THE SUPPLY OF COTTON IN ZAIRE: A FEASIBILITY STUDY

BY

LITITIYo AFATA
 THE SUPPLY OF COTTON IN ZAIRE: A FEASIBILITY STUDY

by

Lititiyo Afata

k thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the North Carolina Agri­

cultural and Technical State University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Agricultural Eco­
nomics.

Greensboro

1983

Approved by:

Advisor

Chairman of the Deja7 tment

Dean of the Gaduate-School

IN MEMORY OF MY BELOVED FATHER,
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author i:ould first of all acknowledge appreciation to all those

who have contributed to the completion of the Master's program at North

Carolina A&T State University. Special thanks go to Dr. Anthony Yeboah

and Dr. Sidney Evans of North Carolina A&T State University, and Dr. Jack

C. Thompson of the University of Georgia, who contributed more than any

other to the thesis development. Suggestions from Dr. Thompson and other

colleagues were of great importance. Comments from other faculty members

and people involved in cotton production and manufacture in the Republic

of Zaire are also appreciated. We wish to express appreciation to the

United States Agency for International Development and the Zaire Govern­

ment for providing the scholarship; for without such assistance, this pro­

gram could not have been completed.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................... i

LIST OF TABLES .................................................... iv

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................... vi

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ 1.
Statement of the Problem .................................... 1
Objectives of the Study ..................................... 4
Application of Theory ....................................... 4
Methodology ................................................. 8
Scope and Limitations ....................................... 9
Review of Related Literature ................................ 10

II. THE COTTON INDUSTRY ......................................... 14

Introduction of Cotton in Zaire ............................. 14

The ONAFITEX ................................................ 20
The Textile Industry in Zaire ............................... 25

III. CURRENT SITUATION AND ANALYSIS OF PRESENT POLICIES .......... 33

Buying and Ginning Cotton ................................... 33

Cotton Production Projects .................................. 33
Cotton Pricing Policy ....................................... 46
Evaluation of Constraints on Cotton Production at
the Farm Level .............................................. 51

ii
 Page

IV. FEASIBILITY COMPARISON OF COTTON WITH ALTERNATIVE

ENTERPRISES ........................... ..................... 64

Labor Requirements .......................................... 64

Level of Inputs Used ........................................ 64
Yields and Gross Returns Representative of
Selected Crops .............................................. 69
The Marketing Channel ....................................... 75

V. SUNH'ARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ............. 80

Summary and Conclusions ..................................... 80

Policy Recommendations ...................................... 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................... 90

GLOSSARY .......................................................... 92

iii
 LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Seed Cotton Production, Republic of Zaire, 1915-1980 ....... 16

2. Republic of Zaire: Cotton Companies, Number of

Ginning Plants and Their Location .......................... 21
3. Nominal and Real Salaries of both the Private and
Public Sectors, Zaire, 1975-1980 ........................... 28
4. Ranking of the Mills by Weaving Capacity, Zaire, 1982 ...... 30

5. Sources of Cotton for Textile Mills, Zaire, 1982 ........... 31

6. Current Inventory of Cotton Gins Operated by the
Cotton Companies, Zaire, 1982 .............................. 34
7. C.S.Co.'s Projections of Cotton Production for Five
Years of Program Beginning 1980, Zaire, 1982 ............... 37
8. Cotton Activity of P.M.K.O. Project, Zaire, 1982 ........... 40

9. Allocation of Investment Budget to Selected Sectors

of the Economy, Zaire, 1978 to 1981 ........................ 43

10. The Share of the Government in the Investment of

the Three Cotton Companies, Zaire, 1981 .................... 44

11. Financing Sources for the "Programme de Relance de

le Culture Cotonniere au Zaire," Zaire, 1981 ............... 45

12. Nominal and Deflated Prices for Seed Cotton,

Zaire, 1975-1981 ........................................... 48

13. Effect on Mechanization and the Use of Insecticides

on Farm Income, Tanganyika and South Maniema
Sub-Region, Zaire, 1978 .................................... 60

14. Labor Requirements for One Hectare of Cotton, Zaire, 1982 65

15. Family Size of Selected Farmers in Bas-Ueles and Lualaba

Sub-Regions, Zaire, 1982 ................................... 67

iv
 Page
Table

16. Level of Education of Selected Farmers in the Bas-Ueles

68
and Lualaba Sub-Regions, Zaire, 1982 .......................

17. Yield and Gross Returns Representative of Selected

Crops in the Bas-Ueles and Lualaba Sub-Regions, 70
Zaire, 1982 ................................................

18. Labor Requirements for One Hectare of Land Planted 71

to Selected Crops in Bas-Ueles Sub-Region, Zaire, 1982 .....

19. Labor Remuneration for Selected Crops, Bas-Ueles 72

and Lualaba Sub-Regions, Zaire, 1982 .......................

20. Results of PRONAM Experiments in Intercropping

Manioc (Cassava), Corn and Peanuts, PRONM Station, 74
Mvuazi, Bas-Zaire Region, Zaire, 1983 ......................

21. Total Cost of Transportation, Insurance, Handling and 78

Storage of Seed Cotton per Ton, Zaire, 1982 ................

v
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

i. Supply and Demand for Cotton Under Assumed Price Changes .. 50

2. Marketing Channels for Cotton in Zaire, 1982 .............. 76

 ABSTRACT

In Zaire, the agricultural sector employs 75 percent of the total popu­

lation and holds a strategic position in the promotion of economic develop­

ment for the country. However, the predominance of subsistence production

is so pronounced until even now the contribution of agriculture to the

gross national product remains low. The cotton industry is one of the

largest in the agricultural sector and the ultimate goal of the Department

of Agriculture has been to find ways and means of achieving self-sufficiency

in cotton production and eventually to export the surplus. This study is

intended to facilitate the formulation of new policies and strategies in

cotton production. It shows to what extent cotton production can be made

more economically viable.

Basic to this study are the concepts of economic efficiency, the

supply function, price elasticity of supply and opportunity cost. All of

these concepts are used to show the effect on cotton production and on

farmer's income. Data on cotton production and prices were compiled from

both primary and secondary sources.

The main finding of the study is that an increase in price alone would

not necessarily assure an increase in production. Increases in cotton

prices have been more than offset by increases in prices paid by the farmer,

i.e., inflation. However, there is a risk also of making Zairian cotton

more expensive by increasing its price and therefore making it less com­

petitive in the market. This would mean that cotton pricing policies

should be viewed within a more global framework, with the major aim being

to make cotton cultivation as profitable at the farm level as other com­

peting crops. An evaluation of the constraints to cotton production at the

farm level has shown that heavy labor requirements combined with the cost

\I
of production and the pressures of inflation has resulted in a reduction of

farm income. Finally, no great increase in cotton production should be

expected until the price is more competitive and the cost of production is

lowered enough to make cotton production profitable to the farmer.

 4-

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Role of Agriculture in Zaire

The customary approach to the role of agriculture in economic deve­
lopment is formulated in terms of the contributions the agricultural sec­

tor can make or the functions it cau perfoim during the process of economic
development. It is generally accepted that agricultural development can
promote the economic development of less developed countries in five dis­

tinct ways:
1. By increasing the supply of food available for domestic consumption.
2. By releasing the labor needed for industrial employment.

3. By enlarging the size of the domestic market for the manufac­

turing sector.
4. By increasing the supply of domestic savings.

S. By providing the foreign exchange earned through agricultural

exports.
In Zaire particularly, the agricultural sector keeps a strategic po­

sition in the promotion of economic development. Widely varying types

of climate, soil and topography are combined to produce a diverse pattern

of land utilization and cropping. The agricultural sector alone utilizes

 2

more than 75 percent of the population. Traditional techniques of culti­

vation and low productivity exist together with some of the most developed

agricultural technology in Africa. However, the predominance of subsis­

tence production over the cash crop sector is so great that the ccntribution

of agriculture to the gross national product has been low. Up to the early

1960's, the country was self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs and other agri­

cultural products. Since then, the trend has been reversed and domestic

production has actually been heavily supplemented with imports, making

it difficult for the government to deal with the problem of balance of

payment. Therefore, there is a need to decrease food imports by putting

more emphasis on domestic production which will stimulate the whole economy.

The textile industry in Zaire expanded in the past to the extent that

its capacity is presently more than the domestic supply of cotton. The

textile mills are presently operating below capacity and due to the compe­

tition from imports of second-hand clothing, they cannot actually sell

all they produce. In addition, cotton production is becoming economically

less profitable as compared to food crops, because of its high cost of

production and prevailing low producer price. The latter is due largely

to government price policy for cotton. The problem is definitely impor­

tant and represents a serious threat to the survival of the whole cotton
industry.

Brief Historical Background of the Agricultural Sector

Zaire gained independence from Belgium in June 1960. Because of its

mineral wealth, Zaire has been the subject of intense interest among the
major world powers for a long time. Political instability of the post

independence period, nationalization policy (which took place in 1973)

and the collapse of the marketing structure resulted in stagnating agri­

cultural production.

The country was normally self-suffici nt in foodstuffs before 1960,

and exported an impres.-ive volume of agricultural products. Between 1960

and 1966, total production fell drastically because of insecurity in the

producing areas and the breakdown of the distribution system which made

the farmer's income fall. Presently, cotton production in Zaire is far

less than the 1960 level. Production has declined because of the reduction

in the number of cotton farmers, reduction in the acreage per farm, as

well as in yield per acre. The restricted cash income has meant that the
demand for inputs (fertilizers) has bcen insufficient to stimulate the

establishment of efficient systems of distribution for such inputs.

In addition, poor road networks have raised transport costs to the

extent that product/input price ratios are unfavorable. Cotton farmers

can no longer afford to purchase necessary inputs and the interrelated­

ness of this whole set of constraints obviously increases the difficulty

of achieving a profitable industry.

Importance of the Study

As will be shown later in this study, the cotton industry is one of

the largest in the agricultural sector in Zaire. The ultimate goal of

the Department of Agriculture has been to find ways and means to achieve

self-sufficencyin cotton production and eventually to export the surplus.

This will help to lower the costs of production of the local textile in­

dustries, beef-up the revenue of dhe agricultural sector and stimulate

the farmer to produce more.

The present study is therefore intended to facilitate the formulation

 4

of new policies and strategies on cotton production. It will help to show

to what extent cotton production could be economically feasible. This

study is of use to those involved in research on cotton; for students and

for anyone at the policymaking level within the agricultural sector.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Since 1960, the cotton production trend has been downward sloping

because of certain constraints. The objectives of this study could then

be stated as follows:

- to identify the constraints to cotton production and to expansion

of the textile industry;

- to identify the weakness of present policies on cotton production

and to formulate alternative strategies for increasing domestic

cotton supply;

- to establish the conditions under which cotton production could

become economically attractive.

APPLICATIONS OF THEORY

Economic Efficiency

Basic to virtually any economic study is the concept of economic ef­

ficiency. Stigler defines the term in application to the major economic

function, the allocation of resources:

"...the resources at the disposal of the society should be

allocated among products and production units in such a way,
given the state of technological information, as to obtain
as much as possible of the desired outputs. It is important
to emphasize that the allocation of resource:' is not funds-­
 5

mentally a technological question: at any given time there

exist many different ways of making every product. Engineers
generally may prefer one way on grounds of novelty, esthetics,
or parentage, but technological information is insufficient
to make an efficient choice. Efficiency itself is no economic
concept. It is usually defined as useful output divided by
useful input, and it is the function of the values of the
economic system to measure usefulness." (p. 3)

Location Theory for Agriculture

Whittaker discusses 'hunen's theory of location of agricultural pro­

duction, which seems especially appropriate to the cotton industry of Zaire:

"Another feature of Thunen's book was his treatment of the

location of agricultural production in the neighborhood of
a city. He considered a large town, drawing from a surround­
ing plain the agricultural produce which it needed. Com­
modities requiring to be consumed in fresh condition, and
those costly to transport, would be produced nearest the
town (fresh vegetables being an example). In broad rings,
other goods were produced, at greater and greater distances
fron the town as their nature and value made them more and
more able to bear the time and cost involved in transporta­
tion. The price of a particular commodity at the consuming
center would be the same for all suppliers, but its value at
the point of production would gradually lessen as the dis­
tance from the town increased. The good would cease to be
produced wherever another good would yield a greater returnm,
allowing for transportation cost. Where no product would
meet the cost of its preparation and transportation, the
land would cease to be used." (pp. 264-265)

The last statement refers, of course, to production for sale. In Zaire,

such an area would continue in production for subsistence purposes.

The Supply Function

In economics, supply always means the series of prices and corres­

ponding quantities that will be offered at those prices. Specifically,
Buse and Bromley (1965) define the term "supply" as the quantities of a

specific commodity which a seller (or sellers) would be willing and able

to place on the market in a specified time period at alternative prices,

 6

ceteris paribus, (i.e. all other things being held constant). The other
things refer to other variables such as prices of all inputs, prices of

the products of competing enterprises, and technology. Should one of these

items change, the net result is a new supply schedule for the firm; that

is, the ability and willingness to supply a given quantity at a particular

price will be different from what it was before.

It should be noticed that the total industry supply is obtained by

summing up the schedules of all the individual firms in the industry. In

other words, the supply curve of the industry is the sum of the marginal

cost curves above the average variable costs of all potential and actual

firms in the industry.

It should also be noticed that as the price of output rises, the out­
put of the industry is expected to increase for two reasons:

1. The outputs of each firm already in production increases as it

expands output along its upward-sloping marginal cost curve.
2. Other firms will enter the industry and begin to produce.

To study the supply response, we will be concerned with understanding

and explaining how the quantity of cotton placed on the market by individual

farmers is related to the changes in its price. Additional variables such

as changes in input prices, the time period, and the number of farmers

are also of great importance in studying the supply response of agricul­

tural products. For a better understanding and to facilitate the analysis

of supply response, the following concepts are used:

1. Price elasticity of supply.

2. Changes in supply.

3. Changes in quantity of cotton supplied.

Price Elasticity of Supply

The supply theory indicated that as the price of the product goes

up, the quantity supplied is expected to go up (other things being equal).

This is, in fact, the theoretical explanation of the positively sloped

supply curve.
The concept of supply elasticity is a measure of responsiveness of

quantities offered to a change in price; i.e., a comparison of the per­

centage change in the quantity supplied of a commodity to a percentage

change in its price. It is then generally defined as:

E = dq /P = %change in q /% change in p
q p

Where q = quantity supplied

p = price per unit

dq = change in q

dp = change in p

This study utilizes time series analysis, therefore it appeared con­

venient that the price elasticity of supply be computed at the means of

the data.
The elasticity being a dimensionless number, ai elastic response would

simply mean that the change in quantity of cotton supplied in response

to 1 percent change in price per unit is greater than 1 percent (Es > 1).

An inelastic response would occur when the change in the amount of cotton

supplied relative to a 1 percent nrice change is less than 1 percent

(Es < 1). Finally, a response of unitary elasticity would mean that the

percentage change in quantity supplied is exactly equal to the percentage

change in price (Es = 1).

 8

A Change in Supply of Cotton

A change in the quantity supplied may be simply a movement along a

given supply curve. It is of use to see the change in quantity of cotton

supplied as a response to the change in price of cotton, all other vari­

ables being held constant.

A change in supply means that more or less of the commodity will be

offered on the market at the same price. A change in supply of cotton

could be explained by a change in one of the following factors: production

costs, profitability of competitive enterprises, technology, the number

of cotton farmers or weather conditions.

Opportunity Cost
The opportunity cost principle refers to the net income foregone by
choosing a particular enterprise. The income foregone refers to income
from the most profitable alternative enterprise, and, if the income from
the most profitable alternative enterprise is more than was received from

the enterprise chosen, the entrepreneur has in reality suffered a loss.

This simple principle may indicate the most important reason for the re­

luctance of Zairian farmers to plant cotton when, in their best judgment,

there are more profitablc alternative crops available to them (Heady and

Jensen, 1954, p. 184). The level of production of a given crop is going

to be low if there are more attractive alternative crops open to the farmer.

METHODOLOGY

The first step was to collect data related to cotton production and

prices for, at least, the last ten years. Some unpublished sources such
 9

as World Bank reports, government reports, thesis drafts and university

work papers were assembled. However, because of wide discrepancies between

data and the limited amount of reliable sources, it appeared necessary

to search for information from cotton farmers as well as managers of dif­

ferent ginning plants. The author conducted a survey on cotton production,

marketing conditions and ginning in the northern and the southwestern parts

of the country where 70 farmers were interviewed in each region. Three

managers were interviewed. Data concerning transportation costs and price

for ginned cotton were collected from three ginning mills; Filtisaf, So­

texki and Utexco. A questionnaire was set up to ease the work; this helped

to direct the conversation within the interested areas. Data were then
used to compute means, percentages, and to compare the profitability of

producing cotton vs competitive enterprises. The results helped to draw

conclusions on the feasibility for producing cotton and the future of the

cotton industry in Zaire.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The initial objectives of this paper were to assess cotton production

in Zaire and to estimate the supply for the next few years. These ob­
jectives had to be modified as our research went on mostly because of a

lack of useful data on prices or other textile crops initially considered

as competitive enterprises. The lack of accurate and complete time series

data on those items resulted in illogical regression coefficients and ef­

fectively eliminated the possibility of quantitative estimates of supply

elasticity.

Rather than using other textile crops as competitive and substitute

 10

for cotton, we intend to study the feasibility of cotton production with

comparison to other crops within the farmers' combination (or rotation)

and to establish the conditions under which cotton production could become

economically attractive.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

'
The "Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of Congo" is one of

a series of handbooks prepared as Foreign Area Studies by the American

University and designed to provide a broad picture of all aspects of the

economy. The book revealed that cotton production in Zaire declined sharply

soon after independence in 1960. Apparently, in connection with the end

of compulsory cultivation, a marked shift to cash crops occurred on land

suited for cotton. The increase in cotton production that occurred in

the preindependence years was primarily the result of an expansion in the

acreage under cultivation, rather than of greater productivity. During

that period, farmers were under compulsion by the government to produce

cotton. They still are to some extent, but the compulsion is much less

rigorously enforced.

The lack of significant improvements in the traditional methods of

cultivation together with the departure of Belgian Technicians in 1960

brought the whole framework supporting cotton cultivation to a desperate

disintegration.

In the late 196 0's, resumption of cotton cultivation primarily through

the reopening of the seed multiplication centers and the improvement of

1The Democratic Republic of Congo became Republic of Zaire in 1972.

The Area Handbook was published in 1971.
 11

the road system occupied a central role in the government's agricultural

recovery program. Cotton production expanded slightly in 1966 and 1967

as, according to the authors, improved security conditions permitted the

cotton companies to re-enter the cotton growing areas. Those companies

resumed their activities by providing farmers with improved seeds, hand­

tools, insecticides and a more or less assured market.

E. Tollens' (1976) study on cotton production and marketing in Nor­

thern Zaire revealed that cotton yields were relatively low in the area
under consideration, and so was gross income per farm from cotton pro­

duction. He explained the low revenue by a prevailing low producer price

which was well below the price the domestic spinners would have to pay

for imports of the same quality and grade.

The study indicated that the use of improved inputs (fertilizers,

pesticides and good seeds on cotton production, as well as the level of

mechanization) were very low. The author recommended a revision of cot­

ton pricing policy, diffusion of improved agronomic practices, an over­

haul of the cotton extension service, a pilot cotton development project

in Bas-Uele and accelerated research on new varieties.

Brixhe (1958) emphasized the importance of cotton in the Zairian ag­

riculture and gave an estimated figure of 600,000 square kilometers of

land devoted to cotton cropping. He pictured the existence of two major

cotton regions as a distinct advantage in that it facilitates cotton culti­

vation throughout the year. Therefore, the local textile industry should

encounter less problems of supply in cotton fiber which should always be

under cultivation in either one or the other of the two regions north and

south of the Equator.

 According to Brixhe, the cotton industry has a promising future in

Zaire, not to mention its direct influence upon the expansion of income

earning opportunities within the agricultural sector itself.

B. F. Johnston and P. Kilby (1975), argued that the most promising

means of increasing farm productivity and output in a particular country

will depend on:

a. its resource endowment and land/man ratio,

b. the technologies available and in prospect,

c. its infrastrucLuire,

d. factors influencing the readiness and ability of farmers to adopt

innovations, and

e. the existing institutions and administrative capabilities.

V. Ruttan and Y. Hayani (1969) have hypothesized that relative factor

prices will induce not only farmers and firms supplying inputs but also

agricultural administrators and scientists to emphasize on a country's

scarce factors of production. Their analysis is especially valuable in

calling attention to the fact that prices which accurately reflect social

opportunity costs are perhaps even more important in influencing the ori­

entation of research and therefore the nature of technical change, which

conditions a country's agricultural growth path than in relation to short­

run allocative efficiency. The mechanism of agricultural growth is there­

fore a dynamic process of factor substitution in response to trends in

relative prices.

The decrease in cotton production in Zaire could partially, if not

totally, be related to its profitability as compared to alternative enter­

prises, especially food crops. Given the limited resources, farmers have
 13

no other choice than putting the additional or the existing units of labor,

capital and land to the enterprise that will bring the greatest return.

Heady and Jensen explain this fact with the principle of opportunity costs,

which states that '"profitwill be greatest if each unit of labor, capital

and land is used where it will add the most to return." The principal

is called "opportunity cost" because it considers the value of one enter­

prise sacrificed as a cost in producing another enterprise. They called

attention to the fact that the best combination of enterprises is attained

not when we select profitable crops, but when we select the most profi-­

table enterprises. le combination which is most profitable will depend

on the price we receive for the different products, the direct costs at­

tached to each enterprise and the amount of production we sacrifice as

we replace one enterprise partly or entirely with another one.

 14

CHAPTER II

THE COTTON INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION OF COTTON IN ZAIRE

According to the available literature (Banneux in 1938 and Brixhe

in 1953), cotton was undoubtedly introduced in Zaire (former Congo) by slave

traders from Egypt and Sudan and by Portugese traders from Angola back

in the 1860's. The crop (Gossypium Hirsutum) grew wild in most of the
savanna region north of the rain forest and the savanna region in the south­

central part of the country. From 1915 to 1920, Edward Fisher an American
cotton specialist, introduced the American variety; Triumph Big Boll, in

Sankuru and in Maniema and obtained satisfactory yields in regions with

moderate altitude and pronounced dry season. The government decided to

extend cotton production to other regions. In 1918, cotton cultivation
became compulsory in all regions except Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville).

The same year, the colonial government ordered two ginning mills from the

United States, and on February 10, 1920, the first important private cot­

ton company, COTONCO, was set up to develop the cotton industry in Zaire.

Growth of Cotton in Zaire

From an experimental level in 1918, cotton production grew so rapidly

that the total area cultivated in 1953 reached one-third million hectares.
By 1953, 5,000 cotton extension offices were set up all over the country
 1b

cotton
together with 102 ginning mills for an estimated total of 700,000
in Zaire from 1915
farmers. Table 1 shows the growth of cotton production

to 1974.
one single ton
From the table, seed cotton production went up from
quadrupled over
in 1919 to more than 30,000 tons in 1930. The production

the next decade and reached 132,104 tons in 1940. Between 1941 and 1949,
the war, some of
cotton production fell because of World War II. During
cotton farmers were
the cotton extension services were closed down and
in "crash" rubber
directed to tap natural rubber in forests and to work
a peak
plantations. Production recovered slowly after the war, reached
It
of 179,660 tons in 1959, then fell drastically after independence.

has not reached 100,000 tons since 1960 (Table 1).

production; the
Zairian climate is, in general, suitable for cotton
mountains) nor above 400 C.
temperature never goes below 50 C (except on the
only in the
However, the distribution of rainfall encourages production;
have the amount
areas which, in the five months preceding the dry season,
of the cotton plant.
of water which is needed for the vegetative development
since they are
Cotton production seasons alternate between these regions,

located on each side of the Equator.

three cot­
A Belgian researcher, Van de Walle (1960), distinguished
and the pos­
ton regions in Zaire according to a productivity criterion
Rcgion A with an
sibilities for crop intensification: a high yielding
B with 300
average yield exceding 375 kg per hectare, a marginal Region
300 kg per hec-
kg per hectare and an uneconomical Region C with less than

tare. The number of cotton farmers in the three regions was estimated

at 875,520 in 1959. After independence, the number of cotton farmers in

 /

Table 1

SEED COTTON PRODUCTION, REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE, 1915-1980

Seed Cotton Seed Cotton

Year Production Year Production
-metric tons- -metric tons­

1915 1 1941 138024

1916 13 1942 117836
1917 106 1943 128796
1918 320 1944 90559
1919 450 1945 111253
1920 1527 1946 117852
1921 1770 1947 116353
1922 3105 1948 123905
1923 2610 1949 143081
1924 5130 1950 138389
1925 9167 1951 133402
1926 14928 1952 158347
1927 17639 1953 136411
1928 20207 1954 143348
1929 21754 1955 145726
1930 30600 1956 154481
1931 44799 1957 129829
1932 26775 1958 142507
1933 46400 1959 179660
1934 59160 1960 140077
1935 77781 1961 64630
1936 92105 1962 38873
1937 106496 1963 42820
1938 122463 1964 40210
1939 112228 1965 18700
1940 132104 1966 19960
 17

Table 1 (Cont.)

Seed Cotton Seed Cotton

Year Production Year Production
-metric tons- -metric tons­

1967 24910 1974 48500

1968 45210 1975 26500
1969 47400 1976 25800
1970 53800 1977 33000
1971 59500 1978 16700
1972 52980 1979 18700
1973 66915 1980 29100

SOURCE: A Brixhe: Le Coton au Congo Beige, 1958 and IRES, 1968 to 1980.
 18

three regions dropped and is presently estimated by CSCO at 350,000 far­

mers.
The principal cotton-producing areas are specifically the following:

1. North-Western area; Equator Region, Sub-region of Ubangi and

Mongala.
, I
2. North-Eastern area; Haut-Zaire Region, Sub-regions of Bas-Uele,

and Ituri. These sub-regions include the following urban centers:

Buta, Titule, Bambesa, Dingila, Poko, Rungu, Isiro, Wamba and

Aketi.
3. Central area for the regions of Shaba, Estern Kasai and Western

Kasai, sub-region: Candajika.

4. Eastern area for Kivu Region, zone of Uvira, Fizi and Walungu.

Implantation of Cotton Industry in Zaire

Soon after the introduction of the American variety "Triumph Big Boll"
by Edward Fisher in 1915, the colonial government decided to order two

ginneries from the U.S.A., because of the promising yields obtained. The
two ginning mills were installed in Kibombo (Maniema) and Lusambo (Sankuru).

At the same time, the Deputy Ministry of Colonies, L. Frank, felt the

necessity of associating private business to help develop the newborn cotton

industry. The first private cotton company, the "Compagnie Cotoni6re Con­
golaise" (COTONCO) was founded in Zaire oa February 10, 1920. From 1920
to 1930, several private cotton companies were created in Zaire and by

the end of 1937, there were 119 ginneries installed in the country.

In 1929, the "Comit6 Cotonnier Congolais" or Congolese Cotton Com­

mittee was created, bringing together representative'3 from all the cotton
companies and standardized work methods. It had a strong voice in the
 19

design and implementation of cotton policies until the creation of ONAFITEX

in 1971.

After the creation of the Congolese Cotton Committee in 1929, a num­

ber of institutions were successively founded to support and develop the

cotton industry. Thus, in 1924, the "Fonds de Remploi" or Reinvestment

Fund was born under authorization of the governor general of Zaire (then

Congo). The funds were collected from cotton taxes and were used for ag­

ricultural development of the cotton regions.

In 1936, the Reinvestment Fund was replaced by "Fonds de Reserve Con­

nie're" or Cotton Reserve Fund. This one was established by the colonial

government to stabilize seed cotton prices, to improve road maintenance

and to provide the farmers with the difference between the "potential"

cotton price and the actual price which farmers received. The seed cot­

ton price paid to farmers was determined by deducting the following from

the potential price: cost of small farm tools and road improvement, con­

tributions to local village chests, new taxes which increased the cost

price of cotton ginners, and deposits in the stabilization fund.

In 1943, the Cotton Reserve Fund was brought under the management

of a committee entitled the "Comite de Gerance de la Caisse de Reserve

Cottoniere" (COGERCO). The functions of COGERCO were as follows:

1. Financing, tJhrough private cotton companies, the purchase of

seed cotton from farmers at a fixed, guaranteed price.

2. Financing ginning and transport costs.

3. Supervision of sales of cotton fiber.

4. Development of cotton production through the supply of improved

seeds, insecticides, farm equipment, etc.

 20

In 1950, the reserves of COGERCO amounted to 25 million dollars, and

over the 1951-1953 period, a total of 12.84 million dollars was returned

to farmers as cash bonuses distributed according to their production. The

Decree-Law (Decret Loi) oi August 13, 1965 focused on Zairianization of

COGERCO management and it called for increasing participation of cotton

farmers in the management of COGERCO. This decree reduced the influence

of the private firms in designing cotton policies. COTONCO (Compagnie
Cotonniere Congolaise), a Belgian private company, controlled eight cotton

companies in Zaire and three vegetable oil (including cotton seed oil)

companies. These companies controlled about 90 percent of cot' in marketing

in Zaire and operated 74 cotton ginneries with an estimated ginning capa­

city of 355,300 tons of seed cotton. COTONCO and seven other private com­

panies in Zaire operated a total of 115 ginneries. Presently however,

only about 60 ginning plants are in operation with a total annual capacity

of about 300,000 tons. Since independence, the cotton companies have made
few new investments. These cotton companies existed until the creation

of ONAFITEX in 1971.

THE ONAFITEX

The government decided on the creation of ONAFITEX, August 12, 1971

after COGERCO's failure to cope with the rising ginning costs of the cot­

ton companies. The newborn office replaced COGERCO and COVENCO and com­

bined all the different bodies concerned with cotton production, processing

and marketing under a single organization.

ONAFITEX was created as a public institution under the authority of

the Ministry of Agriculture with monopoly rights for the marketing of
 21

Table 2

REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE COTTON COMPANIES, NUMBER OF GINNING PLANTS

AND THEIR LOCATION IN 1957

Cotton Companies Sub-Region Number of ginning plants

Northern Cotton Region

Belgika U616 8
Societe Contonniere de
Bomokandi U6lg 5
N.A.H.V. U616 - Ubangi 6
Vinchent Ituri 1
COTONCO Bas-U616 11
Haut-U61 6
Ubangi 11
Sub-total 48

Southern Cotton Region

Soci6t6 Cotonni6re Coloniale Lomami-Sankuru 3
Compagnie Commerciale
Belgo-Africaine Lomami-Sankuru 3
Soci6t Contonnidre de
Tanganika Tanganika 7
Coiapagnie de la Ruzizi Sud-Kivu 3
Soci~t6 Cotonnigre de
la Luisa Kasai 1
Compagnie du Lubilashi Katanga 1
Soci6t Congolaise Bunge Haut Lomama
Haut Katanga 5
LACOMINKA Kasai 1
COTONCO Lomai-Kasai
Sankuru, Kivu,
Maniema, Kilolo
Sub-total 52
Total 100

SOURCE: A. Brixhe, Le au Congo Belge, P. 17.

 22

cotton and its by-products and any other textile fiber. By setting up

such an institution, the governent wanted to cut down on the profit margin

of the private cotton companies and eventually to eliminate them if an

agreement could not be reached.

ONAFITEX 2 was then charged with the responsibility of cotton marketing

which included the collection of seed cotton at local assembly points and

transport to the gi.-ning plants. The cotton companies remained responsi­

ble for ginning, baling and transport of bales from ginneries to the pick­

up points. ONAFITEX finally arranged for the sale of cotton fiber to local

textile firms, or for export. The system worked alright until the time

the cotton companies could no longer afford to perform their tasks at the

proposed work fee.3 The government then decided to take over their faci­

lities, supplies and manpower, 4 both Zairian and expatriate. Tollens states

that the principal reasons which led the government to a take-over of the

facilities of the private cotton companies could be summarized as follows:

1. exhaustion of COGERCO reserves and imminence of bankrupcy of

the cotton industry,

2. government effort to put the economy under Zairian control,

3. stubborness of the cotton companies in yielding to government

pressure for changes,

4. inflation of ginning costs,

5. slow Africanization of ginning management,

2 ONAFITE is an abbreviation meaning: Office National des Fibres

Textiles or National Office for Textile Fibers.
3The government first proposed 37 Z per ton of cotton fiber ginned.
After a while, the ginneries demanded a much higher fee for which the
government dIsagreed.
4The nationalization took place in Zaire in 1973.
 23

6. lack of new investments in ginning mills since 1960,

7. persistent losses of the cotton seed crushing industry,

8. difficulties experienced by the government and COGERCO in control­

ling ginning costs because of the lack of knowledge of real pro­

cessing and transportation costs,

9. conflicting incentives and interests placing cotton farmers and

the government in opposition to the cotton companies, and

10. private companies generally ignored cotton legislation.

ONAFITEX then grew up and became a powerful institution responsible

for the growing, processing and marketing of cotton in Zaire. Specially,

its tasks were to provide technical assistance to cotton farmers and to

insure cotton marketing through collection, transport, ginning and the

sale of cotton and its by-products. The new legislation also charged

ONAFITEX with responsibility for:

I. creating a price stabilization fund for the purchase of seed

cotton from farmers,

2. certifying and controlling quality standards of cotton fiber

for export, and

3. organizing cotton farmers into cooperatives in order to gradually

turn the responsibility for processing and commercialization

over to them.

However, the establishment of ONAFITEX was not without difficulties;

in fact, it created some new problems. Some of the problems encountered

were the inability of the main office in Kinshasa to adequately supply

funds and qualified personnel to the regional branches, poor transport

facilities, etc. For these and other reasons, the buying of cotton from

farmers was extended over the year instead of the usual three to five
 24

months after harvest. This resulted in a reduction of quality of cotton

fiber which stayed too long in poor storage conditions before being collected.

At the sale time, cotton production fell from 68,000 tons in 1973 to 15,000

tons in 1978. An inefficient management oi ONAFITE( led to its dissolu­

5
tion in 1978. A new government owned institution, C.S.Co, was created

to take over the administrative and technical tasks previously performed

by ONAFITE(. The government also decided to turn over the work on the

fields to semi-private cotton companies which would simply be supervised

by C.S.Co.

The three semi-private cotton companies operating actually on field

are:

1. SOTEXCO: Soci6t6 Textile Cotonni6re du Haut-Zaire covering the

Haut-Zaire region and most of the northern cotton belt.

2. LA COTONNIERE: Soci6t6 Cotonni6re et Agricole du Kasai et Ma­

niema. The company works in the area from the

southern part of the Kivu region to the western

and eastern Kasai.

3. ESTAGRICO: Soci6t6 Cutonniere et Agricole de l'Est du Zaire

covering the north-eastern parts of the country from

Uvira down to the Shaba region.

These companies are classified as sem-private because of the impor­

tance of government participation. On the other hand, some privately owned

companies resumed their activities in the Shaba region: DASCO, TSHILOBO

and MBAYO.

5C.S.Co: Caisse de Stabilisation Contonni6re or Cotton Stabiliza­

tion Fund.
 25

In the Ubangi, (Equator region) there was also created. -overnment

owned company, COTON ZAIRE, which covers a large area immediately north
of Equator. A more detailed description of these companies will be given

later on in the study.

6
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ZAIRE

Funded in 1925, the textile industry grew so rapidly that twenty years

later, it was able to supply more than 30 percent of the local demand for

fabrics. In fact, the first textile company, TEXSAF, was established in

1925 in Kinshasa md it delivered its first yards of fabrics in 1928. The

mill was equipped with some 300 French made automatic weaving looms.

After the 1930 crisis, a second textile mill, UTEXCO, was set up in

Kinshasa and was equipped with 15,000 spindles and 450 weaving looms.

UTEXCO became prosperous in its activities because of the high demand for

fabrics, and in 1960, the mill increased its equipment to 46,00 spindles
and 1,500 weaving looms. The total output per year was 21,000,000 meters

of colored and uncolored fabrics. Shortly after the second World War,

three other companies each opened a textile mill--and so grew the industry.

Presently, the textile industry in Zaire is composed of ten enter­

prises located in different regions and cities:

City of Kinshasa (The capital city): -UTEXCO

- ZAIRE PRINT

-C.P.A. ZAIRE

- ZAITEX

6The textile industry in Zaire is basically dependent on cotton, syn­

thetic fibers and other fiber crops of lesser importance.
 26

-TISSAKIN

-NOVATEX

City of Lubumbashi (Region of Shaba): -SOLBENA

-AMATO FRERES
City of Kalemie (Shaba region): -FILTISAF
City of Kisangani (Haut-Zaire region):-SOTEXKI

Most of these textile companies dye and print a large part of their

production and several have clothing manufacturing shops attached to the

mill.
The whole textile industry in Zaire consumes about 21,000 tons of

cotton fiber per year, which is more than the domestic production. Un­

til recent developments, the level of output of textile mills was large
enough that domestic production needed to be supplemented by imports. In
fact, the industry has recently been facing difficulties that have forced

most of the mills to cut down on their activities so that the importation

of cotton fiber is no longer needed. These difficulties are mostly re­

lated to lack of foreign exchange necessary to purchase spare parts and

imported raw materials, high cost of production, shrinking market outlet

due to competition from second-hand clething shops and a tight export policy.

According to some reliable sources (FILTISAF Bureau in Kinshasa),

the importation of second-hand clothes amounts to some 30,000 metric tons

or an equivlent of 31,000 tons of cotton fiber a year. One kilogram of

cotton fiber can produce 6.6 meters of fabics; the importation of second­

hand clothes is then estimated at 204,600,000 meters. The individual con­

sumption in Zaire being actually estimated at an average of six to eight

meters of fabric a year, the national consumption could therefore be in

 27

the neighborhood of 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 meters a year. It is clear

that this represents a serious threat to the industry which utilizes, in

turn, some 10,000 people. This figure will be much larger after adding

those working in small clothing shops.

The wholesale price of second-hand clothing is about 1.00 U.S. dol­

lars per kg, or an equivalent of 5.85 Zaires for some 6.6 meters of fabric
at the legal rate of exchange. It should be noticed here that a few mer­

chants actually buy or sell at the legal rate of exchange which, in Zaire,
7
is currently about one-fifth the over-whelming market rate. In addition

to this, smuggling activities on the state borders are intense and all

of these practices have had severe consequences on the local textile in­

dustry. Regardless of the fabulous profits made by the merchants and smug­

glers who are taking advantage of a poorly controlled market, the price
of second-hand clothing looks far more attractive than that of fabric pro­
8
duced locally.

Another factor that explains the competition from second-hand clothes

is the general economic decline which can be pictured by the following

figures showing nominal and rural incomes over a period of six years (Ta­

ble 3).

The matter has been made worse for the local textile industry, for

they cannot buy large quantities of cotton fiber on the International

7From unofficial sources, the market rate of exchange is presently

about 1 U.S. dollar for 29.0 Zaires.
8At the lower levels of income, people would not care much about

the quality of the cloth, the ultimate goal being to get something to
wear. In addition, it can be proven that some people prefer second-hand
clothes because of their softness.
 28

Table 3

NOMINAL AND REAL MONTHLY SALARIES OF BOTH THE PRIVATE AND

PUBLIC SECTORS, ZAIRE, 1975-1980

Year Private Sector Public Sector

Nominal Real Nominal Real

1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1976 131.4 76.9 127.9 74.8
1977 159.5 57.2 133.4 47.8
1978 206.5 49.3 155.7 37.2
1979 277.3 30.1 320.3 34.8
1980 378.3 28.0 371.5 27.5

SOURCE: Banque du Zaire, Rapport Annuel, 1980, page 104.

 29

Market using the official rate of exchange. First, there is a rather con­
stant lack of foreign exchange at the Central Bank for
International trans­
actions; second, such business would be highly unprofitable
for the Bank
because of the large discrepancy between the official
and the market rate.
For all these reasons, the demand for cotton was expected
to fall
in 1983. If there was no change in local markets regulations,
C.S.Co.
predicted a figure of 8.55 metric tons of unsold cotton
fiber in 1982­
1983. This would have forced some cotton companies to
cut down on their
output or to close mills.
The bottom line of the issue in our view is whether to
protect the
cotton industry by reducing the importation of cheap
clothes (especially
second-hand clothes) or to protect the low income people
(majority of the
population) by importing these items.
The textile industry in Zaire, as stated earlier, uses
about 10,000
people. It has a considerable weaving capacity as shown in Table
4.
The textile mills are supplied by different cotton companies
accord­
ing to the location and the capacity of the mill. Presently,
there are
two major cotton companies in the northern cotton belt
and five in the
southern cotton belt. Table 5 shows the different textijc
mills in Zaire
and their major cotton suppliers.
Sixteen factories in Kinshasa and seven in Lubumbashi
produce ready­
made clothing, primarily shirts. Six factories, four
of which belong to
the integrated textile mills, manufacture cotton knitwear
axticles such
as socks, underwear, baby clothing, etc. In addition
to these factories,
many hundreds of small clothing manufacturing enterprises
are scattered
throughout the country, especially in big cities. The textile industry
 30

Table 4

RANKING OF THE MILLS BY WEAVING CAPACITY, ZAIRE, 1982

Enterprise Cotton consumed Number of Number of Capacity 2 Fiber type

in tons spindles looms in 1000m

UTEXCO 9,000 71,000 1,382 60,000 Cotton

SOTEXKI 3,000 21,600 456 18,500 Cotton

FILTISAF 3,500 16,660 360 16,000 Cotton

SOLBENA 2,500 10,000 236 14,000 Cotton

AMATO 1,700 10,000 200 10,000 Cotton

NOVATEX - - 128 4,000 Synthetic

TOTAL 19,700 129,260 2,762 122,500

 Table 5

SOURCES OF COTTON FOR TEXTILE MILLS, ZAIRE, 1982

Cotton Companies
Textile Mill Total Bales LA
Received, 1981a / COTONNIERE AGRICO DATSCO MBAYO TSIILOBO COTON ZAIRE SOTEXCO
.......................................... bales of cotton (a).....................................

UTEXCO 50,882 26,382 ... 8,000 15,500

SOTEXKI 17,737 --- 13,754 --- 17,737
FILTISAF 16,751 2,997 13,754 ............
SOLBENA 8,139 5,788 2,700 451 --- 200
AMATO 6,096 3,795 1,800 301 200 .........
ZAITEX 5,122 2,522 --- 2,000 600
TEXKIVU 1,646 1,646 ............
MDBILIA 909 246 --- 500 163

TOTAL 108,282 41,710 19,900 752 200 200 10,500 35,000

a/A bale of cotton is made up of a bundle of fibers bound into a package and weighing between 50 and 100 kg.

SOURCE: C.S.Co. Bureau, unpublished report, 1982.

 32

contributes about 15 percent of the value added by the manufacturing sec­

tor to the GNP.

 33

CHAPTER III

CURRENT SITUATION AND ANALYSIS OF PRESENT POLICIES

BUYING AND GINNING OF COTTON

In the struggle to increase cotton production, the government, through

the Department of Agriculture, has tried to set up various programs and

projects covering all aspects of cotton cultivation. When the private

cotton companies were abolished in 1972, the government created ONAFITEX

with sole responsibility for buying, ginning and sale of cotton. ONAFITEX

was in fact, a "one channel government marketing office" with monopoly

power. The office was empowered to raise or to lower seed cotton prices

paid to the farmers. Presently, the cotton companies are responsible for

marketing operations under the supervision of C.S.Co. They assure the

buying and the ginning of cotton in the growing ar as where they operate.

COTTON PRODUCTION PROJECTS

Cotton production in Zaire has long benefited from a lot of attention

from the government and specialized institutions such as the World Bank

and the European Development Fund (FED). In this section, the different
projects and programs related directly to cotton production will be briefly

reviewed.
 Table 6

CUPRENT INVENTORY OF COTTON GINS OPERATED BY THE COTTON

COMPANIES OF ZAIRE, 1982

Growing Cotton
Region Companies Observation

Equateur COTON-ZAIRE 11 ginneries in activity

Haut-Zaire SOTEXCO 22 ginneries in activity

6 others in working conditions

Kasai Oriental
and Maniema 1A COTONNIERE 17 ginneries in activity

Tanganika and
Sud-Kivu ESTAGRICO 8 ginneries in activity

Sud-Shaba TSHILOBO-MBAYO
and DATSCO 7 ginneries in activity

TOTAL 71

SOURCE: C.S.Co. Annual Report, 1981.

 35

Programme de RelancL de la Culture Cotonniere

Since 1979, C.S.Co. has been supervising an important program named

PROGRAvYE DE RELANCE DE 1A CULTURE COTTONIERE or PROGRAM FOR RELAUNCHING

COTTON CULTIVATION. This program jointly financed by IDA, FED, CCCE, SOFIDE,

COTTON COMPANIES (Cottoniere, Sotexco, Estagrico) and the government had

initially started in 1978 under ONAFITFX. The numerical objective of the

program is to reach, in five years, about 60,000 metric tons of seed cot­

ton and, therefore, to attain a self-sufficiency in cotton as well as in

textile materials. The program includes the following important points:

-rehabilitation of the feeder roads network,

-reinforcement of extension officers,

- intensification experiments,

-supply of working materials (improved handtools),

-rehabilitation of ginning mills, and

-rehabilitation and reinforcement of transportation vehicles.

Under the supervision of C.S.Co., the program is fully managed by

the three cotton companies. Each one of them has been charged with re­

sponsibility for distribution of seeds to the farmers, vulgarization ope­

rations, buying seed cotton from farmers, transporting and ginning seed

cotton. These companies have sufficient facilities for handling the pro­

duction, and their cooperation with C.S.Co. in this regard has been ex­

cellent.

The total cost of the program in its final stage has amounted to 39.3

million $ U.S. Financing operations started in 1981 with money from FED,

SOFIDE and CCCE. The credits for IDA will be dispatched some time during

1982, along with vehicles and spare parts to be furnished by the same in­

stitution. Spare parts and parts for the ginning mills are expected sometime
 36

in 1983, and by December 1984, the government, through

C.S.Co., is ex­
pected to present to its creditors a final report on the
program. Table
7 provides some estimated figures on cotton production
during the five
years of the program.
The project, Mlizsion de Relance de la Culture Cotonniere
dans 1'
Equateur, was set up in 1972 under an agreement between
the Zairian and
the French governments. A French team of four technicians from C.F.D.T.
came to work with ONAFITEX technicians to develop cotton
production in
the Equator region. This project was mainly involved in
developing cot­
ton prodLiction through improved agricultural extension
services and served
as a feasibility experiment for another project actually
financed by three
institutions: the World Bank, the Belgian Cooperation
and the Zairian
Government. It is under the management of COTON-ZAIRE.

The PMKO 9 Project in Eastern Kasai

The project is located in the eastern Kasai region and

is jointly
financed by the government, B.A.D.,1 0 FIDA, and I.D.A.
The PMKO project
is a fusion of former Tshilenge project in Kasai and CAKO. II
The project
is mainly concentrated on corn production, but is actually
diversifying
its activities to other crops such as cotton, rice and
soybeans.

9PMKO: Projet Mais au Kasai-Oriental or Kasai Oriental

Corn Project.
10BAD:
Banque Africaine de Developpement or African Development
Bank.
1CAKO: Commission Agricole du Kasai Oriental or Agricultural Com­
mission for Eastern Kasai.
 Table 7

C.S.CO.'S PROJECTIONS OF COTTON PRODUCTION FOR FIVE YEARS OF PROGRAM BEGINNING 1980, ZAIRE, 1982

Year No. of Size of Total Yield Produc- Under Expected Expected Expected
farmers fanrm area tion insect yield production total
control increase increase production
ha 1,000 ha tons/ha 1,000 tons 1,000 ha kg/ha tons 1,000 tons

HAUT-ZAIRE: SOTEXCO
1980 102 .27 27.5 .27 7.4 --- 7.4
1981 92 .27 24.8 .26 6.4 --- 6.4
1982 96 .30 28.8 .30 8.6 2.0 280 56C 9.2
1983 100 .35 35.0 .35 12.2 3.0 320 960 13.2
1984 102 .40 40.8 .38 15.5 4.0 320 1,280 16.8
1985 102 .40 40.8 .40 16.3 4.0 320 1,280 17.6

KASAI - MANIIA: COTONNIERE

1980 105 .35 36.7 .37 13.6 --- 13.6
1981 95 .35 36.7 .37 13.6 --- 12.0
1982 100 .45 45.0 .38 17.1 3.0 320 960 18.1
1983 105 .50 52.5 .41 21.5 4.0 336 1,344 22.8
1984 105 .50 52.5 .43 23.6 5.0 336 1,680 25.3
1985 105 .50 52.5 .45 23.6 5.0 336 1,680 25.3

NORD SHABA: ESTAGRICO

1980 38 .36 13.7 .36 4.9 --- 4.9
1981 30 .40 12.0 .40 4.8 --- 4.8
1982 34 .45 15.3 .42 6.4 3.0 344 360 7.4
1983 38 .48 18.2 .44 8.0 4.0 360 1,376 9.4
1984 38 .50 19.0 .46 8.7 5.0 360 1,800 10.5
1985 38 .50 19.0 .50 9.5 6.0 360 2,160 11.7
 Table 7 (Cont.)

Year No. of Size of Total Yield Produc- Under Expected Expected Expected
farmers farm area tion insect yield production total
control increase increase production

TOTAL: ALL AREAS

1980 245 --- 78.0 --- 25.9 --- 22.9
1981 217 --- 70.0 23.2 ... 23.2
1982 230 95.3 --- 32.1 8.0 2,480 34.6
1983 243 --- 105.7 --- 41.7 11.0 --- 3,680 45.4
1984 245 --- 112.3 46.8 14.0 6,760 51.6
1985 245 --- 112.3 49.4 15.0 5,120 45.5

SOURCE: C.S.Co., unpublished document.

The objectives of the project are:

1. To eliminate corn production deficit in Eastern Kasai by pro­

ducing over 70,000 tons.

2. To imrprove standards of living of farmers in Eastern Kasai by

providing them with necessary tools to increase farm income.

The introduction of drying and insect control equipment in the area, as

well as the experimentation with improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides

and tractor mechanization, are the most important activities of the pro­

ject. As to cotton production of PMKO, the followineg figures were repor­

ted in December, 1981 (Table 8). The government is participating with

abcut 16% of the total cost of the project which represents some 6.1 mil­

lion $ U.S. The share of other institutions is as follows:

B.A.D. (African Development Bank): 17%

F.I.D.A. 39%

I.D.A. 28%

Cotton Project of INERA

INERA 1 2 is an important government sponsored agricultural research

institution and one of the most important in Central Africa. Several stu­

dies and experiments have been conducted by the institute on various food

and industrial crops. Research on cotton is underway in three different

centers:

Gandajika Center. The Gandajika Center is actually involved in cross­

breeding the African cotton variety Gossypium snomalum (diplcid) with other

tetraploid varieties;

1 2 INERA:
Institut National pour l'Etude et la Recherche Agronomique
or National Institute for Agronomic Study and Research (formerly INEAC).
 40

Table 8

COTION ACTIVITY OF PMKO PROJECT, ZAIRE, 1982

Area
Zone cultivated Seed variety Yield Production
..... hectare ............. kg/ha tons

TSHILENGE 376.97 NC8 456 1,528.990

MJENE DIiU 4,100.26 NC8 452 1,853.318

GANDAJIKA 4,856.00 NC8 449 2,179.971

KAMIJI 301.04 NC8 452 136.070

SOURCE: PMKO Annual Report, 1981.

 41

Gossypium anomalum X B49

" it X BJA 592
it ItX 1021

" If X Reba BS0

Bambesa Experimental Center. At the Bambesa station, some 50 hec­

tares of land are being used to test and to compare the most popular va­

riety, Reba BSO, to the selected new seeds from the Gandajika fields.

Bokets Experimental Center. This is a multiplication center where

selected seeds are reproduced. They are actually testing and multiplying

new varieties from the cross-breeding of HR-219 X BJA 592 and HR-219 X
Reba BTK 12.

INERA is also conducting fertilizer and pesticide tests on different

varieties of cotton. It is important to notice that INERA (formerly INEAC)

is playing a central role in the development of the agricultural sector

in Zaire. Endowed with 24 main research stations, 22 experimental stations

and several pilot farms equipped with complementary laboratories, INERA

has sufficient capacity to provide seed material for a large scale pro­

pagation of food and cash crops all over the country. The institute is

currently confronted with financial problems and is not therefore running

at its full capacity.

Government Expenditures on Cotton Production

Given the magnitude of the food shortage and the high rate of demo­

graphic growth (2.7 percent), it was decided back in 1972 that agriculture

be the first priority in the government budget. Although the government

has made some efforts in this regard, the portion of the budget allocated

to agriculture remains relatively small. This contradictory reality is

 42

obvious and the problem of shortage in agricultural products is getting

worse in Zaire. Table 9 gives an idea of the government expenditures on

the agricultural sector--as compared to other sectors.

For the four years (1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981), agriculture averaged

2.2 percent and transportation-communication averaged 0.8 percent--a total

of only 3.0 percent for two of the country's most important sectors.

As to the cotton production, the direct government expenditures on

that subsector could be drawn from the government participation in the

different cotton projects. As pointed out earlier, the government is a

shareholder in the largest cotton companies. Its participation is mainly

concentrated on investment funds and real estate. In fact, the govern­
ment has provided them with facilities previously owned by C('AFITEX except

for houses that are rented to the companies. About 345,000 cotton farmers
are actually working in the areas covered by those companies.

The Programme de Relance de la Culture Cotonniere au Zaire project

is partially financed by the gcvernment in local currency (Zaires)13 and

partly by foreign exchange (U.S. dollars). Table 11 shows the share of

different financing sources of the project. Eighteen percent of the total
cost of the project is supported by the government, which finances all

the current expenditures and parts of investment expenditures related to

feeder road improvement and extension operations. In order to encourage

private and foreign investors, the government has been participating actively
in different projects aimed at increasing cotton production and has set

a favorable framework for further research on cotton.

13 e Zaire is the domestic monetary unit. The current legal rate of

exchange is oscillating around 1.0 dollar for 5.8 Zaires. About 10 years ago,
the rate was 1.0 dollar for 0.5 Zaires. The current market rate of exchange is
approximately 29.0 Zaires for $1.00.
 Table 9

ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT BUDGET TO SELECTED SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, ZAIRE, 1978-1981

1978 1979 1980 1981 4 years average

Mil Z's % Mil Z's % Mil Z's % Mil Z's Mil Z's %

Agriculture 12.0 1.2 68.9 2.8 27.9 0.9 128.0 2.5 59.2 2.2
Education 131.9 12.8 664.3 27.3 589.9 20.1 950.8 18.3 418.2 15.3
Public Health 44.8 4.4 93.3 3.8 97.0 3.3 160.3 3.1 98.8 3.6
Public Debt 447.3 43.6 550.2 22.6 932.5 31.7 957.9 18.5 722.0 26.4

Transportation and
Communication 7.3 0.7 21.6 0.9 24.7 0.8 28.3 0.5 20.5 0.8
Other Sectors 383.7 37.4 1,038.3 42.6 1,265.5 43.1 2,962.2 57.1 1,412.4 51.7

Total budgets ! 1,027.0 100.0 2,436.6 100.0 2,937.5 100.0 5,187.5 100.0 2,721.1 100.0

. /The total of sectors, including the five selected ones.

SOURCE: Republique du Zaire, "Conjoncture Economique," D6partement de 1'Economie Nationale et de 1'Industrie,

Kinshasa, December 1981.
 44

Table 10
THE SHARE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE INVESTMENT OF THE THREE COTTON COMPANIES,
ZAIRE, 1981

Cotton Total Government Other shareholder

companies investment participation participation
1,000 Zaires percent percent

SOTEXCO 2,900 30.0 Sotexki 55.0

Utexco 7.5
Ameto 2.5
Zaitex 1.5
Solbena 3.5

LA COTONNIERE 6,700 36.9 Colocoton 26.1

Utexco 24.6
Ameto 6.1
Solbena 6.1

ESTAGRICO 1,850 32.6 Amato 10.8

Filtisaf 24.3
Solbena 10.8
Utexco 10.8.
Zaitex 10.8
 45

Table 11
FINANCING SOURCES FOR THE "PROGRAMIE DE RELANCE DE LA CULTURE COTONNIERE
AU ZAIRE," ZAIRE, 1981

Millions of %of the Total

Financing Sources U.S. Dollars Cost of the Project

IDA 11.3 28.8

FED 6.8 17.3
CCE 2.2 S.6
SOFIDE 1.1 2.8
Zaire Government 7.0 17.8
Cotton Companies 10.9 27.7

Total Costs 39.3 100.0

SOURCE: C.S.Co., unpublished document, 1981.

 46

COTFON PRICING POLICY

In Zaire, setting prices is the appanage of the Department of National

Economy (or ministry of Economy). In the agricultural sector, prices are

discussed and proposed within the Department of Agriculture and submitted

for the approval of the Department of National Economy. The current pricing
policy focuses on minimum producer prices for food and export products,

maximum wholesale food prices, fixed producer prices for crops sold to

government marketing agencies and fixed marketing margins for the whole­

sale and retail levels.

As to cotton pricing policies, they have been changing widely according

to people and institutions that take over responsibilities for cotton pro­
duction. In the pre-independence period, the price was set annually on

the basis of the prices obtained for cotton fiber in the previous year.
Because of the world price fluctuations, a price stabilization fund was

established in 1938. At that time, the seed cotton price paid to the far­
mer was derived from a potential cotton price which was determined from

the average cotton fiber price realized in the preceding year.

The difference between the "potential" price and the price received

by farmers was deposited in the price stabilization fund (Fonds de Reserve).

Currently, it seems that cotton price is no longer set on the basis of

technical considerations. The new policy is more humanitarian and con­

juncture oriented. The objective is to help cotton farmers, by setting
higher prices, keep up with a persistent inflation which tends to lower

the purchasing power of the farmer. In fact, since 1975, the general level
of prices of manufacturing goods as well as agricultural products has been

rising and the inflation rate reached more than 150% by the end of 1980.
 4/

Table 12 shows the effects of inflation on the price of seed cotton

over a period of seven years (1975 - 1981). The Consumer Price Index (CPI)

used in the table was developed by the National Institute of Statistics

(INS) for consumer goods in Kinshasa. In its report (June 1981), the De­

partment of Agriculture requested an increase of seed cotton price from

.80 to 1.80 Zaires per kilogram. This increase brought the price of gin­

ned cotton up to 12 Zaires per kilogram.

The Department is even forecasting a worse conjuncture ahead and has

proposed a much higher price of 2.2 Zaires per kilogram of seed cotton.
This new price has raised the cost of cotton fiber to 15 Zaires per kilo­

gram. This figure is lower than that of imported cotton fiber by quite

a large amount.
According to the President Director General of C.S.Co., quoted by

Muteba wa Kambala in his study on cotton marketing in Zaire, the price

per kilogram for imported cotton fiber is presently around 50 to 55 Zaires

CIF Matadi. 14 This shows that Zairian cotton fiber keeps a competitive

position on the world market basis and that producing cotton in Zaire could

be a profitable activity.

Furthermore, given a price of 55 Zaires per kilogram for imported

cotton fiber, nobody can afford to buy large quantities of cotton fiber

on the international market using the market rate of exchange. It could

be concluded with regards to these considerations that the future of cot­

ton production in Zaire is promising.

By fixing the minimum producer price at 2.2 Zaires per kilogram of

seed cotton, the Department of Agriculture is hypothesizing that cotton

14 Matadi
is the main deepwater port on the Zaire River estuary con­
necting directly with the Atlantic Ocean.
 48

Table 12

NOMINAL AND DEFLATED PRICES OF SEED COTFON, ZAIRE, 1975-1981

CPI
Year Seed cotton price 1981 = 100 Deflated seed price
makuta per kg makuta per kg

1975 35 6.4 546.9

1976 40 10.5 381.0

1977 45 19.1 235.6

1978 52 37.8 137.6

1979 85 55.7 152.6
1980 85 75.0 113.3
1981 120 100.0 120.0

SOURCES: Prices were obtained by interview with personnel at the

C.S.Co. office in Kinshasa. The CPI for the city of Kinshasa,
was obtained from the Institute National de Statistiques.
 49

cultivation will become more attractive and that this will beef up the

production. Nevertheless, this is only as hypothesis; the problem needs

to be looked over carefully as to what would happen if the production does

not follow the increase in price. This could be illustrated by the fol­

lowing graph (Figure 1).

If cotton production is actually at a supposedly equilibrium point,

though not a stable one, with price at Po and quantity available at Qo,

what would happen if the government puts in practice a new price P1

(P1 > Po)? If the increase in prices from Po to P1 is viewed by farmers

as an incentive to grow more cotton, then the production level is expected

to be at Q2. The problem here would be to stimulate the ciemand for seed

cotton at the price P1.

If the increase in price (Po to P1) is counterbalanced by other fac­

tors, such as cost of production, inflation, etc., and therefore has no

positive effe L on the farmers' revenue, we would not expect an increase

in production. On the other hand, cotton companies would cut down on

quantity taken from Qo to Ql and this would drag along other consequences

which would jeopardize cotton production.

According to the President Director General of C.S.Co., the price

of seed cotton would have to be 2.5 times the price of corn in order to
be competitive with corn as an enterprise. That estimate is based on re­

lative yields, labir requirements and possibly other factors. Based on

data obtained during this study, that appears to be a good estimate. If

seed cotton price does not exceed corn price by approximately that ratio,

the opportunity cost for growing cotton will be too high.

P A6(price of seed cotton)

Po1 - - -
i

PO I I

I I

(Quantity of
I L cotton seed)
Q, Q0 Q2 Q

Figure 1. SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR COTTON UNDER ASSUMED PRICE CHANGES
 EVALUATION OF CONSTRAINTS ON COTFON PRODUCTION AT THE
FARM LEVEL

Zairian agriculture is still dominated by traditional practices.

The small scale, family holding is mainly characterized by hard work, small

individual farm style, low yields, reliance on family labor, predominance

of hand tools--and a low farmer's income.

The original plan of this study was to analyze cotton supply in Zaire.

The idea was to check the relationship between cotton production and prices

paid to farmers and to determine the major constraints on cotton production

through personal contacts with farmers in selected areas. Such a study

would yield valuable insight on how to overcome barriers to increasing

cotton production.

The areas visited by the author included the following centers:

(1) Centers of Titule and Dembia in the sub-region of Bas-Ueles (Nor­

thern cotton belt)

(2) Centers of Musenge and Tehala in the sub-region of Lualaba (Sou­

thern cotton belt)

Spencer (1972) distinguished different methods for collecting data

on traditional farms. The method used here is close to the farm business

survey, except that selected farmers were not visited several times, but

only once. In fact, time and budget constraints would not allow the author

to pay more than one visit to farmers in one area.

Transportation problems in the remote areas of the country and dif­

ficulties related to the wide dispersion of cotton growing centers made

it hard to contact more than 70 farmers in each one of the two sub-regions.

One hundred and forty farmers were then picked randomly from a list of
 52

HAV 15 held by the agricultural extension service officer in each center.

The questionnaire being more qualitative than quantitative and knowing

that cultural practices are nearly the same all over the country, it was

judged that the problem of representativeness of the sample 16 was not a

serious one. In addition, as said by E. Tollens (1975), although statisti­

cal theory helps us to determine the degree of representativeness of a

sample, it is difficult to apply this theory to a farm management survey

in the African context; mostly because of a lack of recorded data on pro­

duction and costs.

Work Operations and Cultural Practices

Cultural conditions. Climatic conditions, in general, are favorable

for cotton cultivation in most areas of Zaire, as the temperature never

goes below 5 degrees Celsius (except on the mountains) nor above 38 to

40 Celsius. Average annual rainfall is between 1,400 and 1,800 mm in the

south and between 1,700 and 1,900 mm in the northern cotton belt. Cot­
ton requires a dry season of three to four months for a complete maturation

of cotton bolls and a minimum or 400 to 500 mm of well-distributed rainfall

for a normal growth. The area north of the equator is characterized by a

dry season from December to February. Of the 70 farmers visited in the
Bas-Ueles sub-region, all of them planted cotton sometime between June

and July. In the southern area of Lualaba sub-region, the dry season goes

from mid May to August and cotton is planted in January. However, there
is a considerable variation of soil quality from one area to another and

ISHAV: Hemme adults valide or able-bodied adult male.

16A sample of 140 cotton farmers represents roughly 10 percent of the
total of farmers in the two visited sub-regions.
 53

this fact may be regarded as a constraint to cotton production. In fact,

soils under forest coverage in the northern cotton belt are more fertile

than savanna soils of the south, since they have more humus and a better

moisture retention. There is, in general, a need for using chemical ferti­

lizers to help revitalize soils and a pressing necessity for using fertili­

zers to increase yields. Of the 140 farmers visited, none was using fer­

tilizer to grow cotton.

Cultural practices. The choice of a plot of land to put under culti­

vation depends on such factors as local customs, superstitions, familial

alliances, etc. This explains the fact that one farmer could cultivate

three different plots scattered on different fields. Although the govern­

ment decided back in 1973 that all land belonged to the State and that

a farmer gains right to a plot of land by putting it under cultivation,

t1h traditional land tenure system still exists in some places.

As said earlier, cotton is cultivated in both the forest and the savanna

areas. In forests, the clearing of land is hard and is labor intensive.

Axes and machetes are used for clearing the field (cutting down the trees).

The first job is performed by man, followed by a second operation which

consists of burning up the bushes. Planting is done either in rows or

in lisorderly line- depending upon the direction of the fallen boles of

the trees.

In the savanna area, the breaking up of the land is much easier.

ONAFITEX recommended the following schedule of work for the southern area:

Land clearing: October to December

Land preparation: December 15-31

Planting: January 1-15

First Weeding: January 20-Feb. 5

 54

Thinning: January 20-Feb. 5

Second Weeding: Feb. 25-April 10

Harvest: June-July
In forests, experience has proven that cotton planting should be pre­

ceded by a pre-culture of some foou crop to help clear the land of

excess
nitrogen. Also, as stated by most of the farmers interviewed, cotton
re
quires more work per year and yields a lower rate of return than many
food
crops. So, growing cotton alone will not pay for the amount of work fur­

nished to produce it. Farmers in the savanna, as well as in the forest

areas, used the same argument to support intercropping of cotton.

In the northern area, the following schedule was recommended by

ONAFITEX in view of the amount of work required, the nutritional needs

of the people in the area, and the pedologic advantage of pre-culture

on
the cotton field:

Land clearing: November to March

Land preparation: March 1-15
Planting of corn or
peanuts: March 15-April 15
Harvest of corn or
peanuts: June 15-July 15
Planting of cotton: July 1-15
Thinning: July 20-Aug. 5
Weeding: Aug. 20-Oct. 5
Harvest of cotton: December-January
In savanna area, a maximum spacing of 100 centimeters between rows

and 40 centimeters within the row were recorded while a maximum spacing
of 60 centimeters between rows and 20 centimeters within the row recorded
in the rich soils of the northern forest areas. The author recorded also

an average of six to eight seeds per pocket which amounts to some 20 to

80 kilograms of seed per hectare. These figures were recorded in the south

where the author visited during the planting period. As shown earlier,

the first weeding should be done three weeks after planting, followed by

another one, and by a thinning operation. Harvest starts when the cotton

bolls spring open.

When declining soil fertility causes yields to fall below an accep­

table level, a new tract of land must be cleared and cultivated; the ori­

ginal field will then be left in grass or brush fallow. The duration of

the fallow period depends therefore on the natural fertility of the soil,

the climate, the vegetative cover and the population density. In the nor­

thern area of Bas-Ueles where there is almost no pressure on the land,

the fallow period extends from six to 12 years or even more. In the more

densely populated areas of Lualaba sub-region, the fallow period is shor­

tened to some three to six years to provide a more rapid re-use of the

land.
The crop rotation varies from one area to another, depending upon

the needs of the population in food crops, the climate, etc. The crop

rotation actually in practice is close to the one prescribed by Brixhe

(1958):
In Lualaba sub-region (southern cotton belt)

1st year: December-.July: cotton

September-December: corn

2nd year: December-July: cotton

September-December: peanuts
 56

3rd year: December-June: corn and manioc

(cassava)

September-December: manioc

4th year: : fallow

The shortness of the fallow period in the south could be explained

by the high population density and the high demand for cotton fiber of

the textile mills located in the Shaba (formerly Katanga) region.

In Bas-Ueles sub-region (northern cotton belt)

1st year: March-April: planting corn (pre-culture)

June-July: planting cotton

2nd year: March-April: planting rice, peanuts or corn
June-July: planting manioc and bananas

3rd year and 4th year: manioc and bananas

5th year: fallow
The crop system has been advantageous as some crops have proven to
be complementary (manioc and bananas) and others (corn) necessary as a

pre-culture for cotton, especially in the forest area. In fact, using

corn as a pre-culture for cotton helps not only to clear the land but to

eliminate the excess nitrogen which stimulates vegetative development of

cotton and hinders the development of cotton bolls (Brixhe, 1968).

Infrastructure

Tie visited sub-regions of Bas-Ueles and Lualaba are crossed through­

out by small rivers that flow into the big Zaire river and this is true

for many areas all over the country. Some of these rivers or parts of
them (like the Uele river) are unfortunately not navi <able, making those

areas dependent on roads or railroads to evacuate their products. Most

 57

of the roads are, in turn, linked with many bridges which are seldomly in

use 12 months of the year. In fact, many bridges are subject to perio­

dical breakage, and quite often out of use because of periodical floods.

Roads are in fairly poor condition in the remote areas resulting in delays

in buying cotton from farmers and in high transportation rates charged

by transportation companies.

The handling of seed cotton (loading and unloading of trucks) was

estimated in 1982 to cost 2.50 Zaires per ton. The railroad connections

in the Bas-Ueles sub-region have provided a very useful service in sending

on cotton to the river port of Bumba, not to mention the collecting of

cotton and other food crops from the Isire, Titule, Buta, Aketi and Bondo

centers.

Since 1978, there has been an encouraging increase in cotton production

(from 8,800 tons in 1978 to 11,200 tons in 1979 in the southern cotton

belt) and this effort could rapidly be cut down if the road infrastructure

keeps on disintegrating. C.S.Co., in its annual report of the year 1981,

gave the following figures in relation to the feeder roads that need to

be restored in each cotton growing area:

(1) Kasai and Maniema

Total: 4,260 kilometers of feeder roads. The total cost of

maintenance was estimated at 547,240 U.S. dollars and 4,669,894

Zaires.

(2) Haut-Zaire

Total: 5,164 kilometers of feeder roads. The total cost of

maintenance was estimated at 556,500 U.S. dollars and 4,966,455

Zaires.
 58

(3) Nord Shaba and Ruzizi

Total: 1,800 kilometers of feeder roads. The total cost was

estimated at 311,870 U.S. dollars and 1,568,948 Zaires.

(4) Lualaba and Haut-Lomami

Total: 2,000 kilometers of feeder roads. The total cost was

estimated at 290,670 U.S. dollars and 1,340,000 Zaires.

Agricultural Inputs

Several tests on the field by the Programme National Engrais or National

Program for Fertilizers have shown that cotton yields could go up substan­

tially--even in traditional agriculture (i.e., non-mechanized). Experiments

on the use of pesticides have also demonstrated that treated fields could

easily yield 800 to 1,000 kilograms of seed cotton per hectare.

The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides is still at an experi­

mental level as far as cotton is concerned and none of the farmers inter­

viewed in the Bas-Ueles and Lualaba areas had ever applied those inputs
on his farm. Some farmers, however, were well aware of the existence of

such inputs and expressed their willingness to use them. The limited use

of improved agricultural inputs is not the least of the constraints to

the increase of cotton production in Zaire.

As for the hand tools used for farming, most of the farmers in the

northern area complained of the non-availability of these items at the

local shops. Most of the tools (axes, machetes, hammers, hoes) were over

two to three years old, and finding a blacksmith in the neighborhood was

just as hard as getting money to buy new ones.

The opening of a new agricultural small hand tools factory in Kinshasa

(UNIAZ) illustrates the government preoccupation with promoting agricultural

 59

production. The UMAZ 1 7 opened in 1979 in Kinshasa with a relatively small

capacity of some 700,000 machetes, 600,000 hoes, 30,000 to 50,000 axes

and 100,000 shovels per year. As for most of the factories all over the

country, the problem of getting foreign exchange has hurt the young fac­

tory so that the 1981 output was less than half its full capacity. The
factory was set up with financial assistance from the People's Republic

of China (2/3 of the costs) and the Zaire government (1/3 of the cost).

An interview with the director revealed that the factory has not been able

to sell its 1981 production since iie performance of the middlemen (i.e.,
the government) has not been efficient enough to serve the ieedy farmers

in the remote country side. Most of the farmers expressed their hope to

see the cotton companies play a useful role in making hand tools available.

In his feasibility study on mechanization of cotton cultivation in

Tanganyika and South Maniema sub-regions, J. M. Moreau, 1978, concluded

that farmers' revenues could be higher and cotton yields improved by using

tractors and fertilizers. Mechanization would reduce the heavy burden

of labor input and would perni farmers to expand farm size (Table 13).

These figures, especially tiosc related to costs, need to be updated.

Although they show some economic advantages to the farmer from mechanization

and the use of fertilizer, they show that returns pe, man-day were in­

creased much more by the use of insecticides (Table 13). Steps need to
be taken at the policymaking level in order to introduce the use of such

inputs in an organized fashion through cooperatives, cotton companies,

etc. The future of the industry depends partially on the use of efficient

17The
Tanganyika and South Maniema sub-regions are both located in
the southern cotton belt.
 60

Table 13

EFFECT OF MECHANIZATION AND THE USE OF INSECTICIDES ON FARM

INCOME, TANGANYIKA AND SOUTH MANIEMA SUB-REGIONS, ZAIRE, 1978

Cost or income Troditional Traditional Mechanization

item cultivation cultivation plus fertilizers
plus insecti­
cides

Farm size (hectares) 0.30 0.30 0.75

Yield per hectare (kilo­
grams) 400.00 800.00 1,600.00
Quantity to sell (kilo­
grams) 120.00 240.00 1,200.00
Fixed costs (Zaires) 13.00 18.00 18.00
Costs of intensification
(Zaires) --- -- 202.50
Gross revenue (Zaires) 95.40 212.40 1,062.00
Net revenue (Zaires) 77.40 194.40 616.50
Labor (man-days) 55 63 180
Return per man-day
of labor (Zaires) 1.41 3.08 3.43

SOURCE: Ir. J. M. Moreau: Etude de Faisabilite de la Mecanization de la

Culture du coton, Unpublished document, Kinshasa, Zaire, 1978.
 bl

inputs.

Storae

Growing cotton involves a number of risks, the crop being sensitive

to changes in weather (temperature, humidity, rainfall) and storage con­

ditions. Soon after harvest, cotton should be stored in a cool place,

well ventilated, to allow the air to go through the tuft.

About 98 percent of the visited farmers stored their cotton in baskets

weighing 20 to 30 kilograms placed on drying racks. Only 22 percent of

the respondents had built separate huts as places of storage for cotton

ba:;kets. All the respondents sold all their cotton at one time, most of

them arguing that the storage facilities must be freed in order to store

other crops. A handful of farmers explained that they had to hurry because

the buyer did not show up but once every six months, and they could not

afford to take their production to the ginneries by themselves.

Nowhere in the two visited sub-regions was cotton grown for other

purposes than to be sold. This constitutes another risk involved in growing

cotton--especially in a country with a poor marketing system: no alter­

native use for it on the farm.

Agricultural Credit

There has been a number of experiments with bank loans and agricul­

tural products in Zaire; unfortunately, these experiments have not been

very successful.

In the pre-independence period, loans were granted by credit insti­

tutions, but the credit terms were too striQ.. in terms of requirements

for material guarantees or collateral to allow Zairians to qualify for

 62

them. Later on, the colonial authority decided on the creation of a "special
fund for agricultural credit" destined to serve local farmers who could

provide sufficient material guarantees.

After 1960, some credit institutions were set up throughprivate banks.

The "Ponds Congo" was created soon after independence in order to help

local settlers take over the abandoned plantations. This first experience
did not go too far as mcst recipents confused loans with grants. Then
were created successively CADEZA (Caisse Generale d'Epargne du Zaire) or
National Savings and Loan Institution, SOFIDE (Societe Financiers de Develop­

pement) set up with aid from the World Bank, and the Credit Agricole Con­

trole or Supervised Agricultural Credit financed partially by the U.S.

Agency for International Development. These newborn institutions initially
conceived to participate actively in the promotion of the agricultural

sector have channeled only a negligible part of their credits into agricul­

ture. By the end of 1971, the "Credit Agricole Controle" disappeared and
part of the funds were transferred to the National Maize Program (PNM).

The National Bank of Zaire actually regulates the credit activities

of private banks and since 1974, commercial agricultural credit has bene­

fitted from the lowest interest rates charged by private banks (Tollens,

1975). Each private or semi-private bank has a minimum quota for credit
which it has to lend to agricultural enterprises. However, some other
studies have mentioned that the low legal rate of interest, coupled with
high inflation, has made agricultural loans create a loss to lenders in­

stead of a return. This effectively shuts off credit in agriculture. Thus,

the low legal rates are not necessarily an effective help to farmers.

In January 1982, the government announced the creation of a new credit

institution, the "Banque de Credit Agicole" or Agricultural Credit Bank

 63

with a capital of 20,000,000 Zaires. The bank regulations were not avai­

lable at the time this paper was written, but it was reported that loans

should be made to middle class and small farmers through cooperatives.

Some cotton companies are actually in the process of providing small

amounts of credit in kind (tools and planting materials). The repayment

in kind (equivalent in value of seed cotton) should be made at harvest.

This practice has been praised by cotton farmers, especially in the Bas-

Ueles, even though they know little about the reimbursement rate.

Up to 1978, ONAFITEX was providing services such as the treatment

of cotton fields with pesticides free of charge, and most important, fi­

nancing cotton marketing operations. This "credit in kind" was covered

by the difference between the final sale value of cotton fiber and the

price paid to the farmer after deduction of all processing costs.

Although lack of credit is frequently cited as an important constraint

to agricultural production in Zaire, it would not be an efficient input

for cotton until the price of cotton makes the farm production of cotton

profitable--and on a competitive basis with alternative crons.

 64

CHAPTER IV

FEASIBILITY COMPARISON OF COTTON AND ALTERNATIVE ENTERPRISES

LABOR REQUIREMENTS

The calculation of cost of production at the farmer's level for a

small scale type of operation seems complicated. In fact, most of the

changes, if not all, had to be estimated because of the non-availability

of written records and the predominance of family labor (non-hired labor).

As to the labor requirements for one hectare of cotton, references were

drawn from INEAC (presently INERA) publications which were in turn slightly

adjusted by the author in the light of his visits to the field (Table 14).
Of the 140 farmers included in the sample, none spent money on fertilizers

and pesticides. However, about 22 percent of the farmers in the northern

cotton belt and some 31 percent in the south reported that their cotton

fields had been treated with pesticide without charge by ONAFITEX extension

agents. The remainder grew their cotton without any pesticide treatment

and the reason could be the wide dispersion of cotton fields, especially

in the forest area.

LEVEL OF INPUTS USED

Harvesting labor requirement was estimated on the basis of 25 kilograms

of seed cotton per man-day and an optimum of 400 kilograms of seed cotton
 65

Table 14

LABOR REQUIR4IENTS FOR ONE HECTARE OF COTTON, ZAIRE, 1982

Task Forest area Savanna area

Northern belt Southern belt
............... man-days ................

Clearing and breaking 110 100

Planting 15 15

Weeding a / 45 30

Harvesting 16 16

Uprooting and burning

dried stumps 10 10

Total 196 171

a/Weeding in the forest area is done three times and requires 15

man-days each time. In the savanna area, weeding is also done three
times, but requires only ten man-days each time.

SOURCE: Based on data published by INERA, but adjusted slightly based

on data from survey done by the author.
 56

per hectare. As the figures above illustrate, cotton production is labor­

consuming and none of the visited farmers hired labor. E. Tollens (1975)

reported that on the average, 3.89 units of family labor were available

per farm. The following figures related to the size of the fanily were

recorded in the visited centers of Bas-Ueles and Lualaba sub-regions (Ta­

ble 1S). An average of 2.1 children of working age per farm was recorded

in Lualaba and about 2.5 in the Bas-Ueles sub-regions. Labor from chil­

dren of working age is taken for granted--except for those who have either

migrated to the city or have become heads of their own families somewhere

else. In addition, communal labor and free labor in mutual exchange is

quite usual all over the country.

Most of the farmers, as well as the group of children staying with

them on the farm, have little education. The figures below show the level

of education of the selected 140 farmers in Bas-Ueles and Lualaba (Table

16).
At this relatively low level of education, the cost of labor at the

farmer's level could be roughly compared with the legal wage rate of an

uneducated government employee (door-keeper) which is in fact the lowest

monthly pay rate of 96 Zaires (base salary). Of course, the "take hor-"

pay for the government employee could range somewhere between 120 and 150

Zaires, adding up all items.

Seeding materials were provided by ONAFITEX which had in turn the

monopsony rights to buying seed cotton (one channel marketing). Since

1978, this task is performed by the cotton companies in the areas where

they operate.
As to the hand tools used per hectare for farming, the following
 67

Table 15

FAMILY SIZE OF SELECTED FARMERS IN BAS-UE.ES AND LUALABA

SUB-REGIONS, ZAIRE, 1982-

Number of children of Ba.-Ueles frequency Lualaba frequency

working age (above 15) of class of class
................... farms ..................

0- 3 61 66

4- 7 7 5

8-11 2 --

Total 70 70

a/All farmers included in the sample had only one wife, although
polypamy is sometimes practiced in these areas.

SOURCE: Data collected by the author.

 68

Table 16

LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF SELECTED FARMERS IN THE BAS-UELES AND

LUALABA SUB-REGIONS, ZAIRE, 1982

Years of schooling Bas-Ueles Lualaba

0 - 6 (primary school) 41 29

7 - 9 (orientation cycle) 21 31

9 - 12 (secondary school) 8 10

Total 70 70

SOURCE: Data collected by the author.

 69

figures were recorded:

2 files every two years 20 Zaires X 2 2 = 20 Zaires
2 hoes every two years 25 Zaires X 2 2 = 25 Zaires
2 machetes Lvery two years = 25 Zaires X 2 2 = 25 Zaires

2 axes every two years = 25 Zaires X 2 2 = 25 Zaires

Total 95 Zaires/year

YIELDS AND GROSS RETURNS OF SELECTED CROPS

Gross Returns

In the Lualaba and Bas-Ueles sub-regions, cotton was grown together

with corn, rice, peanuts or cassava (more than 50 percent of the farmers

included in the sample followed that pattern). As a consequence, the in­

dividual yields obtained from each crop were relatively low.

During the survey, farmers were asked how much they received last

season for fifty acres (1/2 hectare) of cotton, corn, rice, peanuts and

cassava. After much discussion, they decided on 225 Zaires for cotton,

618 Zaires for peanuts, 1,012 Zaires for corn, 980 Zaires for rice, and

2,550 Zaires for cassava (Table 17).

The agricultural extension agents concurred with the estimates made

by the farmers, but added that those who followed all planting advice earned

as much as 450 Zairos for cotton alone. To this, the farmers responded
that such a man would be losing too much time that could be spent on the

other crops.
Taking into consideration the pricc per unit for each crop and the

labor requirements in terms of man-days for each activity, it was possible

to get a rough estimate of labor return per man-day (Tables 18 and 19).
 70

Table 17

IELI,. AMD GROSS RETURNS REPRESENTATIVE OF SELECTED CROPS IN

THE BAS-UELES AND LUALABA SUB-REGIONS, ZAIRE, 1982

Crop Yield Price (per Kg) Gross return (per Ha)

kg/ha .............. Zaires .......................

Cotton 250 1.80 450

Peanuts 700 2.80 1,236

Corn 650 1.90 2,024

Rice 450 4.50 1,960

Cassava 3,400 1.50 5,100

SOURCE: Gross revenue computed by the author. Gross return is total

yield times price. Farmers actually do not sell all of
their production.
 Table 18

LABOR REQUIREMENTS FOR ONE HECTAE OF LAND PLANTED TO SELECTED

CROPS IN BAS-UELES SUB-REGION, ZAIRE, 1982

Land Weeding & crop Harvesting & Total

Crop preparation Planting maintenance related per ha
activities
................. man-days per hectare ......................

Cotton 110 15 45 26 196

Corn (105) 11 (30) 33 44

Rice (95) 65 (28) 100 165

Peanuts (98) 25 (17) 70 95

Cassava 162 17 45 60 286

Total 272 133 90 289 786

SOURCE: Gross revenue computed by the author.

 Table 19

LABOR REMUNERATION FOR SELECTED CROPS, BAS-UELES AND LUALAaA

SUB-REGIONS, ZAIRE, 1982

Land Gr-,s Return per

Crop Prep. Planting Weeding Harvest Total r iue Man-day
....... man-days per hectare ...... .......... Zaires ............

Cotton 110 15 45 26 196 450 2.30

Corn (105) 11 (30) 33 44 1,236 28.09

Rice (95) 65 (28) 100 165 2,024 12.27

Peanuts (98) 25 (17) 70 95 1,960 20.63

Cassava 162 17 45 60 286 5,100 17.96

Total 272 133 90 289 786 10,770 81.25

SOURCE: Labor requirements were drawn from the INEAC Publication, Normes
de la Main d'Oeuvre, and slightly adjusted by the author in-tH
light of survey results.
 73

This gives a definite picture of the profitability of the basic food crops

grown in Zaire as compared to cotton. Note that although these different

crops were found on the same field, planting and harvesting were peeformed

at different moments.

From Table 19, it is obvious that the gross revenue is higher from

cassava than from any other crop. This could be misleading. Although

cassava can be grown in ten to 12 months, its harvest often extends the

land-use time to 18 to 24 months--or longer; whereas, none of the other

crops require more than six months. So, the farmer may harvest two or

more crops of the others during the time used for one crop of cassava.

Labor Remuneration

Labor remuneration was then calculated by dividing the gross revenue

(not net revenue) by the total man-days required for 1.0 hectare. Although
the gross revenue is used, and not the net, this is of no great consequence.

In fact, in the traditional agriculture, there are very small expenses

for other inputs than labor. Therefore, the calculation of return per

man-day is virtually the same as it would be using the net return.

A casual study of Table 20 reveals that the peasant farmer's reluctance

to grow cotton is based on the opportunity cost principle. Although he

never heard of such a principle, his comon sense tells him he has more

attractive alternatives than cotton. In fact, with the exception of rice,

cotton is the least attractive crop. Even rice would be more attractive

than cotton if the farmer had enough labor to handle the heavy labor re­

quirements of planting and harvesting the crop.

With his limited tools and capacity for clearing more land, it was

concluded that the farmer was better off intercropping than he would be
 74

Table 20

RESULTS OF PRONAM EXPERIMENTS IN INTERCROPPING MANIOC (CASSAVA),

CORN, AND PEANUTS, PRONAM STATION, MVUAZI, BAS-ZAIRE REGION,
ZAIRE, 1983

Treatment Manioc Maize Peanuts

....... metric tons per hectare .........

Manioc-Maize-Peanuts 14.4 2.6 1.5

Manioc-Maize 15.1 2.9
Manioc-Peanuts 16.1 2.1
Manioc alone 154 ......

Maize alone --- 3.2 ---

Peanuts alone --- 2.5

SOURCE: Personal interview with Citoyen Lutaladio ne Bambi, Ingenieur

Agroncine, PRONAM, Mvuazi, 1983. Citoyen Lutaladio cautioned
that yield differences were not statistically significant.
growing just cotton (mono-culture). Data supporting this conclusion are

shown in Table 20, although cotton was not among the crops intercropped

in this set of experinents. Programme National Manioc (PRONAM) provided

data shown in Table 20. They found that manioc yielded more intercropped

with peanuts than when grown alone. The research station, PRONAM, formed

a definite conclusion that the farmer made a higher return from intercrop­

ping than from mono-culture.

The 65 makuta boost in the price of cotton per kilogram has been a

start in an attempt to match the prices farmers can get for food crops

with a nearly equal input of labor. This new price, however, will still
bring a farmer less than five hundred (500) Zaires for one hectare--which

is far less than from any of the other crops (corn, rice, peanuts or cas­

sava).

THE MARKETING CHANNEL

The cotton industry of Zaire is facing several problems including

that of the great disparity between the price of cotton paid at the farm

gate and that paid by the textile factory to the cotton companies for cot­

ton fiber. The ginning margins, which include the cost of maintenance

of the gin machinery, appear to be too high. In the U.S.A., the cotton
farmer typically gets enough from the sale of cotton seed to pay for gin­

ning, bagging and marketing his cotton. The marketing channel is shown

in Figure 2.
It is widely accepted that three kilograms of unginned cotton (seed
cotton) are required to produce one kilogram of cotton fiber. Therefore,
the cost in payment to the farmer for one kilogram of fiber should be three
Figure 2. MARKETING CHANNEL FOR COTTON IN ZAIRE, 1982

Leed cotton at farm gate

(village) (Equivalent to Z 5.40
arm __
___ __ price:
gate _,__ _ 1.808/kg fiber)
per kg. of cotton

i~~~~ e
i~to
bopne
o 4g) (-)

I
Cotton Companies

~Cotton fiber price: 15.8/kg FP

L--- , (gneies Epr

Socal textile
manufacturers
 77

times that of unginned cotton. Currently, the disparity between the farm
gate price and the price of cotton fiber is so great that the cotton farmer

receives a relatively small portion of the price received by the gins for

cotton fiber.

It is interesting to notice that the current policy on cotton pro­

duction is somehow working towards an alleviation of excessive cost of

marketing. In most of the cotton producing areas, if not all, the farmer's

task ends by carrying his seed cotton from the field to his home and by
putting it in a temporary storage near his house. The new cotton legis­

lation charges C.S.Co. with responsibility for costs related to transport

of seed cotton to the ginneries, insurance fees, handling, storage and

other small expenses. These expenses are in turn reimbursed to C.S.Co.

by the cotton companins on an annual contribution basis. The C.S.Co. pe­

riodical (December 1981) reported the following figures related to these

costs (Table 21) which are not inputed to the farmer's production expen­
ditures.

With the new price of 1.80 Zaires per kilogram of seed cotton, the

cost in payment to the farmer of one kilogram of cotton fiber is 1.80 X

3 = 5.40 Zaires. The cotton companies are paid 15.30 Zaires for the same

kilogram of cotton when it leaves the gin. This means the ginneries are

making about 10 Zaires profit out of each kilogram of cotton fiber sold.

In view of these figures, the charge for ginning could be estimated as

follows:

1 kilogram of cotton fiber: 1.80 X 3 = 5.40 Zaires

Transport, handling, etc.: 1,060 1,000 = 1.06 Zaires

Ginning Costs: 15.30 - 6.46 = 8.84 Zaires

Total 15.30 Zaires
 78

Table 21

TOTAL COST OF TRANSPORTING, INSURANCE, HANDLING AND STORAGE

OF SEED COTTON PER TON, ZAIRE, 1982

Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

............... Zaires per ton .................

Cost per ton

of seed cotton 474.59 474.59 643.88 643.88 1,060.00
 79

This allows us to get a rough estimate of the farmer's share of the gin's

price for cotton fiber. For one kilogram of cotton fiber sold (15.30 Zaires),

the farmer gets about 30 percent of the value.

In the United States, the costs of hauling, ginning and baling are

paid by the farmer, and are included in the farm price. However, according

to Ku'l1s, these costs are generally covered by the revenue the farmer re­

ceives from the sale of cotton seed (p.360). One could not maintain that

the same could or should be the case in Zaire. However, the farm price

of cotton needs to be higher in order to make cotton attractive to the

Zairian farmer.

One aspect of the problem in Zaire is the high cost of assembling,

processing and transporting the cotton from where it is grown to the tex­

tile mills. It seems likely that some of the farms where cotton is now

grown are beyond the circle where cotton buyers under a free price system

would pay anything for the cotton. Marketing costs in the more distant

areas absorb all of the price received for the product delivered to the
mills. These areas, according to Thunen (cited by Whittaker, 1960), world

revert to idle land. In Zaire, they would not revert to idle la-.., but

to subsistence production of food crops.

According to the President of C.S.Co., that organization hopes to

concentrate production of cotton in areas where the tutal cost of pro­

duction, assembly, processing and transportation to the mill will be less.

This move should enable the industry to pay the farmer a more attractive

price. This move would certainly be toward agreement with Thunen's theory

of the location of agricultural production.

 80

CHAPTER V

SU NvARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECONKNDATIONS

SU NARY Avw CONCLUSIONS

Cotton was introduced in Zaire back in the early 1900's by slave tra­

ders from Egypt and Sudan, and by Portuguese traders from Angola. The

crop grew wild in the savanna and forest regions north of the equator until

Belgian colonization. Between 1917 and 1957, farmers were required to

raise cotton as a means of "education." Compulsory cultivation was linked

with distribution of selected seeds from government multiplication centers,

an elaborate system of zoning for ginneries -nd a reliable marketing or­

ganization.
A quick review of the history of th. zafricultural sector and that

of cotton production in particular revealed ;_'iat there has been a decrease

in both the area cultivated and the production. Cotton production reached

a top level of 179,660 tons in 1959 with an estimated 800,000 families

involved in the production. Between 1960 and 1964, the industry faced

a lot of difficulties brought about by political disturbances. Most of

the -jmpanies resumed their activities in 1965 and cotton production trend

was distinctly rising until 1973 when the government decided to nationa­

lize all enterprises. Up to 1959, the production was sufficient to cover

the domestic demand for fiber and to generate a surplus that was exported.

Ten years after independence, Zaire had bo begin supplementing its

 81

production with imports from the United States, and the situation has not

changed much since then. The individual farm size has decreased and so has
by
the total output and the number of cotton farmers--currently estimated

C.S.Co. to be 350,000 farmers.

Given the country's potential for production and the need to satisfy

a growing textile industry, it seemed urgent to the government to set new

strategies in order to increase cotton production. The government then crea­

ted the National Office for Textile Fibers (ONAFITEX) in 1971--with the mo­

nopoly rights for the marketing of cotton and its by-products. ONAFITEX

to
was charged with the responsibility of providing technical assistance

farmers, to ensure cotton marketing through collection, transport, ginning

and the sale of cotton fiber. An inefficient management led to the dissolu-

tion of ONAFITEX in 1978 and to the creation of C.S.Co. The role of the

Cotton Stabilization Company, C.S.Co., in the sub-soctor is strictly technical

and administrative, the work in the field being left to the cotton companies.

At the same time, the textile industry has been expanding as a consequence

of high demand for fabrics. The capacity of the textile industry is actually

in the neighborhood of 21,000 tons of cotton fiber with a total of eight

major textile mills located in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Lubumbashi and Kalemie.

The production of seed cotton was 29,100 tons in 1980, or an equivalent of

8,730 t-)s of cotton fiber. The domestic supply of cotton fiber is much

less than the current capacity of the mills. Cotton fiber is, therefore,

imported.

A look over the allocation of the government budget to different sectors

of the economy shows that the portion of the budget directed to agricul­

ture is relatively small. Nevertheless, the participation of the government

 encouraging for further
in various cotton projects, though small, has been
not thus far
settlement of private and semi-private cotton companies--but

for the farmers.

within the
In Zaire, agricultural prices are discussed and proposed
the approval of the De-
Department of Agriculture and then submitted for
policy on cotton production
partment of National Economy. The new pricing
it has been proposed recently
seems merely conjunctively oriented. In fact,
to llS--and even to 180
to raise cotton prices from 90 makute per kilogram
price would make cotton
makuta per kilogram, hoping that the increase in
found that this increase
production more attractive. In this study, it was
Increases in the
in price alone would not imply an increase in production.
in the price of things
cotton price have been more than offset by increases
the other hand, there is
purchased by the farmers; i.e., by inflation. On
than imported cotton
a risk of making Zairian cotton a lot more expensive
pricing poli­
and, therefore, less competitive in the market. So, cotton
the real aim being
cies should be considered within a more global framework,
level as competing crops.
to make cotton cultivation as profitable at the farm
traditional
In Zaire, the agricultural sector is still dominated with
of society.
practices incompatible with the needs and the requirements
farm level
An evaluation of the constraints to cotton production at the

has shown that there are the following: (1) a reliance on hand tools;
labor; and (4) a
(2)a lack of improved inputs; (3) a reliance on family
combined with
lack of economic motivation. The heavy labor requirements
has resulted
costs of production aggravated by a generalized inflation

in a reduction of farmers' incomes. Compared to an uneducated government

 83

18 The
employee, the cotton farmer was relatively less well remunerated.

higher prices proposed by the Department did not reverse the situation.

However, the farmer could do much better than a low-paid government worker-­

if he produced any one of several of the competing crops.

Cultural conditions were found to be favorable for cotton in the areas

north and south of the equator. Soil fertility and the distribution of

rainfall varied according to ,he distance from the equator line and the

vegetative cover (either forest or savanna cover). The duration of the

fallow period as well as the crop rotation variedalso according to the

natural fertility of the soil, the climate and the population density.

In the populated Lualaba sub-region (southern cotton belt) the fallow period

was two to four years shorter than in Bas-Ueles (northern cotton belt).

The road infrastructure is in poor condition. About 13,500 kilometers

of feeder roads in the cotton producing areas need to be restored and to

be kept in fairly good shape. The poor road network is not the least of

the constraints of cotton production in Zaire.

In an attempt to calculate the cost of production, we found that the

only inputs for which the farmers spent cash money were the hand tools.

Work from family people was taken for granted, not to mention the work

furnished by other farmers in the communal work scheme. It takes an average

of 196 mon-days to bring into cultivation one hectare of cotton in the

northern cotton belt against ]71 in the south. This amount of work is

too heavy. The return to labor amounted to 14.7 Zaires per man-day in

intercropping (cotton, corn and peanuts)--and only 5.2 Zaires per man­

18 In calculating the return to labor, we have used nominal prices

collected in 198.. The real prices would have been obtained by deflating
the nominal prices using a consumer price index.
 84

day in mono-culture (just cotton). This low return to labor could almost

exclusively be explained by the heavy input of labor required for land

preparation and by the low yields per hectare. Practices such as planting

(or harvesting) cotton three to four weeks later than the correct moment,

irregular weeding and thinning, irregular spacing, etc. are the factors

that, we think, explain the low yields. The improvement of these practices

does not cost money; it is a matter uf willingness and motivation. Other

factors explaining low yields (and requiring some investments) are the

lack of improved inputs, especially pesticides and fertilizers, and a poor

agricultural extension framework.

The survey revealed that cotton farmers (in general) had little edu­

cation; this could hinder to some extent the extension efforts to intro­

duce in the rural area the use of new improved inputs and agricultural

practices. Storage conditions need to be improved in order to keep the

quality of fiber high and to reduce waste.

A number of experiments with bank loans and ag icultural credit have

been conducted in Zaire, but they have not been very successful for several

reasons. On the one hand, commercial banks and other credit institutions

fear the lack of credibility on the part of the farmers; on the other hand,

most of the farmers tend to confuse loans with grants. The creation of

a new ag 'icultural credit bank in January 1982 is viewed as a positive

step towards the establishment of a credit system which would be flexible

enough to enable small farmers to qualify for loans.

In the present study, an attempt was made to identify the constraints

to the production in Zaire. Although perhaps not all of them have been

revealed, this study has revealed the major ones. From it, certain policy
 85

recommendations can be formulated.

POLICY RECOMvIENDAT IONS

Cotton farmers in Zaire definitely need to be motivated to increase

the production. The increase in price from .90 Zaires per kilogram to

1.80 Zaires per kilogram for seed cotton recommended by the Department

of Agriculture sounds reasonable on the surface--but there has been rapid

inflation. The government should try to make cotton production as pro­

fitable as the cultivation of the competing food crops in order to motivate

the farmers to produce it. However, there is a need to back up the increase

in price by other supporting policies and strategies in order to come up

with a positive result.

If a price policy is to be effective in increasing aggregate agricul­

tural production, it must bring about a greater input of resources into

agricultural production. In a traditional agriculture, the principal input

which may be affected by price policy is the labor input and the principal

substitution is a more profitable crop for a less profitable one--or work

for leisure. In Eact, more land may be brought into cultivation or with­
drawn from cultivation as a result of price changes, but this occurs primarily

through the use of more or less labor on improvements in the existing land-­

or in lesser degree, in extending the margin of cultivation. We therefore

recommend actions towards an alleviation of work, especially for land pre­

paration. This might be done more efficiently using either animal traction

or, eventually, mechanizing that activity. References on cost of mecha­

nization are available, although more detailed feasibility studies need

to be performed.
 86

It should also be recommended that small hand tools be made available

to farmers at reasonable prices. This would enable more farmers to afford

those primary inputs.

An effort is needed on the part of the government to protect the tex­

tile industry. We recommend that textile companies be granted the right

to export parts of their final products. This would help them in the fol­

lowing ways:

(1) To ,,rn foreign exchange needed for international transactions

(for instance, the buying of spare parts).

(2) To improve the quality of the fabrics by the nodernization of

the machinery.

(3) To guarantee jobs for the 10,000 people already employed by

those companies and create new jobs for the jobless.

(4) To beef up the national treasury and, in the lo;;g run, to improve

the balance of payments.

The cotton industry has felt a pressing need for setting new regula­

tions aimed at reducing the importation of used clothing, since these pro­

ducts are actually a serious threat to the domestic textile industry. How­

ever, this second-hand clothing is an economic boon to the poor people.

An alternative solution to the problem would be the exportation of either

seed cotton or cotton fiber by the cotton companies. It is quite clear

that consumers will be forced to pay a bit higher prices for clothing if

importation of second-hand clothing is stopped.

We also recommend that special attention be paid to the following

specific points:

(1) A substantial increase is needed in the portion of the national

budget allocated to agriculture, the agriculture sector being

 87

proclaimed the "priority of priorities."

(2) The agricultural extension services of the Department of Agri­

culture should be reinforced and the officers retrained. They

are the ones in direct contact with farmers and their role is

essential in diffusing modern agricultural practices, as well

as the use of improved inputs in the rural areas.

(3) The experimental centers of INERA (especially Gandajika, Bambesa

and Boketa) should be geared up for breeding and selection of

new varieties and for experimentation with chemical fertilizers,

pesticides and mechanization.

(4) C.S.Co. needq to be regularly reimbursed by funds from the in­

dustry in order to stay on schedule with the collecting and trans­

port of cotton from the cotton farms.

(5) The flow of agricultural hand tools from the manufacturer in

Kinshasa to the farmers in the remote countryside should be ac­

celerated. Efficient production cannot be expected without at

least a satisfactory complement of simple hand tools.

(6) Cotton production should be concentrated in areas where the total

cost of assembly, ginning and transportation will be the least.

That may well be in an area or areas where production of cotton

is not at the lowest cost at the farm level. However, mills

have to pay for ginned cotton delivered to the mill.

(7) Cotton prices need to be raised to reach, at least, 2.5 times

the price of corn in order to make cotton production attractive

to farmers. This should have little or no negative effect on

corn production. Farmers would still produce corn for their

own use and to sell. Corn is a rather profitable enterprise.

(8) New investments should be made in equipment for expanding the

seed cotton oil industry. This will help people involved in

the production of cotton to draw additional profit from this

enterprise. Both oil and cotton cake are valuable products with

good demand.

(9) Given the country's potential for agricultural production, there

is a large opportunity for increasing cotton yield by an efficient

job of agricultural education and extension based on practices

such as correct spacing between rows and within rows, timely

planting, weeding, harvesting, etc. Many such improvements re­

quire no additional cash expenditure on the part of the farmer.

(10) We also recommend that agricultural credit institutions grant

credit in kind rather than credit in cash. The improved inputs,

such as fertilizers and pesticides, being exclusively imported

items, it is quite obvious that not many smallholders can afford

to buy sufficient amounts of these inputs. It would be easier

for the creditor to get his money back from a farmer whose pro­

ductivity would more than likely double or even triple by using

fertilizers and pesticides.

(11) Under the present situation, irtercropping has proven to be better

for farmers in terms of profitability. We, therefore, recommend

that cotton, which fits well in this system, be intercropped

with such other crops as appear to make the overall combination

the most profitable.

(12) We recommend the plan of the President of C.S.Co. to concentrate

the production and processing of cottorn in a more limited area

 or areas in order to reduce the costs of assembly, processing

and transportation. With more cotton produced in selected areas,

it will be possible to process oil and cotton cake from cotton

seed more economically, adding further to the efficiency of the

move to concentrate production.

In conclusion, we recommend that both economic and agronomic research

be continued on cotton. The climate and land resources of the country

are too well adapted to cotton for this crop not to have a good future
for Zaire. However, no great increase in cotton production should be ex­

pected until either the price is high enough, or cost of production has

been lowered enough to make cotton competitive with alternative crops as

a farm enterprise.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Banque du Zaire, Rapport Annuel, 1978

Banque du Zaire, Rapport Annuel, 1980
Banque du Zaire, Rapport Annuel, 1981
Banque du Zaire, Kinshasa, 1979, 1980, 1981.

2. Brixhe, A., Le Coton au Congo Belge, Compagnie Cotonniere

Congolaise, 30 Edition, publication du Ministere du Congo Belge
et du Ruanda-Urundi, Bruxelles, 19S8.

3. Conjoncture Economique, Departement de 1'Economie Nationale et de

l'Industrie, Kinshasa, 1980.

4. C.S.Co. Rapport Annuel, C.S.Co., Direction Generale, Kinshasa, 1983.

5. Dim,'ndja, B., "Le Probleme de la Production Cotonniere dans le District

de Sankuru, Unpublished Thesis, Universite Lovanium, Faculte
des Sciences Economiques, Kinshasa, 1971.

6. Essais Agronomiques, ONAFITEX, Direction Regionale Nord-Ouest, Mission

C.F.D.T., Gemena, 1974.

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Washington, D.C., 1982.

9. Foreign Area Studies: Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of

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ton, D.C., 1971.

10. Heady, E. 0. and Jensen, H. R., Farm Management Economics, Prentice-

Hall Incorporated, New York-P-f4 .

11. Indices des Prix de Detail des Biens de Consommation Courante aux
Marches de Kinshasa, IRES, Cahiers economiques et sociaux, Kin­
shasa, 1973.

12. Johnston, F. and Kelby, Agricultural Development, McGraw-Hill Co.,

New York, 1975.
13. Kohls, R. L., Marketing of Agricultural Products, The MacMillan Com­
pany, New York, 2nd Edition, 1961.

14. Lumpungu, K., Les Problemes Actuele de l'Economie Agriccie Ziroise,

IRES, Seminaire sur le Developpement Agricole au Zaire,- isaa,
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15. Le Develcppement Accelere en Afrique au Sud du Sahara, Banque Mon­

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 GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS

ONAFITEX: Office National des Fibres Textiles (National Office for Tex­
tile Fibers)

INERA: Institut National d'Etude et de Recherche Agronomiqu.e (National

Institute for Agronomic Study and Research)

IRES: Institut de Recherches Economique et Sociale (Institute for

Economic and Social Research)

FED: Fonde Europeen de Developpement (European Development Fund)

C.S.CO.: Caisse de Stabilisation Cotonniere (Cotton Stabilization Fund)

IDA: International Development Association

COCE: Caisse Central de Cooperation Economique (Central Fund for

Economic Cooperation)

SOFIDE: Societe Financiere de Developpement (Financial Development

Company)

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 hectare (ha) = 2.471 acres

1 hectare (ha) = 100 acres = 10,000 square meters

1 kilometer (km) = 0.621 mile

1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet

1 kilogram (kg) = 2.204 pounds