PIANC

‘Setting the Course’

Report n° 116 - 2012

Safety Aspects Affecting the

Berthing Operations of
Tankers to Oil and Gas Terminals
The World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure
PIANC Report 116
PIANC Report 116
 PIANC ‘Setting the course’

PIANC REPORT N° 116

MARITIME NAVIGATION COMMISSION

Safety Aspects Affecting the

Berthing Operations of
Tankers to Oil and Gas Terminals
2012

PIANC Report 116

 PIANC has Technical Commissions concerned with inland waterways and ports (InCom),
coastal and ocean waterways (including ports and harbours) (MarCom), environmental
aspects (EnviCom) and sport and pleasure navigation (RecCom).

This report has been produced by an international Working Group convened by the
Maritime Navigation Commission (MarCom). Members of the Working Group represent
several countries and are acknowledged experts in their profession.

The objective of this report is to provide information and recommendations on good

practice. Conformity is not obligatory and engineering judgement should be used in its
application, especially in special circumstances. This report should be seen as an expert
guidance and state of the art on this particular subject. PIANC disclaims all responsibility
in case this report should be presented as an official standard.

PIANC Secrétariat Général

Boulevard du Roi Albert II 20, B 3
B-1000 Bruxelles
Belgique

http://www.pianc.org

VAT BE 408-287-945

ISBN 978-2-87223-196-6

© All rights reserved

PIANC Report 116

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction ......................................................... 4 13 Nautical Port Information..................................... 50

2 Terms of Reference............................................... 4 14 Ship Characteristics............................................ 52

14.1 Crude Oil Tankers...................................... 52
3 Members of the Working Group............................ 5 14.2 LNG Carriers............................................. 53
14.3 LPG Carriers.............................................. 55
4 Meetings of the Working Group............................. 6
15 Definitions ....................................................... 55
5 Safety Management and Risk Assessment........... 7
5.1 Safety Management System (SMS)............ 7 16 References and Recommended Literature......... 56
5.2 Risk Assessment System............................ 8
5.3 Application of Risk to Port Transit, Towage, Appendix A: Example of Operational Risk
Pilotage and Passage Planning................. 11 Assessment................................... 58
5.4 Towage...................................................... 12
5.5 Pilotage...................................................... 13 Appendix B: Wind Force Formulations............... 80
5.6 Passage Planning...................................... 14
Appendix C: Current Force Formulations........... 87
6 Environmental Conditions................................... 16
6.1 Location..................................................... 16 Appendix D: Wave Force Formulations.............. 94
6.2 Data Requirements and Availability........... 17
6.3 Topography and Bathymetry...................... 18
6.4 Geology and Geotechnical Condition........ 18
6.5 Datums and Coordinate Systems.............. 18
6.6 Water Levels and Tidal Range.................. 18
6.7 Environmental Design Conditions............. 18
6.8 Current....................................................... 19
6.9 Wind ....................................................... 20
6.10 Wave ....................................................... 21
6.11 Visibility...................................................... 22
6.12 Ice ....................................................... 22
6.13 Other Environmental Aspects.................... 22

7 Approach from Open Sea to the Terminal........... 22

7.1 Requirements for the Approach Channel...... 22
7.2 Tug Assistance.......................................... 23
7.3 Channel Dimensions................................. 23
7.4 Berth Depth and Underkeel Clearance...... 24
7.5 Air Draught and Clearance........................ 25
7.6 Anchoring Areas........................................ 25
7.7 Places of Refuge....................................... 25
7.8 Passing and Overtaking in Channels........ 26
7.9 Manoeuvring/Turning Areas....................... 26
7.10 Locks ....................................................... 26

8 Berthing, Mooring and Monitoring Systems........ 27

8.1 Mooring System......................................... 27
8.2 Fendering.................................................. 28
8.3 Vessel Docking Aid Systems..................... 29

9 Required Space for Safe Berthing....................... 31

10 Calculation of Environmental Forces................... 34

10.1 Wind Forces.............................................. 34
10.2 Current Forces........................................... 37
10.3 Wave Forces.............................................. 37

11 Acceptable Metocean Conditions for Safe

(Un)Berthing ....................................................... 39

12 Operational Safety during Berthing..................... 42

3 PIANC Report 116

 1 INTRODUCTION This indirectly means that under the same compa-
rable environmental conditions (wind, waves and
This report identifies and discusses the significant current), the acceptable operational risks during ap-
safety aspects associated with the arrival, berthing proaching, berthing and unberthing are or can be dif-
and unberthing operations of oil and gas tankers at ferent from terminal to terminal or the risk for e.g. oil
terminals. Factors considered included the termi- spillage, grounding of the tanker etc. can be higher
nal’s safety management and risk assessment pro- at one terminal compared to another terminal. This
cedures and the impact of wind, wave and current can easily be seen if one compares and evaluates
forces acting on the tanker. the different oil and gas terminals manuals for ac-
ceptable operational limits for approaching, berth-
Oil and gas terminals pose safety hazards and en- ing and unberthing a tanker around the world.
vironmental risks which can be controlled and mini-
mised through proper design and the application of Therefore, the following main questions must be an-
sound operating practices. Industry guidance, to- swered if one wants a common and mutual under-
gether with national codes of practice, such as the standing either national or international guideline or
UK’s Port Marine Safety Code, promotes a unified recommendation for safe berthing and unberthing
approach to managing safety within ports and termi- of an oil or gas tankers.
nals. The guidance contained within this document
aims to build on such existing recommendations Historical Background - Definition of the Prob-
and requirements and focuses on the critical issues lem
associated with a tanker’s harbour approach and
berthing/unberthing operations. The intentions of the Working Group have been to
highlight the main safety aspects affecting the ap-
It is recommended that governments have a clear proach, berthing and unberthing operations of oil
understanding of the safety aspects and risks af- and gas tankers to or from a terminal. To this day
fecting the berthing operations of tankers to oil and there have been no common national or interna-
gas terminals. The present guidance is aimed at tional regulations, recommendations or standards
promoting a common and mutual understanding of for taking a large oil or gas tanker to a terminal re-
these safety aspects and risks as a basis for making garding the safety aspects and risks of the berthing
recommendations to national authorities. and unberthing operation.

Objective of the Working Group

2 Terms of Reference
To give guidance to port authorities to define their
General Background and Definition of the Prob-
own rules of admission, handling, etc. of oil and gas
lem
tankers, giving limits for safe approach, berthing
and unberthing with or without tug assistance and
To this day there have generally been no common
mitigations of risk.
national or international regulations, recommenda-
tions or standards for taking an oil or gas tanker
Earlier Reports to be Reviewed
from open sea to a terminal regarding the safety as-
pects of the approaching, berthing and unberthing
There have been no earlier PIANC reports or evalu-
operation. It has been up to each various oil or gas
ation on this matter.
terminal to decide the following:
Matters to be Investigated
• The acceptable environmental forces due to wind,
waves and current acting on a tanker during the
Various standards in the world (like the Spanish
berthing and unberthing operations
ROM, BS 6349, OCIMF 97 and OCIMF/SIGTTO
• The number and size of tugboat assistance dur-
95) give different recommendations for assessing
ing the operations
safe limits for wind, current and waves during berth-

PIANC Report 116 4

ing and unberthing. The Working Group shall study Haskollvegen 33
these differences and rationalise the methods to NO-3400 Lier
determine these values and give margins of accu- Norway
racy. Phone: +47 950 54 848
E-mail: [email protected]
The Working Group shall give ranges of critical
combinations of wind, waves and currents for (un)- Mr Svein Ove Nyvoll, Member, Secretary, Young
berthing operations, and simultaneously give con- Professional
siderations for harbour authorities on how to define Nyvoll Consult as
the critical conditions in their specific setting. These Carl Bergersens Vei 30
considerations may be in the form of a checklist NO-1481 Hagan
(amount of available space, traffic density, etc.). Norway
Phone: +47 976 56 656
The Working Group shall also study safe mooring E-mail: [email protected]
distances between ships and provide recommenda-
tions. The recommendations should not only give Mr José Llorca, Member
the range, but also should give considerations (in Puertos del Estado
the form of a checklist) that can be used by the port Avda. del Partenon 10
authority to determine the required distances for 28042 Madrid
their own port that will mitigate and manage risk to Spain
as low as reasonably practical. Phone: + 34 91 524 55 18
E-mail: [email protected]
The Working Group shall give considerations on the
number of tugs as function of ship (type and size), Mr Sergi Ametller, Member, Young Professional
wind, wave and currents conditions and draught. Panama Canal Enlargement,
These considerations are being given in such a Electromechanical Manager
way that the port authority can define its own rules SACYR - GUPC
and manage risk on the basis of the given consid- GUPC Corozal Este Edif.
erations. 732 Panama City
Panama
Suggested Final Product of the Working Group Phone: +507 6400 3824
E-mail: [email protected]
The Working Group shall also draft a recommen-
dation for assessing safe conditions for (un)berth- Mr Frederic J.L. Hannon, Member
ing, give considerations for the amount and power TOTAL – Gas & Power
of tugs needed for berthing operations and give LNG/Shipping Project Manager
considerations for safe distances between moored 2 Place Jean Miller – La Défense 6
ships. However, local factors may influence these 92078 Paris La Défense Cedex
recommendations and a risk assessment should France
be carried out to manage risk as low as reasonably Phone: +33 1 47 44 77 36
practical. E-mail: [email protected]

3 Members Mr Graeme Robertson, Member

Senior Marine Facilities Advisor
of the Working Group Shell Shipping Technology
Shell Centre
The Working Group has been comprised by the fol-
2 York Road, London, SE1 7NA
lowing members:
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 207 934 8659
Mr Carl A. Thoresen, Chairman
E-mail: [email protected]
PORT-CAT Consulting engineer

5 PIANC Report 116

Mr Lawrence K. Cunningham, Member Mr Willem Hoebée, Member
Halcrow Port of Rotterdam
22 Cortlandt Street World Port Center, P.O. Box 6622
New York, NY 10007 3002 AP Rotterdam
USA Phone: + 31 010 252 16 98
Phone: +1 212 608 3990 The Netherlands
E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Mr Friedrich Vogel, Member Mr Teo Ribakovs, Correspondent member, Young

Wilhelmshavener Raffineriegesellschaft Professional
Raffineriestraße 1 Moffatt & Nichol
D-26388 Wilhelmshaven 11011 Richmond Ave Suite 200
Germany Houston, TX 77042
Phone: +49 0 4421 509 158 USA
E-mail: [email protected] Phone: +1 713 977 7372
E-mail: [email protected]
Captain Jean Persy, Member
Port of Antwerp CDR Patrick W. Clark, Correspondent member
Havenhuis, Entrepotkaai 1 United States Coast Guard
2000 Antwerpen USCG Headquarter (CG-5222)
Belgium 2100 Second Street, SW, Suite 1208A
Phone: +32 3 205 21 84 Washington, DC 20593
E-mail: [email protected] USA
Phone: +1 202 372 1410
Mr Andy Dogherty, Member E-mail: [email protected]
OCIMF
MP100 ExxonMobil House, Ermyn Way, 4 Meetings of
Leatherhead
Surrey KT22 8UX
the Working Group
United Kingdom
The Working Group held the following meetings:
Phone: +44 01372 223427
E-mail: [email protected]
• Brussels, Belgium, July 9-10, 2007 (kick-off
Captain Andrew Murray, Member meeting)
SIGTTO • Madrid, Spain, October 16-17, 2007
17 St. Helen’s Place • Wallingford, UK, February 27-28, 2008
London EC3A 6DG
• Bergen, Norway, September 2-4, 2008
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 20 7628 1124 • New York, USA, February 10-11, 2009
E-mail: [email protected] • Rotterdam, The Netherlands, June 29-July 1,
2009
Dr Mark McBride, Member • London, UK, September 7-8, 2009
HR Wallingford
• Barcelona, Spain, January 19-21, 2010
Howbery Park
Wallingford, Oxon, OX10 8BA • Paris, France, June 15-16, 2010
United Kingdom • Hamburg, Germany, September 28-29, 2010 (fi-
Phone: +44 1491 835381 nal meeting)
E-mail: [email protected]

PIANC Report 116 6

 5 Safety Management • Definition of the safety policy
• Definition of the organisation and personnel roles
and Risk Assessment
within it
• Setting standards
Marine operations conducted within a port should
• Performance monitoring
be controlled by policies and procedures within
• Audit and review system
a Safety Management System (SMS), which is
based upon a structured and formal assessment of
Further guidance on the above elements can be
risk within the port. Such a risk assessment system
found in the PMSC ‘Guide to Good Practice’ (Refer-
should be an integral part of the Safety Manage-
ence 3). The SMS should cover all aspects of port
ment System used by the competent harbour au-
design and operations, and policies and procedures
thority to manage all port operations and activities.
should meet objectives that include the following:
The United Kingdom Department for Transport
• Regulate the safe arrival, departure and move-
(UKDfT) has published a ‘Port Marine Safety Code
ment within the harbour of all vessels
[PMSC]’ (Reference 2) and an accompanying
• Protect the general public from dangers arising
‘Guide to Good Practice for Port Marine Operations’
out of marine activities within the harbour
(Reference 3). While not mandatory, they represent
• Protect the environment from the impact of ma-
industry best practice regarding the safety of ma-
rine activities within the harbour
rine operations in ports.
• Prevent acts or omissions which may cause per-
sonal injury to employees or others, or damage
This Code states that a harbour authority’s safety
the environment
policy should promote a positive safety culture, fos-
tered by the visible and active leadership of senior
Tools
management. Its aim should include the motivation
and empowerment of staff to work safely, not just
The above objectives should be achieved by de-
to avoid accidents. Policy and related procedures
veloping port-specific functional procedures which
should be underpinned by effective staff involve-
may typically include:
ment and participation and be sustained by effec-
tive communication and the promotion of compe-
• Ship Movement (Navigation Management) pro-
tence.
cedures
• Vessel Traffic System (VTS) (see Reference 24)
5.1 Safety Management System (SMS) • Port Control Procedures
• Pilotage Procedures
The aim of a Safety Management System is to man- • Towage Guidelines
age and minimise risk. Risk assessment methods • Conservancy Procedures
are used to identify priorities and to set objectives • Emergency Procedures
for eliminating hazards and reducing risks. Wher- • Administrative Procedures, including:
ever possible, risk should be eliminated through the o Training and Certification
selection and design of facilities and equipment. If o Management of Change
risks cannot be eliminated, they are minimised by o Risk Assessment
physical controls or, as a last resort, through sys- o Incident and Near Miss Reporting
tems of work and personal protection equipment. o Audit and Review
Performance standards should be established and
used for measuring achievement and specific ac- In a large port it is likely that separate procedures
tions to promote a positive health and safety culture will be developed for each of the above; in a small
should be identified and implemented. port some may be combined. Also, there are signifi-
cant areas of overlap between the above functions,
Objectives and items which appear in one of these documents
in one port may be found in another in a different
The establishment of a SMS requires the following port.
elements to be developed:

7 PIANC Report 116

Safety Management System Performance 5.2 Risk Assessment System
The Safety Management System should include Risk assessment comprises the first step in the de-
formal recording procedures and self-monitoring to velopment and application of the SMS. The aim of
ensure that the system is functioning. This should the risk assessment is to establish the risks which
cover premises, plant, substances, people, proce- need to be managed in the port and to identify
dures and systems, including individual behaviour means to control them at acceptable levels.
and performance.
The risk assessment process should identify the
The system should include provision for systematic hazards, together with the events or circumstances
review of performance based on the information which may give rise to their realisation, determine
from monitoring and from independent audits of the risk posed by them and identify the barriers that
the whole system. The port authority should work can be put in place to control the risk by preventing
towards continuous improvement through the con- the realisation of the hazard and/or mitigating its
stant development of policies, systems and tech- effect if it does occur.
niques for risk control.
In the context of this document:
Performance should be assessed by reference to
performance indicators (both internal and external), • ‘Hazard’ is defined as something with the poten-
including industry good practice. tial to cause harm
• ‘Risk’ is defined as the combination or product of
If controls fail, or if near misses or incidents oc- frequency of occurrence and consequence
cur, these should be investigated to determine root
causes and corrective action taken where appro- The risk assessment process consists of five parts:
priate; this may include amendment of the Safety
Management System or procedures. • Data gathering
• Hazard identification
Emergency Planning • Risk analysis
• Assessment of existing measures
The Safety Management System should include • Identification of risk control measures/options
preparations for emergencies. The range of emer-
gency scenarios should be identified as far as prac- Data Gathering
ticable in the formal risk assessment. Emergency
plans should be exercised regularly. The Data Gathering process will aim to establish an
initial list of hazards. In essence, data gathering in-
Consultation volves familiarisation with all aspects of the existing
port operations. This will include gaining a detailed
The Safety Management System will be most ef- understanding of:
fective if measures are taken to involve and secure
the commitment of all concerned. This applies both • Topography of the port and its approaches
to the risk assessment process and to the subse- • Environmental data (currents, tides, climate and
quent operation of the SMS. Port authorities should
weather, etc.)
therefore consult as widely as practicable with
• Traffic flows and cargoes handled
all port users (stakeholders). Such parties will in-
• Leisure users
clude the harbour master, his navigation staff, port
• Port facilities, including VTS, pilotage, tug ser-
controllers, pilots, Pilotage Exemption Certificate
vices, etc.
(PEC) holders, tug masters and towage providers,
terminal and berth operators and their staff, ship • Existing policies and procedures
operators, agents, representatives of leisure user • Priorities and safety culture of the Port Authority
groups, environmental groups, national coastguard • The organisational structure of the Port Author-
authorities, etc. ity

PIANC Report 116 8

From this information, existing and potential haz- ity of occurrence and the consequences reasonably
ards can be identified, together with an appreciation expected to be associated with that level of prob-
of how they are managed within the current safety ability.
management system. The process should include a
detailed review of the existing incident database. While incident data can be helpful in identifying
hazards, its value in assessing likely frequency of
A number of tools can be used to accomplish haz- occurrence is marginal due in part to the scarcity
ard data gathering including: of significant incidents and measures which have
been put in place subsequent to those incidents.
• Questionnaires and interviews with port manage- Near miss data may give a better impression but
ment, harbour masters and other port operations should still be treated with extreme caution. There
officers, pilots, other port employees, contractors will also be a number of potential major incidents
and representative port users, including leisure identified which have never actually occurred within
users and environmental groups the particular port.
• Auditing marine and safety procedures
• Firsthand observation of various port operations The consequences of an event are best developed
(VTS, Pilotage, tug operations, mooring, etc.) by consideration of event scenarios by suitably ex-
perienced personnel. The consequences should be
Hazard Identification broken down into categories, assessing the effect of
the event on personnel, on the environment, on port
The process of hazard identification attempts to list users, and on the continued operation of the port
all the hazards which currently exist within the port (which will include the effect upon the reputation of
as a result of operations conducted therein. This in- the port). The potential for escalation of an unwant-
cludes and builds upon the hazards identified in the ed event should be included in the consideration of
data gathering process. consequence.

One of the most effective tools for this is the group The analysis can be established by qualitative or
‘HAZID’ (Hazard Identification) or SWIFT (Structured quantitative methodology, or a combination of both.
What-if ? Techniques) meeting(s) where stakehold- Qualitative risk assessment is generally conducted
ers (under the guidance of a suitable facilitator), on the basis of objective estimates of risk and con-
identify new hazards and authenticate existing haz- sequences. Quantitative Risk Assessment involves
ards and their risk control measures. analysis based on historical data, mathematical
modelling or other calculations of the probability and
These stakeholders should include port managers, consequence for each hazard. Whichever method
marine professionals (including harbour masters, is used, it will greatly assist the subsequent (rank-
port control/VTS officers, pilots, PEC holders, tug ing) process if a numerical value can be assigned
masters) other port workers and users (both com- to each risk.
mercial and leisure). In all cases, personnel from
management to the lowest operational level should The baseline condition for the analysis should be
be included to facilitate the full identification of the clearly identified, and in particular which existing
different levels of hazard. risk control measures are assumed to be in place.
Ideally, the baseline condition would assume no ex-
Risk Analysis isting risk control measures in place (ground zero).
However, if effective use is to be made of current
Risk can be defined as the product of the probability experience and historical data (where such meas-
of an event occurring and the consequences flow- ures would generally have been in place), this is
ing from it. Thus, an event which occurs infrequently difficult to achieve in practice.
and has a low level of consequence constitutes a
lower risk than one which occurs more frequently The analysis should generate a complete hazard list
and has a higher consequence. The analysis for which is ranked by severity of the risk associated
each hazard requires the establishment of probabil- with each hazard. The ranking assigned should

9 PIANC Report 116

be proportional to the level of risk determined and be established (or modified). The operation of these
referenced to the ALARP (‘As Low As Reasonably measures then becomes part of the SMS. As the
Practicable’) level. The definition of what constitutes SMS includes performance measurement and an
a tolerable level of risk can usually be determined audit and review process, the control measures a-
by inspection and comparison of various hazards dopted will be checked, audited and reviewed on a
on the ranked hazard list, although it should be not- regular basis. The frequency of these reviews may
ed that it may be the subject of legislation within the be fixed, or may vary depending on the degree of
country or region where the port exists. risk identified.

Assessment of Existing Measures The risk assessments themselves should also be

subject to regular review of their applicability and
Existing control measures and defences identified effectiveness. Further information on compiling
in the Data Gathering and Hazard Identification Risk Assessments for Port Operations can be ob-
stages should be reviewed. Additional control meas- tained from References 2 and 3 and an example of
ures may be identified to address gaps, or where an operational risk assessment is included as Ap-
enhanced measures are indicated as being re- pendix A.
quired by the analysis. There may be areas where
risk control measures are disproportionately high, Software
considering the risk involved, and may be reduced
with subsequent benefit to resource allocation. Port Risk Management softwares are available
from a number of established sources. This can
Risk Control assist, not only with the collation, storage and up-
dating of hazard data and risk control measures,
This stage identifies the specific control measures but also with processing such data in a systematic
to be put in place to achieve the risk profile required and objective way. The software can typically pro-
by the port’s safety policy and/or other relevant leg- cess the data so as to give ‘ranked’ hazard lists, i.e.
islation/standards. This will include consideration of lists of hazards and/or risk control options which
all identified risk control options, together with the are prioritised in order of ascending or descend-
resource requirements, benefits and other conse- ing risk. As these systems are generally capable of
quences of their implementation. continuous updating, it follows that they can show
the current risk management status of the port on
Once the risk assessment has been completed, demand.
with risk control measures selected, the SMS can

Figure 5.1: Relationships between the Safety Management System and Risk Assessment:
Risk Assessment defines the risk, Safety Management System manages the risk

PIANC Report 116 10

Such software can also generally accommodate counters should be considered, in combination
MATRA (Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment) with estimated probabilities of mechanical failure
platforms to address terrorism, crime and other sim- or operational error onboard the ships.
ilar hazards. • Existing Navigation Aids and safety systems, i.e.
risk control measures already in place.
The information obtained from the system may be • The historical incident rate for the transit passage
used by the Harbour Master or Port Manager to concerned, noting the regime of risk control meas-
decide priorities for the allocation of resources to ures in place over the period for which the data
achieve a balanced risk profile within the targets set is taken and any changes in them. The availabil-
out in the port’s Safety Management Policy. ity of such information will affect the accuracy of
the probability assessment. If little or no data is
5.3 Application of Risk to Port Transit, available, then probability assessment will have
Towage, Pilotage and Passage Planning to place greater reliance on professional judge-
ment.
It is not within the scope of this document to address
all possible areas of risk assessment. Therefore, as Through consideration of the above, it is possible to
an example, one primary area – vessel movement assess the probability of collision, contact or ground-
– will be considered and within that area, three pro- ing for any given ship type and transit.
cesses – towage, pilotage and passage planning –
will be considered in more detail. In each case and for each specific area of the port
or channel, the consequences of potential incidents
Analysis of the risks inherent in the transit of ships should be assessed. Credible scenarios should be
from the port entrance to the berth and elsewhere developed for each hazard, each relevant ship type,
will typically require an examination of all relevant and each section of the port/channel. For example,
hazards (including events) which could contribute the consequence of the grounding of a loaded crude
to the ship colliding with another ship, contacting a oil carrier will be different from the grounding of a
fixed object, or grounding. Other outcomes which fishing vessel. The risk of environmental pollution
might be considered include fire/explosion, person- is obviously higher with the former, whereas the
al injury, etc. chances of personal injury are higher with the lat-
ter. The risk assessment procedure should identify
Using such a ’result-orientated’ approach not only this, along with the applicable risk control options.
facilitates perception of the consequences of the re- For example, the tanker grounding scenario might
alisation of the hazard, but also allows for hazards require extra tugs, traffic control (e.g. ‘clear channel’
to be categorised within a relatively small number transit) or tidal staging (underkeel clearance limita-
of groups, within which risk control measures are tion), etc., to reduce the risk to acceptable levels,
often found to address a number of (sometimes dis- whereas the risk control measures for the fishing
parate) hazards. vessel grounding would be very different and prob-
ably relate to training, certification and inspection
The assessment should take into account the fol- procedures.
lowing:
Developing further the example of the use of tugs
• Geographical Features of the transit, such as the to prevent tanker groundings, the risk assessment
extent of navigable waters, bends in the channel, process might utilise a number of tools to assess
obstructions and isolated dangers, nature of the the correct number and type of tugs to use for any
seabed, etc. part of the transit and how they might best be used.
• Water Factors – tidal range, tidal streams and Previous experience of port operations, particularly
currents. where incidents or near misses have occurred, will
• Environmental Factors, such as the incidence of form part of this assessment. Mathematical tools
poor visibility, strong winds, swell, etc. and tables can be used to estimate the tug power
• Traffic density and likely encounters with other required for any given wind speed, current force and
ships. The frequency and geometry of likely en- ship windage and underwater areas.

11 PIANC Report 116

More accurate results are available using computer • Size, type and manoeuvrability of ships con-
simulations of varying complexity including fast-time cerned
computer modelling and manned full-mission simu- • Weather and tidal factors and limits including
lator trials. Certain simulators are able to provide wave heights and time periods
linked manned simulator environments, so that the • Environmentally sensitive areas
ship under towage and its tug(s) can be simulated • Capability for active (tug made fast to the ves-
live in real-time, with each manned by personnel sel) or passive (running close but not made fast)
of the appropriate experience. Using simulators escorting
allows multiple worst-case scenarios to be exam- • Whether tugs need to be used to facilitate certain
ined in depth, so that a number of scenarios can be manoeuvres (turning, un-berthing, etc.) and if so,
tested and procedures derived which will meet all where they should be available
expected scenarios. • Whether the ship has enhanced means of con-
trol (e.g. bow and stern thrusters, twin propellers,
Full-scale towage trials can also be undertaken. high lift rudders, etc.) and how this may offset tug
Data from all of these sources can help to improve requirements
the accuracy of the assessment. The process can
establish minimum towage requirements for dif- As a minimum, Towage Guidelines should spec-
ferent types and sizes of ship for different parts of ify the minimum number, type and power of tugs
the channel and establish environmental limits for to use for any given ship type and for particular
movement of ships within the port. This informa- berths. Where a requirement for escort towage has
tion can then be incorporated into a set of Towage been identified, the Guidelines should also identify
Guidelines for the port. the performance objective for the use of escort tugs
and where and under what conditions escorting is
It is to be noted that these same techniques may to be carried out, together with the required proce-
also identify excessive tug allocation to smaller dures.
vessels, which can then be corrected, freeing tow-
age resources for use elsewhere in the port. Towage Guidelines may also contain:

It should also be noted that the use of simulation • Variations required/permitted for different envi-
techniques is not confined to towage. They can ronmental conditions (weather, tide and current
also be used, for example, to establish manoeuvr- considerations, etc.)
ing strategies and to examine potential modifica- • Permissible reductions for ships with thrusters,
tions to channel design. high lift rudders, etc.
• Preferred method for securing and utilising tugs
5.4 Towage • Procedures for restricted visibility
• Training requirements for tug crews (e.g. simula-
Formal Risk Assessments as described above fa- tion, training with pilots, etc.)
cilitate the formulation of Towage Guidelines for a
port. While not every port will use all the tools de- There is obviously some overlap between Towage
scribed above to decide on tug requirements, each Guidelines, VTS, Vessel Movement and Pilotage
port should nevertheless develop Towage Guide- Procedures and it may be considered that some
lines which indicate the minimum number, type and of the above content would be more appropriately
size of tugs to use for particular ship types and siz- placed in these alternative procedures. For control
es approaching or leaving particular berths and any purposes, it is good practice to cross-reference
difficult navigational areas within the port. rather than duplicate these entries.

When developing Towage Guidelines, the following The Towage Guidelines should clearly identify to
factors should be considered: what extent they are wholly or partially advisory, or
mandatory.
• The geography of the port and approaches
• Any difficulties associated with specific berths, Operational safety issues associated with tug use
locks, bridges, etc. during berthing are addressed in Section 12.

PIANC Report 116 12

 5.5 Pilotage formally define the broad structure of a pilotage
service and to which vessels and areas it applies,
The Risk Assessment will determine and the SMS while Regulations contain the administrative re-
will stipulate the scope and nature of the Pilotage quirements and details of the service which support
service. Reference should also be made to local the Directions. Pilotage Directions and Regulations
and national legislation, ISPO’s International Stan- are often combined in a single document.
dard for Maritime Pilot Organisations (Reference
23) and IMO Resolution A.960(23) (Reference 12) The competent harbour authority should consider
when considering the implementation of a Pilotage granting exemptions from the requirement to carry
service. Considerations relating to the establish- a regular pilot to bona fide Masters and First Mates
ment and maintenance of a Pilotage service include of vessels which regularly trade to the port, such
the following. as ferries, bunker barges and other regular call-
ers. Any procedures for vessels exempt from the
Provision of a Pilotage Service requirement to take regular pilots should be set out
in the Pilotage Regulations. The location(s) for pi-
The risk assessment process should determine lot boarding and landing and any requirements with
whether it is necessary to offer a Pilotage Service regard to pilot boarding and landing arrangements,
and, if offered, whether the service should be com- including the over-carriage of pilots, should also be
pulsory for certain types of vessels and in which ar- defined.
eas of the port it is required. Some smaller vessels
may not require a pilot under normal circumstanc- As with any act of pilotage, the responsibility re-
es, but if they wish to transit the port in adverse mains with the master of the vessel. The Pilotage
conditions (e.g. restricted visibility, strong winds) it Regulations should include the general steps to be
may be considered necessary for them to take a taken in the event of a navigational incident in the
pilot. Risk assessments may further indicate that all port, or a significant near miss, including the report-
vessels carrying hazardous cargoes should be re- ing procedures.
quired to take a pilot.
Pilotage Procedures
Additional Pilots
Once the requirements for the pilotage service
More than one pilot may be desirable where the have been established, pilotage procedures should
workload is high or a single-man-error would have be developed. These procedures may be included
critical consequences, for example, when handling within the Pilotage Directions or Regulations. How-
large vessels requiring precise manoeuvring or ever, it is generally preferable to generate these as
where communication loads are high. a separate document within the Safety Manage-
ment System to enable them to be updated more
Preferred (Choice) Pilots rapidly and easily.
Preferred pilots may be available within a pilotage The demarcation between which items are con-
service for certain ship types or for certain terminals
tained in the Pilotage Directions and Regulations
within the port. These pilots may undergo enhanced
and those contained in Pilotage Procedures will
training funded by a terminal operator and be se-
vary from port to port. In a small port, they may be
lected or rostered primarily for ship movements to
combined in a single document.
or from that terminal.
Similarly, there are substantial areas of overlap be-
Pilotage Directions and Regulations
tween Pilotage Procedures, VTS procedures, Ves-
sel Movement Procedures and Towage Guidelines
Pilotage Directions and Regulations generally cov-
and certain items which appear in a particular docu-
er matters relating to the service which are broadly
ment in one port may be found in another in a dif-
regulatory in nature and not subject to frequent
ferent port. Again, in small ports, these procedures
change. Other items relating to pilotage should
may all be combined in a single document.
be contained in Pilotage Procedures. Directions

13 PIANC Report 116

In addition to the elements described above, Pilot- the boarding and landing areas. It should also allow
age Procedures may also include: sufficient rest time so that pilots are not fatigued
and have sufficient time for the preparation of pas-
Navigational Information (Port Passage Plan) sage plans.

A description of: Pilot Recruitment and Training System

• Principal channels, depths, underkeel clearance, The performance of pilots is critical in ensuring
etc. effective risk reduction. The competent authority
• Tidal streams, heights, etc. which authorises pilots for the port should ensure
• Principal navigational marks, leading lines, etc. that an effective system is in place for recruitment,
• Dangers and clearing lines training and certification of the pilots operating with-
• Maximum speeds, avoidance of wash, areas in the port (see References 12, 22 and 26). The
where squat is a concern, etc. Training and Certification system should be docu-
mented within the Pilotage Procedures.
These data may additionally or alternatively be pre-
sented pictorially in the form of a generic port pas- Pilotage Exemption
sage plan.
The qualifying conditions for obtaining and main-
It should be noted that ports will not generally have taining Pilotage Exemptions should be set out in
a ‘procedure’ for passage planning as such. How- the Pilotage Procedures and should include the
ever, they should actively promote and support the vessel types and sizes for which Pilotage exemp-
process of passage planning by ship’s staff and tions are issued.
pilots through the compilation of generic passage
plans (see 5.6 below). Such procedures as they It should be noted that Pilotage Exemptions ap-
may have in this respect would generally be con- ply to an individual person (the ‘holder’) and not to
tained within the Pilotage Procedures. the vessel. The type and size of vessels for which
the exemption applies will generally be limited and
Boarding and Landing of Pilots should be specified.

Pilotage procedures should include procedures for 5.6 Passage Planning

the safe boarding and landing of pilots, including
requirements for personal protective and rescue Port authorities should actively support and pro-
equipment. It may be appropriate to develop sepa- mote effective passage planning. The formal risk
rate pilot launch procedures, in which case the de- assessment will normally identify that all move-
tail for boarding and landing may be contained in ments of vessels within the port area should be
them. performed according to a passage plan, prepared
in advance and agreed by all persons concerned
The boarding areas must be defined so as to allow with the conduct of the vessel.
pilots to board and land safely and also allow for
a proper Master/Pilot exchange after boarding and Passage planning has four main constituents:
prior to entering critical areas.
• Appraisal of all relevant information
Further information can be found within SOLAS Ch. • Planning the intended voyage
5 Reg. 23, IMPA Code and US CFR 46 Vol. 4 Sub • Execution of the plan taking account of prevailing
part 96.40. conditions
• Monitoring the vessel’s progress against the plan
Rostering (Shift System) of Pilots continuously

The shift pattern adopted will depend on local fac- SOLAS (Regulation 34) requires that the vessel’s
tors within the port including the length/duration of master ensures that the intended voyage is planned
Pilotage trips, the traffic density and access time to using appropriate nautical charts and nautical

PIANC Report 116 14

publications. The voyage plan coverage should be to the delays inherent in the traditional hydrographic
berth-to-berth and should therefore contain a de- office processes).
tailed plan of that part of the passage conducted
within the confines of the port. Generic Port Passage Plans

Detailed guidance on planning a voyage from berth The port’s pilotage service should develop their
to berth can be found in References 11, 20, 21 and own passage plans for safe transit to and from all
24. While this guidance is intended for ship’s Navi- berths and anchorages, for the range of ship sizes
gating Officers in preparing their passage plans, and types accepted by the port. These will be based
it also has direct application to the act of Pilotage on the port’s generic plans but will be individually
within the port. tailored to the specific ship and berth. A copy of this
plan should be provided to the ship’s Master for dis-
Port Information cussion with the Bridge Team when the pilot boards
(during the Master/Pilot Exchange). The plan to be
The pilot and port authority have information which adopted for the transit should be agreed between
is relevant to the ship’s passage plan but which may the pilot and Master and the Bridge Team should
not be available to the ship’s staff at time of initial be briefed before the vessel commences the transit
compilation. Communication between the vessel through the port area.
and port authority prior to arrival, as well as with the
pilot upon boarding, is vital to the preparation of an Good passage planning can materially reduce the
effective plan for the safe transit of the ship through risks inherent in the transit of vessels through the
the port. port. It does this by generating a plan which opti-
mises safety margins whilst facilitating accurate
Ports are recommended to establish general guid- monitoring of the ship’s position and progress along
ance for simple, generic entry to and exit from the the track.
port. These can then be elaborated where appro-
priate for particular port areas, berths, ship sizes Position Monitoring
and even specific environmental conditions, tidal
constraints, tug allocations, etc. Particular attention Monitoring the ships position and progress in con-
should be paid to critical port movements like, for
fined waters, whether carried out by a licensed pilot
example, the movement of deep draught vessels
or ships officers, is normally done by reference to
to particular berths. The object of this port passage
visual, radar information and/or AIS. Undue reliance
guidance is to ensure that:
should not be placed on information provided by
electronic navigational aids such as portable ECDIS
• All parties know relevant details of any particular
units and GPS receivers.
port passage in advance
• There is a clear, shared understanding of po-
Conning vessels in port areas is normally based al-
tential hazards, margins of safety and the ship’s
most entirely on visual navigation. The advantages
characteristics
of visual conning are that it is generally very accu-
• Intentions and required actions are agreed for the
rate, simple and less prone to error. Visual naviga-
conduct of the vessel’s transit
tion aids may be official marks, such as beacons
This information may be published either in a graph- and leading marks, or ‘unofficial’ geographical fea-
ical form, such as a Generic Passage Plan, includ- tures. Optimum placement of the former can greatly
ing relevant chart extracts, or in a plain text format, facilitate safe navigation and the production of pas-
to update and augment the information contained in sage plans that are easy to follow and therefore less
Pilot Books, such as the British or US ‘Sailing Direc- prone to error. Visual navigation marks which are
tions’. aligned with the vessel’s intended track (especially
leading marks or ranges) are particularly useful and
The posting of information on the port’s website greatly reduce the possibility of errors inherent in
facilitates easy access by ship’s staff and enables more elaborate position monitoring systems and
updating of the information in real-time (as opposed techniques.

15 PIANC Report 116

In restricted visibility, electronic navigation aids be- 6 Environmental Conditions
come more important and radar will normally be-
come the primary system. Passage plans should 6.1 Location
therefore incorporate the use of the technique known
as parallel indexing (described in References 11, The fundamental requirement for any port or marine
20, 21 and 24) which utilises radar to maintain the terminal is for ships to be able to enter and depart
vessel on-track, using the distance measured from safely and, once berthed, to remain alongside for
radar-conspicuous targets as they pass abeam. A long enough to safely load or discharge their car-
similar technique, known as clearing ranges, can go. Consequently, all relevant site-specific issues
be used to monitor the vessel’s position in relation which could affect a ship’s navigation and mooring
to safe margins at each side of the navigable chan- must be taken into account. These include:
nel. In a similar way, the ship’s lateral position in the
channel during a turn can be accurately and very • Marine access for the vessel, including suitable
easily monitored and controlled using a suitable ra- turning/manoeuvring areas near the berth
dar target (ranging mark), situated at the geometric • Suitable anchorage area(s)
centre of the turn (i.e. constant-radius turn). • Provision of adequate navigation aids, VTS, tugs
and pilots
Aids to Navigation • Sufficiently deep, protected water for the berth,
to allow the vessel to safely moor and to load/
Port Control, incorporating VTS monitoring and discharge cargo
surveillance, may be considered appropriate if con- • Nature of the seabed and requirements for capi-
ditions for the pilot transfer – boarding or landing – tal and maintenance dredging
are assessed as posing too high a risk to the safety • Tidal range
of the pilot or vessel. • Prevailing current, sea and weather conditions
and the orientation of berths
The provision of suitable navigation aids to facilitate • Passing ships
• Impact/conflict with other port traffic
Port Control, particularly where natural features are
• Security and unauthorised craft
not available, can materially assist the accuracy
• Proximity to population centres
of the system and reduce risk levels. Where such
• Environmental impact issues
aids are available, passage plans can be prepared
• Availability of power, fresh water, bunkering, etc.,
which can substantially reduce the risks inherent in
where required
transit of the port. • Hazardous zones analysis
In the event of equipment malfunction on the ves- Ideally, the facility should be located where shel-
sel, many VTS systems can provide similar infor- tered deep-water is naturally available. This is not
mation to the pilot from a radar reference line by often possible and such conditions will need to be
radio. However, this information is not generally of artificially created through dredging and/or break-
the same quality or accuracy as that available on water construction. It is critical to achieve the right
board the vessel. balance between berth protection (length of break-
water) and marine access (length of approach
Note: While buoys are almost invariably used to channel and size of manoeuvring area).
mark the edges of channels, safe limits for particu-
lar vessels may be dependent on draught. More- Account will need to be taken of any existing fa-
over, buoys may drift from their charted positions cilities at or adjacent to the site and their potential
and ‘best practice’ therefore cautions mariners impact on design, such as potential disruption to/
against placing undue reliance on them. In areas from the existing facilities, operational restrictions,
of ice, navigational boys may be removed from the construction restrictions and simultaneous opera-
water during the ice season or simply pushed un- tional issues.
der the drifting ice during the winter in order to re-
appear in spring. Any existing or planned pipelines and cables across
possible shipping routes or proposed dredged

PIANC Report 116 16

areas will also need to be taken into account. Some to predict wind conditions at the site, is also avail-
useful guidance is contained in SIGTTO Information able from hindcasting agencies.
Paper No. 14 - Site Selection and Design for LNG
Ports and Jetties (Reference 18). • Tidal level and current measurements. Such data
can be found on charts and sailing directions and
6.2 Data Requirements and Availability in some cases, tidal atlases or local measure-
ments (current/tide measuring equipment) may
An understanding of the site conditions is a fun- be available. This data is usually sufficient in the
damental requirement for successful site location early design stages, but site-specific tidal level,
and planning of a marine terminal. This is achieved current measurements and flow modelling may
through analysis of data, as well as modelling using be required at later design stages.
the data.
• Wave measurements. These are not usually
Often, very little data is available for proposed available unless specifically undertaken for the
‘Greenfield’ sites, especially in remote locations. The project. Wave modelling is normally used in the
data can be obtained from existing sources and/or early design stages and this should be conduct-
new data collection and should be collected as ear- ed using local wave data (where available) and
ly as possible. The following data are amongst that appropriate wave hindcasting techniques. Other
required to compare and evaluate alternative sites sources of anecdotal or approximated conditions
and to progress the design of marine facilities. may be found in Sailing Directions.

• Basis of design for project, including identification • Offshore and nearshore wave modelling. This can
of design ships, level of operability required, spe- be used in the absence of, or in addition to, wave
cific owner/operator requirements. measurements at the site. For exposed sites, this
is needed to determine if breakwater protection
• Charts, maps and survey drawings. These are will be required to meet the design operability of
usually available, but may be out of date should the planned berth(s).
no recent surveys have been undertaken, or if
the original tanker or terminal design basis has • Wave disturbance/penetration modelling. This is
been changed. These may be acceptable for use not usually available and will need to be under-
in early design stages, especially if the nature taken if breakwater protection is required, or if
of the site is such that it has not changed sig- the site is located within another harbour or a site
nificantly since the last survey date (i.e. predomi- that is not directly exposed to the open sea. This
nantly rocky seabed, or a stable environment). If should include, where necessary, the assessment
the data applicable to the port, terminal or berth of potential harbour resonances and the impact of
is over 5 years old, consideration should be given long waves.
to validating the data. Contact should be made
with the relevant Hydrographic Office or port hy- • Visibility. Some data on visibility, and the likeli-
drographic department to identify the most up-to- hood of periods of poor visibility, may be available
date information relevant to the site and project from, for example, the UK Admiralty Pilot or other
requirements. Sailing Directions. If other marine operations take
place nearby, local knowledge may be used to
• Wind measurements. These may be undertaken assess the likely impact of poor visibility at early
at the site but may also be available from other design stages.
local ports or airports. Any non-site-specific data
must be assessed for suitability, e.g. if a local • Ice. Where affected, information on the likely ice
airport is sheltered from any direction to which coverage and thickness may be available from lo-
the site in question would be exposed. Measure- cal agencies.
ments should also be taken over an adequate pe-
riod of time to define return periods and should be • Geological and geotechnical data. This includes
converted to the appropriate reference height and borehole and seismic survey data, taken from the
duration. Offshore wind data, which can be used immediate vicinity of the site. This data is highly

17 PIANC Report 116

 site-specific and not usually available unless un- of dredging required. The dredging of rock is the
dertaken for the project in question. However, it most expensive type of dredging; dredging softer
is essential and should be collected at an early material, even if it is in greater quantities, may be
stage. cheaper.

• Coastal dynamics. Consideration of longshore Mud needs to be assessed for the stability of side
drift and other sources of sedimentation and ero- slopes of any dredged channel or manoeuvring
sion, including nearby dredging. area. It also needs to be assessed for the likelihood
of the fluidisation of the mud during storms, which
• Seismic assessment. The potential for seismic may result in significant or even catastrophic infill of
activity at the project site needs to be determined dredged areas.
and taken into account in the design.
Nearby dredging activities, unrelated to the site of
• EIA and other permit requirements. Consider- interest, may have an impact on siltation rates and
ation should be given to the requirements of the could cause additional dredging during the opera-
Environmental Impact Assessment and the data tional phase.
required to satisfy such an assessment. These
can be extensive, depending on the local author- PIANC has published several reports regarding
ity requirements, but should include water turbid- dredging with a focus on environmental aspects,
ity caused by dredging and acoustic effects from cost-benefit and maritime navigation. More infor-
piling works. mation can be found in these reports.

6.3 Topography and Bathymetry 6.5 Datums and Co-ordinate Systems

Topography and bathymetry are important factors It is essential that consideration is given to the da-
to be considered in the design and location of the tums and co-ordinate systems of the charts of the
terminal facility, particularly to ensure that the loca- site of interest. Only consistent datums and co-
tion of the terminal does not adversely impact the ordinate systems should be used and they should
safe berthing and unberthing of tankers at the ter- be confirmed with the appropriate hydrographic au-
minal. Considerations include: thority.

• Manoeuvring area and berthing pocket design 6.6 Water Levels and Tidal Range
• Dredging requirements
• Nearby or adjacent dredging A ship’s dynamic behaviour, both when manoeu-
• Siltation, siltation rates and the need for over- vring and when moored, will be influenced by the
dredging depth of water available. With regard to manoeuvr-
• Potential for scour near structures and its long- ing, ships in shallow water tend to turn with a small-
term impact er drift angle, a larger turn diameter and a higher
• Seismic conditions steady state speed. In addition, stopping times and
• Nautical bottom definition, if required distances are decreased in very shallow water.

There are different types of data collection meth- See Section 7 for issues related to underkeel clear-
ods, such as side scan, multi-beam, dual frequency ance and vessel squat.
multi-beam and interferometric. The choice of the
most suitable method should be made in conjunc- 6.7 Environmental Design Conditions
tion with a specialist field measurement vendor.
Environmental design conditions are often a func-
6.4 Geology and Geotechnical tion of the design life of the facility and its ancillary
Condition equipment, and the conditions in which they are
expected to operate. The return periods for design
The seabed type may dictate the amount and type and operation should be derived accordingly and be

PIANC Report 116 18

based on the relevant standards. As an example, In relatively shallow water the flow speeds may be
for a design life of 50 years, the return period for greater than in nearby deeper water areas. This may
the structural design may be 200 years or greater. increase vessel squat and the reduced underkeel
However, the operational design conditions are dif- clearance will result in an increased current load on
ferent, as it would not be expected that ships would the ship.
be berthing or manoeuvring in extreme conditions. A
more suitable return period for operational assess- Strong currents that flow across harbour entrances
ment may be 1 year or 10 times per year conditions, may cause a strong turning moment on the ship
depending on the site. This can be used to assist in when entering or leaving the current flow due to the
estimating operational downtime. current acting on the bow or stern.

The availability of site-specific measurement data On channel or river bends, where there is a current
is critical and data collection and monitoring pro- along the channel, the flow velocities generally will
grammes should be undertaken at the earliest be greater around the outside of the bend. These
possible stage of the design process. Where prac- can result in localised erosion of the bed. Similarly,
ticable, these measurements should be continued the flow speeds will be slower in the inside of the
post-design in order to provide information to assist bend and hence siltation may occur, reducing the
with monitoring and to establish and verify the de- available depth in such areas.
sign conditions. This will enable a firm foundation
to be provided for review of the design and opera- Currents can have an impact on siltation. This is par-
tions and allow any development to be based on ticularly the case with dredged berth areas, such as
validated data. dredged pockets, slips/docks where current veloci-
ties may slow, allowing for increased siltation rates
compared with those expected at the site.
6.8 Current
Current flows which are aligned with the berth can
The currents at the site need to be understood as
assist berthing (and unberthing) manoeuvres as, by
they can have a significant effect on ship manoeuvr- placing the current slightly on one bow or the other,
ing, berthing and mooring. Currents can induce set the drift vector can be used to advantage to move
and momentum on the vessel which may affect ma- the vessel laterally towards or away from the berth.
noeuvres significantly. Conversely, current flow which is not well aligned
with the berth is likely to severely hamper berthing
The effect of current flow on a ship depends on the and unberthing manoeuvres and may result in haz-
flow speed and relative direction, and the area of ardous situations. For this reason, where current
hull that is exposed to the current. The direct effect flows are significant, the orientation of the berth in
of current flow on a manoeuvring ship is for it to tend relation to current flow is probably the single most
to cause the ship to drift down-current. significant factor when planning the location and
alignment of the berth, and must therefore be care-
If the ship is moving through the water at significant fully considered.
speed in a cross-current, the ship’s Master or pilot
will attempt to counteract the effect of the current by Strong currents may also affect the ability of support
adopting a set or drift angle (the angle between the vessels, such as tugs and mooring line boats, to op-
ship’s heading and the track) into the current, such erate. These vessels will need to use more of their
that the ship’s overall (ground) velocity moves the own power to control their own position in strong
ship in the desired direction. However, this will result flows, leaving less for providing assistance to the
in an increased swept path for the ship which, in ship, hence reducing their overall effectiveness.
extreme cases, may approach double the beam of
the ship. When the ship is stationary or moving very In areas of strong current, consideration will also
slowly through the water, as will be the case for a need to be given to the manoeuvrability of the tank-
ship engaged in close-quarters manoeuvres, the pi- er itself, i.e. the propulsive power available to over-
lot may have to rely on tug assistance to overcome come the flow effects and still enable it to manoeu-
the current forces acting on the ship. vre safely.

19 PIANC Report 116

It is important that areas where fresh water (fluvial) generally counteract this by allowing a drift angle
flows mix with tidal flows are identified and con- or ‘leeway’ (i.e. angling the ship’s head slightly into
sideration should be given to any change in water the wind, to compensate for the drift, so that the
density, which will have an impact on the vessel’s ship moves bodily in the desired direction over the
draught. In addition, the likelihood of stratified flows, ground (course made good)). This results in an
where the fresh water flow direction is different to overall increased swept path for the ship. When
the salt water flow, will need to be understood and the ship is stationary or moving very slowly through
the implications assessed. the water, as will be the case for a ship engaged in
close-quarters manoeuvres, the pilot will generally
The impact of a current on a moored ship is to in- rely on tug assistance to overcome the wind forces
duce forces in its mooring lines, depending on the acting on the ship, which can be significant, espe-
flow speed and direction, relative to the ship. This cially in strong beam winds.
is further discussed in Section 10.
The wind conditions may also affect the ability of
Methods to assess the current conditions at site in- support vessels, such as tugs and mooring line
clude: boats, to operate. These vessels may drift more
easily in strong winds, which will affect their ability
• Information published on navigation charts and/ to hold position and their overall effectiveness.
or sailing directions;
• Tidal atlases; Wind speed will vary (increase) with height above
• Local measurements; the ground or water and also in proximity to any
• Computational flow modelling. structures. This should be taken into consideration
when siting instruments and analysing data tak-
Further information is available in e.g. BS 6349 en from them (the standard height at which wind
(Reference 7) and ROM (References 5 and 6). speed is measured is 10 m above ground level).

6.9 Wind It is necessary to consider the wind conditions that

may affect ship manoeuvring or motion at the berth.
The wind conditions at the site can have a signifi- This is further discussed in Section 10.
cant effect on ship manoeuvring and ship moor-
ing. Meteorological and other local phenomena can re-
sult in short duration periods of high wind speeds,
The effect of the wind on a ship depends on the such as those associated with squalls, anabatic
wind speed and relative direction, as well as the and katabatic winds, etc. These may not be includ-
overall windage of the ship. In general, the maxi- ed fully in historical data, for example hourly aver-
mum wind forces that act on a ship are associated aged measured data sets, and should therefore be
with beam winds. assessed separately where applicable.

LNG carriers with a spherical containment system Methods to assess the wind conditions at site in-
(Moss-Rosenberg) have proportionately higher clude:
windage than those with a prismatic/membrane
containment system and vessels in ballast have • Information published in sailing directions;
relatively more windage than laden vessels be- • Local experience;
cause of the increase in freeboard. Consequently, • Local measurements, including the impact of
while all ships will be affected by the wind condi- shielding or other local influences;
tions, LNGCs with spherical tanks and vessels in • Wind modelling and other data sources such as
ballast will be more sensitive to the wind than laden those offered by NOAA, WMO; UK Met Office
vessels or those with membrane tanks. etc.

In significant wind conditions, tankers will gener- The calculation of wind forces is discussed in Sec-
ally drift downwind. The ship’s master or pilot will tion 10

PIANC Report 116 20

 6.10 Wave An important second-order nonlinear effect arising
from continuous wave action against a moored ob-
The wave conditions at the site can have a sig- ject is the drift force. This consists of a steady state
nificant effect on ship manoeuvring and mooring. component and an oscillating component (in irregu-
These can be categorised as locally wind gener- lar seas) associated with wave grouping action and
ated (wind) waves and longer period (swell) wave having periods of the order of 20 to 100 seconds,
conditions from more distant storms and weather which is within the range of natural periods of large
systems. moored vessels.

Waves can also originate from other sources, in- For ships alongside, large motions can be generat-
cluding pressure field effect (caused by passing ed by resonance due to the elasticity of the overall
ships) and subsurface thermal differences. Any mooring system and the interaction of local wave
wave may be augmented by resonance (seiche) conditions. The natural period of a moored vessel
effects. These can occur when the period of an ex- can be increased by the use of longer and more
citing wave is similar to (or a harmonic of) a natural elastic moorings and softer fenders and can be de-
physical dimension of a harbour, estuary or even creased by the use of shorter, stiffer moorings and
an ocean basin. stiffer fenders. This can be used to reduce the po-
tential for resonance in mooring systems, depend-
Long period wave action is typically considered ing upon the prevailing wave climate at the site.
as relating to periods ranging from around half a
minute to several minutes or more, and can be a The wave induced vertical motions of the ship
serious hazard even in protected waters, when the (heave, pitch and roll) will need to be assessed with
wave periods are similar to the natural oscillation regard to the risk of sea bed contact both when un-
periods of the mooring system. derway and when at the berth. Sufficient underkeel
clearance will need to be provided to ensure safe
Wave resonance effects can also be a serious haz- navigation and mooring.
ard in harbours, both at nodal points where the hor-
izontal flow of water associated with an oscillation Smaller support vessels involved in ship manoeu-
is at its greatest (e.g. mooring breakout hazard) vring operations, such as pilot boats, tugs and line
and at antinodal points, where oscillations reach boats, are generally more affected by waves than
maximum amplitude (e.g. mooring breakout and the ships they are assisting. At many ports it is the
grounding hazards). performance limitations and safety considerations
of the required support vessel operations that gov-
The effect of wave activity on a ship depends on ern the limiting wave conditions for safe ship ma-
the wave height, period and relative direction. The noeuvring (see Section 11 for a discussion on how
manoeuvres of large tankers and gas carriers are environmental conditions affect ships).
generally not significantly affected by short period
waves (i.e. less than about six seconds). However,
The impact of wave activity on a moored ship is to
in longer period wave conditions these ships will
induce motion and consequent forces in its moor-
increasingly tend to turn broadside onto the waves
ing lines. This depends on the wave height, period
and drift slowly down-wave. Depending on the
and direction, relative to the ship. The forces that
wave period and wave length and the relative an-
are experienced by the ship whilst moored can be
gle of the wave to the ship, certain wave conditions
determined from an appropriate computer based
can cause a ship to pitch and/or roll significantly. In
dynamic mooring evaluation tool or by physical
shallow water this may increase the risk of part of
modelling.
the ship’s hull making contact with the seabed.
In areas of relatively high tidal range and narrow
The motions of moored vessels are typically char-
acterised by low frequency horizontal motions (with channels, tidal bores may occur where a head dif-
typical periods of 1 to 2 minutes) caused by long- ference between the wider (seaward) and narrow
period wave effects and high frequency vertical mo- (river) areas, together with a strong out flowing cur-
tions, with periods ranging from 5 to 20 seconds. rent, combine to cause a rolling wave or wave train

21 PIANC Report 116

on the beginning of the flood tide. Such waves may 6.12 Ice
be up to 2 metres in height.
Conventional tankers and gas carriers are normally
Solitary waves are subsurface waves which travel designed for optimum performance in open water.
along pycnoclines. These are thin layers or simply This applies to designs for their hull form, rudders
interfaces between two layers of different densities and propellers. Large conventional ships perform
where the density of the fluid changes significantly relatively poorly in ice for a number of reasons, in-
across the layer. The arrival of solitons is difficult cluding:
to predict but they can be detected using, for ex-
ample, seabed pressure sensors, radar and satel- • They are more difficult to manoeuvre
lite based systems. Solitons may adversely affect • Propellers designed for optimum open water per-
moored vessels and consideration should be given formance may not be suited for delivering maxi-
to the likelihood of occurrence of solitons at the site mum thrust in ice
of interest. Their potential impact should be taken • Propellers and rudders designed for open water
into account in the terminal design and subsequent operation may be more susceptible to ice impact
operations. damage

Methods to assess the wave conditions at site in- If an ice-bound port is intending to receive conven-
clude: tional tankers and gas carriers, due account will
need to be taken of the above limitations. In addi-
• Information published in sailing directions tion, the need for ice-breaker assistance to escort
• Local measurements using, for example wave transiting vessels and specialist tug support to as-
rider buoys or acoustic Doppler current profiler sist with berthing and unberthing operations should
(ADCP) equipment be assessed at the berth design stage.
• Wave modelling
Further information on operations in ice is contained
The calculation of wave forces is discussed in Sec- in Reference 27, 35 and 36.
tion 10.
6.13 Other Environmental Aspects
6.11 Visibility
Other environmental aspects that will need to be
In general, when navigating in port areas, it is ad- considered are:
visable to use visual information rather than instru-
ments to judge the vessel’s position, rate of turn • Earthquake/seismic conditions
and, to some extent, speed. Visibility is therefore a • Risk of tsunamis
major factor in safe manoeuvring. Visibility can be • Risk of hurricanes/ cyclones
affected by fog, dust, sand, heavy rain and other
local phenomenon. Methods to assess visibility as- The frequency of occurrence of these conditions
pects include: will need to be evaluated for the site in question
and suitably detailed studies undertaken to evalu-
• Information from sailing directions ate the impact on design and operation.
• Local knowledge/experience
• Local measurements 7 Approach from Open Sea
Consideration should be given to the issue of vis- to the Terminal
ibility in the design of visual aids to navigation (such
as range marks, lights, etc.). The requirement for 7.1 Requirements for the
alternative aids, such as radar-based systems for Approach Channel
use when visibility is compromised, should be con-
sidered on the basis of the risk assessment, using For many ports and terminals, an approach chan-
statistical visibility data. nel provides access from the open sea. Such

PIANC Report 116 22

channels may be naturally formed or may be 7.2 Tug Assistance
dredged, in whole or in part, to provide sufficient
width and depth for safe navigation. All channel de-
The requirements for tug assistance during the ves-
signs are highly site specific and hence are unique
sel’s approach, and in particular the used of escort
for each port or terminal.
towage where appropriate, will be determined by
the results of a navigation based risk assessment,
As a consequence, the overall layout and actual di-
as described in Section 5.4 and Chapter 12.
mensions of a channel depends on the particular
site conditions, including the ship types and sizes
to be accommodated, the sea level conditions, the 7.3 Channel Dimensions
metocean conditions and the tug support avail-
able. The overall channel design, in terms of its width,
depth, layout, orientation, etc. should be designed
Some general comments are: according to the guidelines presented in the PIANC
WG 49 report (Reference 33). This report presents
• Terminals located offshore or along relatively methods for both conceptual and detailed design
straight sections of coastline are often comprised stages of a channel.
of a berth or berths protected by a breakwater,
where shelter from waves and sometimes cur- During the detailed design stage, Reference 33
rents is required. Approach channels to such ter- recommends that ship navigation simulation is
minal vary from short natural channels to long used to assist in defining the channel width, layout
dredged channels where the cost of locating the and orientation requirements. Such a navigation
terminal further offshore may be more than the simulation study will normally consider normal op-
dredging required erations, such as standard arrivals and departures
• Natural rivers may serve as approach channels in a range of metocean conditions (wind, waves
for inland terminals. In many cases dredging and and currents). In addition, emergency scenarios
straightening of the route have to be undertaken are often usually considered that simulate the ef-
to ensure safe navigation fect of credible equipment failures. Some examples
• In all cases where dredging is required, the likely of scenarios that are considered in the selection of
siltation needs to be assessed to ensure that any channel dimensions are:
maintenance dredging requirements are taken
into account at an early design stage
• Ship steering gear failure at maximum rudder
• Terminals located in areas close to naturally
angle likely to be used at a bend or turn.
deep water, such as in fjords, often have natu-
• Partial steering gear failure, where the rudder
rally deep and wide approaches, which, when
can be recovered within a certain time period
sufficient sheltered, can often form very effective.
(say 2 to 5 minutes).
Usually these terminals have the best available
• Ship main engine failure.
approach channels due to a maritime point of
• Blackout onboard ship including all onboard sys-
view
tems (loss of engine, steering and bridge navaid
• Terminals located within existing ports may have
equipment).
to share approach channels with other marine
• Impact of squalls in locations where they may
traffic. In such cases suitable risk assessments
occur with little warning.
should be undertaken (see Section 5) to ensure
that suitable measures are taken to mitigate any
significant risks associated with managing the These criteria should have been considered as
marine traffic part of the navigation risk assessment (see Sec-
tion 5 and Appendix A).
The design considerations for approach channels
are described in detail in the report of PIANC WG Further guidance and examples can be found in
49 (Reference 33). the PIANC WG 49 report (Reference 33).

23 PIANC Report 116

 7.4 Berth Depth and For more detailed assessment, an appropriate sim-
Underkeel Clearance ulation model can be used. It should be noted that
real-time ship navigation simulation is not the most
The design of the channel depth is often defined in suitable tool for determining the UKC requirement
terms of the required underkeel clearance (UKC) in waves, as it can only provide a snapshot of the
requirement for the design ship(s) in conjunction likely vertical ship movement in any particular simu-
with a design water level. This may be defined as lation exercise. More appropriate tools should be
part of the overall design requirements which, for used in the detailed design of the channel depth
example, may require all tide access, or as speci- in areas exposed to wave activity. These should
fied by the port, terminal operator or local naviga- be able to define the risk of seabed contact for the
tion authority. design ship(s) in the limiting metocean conditions
at a range of ship speeds and at a number of loca-
UKC requirements should be optimised and con- tions along the length of the channel, for transiting
firmed during the navigation related studies and in both directions, as well as for the range of wave
associated risk assessments and all design criteria directions expected at the site.
should be verified through the use of simulation.
In addition to the channel, the dynamic and static
Consideration also needs to be given to emergency UKC clearances when the vessel is alongside its
egress and the requirements for evacuating the ship berth should also be considered. For an individual
from the berth, not necessarily to the open sea. berth, the required depth should extend over an
area that has indicative minimum design dimen-
The PIANC WG 49 report (Reference 33) provides sions of a length of about 1.25 times the overall
guidance for the conceptual design of UKC require- length of the design ship and a width of about 1.5
ments, as follows.

Table 7.1: Conceptual design of underkeel clearance (UKC) requirements

PIANC Report 116 24

times the beam. This does not include for any ma- sessment will include consideration of navigational
noeuvring area for the ship or tugs. hazards, traffic density, environmental conditions,
seabed (holding) conditions, etc. Where a suitable
For conceptual design purposes, some examples anchorage is not available, alternative safe waiting
of indicative UKC requirements at the berth are: areas will need to be established.

• A static underkeel clearance of 5 % of the ship’s Guidelines for the design of anchorage areas is
actual maximum draught while alongside. contained in the PIANC WG 49 report (Reference
• Where it is considered necessary to allow for 33).
ship motion at the berth, the minimum underkeel
clearance may be defined as a function of the 7.7 Places of Refuge
ship’s beam or length, e.g. 2 % beam.
Subject to further amendments and changes, and
7.5 Air Draught and Clearance in order to meet the expectations of IMO Resolution
A.949(23) (Reference 13), which provides guidance
The air draught of a ship is the distance from the on the need for coastal states to develop strategies
water level to the highest point of the ship at the to provide places of refuge for ships in need of as-
prevailing draught. The highest point is typically a sistance, national administrations may appoint one
radar or radio antennae, but can occasionally be or more competent authorities with strategic pow-
a part of the ship’s superstructure or other equip- ers to develop national plans to accommodate such
ment. There must be sufficient clearance for the situations.
ship to safely pass under all bridges, cables and
other structures to gain access to a terminal/berth, While every potential vessel in need of assistance
given the ship’s draught, trim and the tidal state at will have a unique set of circumstances, contingen-
the time of transit. Sufficient clearance is defined cy plans may require a port, or ports, to pre-identify
as that needed to avoid damage to structures and places of refuge that may be used for the various
equipment and may be 1 to 2 m, where appropri- scenarios envisaged, and that have taken into con-
ate, or 5 % of the ship’s air draught. sideration factors such as:

It should be noted that meteorological effects such • The identity of the authority that will receive and
as storm surges and low barometric pressure can handle such situations and ultimately make the
reduce air draught clearance and these need to be independent decision on accepting or refusing
taken into account. The effects of ship squat will the ship a place of refuge
increase air draught clearance, but are usually not • The procedures by which that decision on accep-
taken into account due to the unreliability of de- tance or otherwise is determined
termining the precise value for any given ship and • Factors influencing a rapid decision on whether
scenario. to accept the ship in need of assistance, which
will include, amongst others, a description of the
Consideration should also be given to the poten- environmental, economic and social factors, as
tial construction of new bridges, cable cars, electric well as natural conditions
cables, etc. on the passage to the site in question • The resources and installations in the place of
and the possible impact of hot exhaust gases on refuge suitable for assistance, rescue and com-
structures or equipment under which the vessel will bating pollution
pass. • Procedures for co-ordination and decision mak-
ing in respect of the ship in need of assistance
7.6 Anchoring Areas
It is accepted that while IMO Resolution A.949(23)
The availability and suitability of anchorage areas provides guidance, regional or national regulations
at or near the terminal in question should be as- may exist that complement these requirements;
sessed as part of the terminal design process and e.g. the European Directive on Maritime Safety
this will form part of the risk assessment. The as- (2002/59 as amended by 2009/17). These should

25 PIANC Report 116

be referenced, and national administrations con- Channel width restrictions, including those that
sulted when drawing up port contingency plans may occur naturally or constraints from berths lo-
to ensure that local requirements addressing the cated along the channel also need to be assessed.
safety of vessels in need of assistance are devel- In particular, the effects of a ship passing a moored
oped in line with national strategies and expecta- vessel needs particular attention, especially where
tions established by the competent authority. high risk/hazardous vessels are involved. Speed or
separation distance restrictions may be required for
7.8 Passing and Overtaking passing traffic to minimise their effect on moored
in Channels vessels, along with suspension of cargo handling
activities at the berth, where appropriate. Again,
The issue of passing and overtaking vessels in design guidance on these issues is provided in the
channels and fairways needs to be considered PIANC WG 49 report (Reference 33) and the ac-
carefully and will form part of the navigation risk as- ceptable parameters will be determined as a result
sessment. Considerations will include: of the risk assessment and supporting studies.

• Vessel sizes and their relative manoeuvrability 7.9 Manoeuvring/Turning Areas

for the prevailing environmental conditions and
those permitted for transit Guidelines for the design of manoeuvring and turn-
• Channel width, bends, seabed profile, the pro- ing areas is contained in the PIANC WG 49 report
vision of passing places and any other physical (Reference 33). At the conceptual design stage, the
constraints starting point for the diameter of a turning area is 2
• Exclusion zones may be required around par- times the overall length of the longest design vessel.
ticular ships or ship types, as determined by the However, it should be noted that not all manoeu-
outcome of the risk assessment vring areas are circular. If there is a predominant
• Other risk mitigation measures, such as control wind or current condition, then the manoeuvring
of vessel speed and/or the use of tugs, as deter- area may need to be more elliptical in shape to take
mined by the outcome of the risk assessment account of the drift of the ship as it swings. Consid-
• The provision of a Vessel Traffic System (VTS) eration of optimising this manoeuvring area/turning
or a Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) circle dimensions is usually carried out using real
which may assist in managing the traffic flows time navigation simulation studies and the results
(see Section 5) of the risk assessment, both of which will take ac-
count of the tug support required.
Guidance on the design of channels for two-way
traffic is contained in the PIANC WG 49 report (Ref- Consideration should also be given to the space
erence 33). required for tugs to operate, taking into account
tow-line lengths and any the physical size of the
As previously indicated, for some long channels tugs required. More information on tug selection is
it may not be economically viable to design the provided in Section 9.
channel for two-way traffic along its entire length.
Hence, there may be restrictions on two-way traffic The local water depth and underkeel clearance
along certain sections of the channel. Alternatively, must be taken into account together with any asym-
constructing meeting/waiting areas may be consid- metry in depth across the turning area. Low under-
ered as an acceptable alternative. keel clearances will slow the turning manoeuvre
and/may require more power from assisting tugs.
In areas where the channel banks are relatively
steep, the effect of the banks on current flows and 7.10 Locks
on the manoeuvring of the ships need to be taken
into account. Bank stability also needs to be con- Where locks are used on route (e.g. Panama Ca-
sidered, especially in areas with highly mobile sea nal) or as access to port or terminal areas, the lock
bed material. cycle times and overall accessibility need to be

PIANC Report 116 26

carefully considered in terms of scheduling traffic and ships that will use the berth. The mooring lines
throughput. The presence of locks will result in a will normally be provided by the ship, but shore-
requirement for abort procedures and associated lines may be rigged where there are very strong
emergency anchorages. Lock operational issues tidal flows or bores. The criticality of the mooring
should be considered as part of the port based risk system should not be underestimated and guid-
assessment. ance should be sought from appropriate literature
such as OCIMF ‘Mooring Equipment Guidelines’
8 Berthing, Mooring (Reference 4). In particular, the terminal’s mooring
equipment should be consistent with that available
and Monitoring Systems on the ships operating at the terminal.

8.1 Mooring System The most basic means of securing the ship’s moor-
ing lines is by use of a bollard, which is simply a
The mooring system consists of the mooring lines fixed mooring point on the berth. This type of moor-
and a means of securing the lines to the berth ing arrangement may be found on many older oil
structure capable of holding the vessel in position and gas jetties.
against loads imparted on the vessel due to envi-
ronmental conditions. Typically, on more modern oil and gas jetties the
mooring fittings comprise of quick release hooks
Ship’s lines will generally be of wire or ultrahigh mo- (QRHs). Quick release hooks have the advantage
lecular weight polyethylene (HMPE), construction of reducing the amount of manual handling required
with rope tails of synthetic fibre. Other man-made to moor the vessel. QRHs also enable the vessel to
fibres may be used, but it is not normally acceptable be unmoored quickly in the event of an emergency
to mix these materials in a mooring system, due to and facilitate both manual and automatic release of
their differing elasticity. The mooring system needs the mooring lines without the need to reduce ten-
to be designed to suit the environmental conditions sion in them.

Figure 8.1: Fixed Bollards on Berth Head

FIgure 8.2: Quick Release Hook and Capstan

27 PIANC Report 116

Some terminals have the capability to release the The berth needs to be able to accommodate both
QRH remotely from a shore control room in the the largest ships for which it has been designed,
case of an emergency. A few terminals also have and also the smallest. Therefore, the position of
the ability to release all of the QRHs simultane- mooring points along the berth should be carefully
ously. This practice is not recommended as it may considered with the aim of accommodating a vari-
result in a vessel drifting off the berth unable to use ety of mooring spreads.
its engines to manoeuvre due to mooring ropes be-
ing in the water in the vicinity of the propeller. The guidance in this document relates to conven-
tional mooring arrangements involving ship’s lines
Quick release hook units may have a capstan in- secured to shore mooring points. However, it is rec-
stalled on them to aid the handling of messenger ognised that other means are sometimes employed
lines (see Picture 8.2). QRHs may be fitted with a to secure a ship alongside, including systems that
load cell to monitor the tension being exerted upon embrace magnetic, suction or Hi-Lift principles.
the hook by the mooring line. Load cell information Such alternative systems are often used with dedi-
may be relayed to the berth control room and, via a cated vessels and are considered outside the scope
ship/shore link, to a display on board. of this document.

Guidelines for the Safe Working Load (SWL) of 8.2 Fendering

QRHs will be dependent upon the largest vessel
that the berth is required to handle and the mooring The basic function of the fendering system is to
lines that they will use. protect both the berth and the vessel from the kinet-
ic energy associated with the berthing of a vessel
and the forces exerted on the berth once the vessel
is securely moored. The fendering system is de-
signed to limit the corresponding reaction imparted
to the breasting structures and uniformly distributes
this reaction to limit the pressure exerted on the hull
of the vessel. The fenders should be positioned to
allow the vessel to lie parallel to the berth at all ex-
Table 8.1: General Guideline of Maximum Vessel pected freeboards and heights of tide.
Displacement to SWL
(Source BS 6349-Part 4)
The two most common fender types in use are:
At quays where there is a strong current, wind or
Elastomeric Systems
wave conditions, the above values for SWL should
be increased by up to 25 % for ships of 50,000 mt
A number of different designs of elastomeric fend-
displacement or above. Table 8.1 provides general
ers are available. However, they all follow a similar
guidance and a full assessment of prevailing fac-
design principle. The elastomeric fender is a rubber
tors, including weather, tide, current and speed of
unit that absorbs berthing energy by virtue of the
passing traffic should be undertaken prior to decid-
work required to deform it elastically by compres-
ing the required SWL.
sion, bending or shear, or a combination of such
forces.

Figure 8.3: Generic Fender Designs

PIANC Report 116 28

Flexible Dolphins gives the vessel’s distance off and speed of ap-
proach to the berth at both bow and stern.
A flexible dolphin typically comprises a large diam-
eter monopole or a group of vertical piles connect-
ed in a concrete cap. The dolphin is designed to ab-
sorb the energy of the berthing vessel by horizontal
displacement of the pile heads in conjunction with
the deflection of the fender (if fitted).

The fendering systems at each berth should be

designed to accommodate the forces likely to be
generated by the largest displacement vessel and
the range of vessels expected to use that particular
berth.

Further information on fendering may be found in

PIANC’s ‘Guidelines for the Design of Fender Sys- Figure 8.4: Berth Board
tems’ (Reference 17).
Environmental and Metocean Monitoring
8.3 Vessel Docking Aid Systems
Environmental and metocean monitoring systems
Docking aid systems provide the vessel’s pilot and can typically measure wind, wave height and pe-
Master with real-time information as to the position riod, current speed and direction (possible at differ-
of the vessel relative to the berth. The information ent levels through the water column), tidal height,
may be displayed on a panel located on the berth temperature, humidity, visibility and air pressure
and visible to the vessel or on a portable screen data. The location of the data gathering instru-
carried by the pilot on the vessel. Older terminals ments can substantially affect the accuracy of the
generally rely on a speed of approach indicator readings. Data from the system should be made
showing readings on a berth display panel. Newer available to the berth operator, ship’s staff and pilot,
or refurbished terminals may be fitted with a porta- as appropriate.
ble display carried by the pilot and may have colour
display indicators for preset alarm parameters
aligned to the fender design criteria.

The docking aid system may be used to comple-

ment a properly designed and engineered berth,
and can assist with mitigating the risks associated
with berthing operations and the potential for dam-
age to fenders or the berth structure.

If the docking aid system is inoperable, alternative

risk mitigation measures should be implemented,
such as the use of additional tug(s) or a reduction
in the environmental operating conditions.

Distance/Speed of Approach Indicators

Figure 8.5: Metocean Monitoring Data Display
Speed of approach indicators typically comprise
of two lasers mounted on the berth that measure Mooring Load Monitoring Systems
the relative distance of the vessel’s bow and stern
to the berth. The change of distance against time Mooring load monitoring systems are designed to

29 PIANC Report 116

monitor and record the tensions in a vessel’s lines balance of tensions within the mooring system.
once it is safely moored alongside the terminal. The However, terminal operating procedures should
tensions on the mooring lines can be influenced by ensure that the ship’s lines under tension are not
a number of factors, including but not limited to, adjusted solely on the load display data, as heaving
wave action, wind load on the vessel, current, tidal capacities of winches are lower than brake holding
effects and by changes in draft during cargo opera- capacities and lines may continue to render once
tions. It is recommended that where these systems the brake is released. Adjustment of lines should
are fitted at terminals, they should include alarm only be undertaken in close co-ordination with the
functions for both low and high tension. responsible officer onboard the vessel who has the
responsibility for the safe mooring of the vessel.
The mooring load monitoring system gives real-
time information displayed on a screen which is Ship-shore Links
usually available within the berth control room. The
data may be transferred via a ship/shore link to a Once safely moored alongside and prior to starting
vessel’s cargo control room. cargo transfer, safe and reliable communications
between ship and shore need to be established.
Fender loading monitoring is also possible, using
the docking aid system to measure compression of Oil terminals generally rely on portable radio com-
the fender system. munication between the vessel and the shore
control room. At some locations additional safety
features, such as a remote ESD pendant and/or
deadman alarms may be installed.

At LNG terminals and many large LPG facilities the

actuation of emergency shutdown (ESD) valves is
interlinked between ship and shore by either fibre
optic or multi-core electric cables. These commu-
nication systems allow not only ESD signals to be
transmitted between ship and shore but also voice
communications and data such as mooring tension
and wave height. More information can be found in
Reference 30.

LNG terminals usually have an electric or fibre optic

Figure 8.6: Control Room Mooring Load Display link with a pneumatic link as back up. LPG termi-
nals are sometimes fitted with an electric link (re-
The graphical nature of the mooring load display ferred to as a ‘SIGTTO Link’) but in many cases
assists the vessel’s operator in achieving an even only a pneumatic link is fitted.

Figure 8.7: ESD Cables Showing Different Connections

PIANC Report 116 30

 9 Required Space for edged that for some vessel types, such as contain-
er ships, the clearance between adjacent vessels
Safe Berthing
or structures may be small, but adequate given the
manoeuvring capability of the ship and associated
Safety distances will need to be considered for sev-
eral conditions that include: tugs and thrusters. However, for oil and gas tank-
ers additional clearance is provided as an addition-
• Clearance between vessels moored at adjacent al safety measure due to the consequences of an
berth(s) or manoeuvring onto berths incident.
• Distance between navigational channel and
moored vessels The safety distances are illustrated in Figures 9.2,
• Safety zone around manifolds of berths and tank- 9.3 and 9.4 for three berth configurations. The fol-
ers lowing parameters are considered:

The distance requirements can vary from terminal • L1 LOA of vessel moored to Berth 1
to terminal depending on the safety philosophy in • L2 LOA of vessel berthing at Berth 2
each location and will be determined by the termi- • L3 Length between manoeuvring vessel and
nal operator, port or national administration. The end of basin/grounding line
safety distances will be influenced by many factors • R1 Safety zone centred on vessel manifold at
and should be determined from risk assessments Berth 1
and, where appropriate, engineering studies taking • R2 Safety zone centred on vessel manifold at
into consideration some or all of the following fac- Berth 2
tors: • RT Working distance of combined tow line and
tug from vessel hull
• Navigational and ship manoeuvring parameters • W1 Spacing between moored vessels and
including ship size and availability and type of passing vessel
tug support • W2 Spacing between a moored vessel and
• Availability and experience of pilots for types of opposite obstruction
vessels to be handled • W3 Distance between berth fronts at finger
• Likelihood, proximity, speed, and density of piers
passing traffic including the behaviour of moored • d Offset of vessel’s position on approach
ships from passing ship effects
• Fire regulations, hazardous cargo zones and Typical values can be used as a baseline from
risks associated with various scenarios involving which site-specific determinations can be factored
loss of product containment into the risk assessment for the location. These
• Cargo types being handled and whether adjacent may be in the following ranges.
vessels/berths are being operated by the same
facility owners Typical clearance (L3) between vessels moored
• Proximity to population centres and environmen- at adjacent berth(s) or manoeuvring onto
tally sensitive areas berths, subject to appropriate risk assessment
• Environmental considerations, e.g. current/tide, (see Figures 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4)
wave, swell, wind, etc.
• Additional safety measures or equipment that will • The distance between a moored oil tanker and
enhance safety of vessels at the berth, e.g. ad- another vessel (end to end) may be in the range
vanced load cell monitoring of moorings, Emer- of 30 to 100 m
gency Release Systems (ERS), Emergency • When a LPG tanker is moored end to end with
Shutdown Systems (ESDs), etc. another vessel, the distance may be from 30 to
150 m
It is not possible to determine a prescriptive value • When a LNG tanker is moored end to end with
for safe distances due to the individual site-specif- another vessel, the distance may be from 50 to
ic considerations for each location. It is acknowl- 150 m

31 PIANC Report 116

• For manoeuvring tankers onto berths in harbour moored tanker, the minimum distance between a
basins surrounded by an obstruction (e.g. other tanker and a passing ship should be determined.
adjacent tankers, berth structure, or grounding Where the speed of the passing ship (through the
line) and subject to an appropriate manoeuvring water) is low (less than about 4 knots) the minimum
simulation study, a minimum clearance between distance may be as low as 50 m. However, the im-
the tanker and the obstruction may be in the pact on the moored tanker and passing ship should
range of 30 to100 m in length (L3) and in width always be subject to a passing ship evaluation,
100 to 300 m (W1). which will consider:

Vessel size, engine power and manoeuvrability, in- • The effectiveness of the mooring arrangement
cluding any operational aids such as thrusters and • Current velocity
enhanced steering systems, such as those incor- • Effect of a low passing ship speed on its steer-
porating twin or high lift rudders, will impact on the age
area required for manoeuvring. • Depth of water at berth and in channel
• Individual ship draughts
The distance between the tankers will also depend • Speed
on the tug type, LOA, capacity and length of towline • Orientation of moored tanker relative to channel,
used when berthing and unberthing tankers. i.e. parallel or perpendicular
• Separation distance between the passing and
In a berthing situation where there are two or more
moored vessels
adjacent vessels, in order to allow cargo transfer
• Collision risks arising from equipment or naviga-
operations on the tankers to continue safely, it is
tional failures of passing vessels
recommended that the safety zone (see below) of
the berthed tanker(s) should not be breached by
Safety zone (R1, R2) around manifolds of berths
the vessel berthing/unberthing or the attending tugs
and tankers
and other support craft, unless a risk assessment
has determined that cargo transfer operations can
A safety zone centred on the tanker’s manifold
continue.
should be determined from the risk assessment to
Distance (W1) between navigational channel enable the tanker to berth and unberth without the
and moored vessels safety zone on an adjacent vessel being breached.
The risk assessment will be product, site and event
To minimise the risk of damage or breakout of the specific. Factors to be considered would include:

Figure 9.1: Harbour basin with obstructions

PIANC Report 116 32

• Cargo type – flammability, density and toxicity of • Spacing to avoid escalation of potential incident
product and gases (Chemical, LNG or LPG) at a berth to other berths, facilities or vessels
• Event scenario – loss of containment, such as
cargo transfer hose or mechanical arm failure, Typical ranges for safety zones are around 30 m
vent release, penetration of outer hull and breach from ship’s offshore side, as used in Japan for gas
of inner hull structure, or failure of tanker or jetty terminals (small release) and can extend to 200 or
equipment 300 m from the manifold for some LNG and LPG
• Product spillage dispersion modelling including terminals. For oil tankers typical ranges are 15 to
whether air or waterborne and whether gas den- 30 m from the ship’s offshore side.
sity is heavier or lighter than air
• Installed safety systems that can mitigate the Tug design and capability are important factors that
effects of an event including; ESD (emergency should be included separately in the risk assess-
shutdown), ERS (emergency release system), ment when considering their ability to work within
vapour detection, etc. a safety zone.
• Prevailing environmental conditions – relative
wind speed and direction, current and waves, It is preferable to avoid overlapping safety zones
etc. even though this may not always be geographically

Figure 9.2: Alongside Distances and Passing Ships

Figure 9.3: Abeam Distance Between Ships Moored at Different Berths

33 PIANC Report 116

 Figure 9.4: Abeam Distance Between Ships Moored at the Same Berth

or economically possible. If avoiding overlapping treated as constants, variables will have site-spe-
safety zones is not possible, it is advisable to only cific values based on local climatic factors detailed
use equipment appropriate for use in the overlap- within the Operating Conditions (see Section 6).
ping safety cones. Such equipment may include
spark arresters or other equipment with isolated The following Section contains a summary of cal-
ignition sources. culation methodologies which are further detailed
in Appendices B, C and D.
10 Calculation of
Environmental Forces 10.1 Wind Forces

Environmental forces, mainly consisting of wind, Wind force is due to the resistance offered by the
current and waves acting on a vessel, may result in vessel’s upper work to the atmospheric flow. Both
an increase of the loads exerted on the fenders and the wind drag and the pressure over the vessel’s
mooring lines, as well as vessel movements and hull may vary considerably depending on a vessel’s
velocities. Therefore, determination of such forces size and geometry and are usually calculated as a
acting on the vessel’s hull, which may vary consid- single force by means of the drag equation. The
erably depending on both its size and geometry, wind force calculation methods described in this
are of primary importance for design and planning document represent a set of different recommen-
(including provision of tugs). Standard formula and dations to obtain the magnitude of the wind force.
coefficients are available to assist in calculating the
approximate magnitude of these forces and these The main standards and guidelines referenced are
are described in further detail in this Section. the following:

Environmental forces can also be determined by • Spanish Standard ROM 0.2-90 (References 5
numerical and physical modelling and more so- and 6)
phisticated numerical approaches continue to be • OCIMF 2008 Mooring Equipment Guidelines
developed. (Reference 4)
• British Standard BS 6349 Part 1:2000 (Refer-
Analytic formulations provide force values which ence 7)
usually depend on a number of parameters that
characterise the fluid (air or water) and variables In essence, all the calculations are based on the
that characterise the action. While parameters are established drag force (F) formula:

PIANC Report 116 34

 F = C ⋅ ρ⋅ A⋅V 2 (10.1) Where more relevant drag force data are available
for a specific ship, these should be used in prefer-
ence to the general data obtained from standards
With: C as the drag coefficient and guidelines.
€ ρ as the fluid density (air)
A is the area projected onto a plane Air Density
perpendicular to the flow direction
of movement Air density values may introduce differences in the
V is the flow average velocity relative wind force values up to almost 10 %. More accu-
to the body rate results may be obtained by using this formula:

Differences are found in the way the different fac- ρ air = 360.77819 ⋅ (273.9+ º C )−1.00336 (10.2)
tors of the drag force formula are calculated. These
differences are analysed in Appendix B. Barometric pressure and air moisture also has a
significant effect on air density, although it is un-
The following provides a description of the factors €likely that conditions at a specific site allow an as-
that are included in the drag formula. sumption of consistently high or low pressures to
be sagely made.
Drag Coefficient C
Wind Average Velocity
The drag coefficient is empirical and thus its value
is estimated from experimentation. BS and OCI- Important differences may arise depending on the
MF’s formulations provide relatively accurate esti- recommendation used, not only in the adopted val-
mations of the drag coefficients, depending on the ue of the gust factor, but also in the defined time
wind angle of attack relative to the vessel. In ad- used to characterise a wind gust.
dition, OCIMF’s formulations take into account the
loading condition of the vessel (ballasted or fully Generally, a ten minute (10 min) average stan-
loaded) and the bow configuration. dard (considered at 10 m height and 50 year return
period) has been adopted for the sustained wind
The OCIMF ‘Mooring Equipment Guidelines’ in- definition. Different organisations have utilised dif-
clude specific drag coefficients for gas carries in the ferent durations such as 1 min or 2 min, defining
75,000 to 125,000 m3 class (spherical or prismatic simple factors to convert from one to another. For
tanks). The existing wind coefficients for VLCCs instance, the peak 1 min wind (averaging time for
were not considered applicable to gas carriers due the standard for sustained wind) used by the World
to inherent differences in hull shape and wind area Meteorological Organisation in the Atlantic and
distribution. The presence of spherical tanks on gas Northeast Pacific tropical cyclone basins, is roughly
carriers has the most significant impact on the wind 12 % higher than the peak 10 min wind.
drag coefficients. The deviations in the coefficients
result from differences in the relative force contri- However, when considering the wind forces acting
bution and distribution due to the configuration of on a moored vessel, the focus is on the wind gust
the spherical tanks. Therefore, separate curves for that is capable to overcome the vessel inertia. For
conventional prismatic and spherical tanks have a given vessel (characterised by its length, shape,
been developed (see Appendix B). Differences in etc.), such wind can be defined by two dependent
load conditions are not significant due to the rela- variables: wind duration and velocity. Different ap-
tively small change in draft from a ballasted to a proaches have been applied to assess the definition
fully loaded condition for the sizes of gas carriers of the design velocity to be used in the calculation.
reviewed.
Spanish ROM’s formulation first characterises the
Only the OCIMF ‘Mooring Equipment Guidelines’ vessel by its length ‘L’. The value of ‘L’ determines
define specific wind drag coefficients for gas car- the wind gust duration and consequently the gust
riers. coefficient that affects the sustained velocity.

35 PIANC Report 116

 15 sec if L ≤ 25 m lection of the 30 second wind is based on the time
it takes the forces in a mooring system to respond
60 sec if L > 25 m (10.3) to wind velocity changes, 30 seconds being a typi-
cal value for a ballasted VLCC. Smaller ships will
The ROM recommends using the following gust respond more quickly and a fully laden VLCC may
factor for the following wind durations: require 60 seconds to respond. However, for con-
€
sistency, a 30-second average period is suggested
for all ship sizes and loading conditions.

In the case of ships, British Standards recommend

using the 1 minute mean wind speed for the design
of moorings, because of the time needed for full
line loads to develop, taking into account the inertia
of the vessel.

The following table provides a summary of the gust

duration and gust factor included in each formula-
tion.

The most accurate methodology consists of meas-

Table 10.1.1: Wind Gust Duration and Gust Factor
uring the wind velocity for the representative dura-
(ROM 04-95)
tion (10 min, 60 s, 30 s or others) as this avoids
The gust factors included in the ROM are quite high having to use a gust factor.
when compared with other recommendations, such
as those published by California Building Standards The table below, using the MOTEMS gust factors in
Code Chapter 31F - Marine Oil Terminal Engineer- the absence of British Standard and OCIMF data,
ing and Maintenance Standards [MOTEMS] (see indicates up to 21 % difference in obtained values.
Reference 28). For example, the ROM define a gust ROM drag coefficient values tend to increase these
factor for duration of 60 seconds of 1.31 whereas differences further. ROM’s wind forces are ap-
MOTEMS’s recommendation has a value of 1.19. proximately 25-35 % higher than the wind forces
obtained using OCIMF or British Standard’s formu-
According to OCIMF, wind velocity is the velocity lations.
measured at the standard datum height of 10 m
above ground or water surface and is representa- It should be noted that OCIMF have defined par-
tive of a 30 second average mean velocity. The se- ticular recommendations for tankers.

Table 10.1.2: Summary of Gust Duration and Gust Factor Considered in Different Formulations

PIANC Report 116 36

 10.2 Current Forces OCIMF

Current force over a vessel’s hull may vary consid- • ‘Mooring Equipment Guidelines’ include drag co-
erably depending on both vessel size and geom- efficients for VLCCs taking into account the cur-
etry, and is best determined by scale modelling. rent attack angle, the loading condition and the
water depth to draught ratio
The current force calculation methods described in • The OCIMF coefficients used to compute current
this document represent a set of different recom- loads on VLCCs are also generally applicable to
mendations to obtain the magnitude of such force. gas carriers in the 75,000 to 125,000 m3 class
due to the similarity of the submerged hull ge-
In essence, all the calculations are based on the ometry when compared with VLCC’s having con-
established drag force (F) formula: ventional bows

F = C ⋅ ρ⋅ A⋅V 2 (10.4)
British Standard

• The British Standard includes drag coefficients
With: C as the drag coefficient
and correction factors for shallow water effects
ρ as the fluid density (water)
€ • The drag coefficients take into account the cur-
A is the area projected onto a plane per-
rent angle attack and the vessel’s geometry
pendicular to the flow direction of move-
(small or very large tankers)
ment
V the flow average velocity relative to the Where more relevant drag force data are available
body for a specific ship, these should be used in prefer-
ence to the general data from available publications.
Differences are found in the way the different fac-
tors of the drag force formula are calculated. These Current Forces
differences are analysed in Appendix C.
Transverse current forces calculated by ROM are
The following provides a description of the factors more conservative than those given by BS and
that are included in the drag formula. OCIMF. OCIMF and BS transverse forces show
good conformity for tankers in a loaded condition.
Drag Coefficients However, the current forces for tankers in a ballast-
The drag coefficient is empirical and thus its value ed condition show significant differences.
is estimated from experimentation. Since its value
depends mainly on the vessel’s geometry, it is diffi- Although values for longitudinal current forces at
cult to determine whether one recommendation pro- 0º, 90º and 180º are of the same order, the course
vides a better or more accurate value than another. of the graphs between these points is different for
Nevertheless, the following information should be each formulation. The results for longitudinal cur-
considered. rent forces at 0º and 180 º from BS and ROM are
quite comparable. OCIMF’s longitudinal current
ROM forces at 0º and 180 º are lower than the two other
formulations.
• ROM formulation includes a shape factor for the
calculation of transverse and longitudinal current It should be noted that OCIMF have defined par-
force ticular recommendations for tankers.
• The transverse factor depends only on the water
depth to draught ratio. ROM’s transverse coeffi- 10.3 Wave Forces
cient does not depend on current attack angle or
load condition Wave forces, caused by the complex interaction of
• The longitudinal factor depends only on the ge- the water particle kinematics and the vessel’s body,
ometry of the ship’s bow. ROM’s longitudinal co- may originate from a broad number of wave sourc-
efficient does not depend on current attack angle, es, such as swell or sea waves or pressure field ef-
load condition or water depth to draught ratio fect caused by passing ships and harbour seiching.

37 PIANC Report 116

Wave action can generally be classified accord- in order to do this, as the presence of the vessel
ing to the frequency of motion as short period wind modifies the incident wave train. There are some
waves and swell and long period wave action, analytical approximations available, as defined in
which can also be as a result of harbour or basin Technical Standards and Commentaries for Port
oscillations known variously as seiche, surge and and Harbour Facilities in Japan for static wave
ranging action. Wind waves and swell are of funda- forces on a vessel rigidly moored at an offshore
mental importance at offshore terminals and typi- (wave-transparent) dolphin.
cally have periods of less than 20 seconds.
The second type of wave force is nonlinear in na-
An important second-order nonlinear effect aris- ture and a result of the irregular sea state. This
ing from continuous wave action against a moored force, sometimes referred to as the drift force, is
object is the drift force. This consists of a steady primarily a consequence of wave grouping and
state component and an oscillating component (in set-down effects. The drift force is a steady force
irregular seas) associated with wave grouping ac- in regular waves and a slow-varying low frequen-
tion and having a periodicity in the order of 20 to cy force in irregular waves. Because damping is
100 seconds, which is within the range of natural relatively low at a lower frequency and because
periods of large moored vessels. the usual range of periods of 20 to 100 seconds is
also within the range of natural periods of moored
Long-period wave action manifests itself typically ships, the slow varying drift force may cause over-
in periods ranging from around half a minute to stressing of mooring lines and large fender forces.
several minutes or more and may pose a signifi- The drift force is generally much smaller than the
cant hazard when the natural period of the mooring oscillating wave force.
system and the seiche period are nearly coincident
and/or when a vessel is located near a nodal point Analytic Formulations
in the harbour where the horizontal flow of water
associated with the seiche action is at its greatest. The analytic determination of wave forces on a
vessel is considered a much more complex mat-
When considering the behaviour of a moored ves- ter than its precedents, because wave forces
sel, it is important to take into account that the mo- depend on many variables, such as the incident
tions of moored vessels are characterised by low wave parameters - height, period and direction,
frequency horizontal motions (with typical periods non-linearity, etc.-, vessel’s characteristics, moor-
of 1 to 2 minutes) caused by long-period wave ef- ing and fender characteristics and hydrodynamic
fects, and high frequency vertical motions with pe- response.
riods ranging from 5 to 20 s. The natural period of
a moored vessel can be increased by the use of Neither the British Standard nor OCIMF provide
longer and more elastic hawsers and softer fend- a formulation to assess wave forces over moored
ers and can be decreased by the use of shorter, vessels. ROM gives a formulation to estimate wave
stiffer hawsers and stiffer fenders. This fact can be forces (See Appendix D). Nevertheless, computa-
used to reduce the potential for mooring system tional and physical modelling techniques should be
resonance, depending upon the prevailing wave used to address forces on moored ships, especial-
climate at the site. ly in exposed berths.

Wave Force Components Appendices B, C and D contain the calculations

carried out by the Working Group for the differ-
Wave forces on moored vessels manifest them- ent formulations. Further information is available
selves in two components. The first is a linear os- in ‘Preliminary Calculations for Wind and Current
cillatory force at the frequency of the waves. This Loads on Tanker-shaped Vessels’ (Reference 32)
force can be determined by integrating the vary- by Hein Oomen et al. (2003) which includes a com-
ing water pressures around the submerged portion parison of different recommendations for comput-
of the hull. Diffraction theory must be employed ing wind and current forces.

PIANC Report 116 38

 11 Acceptable Metocean Monitoring Equipment
Conditions for Safe
To ensure the accuracy of data, it is important that
(un)Berthing the correct equipment is selected for use in the
operating environment. As a minimum, terminals/
The terminal operator and the designated naviga- ports should be equipped with real-time wind speed
tion authority within the port should have a good and direction measuring equipment. Additionally,
understanding of issues associated with the han- they should consider whether equipment that can
dling of tankers using the terminal and should joint- provide tide, wave and current data is required.
ly agree the processes required to manage associ-
ated risks. Where adverse weather may result in pilot board-
ing and ship manoeuvring difficulties, particularly in
The identification of limiting environmental criteria offshore locations or when navigating narrow chan-
for operations, both within the port and alongside nels and bars, the use of appropriate meteorologi-
the terminal, is fundamental in ensuring that the cal recording devices should be considered. These
variables of weather are properly taken into ac- should be located close to the pilot boarding station
count and actions identified to reduce and manage or constrained area and will feed back real-time in-
risk. formation to facilitate decisions aimed at ensuring
safe boarding and manoeuvring of the ship.
Studies and data gathered during the design phase
will determine the site-specific metocean condi- All data should be recorded at a central point and
tions to be used to optimise the layout of the berth appropriate tools developed for analysis of the
and port. The information obtained will be based on data. Historical records will be of particularly use
local records, data obtained and logged by project when considering future design changes to the
personnel and external sources, such as the World terminal or changes to the operating equipment or
Meteorological Organisation. facilities.
The environmental forces acting on ships berthing, Wind speed limits should be inputted to measur-
unberthing and alongside should be taken into ac- ing equipment and alarms generated in a centrally
count when carrying out associated mooring analy- manned area when the limits are reached. More in-
sis in both static and dynamic modes. This analysis formation can be found in PIANC Working Group
will identify any limiting conditions impacting on the Report nr. 54 (see Reference 31).
safe operation of the berth and the ship’s equip-
ment. Maintenance of Equipment
Responsibilities Data recording equipment should be regularly
maintained to ensure its continued integrity and ac-
The designated navigation authority should have curacy. Appropriate spare parts, including where
the responsibility for implementing the weather appropriate, replacement units, should be available
policy for the time up until the ship is berthed and (see OCIMF/SIGTTO ‘Jetty Maintenance and In-
for the time when the ship is unmoored to when spection Guide’, Reference 28).
it is clear outward from the port. During the time
the ship is on the berth, the terminal will usually Tug Operating Conditions
implement its weather policy for suspending cargo
operations. It is important that limiting metocean conditions for
tug operations are determined at an early stage and
In the event that any un-forecasted adverse weath- are included in tender documentation when con-
er is experienced while the ship is alongside, the tracting foe tug services. The required environmen-
terminal, navigation authority and the ship’s master tal conditions that the tugs are expected to operate
should discuss any safety implications and agree in should be defined in contract documentation.
the required action to take.

39 PIANC Report 116

The effectiveness of tugs will be impacted when • Approximately 22 m/sec or 45 knots is the recom-
operating in significant waves, particularly in signifi- mended safe mooring wind limit. Vessels should
cant wave heights of more than about 1.5 metres be held at anchor if higher wind velocities are
(see Table 12.1). forecasted. If the vessel is already moored at the
berth when such conditions occur, extraordinary
Mooring Boats risk mitigation measures, such as ballasting to
reduce wind area, using additional mooring lines,
Modern mooring boats or launches should be able and using one or more standby tugs (to push the
to operate within the limiting conditions of the ship vessel against the berth), should be taken to re-
and tugs. If the mooring boats cannot be safely used duce the risk of the vessel breaking out. In such
within the limiting conditions, alternative methods of circumstances, it is recommended that loading
mooring the ship could be considered as part of the arms are disconnected before allowing the tug to
design study. An assessment of the mooring boat push the vessel alongside the berth.
design and operational characteristics against the
actual local conditions and environment may allow Note. These operational guidelines are applicable
deviations from the guideline wave height. for sheltered berths (significant wave height less
than 0.6 m). Lower wind limits may apply at exposed
Approximate Wind Speed Limits for Safe Op- berths and should be based on dynamic mooring
erations analysis to provide a higher degree of confidence
in the mooring integrity.
The following guidelines may be considered as pro-
viding a guide for safe operations but do not pre- The designer should perform an operational-based
clude the terminal operator or navigation authority and design-based mooring evaluation. The design-
from carrying out basic due diligence in perform- based mooring evaluation uses all combinations
ing site and vessel-specific navigation simulations, of vessel mooring equipment that will produce the
mooring analysis, risk assessments and metocean highest load in the mooring structures and breast-
data analysis. ing dolphins, whereas the operational-based evalu-
ation will use the combination of vessel mooring
For oil tankers and gas carriers, the following can equipment which results in the highest stress in the
be considered as guidance only, subject to engi- mooring lines and largest vessel movements.
neering and mooring analysis of the local condi-
tions and support infrastructure: The forces generated by waves that strike moored
vessels beam-on or on the bow/stern quarter need
• Approximately 10 m/sec or 20 knots is the recom- to be carefully analysed in terms of fender capac-
mended safe wind limit for berthing vessels with a ity. The period of the wave will also have a signifi-
projected wind area greater than 5,000 m2. cant effect on the forces created on the fenders by
• Approximately 12.5 m/sec or 25 knots is the rec- movement of the ship on the berth.
ommended safe wind limit for berthing vessels
The analysis of these forces will determine wave
with a projected wind area between 3,000 and
height conditions and time periods that will define
5,000 m2.
limiting conditions for the operation.
• Approximately 15 m/sec or 30 knots is the rec-
ommended safe wind limit for berthing vessels
In Table 11.1, the trigger points referred to under
with a projected area less than 3,000 m2.
‘WIND’ refer to the ‘mean’ wind speed, which is de-
• Approximately 15 m/sec or 30 knots is the rec-
fined as the 30 second average mean wind speed
ommended safe wind limit for cargo transfer op-
as measured at a standard datum height of 10 m
erations. above the ground or water surface at the Terminal’s
• Approximately 20 m/s or 40 knots is the recom- weather station anemometer for when the ship is
mended safe wind limit for disconnection of load- alongside. The anemometer of the Port will be used
ing arms. subject to confirmation from the manu- by the Port Authority to determine all other condi-
facturers. tions.

PIANC Report 116 40

 41
Table 11.1: Example of Typical Adverse Weather Procedures

PIANC Report 116

If it becomes necessary for a ship to vacate the controlled approach velocity towards the berth. The
berth before completion of cargo transfer as a re- approach velocity of the tanker should gradually be
sult of a change in forecasted adverse weather reduced to about 0.05 m/sec. in the final phase be-
conditions, then re-berthing of the ship will only be fore the tanker makes contact with the fender struc-
undertaken after the weather conditions have again tures. The maximum acceptable tanker’s approach
returned to within the above criteria. velocity should be about 2/3rds of the design ap-
proach velocity for the berth structures. To manage
Caution. It may not be possible to sail a partial- this, there must be sufficient thrust capacity (as a
ly laden membrane type LNGC from the berth if combination from tugs and ship’s thruster(s) where
the liquid levels in the tanks are within the zone fitted) even if one of the thrust components should
in which ’sloshing’ damage can occur, depending suffer a failure. Due consideration should be given
on the specific ship type and classification. This to the potential for loss of power on the ship, re-
should be referenced in the terminal’s contingency sulting in the ship’s engines and thrusters (where
plans. fitted) being unavailable.

12 Operational Safety Tugs

during Berthing
The requirements of the tug fleet should cover the
following services:
As identified from the port risk assessment (see
Section 5) it is important that all oil and gas termi-
• To provide necessary assistance during the
nals or their controlling navigation authorities have
berthing and unberthing operation to counteract
a clear and effective plan for the berthing of vessels
wind, wave and/or current forces
that includes pilotage, the provision of tugs and the
• To enable the tanker to turn in the available
development of environmental limits for safe opera-
area
tions.
• To act as a restraining or anchoring force on a
tanker moving towards the berth structure;
Documentary evidence should also be available to
• To act as a stand-by vessel when a gas or oil
demonstrate that the port/terminal can effectively
tanker is moored
handle tankers in the operational wind speeds and
• To carry out emergency, fire fighting and antipol-
with the tugs stationed at the terminal. From a safe-
lution operations
ty point of view, unless the ship is equipped and
• To assist a tanker in an emergency situation,
approved to manoeuvre itself and port regulations
e.g. due to break down of propulsion machinery,
permit it to do so, tug assistance should always be
steering gear, etc. The tug should be able to as-
provided during berthing and unberthing operations
sist directly at any time during the tanker’s ap-
of oil and gas tankers.
proach or departure, as defined in the terminal’s
navigation risk assessment
The number of tugs needed for handling the dif-
ferent types of tankers are affected by issues that
The necessary tug capacity (i.e. effective bollard
include the size and type of tanker, the approach
pull) should be sufficient to overcome the maxi-
route, the exposure and type of berth structure, the
mum wind, wave and/or current forces generated
environmental conditions and the bollard pull of
on tankers using the port, under the maximum
each tug. The actual number and power of tugs re-
wind, waves and/or current permitted for harbour
quired should be a function of the towage guidance
manoeuvring and with the tanker’s main engines
developed from the port risk assessment.
and bow thrusters out of action.
Where sea room permits when berthing at an oil or
Due consideration should be given to Reference
gas berth, the tanker will usually be stopped at a
15.
distance of up to 100 metres off the berth. From this
position the tanker is manoeuvred transversely at a

PIANC Report 116 42

Number of Tugs sufficient tug assistance to control a gas tanker in
the maximum permitted operating condition, as-
In the evaluation of the approximate total number suming that the tanker’s engines are not available.
of tugs required for manoeuvring a tanker under
berthing and unberthing operations, the following In determining tugs to be used for berthing and
has been assumed: unberthing operations, it is essential that the maxi-
mum environmental operating criteria are estab-
• The forces acting on the tanker can be due to lished for the ship and the port/terminal. Essentially
wind (Fwind), wave (Fwave) and current (Fcur- this means wind speed and direction, sea condi-
rent) tion, wave and swell height, direction and period.
• For the wind forces based upon a wind speed
other than 30 sec duration, a force to take ac- Number of Tugs Required
count of wind gusting (Ψgust) should be ap-
plied The number and size of tugs required to manoeu-
vre and hold the ship in position during berthing
and unberthing operations when exposed to the
Bollard Pull of Tugs port or terminal’s limiting environmental conditions
requires careful study and analysis. Consideration
Due to possible uneven bollard pull when several should be made with respect to the points on the
tugs are used and inaccuracies in the method of hull where the tugs are permitted to push. It is im-
calculating the bollard pull required to control the portant that tug push points are clearly marked on
tanker, it is recommended that a tug bollard pull the hull of the ship and, where they are provided,
weighting factor, Φ is applied of between 1.2 and pushing should not be carried out at any other place
1.5 depending on the general weather condi- to avoid potentially damaging the ship’s hull.
tion.
It is normal practice to confirm the suitability, size
The total effective tug bollard pull BP required to and number of tugs through simulation studies.
control a tanker due to environmental forces can In existing terminals where such studies have not
roughly be calculated from the following formu- been carried out, is recommended that manoeuvr-
la: ing studies are undertaken as part of the review
process when upgrading tugs or reviewing the en-
Bp = Φ · [(CG ·Fvind) + Fcurrent + Fwave] (12.1) vironmental operating conditions.

An evaluation of necessary tug bollard pull for tank- It is recommended that there is always an opera-
ers should at least be based upon the design speci- tional safety factor when determining the power re-
fications obtained from the following: quirements of tugs. The following formula may be
useful as guidance in determining tug power. How-
• OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines (Refer- ever, the results should be verified through simula-
ence 4) includes formulae for wind and current tions:
forces
TC
• SIGTTO have a wind load calculator (on-line) SO ≥ ≥ 1.1 to 1.25 (12.2)
• Spanish Standard ROM 0.2 - 90 (References BP (12.2)
5 and 6) includes formulae for estimating wave
forces
The Safety Operation Factor (SO) ≥ 1.1 to 1.25 is
€
Consideration should be given to ensuring that en- obtained by the actual total available tug capacity
vironmental factors, such as swell, do not cause (TC), including any bow thrusters, being divided by
loads in equipment that exceed its SWL. the total required effective tug bollard pull (BP) due
to environmental forces during each phase of the
SIGTTO recommends that there should always be berthing and unberthing operation.

43 PIANC Report 116

During berthing and unberthing, part of the safety nominal tug power requirements. In using simula-
risk assessment is related to the tug bollard pull tion tools it is necessary to clearly identify the suc-
required to overcome the maximum environmental cess criteria beforehand. These criteria can include,
operating conditions, e.g. wind, current and waves, but not be limited to:
established by the Port/Harbour Authority. It is im-
portant to consider the impact on the operation in • Effective tug power used should not exceed e.g.
the event of a tug failure. Although there is normally 75 % of maximum available power on, for exam-
sufficient spare bollard pull in the overall tug capac- ple, 3 out of 4 tugs for sustained periods
ity to allow for a failure in one tug, this should be • Manoeuvrability of the vessel is achieved with-
verified through simulation modelling. in pre-set boundaries and safety distances are
maintained
The number of tugs to be used can be between 2 • Ability to tow effectively in maximum sea/swell
and 6, but normally will be between 3 and 5, de- conditions
pending on the size of the ship and the bollard pull
of the tugs. Using too many tugs can increase the The effectiveness of a tug depends on the wave
risk of the operation as it is more difficult for a pi- conditions at the tug location, the length of the tow-
lot to keep track of larger numbers. The number of line, the towing direction with respect to the motion
pushing tugs may be limited by the number of avail- of the ship, the velocity of the ship and the amount
able tug push points. of wave shielding or reflection by the ship. This re-
duced tug effectiveness is accounted for in simula-
Impact of Port Layout on Tug Selection tion studies by reducing the available towing force
exerted on the ship in waves to a proportion of the
The overall port layout – channel design, entrance, maximum force that can be exerted in still water.
turning areas, manoeuvring room - will influence Some examples are shown in Figure 12.1.
the number and power of tugs to be used. Where
space in the port is limited, the length of tow lines Simulation Training
may need to be short and this can limit the effective
applied towing power. Where tugs are working in Simulation training involving pilots and tug mas-
exposed areas, reduced efficiency or potential in- ters is very important in developing communication
ability to push must be considered. skills and practicing emergency events that are not
otherwise possible. Any simulations should be re-
The physical size and displacement of the ship in alistic and involve credible scenarios that can be
laden and ballast conditions, the longitudinal and safely resolved. Improved appreciation and respect
end-on windage areas, submerged hull area and between pilots and tug Masters has been observed
underkeel clearance all have to be taken into ac- where regular simulation training is carried out.
count when determining sufficient tug power. The
efficiency of tug design, both propulsion and hull Communication between tug Masters and pilots
form, in the prevailing environmental conditions is should always be clear and unambiguous. This is
also an important factor. of particular importance in ports where tug crews
and pilots rotate with duty periods.
Different water depths can affect the tug power re-
quirements. The less the depth of water under the Failure of a tug during a berthing or unberthing op-
ship, the greater the power required. The addition of eration should be taken into account. In the event
current and reduced water depth will also increase of a tug failure, the berthing operation should be
the tug power requirement for the same ship. able to be either completed or aborted safely with
the remaining tugs. Due consideration should be
Tug Selection – Modelling given to reducing berthing/unberthing parameters
in the event that operations cannot be safely termi-
Using simulation tools, the tugs, ship and environ- nated when a tug failure occurs.
mental conditions can be modelled to assess the

PIANC Report 116 44

Figure 12.1: Tug Effectiveness Curves
(Courtesy of HR Wallingford)

45 PIANC Report 116

Bow/Stern Thrusters and High Lift Rudders have resulted in three main types of studies for port
planning and design:
The use of bow/stern thrusters and high lift rudders
on ships to reduce the number of tugs for berthing/ • Full mission real time bridge training simulators
un-berthing should be considered carefully. Provid- with full 360° projection of the surroundings.
ing the reliability and operation is confirmed before These simulations can be powerful tools in pilot
arrival, it could be possible to reduce the number of training, but some may be difficult to configure
tugs when handling such equipped ships. However, for design purposes, unless models of the sur-
this gives very little if any safety margin in the event roundings are available.
of failure of the ship’s equipment and may add un- • PC-based real-time simulators, or full mission
necessary risk to the operations. On the other hand, real-time bridge research simulators with prop-
if it is assumed that any bow/stern thruster or high er modelling of the characteristics of the wind,
lift rudder action is not included in the determina- wave and current conditions, bathymetry, port
tion of required tug power, then in the event of a tug layout, ship characteristics and tug performance
failure the margin of safety is greatly improved if the in various sea states. The advantage of real time
bow/stern thruster is available for use. simulations is that they allow proper modelling
of the human element in ship handling, although
In determining the overall tug capacity for tanker on some more simple PC-based simulators, the
terminals, the use of the ship’s bow/stern thrusters projection is often limited to bird’s eye views and
is normally discounted during simulations. instrument controls, which may be less appropri-
ate.
Deterioration of Effective Tug Power
• PC-based fast time simulations with preset
tracks or instrument settings. This type of simu-
It has been observed from tug bollard pull tests that
lation does not include the human element in the
a tug’s effective power deteriorates over a period of
ship’s handling. However, a large number of runs
time. Up to 5 % of the bollard pull may be lost through
can be carried out in a limited time frame, which
engine tuning, servicing, hull growth and propeller
would allow a statistical approach on variations
growth or damage. Regular bollard pull testing of
in settings.
tugs, in particular after each dry dock, should be
encouraged to confirm available tug power to tug
Selecting the most appropriate tool for navigation
Masters, pilots, ship’s masters and owners/charter-
studies depends on local conditions. A relatively
ers. This is especially important when operations
easy approach without too many variations along
may be carried out in marginal conditions for the
the track of approach can be modelled with fast
manoeuvring of ships. It is important that there is
time simulation to assess stopping distances and
feedback between the tug master and pilot where
channel widths. More complicated approaches can
deterioration in the towing performance of the tug
be modelled with real-time simulations. It is impor-
is noted. In many instances there is a contractual
tant to evaluate the actual capabilities and limita-
obligation on the tug owner/operator to maintain a
tions of these tools, particularly with regard to vali-
minimum bollard pull.
dating their results with full-scale tests.
Economic Considerations
Mooring Boats
Economic considerations associated with the num-
The decision whether or not to use mooring boats
ber of tugs used for operations should not outweigh
in berthing/unberthing operations has been and
safety considerations and the Master and Port Au-
continues to be debated, where suitable safe alter-
thority should ensure that the safety of the ship and
natives are possible and available.
tugs remains paramount at all times.
In many instances where mooring boats are used,
Navigation Simulation Studies
adverse weather procedures may limit the operat-
ing conditions.
Developments in the simulation of vessel handling

PIANC Report 116 46

In locations that do not have mooring boats, mes- delegated between pilots, this must be clearly com-
senger lines are usually run from the berth when municated.
the ship is alongside to pull the ship’s mooring lines
to the shore. Although mooring times are usually It is the ship master’s responsibility to ensure that
extended when no mooring boat is used, risks as- the pilot is not released from the vessel until the
sociated with boat failure and mooring line entrap- safe completion of the pilotage service and that
ment in the boat are removed. there is an appropriate post-pilotage service ex-
change prior to the pilot’s disembarkation. This pro-
It is recommended that an analysis is carried out vision should also apply when pilots transfer within
in any project development to determine the safest the pilotage service, for example during a long pas-
and most effective means of mooring and unmoor- sage under pilotage.
ing ships. Alternatives must always be evaluated
and held in reserve in the event of the non-avail- It is recommended that the guidance in IMO Reso-
ability of the primary means of passing moorings lution A960 ‘Recommendation on Training and Cer-
between ship and shore. tification and Operational Procedures for Marine
Pilots (2003)’ (Reference 12) is followed to ensure
Mooring Services that competencies are maintained.

Mooring services are contracted out at many ports Master-Pilot Exchange

and terminals. It should be noted that contracting out
the services does not lessen the port or terminal’s The Master-Pilot Exchange is an important process
obligation with regard to the HSE management of that demonstrates that the appropriate information
the contractor. Marine professionals employed by on the condition and handling characteristics of the
ports and terminals can play an important role in ship have been passed to the Pilot. It is also impor-
developing and maintaining competencies of moor- tant that sufficient time is provided to ensure a full
ing contractors and ensuring that operations are Master-Pilot Exchange occurs, and that the ship’s
carried out safely by direct supervision. in-port passage plan (see Section 5) is reviewed
and executed during the transit. Any modifications
Pilots to the plan from Pilot boarding to berth should be
agreed by Master and Pilot and appropriate direc-
The number of pilots used at ports and terminals is tion given to the bridge navigation personnel.
normally based on an assessment by the National
Authority, Harbour Master and pilots, taking into ac- An example of a Master-Pilot Exchange is shown in
count the length of pilotage, complexity, type and Table 12.1 on the next page.
size of ship being handled, number of tugs and the
berthing manoeuvre. Mooring Line Fatigue

Optional parameters for consideration can be wind, Information on mooring lines is provided in ‘Moor-
current, sea and swell. ing Equipment Guidelines’ (Reference 4).

An additional consideration should be the age pro- On larger ships, mooring lines typically are con-
file of the Pilot group and the need for recruiting structed of wire or high modulus fibre, such as
and developing new pilots. It should be borne in HMPE and Aramid and are provided with a synthet-
mind that it can take up to 7 years from introducing ic rope pennant or mooring tail. The tail is designed
a new pilot to the individual achieving full compe- to provide stretch or elasticity in the mooring line to
tency to handle the largest vessels. prevent breaking.

Where there is more than one pilot onboard, it is The ‘cycling’ of mooring lines on exposed berths
important to ensure that the ship’s master knows can lead to sudden unexpected failure due to fa-
which pilot is taking the lead role. Where duties are tigue in the lines.

47 PIANC Report 116

 Table 12.1: Example of a Master-Pilot Exchange, Part One
Complies with requirements of IMO Resolution A601(15)

PIANC Report 116 48

Table 12.1: Example of a Master-Pilot Exchange, Part Two
Complies with requirements of IMO Resolution A601(15)

49 PIANC Report 116

While it is normal to use 11 metre long tails at shel- hull, environmental parameters should be reduced
tered berths, it has been shown in studies that the on the mooring simulations until the limits are not
tails may need to be doubled to 22 metres at ex- exceeded.
posed berths to limit dynamic amplifications of line
tensions. However, this may result in increased Fenders should be located in a position to align with
vessel movement (surge and sway) and any pro- relevant guidance contained in accepted referenc-
posal to increase tail length should be subjected es such as those published by OCIMF (Reference
to a detailed mooring analysis. Such analysis may 4, MEG), PIANC (Reference 17), ROM (Referenc-
include physical model tests and an evaluation of es 5 and 6) and BS 6349 (Reference 7) to ensure
the limitations of cargo handling equipment. vessels are properly supported along their parallel
middle body when at normal ballast draft and that
The layout of the jetty mooring system can con- the overhang length of the vessel is minimised.
tribute to mooring line fatigue, for example, where
mooring lines are pulled across fender panel chains, Passing Ship Speeds
over rough surfaces and other snagging points.
Where berths are positioned alongside navigable
In some terminals, for example, where the current channels, it is important to determine the impact of
exceeds 3 knots, shore-based moorings may be the speed and separation distance of passing ships
provided. The maintenance and deployment of the on moored vessels. Excessive surge on a ship
shore moorings will be the responsibility of the ter- alongside can cause damage to fenders, loading
minal. Particular attention should be given to ensur- arms and moorings.
ing that the use of shore moorings does not cause
a mismatch with the ship’s mooring lines (see Sec- Studies can be carried out to determine appropri-
tion 8). ate limiting conditions. Where possible these stud-
ies should be validated through local observations
Fender Pressures on Tanker hull once the terminal is commissioned.

It should be ensured that the vessel’s hull is not 13 Nautical Port Information
subjected to excessive pressure in way of fender
landing areas. This is of particularl importance Ship’s masters, agents, charterers and other stake-
where berths are in an exposed location. The same holders in the shipping industry have an interest in
should also apply to tug fenders. obtaining reliable and up-to-date port and terminal
information.
Fender pressures are determined through static or
dynamic mooring simulations and a berthing evalu- A number of developments underline the growing
ation. It is important to determine the appropriate interest in the availability, preferably on-line, of ac-
analysis model based upon the site-specific envi- curate and reliable information about ports and ter-
ronmental conditions. minals:

When a vessel is to attend a berth for the first time, • IMO Resolution A.893 (Reference 11) and ICS
it may be necessary for the ship owner to confirm Bridge Procedures Guide (Reference 21) require
the hull pressure rating which should not exceed voyage or passage planning, which is essential
the guidance provided in PIANC’s ‘Guidelines for for all ships engaged on international voyages.
the Design of Fender Systems’ (Reference 17). The aim of passage planning is the preparation
of a ship’s navigation plan so that the intended
The terminal should use the characteristics of the passage can be executed from the departure
fenders and the area of fender panel faces in or- port to the arrival port (’berth to berth’) in a safe
der to determine fender loading during the mooring and efficient way in respect of both the vessel
studies both during the design phase and subse- and the environment.
quently in use. On existing terminals, where fender • There is an increasing number of ships which
loadings exceed the safe pressure on the tanker have onboard access to the Internet and, in

PIANC Report 116 50

 general, crews are frequently less familiar with • Port description and navigation
particular ports and thus require more informa- • Port safety
tion about them in advance of arrival. • Port security
• From safety and commercial points of view, ac- • Environmental information
curate water depth information is particularly im- • Nautical services and communication
portant for calculating the maximum allowable • Port operations and services
draft for vessels.
• Reducing emissions. With accurate information The Port Sections Guide provides specific nautical
on tidal windows and berth availability, the ves- information for each berth and fairway section such
sel can proceed to the pilot station at optimal as:
speed, saving bunker fuel and hence reducing
emissions. Provided with good terminal informa- • Required underkeel clearance
tion, the ship can be fully prepared for mooring • Mooring requirements
and loading/discharging operations, thereby sav- • Deployment of tugs
ing manoeuvring time in port and reducing emis-
sions. Ideally, nautical port information will originate from
an authorised source, be reliable, up-to-date and
The required nautical port information consists of freely available on-line (via the Internet). However,
two parts: currently most port information is gathered from
ship’s agents and distributed by private parties. To
• Port Information Guide for the port as a whole, maintain the information accurate and up-to-date is
providing general nautical port information a challenge.
• Port Sections Guide for each berth or fairway
section, providing specific nautical port informa- The varied and sometimes inconsistent sources
tion per section of the port of nautical information may lead to confusion and
have an adverse impact on ship and port safety and
The Port Information Guide provides all general the overall efficiency of port operations. The lack of
nautical information for the port as a whole, such uniformity and availability of reliable port and termi-
as: nal information is primarily due to the fact that the
information is generally published in printed docu-
• Contact information and port regulations ments which do not contain the most recent infor-
• Notifications, arrival and departure checklists mation. Publishers typically gather the information

Figure 13.1: LNG Carrier at Altamira, Mexico

51 PIANC Report 116

by sending questionnaires (in different formats) For port and shipping information specifically re-
to port authorities, ship’s agents and terminals. In garding LNG (and LPG) reference is made to
general ports do not have a central source for this SIGTTO and GIIGNL:
information.
• The Society of International Gas Tankers & Termi-
PIANC recognises the need to make port and ter- nal Operators Ltd (SIGTTO) has a large number
minal information available to mariners and pub- of publications regarding LNG (and LPG) avail-
lishers of nautical information in an efficient and able via their website: (www.sigtto.org), e.g. ‘Site
standardised way. Examples are: selection and Design for LNG Ports and Jetties’
(2003), which provide basic information needed
• The International Harbour Masters Association to design a gas terminal.
(IHMA) has developed, after consultation with • The International Group of Liquefied Natural
many stakeholders, a standardised template for Gas Importers (GIIGNL) provides annually an
a Port Information Guide. This template is freely overview of the state-of-the-art technology in the
available to all users in a web-based applica- LNG Industry and of its general economic state.
tion (www.harbourmaster.org). A number of ports This information (e.g. ‘The LNG Industry 2010’)
use the standardised template, including Bre- is freely available on their website: www.giignl.
men and Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven, Lisbon, org.
Goteborg, Shannon Estuary and Rotterdam. The
standard for the Port Sections Guide was estab- 14 Ship Characteristics
lished by IHMA in April 2010.
• The Oil Companies International Maritime Fo-
rum (OCIMF) has developed a marine Terminal 14.1 Crude Oil Tankers
Particulars Questionnaire (TPQ) for oil, gas and
chemical terminals. The aim is to provide a stan-
dard format for the collection of information on a
terminal’s arrangements and facilities that can be
shared with terminal users and other interests.

The provision of widely accepted, standardised

templates via the Internet of port and terminal in-
formation will substantially contribute to further im-
proving the safety of shipping in port areas and the
efficiency of port operations. However, the onus
is on individual ports and terminals to accurately
complete the templates and maintain the informa- Figure 14.1.B: Common Sizes of Crude Oil and
Products Tankers
tion up-to-date.

Figure 14.1.A: Typical Crude Oil Tanker

PIANC Report 116 52

Table 14.1.1: Example of Dimensions of Different Classes of Crude Oil Tanker

14.2 LNG Carriers

Figure 14.2.A: Typical Membrane LNG carrier

Figure 14.2.B: Typical Spherical LNG carrier

53 PIANC Report 116

 Figure 14.2.C: Common Sizes of LNG Carriers

Table 14.2.1: Example of Dimensions of Different Classes of LNG and LPG Carriers

PIANC Report 116 54

 14.3 LPG Carriers other cargoes, such as dry bulk), crude oil tankers,
petroleum product tankers, chemical tankers and
gas carriers (both LNG and LPG).

Dimensions

Air Draught is the distance between the highest

point of the ship and the waterline of the ship.

Berth Depth is the minimum depth alongside the

berth at chart datum.

Chart Datum is the reference level from which all

heights and depths are measured. This usually ap-
Figure14.3.A: Typical LPG Carrier proximates to the lowest astronomical tide level at
the location.

Deadweight is the carrying capacity of a ship, in-

cluding cargo, bunkers and stores, in metric tonnes.
It can be given for any draught but is generally
used to indicate summer deadweight at summer
draught.

Displacement is the mass of water in tonnes dis-

placed by a vessel at a given draught.

Figure 14.3.B: Common Sizes of LPG Carriers Draught (or Draft) is the depth of the keel below
the waterline.
15 Definitions Fairway Depth is the minimum depth in the fairway
at chart datum.
General Terms
Freeboard is the vertical distance measured from
Crude Oil (or unrefined petroleum) is a naturally
waterline to the freeboard deck, normally the up-
occurring volatile and flammable liquid consisting
permost continuous deck or maindeck.
of a complex mixture of hydrocarbons, originating
from geological formations beneath the earth’s sur-
Keel Top Distance (or Keel-Masthead Distance)
face.
is the distance from the keel to the highest point on
the entire ship.
Liquefied Natural Gas [LNG] is natural gas which
has been refrigerated to liquid state (typically -160
Parallel body length is the length of the flat side of
to -170°C) for ease of storage or transport.
the ship at the waterline.
Liquid Petroleum Gas [LPG] generally refers to
propane, butane and mixtures of these gases, which Underkeel Clearance (UKC) is the least vertical
are maintained in liquid state by refrigeration, pres- distance measured from the sea bed to the ship’s
surisation or a combination of these measures. keel.

Tanker is a vessel which is designed for the stor- Port Areas

age and transportation of liquid in bulk (i.e. in tanks
integral to the ship’s hull). The term tanker includes Anchorage Areas are areas designated by the rel-
combination carriers (which can alternatively carry evant authority in which ships may anchor.

55 PIANC Report 116

Harbour Basin is a sheltered area within natural or the pilot on board the larger vessel. They are also
constructed breakwaters. extensively used for towing (or pushing) vessels
which are not provided with their own propulsion
Pilot Station is the location designated by the systems. They may also provide salvage (towing)
relevant authority, usually in the port approaches, and fire fighting capabilities.
where the sea pilot boards or disembarks from the
ship. Environmental Terms

Terminal Safety Zone is a specified distance from Metocean Conditions are the environmental con-
the terminal within which certain activities (includ- ditions due to wind, wave, current, etc.
ing those of the third parties and the general public)
may be restricted. Wind Area is the projected area of the ship above
water level presented towards the wind.
Turning Basin is an area within a port or waterway
designated for turning ships around. Wind Force is the total amount of wind forces act-
ing on the ship at any time.
Terms of mooring
16 References and
Active Escort refers to the practice of securing a
tug on a line from the stern from a ship which is Recommended Literature
transiting confined waters. The purpose is to as-
sist in emergency stopping and/or steering the ship
away from danger in the event of malfunction of the 1. Thoresen, C.A. (2010): “Port Designer’s Hand-
ships machinery. Tugs used for this purpose are of book”.
special design. 2. UK Department for Transport (2009): “Port Ma-
rine Safety Code”.
Passive Escort is the corresponding term used 3. UK Department for Transport (2009): “Port Ma-
where the tug accompanies but is not made fast to rine Safety Code – A Guide to Good Practice on
the ship. Port Marine Operations”.
4. OCIMF (2008): “Mooring Equipment Guide-
Master is the Captain or person in charge of a lines”, 3rd Edition.
ship. 5. Ministerio de Obras Publicas y Transportes,
Madrid (1990): “ROM Recomendaciones para
Mooring Boats are workboats used to assist in Obras Maritimas (Maritime Works Recommen-
taking the ship’s mooring lines to the shore moor- dations, Actions in the design of maritime and
ing facilities. harbour works ROM 0.2-90, English version)”.
6. Puerto Del Estado (2007): “ROM 3.1-99 Rec-
Mooring Tails comprise of a short length of syn- ommendations for the Design of the Maritime
thetic rope attached to the end of a mooring line to Configuration of Ports, Approach Channels and
provide increased elasticity and also ease of han- Harbour Basins” (English version).
dling. Also referred to as ‘pennant’ or ‘pendant’. 7. British Standards (2000): “BS 6349, Maritime
Structures. Part 1: Code of Practice for General
Pilot is the person licensed by the competent au- Criteria”.
thority who provides navigational advice and guid- 8. British Standards (1988): “BS 6349, Maritime
ance to the ship’s Master for the navigation within Structures. Part 2: Design of Quay Walls, Jet-
ports, canals, rivers and certain other areas. In ad- ties and Dolphins”.
dition to special ship handling skills, Pilots also pro- 9. British Standards (1994): “BS 6349, Part 4,
vide specialised knowledge of the local area and Code of Practice for Design of Fendering and
environmental conditions. Mooring Systems”.
10. EAU (2004): “Empfehlungen des Arbeitsauss-
Tugs assist in the manoeuvring and mooring of chusses für Ufereinfassungen (Recommenda-
larger vessels. They are normally controlled by tions of the Committee for Waterfront Structures,
Harbours and Waterways)”, English version.

PIANC Report 116 56

11. IMO Resolution A.893(21): “Guidelines for Voy- Conference on Port & Maritime R&D and Tech-
age Planning”. nology.
12. IMO Resolution A.960(23): “Recommendations 33. PIANC (2012): “Horizontal and Vertical Dimen-
on Training and Certification and Operational sions of Fairways”, Report of Working Group
Procedures for Maritime Pilots”. No 49.
13. IMO Resolution A.949 (23): “Guidelines on Plac- 34. Department for Homeland Security, United
es of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance”. States Coast Guard (2005): “Guidance on As-
14. John W. Gaywaine: “Design of Marine Facilities sessing the Suitability of a Waterway for LNG
for Berthing, Mooring and Repair of Vessels”. Marine Traffic (NVIC 05-05)”.
15. Capt. Hank Hensen: “Tug Use in Port: A Practi- 35. Captain Buysse, J. (2007): “Handling Ships in
cal Guide”. Ice: A Practical Guide to Handling Class 1A and
16. PIANC (1995): “Criteria for Movements of 1AS Ships”.
Moored Ships in Harbours”, Report of Working 36. Lloyd Toomey & Dickins (2010): “The Ice Navi-
Group No 24. gation Manual”, Witherby Seamanship Interna-
17. PIANC (2002): “Guidelines for the Design of tional House.
Fender Systems”, Report of Working Group
33.
18. SIGTTO: “Site Selection and Design for LNG
Ports and Jetties”, Information Paper No. 14.
19. OCIMF, SIGTTO: “LNG Operations in Port Ar-
eas”.
20. Nautical Institute: “Bridge Team Management –
A Practical Guide”.
21. ICS: “Bridge Procedures Guide”.
22. ICS: “International Best Practice for Maritime
Pilotage”.
23. ISPO International Users Group (2009): “Inter-
national Standard for Maritime Pilot Organiza-
tions”.
24. Nautical Institute: “Passage Planning”.
25. IALA (2008): “VTS Manual”.
26. British Ports Industry Training: “Syllabus for Ma-
rine Pilot Training”.
27. OCIMF: “The Use of Large Tankers in Season-
al First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Condi-
tions”.
28. “Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Mainte-
nance Standards (MOTEMS)”, California Build-
ing Standards Code, Chapter 31F - Marine Oil
Terminals.
29. OCIMF/SIGTTO: “Jetty Maintenance and In-
spection Guide”.
30. SIGTTO (2009): “ESD Arrangements & Linked
Ship/Shore Systems for Liquefied Gas Carri-
ers”.
31. PIANC (2012): “Use of hydro/meteo information
to optimise safe port access”, Report of Work-
ing Group No 54.
32. Oomen, H. and Ligteringen, H. (2003): “Prelimi-
nary Calculations for Wind and Current Loads
on Tanker-shaped Vessels”, 2nd International

57 PIANC Report 116

 Appendix A: • Bishop Tankers Ltd. (shipmasters)
• Primary Energy Ltd. (Mistlefoot Power Station)
Example of Operational Risk
• Blue Chip Timber (Whitby Wharfage)
Assessment. • Genesis Towage and Salvage Ltd.
• Mooring gangs
Report nr 09/01234 prepared by Leedman Marine • Cross Stacks Ferry
Consultants Limited. • Agency services
• Seafarer’s Sailing Club
• Other General Services
Executive Summary
The hazards identified were assessed in terms of
This report is of a sample practical risk assessment likelihood (frequency) and probable outcome (con-
of navigational operations and other related activi- sequence) during a workshop which included repre-
ties within the fictional port of Genesis. sentation from the above group and the measures
controlling these hazards were identified. From
This project was commissioned by Genesis Port this assessment, the hazards were sorted into a
Limited as part of its ongoing process of formalising Ranked (i.e. prioritised) Hazard List.
and enhancing its control of the safety of navigation
within the port of Genesis, in compliance with the Results
Port Marine Safety Code. The results of this study
will be used to assist in establishing a comprehen- The final hazard list contained some 83 hazards of
sive, effective and efficient Navigational Safety which the thirty most significant were considered to
Management System which contributes directly to be as follows:
the day to day management of navigational safety
in the port. 1. Grounding - Any vessel - on Nevasa Shoal
(Hazard 29)
The purpose of this document is to present a rec- 2. Collision - Coastal traffic and explosive cargo
ord of hazards identified in the areas concerned, to- vessel (Hazard 4)
gether with an assessment of the comparative risk 3. Grounding - Any vessel on Stag Rock (Hazard
of such events occurring. A number of risk control 30)
options are identified, which will need further re- 4. Fire/Explosion – Explosives Cargo vessel (Haz-
view by the board of directors (including cost ben- ard 40)
efit analysis) before a decision on implementation. 5. Contact - Tanker lands heavily on No 1 Jetty
(Hazard 72)
Method 6. Contact - Vessel hits another anchored in vicin-
ity of Ballast buoy (Hazard 25)
A risk assessment of marine operations was car- 7. Collision – Cross Stacks ferry and Commercial
ried out by Leedham Marine Consultants Ltd (LMC) Vessel (Hazard 17)
between November 2005 and March 2006. The risk 8. Grounding - Any vessel, either side of the chan-
assessment comprised a period of data gathering, nel (Hazard 27)
including a structured Hazard Identification meet- 9. Grounding - Any vessel, close to No. 15a buoy
ing, from which hazards relating to navigation with- (Hazard 6)
in the port, in terms of the port environment (natural 10. Capsize - Timber vessel in port or port ap-
topography, tidal currents, weather, etc.) and trade/ proaches (Hazard 11)
traffic density were identified. In addition to Port 11. etc.
Authority staff, the following port stakeholders were
consulted in the process: Only one hazard (No 40) ranked as ‘High Risk’
(rating 8, 9 or 10) within any of the scenarios ex-
• Port Radio Service amined. Seventeen hazards ranked as moderately
• Genesis Pilotage Ltd. high (rating 7), mainly from within the above group.
• Industrial Explosives (Shipping) Ltd. (ship mas- A further sixty-six ranked as moderate (rating 6).
ters and senior officers);

PIANC Report 116 58

Recommendations Radar installation
A new VTS radar installation should be provided,
From the work undertaken by the risk assessment suitable for monitoring traffic moving in and out
team, including the output of the risk assessment of the port and its approaches.
process, the following recommendations were Navigation
made by the Study Team: a) Dog Island leads (transit) should be re-instated,
including lights for night approach.
Harbour Authority b) Doppler berthing aid should be installed at the
a) Consideration should be given to revising the Power Station jetty to assist judgement of clos-
present organisational structure for the opera- ing speed and alignment when berthing tankers.
tion of the port authority, with separate functions c) No.15a buoy should be re-sited, approximately
of Harbour Master, Deputy Harbour Master, As- 4 cables southwest to better mark the maximum
sistant Harbour Masters, Port Controllers and extent of the bank.
Secretariat. d) The main channel leading mark lights should be
b) A Navigational Safety Management System is upgraded to at least 10-mile visibility range and
compiled and implemented. The NSMS should, the forward mark should include a red danger
inter alia, set policy, standards and compliance sector covering the depths under 10 metres on
monitoring criteria for the safety of navigation Nevasa Shoal.
and should include a Near Miss reporting sys- e) All efforts should be made to expedite the re-
tem as per the Port Marine Safety Code. placement of the Nevasa beacon. In the mean-
time, it is recommended that the present buoy
Navigational Policy be upgraded to a Class 1 buoy and consider-
a) The port should formalise written policies and ation given to supplementing it with a further
procedures for the control of traffic movements buoy to the northward of the shoal.
within the port. This should include documenta-
tion of current best practice and development of Pilotage
these where necessary. a) It is recommended that the port should seek
b) It is recommended that policy should be devel- Competent Harbour Authority status to facilitate
oped in conjunction with the Seafarer’s Sailing control over the safety of navigation within the
Club, with regard to yacht racing in the main port, as recommended by the Port Marine Safe-
channel. It is also recommended that policy ty Code.
should be developed with regard to the control b) The port should implement a policy for the op-
of fishing vessels within the port’s area of juris- eration of the pilotage service, including formal
diction. Pilotage Directions and pilotage procedures.
c) A pilotage training and examination system
Port Radio Service should be created and implemented, including
The present Port Radio Service should be re- the criteria for the issue of Pilotage Exemption
viewed and restyled as a full Port Control Ser- Certificates (PECs).
vice or VTS, with appropriately trained person-
nel, capable of maintaining an efficient radar Port (Generic) Passage Plan
watch, in addition to handling radio communica- A generic passage plan(s) should be developed
tions. for the port; it is suggested that this would best
be achieved by means of working groups under
Port Control Building the Harbour Master.
A new site should be found for the Port Radio
Service which gives unobstructed view of the Explosive Vessel Vetting System
port and its approaches. The building should Port Approval (vetting) of Operators and ships
include the necessary facilities to support the engaged in Explosives movements, through a
operation of Port Control and Traffic Manage- system of inspections of ships and operational
ment. audits.

59 PIANC Report 116

. .Towage Guidelines Introduction
. Towage guidelines should be developed, in
consultation with pilots and users, and incorpo- Purpose and Scope
rated into the Navigational Safety Management
System. The overall scope of work for this study included
the port of Genesis and all of the areas within the
. Tanker Movements geographical limits of the Sumner Estuary between
. Current best practice for tanker movements in South Head and Black Point. A number of specific
the port should be formalised and documented, locations required particular attention in that they
including towage guidelines and pilotage crite- represented areas where manoeuvring traffic exists
ria (as above), planning and communications. and/or where precise ship handling is necessary.

. Liaison with Port User Groups (Including The study included all commercial vessels trading
Leisure Users) externally to and from the Port. Leisure vessels and
. Formal links should be established with port intra-port traffic were included in relation to their in-
user groups, including leisure users to create a teraction with commercial vessels.
channel for two-way communications between
the Port Authority and user groups. These The study included all navigation-related operation-
should operate at management and operation al functions including environmental and operation-
levels. al limitations (i.e. tidal regime, channel limitations,
weather limitations, vessel cargoes, etc.) and the
General Comments traffic management infrastructure and its impact on
the safety of navigation.
The results of our study indicate that the operation
of shipping into and out of Genesis Harbour is gen- Methodology
erally carried out in an efficient and safe manner.
The approach taken by Leedham Marine Consul-
The Pilots, Shipmasters, Radio Station Operators, tants Ltd is based on the Formal Safety Assess-
Tug skippers and others interviewed during the ment (FSA) method, adopted by the International
course of the study all demonstrated very high lev- Maritime Organisation, (IMO). This consists of five
els of professionalism and seamanship, together distinct steps:
with a firm commitment to safety. This is attested
by the low levels of recorded incidents over the last 1. Hazard Identification
few years of operation. 2. Risk Assessment
3. Risk Control Options
Masters and port users interviewed generally ex- 4. Cost Benefit Analysis
pressed satisfaction with the way in which the port 5. Recommendations for Decision Making
has operated up to the present time.
This report covers steps 1, 2 and 3 of the FSA pro-
We nevertheless consider that the provision of a cess, specific to the Port of Genesis. Some new risk
new port radar and the upgrade of the Port Radio control measures are outlined, along with a number
Service towards a full Port Control / Vessel Traf- of comments and recommendations. The costs and
fic Service would materially assist in the safety of benefits of new risk control measures are excluded
marine operations through the provision of better from the scope of this report. From the generation
information to vessels and the facilitation of vessel of the risk profile, the necessary core components
movements. of a Navigational Risk Management System can
also be developed.
We further consider that the advent of the Port Ma-
rine Safety Code will require formalisation of the The report describes the methods used to develop
procedures by which the port is currently managed. the hazard list and associated risk assessment.
This best achieved by the development of a Navi- The information presented has been obtained from
gational Safety Management System. data provided from:

PIANC Report 116 60

• Documents furnished by Genesis Harbour Lim- Description of the Port
ited
• Holding a number of interviews with Genesis port General
staff, representatives of principal port users and
other organisations of relevance to activities in Genesis Port Limited is the Statutory Harbour Au-
the subject areas thority responsible for the Port of Genesis and the
• Carrying out a number of familiarisation trips on operations occurring in the area. The principal com-
vessels, both inbound and outbound and inter- mercial operators utilising the Port of Genesis are
viewing Masters and senior officers of transiting Genesis Explosives Cargo Ltd., Primary Energy and
vessels Blue Chip Timber, all of whom have vessels which
• Analysis of completed questionnaires distributed call at their own dedicated berths within the port.
to port stakeholders
• Various on-site visits The main types of trade using the port are as fol-
• Observations of general waterborne activities in
lows:
and around the Port of Genesis
• A structured ‘HAZID’ meeting held at the offices
• Explosives Cargo Vessels
of Genesis Port Limited on January 23, 2006
• Oil Tankers
• A Hazard Workshop held at the offices of Gen-
• Timber Carriers
esis Port Limited on March 18, 2006
• General Cargo
• Leisure Cruise Boats
In this study, the reliance on individual competence
is significant in the prevention of incidents and em- • Cross-Harbour Ferry
phasis has been placed on this aspect. • Occasional Barge/Tugs

Acknowledgments In addition, the Port of Genesis also has significant

recreational usage, the main facility being the Sea-
In order to obtain input data, a considerable num- farer’s Sailing Club. Extensive fishing activities also
ber of interviews were conducted with Genesis take place throughout the Sumner Estuary. At the
Harbour staff and with various organisations either eastern end of the estuary, there are also a number
concerned with the operation of the port or working of marine farms which produce a variety of shell-
within the port limits. fish in commercial quantities.

Documents studied included: There are currently approximately 550 vessel move-
ments per annum in the Port of Genesis. The Sail-
• Port Plans and UKHO charts ing Club has a membership with some 230 yachts,
• Port of Genesis Byelaws (1995) with a further 35 visitors moorings, which are fully
• Port of Genesis Harbour Orders 1934, 1948, utilised during the summer season. The club holds
1949 and1992 regular races and regattas in the estuary, obviously
• Port of Genesis Harbour Order (Explosives) involving the transit of boats through the harbour
1981 waters.
• Sumner Estuary Hydrographical Study 1979-81
• Sumner Estuary Bathymetric and tidal data 1972- The Port of Genesis has a generally open and un-
2001 obstructed approach, with approximately 12 metres
• Industrial Explosives (shipping) Ltd. – Standard of water above chart datum in the channel (main-
Route and Passage Plans tained by occasional dredging).
• Port of Genesis – Navigational Consultation Pa-
pers 1997 The harbour has a maximum tidal range of approxi-
• Port of Genesis – Towage Consultation Paper mately 1.2 metres. The tidal stream in the harbour
1999 entrance generally runs rectilinearly, up to about
• Genesis Port Ltd .– Port User Consultation Pa- 1½ knots at springs.
per 2000

61 PIANC Report 116

The seabed topography is stable and the bottom is Vessel Traffic Service
predominantly gravel, with some clay and silt, al-
though isolated rock outcrops exist in some areas. The Port of Genesis Radio Station is sited on
A Hydrographical Survey is generally carried out Blockhouse Point and is operated by Port Authority
about every two years. contract staff. The service operates on a daylight
basis (extended hours and other times by prior ar-
There are no anchorage areas within the Port. A rangement) and acts as a central point for commu-
designated anchorage with a least depth of 17 me- nications for all harbour traffic. It is an information
tres exists, centred 2.4 miles from the end of the service only with no designated powers of direction
eastern breakwater (see BA chart 9234). or control.

There is a regulatory speed limit of 6 knots within The Radio Station is equipped with a modified ma-
the port limits (Byelaw 17). rine (ship) X-band radar, which is approximately six
years old. It is reported as ‘somewhat unreliable’
Mistlefoot Power Station (Primary Energy) and none of the staff has attended any formal train-
ing in its use.
The marine terminal for Mistlefoot Power Station
lies within the limits of Genesis Harbour on the Other Port Services
northern side. It comprises No 1 (HFO) Jetty, ca-
pable of accommodating vessels up to 65,000 dwt, Tugs
and No 2 Jetty, capable of accommodating smaller There are two tugs of 25-tonne bollard pull and a
tankers and service vessels. further two tug/workboats of 3-tonne bollard pull
currently in the port. In addition, 2 work boats are
Mistlefoot ‘A’ power station operates exclusively on available for line handling and other duties. Ad-
heavy fuel, and deliveries average around 17-19 ditional tugs are available from Beckfoot, on 2-4
tanker calls per year, with a typical tanker size of hours’ notice.
about 40,000 tonnes DWT. According to Byelaw 16,
tanker movements are restricted to daylight hours There is no set compulsory requirement for vessels
only. using the Port of Genesis to employ the services of
tugs. This is generally left to the Pilot’s and Masters’
Blue Chip Timber Facility - Whitby Wharf discretion, but the Harbour Master has the power to
issue directions on the use of tugs, should he con-
This site comprises a timber storage facility and a sider it appropriate (Byelaw 2).
conventional berth, with a least depth of 7.2 me-
tres, which is used for import and export. The for- Bunkering
mer Bitumen facility has now been closed and the Bunkering operations by barge are not generally
site now operates purely as an import/export facility undertaken within the Harbour. Small quantities
for timber and occasional third party cargoes. of gas oil bunkers and lubes are delivered by road
tankers on a daily basis. There is no black oil op-
Pilotage eration.

The pilot generally boards and lands about 2 miles Explosives

to seaward of the fairway buoy. Genesis Port Lim- Special Procedures are in place for the handling of
ited is a Statutory Harbour Authority, but not a Com- explosives in accordance with the applicable statu-
petent Harbour Authority for pilotage purposes. tory regulations; this is normally carried out under
There is no compulsory pilotage, although pilots the supervision of the MOD and Port HSE Officer.
are available from Genesis Pilotage Ltd. – a private
company operated by a former Harbourmaster. Other Hazardous Goods
Procedures are in place for the handling of danger-
Although pilotage is not compulsory, tankers and ous goods; these are carried out in conjunction with
vessels carrying explosives invariably take a pilot. the Port HSE Officer.

PIANC Report 116 62

Port Authority Organisational Structure of port user groups. A list of consulters is contained
Port Authority Staff currently comprises a Harbour- in the Executive Summary to this report. The pur-
master, two Port Officers, who man the port radio pose of these meetings was to establish the nature
and carry out managerial and supervisory roles and extent of their involvement in marine opera-
within the port and one clerical assistant. One of tions in the Port of Genesis and also to elicit infor-
the Port Officers is responsible for HSE; the other mation which could be used to identify hazards to
is responsible for conservancy issues. navigation, both in terms of the port environment
and vessel traffic patterns. The Study Team also
An organisation chart of the port authority should obtained their views on the operation of the port in
be included here to show the key staff and contact the context of their various interests.
personnel.
HAZID Meeting
Stage 1 A structured HAZID meeting was held on January
Hazard Identification and 23, 2006 at the Port of Genesis Office. Those at-
tending the meeting were as follows:
Data Gathering
• Harbour Master
Data Gathering Exercises
• Master, MV Seal Express
In order to ensure that the hazard identification was • Master, MV Great Seal
comprehensive, proactive and not confined only to • Master, MV Super Seal
hazards which have occurred in the past, a number • Pilot
of techniques were used as follows. • Gipson Agency
• Leadship Agency
Port Authority Interviews and Familiarisation • Shipright Systems
Trips • Blue Chip Industries
The Study Team held a series of interviews with the • Primary Energy (Mistlefoot Power Station)
Harbour Master and also undertook familiarisation • Seafarer’s Sailing Club
trips with pilots on a range of different types and • Director, Leedham Marine
sizes of cargo vessels, both inbound and outbound, • Principal Consultant, Leedham Marine
to all the main berths in the harbour, under a range
of weather conditions. One member of the Study The meeting was led and structured by our experi-
Team also had relevant experience as Master of a enced facilitators who took the discussions sequen-
coastal tanker trading to Mistlefoot Power Station. tially through the identified accident categories and
vessel types affected, for each area in turn. This
Questionnaires type of approach employs and relies on the experi-
Questionnaires were also circulated to other stake- ence of those present to identify new hazards and
holders who the Study Team did not have the op- consolidate/expand on those identified within the
portunity to interview in person. This data was in- preliminary hazard list.
corporated into the hazard list, prior to stage 3.
The session was structured around the operation of
Document Study and Incident Data taking various vessels into and out of the harbour
Harbour Authority documents relating to naviga- and examining in detail the hazards associated with
tion within the port area were provided to the Study each operation. The hazards included in the dis-
Team. The team was also provided with access to cussion were geographical, weather, traffic related
the port’s database of navigational incidents which and cargo related. The interaction of the Port Radio
had occurred within the port area during recent Service, port user requirements and general com-
years. This information was used to assist in the munications were also taken into account. Time
initial compilation of the hazard lists. was also taken to discuss leisure craft movements
and their interrelation with commercial movements
Stakeholder Interviews and the Port Radio Service.
The Study Team also held meetings with a number

63 PIANC Report 116

The hazard data obtained during Stage 1 were Leading Marks.
used to facilitate discussion throughout the meet- The lights are considered just about adequate in
ing. All of those present participated fully and notes good visibility. The back light is reported unreli-
taken during the meeting were used to supplement able.
and confirm the hazard data obtained during Stage
1. The consolidated information was then used to Hibling Quay.
form the input for the Hazard Lists, which are con- Hibling Quay was formerly used for roll-on-roll-
tained in Appendix 1 to this report. off cargo and is fitted with a link span which is no
longer used. The knuckle on the quay protrudes 5
Hazard Data Identified metres from the normal berth face, presenting an
obstruction to vessel approaching to berth at the
Using the data obtained from the interviews, famil- timber berths.
iarisation trips, document studies, questionnaire re-
turns, HAZID meetings and workshops, a prelimi- Turning
nary hazard list was drawn up, from which a hazard In strong northerly winds, vessels turning within the
database was constructed and populated. harbour sometimes get close to the southern quays;
this is aggravated if vessels are alongside the ex-
This section describes the hazards which were plosives berth, with the restricted area in force.
identified by the Study Team from the above inter-
views, trips, questionnaires and HAZID meeting. Marina
The waiting pontoons for the marine extend some
Geographical (from seaward) 10 metres into the southern extremity of the com-
mercial port area. The piles are lit with red (port)
Nevasa Shoal and green (stbd) lights.
This lies 3.4 miles east of the port entrance with
a least depth of 0.5 metres. The rock is presently Vessel Types
marked only by a temporary isolated danger buoy
to the south. Explosives cargo vessels
These are generally small cargo vessels, typically
Stag Rock less than 500 gross tonnes. They can be affected
An isolate outcrop with a least depth of 6 metres by the strong outflow from the power station on
1.2 miles outside (north of) the main approach the final approach to the explosives berth. At such
channel. times the vessel needs to keep significant way on
to maintain manoeuvrability.
Western Shelf
This is a line of rocks at the western end of the They also tend to be single hold vessels. Loss of
estuary with a least depth of 2.3 metres. It is well hull integrity on such a vessel (e.g. by collision,
marked by three lighted cardinal buoys. contact, etc.) could result in rapid foundering. If
this occurred in the main channel, port operations
Nelson Beacon would be seriously affected.
This beacon can be difficult to distinguish from the
background shore lights on the normal approach Many of the vessels are under SOLAS minima and
line to the port entrance. therefore standards of construction, equipment,
manning and operation are not guaranteed; how-
No. 15a Buoy ever, these vessels have not historically caused
The buoy is presently well into the channel and no significant problems.
longer marks the salient extremity of the adjacent
bank extension. A significant eddy also occurs on Cross Stacks ferry
the spring ebb between 15 and 15a buoys, which This service is operated by two Class V passenger
can set vessels towards the western shore. boats, each with a capacity of 85 persons. They

PIANC Report 116 64

operate an hourly service between the public quay is in radio contact with other shift personnel and, if
in Genesis Harbour and Cross Stacks Island, some not incapacitated, could summon assistance in the
six miles from the port. The vessels are fitted with event of an emergency.
VHF radios but often do not communicate with the
port radio service when moving; moreover, they are Port Radio Service is normally manned only in day-
not of sufficient size to be visible to approaching light hours, although there is technically provision
vessels over the harbour breakwaters. for 24-hour operation (eight hour shift system, in-
cluding the Harbour Master). The same personnel
Harbour Tugs and workboats also supervise mooring gangs, communications
The tugs available at Genesis Harbour frequently being maintained using a hand-portable radio.
work away from the port at Beckfoot and beyond,
thus limiting their availability at short notice (e.g. in Radio Discipline and Procedures
emergency, salvage, etc.). There is no formal discipline or procedure, although
all radio operators are certificated. A basic log of
Pilot boat shipping movement is maintained, but there is no
The pilot boat is a converted workboat and not par- recording service on the port radio system.
ticularly suitable to personnel transfer off port limits.
General Procedures
Timber Vessels Procedures for approaching, entering and leaving
These vessels may experience stability problems, the port are not formalised, however there is gener-
particularly in winter and with deck cargoes. One ally good communication between ships, the Port
such vessel shed cargo into the harbour waters Radio Service and the berthing gangs. Vessels
during discharge, two years ago.
often do not call the Port Radio for permission to
slip, and sailing times are sometimes only advised
Hazardous Goods Vessels
retrospectively.
Explosives vessels and tankers calling at Mistlefoot
power station, are subject to special procedures
Scheduling
and scheduling, however these procedures are not
The importance of timing of vessel movements is
formalised or consistently applied, and contraven-
tions occasionally occur. critical in reducing hazards. Explosives cargo ves-
sel movements tend to be scheduled well in ad-
Fishing. vance and – by consensus agreement - other ves-
Fishing boats frequently operate close to the fair- sels do not move when the explosives vessel is in
way and harbour entrance. When trawling, they are transit.
slow to manoeuvre and cannot turn quickly. Dur-
ing fishing activities, crews may be distracted from Other Procedures
keeping a proper lookout.
Navigational Movement Restrictions
Yachts There are currently no port procedures in place re-
The yacht club holds frequent races in the summer lating to restrictions on movement during periods
and these invariably involve transiting the harbour of restricted visibility or high winds; decisions on
and the entrance. Concern was expressed at lei- movement are left to the discretion of Masters.
sure craft impeding the passage of commercial
traffic in, or close to, the harbour entrance. Sailing It is considered that the absence of manoeuvring
Club members also recognised this as a prime haz- guidelines or restrictions can place Masters under
ard area. pressure and erode safety margins.

Port Radio Service Notices to Mariners

It was considered that more use could be made of
Workload Notices to Mariners; these were rarely issued in
The service is operated by a single operator, who practice.

65 PIANC Report 116

Personal Safety vres, which were executed very well in very difficult
weather conditions.
Boarding and Landing Pilots
The safety of pilot and launch crews during board- None of the Masters interviewed raised any par-
ing and disembarking pilots at sea was raised in ticular concerns or problems regarding the opera-
general terms. Specific hazards arose in relation tion of the Port or the Port Radio Service, although
to the manoeuvring of the reserve pilot (workboat) several expressed a wish for a more structured ar-
alongside vessels that would not (or could not) cre- rangement.
ate a lee.
Local yachting interests were highly appreciative of
Standards of thermal protection were also raised, the service provided by the Port Services.
should a pilot fall in the water. It was reported that
the pilot does have an EPIRB or the facility to ‘hook Pilotage
on’ to the launch’s safety rail. The port has no generic passage plans, although
individual vessels have each prepared their own,
Mooring Gangs according to ISM requirements.
Some of the mooring dolphins are not lit. Poor light-
ing on dolphins can cause problems for mooring Stage 2
gangs. Line gangs need to work close to the edge
of the dolphins when handling lines, creating a haz-
Risk Assessment
ard of falling.
IMO Guidelines define a hazard as “something with
the potential to cause harm, loss or injury” the reali-
General Observations
sation of which results in an accident. The potential
for a hazard to be realised can be combined with
Standards
an estimated (or known) consequence of outcome.
In all trips undertaken, the Study Team considered
This combination is termed ‘risk’. Risk is therefore
that the shipmasters conducted the passages in a
a measure of the frequency and consequence of a
safe and professional style. In particular, we ob-
particular hazard. One way to compare risk levels
served several berthing and unberthing manoeu-
is to use a matrix approach:

Figure A.1: Example Risk Matrix

(Note that ALARP region shown is indicative only)

PIANC Report 116 66

At the low end of the scale, frequency is extremely Risk Matrix Criteria
remote and consequence insignificant; risk can be In this study, each hazard was reviewed with re-
said to be negligible. At the high end, where haz- spect to cause and effect. Frequencies were de-
ards are defined as frequent and the consequence rived for notional ‘most likely’ and ‘worst credible’
catastrophic, then risk is termed intolerable. The hazard events in each case, using the following fre-
IMO guidelines allow the selection of definitions of quency bands:
frequency and consequence to be made by the or-
ganisation carrying out the risk assessment. This is 1. Frequent One or more times per
important as it allows risk to be applied in a qualita- year
tive and comparative way. To identify high risk lev- 2. Reasonably Probable One or more times in
els in the traditional mathematical way would re- 10 years.
quire a large volume of casualty data (which is not 3. Remote One or more times in
generally available). 100 years
4. Very Unlikely Less than once in 100
For this study, ALARP can be defined as ‘Tolerable’ years
only if the reduction of the risk is impracticable, or if 5. Extremely remote Less than once in 1000
the cost of such reduction would obviously be high- years
ly disproportionate to the improvement. It can also
be defined as ‘Tolerable’, if the cost of reducing the The first three categories are self-explanatory.
risk is greater than any improvement gained. Each
Category 4 represents a frequency suggesting an
risk should be assessed to be ALARP individually,
event which is unlikely to happen, but has been
which may have a risk level lower or higher than the
identified as a possibility. Category 5 is an event
indicative region shown in Figure A.1.
which is currently considered scarcely credible, but
where the consequential outcome is catastrophic,
Criteria For Assessment at The Port of Genesis
and thus needs to be included to take account of
possible future changes in risk.
Port Areas
To undertake any form of port risk assessment, it
is necessary to break the port area into geographi- Using the assessed notional frequencies for the
cal areas of relevance and examine risks in each ‘most likely’ and ‘worst credible’ events for each
area sequentially, then examine what risks are be- hazard, the probable consequences associated
ing transferred from one area to another, as ap- with each event were assessed in terms of dam-
propriate. Within the Navigational Safety Manage- age to:
ment System, a simple incident recording system
can then be introduced with the same geographical • People (e.g. personal injury, fatality, etc.)
breakdown. The scope of this study included areas • Third party (non-Genesis Harbour Limited) prop-
under the direct control and responsibility of Gen- erty
esis Harbour Limited, with additional areas of the • The environment (oil pollution, etc.)
port approaches. The geographical breakdown for • Port business (reputation, financial loss, etc.)
this study was as follows:

Area Detail

1 The Port Approaches

2 Nevasa Shoal to Fairway Buoy

3 Fairway Buoy to the Harbour Heads

4 Harbour Area

67 PIANC Report 116

The rating applied was such that the consequences • Fire
were broadly equivalent across the categories as • Pollution
shown above. • Personal Injury
• Loss of Hull Integrity
It should be noted that in terms of Property, the risk
assessment by necessity considers the loss of a Hazard Data
large commercial vessel is of wider implication than Using the data obtained from interviews, familiari-
the loss of a leisure cruiser or yacht. This assess- sation trips on vessels, site visits and observations,
ment criterion is not intended to under-value dam- a preliminary hazard list was drawn up. This was
age suffered by the leisure user, whose personal verified and developed at the structured HAZID
loss may be very significant in relative terms. How- meeting.
ever, it is recognised that the loss of a commercial
craft often has a wider implication in terms of port Following the HAZID meeting, details of each haz-
business and negative media exposure. ard were recorded in a structured hazard list, to-
gether with the relevant identified cause or causes
Accident Categories and possible escalation factors. Questionnaires
The Operational Risk Assessment uses Accident were later circulated to those personnel who had
Categories to organise hazards for assessment. not been interviewed and the responses included
The Accident Categories identified as relevant to within the hazard list.
this study are:
Review Process
• Collision Frequency and consequence data was then gen-
• Contact erated for each hazard in the structured hazard
• Grounding list in terms of a ‘most likely’ and ‘worst credible’
• Capsize/Stability scenario, by a process of expert review. This was

PIANC Report 116 68

undertaken at a Hazard Workshop at the offices of The scoring was carried out on the basis of the cur-
Genesis Port Limited on March 18, 2006, in which rent status quo with regard to risk control – i.e. with
the following participated: all current procedures, both official and unofficial
(custom and practice) in place.
• Harbour Master
• Explosives Cargo vessel Master Risk Assessment
• Timber Carrier Master
• Pilot Risk Analysis
• Director, Leedham Marine From the individual frequency and consequence
• Principal Consultant, Leedham Marine ratings for each hazard, individual risk factors were
derived on a scale of 0 (low risk) to 10 (high risk) as
During the workshop, each hazard was considered fshown below.
in turn and scored on the basis of its consequence
in terms of human life, the environment, third party The risk data obtained from this process was then
property and port business, for both the most likely tabulated (in terms of the ‘most likely’ and ‘worst
and the worst credible scenarios. On completion credible’ events in each of the four categories) for
of the workshop, the scoring data was entered into each hazard.
the hazard database and a ranked hazard list pro-
duced to show the risk profile. It should be noted that occasionally, most likely
scenarios can generate higher individual risk lev-
The frequency and consequence data thus obtained els than worst credible; this is due to the increased
was then reviewed by the study team to ensure frequency naturally associated with the most like-
internal consistency (the port having little existing ly event. In effect, the assessment is scoring the
incident data with which the assessed frequency risk associated with two different outcomes from
and consequence could be compared). During this the same initiating event. This tends to occur par-
process, some hazards were combined where the ticularly where consequence levels are similar be-
hazards were similar and the risk profile identical. tween most likely and worst case and/or where the
The reviewed hazard list is reproduced in full in Ap- frequency of the worst credible is very much less
pendix A.1 to this report. than that of the most likely.

Where:

0 & 1 Negligible Risk

2 & 3 Low risk
4, 5 & 6 Moderate risk
7 & 8 Significant Risk
9 & 10 High Risk

69 PIANC Report 116

Hazard Ranking Hazard 29 - Grounding - Any vessel on Nevasa
The risk number of each of the four categories (Life, Shoal (Area 1)
Property, Environment and Port Business) can be This hazard scores moderately high in property and
factored to proportionally increase or decrease the environment in the most likely, and in life and prop-
effect of that category on the overall hazard rank- erty in the worst credible scenario.
ing. After discussion with Genesis Harbour Limited,
it was agreed that the risk output should be based In addition to generic causes, additional possible
on an equal value (unity weighting) for each cat- causes for this hazard include collision avoidance
egory. manoeuvres and tidal set.

The risk data obtained from the above process was Serious damage to the vessel is possible with loss
then analysed to obtain four indices for each haz- of hull integrity. Serious pollution is also possible
ard as follows: if bunker tanks are breached. Evacuation may be
required. SAR operations would be hampered by
A) the average risk value of the four categories in restricted visibility or darkness.
the ‘most likely’ set
B) the average risk value of the four categories in Measures currently in place to control this risk in-
the ‘worst credible’ set clude:
C) the maximum risk value of the four categories
in the ‘most likely’ set • Navigation marks: the Nevasa Shoal is marked
D) the maximum risk value of the four categories by a temporary isolated danger buoy (following
in the ‘worst credible’ set destruction of the Nevasa Beacon in December
2004)
Average risk values are sensitive towards hazards • Pilot’s expertise and training
which score moderately or highly over a number
of categories, whilst the maximum risk values are Further possible measures to reduce this risk in-
sensitive towards hazards which score particularly clude:
high in any category.
• All effort should be made to expedite the replace-
These values were then aggregated to produce a ment of the Nevasa Beacon. In the meantime,
numeric value representing the average of the four it is recommended that the present buoy be up-
indices. graded to a Class 1 buoy and possibly supple-
mented with a further buoy to the northward of
The hazard list was then sorted in order of the ag- the shoal.
gregate of the four indices to produce a Ranked • Development of generic Port Passage Plan
Hazard List, in descending order, with the highest
risk hazards at the top. This list is produced in full Hazard 4 - Collision - Coastal Traffic and Explo-
in Appendix A.2 to this report. sives Cargo Vesse. (Areas 1 and 2)
This hazard scores moderate/high in life and prop-
Stage 3 erty in both the most likely and worst credible sce-
Mapping Defences narios. It also scores moderately in the worst cred-
(Risk Control Options) ible environment scenario.

The Ranked Hazard List was reviewed at a further In addition to generic causes, particular causes for
this may include poor watch-keeping and equip-
meeting at the offices of Genesis Port Limited on
ment standards on the explosives vessels, which
March 27, 2006 and the defences currently in place
are generally under the tonnages required for com-
to control the hazards identified by the ranking pro-
pliance with SOLAS and other maritime legislation.
cess as most important, were reviewed.
The most likely scenario would be a glancing blow
The result of the review of the top thirty ranked haz-
with minor damage and few injuries. In the worst
ards (in order of highest overall risk) was as fol-
credible scenario, serious damage to both vessels
lows.

PIANC Report 116 70

is likely. Loss of hull integrity explosion and pollu- Additional measures which could improve control
tion is also possible. Evacuation may be required. of this hazard include:
Measures currently in place to control this risk in-
clude: • Re-establishment of the northern approach leads
on Dog Island
• External Procedures: Collision Regulations • Development of generic Port Passage Plan
• Warning broadcasts are made on VHF channel
16/14 of the explosives cargo vessel movements Hazard 40 - Fire/Explosion – Explosives Cargo
by the Port Radio Service vessel (All Areas)
• Other vessels do not enter, leave or move within This hazard scores high in life and property in the
the port whilst the explosives vessel is in transit most likely and worst credible scenarios. It also
scores moderately in the worst credible environ-
It is considered that this hazard should be ade- ment and port business scenarios.
quately covered by the above measures. Additional
measures which could improve control of this haz- Causes include fire in the accommodation or en-
ard include: gine room spreading to cargo areas, or uncontrolled
heat (ignition) sources in cargo areas.
• Port Approval (vetting) of Operators and ships
engaged in Explosives movements, through a The worst case scenario would include significant
system of inspections of ships and operational loss of life, damage to property and evacuation of
audits homes in the locality.
• Provision of a new radar facility for the port; this
would enable the port to monitor the vessel tracks Measures currently in place to control this risk in-
and advise of possible conflict clude:

Hazard 30 - Grounding - Any vessel on Stag • Loading, Discharge and Stowage Procedures:
Rock (Area 2) Industrial Explosives Ltd.
This hazard scores moderate/high in property in • Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regu-
lations 1987
the most likely and worst credible scenarios. It also
• Port Byelaws 60, 82 85
scores moderately in the worst credible environ-
• MOD Procedures
ment and port business scenarios.
It is considered that this hazard should be ade-
In addition to generic causes, particular causes for
quately covered by the above measures.
this may include the inability to distinguish Nelson
Beacon from the background lights on approach
Hazard 72 - Contact – Tanker lands heavily on
and/or vessels cutting the corner when approaching
No 1 Jett. (Area 3)
from the north and passing inside Nevasa Shoal.
This hazard scores high in the property category in
both the most likely and worst credible scenarios. It
The most likely scenario would include significant also scores moderately in the worst credible pollu-
damage to the bottom of the vessel. In the worst tion and life scenarios.
case scenario significant pollution may occur and
evacuation may be required. Restricted visibility or In addition to generic causes, particular causes for
darkness would hamper SAR operations. this hazard may include strong Northerly winds on
the flood tide, inadequate power in marginal condi-
Measures currently in place to control this risk in- tions, failure to take sufficient tugs or unavailability
clude: of tugs at short notice.

• Stag Rock South Cardinal Buoy The most likely scenario could include significant
• Nelson Beacon – heading mark when approach- damage to the hard-arm facility and vessel. The
ing from the east; maintaining a least bearing of worst case scenario could include serious injuries
265° clears Stag Rock by one mile and pollution.

71 PIANC Report 116

Measures currently in place to control this risk in- Hazard 17 - Collision – Cross Stacks Ferry and
clude: Commercial Vessel (Area 1 and 2)
This hazard scores moderate/high in life and prop-
• Pilotage Procedures: Pilot expertise and train- erty in both the most likely and worst credible sce-
ing narios. It also scores moderately in the worst cred-
• Tugs and workboats are available, given suf- ible environment scenario.
ficient notice and readiness. Criteria for taking
tugs is according to the Master’s discretion In addition to generic causes, particular causes for
• Wind speed indication is available from the ter- this may include the commercial vessel entering
minal port too fast, lack of port control and lack of com-
munications.
Additional measures which could improve control
of this hazard include: The most likely scenario would be a glancing blow
with minor damage and few injuries. In the worst
• Establishment of Doppler berthing aid on the credible scenario, serious damage to the ferry is
southern end of the jetty likely. Evacuation may be required. SAR operations
• Implementation of Towage Guidelines would be hampered by restricted visibility or dark-
ness.
Hazard 25 - Contact - Vessel hits vessel an-
chored in vicinity of Ballast buoy (Area 2) Measures currently in place to control this risk in-
This hazard scores moderately in the property cat- clude:
egory of the most likely scenario and moderate/
high across all categories in the worst credible sce- • External Procedures: Collision Regulations
nario. • The ferry is highly manoeuvrable and can gener-
ally avoid or extricate itself from hazardous situ-
In addition to generic causes, particular causes for ations with conventional vessels without undue
this hazard may include the vessel anchoring too difficulty
close to Ballast buoy, lack of port control (in pre-
venting the former) and the absence of a designat- It is considered that this hazard should be ade-
ed anchorage area on the chart. quately covered by the above measures. Additional
measures which could improve control of this haz-
The most likely scenario would be a low energy im- ard include:
pact. In the worst case, both vessels could sustain
serious damage, with pollution and possible loss of • Provision of radar facility for the port; this would
hull integrity. Evacuation may be required. enable the port to monitor the vessel tracks and
advise of possible conflict
Measures currently in place to control this risk in-
clude: Hazard 27 - Grounding - Any vessel, either side
of the channel (Area 3)
• External Procedures: Master’s expertise and This hazard scores moderate/high in property in
training both the most likely and worst credible scenarios.
• Vessels which contact the Port Radio Service It also scores moderate/high in the worst credible
are advised to anchor 2.4 miles from the end of environment and port business scenarios.
the eastern breakwater
In addition to generic causes, particular causes for
Additional measures which could improve control this may include strong cross winds – particularly
of this hazard include: where vessels are slowing to manoeuvre. The most
likely scenario could include significant damage to
• Provision of radar facility for the port; this would the bottom of the vessel. In the worst case scenario
enable the port to monitor the position of vessels significant pollution may occur and evacuation may
at anchor and approaching traffic be required.

PIANC Report 116 72

Measures currently in place to control this risk in- • Repositioning of Buoy No 15a at the salient intru-
clude: sion into the channel
• Provision of radar facility for the port; this would
• Pilot’s expertise and training enable the port to monitor the position and prog-
• External Procedures: Master’s expertise and ress of vessels
training
• Internal leading line (transit) Hazard 11 - Capsize – Timber Vessel in port or
port approaches (All Areas)
Additional measures which could improve control This hazard scores moderately in property in both
of this hazard include: the most likely and worst credible scenarios.

• Provision of radar facility for the port; this would In addition to generic causes, particular causes for
enable the port to monitor the position and prog- this may include strong winds which occasionally
ress of vessels gust down the valley and through the port area.
• Addition of day lights on the leading line; this
would enhance their visibility in marginal condi- The most likely scenario could include significant
tions recovery costs and possible injuries, together with
• Development of Towage Guidelines restrictions on port movements. In the worst case
scenario fatalities are possible, together with long-
Hazard 6 - Grounding - Any vessel, close to No. term port closure.
15a buoy (Area 3)
This hazard scores moderate/high in property in Measures currently in place to control this risk in-
the most likely and worst credible scenarios. It also clude:
scores moderate/high in the worst credible environ-
ment and port business scenarios. • External Procedures: Master’s expertise and
training
In addition to generic causes, particular causes for • Timber regulations
this include the significant eddy which occurs on
the spring ebb between 15 and 15a buoys and the It is considered that this hazard should be ade-
position of No 15a buoy which no longer marks the quately covered by the above measures.
furthest intrusion of the bank into the channel.
Hazard Summary
The most likely scenario could include significant
damage to the bottom of the vessel. In the worst 1) Only one hazard (Ref No 40) ranked as ‘High
case scenario significant pollution may occur and Risk’ (rating = 8,9 or 10) within any of the sce-
evacuation may be required. narios examined.
2) Seventeen hazards ranked as moderately high
Measures currently in place to control this risk in- (rating=7) and a further sixty-six ranked as
clude: moderate (rating=6) within the ‘Worst Credible’
scenarios.
• Pilot’s expertise and training 3) Two hazards ranked as moderately high
• External Procedures: Master’s expertise and (rating=7) and a further twenty-seven ranked as
training moderate (rating=6) within the ‘Most Likely’ sce-
• Leading line: this leads vessels clear of the dan- narios. These hazards generally correspond to
ger (i.e. duplicate) those captured within the ‘worst
credible’ in (2) above.
Additional measures which could improve control
of this hazard include: We consider that the top twenty-three hazards from
the ranked hazard list together with the hazards de-
• Addition of day lights on the leading line; this scribed above under Stage 3 merit continued re-
would enhance their visibility in marginal condi- view and consideration should be given to the risk
tions control measures proposed.

73 PIANC Report 116

In some cases it may be appropriate to undertake time should be formalised; this could be based on a
further study to consider the costs and benefits of minimum distance between moving vessels.
introducing further measures.
Policy should be developed with regard to the con-
It can be seen that in many cases, the risk control trol of fishing vessels and leisure craft within the
options put forward for consideration generally ad- port jurisdiction, and particular yacht racing in the
dress more than one hazard. In many cases ad- vicinity of and crossing the main channel.
ditional hazards which are outside the top twenty-
three will also be addressed by these options. This addresses many hazards throughout the haz-
ard list, particularly Nos […]
Operational Risk Assessment - Recommenda-
tions Port Radio Service
It is recommended that the Port Radio Service
During the course of our studies, the team noted should be reviewed and re-styled as a Port Control
a number of areas where it was considered that Service or VTS, with appropriately trained person-
improvements could be made. These were as fol- nel, capable of maintaining an efficient radar watch
lows. in addition to handling communications. Training
should be provided to enable port controllers to
Harbour Authority adopt more proactive involvement in ship move-
The current organisation of the Harbour Authority ments.
does not provide the Harbour Master with sufficient
technical support staff to assist in his duties or to Port Control Building
cater for absences due to holidays, sickness, etc. The current building used by the Port Radio Ser-
vice has very limited facilities and a poor view. We
It is therefore recommended that consideration recommend the establishment of a new port con-
should be given to re-structuring the present ar- trol building, with a better view over the port area
rangements to allow for the following: including all berths. The building should include the
necessary facilities to support the operation of Port
• The development of a new organisational struc- Control and Traffic Management.
ture for the operation of the port authority, with
separate functions of Harbour Master, Deputy Radar installation
Harbour Master, Assistant Harbour Masters, Port It is strongly recommended that a proper radar in-
Controllers (see below) and Secretariat stallation should be provided, suitable for monitor-
• A Navigational Safety Management System is ing traffic moving in and out of the port. Investiga-
compiled and implemented. The NSMS should, tion should be carried out to determine the most
inter alia, set policy, standards, and compliance suitable site for the antennae, in order to give ad-
monitoring criteria for the safety of navigation. equate coverage of the port and its approaches.
A Near Miss reporting system should be imple- Communications will also require upgrading. Re-
mented, properly maintained and used to inform cording facilities for both should also be provided.
the safety management system
This addresses Hazard Nos [...]
Navigational Policy
The port should devise a policy for the control of Navigation
traffic movements within the port and it should issue
clear guidance and instruction to port controllers Northern Leads
accordingly. The policy should include, inter alia, Formerly leading marks were maintained on Dog
criteria for the conduct of navigation in restricted Island, which could be used to clear west of Nevasa
visibility and any other circumstances which might shoal and east of Stag Rock. These fell into disuse
require restriction on navigational movements. following the removal of the Observatory and Jetty
on Dog Island and the leads should be reinstated.
The current custom and practice of restricting
movement in the main channel to one vessel at a This addresses Hazard Nos [...]

PIANC Report 116 74

Berthing Aid (Doppler) ing and boarding in exceptional circumstances
Doppler berthing radar could be installed at the should also be developed. This should be incor-
southern end of the jetty. This would assist Masters porated in Pilotage Directions
and Pilots of approaching vessels in judging clos- • A policy should be developed for operation of the
ing speed and parallel alignment. pilotage service. This could be either contract or
employment, but our recommendation would be
This addresses Hazard Nos [...] contract, at least in the initial stages
• A pilotage training and examination scheme
No 15a buoy should be created and implemented. This should
The present position of No. 15a buoy no longer include specific criteria for assessing new explo-
marks the furthest intrusion of the bank into the sives cargo vessel Masters prior to being autho-
channel. It is recommended the buoy be moved rised to navigate the port without a pilot, i.e. as
approximately 4 cables south west (to a position PEC holders. The scheme should include train-
recommended by the hydrographical service) to ing/instruction under adverse weather conditions,
mark the salient extremity of the adjacent bank ex- darkness, etc.
tension.
This addresses Hazard Nos […]
This addresses Hazard Nos [...]
Towage Guidelines
Inner Leading Marks It is recommended that Towage Guidelines should
It is recommended that consideration be given to up- be developed, in consultation with pilots and us-
grading the final approach channel leading marks ers, and incorporated into the safety management
by fitting day-lights, to make them more prominent system. The guidelines should take account of the
against the background in marginal visibility condi- physical conditions of the harbour and the charac-
tions. These lights could be remotely activated by teristics of the vessels using it.
Port Control on demand.
This addresses hazard Nos [...]
This addresses Hazard Nos [...]
Liaison with Port User Groups (including Lei-
Nevasa Shoal sure Users)
It is recommended that all effort should be made to
It is recommended that consideration should be
expedite the replacement of the Nevasa beacon. In
given to the establishment of formal links with port
the meantime, it is recommended that the present
user groups, including leisure users. This would
buoy be upgraded to a Class 1 buoy and possibly
create a channel for two-way communications be-
also supplemented with a further buoy to the north-
tween the Port Authority and user groups.
ward of the shoal.
This would assist in addressing Hazard Nos [...]
This addresses Hazard Nos [...]
Explosive Vessel vetting System
Pilotage
Port Approval (vetting) of Operators and ships en-
It is recommended that the port should seek Com-
gaged in Explosives movements should be intro-
petent Harbour Authority (CHA) status to facilitate
duced through a system of inspections of ships and
control over the safety of navigation within the port,
as per the Port Marine Safety Code. We would fur- operational audits.
ther recommend:
This would assist in addressing Hazard Nos [...]
• On obtaining CHA status, a system for the issue
of formal PECs is implemented Port (Generic) Passage Plan
• Formalisation of pilotage criteria, with specific In order to comply with the Port Marine Safety Code,
reference to vessels requiring pilots, boarding generic port passage plans should be developed. It
points, notice, etc. Procedures for over-carry- is therefore recommended that:

75 PIANC Report 116

• A working group of explosives cargo vessel Mas- In some cases it may be appropriate to undertake
ters should be set up, under the Harbour Master, further study to consider the costs and benefits of
to produce a generic base-case port passage introducing further measures. It can be seen that
plan for explosives cargo vessels in many cases, the risk control options put forward
• A further generic port passage plan is produced for consideration generally address more than one
to assist Bridge Teams of other vessels to easily hazard. In many cases additional hazards which
assimilate the information needed for the pilot- are outside the top twenty-three will also be ad-
age transit; this should be carried out in consulta- dressed by these options.
tion with the pilot
General Summary
Generic passage plans should ideally be mainly
pictorial (i.e. as a chartlet) with all information avail- The results of our study indicate that the operation
able at a glance; they should not involve the Mas- of shipping into and out of Genesis Harbour is gen-
ter or pilot in extensive reading or writing at a time erally carried out in an efficient and safe manner.
when their attention is required for navigation.
The Pilots and Masters interviewed during the
This addresses numerous navigational hazard in- course of the study all demonstrated very high lev-
cluding Nos [...] els of professionalism and seamanship, together
with a firm commitment to safety. This is attested
Summary and Conclusions by the low levels of recorded incidents over the last
few years of operation. Masters and port users in-
Operational Risk Assessment terviewed generally expressed satisfaction with the
way in which the port has operated up to the pres-
Our review of the hazards identified during the op- ent time.
erational risk assessment carried out at Genesis
Harbour between November 2005 and March 2006 We nevertheless consider that the provision of port
indicates as follows: radar and the upgrade of the Port Radio Service
towards a full Port Control/Vessel Traffic Service
1) Only one hazard ranked as ‘High Risk’ (rating would materially assist in the safety of marine oper-
= 8, 9 or 10) within any of the scenarios exam- ations through the provision of better information to
ined vessels and the facilitation of vessel movements.
2) Seventeen hazards ranked as moderately high
(rating = 7) and a further sixty-six ranked as We further consider that the advent of the Port Ma-
moderate (rating=6) within the ‘Worst Credible’ rine Safety Code will require formalisation of the
scenarios procedures by which the port is currently managed.
3) Two hazards ranked as moderately high (rat- This best achieved by the development of a Navi-
ing = 7) and a further twenty-seven ranked as gational Safety Management System which will:
moderate (rating=6) within the ‘Most Likely’ sce-
narios. These hazards generally correspond to • Set out the Authority’s policies and procedures
(i.e. duplicate) those captured within the ‘worst for the regulation of marine operations
credible’ in (2) above • Set standards for operation and targets for im-
provement
The full list of hazards is contained in Appendix A.1 • Monitor compliance through a system of verifica-
to this report, with a ranked summary in Appendix tion and audit, and identify reasons for any short-
A.2. falls
• Include procedures for the investigation of inci-
We consider that the top twenty-three hazards from dents and near misses, and apply the lessons
the ranked hazard list together with the hazards de- learned
scribed earlier under Stage 3 merit continued re-
view and consideration should be given to the risk
control measures proposed.

PIANC Report 116 76

 APPENDIX A.1
Example Ranked Hazard List
including Risk Control

77 PIANC Report 116

PIANC Report 116 78
 APPENDIX A.2
Example Summary Hazard list

79 PIANC Report 116

 Appendix B: φV is the angle of the resultant force
Wind Force Formulations relative to the vessel longitudinal
dimension
Formulations in the Spanish Standard ROM ρ is the air density, equal to
€ air 1.225 kg/m3
The ROM wind force calculation method is based Vr is the wind speed relative to the
on the drag force (F) formula: vessel, considered at 10 m above
the ground, and supposed uniform
F = C ⋅ ρ ⋅ A ⋅ V 2 (1) over the ship. The calculation of
this speed requires the definition of
With: other velocities: the vessel velocity
C as the drag coefficient V equals zero when the vessel is
€ ρ as the fluid density (air) moored ; the absolute wind velocity
A is the area projected onto a plane Vv corresponds to a height of 10 m
perpendicular to the flow direction above the waterline. Immediately:
of movement
V the flow average velocity relative to
the body
V r = VV − V (3)

Forces due to wind pressures on ships:

The value of Vv is equal to the average speed of the
€ shortest wind gust capable to overcome the vessel
ρ A1 + A2
R air = air ⋅ V r2 ⋅ (2) inertia (named here, for the seek of clarity, Gust ve-
2 cos(φ air − α air )
locity Vgust(τ)). The duration of such gust τ is:
F T = RV sinφ v ,F L = RV cosφV
15 sec if L ≤ 25 m
60 sec if L > 25 m (4)
€
The necessary gust speed Vgust is given by the ROM
€ 3.1-99 section 2.1.2.2.1.C Probable maximum wind
speed, which provides the following relationship:

V gust = C G (τ ) ⋅ V v (5)

Notice that such relationship is dependent on the

height above the ground, and:
€
• VV is the average speed of the considered wind
Figure B1: Wind Forces Sketch
(Note sub-indexes ‘v’ and ‘air’ are used indistinctly) climate, not necessary equal to Vv.;
(Source ROM 02-90)
• CG is the gust factor. For a 10 m height and a
Where: € time range of 3 s to 10 min, FG is given as:
Rair is the total wind force over
the vessel Summarising, the calculation of Vr requires the
FT is the transverse component knowledge of the vessel size to determine the
of the force necessary duration of a wind gust strong enough
FL is the longitudinal component to overcome its inertia. Such duration establishes
of the force the value of the gust factor FG. The multiplication of

PIANC Report 116 80

 Table B.1: ROM’s Gust Factor vs. Gust Duration
(Source ROM 04-95)

this factor by the average wind speed given by the AT is the Broadside or lateral ballasted
wind climate results in the wind speed sought in the projected area
present calculation.
Nevertheless, in the absence of accurate informa-
As an example, for the calculation that will be car- tion about the drag coefficients for the different
ried out later (from a vessel of Lbp = 346 m), equa- vessels and loading conditions, the wind forces
tion (4) provides a value equal to 60 sec (1min) for can be calculated according to the following sim-
the gust duration τ, which results in a gust factor plification:
FG = 1.31. An average wind climate characterised
by a wind speed VV = 10 m/s , the gust velocity ρ air (7)
Rv = C V ⋅ V r ( AT ⋅ cos α air + AL ⋅ sin α air )
2 2
1min
equals to V gust = 13.1m/s . 2

Continuing the description of the formula (2), we Where Cv=1.3 for any vessel and wind angle.
have: €
€
€ Formulations by OCIMF
• αair is the angle at which the wind blows relative
to the longitudinal ship dimension Overall wind forces are described as follows.
• Фair is the angle of the resultant force ρair relative (see figure B.2 on the next page)
to the longitudinal ship dimension
The longitudinal wind force FXW (in kN) is such:
In addition:

ρA
A1 = C L ⋅ AT ⋅ cos2 α air and A2 = C T ⋅ AL ⋅ sin 2 α air F XW = C XW ⋅ ⋅AT ⋅VW2
7,600 (8)
(6)
The lateral wind force FYW (in kN) is such:
Where:
€
CL is the shape factor of the ship when the € ρA
wind blows in the direction of the ship’s F YW = C YW ⋅ ⋅A L ⋅VW2
transversal axis. As a first approach, 7,600 (9)
CL = 0.8 if αair = 0º, and CL=1,0 if αair = 180º
CT is the shape factor of the ship when the The wind yaw moment:
wind blows in the direction perpendicular to ρA
M XYW = C XYW ⋅ ⋅A L ⋅VW2 ⋅ L BP
the transversal axis, CT = 1.25 if αair =€90º 7,600 (10)
AL is Head on or transverse ballasted
projected area

€
81 PIANC Report 116
 Figure B.2: Sign Convention and Coordinate System
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

Where:
CXW (non-dimensional) is the longitu-
dinal wind force coefficient
CYW (non-dimensional) is the trans-
verse wind force coefficient
CXYW (non-dimensional) is the wind
yaw moment coefficient

Figure B.3: Lateral Wind Drag Coefficient (CYw) Figure B.4: Longitudinal Wind Drag Coefficient (CXw)
vs. Angle of the Wind vs. Angle of the Wind
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF) (Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

PIANC Report 116 82

 Figure B.5: Wind Drag Coefficients for Gas carriers: CYw (top), CXw (bottom left) and CXY (bottom right)
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

These coefficients are based upon data obtained erage mean velocity. The selection of the 30 sec-
from model tests, and: ond wind is based on the time it takes the forces
in a mooring system to respond to wind velocities
ρA (kg/m3) is the air density, equal to changes. 30 seconds is a typical value for a ballast-
1.223 kg/m3 (at 20ºC) ed VLCC. Smaller ships will respond more quickly
AL (m2) is the longitudinal projected area of and a fully laden VLCC may require 60 seconds
the vessel above the waterline to respond. However, for consistency, a 30 second
AT (m2) is the transverse projected area of average period is suggested for all ship sizes and
the vessel above the waterline loading conditions.
VW (knots) is the design wind speed at height
10 m above the water level The reading and use of OCIMF’s Formulation, as
published in ’Mooring Equipment Guidelines’, is
Wind velocity is the velocity measured at the stan- clear and very straight forward. However, the for-
dard datum height of 10 m above ground or water mulation is in terms of a sustained wind velocity
surface and is representative of a 30 second av- and does not consider wind gusts of limited duration

83 PIANC Report 116

 that may also affect the vessels. The analysis of Formulations by British Standard
such corrections is difficult to undertake and there
seems to be little information in the literature, but The overall wind force is broken down into two
they are necessary in order to provide accurate transverse forces acting on each perpendicular of
predictions in real case scenarios. If other duration the vessel, and a third longitudinal component act-
wind data is available, it could be adjusted to 30 ing at the centre of the vessel.
second duration, in accordance with the following
equation defined in Marine Oil Terminal Recom- The transverse wind forces FTiW (in kN, forward or
mendations: aft) are such:
vt
V t= 30 sec = F T i W = C T i W ⋅ ρ A ⋅A L ⋅VW2 ⋅10−4
C t (11)
(13)
Where: The sub index “i” can be either forward (f) or aft (a),
Vt=30sec = wind speed for a 30 second also called bow and stern respectively.
duration €
€ vt = wind speed over a given duration The total transverse wind force is such:
Ct = conversion factor from Figure B.6
Aft
F T W = F TW + F T W Forward (14)

The longitudinal wind force FLW (in kN) is such:

€ F LW = C LW ⋅ ρ A ⋅AT ⋅VW2 ⋅10−4 (15)

Continuing:
CTiW is the transverse wind force coefficient
€ (forward or aft)
CLW is the longitudinal wind force coefficient
ρA (kg/m3) is the air density. It varies from
1.3096 kg/m3 (at 0ºC) to 1.1703 kg/m3
(at 30ºC)
AL (m2) is the longitudinal projected area of
the vessel above the waterline
VW (m/s) is the design wind speed at height
Figure B.6: Wind Duration vs. Conversion Factor 10 m above the water level
(Marine Oil Terminal, Division 3)
In the case of ships, the British Standard recom-
A second correction for the wind speed comes from mends the use of a 1 minute mean wind speed for
the elevation. The wind speed measured at an el- the design of moorings, because of the time need-
evation of 10 meters above the water surface, with ed for full line loads to develop, taking into account
duration of 30 seconds shall be used to determine the inertia of the vessel. If other duration wind data
the design wind speed. If these conditions are not is available, it could be adjusted to 30 second dura-
met, the following correction shall be applied: tion, in accordance with the gust factor included in
Figure B.6.
⎛ 10 ⎞1.7
VW = V h ⎜ ⎟
⎝ h ⎠ Formulations summary
(12)
Where:
The table on the next page summarises the differ-
Vw = wind speed at elevation 10 m
ences of the following three formulations consid-
Vh = wind speed at elevation h
€ ered, with some simplifications with respect to the
h = elevation above water surface of wind
formulation.
data [m]

PIANC Report 116 84

 Figure B.7: Wind Force Coefficient vs. Angle of the Wind
Small Tankers (left) and Very Large Tankers (right)
(BS 6349 Part 1)

Table B.2: Formulation Summary

Note: * Values from Figures 2 and 3. ** Values from Figure 6

85 PIANC Report 116

Practical analysis of the formulation − Width B = 56.2 m
− Broadside or lateral
Design ship ballasted projected area AL = 6,930 m2
For comparison purposes, a 200 000 DWT design − Head on or transverse
oil tanker ship in ballasted condition is used having ballasted projected area AT = 1,730 m2
the following particulars:
Results
− Length Loa = 350 m The following table summarises the wind force re-
− Length between sults (in kN) obtained from the application of the
perpendiculars Lbp = 346 m three formulations to the design ship parameters.

Table B.3: ROM Wind Forces

Note: * ROM Gust Factor

Table B.4: OCIMF Wind Forces

Note: ** Marine Oil Terminal Gust Factor

Table B.5: British Standard Wind Forces

Note: ** Marine Oil Terminal Gust Factor

PIANC Report 116 86

 Appendix C: Supposed uniform over the vessel’s sub-
merged hull. Vessel velocity V equals zero
Current Force Formulations
when the vessel is moored. The absolute
current velocity VAC: corresponding to a
Formulation in the Spanish Standard ROM
height of 50 % of the vessel draught.
Immediately:
The resultant forces from the pressure and friction
forces produced by currents acting on ships may
V c = V AC − V (17)
be simplified into one horizontal force in the longi-
tudinal direction of the ship, another in the trans-
versal direction and a vertical axis moment, all of Continuing the description of the formula (16), we
them applied at the ship’s centre of gravity. These have:
€
resultants forces can be estimated by means of the
following formulas. • αct is the angle at which the current acts relative
to the longitudinal ship dimension
Resultant forces due to current pressures on ship: • ФC is the angle of the resultant force relative to
the longitudinal ship dimension
ρW A1 + A2
RC = ⋅ V cr2 ⋅ In addition:
2 cos(φC − α C ) (16)
F T = RC sinφC , F L = RC cosφC A1 = C L ⋅ AT ⋅ cos2 α C and
M TC = ecp L = F T K ec L A2 = C T ⋅ AL ⋅ sin α C
2
(18)

Where:
€ CL is the shape factor of the ship when the current
€ acts in the direction of the ship’s longitudinal
axis. This factor depends on the geometry of
the ship’s bow. It can vary between 0,2 and
0,6. Lacking a more precise determination, a
value of 0,6 is adopted for conventional bows
CT is the vessel’s shape factor when the current
acts on the direction of the transversal axis

Figure C.1: Current Pressures Forces Sketch

Note the sub-indexes ‘c’ and ‘current’ are used
indistinctly
(Source ROM 0.2-90)

Where:
RC is the total current force over the vessel
FT is the transverse component of the force
FL is the longitudinal component of the force
φC Figure C.2: CT vs. Non-dimensional Water Depth H
is the angle of the resultant force relative (ROM 0.2-90)
to the vessel longitudinal dimension
ρwater is the water density, equal to 1.030 kg/m3
The non-dimensional water depth H is determined
for seawater and 1.000 kg/m3 for fresh water
€ by h/D, where:
Vr is the current speed relative to the vessel,
h = total water depth
according to the following conditions. It is
D = vessel’s draught
considered at half the draught of the vessel.

87 PIANC Report 116

 If the values of the areas are not provided, they can Where:
be estimated as follows: F’TC is the transverse component of current
drag force on a ship (t)
AL = L BP ⋅ D (19) F’LC is the longitudinal component of current
AT = B ⋅ D drag force on a ship (t)
(20)
Cγ is the friction coefficient. 0.004 shall be
adopted for ships in service and 0.001
€ Where:
for new ships
AL is Head on or transverse submerged
€ A’TC =Transverse projected wetted surface of a
projected area
ship (m2)
AT is the Broadside or lateral submerged
A’LC =Longitudinal projected wetted surface of a
projected area
ship (m2)
LBP is the length between perpendiculars
D is the vessel’s draught
Lacking other known values of these areas, they
B is the vessel’s width
can be approximated by the following expressions:
Finally:
esp.
A'TC = ( L BP + 2D ) ⋅ B (22)
is the resultant force eccentricity.
Keck is the non-dimensional eccentricity A'LC = ( B + 2D ) ⋅ L BP
coefficient that may be estimated from
the following table:
Formulations by OCIMF
€ Overall current forces are broken down as de-
scribed in Figure B.2. The longitudinal current force
FXC (in kN) is such:

ρC
F XC = C XC ⋅ ⋅L BP ⋅T ⋅ VC2
7,600 (23)
The lateral current force (in kN) is such:

Table C.1: Keck vs. αct ρC

€ F yc = C yc ⋅L BP ⋅T ⋅ VC2
(ROM 0.2-90) 7,600 (24)
ρ
Resultant Forces due to current drag on ships: = (C YAC + C yFC ) ⋅ C ⋅L BP ⋅T ⋅ VC2
7,600
ρW The current yaw moment:
F 'TC = ⋅ C r ?V cr2 ⋅ A'TC sin 2 α
2 (21)
ρC
ρ
F 'LC = W ⋅ C r ?V cr2 ⋅ A'LC cos 2 α € M XYC = C XYC ⋅ ⋅ L2BP ⋅ VC2
2 7,600 (25)
⎛C − C YA ⎞ ρC
= ⎜ YF ⎟⋅ ⋅ L2 ⋅ V 2
⎝ 2 ⎠ 7,600 BP C
€
Where:
€ CXC (non-dimensional)
is the longitudinal current force coefficient
CYC, CYAC, CYFC (non-dimensional)
is the transverse current force coefficient
CXYC (non-dimensional)
Figure C.3: Current Drag Forces Sketch
(ROM 0.2-90) is the current yaw moment coefficient

PIANC Report 116 88

These coefficients are based upon data obtained
from model tests, and:

αrc (kg/m3) is the water density, equal to

1.025 kg/m3 at 20 º C
LBP (m) is the length between perpendiculars
VC (knots) average current velocity acting over
the draught, which may be corrected
according to Figure C.10 when velocity is
specified at a certain water depth

The OCIMF coefficients take into account the ves-

sel load conditions and the water depth to draught
ratios. Mooring Equipment Guidelines (OCIMF,
2008) include various figures providing the formu-
lations coefficients for different conditions. The co-
efficients for a full load and ballasted tanker and
various water depth to draught ratio follow.

Figure C.6: Current Yaw Moment Coefficients (Cxy)

for Loaded Condition
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

Figure C.4: Lateral Current Drag Force Coefficient (CYc)

for Loaded Condition
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

Figure C.7: Longitudinal Current Force Drag Coefficient

(CXc) for Ballasted Tanker
Figure C.5: see next page (Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

89 PIANC Report 116

 Figure C.5: Longitudinal Current Drag Force Coefficient (Cxc)
for Loaded Conditions and for Various Water Depth to Draught Ratios
1.1 (top left), 1.2 (top right), 1.5 (middle left), 2 (middle right) and greater than 4 (bottom)
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)
PIANC Report 116 90
Figure C.8: Lateral Current Drag Force Coefficient (CYc) Figure C.9: Current Yaw Moment Coefficient (CXYc) for
for Ballasted Tanker Ballasted Tanker
(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF) (Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

Figure C.10: Current Velocity Correction Factor

(Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF)

91 PIANC Report 116

 Formulations by British Standard

The overall current force is broken down into two

transverse forces acting on the bow and the stern
of the vessel, and a third longitudinal component
acting at the centre.

The transverse current forces at Aft/Forward FTAft /

FTForward (in kN), also called bow and stern respec-
tively, are such:

F TAft = C TAft ⋅ C Tdepth ⋅ ρW ⋅A L ⋅VC2 ⋅10−4 (26)

F TForward = C TForward ⋅ C TdepthρW ⋅A L ⋅VC2 ⋅10−4 (27)

€
The total transverse current force is such:
€ Forward
F T = F TAft + F T (28)

And the longitudinal current force FL (in kN) is

such:
€
F L = C L ⋅ C LdepthρW ⋅A L ⋅VC2 ⋅10−4 (29) Figure C.11: CT,LDRAG vs. Angle of the Current
(British Standard 6349 Part 1)
The momentum MXY formula is not provided.
€ Continuing:

CTAft, CTForward are the aft or forward transverse

drag coefficients
CL is the longitudinal drag coefficient
CTDepth, CLDepth are the transverse or longitudinal
depth correction factors
ρW (kg/m ) is the water density, equal to 1.000
3

kg for fresh water and 1.025 kg/m3

for seawater
AL (m )2
is the longitudinal projected area of
the vessel below the waterline:

AL = L BP ⋅ dm (30)

Where dm (m) is the mean draught of the vessel.

€ Finally, VC (m/s) is the design average current ve-
locity, in the mean depth of the submerged part of
the vessel.
Figure C.12: CT,DEPTH vs. Angle of the Current
(British Standard 6349 Part 1)

PIANC Report 116 92

 section to improve understanding of such formula-
tions and the hypothesis they involve.

Design Ship
For comparison purposes, a 200,000 DWT design
oil tanker in fully loaded condition is used having
the following particulars:

Figure C.13: CLDEPTH vs. Angle of the Current − Length Loa = 350 m
(British Standard 6349 Part 1) − Length between perpendiculars Lbp = 346 m
− Width B = 56.2 m
Practical analysis of the formulation − Draught (Fully loaded) Dd = 20.4 m

The sets of formulations subject to the present Results

analysis basically vary from each other in the cal- The following table summarises the current force
culation of the different factors of the drag equation. results (in kN) obtained from the application of the
A simple comparison is carried out in the present three formulations to the design ship parameters:

Table C.2: ROM Current Forces

Table C.3: OCIMF Current Forces

Table C.4: British Standard Current Coefficients

Table C.5: British Standard Current Forces

93 PIANC Report 116

 Appendix D: to the vessel longitudinal dimension
(from bow to stern)
Wave Force Formulations
ρwater is the water density, equal to 1.030 kg/m3
D’ is the length of the vessel’s projection in
Formulation by the Spanish Standard ROM
the direction of the incident waves, in
metres. In the absence of known values,
Neither the British Standard nor the OCIMF Guide-
this may be approximated by the following
lines provide a formulation to assess wave forces
expression:
over moored vessels.
D'= L PP ⋅ sinα + B ⋅ cosα (32)
The ROM uses the following formula for assessing
forces due to waves for a ship in full load condi-
tion: Where LPP and B are the length between perpen-
diculars and the beam, respectively.
€
F T = C f ⋅ C d ⋅ γ w ⋅ H s2 ⋅ D'⋅sinα
(31) Cfw is the waterline coefficient (non dimensional)
2
F L = C f ⋅ C d ⋅ γ w ⋅ H ⋅ D'⋅cosα
s Cdw is the depth coefficient (non dimensional)
Hs = significant wave height for the direction
determined at the site’s depth, in metres

€ The maximum value for the limiting operating con-

ditions established for the pertinent port or facility
will be taken for this wave height (Hs). This value
may be different depending on the direction of ac-
tion if the characteristics of the location or the ma-
noeuvre being studied so justify.

Figure D1: Wave Forces Sketch The value of Cfw is given in the following figure as
(Source ROM 0.2-90) a function of the relative wave length (Lwr) at the
depth of the site (h) and the vessel’s draught (D).
Where:
FT is the transverse component of the force The length of apparent wave relative to the vessel
FL is the longitudinal component of the force (Lwr) at the site’s depth may be calculated by the
α is the angle of wave’s propagation relative following expression:

Figure D.2: Waterline Coefficient and Depth Coefficient (Cfw and Cdw.)
(Source ROM 0.2-90)

PIANC Report 116 94

 Twr Practical analysis of the formulation
L wr = L w (33)
Tw
The impact of wave forces on the 200,000 DWT
Lw = Absolute wave length, in m at the design oil tanker in fully loaded condition is con-
site’s depth. sidered. Using the data of the previous section, the
Tw = Absolute wave period, in s. following waves forces (in kN) are obtained using
€ Twr = Wave period, apparent or relative to the the ROM formulation:
vessel or period of encounter, in seconds,
which may be calculated by the following
expression:

1 1 V ⋅ cosα wb (34)
= +
Twr Tw Lw

Where:
V is the vessel’s absolute speed with respect
€ to the sea bottom, in m/s
α wb is the angle formed between the vessel’s
absolute speed and the wave direction
(incoming)
β = Vessel’s drift angle
€
In the case Twr is negative, it will be taken that the
relative waves are in the opposite direction.

Figure D.3: Determining the Apparent Waves Relative to the Vessel

(Source ROM 0.2-90)

Table D.1: ROM Wave Forces

95 PIANC Report 116

 PIANC Secrétariat Général
Boulevard du Roi Albert II 20, B 3
B-1000 Bruxelles
Belgique

http://www.pianc.org
VAT BE 408-287-945

ISBN 978-2- 87223-196-6

EAN 9782872231966

978-2-87223-196-6
PIANC Report 116