EVISED PENAL CODE Art. 12 THE ee inal law officer does not Assurance of immunity by @ public exempt a Pitan from criminal liability. . delivered to the barrio lieuten, Thus, the accused who ced “that anyyy, y ai tter announ' any, a tion when the la! FONE yp Ban ntvearms akould surrender them 20 that he wi p02 tn criminal responsibility arising ¢ fi ynalized” is not exempt from a the possession of the unlicens firearm and ammunition In not even the President could give such assurance munya violator of the firearm law. His constitutional power o} clemency ee be exercised only after conviction. (People v. Alabas, C.A,, 59/7" 3091) Complete defenses in criminal cases. 1. Any of the essential elements of the crime charged is not pro,.4 by the prosecution and the elements proved do not constitys, any crime. 2. The act of the accused falls under any of the justifying circumstances. (Art. 11) 3. The case of the accused falls under any of the exempting circumstances. (Art. 12) 4. The case is covered by any of the absolutory causes: a. Spontaneous desistance during attempted stage (Art. 6), and no crime under another provision of the Code or othe. penal law is committed. b. Light felony is only attempted or frustrated, and is not against persons or property. (Art. 7) The accessory is a relative of the principal. (Art. 20) Legal grounds for arbitrary detention. (Art. 124) Legal grounds for trespass. (Art, 280) The crime of theft, swindlin, ici ischief i r theft, ig or malicious ‘hi committed against a relative. (Art. 332) niet 8 fa When only slight or less serious physical injuries are damned by the person who surprised his spouse or eB 2_ ‘TITLEO! Felonies and Circumstances which = Affect Criminal Liability he eet ae with the offended party when the is ra i i Tnseiviouaness. (Art 3 pe abduction, seduction, or acts of j. _ Instigation. 6 Guilt of the accused not established beyond reasonable doubt. 6 Prescription of crimes. (Art. 89) 7, Pardon by the offended party before the institution of criminal action in crime against chastity. (Art. 344) ww Mitigating circumstances. 1, Definition ___ Mitigating circumstances are those which, if present in the commission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty. 2. Basis age Mitigating circumstances are based on the diminution \ ofeither freedom of action, intelligence, °F intent, or on the lesser perversity of the offender. Classes of mitigating circumstances. 1, Ordinary mitigating — those enumerated in subsections 1 to 10 of Article 13. tioned in subsection 1 cumstances, of Article 13 are ‘Those ment if Article 69, for ordinary mitigating cir instance, is not applicable. 2. Privileged mitigating — a, Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under tighteen years of age. ~ When the offender is a minor dd his case falls under the under 18 years of age an f the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, provisions of pre ollowing rules shall be observed: 263AL CODE aap REVISED Pe 2 HE RE ini Law rt. : gon under 16 years of ng and a ( A pnd under 18 years teal 7 Ne ae porsom ov ernment OF exempt fr’ inal without di liability: 16 and under 18 years yn ovel @ Ord y peregiscernmenty the penalty next ofage who gcd ned by law shall be imposed, at Proper period. (AS amended by R.A, No. 9344) iele 69. te imposed when the crime b. Article enalty 10 be ore. —A penalty lower comm not wholly , 2 O agthan that prescribed by law Ban 1 he deed is not wholly excusable by lack of some “tthe conditions required to ft aed rey am cl ins ; iided, That the majority of such conditions xxx, Prov be present. «Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties ‘ods. — In cases in which which contain three periods. i ibed by law contain three the penalties prescr! periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or Pomposed of three different penalties, each one of corits forms a period x xx, the courts shalll observe Jor the application of the penalty the following rules, aocording to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances: XXX. (6) When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that tmaay ‘deem applicable, according to e number and nature of such circumstances. XXX. Privileged mit i Privileged mitigating circumstances applicable only to particular 1. Volunt lease ary meal the person illegally detained within three offender attaining his purpose and 2644 ‘TITLE ONE Art 12 Folonies and Circumstances which Affect, Criminal Linb ofore the institution of eriminal action, (Art. 268, par. 3) ‘The penalty is one dogree lower. 2 Abandonment without justification of the spouse who committed adultery. (Art. 333, par. 3) The penalty is one degree lower. \ pistinctions. 4 1. Ordinary mitigating is susceptible of being offset by any aggravating circumstance; while privileged mitigating cannot be offset by aggravating circumstance. 9, Ordinary mitigating, if(not’ offset by an aggravating circumstance, produces only, the effect. of applying the penalty provided by law for the crime in its minimum period, in case of divisible penalty; whereas, privileged mitigating produces the effect of imposing UPOn the ‘ffender the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that provided by law for the crime. People v. Honradez (C.A,, 40 0.G., Supp. 4, 1) Facts: The accused who was charged with robbery was less than 18 years old. He committed the crime during nighttime purposely sought, which js an aggravating circumstance. Hold: The aggravating circumstance of nighttime eannot offset the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Mitigating circumstances only reduce the penalty, but do not change the nature of the crime. Where the accused is charged with murder, as when treachery as a qualifying circumstance is alleged in the information, the fact that there is a generic or privileged mitigating circumstance does not change the felony to homicide. If there is an ordinary or generic mitigating circumstance, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, the ‘accused should be found guilty ofthe same crime of murder, but the penalty to be imposed is éduced to the minimum of the penalty for murder. 265as A 1D THEVA PRIVAT COW Cvininal haw Tethere Gea privileged milli elrenimataniee, ie penal Y toy Aidan will he radioed by one on twa degrees layer Voveny came, (he aeouied thould he held yuilly of murdey . Mhofidamontor the (rial court Unit the mitigating vireumutanes OM honhabiinal drankennen changen the felony to homie i erronoota, Decne trenchery ii alleged in the diformation wid the opine committed hy the appellant ke that of murder, he WiNigobing Cr OUWUMtATOM PeduCeR the ponally provided hy law but, the nature of the evime, (People v, filam, CA, 60.0.0, NOGA)Chapter Three CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY Art. 18. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances: 1, Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from. criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2, That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. 4, That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. 8 That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind, or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings. 267PE] DE 1 THE REVISED PENAL COL — Criminal Law ould dimin; the offender as w i ish sce Ste wilipower ofthe offender without ho th exercise cts. depriving him of consciousness of his a other circumstances of a sin.) aed e-mentioned. lay nature and analogous to those abov' Ver Par. 1. ~ Those mentioned in the preceding chapter whe, 7 the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempy from criminal liability in the respective cases arg be attendant. “Those mentioned in the preceding chapter.” This clause has reference to (1) justifying circumstances, and (9) exempting circumstances which are covered by Chapter Two of Title One. Circumstances of justification or exemption which may give place to mitigation. The circumstances of justification or exemption which may give place to mitigation, because not all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal lability in the respective cases are attendant, are the following: @ Self-defense (Art. 11, par. 1); (2) Defense of relatives (Art. 11, par. 2), (S) Defense of stranger (Art. 11, par. 3) (4) State of necessity (Art. 11, par, 4); (5) Performance of duty (Art, 11, par. 5); (8) Obedience to order of superior (Art. 11, par, 6); (1) Minority above 15 but below 18 ‘years of age (R.A. No. 9344); (8) Causing injury by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4); and (9) Uncontrollable fear, (Art. 12, par. 6) Paragraphs 1 and2 of Article 12 i oe hecause, as stated by the Suprocemnet give place to mitigation,_ ‘TITLE ONE Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability condition ofa person is indivisible; that, there is no middle ground fepween sanity and insanity, between presence and absence of bealligence. (Dees. of Supreme Court of Spain of December 19, 1891 ig of October 8, 1884) Art. 13, But if the offender is suffering from some illness which would diminish the exercise of his' willpower, without however depriving jim of consciousness of his acts, such circumstance is considered a mitigation under paragraph 9 of Article 13. It would seem that one po is suffering from mental disease without however depriving one of {onseiousness of one’s act may be given the benefit of that mitigating circumstance. When all the requisites necessary to justify the act are not attendant. 1, Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, and defense of stranger. Note that in these three classes of defense, unlawful aggression must be present, it being an indispensable requisite. What is absent is either one or both of the last two requisites. Paragraph 1 of Article 13 is applicable only when unlawful aggression is pre: sent but the other two requisites are not present in any of the cases referred to in circumstances Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of Article 11. ‘Article 13, paragraph 1, applies only when unlawful aggression is present, but the other two requisites are not present. (Guevara) When two of the three requisites mentioned th erein are present (for example, unlawful aggression and any one of the other two), the case must not be considered as on ¢ in which an ordinary or generic nnitigating circumstance is present. Instead, it should be considered a privileged mitigating circumstance referred to in Article 69 of this Code. Thus, if in self-defense there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, the means employed to prevent or repel it was reasonable, but the one making a defense gave sufficient provocation, he is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance, because the majority of the conditions required to justify the act is present. (Art. 69) Also, if in the defense of a relative there was unlawful aggression 269eee eee > CODE ep PENAL Art. 13, ira Renal bl ing the relati e defending t a rit he isentitled tog privet but the o on the part of the deceased, ne repel unreasonable means to prevent 0 idgirstina’ciseuiiatino®: mitigating circu if wful aggression on the Lelie - eee 04 sLresa esata by the defendant, snatched the without sufficient ey poe having ate i from thed veel he should not have wound it aro neck a from the deceased, tightened it. is incomplete self-defense on the Part Of the Held: There is in lord a privileged mg defendant, which may be consi te te : circumstance. (People v. Martin, 89 Phil. 18, fon, there could be no sep i is unlawful aggression, I ‘ Incomplete self-defense, when ordinary mitigating ang When Privileged mitigating, aggression (bythe victim) alone is prove, su circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. When itis combined with another. clement of self-defense, such incomplete self-defense becomes.a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 69 of the same Code. (De Luna v. CA, 244 SCRA 762. 763) Example of incomplete defense: ‘The deceased was about to set on fire the house of the Tres where she was sleeping together with her two children grey srappled and the accused beloed to death the deceased, othe a mawfill aggression consisting in trying to set on fire the house ofthe accused, There was the element of danger to the occupants of the house, But having already driven the ABEressor out of the house, who was prostrate on the ground, e accused should not have Persisted in Wounding her no less than 14 times. There is, therefore, absence of one circumstance tojustify the act — reas le necessity of killing the aggressor. 5, ccused was entitled toa Privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, Here, the accused acted in defense of her 270___ TITLE ONE Ar 13 Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability son, her home, and her children. (U.S. v. Rivera, 41 Phil. 472, TigA7) ‘example of incomplete self-defense: ‘The accused is entitled to only incomplete self-defense. ‘The deceased was in a state of drunkenness, so he was not as dangerous as he would if he had been sober. His aim proved faulty and easily evaded as shown by the fact that the person defending was not hit by the stab attempts-blows directed against him. The necessity of the means used to repel the aggression is not clearly reasonable. (People v. De Jesus, No. 1158506, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 616, 627) Example of incomplete defense of relative: ‘The deceased hit the first cousin of the accused with the putt of a shotgun. The deceased also pointed the shotgun at the first cousin, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to him and asked him, “Do you like this, Dong?” to which the latter replied, “No, Noy, I do not like that.” The deceased then placed the bullet in the shotgun and was thus pointing it at the first cousin when the accused came from behind the deceased and stabbed him. There was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased and there was no provocation on the part of the accused. However, because of a running feud between the deceased and his brother on one side and the accused and his brother on the other side, the accused could not have been impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. He was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive. He is only entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative. (People v. Toring, G.R. No. 56358, October 26, 1990, 191 SCRA 38, 45-48) Incomplete justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury. ‘Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a justifying circumstance if all the three requisites mentioned in paragraph 4 of Article 11 are present. But if any of the last two requisites is absent, there is only a mitigating circumstance. amo 10DE wae RBVISED PENAL COL we Criminal Law sircumstance of performance of duty, ote justifying ¢ RX _ Incomplete justi{vt a diseussod under Article 11, there are 4, mae rosont in order that the ci cumatang isi be p ioe relates ayo akon a8 jUstilVing one, namgy in Attilo U1, No. 5, ma) ‘That the accused acted in the Ce ia ofa duty op in the Tawful exorcise of a right or office; an j ed or offense committed be th Nhat the injury caused or 0 ren esate of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. t is where only one of the In the case of People v. Oanis, supra, f requisites of circumstance No. 5 of. Article 11 was present, Article gg was applied. The Supreme Court said — “As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia: There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in Article 11, No. 5, of the R.P.C. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise ofa right or office; and (b) that the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for a bon Folonies and ‘Affoct © ONE, Art. 13, matancos which, minal Linbitity aor all the foregoing, the judgmont is modified and appollants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance tbove-mentioned, und accordingly | gontenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correccional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the ace ories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the Yeceased Serapio Tecson, jointly ‘and severally, an indemnity of P2,000, with costs. 2 Since the Supreme Court considered one of the two requisites as constituting the majority, it seems that there is no ordinary mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1, when the justifying or exempting circumstance has two requisites only. 4 Incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to an order. Roleda fired at Pilones, following the order of Sergeant, Benting, Roleda’s superior. It appears that on their way to the camp, Roleda Jearned that Pilones had killed not only @ barrio Iieutenant but also a member of the military police, and this may have aroused in Roleda a feeling of resentment that may have impelled him to readily and without questioning follow the order of Sgt. Benting. ‘To this may be added the fact of his being a subordinate of Sgt. Benting ‘who gave the order, and while out on patrol when the soldiers were supposed to be under the immediate command and control of the patrol leader, Sgt. Benting. (People v. Bernal, et al., 91 Phil. 619) When all the requisites necessary to exempt from criminal liability are not attendant. 1. Incomplete exempting circumstance of minority over 15and under 18 years of age. To be exempt from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, two conditions must be present: a. That the offender is over 15 and under 18 years old; and b. That he does not act with discernment. Therefore, if the minor over 15 and under 18 years of age acted with discernment, he is entitled only toa mitigating 273~ Art, 13 VISED PENAL CODE rHE RE" TH ail La all the requisites necessary tg xen, present. Dt, is specifically covered by Ry, 4 Welfare Act of 2006), 2 ame, Me circumstance, because not from criminal liability are The case of such minor 9344 (The Juvenile Justice an by R.A. No. 10630. ing circumst Incomplete exempting | ' i re are fo - Under paragraph 4 of Article 12, a is ped equi siteg that must be present in order to exemp! m1 crimingt liability, namely: 2\)\«\¢'h a. A person is performing a lawful act; -b. With due care; ¢. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; ang d. Without fault or intention of causing it. ~ If the second requisite and the 1st part of the fourth requisite are absent, the case will fall under Article 365 which Punishes a felony by negligence or imprudence, ance of accident. In effect, there is a mitigating circumstance, because the Penalty is lower than that provided for intentional felony. ~ Ifthe first requisite and the 2nd part of the fourth requisite are absent, because the person committed an unlawful act and had the intention of causing the injury, it will be an intentional felony. The 2nd and 3rd requisites will not be present either. In this case, there is fot even a mitigating circumstance, Incomplete exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear, the fear was of an evil greater that which he was required to That it prfsas / tat an rains nt of such gravity and imminence (uncontrollable PS Would have succumbed te it 274_ TITLE ONE, Art. 13 Felonies and Circumstances which Affect, Criminal Liability Ifonly one of these requisites is present, there is only a mitigating ajroumst ance. situstration: People v. Magpantay (C.A,, 46 0.G. 1655) Facts: In the night of May 8, 1947, Felix and Pedro took turns to guard, that when one was asleep the other was awake. At about 9:00 p.m. when ro was asleep, the silhouette of a man passed in front of their house Mjahout any light, The night was dark and it was drizzling, The coconut trees {nd the bushes on the sides of the road increased the darkness. When Felix saw the silhouette, he asked it who it was, but it walked hurriedly, which made Felix suspicious as it might be a scouting guard of the Dilim gang. Felix fired into the air, yet the figure continued its way. 5 When Pedro heard the shot, he suddenly grabbed the rifle at his side and fired at the figure on the road, causing the death of the man. This man was afterward found to be Pedro Pinion, who was returning home unarmed after fishing in a river. ‘The accused voluntarily surrendered to the barrio-lieutenant and then tothe chief of police. Held: The accused acted under the influence of the ‘fear of being attacked, Having already in his mind the idea that they might be raided at any moment by the Dilim gang and suddenly awakened by the shot fired by Felix, he grabbed his gun and fired before he could be fired upon. The fear, however, was not entirely uncontrollable, for had he not been so hasty and had he stopped a few seconds to think, he would have ascertained that there was no imminent danger. He is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of grave fear, not. entirely uncontrollable, under paragraph 1 of Article 13 in connection with paragraph Gof Article 12 of the R.P.C. That said two provisions may be taken together to constitute a mitigating circumstance has been declared by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of February 24, 1897 and by Groizard. (Codigo Penal, Vol. I, pp. 370-372, Third Edition) Consequently, there are two marked mitigating circumstances in favor ofthe accused. Article 64, in paragraph 6, of the R.P.C. provides that: ~‘When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according tothe number and nature of such circumstances.” The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. The next lower penalty is prision mayor, which may 2751D PENAL CODE : SBI THE REY inal LA ae Crimin jicabl be imposed in the period that the court may deem applicable According tg imy : the number and nature of such ci Inview of the foregoing, this Cow oe wi i sruilty of homicide, with tO Or ing ray cx he judgment appealed from by Imbert ears and one day from six months and one day ‘of prision cor! of prision mayor. ircumstance. rtfinds the accused Pedro Magpant, ry marked mitigating circumstances, ay pon him the penalty op ith due respec, it is believed that Article 69, in connection with hele Gof Article 12, not Article 13, paragraph 1, in relation to paragraph 6 of Article 12, should be applied. When it considered grave fear, not entirely uncontrollable, as ordinary mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1 together with voluntary surrender, and applied Article 64, the Court of Appeals should have fixed the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty (prision mayor) in its medium period. The two mitigating circumstances having been considered already for the purpose of lowering the penalty for homicide by one degree, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 64, there is no mitigating circumstance that will justify the imposition of prision mayor in its minimum period, Had Article 69 in connection with paragraph 6 of Article 12 been applied, the penalty imposed would have a correct basis. Und Article 69, the penalty one or two degrees lower than that provided for the offense may be imposed. The mitigating circumstance of yoluntary surrender need not be considered in lowering tl alt by one degree. Therefore, the(voluntary surrender ofbn mene which is a generic mitigating circumstance, may be consi r ic mitigat mstance, may be considered fi the purpose of fixing prision mayor in ts minimum period. (Art 6a, Par, 2. — is hae we offender is under eighteen years of age or poesia In the case of the minor, he shall be st it a of Article oe int i accordance with the provisions Paragraph 2, Arti Act No, 9344,” 13 ofthe RPC. impliedly repealed by Republic Paragraph 2, Arti und » Article 13 of the ler 18 Years of age is entitled ‘oP, providing that offender ing circumstance of 276‘TITLE ONE Felonies and Gane which ae Affect Criminal Liability inoityi8 deemed repealed by R.A, No, 9344 which declares that a iid above 16 years old but below 18 years old shall be exempt from ‘ania liability unless he/she has acted with discernment. (Sec. 6, ga. No- 9844) Inother words, whereas before, an offender 15 or over but under 48 years of age is entitled only to the benefits provided under Article 68 of the R.P.C., under R.A, No. 9344 or the “Juvenile Justice and rayare Act of 2006,” such offender may be exempt from criminal jability if he/she acted without discernment, On the other hand, if such offender acted with discernment, auch child in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion programs provided under Chapter 2 of R.A. No. 9344. Meaning of Diversion and Diversion Program under Republic Act No.9344 caer DS “Diversion” refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, paychological, or educational background without resulting to formal court proceedings. (Sec. 4{j], R.A. No. 9344) “Diversion Program” refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an offense without resorting to formal court proceedings. (Sec. 4{j], R.A. No. 9344) System of Diversion. Children in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion programs without undergoing court proceedings subject to the following conditions: (a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than six years imprisonment, the law enforcement office or Punong Barangay with the assistance of the local social welfare and development officer or other members of the Local Councils for the Protection of Children (LCPC) established in all levels of local government pursuant to R.A. No. 9344, shall conduct mediation, family conferencing and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt 217> Ne bry i CODE E REVISED PENAL re oH Criminal Law ae ‘odes of conflict resolution in accordance with th ay the child with a view to accomplishing tho object, ¢ restorative justice and the formulation ofa diversion progeny, 9! child and his/her family shall be present in these activities, ‘e (b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty j, , more than six years of imprisonment, the local social weltirg 4" development officer shall meet with the child and his/her paygyr! or guardians for the development of the appropriate diversion, "* rehabilitation program, in coordination with the Barangay Coy," forthe Protection of Children (BCPO) created pursuant to R.A. n! i No, (c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime Committeg exceeds six years imprisonment, diversion measures may be Tesorted to only by the court. (Sec. 23, R.A. No. 9344) Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. A child in conflict with the law may undergo conferengi mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice system Prior to his entry into said system. A contract of diversion may 1. entered into during such conferencing, mediation or concili io Proceedings. (See. 25, R.A. No. 9344) vn Contract of Diversion. the completi ; not to exceed 45 days, Pletion of the diversion Proceedings buteo TITLE ONE Art 18 Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability he child shall present himself/herself to the competent fe rities that imposed the diversion program at least once @ e ch £0 reporting and evaluation of the effectiveness of the Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract i aiversion, aS certified by the local social welfare and development Secor, shall give the offended party the option to institute the eppropriate legal action. ‘The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended cag the effectivity of the diversion program, but not exceeding @ period of two years. (Sec. 26, R.A. No. 9344) Where diversion may be conducted. Diversion may be conducted at the Katarungang Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or preliminary investigation lage and at all levels and phases of the proceedings including judicial evel. (Sec. 24, R.A. No. 9344) Duty of the Punong Barangay or the Law Enforcement Officer when there is no diversion. If the offense does not fall under the category where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than six years ofimprisonment or in cases of vietimless crimes where the imposable penalty is also not more than six years imprisonment, or if the child, his/her parents or guardians does not consent to a diversion, the Punong Barangay handling the case shall, within three days from determination of the absence of jurisdiction over the case or termination of the diversion proceeding as the case may be, forward the records of the case to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the appropriate court, as the case may be. (Sec. 27, R.A. No. 9344) In case a Law Enforcement Officer is the one handling the case, within same period, the Law Enforcement Officer shall forward the records of the case to the prosecutor or judge concerned for the Conduct of inquest and/or preliminary investigation. The document transmitting said records shall display the word “CHILD” in bold letters. (Sec. 28, R.A. No. 9344) 279Art. 13 agen is only Tic miti, igover70¥28"S ofage! Mating That the offender is circumstance. article 43 covers saaurretred 18 Yea : icle 68, providing for priyi While paras ears, Article f Bey of age and those oa . ee ‘not include the case of offenders Vey mitigating ciroumstances, 70 years old. ¢ R.A. No. 9346 prohibiting ; ctment of R. cased where the tt Brio to ath penalty Bere effect of a prs et imposition of the dot 170 years of AE® hat id Privileged that the offender is over "> yy: (1) when he committed an offensg shall not be imposed (Art, 47, mitigating cireumsta ‘1 n , punishable by death, once is already imposed, it sha” 1) and (2) when the suspended and commuted. (Art. 83) an joned two cases, Y of de ‘the bove-mentioned F ath will wea he lowered to life imprisonment (reclusion perpetug), tance of old age applies only when offender he commission of the offense, nce, Di The mitigating circums! is over'70 years old at the time of t! he mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13(2) the Revised Penal Code applies only when the offender was over 7 years at the time of the commission of the offense. The Petitioner, being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses charged. was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance. (Reyes v. People, GR. No. 177105, August 12, 2010) Basis of paragraph 2. The mitigating circumstances in paragraph 2 of Article 13 are based on the diminution of intelligence, a condition of voluntariness, Par. 3. — That the offender had no intention to commit so grave @ wrong as that committed, Rule for the application of this paragraph. This cireums! f proven show that oe be taken into account only when the facls 'sanotable and evident disproportion betwee? 280y TITLE ONE Felonies and Circumstances which fect Criminal Liability Art. 13 ans employed to execute the eri i am ee mreyes, 36 Phil. 904, 907) criminal act and its consequences. Illustrations: 1 The en who was quarreling with his wife punched her in the abdomen, causing the rupture of her hypertrophied spleen, from which she died, (P il. 255, ge (People v. Rabao, 67 Phil. 255, ‘The accused confined himself to giving a single blow with a bolo on the right arm of the victim and did not repeat the blow. The death of the victim was due to neglect and the lack of medical treatment, his death having resulted from hemorrhage which those who attended to him did not know how to stop or control in time. (U.S. v. Bertucio, 1 Phil. 47, 49) The accused, a policeman, boxed the deceased, a detention prisoner, inside the jail. As a consequence of the fistic blows, the deceased collapsed on the floor. The accused stepped on the prostrate body and left. After a while, he returned with a bottle, poured its contents on the recumbent body of the deceased, ignited it with a match and left the cell again. As a consequence, the victim later on died. Held: The accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of “no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.” (People v. Ural, No. L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 140-141, 146) Intention, being an internal state, must be judged by external acts. The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. (1) It may be deduced from the proven facts that the accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at 281,E ‘THE REVISED PENAL COD) oe Criminal Law -30801, March 27, he municipal dispensary. (People &- Ural, No. L A the m is 74, 5 38, 146) 1974, 56 SCRA 1 the accused fired a loaded revolver at the decease d 7 te at be presumed, taking into consideration and killed him, mployed as being sufficient to produce the evil which the means employ i consequence of his act and he oo Ee mitigating ereumstance ae ca to commit a wrong as that committed. (U.S. v. Fitzgerald, 2 Phil. 419, 422) . ra ah (3) Where at the time of the commission of the oo the accused was 32 years of age, while his victim was 25 yearshis ni when the latter resisted his attempt to rape her by biting an sezatching him, to subdue her, the accused boxed her and then held her on the neck and pressed it down, while she was lying on her back and he was on top of her, these acts were reasonably sufficient to produce the result that they actually produced — the death of the victim. (People v. Amit, No. L-29066, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 95, 98) (4) When the assailant, armed with a bolo, inflicted upon his victim a serious and fatal wound in the abdomen, it is not to be believed that he had no intention of killing his victim, having clearly shown, by the location of the wound, that he had a definite and perverse intention of producing the injury which resulted. (U.S. v. Mendac, 31 Phil. 240, 244-245) (5) Where defendant alleged as mitigating circumstance that he did not intend to commit so grave an injury, the Court held that the plea is groundless; he used a knife, six inches long. The fatal injury was the natural and almost inevitable conseque he attempted to stab a second time but w. ieeaes ‘as prevented i (People v. Orongan, et al., 58 Phil. 421 6, 429) from doing so.TITLE ONE Art. 13 Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability rye weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted, and the manner it is inflicted may show that the accused intended a wrong committed, 1. _ Intention must be judged by considering the weapon used, the injury inflicted, and his attitude of the mind when the accused attacked the deceased. Thus, when the accused used a heavy club in attacking the deceased whom he followed some distance, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, itis to be believed that he intended to do exactly what he did and must be held responsible for the result, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. (People v. Flores, 50 Phil. 548, 551) 2, When a person stabs another with a lethal weapon such as a fan knife (and the same could be said of the butt of a rifle), upon a part of the body, for example, the head, chest, or stomach, death could reasonably be anticipated and the accused must be presumed to have intended the natural consequence of his wrongful act. (People v. Reyes, 61 Phil. 341, 343) 3. The weapon used, the force of the blow, the spot where the blow was directed and landed, and the cold blood in which it was inflicted, all tend to negative any notion that the plan was anything less than to finish the intended victim. The accused in this case struck the victim with a hammer on the right forehead. (People v. Banlos, G.R. No. L-3412, December 29, 1950) 4, Asto the alleged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, the same cannot be appreciated. The clear intention of the accused to kill the deceased may be inferred from the fact that he used a deadly weapon and fired at the deceased almost point blank, thereby hitting him in the abdomen and causing death. (People v. Reyes, No. L-33154, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 474, 482) 5. Where the evidence shows that, if not all the persons who attacked the deceased, at least some of them, intended to cause his death by throwing at him stones of such size and weight as to cause, as in fact they caused, a fracture of his skull, and as the act of one or some of them is deemed 283‘THE REVISED PENAL CODE fail Criminal Law ing sufficient proof op others there being sul Proof op t keine circumstance of lack of inten, conspiracy, # wave a wrong as the one actually committed to commit so a be considered. (People v. Bautista, Noy cannot ae a 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184, 190-191; Peony, eed No, 1-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA soy, v. Espejo, No. 424) f five stab wound: inflicting by the accused of five stab wounds caused 6. The ee brings forth in bold relief the intention ed to snuff out the life of the deceased, and definitely negates any pretense of lack of intention to causg so serious an injury. (People v. Bratia, No. L-29210, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 307, 316) to be the act Article 13, paragraph 3, is not applicable when the offender employed brute force. ‘To prove this circumstance, the accused testified that “my only intention was to abuse her, but when she tried to shout, I covered her mouth and choked her and later I found out that because of that she died.” The Supreme Court said: “It is easy enough for the accused to say that he had no intention to do great harm. But he knew the girl was very tender in age (six years old), weak in body, helpless and defenseless, He knew or ought to have known the natural and inevitable result of the act of strangulation, committed by men of Superior strength, specially on an occasion when she was resisting the onslaught upon her honor. The brute force employed by the appellant, completely contradicts the claim that he had no intention to kill the victim.” (People v. Yu, No. 1-13780, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 199, 204) Itis the intention of the offender at the moment. when he is committing the crime which is considered, The point is raised that the trial court shoul the mitigating circumstance Wrong as that committed. The argument is that the accused planned only to rob; they never meant to kill. : Held: Article 13, Paragraph 3, of the R.P.C. addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the Particular moment when he executes 284- TITLE ONE Art. 13 Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability orcommits the criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case under review, the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the resistance offered py the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery with homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly granted. The irrefutable fact remains that when they ganged up on their victim, they employed deadly weapons and inflicted on him mortal wounds in his neck. At that precise moment, they did intend to kill their victim, and that was the moment to which Article 13, paragraph 3, refers. (People v. Boyles, No. L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88, 95-96; People v. Arpa, No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1037, 1045-1046) Article 13, paragraph 3 of the R.P.C. “addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage.” Therefore, if the original plan, as alleged by the accused, was merely to ask for forgiveness from the victim’s wife who scolded them and threatened to report them to the authorities, which led to her killing, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. The records show that the accused held the victim’s wife until she fell to the floor, whereupon they strangled her by means of a piece of rope tied around her neck till she died. The brute force employed by the accused completely contradicts the claim that they had no intention to kill the victim. (People v. Garachico, No. L-30849, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 131, 152) Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, mitigating in robbery with homicide. ‘The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave awrong may be appreciated favorably in robbery with homicide, where it has not been satisfactorily established that in forcing entrance through the door which was then closed, with the use of pieces of wood, the accused were aware that the deceased was behind the door and would be hurt, and there is no clear showing that they ever desired to kill the deceased as they sought to enter the house to retaliate against the male occupants or commit robbery. (People v. Abueg, No. L-54901, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 622, 634) 285> Appreciated in murder qualified by circumstances based on m; ified by ci a of comi 4 n, not on state of mind of accused. er f commission, not ‘THE REVISED PENAL CODE Art. 13 Sriminal Law i foreman beaten up, Facts: Soveral nceused decided tohave a deed a cosine but the vietim died as a result of hemor ‘oti hage, It was not the intention of the accused to kill the victim, : ults from the presence of qualifying circum, oe fae premeditation and treachery) based up the manner'in which the crime was committed and not upon the state of mind of the accused. The mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that commit. ted is based on the state of mind of the offender, Hence, there i8 no incompatibility between evident premeditation or treachery, which refers to the manner of committing the crime, and this mitigating circumstance. (People v. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536, 544-545) Not appreciated in murder qualified by treachery. Lack of intention to com: mit so grave a wrong is not appreciated where the offense committ d is characterized by treachery. The five ‘apons used are mere pieces of wood, and the fact that only seven blows were dealt the deceased b: them, only two of which turned out to be fatal, sh and grievous result was far from their minds, The record shows, however, that the offense cl i and the accused left the sc fter the victim had fallen down. Henee, the mitigating ci x - Pajenado, No, L-26458, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 172, 180) Lack of intent to kill, not mitigating in Physical injuries. Tn crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill ult, the a ill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does not constitute a mitigating: circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 3. People y, Galacgac, C.A., 54 0.G. 1207) Mitigating when the victim dies, (As part of their fun-making, the accused merely intended to set the deceased’s clothes on fire. Burning the clothes of the victim would «, ‘ause at the very least some kind of 286y TITLE ONE Felonies and Circumstances which Affect. Criminal Liability Art, 13 physical injuries on this person. The accused is guilty of the resulting death of the victim but he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave wrong as that committed. (People v, Pugay, No. L- 74924, November 17, 1988, 167 SCRA 439, 449) (2) In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that the victim was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner's liability for his death. Nevertheless, [the Court] must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart was in good condition. ( Garcia v. People, GR. No. 171951, August 28, 2009) Not applicable to felonies by negligence. In the case of infidelity in the custody of prisoners through negligence (Art. 224), this circumstance was not considered. (People v. Medina, C.A., 40 0.G. 4196) ‘The reason is that in felonies through negligence, the offender acts without intent, The intent in intentional felonies is replaced by ‘negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies. Hence, in felonies through negligence, there is no intent on the part of the offender which may be considered as diminished. Is Article 13, paragraph 3, applicable to felonies where the intention of the offender is immaterial? In unintentional abortion, where the abortion that resulted is not intended by the offender, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed is not applicable. (People v. Cristobal, C.A., G.R. No. 8739, October 31, 1942) In another case, where the accused pulled the hair of the complainant who was three months pregnant causing her to fall on her buttocks on the cement floor, with the result that after experiencing vaginal hemorrhage the foetus fell from her womb, it was held that the accused having intended at the most to maltreat 287.NAL CODE VISED PE! Art. 13 THE ‘Criminal Law _ ating circumstance in Article 13 itigating circ! lev. Fl 18, is ly, the DINE his favor. (People v. Flamero the complainant on! nnsidered in , 3, should be co! paragraph mmmitted by any person who, by CA, 58 0.G. 4060) ion is co ‘ Unintentional sport illing of the foetus in the uterus or the violence, shall ca foetus from the maternal womb, causing its e violent expulsion of nS 257) death, but unintentionally. “Applicable only to offenses resulting in physical injuries or material pplical harm. ; itigating circumstance that the offender did not oto pp “a wrong as that committed was not i it so porated tn estea of defamation or slander. (People v. Galang de Bautista, C.A., 40 0.G. 4473) Applied in malversation of public funds Petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong. The records bear out that petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to pay off a debt owed by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated funds went to his medications for his debilitating diabetes. Evidently, there was no intention to i : commit s ». People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008) °° “TONE: Perez Basis of paragraph 3, In this circumstance, j ice, intent, F : ance, a » an element of voluntariness in intentional felony, is ee ly Par. 4, ~ That suffici: r rt of the f Si i ant Provocation o} threat on the part oft of nded Party immediately Preceded the act. 288‘TITLE ONE oe Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability hats provecation? By provocation is understood as any unjust or improper conduct qract ofthe offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or iritating any one- equisites: 1, That the provocation must be sufficient; 2, That it must originate from the offended party; and 3. Thatthe provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked. the provocation must be sufficient. Provocation in order to be mitigating must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. (People v. Pagal, No. L-32040, October 95, 1977, 79 SCRA 570, 575-576) The word “sufficient” means adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. (People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434, 435) As to whether a provocation is sufficient depends upon the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, the place and the time when the provocation is made, Examples of sufficient provocation: 1. The accused was a foreman in charge of the preservation of order and for which purpose he provided himself with a pick handle. The deceased, one of the laborers in the line to receive their wages, left his place and forced his way into the file. The accused ordered him out, but he persisted, and the accused gave him a blow with the stick on the right side of the head above the ear. Held: When the aggression is in retaliation for an insult, injury, or threat, the offender cannot successfully dlaim self-defense, but at most, he can be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance under the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 13. (U.S. v. Carrero, 9 Phil. 544, 545-546) 289CODE gp PENAL THE RE nal Law a ill-treated the accuseq used an¢ accused who killed jy” ,d al the deceased abused "the accused wh ea and cursint . i this mitigating circumstang, e if Ln $7 Phil. 133, 135) (U.S. v. Firmo, the accused saw an unknown Person juny and his wife begged for his pardon ‘eigilled her. Such conduct on aiepare on her eee es ieufficient provocation to the accused, ea ee Marquez, 53 Phil. 260, 262-263) (People v. re was no unlawful aggression, because the Although there Wr yed by the accused, and therefore therg challenge ae 30 there was however the mitigating was no self-defense, was Rowen he mii i f immediate circumstance oF ithe accused and then challenged the latter. (U.S. v. Cortes, 36 Phil. 837) When the defendant sought the deceased, the challenge to fight by the latter is not provocation. ‘Thus, if the defendant appeared in front of the house of the deceased, after they had been separated by other persons who prevented a fight between them, even if the deceased challenged him to a fight upon seeing him near his house, the defendant cannot be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of provocation, because when the defendant sought the deceased, the former was ready and willing to fight. (U.S. v. Mendac, 31 Phil. 240) There was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim where the latter hit the accused on the eye with his fist before the fight. (People v. Manansala, Jr., 31 SCRA 401) aban while intoxicated, found the accused lying feel a having prepared the evening meal. This kicking am Al leceased and he abused the accused by cursing him. A struggle followed and the accused stabbed him wi i entitled to the ae ith a pen-knife. The accused was Provocation or thr; ti ; ». Firmo, 87 Phil, 193) etately preceded the act. (U.S. 290