawit. Then Pasig Regional Trial Court Judge Harriet Demetriou found all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven
counts.

The prosecution's version of the events on that horrible night was based mainly
on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan,
members of appellant Sanchez' security team. They were co-conspirators turned state
witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen and Allan, but
denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed.

The autopsy and vaginal examination conducted by prosecution witness Dr.

Vladimir V. Villaseñor, medico-legal officer of the PNP-CIS, on Eileen’s cadaver
buttresses all the more the gang-rape story of the prosecution. Dr. Villaseñor’s findings,
in a nutshell, disclosed the presence of multiple contusions on Eileen’s body, fresh
shallow lacerations on her hymen, a congested cervix, a gaping labia majora and
oozing whitish fluid (tested positive for spermatozoa) from the vaginal opening. Oozing
spermatozoa, Dr. Villaseñor explained, means that the amount of semen was much
more than the vaginal canal could contain and that there were several seminal
ejaculations that occurred therein. He also noted that a great quantity of whitish fluid
continued to ooze from Eileen’s vaginal opening despite her death for several hours.

The accused went before the Supreme Court to appeal. The pith of the assigned
errors and the focus of the appellants' arguments was the issue of witnesses Centeno
and Malabanan's credibility, whose open-court narrations served as principal basis for
the trial court's rendition of a guilty verdict.

ISSUE:

Are the accused correctly charged with the crime of Homicide and Rape?

HELD:
Yes. The accused are correctly charged with the crime of Homicide and Rape.
Categorical declarations of witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the crime are
more credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused.

To recall, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi, i.e., they were at
their respective homes on the night of the rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan
confirmed the presence of all the appellants on the night of June 28, 1993 till the early
morning of the following day and detailed the exact participation of each in the crime

Moreover, except for the Mayor who presented Ave Marie Tonee Jimenez
Sanchez (his daughter with his mistress Elvira) and Medialdea who presented his
neighbor Anastacia Gulay, the other appellants failed to present corroborating
testimonial evidence to butress their respective alibis. The defense of alibi is inherently
weak especially when wanting in material corroboration.
 In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally harp on the
contradictions in four (4) Sworn Statements executed by Centeno. It may be conceded
that there are inconsistencies in Centeno's testimony, but they refer to trivial details
which do not, in actuality, touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime
committed.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details

and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their
veracity, or the weight testimony.

Consequently, this Court will not reject the testimony of Centeno on the basis of
inconsistencies in his sworn statements taken by police authorities which have been
sufficiently explained. What is more important is that Centeno testified on the witness
stand in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained
consistent on cross-examination. This Court, therefore, finds Centeno a credible
witness.

Additionally, the contention of the accused that the Dr. Ernesto Brion who
testified to the effect that there can be no multiple rape if there is only one laceration on
Eileen's hymen as testified to by Dr. Villaseñor is untenable.The Court dismissed the
argument and ruled that the absence of extensive abrasions or contusions on the
vaginal wall does not rule out rape because the slightest penetrations enough.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
HOMICIDE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFREDO ARAQUEL

G.R. NO. L-12629; DECEMBER 9, 1959
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

DOCTRINE:

The jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, as enlarged, extends
only to "assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident at the trial." (Section
87[c]).

A fortiori, where the intent to kill is evident - as in cases of homicide under the
exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code - the case
must necessarily fall beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts.

Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous

provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused - who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury,
as the case may be - is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment
and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.)
And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted
from punishment.

FACTS:

On 1955, complaint for homicide against Alfredo Araquel accusing him of having
hacked and killed Alberto Pagadian with a bolo. Later on, the complaint filed was
amended a complaint alleging that upon reinvestigation of the facts he found that the
crime committed by the accused was not homicide as charged in the original complaint
but that of homicide under exceptional circumstances as provided for in article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Thereafter, the court rendered decision finding accused guilty under the crime of
homicide under exceptional circumstances and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
destierro for a period of one year to any place not within the radius of at least 25
kilometers from the municipal building of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.

In 1957, the provincial fiscal, filed with the Court of First Instance of the province
an information against the accused Alfredo Araquel charging him with homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the killing of
Alberto Pagadian. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground of
double jeopardy, invoking the previous charge against him for homicide under
exceptional circumstances and the subsequent sentence passed upon him by the
justice of the Peace Court. The trial court sustained the plea of double jeopardy and
dismissed the information. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction over cases charged with
Homicide under exceptional circumstances.

HELD:
No. The Justice of the Peace Court has no jurisdiction over cases charged with
Homicide under exceptional circumstances, rather, it is the Court of First Instance who
has jurisdiction. Consequently, a complaint or information charging homicide under the
exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 must fall under the jurisdiction of the
Courts of First Instance, the offense charged being actually that of homicide.

Conformably to the above findings, we hold that defendant was not tried by a
court of competent jurisdiction when he was arraigned before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Narvacan upon the amended complaint for "homicide under exceptional
circumstances" filed against him by the chief of police of the municipality, and
consequently, has not legally been placed in jeopardy in the present case. Wherefore,
the order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
CHILD ABUSE CASES : SEXUAL ASSUALT AND STATUTORY RAPE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR TULAGAN

G.R. NO. 227363, MARCH 12, 2019
PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or

discrepancies does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In
fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing
the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.
Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal
elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as
the perpetrator of the same.

FACTS:

In this case, AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that sometime in September 2011
while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to her grandmother's
house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private
part. AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she
was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he brought her to his house and
told her to keep quiet. There and then, Tulagan raped her. She did not tell anyone about
the incident, until her aunt examined her private part.

The aunt of the victim AAA, testified that around 10:30 a.m. of October 17, 2011,
she noticed a man looking at AAA outside their house. When AAA asked her permission
to go to the bathroom located outside their house, the man suddenly went near AAA. As
BBB came close to AAA, the man left suddenly. She asked AAA to move her panties
down, and examined her genitalia. She noticed that her genitalia was swollen. AAA then
confessed to her about the wrong done to her by appellant whom AAA referred to as
Badong or Salvador Tulagan
 Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed
laceration at 6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a dilated or enlarged vaginal
opening. She said that it is not normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated vaginal
opening and laceration in the hymen. For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not
know AAA well. He added that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m.
at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves he gathered at the back of their
kitchen.

The RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof
in two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual assault and
statutory rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive
declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. Aggrieved, Tulagan
invoked the same arguments he raised before the CA in assailing his conviction. To
support his appeal, he argued that the testimony of AAA was fraught with
inconsistencies and lapses which affected her credibility.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the decision of the RTC?

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that CA did not err in affirming the decision of
the RTC. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, both the RTC and the CA
also found that the elements thereof were present, to wit: (1) accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim, and (2) said act was accomplished when the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age. Indubitably, the courts a quo found that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for the crime of rape. We
find no reason to deviate from said findings and conclusions of the courts a quo.

Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or

discrepancies does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In
fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing
the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.
Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal
elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as
the perpetrator of the same.

As correctly held by the CA, the fact that some of the details testified to by AAA
did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean that the sexual assault did
not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she
suffered in Tulagan's hands. AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward and
candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as well as
her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are, thus, sufficient
to support a conviction of rape.

The Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases states that "lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of
the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person."

Rape as a Crime against chastity" (a private crime) to a Crime against persons"

(a public crime) as a matter of policy and public interest. Concededly, R.A. No. 8353
defined specific acts constituting acts of lasciviousness as a. distinct crime of "sexual
assault," and increased the penalty thereof from prision correccional to prision mayor.
But it was never the intention of the legislature to redefine the traditional concept of
rape. The Congress merely upgraded the same from a "crime against chastity" (a
private crime) to a "crime against persons" (a public crime) as a matter of policy and
public interest in order to allow prosecution of such cases even without the complaint of
the offended party, and to prevent extinguishment of criminal liability in such cases
through express pardon by the offended party.
 Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime
against chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin
to rape, as well as the rulings in Dimakuta and Caoili. We hold that if the acts
constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is
demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and
no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no
longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium
period, and not prision mayor.
QUALIFIED RAPE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO BACULE

G.R. NO. 127568; JANUARY 28, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged
in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.

An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances. 1. By using force or
intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; 3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime or rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances: (Qualified Rape)
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation.

FACTS:

In 1995, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while the victim, 8 years of age,
was asleep together with the accused, her common-law father, in their house and while
her mother was in Sibonga, Cebu, she was awakened when the accused undressed her
by removing her dress, short pants and panty and thereafter raped her. Immediately on
the following morning, she revealed and narrated the sad experience she suffered in the
hands of the accused to her aunt who occupied the second floor of the house. On that
same day she was brought to the hospital for medical examination.

Dr. Joycelyn Gonzales, a resident physician of Lapu-lapu City District Hospital,

testified she conducted a medical examination on the rape victim/complainant. Based
on her findings, a contusion appeared on the hymenal wall on both sides of the vagina,
There was no deep penetration as to cause the laceration. However, in rare cases, the
hymen would still remain intact even if there is deep penetration. Thus, the court
rendered decision finding the accused GUILTY of rape beyond reasonable doubt,
attended by the aggravating circumstances of ignominy, moral ascendancy and being
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether accused can be prosecuted on qualified rape in the absence of

the allegation of the relationship of the victim and the offender in the information.

(2) Whether the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and moral

ascendancy as ruled by the trial court can be appreciated on this case?

HELD:
(1) No. The accused cannot be prosecuted on qualified rape in the absence of
the allegation of the relationship of the victim and the offender in the information. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with the victim, a child eight years of age. Appellant, however, cannot
be sentenced to death under the first circumstance listed in the last paragraph of Article
335, as amended. While the prosecution did prove that appellant was the common-law
spouse of the victim's parent, such fact was not alleged in the information.

The Court held that the failure to allege in the information the relationship
between the accused and the victim constituted a violation of the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The Court thus reduced
from death to reclusion perpetua the penalty imposed upon appellant therein since the
relationship between him and his 14-year old daughter, though proved, was not alleged
in the information. As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or
in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he
was not properly informed that he was being accused of qualified rape.

(2) No. Aggravating circumstances of ignominy and moral ascendancy as ruled

by the trial court cannot be appreciated on this case. Ignominy is defined as a
circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the
material injury caused by the crime.This Court in previous rape cases, has held the
following circumstances ignominious: where the accused ordered the complainant to
exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes before raping her; rape
was committed in front of the husband of the victim or by two or more persons in view of
one another; where the sexual intercourse was performed in the "dog style" position;
and where the accused plastered mud on the victim's private part. Ignominy was also
present in People vs. Lozano, where the victim was pregnant and whose pleas on that
ground were ignored by the accused who went on to force his lust on her. This Court
however finds the evidence insufficient to prove that appellant indeed committed
sodomy.

Aggravating circumstances before being taken into consideration for the purpose
of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as
the criminal offense. It bears noting that the prosecution never even sought to prove
ignominy, and the alleged act of sodomy was brought out only during cross-
examination. Worse, the prosecution did not pursue this matter by conducting re-direct
examination. This lapse on the part of the prosecution can only favor the accused.

Moral ascendancy is also unfounded. “Moral ascendancy" is not listed among the
circumstances considered aggravating by Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
Article 63, supra, when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Accordingly, the penalty of
death meted by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. Wherefore, the Court
finds appellant Rolando Bacule guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
STATUTORY RAPE AND QUALIFIED RAPE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXXXXXXXXXX

G.R. NO. 229836, JULY 17, 2019
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

DOCTRINE:

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve

(12) years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of
force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape.
For the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the
age of twelve (12). At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to
convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of
proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the
sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.

Qualified Rape; Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x x x The death penalty shall
also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; x x x
Under the foregoing provisions, rape is qualified when:
a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and

b) committed by the victim's parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative

by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law
spouse of the victim's parent.
 But, in order for an accused to be convicted of qualified rape, the Information
itself must allege that the (1) victim is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
rape and the (2) accused is the victim's parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, or
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse
of the victim's parent. These are special qualifying circumstances which alter the nature
of the crime of rape and warrant the increase of the imposable penalty.

FACTS:

In this case, AAA recounted that sometime in 1999 when she was still 8 years of
age, appellant, a step-father of AAA, woke her up and raped her. When BBB, her
mother, came home, she tried to tell her what happened but BBB did not believe her.
The second rape, happened three (3) days later. This scenario took place from 1999 to
2004 which AAA alleged to happened once or twice a day.

In 2004, AAA narrated her ordeal to her friend Portia, who in turn, told her aunt
Lucia Lawas. Thereafter, Lucia Lawas took her first to a priest for confession and then
to a social worker at the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). AAA
was physically examined twice: first by a doctor at Danao General Hospital, and second
by Dr. Liwayway Reyes of VSMMC. Dr. Reyes found that AAA sustained deep notches
at 3, 7, 10, and 12 o'clock positions. Medical expert Dr. Naomi Poca of VSMMC testified
that a finding of 7 o'clock notch is suggestive of an injury caused by a blunt instrument.
Dr. Poca further opined that if the subject had no history of operation or accident, said
notch could have been caused by sexual abuse.

ISSUE:

Whether appellant is guilty two (2) counts of statutory rape or qualified rape?

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's for qualified rape, not for statutory rape.
The SC hold, however, that appellant is guilty of two (2) counts of qualified rape, not
statutory rape. To recall, the prosecution and the defense stipulated that AAA was still a
minor in January 2000. But was she below twelve (12) years old when the twin counts
of rape happened? The evidence on record do not say so. Surely, minority does not
mean one is below twelve (12) years old. It only means one has not reached the age of
majority (eighteen [18] years old). In other words, appellant cannot be convicted of
statutory rape. But, he is guilty of qualified rape in accordance with Articles 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code
In it was uniformly alleged that accused was AAA's stepfather and AAA was "a
virgin under 12 years of age." The parties stipulated only on her minority, which means
below eighteen (18) years old and not below twelve (12) years old. In any event, in view
of the concurrence of the elements of relationship and age (below eighteen [18] years
old), appellant indubitably committed qualified rape which warrants the imposition of the
death penalty. Albeit by virtue of RA 9346, the death penalty has been reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

Wherefore, the appeal is denied. Appellant XXXXXXXXXXX is found guilty of

qualified rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in each
case.