Catalan v. Silvosa

10/22/23, 10:05 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 677
A.C. No. 7360. July 24, 2012.*
ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, JR., complainant, vs.

ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer shall

not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.—Atty. Catalan
relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.” Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which
provides that “A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14
which provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy.” We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa
violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the
Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.”
Administrative Law; Prescription; Administrative offenses do
not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time
of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.—Unfortunately
for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically
exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe.
No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
Disbarment; Attorneys; Disbarment proceedings may be
initiated by any interested person.—Disbarment proceedings may
be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the
right
_______________
* EN BANC.
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353
VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 353
Catalan, Jr. vs. Silvosa
of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts

and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible
with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
Same; Same; Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
is a ground for disbarment; The crime of direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.—Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined
as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. x x x The
crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Same; Same; Atty. Silvosa’s excuse that his conviction for
direct bribery was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public
officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of
integrity in his character.—Atty. Silvosa’s representation of
conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s
final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under
one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction
of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe
than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed
to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required
of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in
his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable
and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character.
The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved
himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan,
Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty.
Sil-
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

vosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against

Atty. Silvosa: (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the
accused in the same case for which he previously appeared
as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague
Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros. Toribio) for P30,000; and
(3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal
Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis
A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for
the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of
reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a
suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two
years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-
00, “People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y
Murillo, et al.” (Esperon case), for the complex crime of
double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was
one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue
with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and
requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty.
Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case where he
previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty.
Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty.
Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same
middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the
accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in
the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the
position of the private prosecutor.
_______________
1 A lawyer shall not, after leaving the government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
355
VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 355

In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted

Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from
handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment
convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23
November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail
pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented
the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for frustrated
murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent,
Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating
judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder
to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a
public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her
P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case
No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint
against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor
of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas),
Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two
years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for
the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas.
The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa.
GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and
aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was
offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the
Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of
instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa.
The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
“WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA

GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct bribery
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
356

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, one year, one month and eleven days of prision
correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and
twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.”2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa

states that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case
on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in
the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the
accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was
only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty.
Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses
Pros. Toribio’s allegations as “self-serving” and “purposely
dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution.”
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits
his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under
probation, he asserts that “conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic]
not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic]
not amount to a crime.’” He further claims that “it is not
the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his
capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent
for which he was convicted falling under the category of
crimes against public officers x x x.”
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September
2008, Comm. Funa found that:
“As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear.
[Atty.
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 34.
357
VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 357

Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.

Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be
unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted
himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar
with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient
intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty.
Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion
to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a

violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a
lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a
claim of bribery that occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In
this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the
word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.]
Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note
that the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago
or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly
cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of
the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with
certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that
herein complainant has no personal knowledge about the charge
of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor
was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the
alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa]
is GUILTY only of the First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the
penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.”3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six
months. In an-
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 145-146.
358

other Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of

Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s
suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office
of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution

and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause
of action and modify its recommendations in the second
and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.” Atty.
Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides
that “A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14
which provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse his services
to the needy.”
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa
violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the
Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of facts.”
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in
the same case on two occasions can only be described as
desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor
was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial
conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation
as collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well
to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
“An attorney is employed—that is, he is engaged in his

professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor—when he is
listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when
he is giving ad-
_______________
4 84 Phil. 569, 576-579 (1949). Citations omitted.
359
VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 359

vice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s

pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his
client’s cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare

relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone
to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.”
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting

interests applies although the attorney’s intentions were
honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery
and casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing the delay in
presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by
stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity
of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty.
Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the
records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe
Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her
affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery
attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran,
then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no
reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against
Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely
denied the accusation and dismissed it as perse-
_______________
5 Pormento, Sr. v. Atty. Pontevedra, 494 Phil. 164, 183; 454 SCRA 167,
181-182 (2005). Citation omitted.
360

cution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is

challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this

respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing
of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar
does not automatically exonerate a respondent.
Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how
much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of
the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings
in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any
interested person. There can be no doubt of the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts
and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are
incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
“Section 1. How Instituted.—Proceedings for the disbarment,

suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state
_______________
6 Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17; 337 SCRA 244, 257 (2000) citing
Reyes v. Gaa, 316 Phil. 97, 101; 246 SCRA 64, 67 (1995).
7 Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 825; 423 SCRA 329, 351 (2004).
8 Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., Adm. Case No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1,
14. Citation omitted.
361
VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 361

clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be

supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in government
service.
x x x x”
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the

complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a
witness in the present case. There is no doubt that the
Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a
matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan
supported his allegation by submitting documentary
evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case
No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his
interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as
an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
“Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case
_______________
9 Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144, 1150; 258 SCRA 483,
487 (1996). Citations omitted.
362

without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law

for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a

final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11 we ruled:
“By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the

elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift
or present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing
some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element.

The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift
and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors,
denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the
trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all
_______________
10 Re: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, 24
April 2012, 670 SCRA 366; Moreno v. Atty. Araneta, 496 Phil. 788; 457
SCRA 329 (2005); In Re: Rodolfo Pajo, 203 Phil. 79; 117 SCRA 713 (1982);
In the matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, 101 Phil.
323 (1957).
11 439 Phil. 339, 346-347; 390 SCRA 495, 500 (2002).
363
VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 363

respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral

turpitude.” (Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and
his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the
penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the
crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the
grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s

conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a
penalty more severe than suspension because we find that
Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards
of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.
His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a
lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays
the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved
himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is
hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,

Villarama, Jr., Perez, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.
Brion and Mendoza, JJ., On Leave.
Peralta, J., On Official Business.
364

Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa disbarred.
Notes.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of

Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. (Vargas vs. Ignes, 623
SCRA 1 [2010])
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the
grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar from his office as attorney. (Rodriguez vs. Blancaflor,
645 SCRA 286 [2011])
——o0o——
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10/22/23, 10:05 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 677

A.C. No. 7360. July 24, 2012.*

ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, JR., complainant, vs.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer shall

VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 353

Catalan, Jr. vs. Silvosa

of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

vosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against

VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 355

In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted

“WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate

(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa

VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 357

Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.

to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a

In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

other Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of

of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution

“An attorney is employed—that is, he is engaged in his

VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 359

vice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is

all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this

“Section 1. How Instituted.—Proceedings for the disbarment,

VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 361

clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be

It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the

“Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a

“By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element.

VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 363

respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral

Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa disbarred.

Notes.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of

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