G.R. No.

76607 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE
REEVES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial
Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO,
AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
These cases have been consolidated because they involve the same doctrine of
state immunity.
US v. Rodrigo (G.R. No. 79470, Feb. 26, 1990)
US v. Ceballos (G.R. No. 80018, Feb. 26, 1990)
US v. Vergara (GR No. 80258, Feb. 26, 1990)
Facts:
GR 76607
The private respondents, Roberto T. Valencua, Emerencia C. Tanglao, and
Pablo C. del Pilar, are suing several USAF officers stationed in Clark Air base in
connection with the bidding which the latter conducted for contracts for barber
services in the said base. On Feb. 24, 1986 the Western Pacific Contracting
Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts.
The bidding was won by a Ramon Dizon. The private respondents objected,
claiming that Dizon had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil
Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid. On June 30,
1986 the private respondents filed a complaint to cancel the award to Dizon and to
conduct a rebidding, and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary
injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
Upon filing the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order
directing the petitioners to maintain the status quo. On July 22, 1986 the
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the action was in
effect a suit against the USA, which had not waived it’s immunity. The individual
defendants, being official employees of the USAF were also immune.
On October 10, 1988 the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The court stated
that a concessionaireship such as a barber shop is not under the RP-US Bases
Agreement.
GR 79470
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages againts the petitioners for his
dismissal as cook in the USAF Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured
urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. He was suspended and eventually dismissed by Anthony Lamachia,
who was then the club manager.
Genove’s filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio City against the individual
petitioners. On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the USA, moved to
dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the USAF, is
immune from suit for his actions are within his official capacity.
On June 4, 1987, the motion was denied. The respondent judge stated that
although the petitioners acted initially in their official capacities, they went beyond
what their functions called for and thus no longer immune to suability.
GR 80018
Luis Bautista, employed as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension
of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
petitioners, Tomi King, Darrel Dye, and Stephen Bostick, who are USAF officers
and agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. According to the sworn
statements of the petitioners, Bautista violated RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and therefore a case was filed against him in the RTC of
Tarlac. Bautista was eventually dismissed from his job. Bautista then filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that they
were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained.
The respondent judge dismissed the motion and held that the claimed
immunity under the Military Bases agreement covered only criminal and not civil
cases.
GR 80258
A complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the
petitioners, who are USAF officers--except the USA--for injuries allegedly
sustained by the former when they were beaten, handcuffed, and dogs were
unleashed upon them by the petitioners. However, the latter denied this stating
that the respondents were resisting arrest for theft and thus sustained the said
injuries.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
acts done by them were in the performance of their official functions
The RTC denied the motion stating that the alleged criminal acts cannot be
deemed as Acts of State.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are immune from suit as provided by the
RP-US Bases Treaty.
Ruling:
According to Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, a state may not be
sued without its consent. This provision was adopted from generally accepted
principles of international law (Art. II, Sec, 2). This immunity is not only applicable
to the state itself but also to its officials who commits acts in the performance of
their official duties. A suit filed against an official of a state in the performance of
his duties is also a suit filed against that state. However, the doctrine of state
immunity is not absolute. The state may not be sued without its consent, thus the
state may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.
Expressed consent may be embodied in a general law or special law. Implied
consent is when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation itself. In
Act no. 3083, the Philippines waives its state immunity from suit and “consents
and submits to be sued on moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express of implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.” In Merritt v. Gov’t of the Philippine Is., “When the government enters into
a contact, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself
to a counterclaim.”
However, such rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected
only by the will of the legislature through the enactment of statues. Moreover, not
all contracts entered by the government will be considered as waiver of its
non-suability; a distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, the suability will result only
when claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
The United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its immunity from suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
As to activities of a state, there is a need to distinguish between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). State immunity only extends only to acts jure imperii. This rule is now
applicable in the US, UK, and other European states.
The other petitioners all claim that they have acted in the discharge of their
official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is still a matter of
evidence. The charges against them cannot be summarily dismissed on their
mere assertion of immunity from suit.
In US vs Guinto, it is found that the barbershops subject of the concessions
are commercial in nature and operated by private persons. They are not agencies
of the US Armed Forces and are not vital to its operation. Hence, the petitioners
cannot claim immunity from the complaint filed. The petition is DISMISSED,
respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing, TRO is LIFTED.
In US vs Rodrigo, the court assumes that the restaurant services offered at
the John Hay Air Station has the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by
the US gov’t in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not even free for
American servicemen, and are available to the public in general, including tourists,
all of which pay for the privileges therein as one would with an ordinary restaurant.
Thus operated for profit. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity. Even if they are acting their official duties, by the mere fact that the US
gov’t itself enters into contract with Genove as an act of its proprietary functions, it
is implied that it waives its immunity from suit. But even with these said
considerations, the complaint against the petitioners must till be dismissed. While
suable, the petitioners cannot be held liable. It is obvious that the claim for
damage cannot be allowed given the strength of the evidence. It has been
established upon thorough investigation that Genove has polluted the soup stock
with urine. disgusting offense. The peitioners acted properly in terminating
Genove. “It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint
for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.” The petition is
GRANTED and the civil case is DISMISSED.
In US vs Ceballos, the petitioners were cleary, upon the study of the records,
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant. By being special agents of the US gov’t, they
thus represent the USA, and thus immune from suability. The petition is
GRANTED and the civil case is DISMISSED.
In US vs Vergara, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a
closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if
the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually
exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.The needed inquiry must first
be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties. The petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to

proceed with the hearing and decision of civil case. TRO is LIFTED.