Intentional tort and criminal law (state offense, evidentiary): distinction, it doesn’t have

the same meaning.

1- If I intent to do something, that intention would be enough, even if the event hasn’t
occurred.
2- Foreseeability that an event will occur (Recklessness), but you still did it.
Trespass to a person (Intentional tort):
1- Assault: no requirement of direct contact, but reasonable expectation (assumption) of
threat of violence (subjective test)- physical and immediate. Damages: difficult to
measure actual damages, in absence of actual injury. General damages (anxiety, fear,
trauma)-could be substantial. At end, could get actionable damages (minor), but they
would be symbolic and will be on record.
2- battery, force, intent (even if you hit someone else, apart from whom you intent to,
there would still be battery), direct application (not need to be a contact). magnitude
of the force is not relevant, but direct contact is, and after that you have to prove the
measure of damage suffered. Whether it is heinous or not will be the other question.
Yes or a no question. Compensation will only be dependent on how much damage
you have suffered.
3- false imprisonment must be unlawful, imprisonment. Restricted mobility.
Leichtman v. WLW Jacor: harmful, offensive intent to cause harm. Battery. Position of the
person is also important, here the plaintiff was a anti-smoking advocate. Physical contact by
parties of smoke.
I de S et Ux v. W de S: no facts, shut up
Sousanis v. Northwest Airlines: sir is in no mood. No facts. Case dismissed. Seatbelt signs
were on (because there was federal duty)- that’s why she was stopped. What about other
passengers moving around? No breach of duty of care on account of airline, thus no damages
given.
Montejo v. Martin Memorial: there was order, for which imprisonment happened. Course
order was reversed. Overturned on appeal and held to be illegal. Authority granted by court
order, and if acted, you can’t bring a tort case against that. Even if it was overturned. Entity
here was private, on which they argued that we should be immune.
Session 16:
Intentional infliction of emotional distress:
Subjective knowledge is the key.
You did the cause knowing the subjective outcome, but still cause emotional distress.
 How is emotional distress different from assault and battery? Battery often time is
proceeded by assault. One of the outcomes of battery b/w could be emotional distress.
No overlap because you can’t be compensated for the same thing twice.
There is a spectrum of measuring emotional distress.
Wilson v. Monarch Paper:
The conduct was extreme and outrageous, and subjecting such an old person is against his
personal dignity. There was also physical manifestation of harm as per his diagnosis.
“The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Wilson on his age discrimination claim,
awarding him $156,000 in damages, plus an equal amount in liquidated damages.
awarding him past damages of $622,359.15, future damages of $225,000, and punitive
damages of $2,250,000.”
The judge did not reduce the damages, because it was not claimed- not appealed.
“Although the award in this case is astonishingly high, neither the quantum of damages, nor
the applicability of punitive damages has been appealed.”
Jonas v. Clinton:
Not intentional, Clinton was not intentional about the distress.
Clinton was not found liable, because she did not contact a psychiatrist, did not stop her
work, or lodged a formal complaint. She did submit a professional testimony, but it was just 4
days before Clinton filed for summary judgment. Did not accept the proof.

Conversion: Moore v Regents of University of California

Sample of cells of plaintiff were taken as his cells were unique that produced more white
blood cells. Dr who was treating him, without his consent, used his cells to produce a cell line
to produce a patent used to treat people. The plaintiff brought a tort case against the patent.
Conversion: impeding of private property.
Q. whether conversion had occurred? Were the extracted cells a property of the plaintiff?
Whether private property rights had been infringed?
Property is also linked with public policy.
Court said: 1) if we hold that the plaintiff is part of patent it is going to prejudice medical
technology because that would distract the drs for due diligence to trace samples. 2) the case
does raise issues of morality as consent was not taken however tort law is not regarded for
such cases. 3) a person has no ownership over cells or patent.

Trespass: Kopka v. Bell Telephone

- Trespass to land (look at damages the property owner is entitled to after a trespass
intentionally does damage.—perspective of owner) vs trespass liability to negligence
(look at the rights of the trespassers on account of some negligence)

- Negligence is not intentional. Battery is intentional.

For trespass to land: D must interfere with a land in the Ps possession (possession is right to
exclude or stop people from entering the property if u want---control-lease/rent/).
Ratio: Trespass to land is an intentional tort, but u do not need to know you’re trespassing to
trespass. Hence it is a strict liability offence as it does not matter whats in the mid. This is so
to protect the rights of the owner. Mistake or good faith is not a defence.

Trespass is for direct interference.

Trespass needs to have intention to be on that land. “I wanted to be on a piece of land-intent”

the reasoning is irrelevant. So if person pushes me on to a land I am not liable for trespass but
the person pushing will be liable for trespass.

Koffman v Garnett
Issue:
1) Assault: no assault because there was no immediate harm
2) Battery: there was physical harm. There was also consent as playing physical sport
however, there is boundary to the extent. The coach said don’t protect yourself and
picked the child up and threw him on the ground which was against the rules of the
game hence below the boundary of consent.
 3) Gross negligence vs negligence: As this was a public school and employees of public
school have immunity from negligence but not gross negligence. This is why they
ended up investigating gross negligence. Gross negligence is a level of negligence
that demonstrates disregard for safety or lives of others. Falling between intent to do
wrongful harm and ordinary negligence, gross negligence is defined
as willful, wanton, and reckless conduct affecting the life or property or another.

Vincent v. Lake Erie

During the storm the ship and dock kept ramming in each other causing a damage.

RULE:

If during a storm a ship owner enters a harbor, becomes disabled, and his ship thrown against
the plaintiffs' dock, the plaintiffs cannot recover. Again, if while attempting to hold fast to the
dock the lines part, without any negligence, and the vessel is carried against some other boat
or dock in the harbor, there would be no liability upon her owner. But where those in charge
of the vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts hold their vessel in such a position that
the damage to the dock results, and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the
dock, the owners are responsible to the dock owners to the extent of the injury inflicted.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs owned a wharf in which ships docked to unload cargo. Defendant owned a ship that
docked at plaintiffs' wharf during a storm. During the storm, plaintiffs' wharf was damaged
by defendant's ship. Plaintiffs brought an action against defendant to recover for the damages
to their wharf. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and denied defendant's motion for a new trial.

ISSUE:

Is Defendant liable for damages incurred to Plaintiff’s property?

ANSWER:

Yes.

CONCLUSION:

On appeal, the state supreme court affirmed, reasoning the damage to plaintiffs' wharf was
not caused by an act of God, which would have excused defendant's liability, but was an
injury caused by the defendant's prudent intention to use plaintiffs' property for the purpose
of preserving its own more valuable property, and the plaintiffs, therefore, were entitled to
compensation for the injury done.

Surocco v. Geary
There was fire San Francisco. D decided to demolish the house to stop the fire and did so.
Issue was that P was taking out things while they blew up the house so there things also
demolished.
The Court held that P could not be compensated because the act was done in public interest.

Montejo v. Martin Memorial (v imp)

Ratio: tortious case for false imprisonment was initially dismissed because it was a court
order. The appellate court said this case will still go to trial for false imprisonment because
there was case law showing that anything that happens during case proceedings have
immunity but the purpose is 1) the proceedings should not be obstructed and 2) the
prosecutors don’t have to feel threatened for things they do during trial process. However this
act was done after/pursuant the court proceedings hence no immunity. The court
distinguished between court order for public rights vs private rights. Enforcement of private
law does not have courts immunity.

Due to issues, the hospital wanted to ship him out- but under the authority of lawful order.
The Guardian was opposing this. At the end, the court order was given allowing them to do
this. The Guardian filed an appeal, on which order was suspended, but the plaintiff was flown
out. The issue was if the guy flown out by unlawful authority, it would be false
imprisonment.
The evidence given was Guatemala had no services to support the medical, and there was no
jurisdiction.
Void ab initio: it never existed
Voidable: could be subject to cancellation
Here the court order was declared to be void, so the decision made through that order would
also be void. When the transfer happened, the order was correct. If the judge allowed you to
do something, the law can’t hold it back.
Despite the fact, that there was a court order allowing you to do this, this will still go to the
trial court.
1- There was case law presented, that said that anything happened during court
proceedings, you will have immunity from them.
2- But it has specific reasons, that court proceedings can’t be altered or get wrong
benefit from.
Outcome:
• Policy concerns: they (witnesses) should speak freely. The reason is to protect court
proceedings and that participants can come without fear. Till the court orders reach finality,
people faith will get away from proceedings.
• Private (get for your own benefit and enforcing for own) and public rights. Private
rights don’t have court immunity.

Katko v Briney
Tort always errs on the side of compensation in damages.
Q: is your action of putting enough current in a wire for a purpose is reasonable or not? What
is the standard of reasonable?
Ration: You cannot kill people to protect your property. Trespassers cannot be killed because
you’re protecting your property. Damage of property is not enough reason to kill anyone
hence it is going to be a charge of battery. Only in self defence can lethal force be used.

Gelman vs Gelman:
General rule: Parents cannot sue their children for negligence and vise versa.
Childern is defined as not reached the age of majority 18.

Facts: mother driven by minior son and due to his negligent driving and 3rd party negligence.
Mother sued the child for negligence and the court overturned the above rule and held parents
can be held negligent for children and vise versa. 1) unity in family is not damaged 2)
discipling vs unity: parents bringing cases against children induces discipline in childer.
. Mother sued child for 3rd party insurance of car. Once she sued her son she was trying to get
money from the insurance company.

- Childern can be sued:

1) If guardian are displaced

Governmental Immunity:
- Administrative law: law that is used by government officials.
- Immunity for government officials in torts.

A. Berkovitz v. United States *

Baby passed away due to taking polio vaccine. The vaccine was regulated by
government. The liability of manufacturer cant be waived. Plantiff sued for polio
vaccine.
Do govt officials have immunity? Does the case fall under the immunity?
Analogous immunity (anything done in good faith)
The court held there was immunity under the courts discretion. Public policy doctrine.
However, the discretionary function exception will not apply because the procedure of
vaccine checking was not followed so it was not an issue of discretion but an issue of
not following a law.

RULE:

The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that involves the permissible
exercise of policy judgment.

FACTS:

The child ingested a dose of an oral polio vaccine and contracted polio from the vaccine.
Petitioners filed suit against the United States, alleging that the United States was liable for
the child's injuries under 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1346(b), 2674 of the FTCA because the Division of
Biologic Standards (DBS) had acted wrongfully in licensing the manufacturer. Petitioners
also alleged that the United States had acted wrongfully in approving the specific vaccine lot.
The Federal Government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, on
the ground that the predecessors' actions fell within the FTCA's exception to liability for the
exercise of a "discretionary function or duty" (28 USCS 2680(a)), but the District Court
denied the motion with respect to these allegations. After the District Court, pursuant to 28
USCS 1292(b), certified its decision for immediate appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, expressing the view that the
discretionary function exception barred a suit based upon the licensing and lot-release
allegations.

ISSUE:

Did the discretionary function exception bar plaintiffs’ suit?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the discretionary
function exception required the dismissal of petitioners' claims. The Court concluded that the
exception posed no bar to the extent that petitioners' licensing claim was based on a decision
of the DBS to issue a license without having received required test data because the DBS had
no discretion to issue a license without the data. Similarly, the DBS had no discretion to issue
a license without determining compliance with regulatory standards.

Public Official Immunity:

A. Clinton v. Jones *

Presidential immunity?
Immunity Rests on a functional test. If the president is doing acts in his personal capacity,
they are not secure. The only immunity is for actions in the capacity of the president.
Functional Test applied= the harassment done by him had nothing to do with his office so it
was not secured under law.

RULE:
The district court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to
control its own docket.

FACTS:

A private citizen sought to recover damages against the President of the United States for
actions that allegedly took place before his term began. The President sought a motion to
dismiss and argued that in all but the most exceptional cases, the U.S. Constitution
requires federal courts to delay such litigation until the President's term ends. The district
court denied the motion to dismiss but postponed the trial. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court to deny the motion to dismiss and reversed
district court's order postponing the trial until the petitioner leaves office. The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari- a writ or order by which a higher court reviews a
case tried in a lower court.

ISSUE:

Was it proper for the district court postpone trial?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The Court ruled that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts
to stay all private actions against the President of the United States until he leaves office.
When defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity,
the Supreme Court has applied a functional approach. Thus, an official's absolute
immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office.
Immunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the
actor who performed it.

B. Harlow v. Fitzgerald *

Qualified immunity: protects things done in good faith. Only operated in simple negligence .
Test: shielded from civil damages unless breaches stator constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known
Absolute immunity: Absolute (reckless or gross)
President has qualified immunity and cabinet has absolute immunity.
Lost because didn’t challenge the previous precdent.

RULE:

Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

FACTS:

Petitioners, Presidential senior aides and advisors, sought review of the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that denied petitioners'
immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment in an action by respondent for civil
damages for petitioners' alleged conspiracy to violate respondent's constitutional and
statutory rights. Respondent brought an action against petitioners for civil damages for
petitioners' alleged conspiracy to violate respondent's constitutional and statutory rights.
Respondent averred that petitioners entered into the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior presidential aides. Petitioners unsuccessfully asserted an immunity defense. At
issue was the scope of the immunity available to senior aides and advisors of the
President of the United States in a suit for damages based on their official acts. On review,
the court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause.

ISSUE:

Are petitioners absolutely immune from suit?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

In performing discretionary functions, petitioners were generally shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have had knowledge. The court
found that petitioners were entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
The court held that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity that would be defeated
if they knew or reasonably should have known that the action violated respondent's
constitutional rights or if the action was taken with malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of respondent's constitutional rights.

Familial and Charitable Immunities:

A. Cowan v. Hospice Support Care, Inc. *
- Defining gross negligence as “showing indifference to another and an utter disregard of
prudence that amounts to a complete neglect of the safety of such other person,” but which
“demonstrat[es] something less than willful recklessness”

Common law doctrine provides that if you’re a charity beneficiary then the beneficiaries of
that charity cannot hold simple negligence against the charity organization.
Simple vs gross negligence (are u crazy mess up) vs recklessness(subjective messing up)
Facts: she broke her leg and for week they did nothing and eventually she died. It was a case
of gross negligence.
The court said because of gross negligence they cannot hide behind the immunity.

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Re: Dkt. No. 9

LifeLong Medical Care, a Berkeley-based healthcare provider, experienced a data breach that
exposed confidential patient information. Herman Cowan and Mary Scott brought state law
claims against Lifelong in California state court, alleging that the healthcare provider failed to
take the proper precautions to prevent data breaches. [*2] Cowan and Scott seek to represent
a class of California residents whose confidential information was exposed during the breach.
Lifelong filed a cross-complaint against Netgain Technology, a Minnesota-based data vendor
with which Lifelong signed a contract for computer services. The cross-complaint alleges that
Netgain is ultimately responsible for any damages arising out of the breach. Lifelong then
filed a notice of removal, explaining that because Netgain is a Delaware corporation based in
Minnesota, the action meets the minimal diversity requirement under the Class Action
Fairness Act.

CAFA provides the federal courts with original jurisdiction over class actions involving at
least 100 class members, where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, and in which
"any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A); see also Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588,
592, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 185 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2013). The general removal statute provides that
"any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants." 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). The question here is whether minimal diversity may be based solely on the presence
of a diverse third-party [*3] defendant, brought into the suit via a cross-complaint.
The Supreme Court's decision in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson all but answers the
question. 139 S.Ct. 1743, 204 L. Ed. 2d 34 (2019). There, the Court held that a third-party
defendant brought into the case by way of counterclaim filed by the original defendant could
not remove an action under CAFA, explaining that this third-party defendant did not count as
a "defendant" under either the general removal statute or CAFA's removal provision. Id. at
1750. The Court emphasized that it "has long held that a district court, when determining
whether it has original jurisdiction over a civil action, should evaluate whether that action
could have been brought originally in federal court." Id. at 1748. Against that
backdrop, Home Depot concluded that "[s]ection 1441(a)thus does not permit removal based
on counterclaims at all, as a counterclaim is irrelevant to whether the district court had
'original jurisdiction' over the civil action." Id. Although Home Depot addressed removal by
third-party defendants, the logic applies even more strongly to removal by original
defendants. Cowan and Scott could not have brought this case originally in federal court, and
Lifelong's decision to file a cross-claim against a [*4] diverse third party cannot create
jurisdiction.

It would be odd if the answer were otherwise. Federal jurisdiction over diversity cases exists
"to provide a neutral forum" in which to settle disputes. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 162 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2005). But
the originaldefendant has no greater or lesser interest in a neutral forum whether a third-party
defendant is brought into an action or not. If a diverse third-party defendant—the only
defendant with an interest in a neutral forum—cannot remove after Home Depot, it would be
strange to allow the original defendant to remove anyway.

Lifelong argues that the Cowan and Scott deliberately engineered their complaint to avoid
CAFA jurisdiction by neglecting to sue Netgain in the original complaint. Lifelong points to
language in the federal diversity statute providing that a court may consider "whether the
class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(3)(C). But this language stems from the so-called "discretionary home state
exception." Adams v. West Marine Products, Inc., 958 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (9th Cir.
2020). The exception provides district courts discretion to remand cases that otherwise meet
CAFA's criteria in the "interests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). It is not, as Lifelong
seems to assume, a tool permitting district courts to exercise [*5] jurisdiction where there
would otherwise be none. Lifelong does not in any event adequately allege that Cowan and
Scott engineered their complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction. The complaint focuses on
misconduct by Lifelong. And although it references Netgain at several points, Cowan and
Scott were not required to sue Netgain simply because they could.

Cowan and Scott move for attorney's fees. Section 1447 provides that "[a]n order remanding
the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). But "[a]bsent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing
party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141, 126 S. Ct. 704, 163 L. Ed. 2d 547 (2005). Lifelong's arguments
may be strained, but they do count as "objectively unreasonable." The motion for fees is
therefore denied.

The Clerk of the Court shall remand the matter to the Alameda County Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
 - ECONOMIC TORT
- CONSPIRICAY TORT
- PASSING OFF

Texaco v. Pennzoil Punitive

A deal was made to sell shares (contract) at a specified price. Another company, texaco, came
after the contract and got the shares.
How are the quantum of damages calculated?
If I breach a contract, how are damages sought?
Expectation interest: putting the person back in the place when the contract was performed.
In torts, person is given damages the person suffers at the hand of tortfeasor. Foreseeability is
the upper limit of calculating damages.
For example, if they had bought the company for x dollars and the befit would be additional
to x. Compensation for lost bargain (covered in contracts) but consequential damages---lost
profits (tricky in contracts). However, in torts damages are calculated that flow from the
breach (forseability)-- all the lost profits are covered.

RULE:The amount of exemplary or punitive damages to be awarded depends on the facts of

the case and rests largely within the sound discretion of the jury. Exemplary damages must be
reasonably proportioned to actual damages. Factors to be considered in determining whether
an award of exemplary damages is reasonable include: (1) the nature of the wrong, (2) the
character of the conduct involved, (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, (4) the
situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned, and (5) the extent to which such conduct
offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
FACTS:The district court found defendant oil company guilty of tortious interference with a
contract between plaintiff and a third oil company. On appeal, the defendant brought 90
points of error, all of which were denied except the assessment of exemplary damages in the
amount of 3 billion dollars. The appellate court directed plaintiff to file a punitive damages
remittitur of 2 billion dollars. The judgment would then be reformed to show 1 billion dollars
in punitive damages and would be affirmed as reformed. Failure to file the remittitur would
lead to reversal and remand of the judgment.
ISSUE:Did the district court err in imposing exemplary damages of three billion dollars
against the defendant for tortious interference with a contract?
ANSWER:Yes.
CONCLUSION: The imposition of exemplary damages in the amount of 3 billion dollars
constituted a confiscation of assets rather than punishment for past action.

National By-Products v. Searcy House Moving

Ratio: In National By-Products Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co., the Arkansas Supreme
Court found that awarding punitive damages requires evidence that the defendant
proceeded intentionally with an unlawful action after knowing that the act was likely to
cause injury.

RULE: An award of punitive damages is justified only where the evidence indicates that the
defendant acted wantonly in causing the injury or with such a conscious indifference to the
consequences that malice may be inferred.Wantonness is essentially an attitude of mind and
imparts to an act of misconduct a tortious character, such conduct as manifests a "disposition
of perversity." Such a disposition or mental state is shown by a person, when,
notwithstanding his conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger
and of common probability of injury to others, he proceeds into the presence of danger, with
indifference to consequences and with absence of all care. It is not necessary to prove that the
defendant deliberately intended to injure the plaintiff. It is enough if it is shown that,
indifferent to consequences, the defendant intentionally acted in such a way that the natural
and probable consequence of his act was injury to the plaintiff.
FACTS:One of the corporation's drivers struck two bystanders, another tractor-trailer, and a
house being transported on a trailer rig. The bystanders' estates filed wrongful death actions
against the house movers and the corporation. A jury award punitive damages against the
corporation.
ISSUE: Were the house movers entitled to punitive damages?
ANSWER: No
CONCLUSION: The court found that the corporation's driver had received six citations in the
previous year for driving an overweight truck, that the corporation had not disciplined the
driver for driving overweight trucks, and that the driver was 25 miles over the speed limit
when he struck the bystanders, the house movers' rig, and the house. The court determined
that there was no evidence that the corporation was aware that the brakes on the truck were
faulty. The court also found that there was a finding of gross negligence in the instant case.
However, the court ruled that gross negligence was not sufficient to justify punitive damages.

- In very rare cases are punitive e damages awarded. For punitive damages there needs to be
recklessness.
- Facts: truck was being driven at a very high speed and he hit another truck and 2 people
died. All three claimants were awarded punitive damages
- What is the criteria for punitive damages?
- The conduct of the tortfeasor has to be reckless. For recklessness person needs to know the
consequences and despite that they take the risk.
- recklessness: if the breaks were faulty and they did not fix them. So they knew the
consequences but took the risk. In this case they relies on the speed at which the truck
driver was driving. The more you’re over the speed limit more chances your conduct will be
categorized as reckless.
- Recklessness can be categorized as comparing how high your speed is compared to the
speed limit.
- Exam question: general and special damages is not linked to how heinous the conduct of the
tortfeasor is. For damages the heinous if the conduct of the tortfeasor becomes important
when awarding punitive damages. If there is good faith defence for the tortfeasor there may
be immunity.

Mathias v, Accor Economy Lodging

RULE: Punitive damages should be admeasured by standards or rules rather than in a
completely ad hoc manner, and this does not tell the court what the maximum ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages should be in a particular case. To determine that, the court
must consider why punitive damages are awarded in the first place.
FACTS: Plaintiff hotel guests sued defendant motel chain owner, claiming willful and
wanton conduct under Illinois law in allowing hotel guests to be attacked by bedbugs. A jury
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
found in favor of the guests, awarding each compensatory and punitive damages. The owner
appealed, complaining primarily about the punitive damages award. The owner argued that at
worst it was guilty of simple negligence and as a result, the guests were not entitled to an
award of punitive damages. The evidence was sufficient to show willful and wanton conduct
given that bedbugs had been discovered in the hotel two years prior to the incident that gave
rise to the guests' complaint. Moreover, the hotel's failure to either warn guests or take
effective measures to eliminate the bedbugs amounted to fraud and perhaps battery. The
award was affirmed.
ISSUE: Were plaintiffs entitled to an award of punitive damages?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court rejected the owner's contention that the punitive damages were
subject to a single-digit ratio when compared to compensatory damages because the test was
whether the punitive damages were proportional to the wrongfulness of the owner's actions.
In this case, the punitive damages award was not excessive because even though the precise
number chosen by the jury was arbitrary, the court took judicial notice that deliberate
exposure of hotel guests to health risks created by insect infestation exposed the owner to
sanctions under Illinois and Chicago law that in the aggregate were comparable in severity to
that of the punitive damages award.

- Bettery vs negligence. No battery because no intent.

- 1) the hotel had knowledge of the bed bugs but didn’t do anything about it
- 2) gave the guests room that was not supposed to be given
- 3) there was no disclaimer or warning for bed bugs
- These above 3 things prove recklessness
- The jury awarded punitive and compensatory damages
- How are punitive damages calculated?
- Apart from punitive damages all damages are compensatory. When punitive damages are
awarded- policy angel- criminal law scope as it is meant to punish the tortfeasor. The idea is
to punish the tortfeasor through money than prison. And the conduct may not be as such to
punish under imprisonment
- The quantum of compensatory damages was too low so the rule of 9times compensatory
damages= punitive damages was too low.

State Farm v. Campbell

RULE: While states possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well
established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these
awards. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of
grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. The reason is that elementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive
fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity
of the penalty that a state may impose. To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers
no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.
FACTS: An insured, when driving with his wife was involved in a multivehicle accident
which was fatal to one of the other drivers. During the ensuing accident litigation, the other
parties offered to settle their claims for the $50,000 amount of the insured's policy limits, but
the insured's automobile insurer rejected the offer. Eventually, a jury determined that the
insured had been 100 percent at fault and a judgment was returned for about $185,000. After
the insured was unsuccessful on direct appeal of the judgment, the insurer paid the entire
amount of the judgment, including the excess over the policy limits. However, there was also
some evidence that allegedly: (1) the insurer's employees had supposedly altered their records
to make the insured appear less culpable for the accident; (2) the insurer, in refusing the
settlement offer, had disregarded the overwhelming likelihood of liability and the near
certainty that, by taking the case to trial, a judgment in excess of the insured's policy limits
would be awarded with respect to the accident; and (3) the insurer had (a) at first assured the
insured and his wife that their assets would be safe from any accident-related verdict, and (b)
later told the insured and his wife, postjudgment, to put a for-sale sign on their house. Thus,
the insured filed a bad faith action against the insurer for fraud and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The The jury awarded the
insured $2.6-million in compensatory damages and $145-million in punitive damages, which
the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. Both parties appealed. The
insured contended that the substantial punitive damages award was justified in view of the
insurer's national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping claim payments and
engaging in fraudulent practices. The insurer argued that the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages clearly indicated that the punitive damages award was excessive and
unrelated to the actual harm suffered by the insureds.
ISSUE: Whether the award of $145-million as discretionary punitive damages, where full
compensatory damages are $1-million, is excessive and in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
ANSWER: Yes
CONCLUSION: The United States Supreme Court held that the punitive damages award was
neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was thus an irrational,
arbitrary, and unconstitutional deprivation of the property of the insurer. While the insurer's
nationwide policies were clearly deficient, evidence of dissimilar and out-of-state misconduct
of the insurer, and out-of-state conduct which was lawful where it occurred, was an improper
basis for punishing the insurer for the limited harm to the insureds. Further, neither the wealth
of the insurer nor the fact that its nationwide misconduct went largely unpunished justified
punitive damages which were grossly disproportionate to the compensatory damages awarded
for the actual harm to the insureds.

- Insurance company was handling the litigation and it said it will pay till its policy limit and no
more so filed a suit.
- The ppl were driving on the wrong side of the road and caused the accident. The insurance
company was then incharge.
- The tortfeasors and the victims decided that we are not going to fight amongst ourselves and
file a bad faith suit vs. the company.
- Key: intentional infliction of emotional distress. The insurance companies refusal to settle for
the price led to the appeal which led them pay way more.
- Multiplier of punitive damages has to be single multiple. Reason for why youre using the
multiplier u are using.
-

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee (Closing Arguments)

RULE: The First Amendment privilege is not limited to newspaper reporting. The press
comprehends different kinds of publications which communicate to the public information
and opinion. Cases recognize the presence of an underlying public interest in this
communication and particularly in maintaining it free in the public interest.
FACTS: Appellant documentary filmmaker, investigating the infamous death of Karen
Silkwood, was deposed by appellee Kerr-McGee Corporation concerning that death and was
asked to reveal his sources. Appellant, having promised anonymity, claimed First
Amendment privilege and filed a motion for a protective order. The district court denied the
motion as untimely filed. The district court went on to hold, however, that even if it had been
timely filed, it would have been denied because of lack of merit. The judge conceded that it
was not possible for him to conclude as a matter of law that there was no possibility that the
information sought might be relevant and that appellant could not have prevailed even if his
motion had been timely.
ISSUE:

1. Was the appellant’s motion for protective order untimely filed?

2. Should the court have recognized the existence of a privilege applicable to media
reporters under the First Amendment?

ANSWER: 1) No. 2) Yes.

CONCLUSION: On appeal, the court held that the motion was not untimely filed and that the
district court abused its discretion in denying it because it was reasonable to wait until after
the case had been transferred to another venue before filing additional motions. Secondly, it
was wrong for the district court to categorically deny "freedom of the press" to appellant
solely because he was a filmmaker and not a regular reporter. The court held that the
privilege had been applied to a broad range of media and publications by the courts that had
announced various factors to consider as to whether the privilege attached. Unfortunately, no
such inquiry into the facts and no such analysis had been performed by the district court, and
the court had an insufficient record with which to make a final determination. Accordingly,
the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings.

In tort law the actual harm that one suffers at the hand of a tortfeasor is calculated.

State Farm v. Campbell:

Insurance company was handling the litigation and the it said it will pay till its policy limit.