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Regional  Water  Corp    


 
 
 
Risk  Assessment      

Workshop  Summary  Paper      


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

   

   

 
 
 
Regional  Water  Corp  
Version  No.:  Final  
Date:  20  March  2012    
 

 
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  
 
Does  this  table  get  deleted  for  de-­‐identification  purposes?  
Document  History:   Prepared  by:  Annette  Davison   Version  1   6/9/2011  
Prepared  by:  Annette  Davison,  Josh   Version  1.1   7/9/2011  
Tickell  and  Annalisa  Contos  
Prepared  by:  Annette  Davison  (post   Version  Final  A   9/12/2011  
comments  from  NSW  Health)  
  Prepared  by:  Annette  Davison  (post   Version  Final  B   15/2/2012  
comments  from  NSW  Health)  
       
Authors:   Annette  Davison,  Josh  Tickell,  Annalisa  Contos,  Kamal  Fernando    
File  Name:   036  Regional  Water  Corp  Risk  Assessment  Summary  Paper  Final  B.docx  
 
 
 
This  document  is  designed  for  printing  double-­‐sided    

Page  i  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  
W O R KS H O P  BAC KG RO U N D  
The  Public  Health  Act  2010  has  been  passed  by  Parliament  and  is  expected  to  commence  in  2012.  
The  Act  will  require  drinking  water  suppliers  to  establish,  and  adhere  to,  a  quality  assurance  program  
that  complies  with  the  associated  Regulation.  The  Regulation  requires  water  suppliers  to  implement  
a  quality  assurance  program  (or  risk-­‐based  drinking  water  management  system)  consistent  with  the  
Framework  for  the  Management  of  Drinking  Water  Quality  in  the  Australian  Drinking  Water  
Guidelines  2011.    
NSW  Health  undertook  a  pilot  program  to  develop  risk  based  management  systems  for  four  water  
supply  schemes.  Regional  Water  Corp  (RWC)  was  one  of  those  schemes.  
In  developing  a  management  system,  water  suppliers  should  undertake  a  risk  assessment  from  
catchment  to  consumer  and  develop  critical  control  points  (this  workshop)  to  ensure  that  unsafe  
water  is  not  released  into  the  distribution  systems  and  that  it  is  protected  from  contamination  
during  distribution.    

W O R KS H O P  O B JEC T IV E :  
The  objectives  of  the  workshop  were  to:  
• Understand  the  system  from  catchment  to  tap  from  a  water  quality  perspective;  
• Understand   and   prioritise   (assess)   the   events,   hazards   and   risks   to   drinking   water  
consumers;    
• Identify  the  control  measures  in  place  for  addressing  the  identified  events,  hazards  and  risks;    
• Identify   any   additional   controls   or   actions   which   may   be   required   to   improve   the   risk  
management  of  the  scheme;  and  
• Identify  critical  control  points  for  the  scheme.  

W O R KS H O P  O U T L IN E :  
The  outline  of  the  workshop  was  to:  
• Describe  the  methodology  to  be  used  in  the  workshop;  
• Present  what  was  known  about  water  quality  risks  relating  to  the  source(s);    
• Capture  knowledge  on  RWC’s  water  supply  system  in  an  integrated  fashion;  
• Capture  participant  consensus  on  risks  and  appropriate  controls;  
• Identify  critical  control  points  for  the  scheme.  

R IS K   S U M M A RY :  
A  total  of  71  hazardous  events  was  identified  for  the  RWC  system  with  the  following  ‘uncontrolled’  
or  ‘maximum’  (risks  without  controls  in  place)  and  ‘residual’  (risks  with  controls  in  place)  findings  
(refer  to  Section  5  for  definition  of  risks).  A  total  of  58  actions  was  identified  to  address  the  risks.  
Uncontrolled  Risk  Summary  –  No.  of  risks  by  location  in  water  supply  system  
System Components High Low Moderate Uncertain Very High Grand Total
Distribution 5 2 1 2 2 12
Fishers Creek Catchment 2 2 1 5 10
Fishers Creek Dam 3 3 6
Percy Colliery Source 2 2 4
Coagulation 4 2 6
Clarification 1 1 2
Filtration (mono media) 2 2 4
Disinfection (chlorine gas) 1 1 2 4
Post Dosing (stabilisation) 1 1
pH correction 1 1 2

Page  ii  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  
System Components High Low Moderate Uncertain Very High Grand Total
Clearwater Tank 1 1
Raw Water Bypass 1 1
Distribution Reservoirs 1 2 2 5
Chlorine Boosters 1 1 1 3
Fishers River Source 2 2
Non-potable water at Taraville 1 1
Whole of System 3 1 2 1 7
Grand Total 24 5 14 9 19 71
 
Residual  Risk  Summary  –  No.  of  risks  by  location  in  water  supply  system  
System Components High Low Moderate Uncertain Very High Grand Total
Distribution 3 2 3 2 2 12
Fishers Creek Catchment 2 5 2 1 10
Fishers Creek Dam 1 2 3 6
Percy Colliery Source 2 2 4
Coagulation 4 2 6
Clarification 2 2
Filtration (mono media) 1 1 2 4
Disinfection (chlorine gas) 3 1 4
Post Dosing (stabilisation) 1 1
pH correction 1 1 2
Clearwater Tank 1 1
Raw Water Bypass 1 1
Distribution Reservoirs 3 2 5
Chlorine Boosters 1 1 1 3
Fishers River Source 1 1 2
Non-potable water at Taraville 1 1
Whole of System 1 3 3 7
Grand Total 15 24 18 9 5 71
 

 
Comparison  of  Maximum  and  Residual  Risks  

Page  iii  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  
 

CCP   S U M M A RY :  
The  following  CCPs  were  identified  for  the  RWC  scheme:  
1. Plant  Inlet  (Raw  Water  Inlet  Valve)  
2. Filtration  (supported  by  coagulation)  
3. Primary  Disinfection  (outlet  of  Clearwater  tank)  
4. Fluoridation  (when  in  place)  
5. Distribution  Reservoirs  (once  procedures  and  monitoring  are  established)  
.  

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Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

CONTENTS  
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  ................................................................................................  II  
Workshop  background  .....................................................................................................  ii  
Workshop  objective:  ........................................................................................................  ii  
Workshop  outline:  ...........................................................................................................  ii  
Risk  Summary:  .................................................................................................................  ii  
CCP  Summary:  .................................................................................................................  iv  
CONTENTS  ...................................................................................................................   1  
1   INTRODUCTION  .....................................................................................................   2  
2   WATER  QUALITY  RISK  ASSESSMENT  –  A  BACKGROUND  ..........................................   3  
2.1   ADWG  Risk  Assessment  Components  .....................................................................  3  
2.2   ADWG  CCP  Components  .........................................................................................  3  
3   SYSTEM  DESCRIPTION  ............................................................................................   4  
3.1   Water  Sources  .........................................................................................................  5  
3.2   Treatment  ...............................................................................................................  6  
3.3   Distribution  .............................................................................................................  6  
3.4   Process  Flow  Diagram  .............................................................................................  8  
4   WATER  QUALITY  RISKS  ..........................................................................................  11  
4.1   Risks  identified  in  previous  studies  .......................................................................  11  
4.2   Risks  identified  through  water  quality  analysis  .....................................................  11  
5   RISK  ASSESSMENT  PROCESS  ..................................................................................  14  
5.1   Risk  Assessment  ....................................................................................................  14  
5.2   Summary  ...............................................................................................................  15  
6   CRITICAL  CONTROL  POINT  IDENTIFICATION  ..........................................................  19  
6.1   Areas  of  additional  work  to  support  CCP  development  ........................................  20  
Distribution  ............................................................................................................................  20  
Fluoridation  ............................................................................................................................  20  
Farmers  River  WS/Gollumville  System  Interface  Points  ........................................................  20  

7   REFERENCES  .........................................................................................................  21  


APPENDIX  A  WORKSHOP  DETAILS   ..............................................................................  22  
APPENDIX  B  WATER  QUALITY  DATA  ............................................................................  23  
APPENDIX  C  WORKSHOP  RISK  REGISTER  .....................................................................  26  
APPENDIX  D  ACTION  PLAN  .........................................................................................  40  
 
   

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Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

1 INTRODUCTION  
The  Australian  Drinking  Water  Guidelines  (ADWG)  (NHMRC/NRMMC,  2011)  set  out  a  holistic  approach  to  
drinking  water  management  including  understanding  where  sources  of  contamination  may  arise  and  how  
contamination  may  find  its  way  to  the  consumer.  The  approach  is  termed  the  Framework  for  the  
Management  of  Drinking  Water  Quality  (the  Framework).    
A  significant  component  of  the  Framework  is  understanding  and  managing  the  risks  to  drinking  water  and  
forms  the  basis  of  this  workshop.    
The  workshop  details  are  provided  in  Appendix  A.  
 

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Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

2 WATER  QUALITY  RISK  ASSESSMENT  –  A  BACKGROUND  


2.1 ADWG   R IS K   A S S ES S M E N T   C O M P O N E N TS  
Element  2  of  the  ADWG  Framework  provides  the  following  framework  for  undertaking  a  risk  assessment  on  
a  water  supply  system.  The  section  where  the  framework  is  addressed  in  this  paper,  or  in  the  risk  workshop  
as  a  workshop  activity,  is  shown  in  brackets.  
Water  supply  system  analysis:  
• Assemble  a  team  with  appropriate  knowledge  and  expertise  (Appendix  A).  
• Construct  a  flow  diagram  of  the  water  supply  system  from  catchment  to  consumer  (Section  3.4).  
• Assemble   pertinent   information   and   document   key   characteristics   of   the   water   supply   to   be  
considered  (Sections  3  &  4).  
Assessment  of  water  quality  data:    
• Assemble   historical   data   from   source   waters,   treatment   plants   and   finished   water   supplied   to  
consumers  (Appendix  B).  
• List  and  examine  exceedances  (Section  4  and  Appendix  B).  
• Assess   data   using   tools   such   as   control   charts   and   trend   analysis   to   identify   trends   and   potential  
problems  (Appendix  B).  
Hazard  identification  and  risk  assessment:  
• Define   the   approach   and   methodology   to   be   used   for   hazard   identification   and   risk   assessment  
(Section  5).  
• Identify   and   document   hazards,   sources   and   hazardous   events   for   each   component   of   the   water  
supply  system  (Workshop  Activity  –  output  being  the  Risk  Register).  
• Estimate  the  level  of  risk  for  each  identified  hazard  or  hazardous  event  (Workshop  Activity  –  output  
being  the  Risk  Register).  
• Evaluate   the   major   sources   of   uncertainty   associated   with   each   hazard   and   hazardous   event   and  
consider  actions  to  reduce  uncertainty  (Workshop  Activity  –  output  being  the  Risk  Register).  
• Determine   significant   risks   and   document   priorities   for   risk   management   (Workshop   Activity   –  
output  being  the  Risk  Register).    

2.2 ADWG   CCP   C O M P O N E N TS  


Element  3  of  the  ADWG  Framework  covers  assessment  of  preventive  measures,  multiple  barriers  and  
critical  control  points.  
Preventive  measures  and  multiple  barriers:  
• Identify   existing   preventive   measures   from   catchment   to   consumer   for   each   significant   hazard   or  
hazardous   event   and   estimate   the   residual   risk   (Workshop   Activity   –   output   being   the   Risk  
Register).  
• Evaluate  alternative  or  additional  preventive  measures  where  improvement  is  required  (Workshop  
Activity  –  output  being  the  Risk  Register).  
• Document   the   preventive   measures   and   strategies   into   a   plan   addressing   each   significant   risk  
(Workshop  Activity  –  output  being  the  Risk  Register).  
Critical  Control  Points  (Section  6):  
• Assess  preventive  measures  from  catchment  to  consumer  to  identify  critical  control  points.  
• Establish  mechanisms  for  operational  control  (Post  Workshop).  
• Document  the  critical  control  points,  critical  limits  and  target  criteria  (Workshop  Activity  –  output  
being  the  identified  CCPs  in  Section  6).  

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Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

3 SYSTEM  DESCRIPTION  
An  overview  of  RWC’s  water  supply  system  is  provided  in  Table  3-­‐1  and  Figure  3-­‐1,  and  in  further  detail  in  
the  following  sections.  
TABLE  3-­‐1.  WATER  SUPPLY  SYSTEM  –  OVERVIEW  DESCRIPTION.  

SYSTEM   DESCRIPTION  
COMPONENT  
Population   The  population  of  approximately  21,000  comprises  Regionalville,  Wangwall,  Starboard,  Dalry,  
Served   Valleyville,  Collen,  and  Barrangaroo.  Some  part  of  Sodit  and  Baconton  and  Kanval  are  supplied  
directly  from  the  Fishers  River  Water  Supply  trunk  main.    
 
Taraville  is  served  by  a  raw  water  scheme,  this  water  is  not  intended  for  drinking.  
Water  Source   SURFACE  WATER:  
Fishers  Creek  and  the  Farmers  River  and  Paddymolloy  River  (via  the  Farmers  River  Water  Supply  
Scheme  operated  by  Bulk  Water  Corp).  
GROUND  WATER:  
None  used  directly  as  a  source  in  the  council-­‐managed  scheme  (see  below  for  Percy  Colliery  
groundwater).  
OTHER  WATER:  
Excess  treated  (chemical  dosing,  DAF  and  pH  correction)  groundwater  from  Percy  Colliery  via  
Percy  Colliery  Water  Transfer  Scheme  (CWTS)  via  Fishers  Creek.  
Water  Storage   Fishers  Creek  Dam  (operated  by  Gollumville  City  Council).  
Titania  Dam  and  Paddymolloy  Weir  (operated  by  Bulk  Water  Corporation).  
Water   Raw  water  from  Fishers  Creek  Dam  is  treated  at  the  Hokey  Pokey  Water  Treatment  Plant  as  
Treatment   follows:  
• Soda  ash  for  pH  correction  
• Alum  for  coagulation  and  polyelectrolyte  (LT20)  as  a  coagulant  aid  
• Flocculation  
• Clarification  (horizontal  flow)  
• Filtration  (mono  media)  
• Disinfection  (chlorine  gas)  and  stabilization  (soda  ash)    
• Fluoridation  (step  not  yet  active,  project  in  progress)  
 
Storage  After   Clear  water  tank  then  distribution  reservoirs  at  Cleaner  St  and  Candle  St.  
Treatment  
Distribution  of   Via  pressurised  pipes  of  various  diameters  (352  km),  pumps  (30)  and  tanks  (17).  
Product  
Any  Special   Booster  chlorination  (re-­‐chlorination  occurs  at  the  Priest  Street  PS  and  the  outlet  of  the  Wangwall  
Controls   and  Tindale  Reservoirs).  
Required   Quality  of  chemicals,  materials  etc  used  in  the  production  and  delivery  of  the  product.  
Manual  verification  sampling  of  water  from  the  distribution  network.  
Backflow  prevention  and  trade  waste  management.  
Operation  and  maintenance  of  all  infrastructure  to  prevent  recontamination.  
 
 
Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  
FIGURE  3-­‐1.  RWC  WATER  SUPPLY  NETWORK  OVERVIEW.  

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3.1 W AT E R   S O U RC ES  
Fishers  Creek  Dam  is  RWC’s  main  reservoir  (Figure  3-­‐2).  Inflows  to  the  dam  are  from  Fishers  Creek,  which  
are  derived  from  a  small  catchment  of  11.7km  sq  (Figure  3-­‐3)  and  supplemented  periodically  with  treated  
water  from  Percy  Colliery.  
The  Fishers  Creek  catchment  is  heavily  vegetated  and  is  entirely  within  “Zone  No  1  (f)—Rural  (Forestry)”.  
Water  sourced  from  catchments  of  predominantly  native  vegetation  and  which  are  heavily  vegetated,  is  
usually  of  a  higher  quality  than  that  sourced  from  agricultural  and  urbanized  catchments.  
Rainfall  occurs  consistently  throughout  the  year  with  summertime  peaks  and  an  average  annual  rainfall  of  
820  mm  although  in  recent  years  the  region  has  been  experiencing  drought  conditions.    
Climate  change  impacts  are  likely  to  exacerbate  water  availability  in  the  region  with  probable  impacts  on  
water  quality.  While  there  are  various  water  quality-­‐impacting  landuses  within  the  local  government  area  
(extractive  industries,  cropping,  agriculture  etc),  most  of  those  landuses  are  outside  of  the  catchment  area.  
Only  two  extractive  sites  (sand/kaolin)  are  within  the  catchment  area.  
Groundwater  pumped  from  Percy  Colliery  is  treated  by  LoCoal  Corp  in  a  Dissolved  Air  Flotation  (DAF)  plant  
and  then  transferred  through  the  water  transfer  system  to  Fishers  Creek  upstream  of  the  dam.  
There  is  no  formal  water  quality  agreement  in  place  between  Percy  Colliery  (LoCoal  Corp)  and  RWC.    
Water  can  also  be  sourced  from  the  Farmers  River  scheme  (operated  by  Bulk  Water  Corp)  via  surface  water  
collected  in  the  Paddymolloy  Weir  and  Titania  Dam.    
Bulk  Water  Corp’s  Operating  Licence  (2008-­‐2013)  states  that:  
4.5.1  Bulk  Water  Corp  must  use  its  best  endeavours  to  enter  into  agreements  with  its  Farmers  
River  Customers  during  the  term  of  the  Licence,  in  relation  to  the  arrangements  to  apply  to  the  
supply  of  water  by  the  operation  of  the  Farmers  River  Scheme.  
4.5.2  The  terms  of  the  arrangements  must,  as  a  minimum,  include:  
(a)  the  standard  of  the  quality  of  water  supplied;  
The  agreement  in  place  between  Bulk  Water  Corp  and  RWC  is:  
Agreement  Concerning  the  Supply  of  Water  from  the  Famers  River  Water  Supply  [the  
Agreement].  
The  Agreement  is  dated  November  2007.  Raw  water  is  supplied  to  RWC  from  the  Farmers  River  scheme  at  
several  points.  
As  part  of  the  liability  provisions  of  the  Agreement,  RWC  has  to  acknowledge  that  it  is  supplied  with  
microfiltered,  chlorinated  water  and  that  Bulk  Water  Corp  shall  not  be  obliged  to  supply  water  of  a  higher  
standard  or  quality.  Further,  RWC  must  treat  any  water  supplied  to  it  to  meet  the  standards  set  by  any  
national  water  quality  guidelines  or  any  other  requirements.  
There  are  no  provisions  in  the  agreement  for  E.  coli  levels  (noting  that  E.  coli  is  a  surrogate  for  pathogenic  
bacterial  contaminants),  or  chlorine  residuals,  and  there  is  no  reference  to  the  Australian  Drinking  Water  
Guidelines  (See  Section  6.1  for  additional  work  required  to  address  this  issue).  
 
Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  
FIGURE  3-­‐2.  FISHERS  CREEK  DAM  WALL.  
 
 

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3.2 T R EAT M E N T  
RWC  owns  and  operates  the  Hokey  Pokey  Water  Treatment  Plant.  The  treatment  steps  are  listed  above  in  
Table  3-­‐1.  There  is  no  fluoridation  at  the  plant  although  
provisions  are  underway  to  allow  for  fluoridation  to  occur  in  
the  near  future.  
Note  that  the  rectangular  tank  is  the  clarifier.  The  clearwater  
tank  is  the  circular  one  and  it  is  covered.  
There  is  a  raw  water  bypass  provision  at  the  plant,  which  
feeds  back  into  the  system  at  the  outlet  of  the  clearwater  
Hokey Pokey Clearwater Tank
tank.  There  is  also  a  clarifier  bypass  line  which  can  be  used  
to  bypass  the  clarifier  when  required.  
Clarifier
bypass line
3.3 D IST R IB U T IO N    
RWC’s  distribution  system  comprises  ca  352  km  reticulation  
ranging  from  50  to  500  mm  (Table  3-­‐2)  15  distribution  
reservoirs  (Table  3-­‐3)  and  16  pumps.    
The  figures  below  show  the  hydraulic  profiles  of  the  Farmers  
River  source  (Figure  3-­‐4)  and  the  Percy  Colliery  source  
(Figure  3-­‐5)  and  how  they  interact  with  the  RWC  water  
supply  system.  
 
 
 
Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  
FIGURE  3-­‐3.  FISHERS  CREEK  CATCHMENT  AREA.  
Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  
FIGURE  3-­‐4.  FARMERS  RIVER  WATER  SUPPLY  HYDRAULIC  PROFILE.  

Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  


FIGURE  3-­‐5.  REGIONAL  WATER  CORP  WATER  SUPPLY  AND  PERCY  COLLIERY  TRANSFER  SYSTEM  HYDRAULIC  PROFILE.  
RWC  uses  an  external  contractor  (Aqualift)  to  inspect  its  reservoir  assets.  A  review  of  the  Aqualift  reports  
was  undertaken  for  this  workshop  and  where  water  quality  relevant  observations  were  made,  they  have  
been  summarised  in  Table  3-­‐4.    
Specifically  relevant  to  this  risk  workshop,  note  that  bird  access,  unauthorised  access  and  vandalism  has  
been  noted  at  various  of  RWC’s  reservoir  assets.    

• Bird  access:  Note  that  bird  access  of  distribution  reservoirs  has  caused  waterborne  outbreaks  in  other  
jurisdictions  resulting  in  illnesses  and  deaths  (Angulo  et  al,  1997;  Clark  et  al,  1996  and  Clark,  2000).    

• Asset  integrity:  Ingress  into  distribution  reservoirs  (either  through  leaking  seals,  open  hatches,  
compromised  structure  integrity  etc)  has  also  resulted  in  deaths  and  illness  from  the  water  supply  
(Falco  and  Williams,  2009;  Olinger,  2009).    

• Security:  Vandalism  and  unauthorised  access  to  distribution  reservoirs  is  also  cause  for  concern  in  
relation  to  contamination  of  water  (including  deliberate  and  unplanned  contamination).  
 

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TABLE  3-­‐2.  RETICULATION  INFORMATION.  

Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  


 
TABLE  3-­‐3.  RESERVOIR  INFORMATION  (SOURCE:  RWC).  
Reservoir   Storage  Capacity  (ML)  

Cleaner  Street  High     3  


Cleaner  Street  Low   4.5  
Candle  Street  New   20  
Candle  Street  Old   6.8  
Hokey  Pokey  WTP   2  
South  Bigton   2  
South  Cowenfell   2  
Culkin  Street   0.3  
Barrangaroo   0.2  
Wangwall   2.7  
Tindale   1.3  
Starboard  High     1.1  
Starboard  Low     1  
Collen     0.4  
Valleyville   4.6  
Total   51.9  

   
 
 
TABLE  3-­‐4.  WATER  QUALITY  RELEVANT  RESERVOIR  OBSERVATIONS  (SOURCE:  SUMMARISED  FROM  AQUALIFT  
REPORTS).  

RESERVOIR   COMMENTS  
Cleaner  St  LL   Bird  access,  dead  bird  found  inside  tank,  vandalism  noted  
Collen   The  entry  hatch  cover  does  not  seal  around  the  front  edge  area  and  where  the  ladder  
stiles  used  to  extend  through  
Tindale   There  is  no  secure  compound  around  the  tank  and  the  ladder  door  was  not  locked.        
Unauthorised  access  to  the  tank  has  most  likely  been  occurring.  
Barrangaroo   There  is  no  effective  padlock  on  the  entry  hatch  -­‐  the  existing  lock  has  been  cut  and  
replaced  as  a  dummy  lock  only.  
Starboard  HL   There  was  no  padlock  on  the  entry  hatch  -­‐  it  is  held  shut  with  a  nut  and  bolt.        
There  is  a  risk  of  unauthorised  access  to  the  tank  due  to  a  lack  of  security  up  on  the  
tank.        
Unauthorised  access  is  a  possibility  and  there  is  no  lock  on  the  entry  hatch.  
Starboard  LL   The  compound  wires  have  been  damaged,  and  the  external  ladder  and  hatch  are  

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RESERVOIR   COMMENTS  
unlocked.        
There  was  deliberate  contamination  placed  inside  the  tank  -­‐  a  lead  acid  battery  and  its  
charger  unit  were  retrieved.        
Unauthorised  access  has  occured  and  there  is  no  lock  on  the  entry  hatch.  
Dalry   The  roof  vent  has  been  vandalized,  so  site  security  needs  to  be  monitored.        
The  entry  hatch  cover  does  not  seal  around  the  front  where  the  ladder  stiles  extend  
through.        
Unauthorised  personnel  have  accessed  to  roof  area  and  the  entry  hatch  cover  is  not  
sealed  against  deliberate  contamination  events.  
Candle  St  No.  2   There  are  a  number  of  defects  in  the  security  fence,  and  graffiti  on  the  external  walls  of  
the  tank.        
Water  and  debris  is  collecting  around  the  platform  area,  and  overflowing  into  the  tank.        
Water  and  debris  is  ponding  and  overflowing  back  into  the  tank,  due  to  the  reverse  
slope  on  the  platform  area.  
South  Bigton   There  is  no  padlock  on  the  entry  hatch  -­‐  the  external  security  is  easy  to  bypass  and  enter  
the  tank.        
There  were  several  small  birds  inside  the  tank  -­‐  the  bird  wire  needs  to  be  checked  in  
detail  to  secure  the  tank.        
The  bird  access  area  needs  to  be  identified  ASAP  -­‐  the  wire  mesh  under  the  eaves  is  the  
most  likely  cause.  
Wangwall   There  were  5  dead  birds  inside  the  tank  -­‐  there  is  no  obvious  entry  point  identified.        
The  bird  access  area  needs  to  be  identified  ASAP  -­‐  maybe  a  hatch  was  left  open  for  a  
period  of  time.  
 
The  towns  of  Wangwall,  Starboard,  Tindale,  Dalry,  Collen  and  Valleyville  are  supplied  from  the  Farmers  
River  water  supply  however,  water  from  this  scheme  can  also  be  supplied  to  Barrangaroo  and  Gollumville  
as  required.  Given  that  the  primary  source  of  reticulated  water  for  Gollumville  is  via  the  RWC  operated  
system,  issues  associated  with  a  potential  dual  source  were  considered  and  included  (but  were  not  limited  
to):  
• Changes  in  water  chemistry  resulting  in  taste  and  odour  complaints  and  biofilm  disturbance  
• Changes  in  water  flow  resulting  in  biofilm  sloughing  and  dirty  water  events  
 
Another  potential  source  of  contamination  considered  for  the  RWC  distribution  system  was  through  cross  
connections  to  non-­‐potable  supplies.  

3.4 P RO C ES S   F LOW   D IAG R A M  


A  conceptual  flow  diagram  for  the  system  is  shown  in  Figure  3-­‐6  and  for  the  water  treatment  plant  in  Figure  
3-­‐7.  The  purpose  of  the  diagrams  is  to  show  key  inputs,  steps  and  flow  direction.  Note  that  a  drought  
pipeline  is  slated  for  supply  to  Wangwall,  Starboard,  Tindale,  Dalry,  Collen  and  Valleyville,  however,  while  
this  pipeline  was  not  considered  during  the  risk  assessment  –  it  will  need  to  be  assessed  prior  to  being  
commissioned.  Procedures  and  records  for  the  operation  of  the  pipeline  will  also  need  to  be  developed  and  
implemented.  
 

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FIGURE  3-­‐6.  CONCEPTUAL  PROCESS  FLOW  DIAGRAM  OF  THE  WATER  SUPPLY  SYSTEM  (ACHIEVED  BY  CONSENSUS  AT  THE  
RISK  WORKSHOP    –  SEE  FOLLOWING  DIAGRAM  FOR  WATER  TREATMENT  PROCESS).  

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FIGURE  3-­‐7.  CONCEPTUAL  PROCESS  FLOW  DIAGRAM  OF  THE  WATER  TREATMENT  PROCESS  AT  HOKEY  POKEY  WATER  
TREATMENT  PLANT.  
 
 

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4 WATER  QUALITY  RISKS  


4.1 R IS KS  ID E N T IF IE D  IN  P R E V IO U S  ST U D IES  
In  2005/06,  seven  blue  green  algae  (cyanobacteria)  alerts  occurred  (Table  4-­‐1).  However,  importantly  for  
this  risk  assessment  workshop,  all  alerts  have  occurred  downstream  of  Fishers  Creek  Dam,  there  have  been  
no  alerts  at  the  dam  itself.  
TABLE  4-­‐1.  ALGAL  ALERTS.  
Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  
Previous  water  quality  complaints  were  received  by  RWC,  from  Wangwall  and  Starboard  residents  (served  
by  the  Farmers  River  Water  Supply),  in  early  2009.  The  complaints  were  investigated  by  the  NSW  Health  
Population  Health  Unit,  RWC  and  Bulk  Water  Corp.  Results  indicated  that  while  the  Paddymolloy  treatment  
plant  was  effective  in  complying  with  Australian  Drinking  Water  Guideline  levels,  levels  of  manganese,  
aluminium  and  iron  recurred  in  supply  mains  and  reticulation  lines  downstream  of  the  plant.  Chlorine  levels  
leaving  the  plant  were  also  found  to  be  too  low  to  maintain  an  effective  chlorine  residual  throughout  the  
system.  

4.2 R IS KS  ID E N T IF IE D  T H RO U G H  WAT E R  Q UA L IT Y  A N A LYS IS  


Water  quality  data  were  sourced  from  RWC  and  the  NSW  Health  (Water  Quality  Database).  To  allow  
statistical  formulae  to  handle  the  full  body  of  data,  non-­‐detects  were  transformed  to  half  the  detection  
limit  and  values  above  the  upper  dynamic  range  of  the  assay  to  twice  the  upper  limit.  
Graphs  of  the  water  quality  parameters  can  be  found  in  Appendix  B.  The  water  quality  parameters  are  
summarised  in  Table  4-­‐2,  Table  4-­‐3,  Table  4-­‐4,  and  Table  4-­‐5  below.  
Gollumville  Hokey  Pokey  Water  Quality  
Water  quality  data  was  extracted  from  the  NSW  Health  verification  monitoring  database  for  testing  carried  
out  in  the  Gollumville  reticulation  supplied  by  Hokey  Pokey  WTP  over  the  period  1-­‐1-­‐2001  to  31-­‐7-­‐2011.  
Water  was  tested  for  38  quality  parameters.  An  analysis  of  the  results  against  the  Australian  Drinking  Water  
Guidelines  2011  is  provided  in  the  tables  below.  Table  4-­‐2  provides  statistics  for  common  parameters,  and  
Table  4-­‐3  provides  descriptions  for  all  parameters  where  any  exceedences  were  recorded.    
TABLE  4-­‐2.  SUMMARY  OF  WATER  QUALITY  DATA  FOR  GOLLUMVILLE  RETICULATION  SUPPLIED  FROM  HOKEY  POKEY  
WTP  (NSW  HEALTH  DATA).  
Parameter   Units   Samples   Min   5th  %ile   Mean   95th  %ile   Max   ADWG  Value   Exceedances  

pH     145   5   6.50   7.86   9.00   9.50   6.5  -­‐  8.5   34  


True  Colour   HU   118   1   0.50   1.22   3.40   11.00   15   0  
Turbidity   NTU   142   0.1   0.05   0.43   1.19   8.00   5  (aesthetic)   2  
1  (desirable  for   8  
disinfection)  
Iron   mg/L   126   0.01   0.01   0.06   0.16   2.11   0.3   1  
Manganese   mg/L   141   0.005   0.00   0.02   0.09   0.52   0.5  (health)   1  
0.1  (aesthetic)   7  
Aluminium   mg/L   126   0.01   0.01   0.13   0.56   1.50   0.2   16  
Nickel   mg/L   128   0.01   0.01   0.02   0.05   0.22   0.02   21  
Thermotoler cfu/mL   102   0   0.00   0.23   0.00   15.00   0   4  
ant  Coliforms  
E.  coli   cfu/mL   746   0   0.00   0.00   0.00   1.00   0   2  
Total   (mg/L  as   126   0.099   3.70   28.30   49.30   95.30   200   0  
Hardness   CaCO3)  

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TABLE  4-­‐3.  WATER  QUALITY  ISSUES  FOR  GOLLUMVILLE  RETICULATION  SUPPLIED  FROM  HOKEY  POKEY  WTP.  
Issue   Frequency   Comment  

pH   Occasionally   pH  was  outside  the  guideline  range  on  35  occasions  from  1255  samples,  the  most  
recent  exceedence  in  2009.  

E.  coli   Rarely   2  positive  detects  for  E.  coli  were  found  from  821  samples,  the  most  recent  in  2003.  

Turbidity   Rarely   2  exceedences  were  found  for  turbidity  in  2004  and  2005,  plus  8  exceedences  of  the  
desirable  limit  for  disinfection  
Free  chlorine   Rarely   1  exceedence  was  found  for  free  chlorine  in  2009.  

Aluminium   Occasionally   16  exceedences  for  aluminium  were  found  from  126  samples,  occurring  consistently  
across  the  sampling  period.  

Iron   Rarely   3  exceedences  were  found  for  iron,  the  most  recent  in  2009.  

Nickel   Occasionally   21  exceedences  for  nickel  were  found  from  128  samples,  during  a  period  from  2004  –  
2006.    

Total  Hardness   Often   60  –  200  mg/L  is  described  as  good  quality  water  in  the  ADWG  2011.  While  there  were  
no  exceedences  of  200  mg/L,  hardness  is  often  lower  than  the  recommended  
minimum  of  60  mg/L,  at  which  the  water  can  be  described  as  soft  but  possibly  
corrosive.  

Gollumville  Villages  Farmers  River  Water  Quality  


Water  quality  data  was  extracted  from  the  NSW  Health  verification  monitoring  database  for  testing  carried  
out  in  Gollumville  Villages  supplied  by  Farmers  River  Water  Supply  over  the  period  1-­‐1-­‐2001  to  31-­‐7-­‐2011.  
Water  was  tested  for  37  quality  parameters.  An  analysis  of  the  results  against  the  Australian  Drinking  Water  
Guidelines  2011  is  provided  in  the  tables  below.  Table  4-­‐4  provides  statistics  for  common  parameters,  and  
Table  4-­‐5  provides  descriptions  for  all  parameters  where  any  exceedences  were  recorded.    
 
TABLE  4-­‐4.  SUMMARY  OF  WATER  QUALITY  DATA  FOR  GOLLUMVILLE  VILLAGES  SUPPLIED  FROM  FARMERS  RIVER  WATER  
SUPPLY  (NSW  HEALTH  DATA).  
Parameter   Units   No.   Min   5th   Mean   95th   Max   ADWG  Value   Exceedances  
Samples   %ile   %ile  
pH     87   6.5   6.8   7.28   7.97   8.5   6.5  -­‐  8.5   0  
True  Colour   HU   68   1   1   6.89   14.20   17.7   15   2  
Turbidity   NTU   87   0.1   0.1   2.17   8.56   22.2   5  (aesthetic)   10  
1  (desirable  for   40  
disinfection)  
Iron   mg/L   73   0.01   0.01   0.13   0.39   1.02   0.3   6  
Manganese   mg/L   85   0.005   0.003   0.09   0.21   2.43   0.5  (health)   3  
0.1  (aesthetic)   12  
Thermotolerant   cfu/mL   140   0   0   0.67   2.05   35   0   14  
Coliforms  
E.  coli   cfu/mL   1291   0   0   0.48   0   78   0   52  
Total  Hardness   (mg/L  as   78   5.4   23.86   29.36   35.03   41.5   200   0  
CaCO3)  
 
 
 

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TABLE  4-­‐5.  WATER  QUALITY  ISSUES  FOR  GOLLUMVILLE  VILLAGES  SUPPLIED  FROM  FARMERS  RIVER  WATER  SUPPLY.  
Issue   Frequency   Comment  

E.  coli   Occasionally   59  positive  detects  for  E.  coli  were  found  from  1410  samples,  the  most  recent  in  2009.  

Turbidity   Occasionally   10  exceedences  of  the  aesthetic  guideline  and  40  exeedences  of  the  recommended  limit  for  
disinfection  were  found.  

Iodine   Rarely   1  exceedence  for  iodine  was  found  in  2002.  

Iron   Occasionally   6  exceedences  were  found  for  iron  from  73  samples  

Lead   Rarely   1  exceedence  for  lead  was  found  in  2011.  

Manganese   Rarely   3  exceedences  were  found  for  manganese  from  85  samples  

True  Colour   Rarely   2  minor  exceedences  were  found  for  true  colour  from  68  samples.  

Total  Hardness   Always   60  –  200  mg/L  is  described  as  good  quality  water  in  the  ADWG  2011.  While  there  were  no  
exceedences  of  200  mg/L,  hardness  is  always  lower  than  the  recommended  minimum  of  60  
mg/L,  at  which  the  water  can  be  described  as  soft  but  possibly  corrosive.  

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5 RISK  ASSESSMENT  PROCESS  


5.1 R IS K   A S S ES S M E N T  
Events  and  hazards  were  identified  for  each  process  step.  Risks  posed  by  each  of  the  events  were  assessed.  
Participants  were  asked  to  identify  the:  
Hazardous  event   A  hazardous  event  is  one  that  introduces  contaminants  (hazards)  to  the  
water.    
For  this  risk  assessment  the  hazardous  event  will  be  for  the  level  of  
contamination  to  be  unacceptable  for  treatment  through  the  downstream  
processes.  Examples  of  a  hazardous  event  might  be:    
• cyanobacterial  bloom  resulting  in  toxins  that  cannot  be  removed  
by  downstream  processes  
• distribution   reservoir   contamination   by   vermin   resulting   in  
pathogens  in  the  distribution  system  
Hazard   A  hazard  is  a  physical,  chemical,  biological  or  radiological  agent  in  the  
water  with  the  potential  to  cause  an  adverse  effect.    
Examples  of  hazards  might  be:  
• Human-­‐infectious   pathogens   and   nutrients   from   failing   septic  
tanks    
• Particles  and  nutrients  from  land  clearing  practices  
Controls  in  place   Controls  are  practices  and  equipment  that  reduce  the  hazard  or  the  
hazardous  event:  
 
Examples  of  controls  include:  
• Catchment  management  programs  to  reduce  nutrients  in  the  river  
thereby  reducing  cyanobacterial  blooms  
• A  water  treatment  plant  
• A  backflow  prevention  program  
Controlled  Risk   This  was  assessed  by  identifying  the  likelihood  and  consequence  of  the  
hazardous  event  occurring  with  the  control  in  place  (residual  risk).  The  
risks  were  assessed  as  Likelihood  (Table  5-­‐1)  x  Consequence  (Table  5-­‐2).    
A  risk  assessment  matrix  (ADWG,  2011)  was  used  to  assess  the  identified  
risks  (Table  5-­‐3).  
Maximum  Risk     Likelihood  and  consequence  of  the  hazardous  event  occurring  if  the  
controls  were  to  fail  or  without  the  controls  in  place.  
 
The  results  were  captured  during  the  workshop  via  an  Excel®  spreadsheet.  

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TABLE  5-­‐1.  LIKELIHOOD  TABLE  (ADWG,  2011).  

 
 
TABLE  5-­‐2.  CONSEQUENCE  TABLE  (ADWG,  2011).  

 
 
TABLE  5-­‐3.  RISK  MATRIX  (ADWG,  2011).  

5.2 S U M M A RY  
A  total  of  71  hazardous  events  were  identified  for  the  Gollumville  system.  All  events  have  been  captured  
within  an  Excel®-­‐based  Risk  Register.  Note  that  ‘uncertainty’  was  captured  along  with  any  other  comments,  
in  the  ‘Basis/Notes’  section  of  the  Risk  Register.  The  register  will  be  reviewed  at  a  set  frequency  and/or  on  
system  changes.  The  Risk  Register,  as  determined  at  this  workshop,  is  presented  in  Appendix  C.  
Risks  remaining  high  after  controls  were  assessed  are  as  follows:  
 Soft  water  in  the  source  water  
 First  flush  rain  event  introducing  contaminants  into  catchment  waterways    
 Short  circuiting  of  filters  leading  to  breakthroughs  
 Underdosing  of  chlorine  (inc  equipment  failure  or  running  out)  leading  to  chlorine  sensitive  
pathogen  survival  in  finished  water  (primary  kill)  
 High  pH  in  the  water  causing  issues  such  as  skin  rashes  and  reduced  disinfection  efficiency  
 Underdosing  of  chlorine  resulting  in  lack  of  chlorine  residuals  in  distribution  system  

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 Raw  water  can  be  connected  into  the  distribution  system  downstream  of  the  clearwater  tank  
resulting  in  undisinfected  water  being  supplied  to  customers  
 Low  chlorine  residuals  resulting  in  the  potential  for  water  quality  failure  
 Malicious  contamination  leading  to  water  contamination  
 Reservoirs  are  not  routinely  maintained  or  checked  resulting  in  water  quality  contamination  eg  
gutter  blockage  and  overflow,  vermin  access  
 Receipt  of  non-­‐conforming  water  into  Gollumville's  distribution  system  resulting  in  water  quality  
issues  
 Aging  infrastructure  leading  to  ingress  and  water  quality  issues  
 Reduced  velocities  in  the  main  resulting  in  conditions  that  favour  biofilm  formation  and  sediment  
accumulation  
 Mains  break  or  perforation  (air  valves  etc)  leading  to  water  quality  issues  
 Disgruntled  employees  or  contractors  leading  to  malicious  damage  resulting  in  poor  water  quality  
(note  that  employees  and  contractors  understand  the  system  so  would  know  where  to  act  to  cause  
most  damage  e.g.  altering  SCADA,  contaminating  clearwater  tank  etc)  
Risks  reduced  from  Very  High  to  Low  with  controls  in  place  are  as  follows:  
 Recreational  activities  in  the  catchment    (illegal)  including  4WD,  camping  
 Recreational  activities  in  the  catchment  (illegal)  
 Ingress  into  clear  water  tank  through  integrity  issues  and  potentially  flood  inundation  from  creek  
Risks  reduced  from  High  to  Low  with  controls  in  place  are  as  follows:  
 Reservoir  turnover  leading  to  water  quality  issues  
 Receipt  of  high  levels  of  metals  (Fe  and  Mn)  from  Percy  source  above  ADWG  values  
 Receipt  of  high  levels  of  metals  (Ni)  from  Percy  Colliery  source  above  ADWG  values  
 Over  and  underdosing  of  coagulant  
 Rapid  change  in  raw  water  turbidity  resulting  in  inability  to  treat  
 Bushfire  taking  out  the  plant  
A  total  of  56  actions  was  identified  in  the  workshop  (with  two  added  post  workshop  to  take  the  total  to  58)  
to  address  the  identified  risks.  An  Action  Plan  has  been  developed  and  is  presented  in  Appendix  D.  
An  overall  summary  of  the  uncontrolled  (‘maximum’)  and  controlled  (‘residual’)  risks  is  presented  in  tabular  
and  graphical  form  below  (Table  5-­‐4,  Table  5-­‐5  and  Figure  5-­‐1).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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TABLE  5-­‐4.  RESIDUAL  RISK  SUMMARY  


System Components High Low Moderate Uncertain Very High Grand Total
Distribution 3 2 3 2 2 12
Fishers Creek Catchment 2 5 2 1 10
Fishers Creek Dam 1 2 3 6
Percy Colliery Source 2 2 4
Coagulation 4 2 6
Clarification 2 2
Filtration (mono media) 1 1 2 4
Disinfection (chlorine gas) 3 1 4
Post Dosing (stabilisation) 1 1
pH correction 1 1 2
Clearwater Tank 1 1
Raw Water Bypass 1 1
Distribution Reservoirs 3 2 5
Chlorine Boosters 1 1 1 3
Farmers River Source 1 1 2
Non-potable water at Taraville 1 1
Whole of System 1 3 3 7
Grand Total 15 24 18 9 5 71
 
TABLE  5-­‐5.  UNCONTROLLED  RISK  SUMMARY  
System Components High Low Moderate Uncertain Very High Grand Total
Distribution 5 2 1 2 2 12
Fishers Creek Catchment 2 2 1 5 10
Fishers Creek Dam 3 3 6
Percy Colliery Source 2 2 4
Coagulation 4 2 6
Clarification 1 1 2
Filtration (mono media) 2 2 4
Disinfection (chlorine gas) 1 1 2 4
Post Dosing (stabilisation) 1 1
pH correction 1 1 2
Clearwater Tank 1 1
Raw Water Bypass 1 1
Distribution Reservoirs 1 2 2 5
Chlorine Boosters 1 1 1 3
Farmers River Source 2 2
Non-potable water at Taraville 1 1
Whole of System 3 1 2 1 7
Grand Total 24 5 14 9 19 71
 

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FIGURE  5-­‐1.  GRAPHICAL  REPRESENTATION  OF  RISKS  (X  AXIS  –  RISK  RATING;  Y  –  AXIS  –  NUMBER  OF  RISKS  IDENTIFIED).  

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6 CRITICAL  CONTROL  POINT  IDENTIFICATION  


Critical  control  points  are  the  operational  core  of  the  drinking  water  management  system.  CCPs  are  covered  
under  Element  3  of  the  Framework.  In  the  Framework,  CCPs  are  defined  as:  
“…..an  activity,  procedure  or  process  at  which  control  can  be  applied  and  which  is  essential  to  prevent  a  
hazard  or  reduce  it  to  an  acceptable  level.”  
For  a  point  to  be  considered  critical  it  must:  
• Control   hazards   that   represent   a   significant   risk   and   require   elimination   or   reduction   to   assure  
supply  of  safe  drinking  water.  
• Have  a  parameter  (surrogate)  that  can  be  measured  in  a  timely  manner  for  the  hazardous  event  
• Be  able  to  have  a  correction  applied  in  response  to  a  deviation  in  the  process  
The  key  risks  from  the  risk  assessment  were  reviewed  and  the  critical  control  points  were  identified.    
The  points  in  the  Gollumville  system  identified  as  critical  control  points  (or  future  critical  control  points)  
were  (see  also  Table  6-­‐1):  
1. Plant  Inlet  (Raw  Water  Inlet  Valve)  
2. Filtration  (supported  by  coagulation)  
3. Primary  Disinfection  (outlet  of  Clearwater  tank)  
4. Fluoridation  (when  in  place)  
5. Distribution  Reservoirs  (once  procedures  and  monitoring  are  established)  
TABLE  6-­‐1.  CRITICAL  CONTROL  POINT  WORKSHOP  OUTCOMES.  
Critical Controls Parameter Operating Adjustment Critical Comments
Control Point Target Limit Limit
Plant Inlet Pathogens/Turbidity Turbidity (currently Operating Design
(Inlet Valve) not online, sample range limit
taken to lab)
Coagulation pH pH 6.4 <6 >7 Remains Operational not critical
(Operational at <5 >7.5 control point
Point) after Monitoring of Al residual
adjustment
Filtration Pathogens Turbidity 0.3 NTU 0.5 NTU 1 NTU
Primary Chlorine sensitive Free chlorine 1.7 mg/L <1.5mg/L 1.2 mg/L Limits are set on ability to
Disinfection pathogens residual (manual maintain a distribution
(outlet of measurements) chlorine residual.
CWT) Consider having online
telemetered
measurement. The limit of
1.2 mg/L is subject to
review and may need to
be amended to ensure
that an appropriate
chlorine residual (0.2
mg/L) reaches
consumers.
Primary Chlorine sensitive pH 7.8-8.2 <7 >8.5 Remains Consider changing pH
Disinfection pathogens at >8.5 monitoring point to inlet of
(outlet of after CWT.
CWT) adjustment
Fluoridation Fluoride Fluoride To be established once
fluoridation is online (see
below Section 6.1)
Distribution Pathogens Free chlorine Zone specific FCl currently measured in
Reservoirs residual the distribution system not
at the reservoir. Could
consider having a
monitoring point directly
downstream of the
reservoirs. Sampling
points to be reviewed for
appropriateness.
Distribution Pathogens Vermin-proofed Is vermin Evidence of Breach not

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Critical Controls Parameter Operating Adjustment Critical Comments


Control Point Target Limit Limit
Reservoirs proof breaches rectified
Distribution Pathogens Secure and leak- Is secure Evidence on Breach not
Reservoirs proof breach rectified
 
The  critical  limits  will  be  considered  further  as  the  critical  control  points  are  refined  during  development  
and  implementation.  

6.1 A R EA S  O F  A D D IT IO N A L  WO R K  TO  S U P P O RT   CCP  D E V E LO P M E N T  


Distribution  
Note  that  while  distribution  reservoirs  were  considered  by  the  team  as  needing  to  be  assigned  as  critical  
control  points,  the  monitoring  and  procedures  supporting  this  system  component  are  currently  not  well  
developed  and  will  need  to  be  reviewed  before  the  distribution  reservoirs  can  be  assigned  as  a  critical  
control  point.  

Fluoridation  
While  fluoridation  is  not  currently  in  place  at  the  Hokey  Pokey  Water  Treatment  Plant,  fluoridation  will  be  
assigned  as  a  critical  control  point  once  in  operation.  

Farmers  River  WS/Gollumville  System  Interface  Points  


Discussion  was  had  by  the  group  around  the  Farmers  River  WS  handover  points  and  whether  they  
could/should  be  assigned  as  critical  control  points.  Given  that  there  is  currently  no  monitoring  or  
procedures  in  place  at  the  handover  points,  the  consensus  was  that  these  points  in  the  system  should  be  
reviewed  in  terms  of  the  legal  water  quality  agreement  and  the  procedures/monitoring,  and  then  
reassessed  at  a  later  date.  See  Actions  13  to  16,  37,  38,  41  and  45  relating  to  issues  associated  with  receipt  
of  water  from  other  sources.  

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7 REFERENCES    
References  which  specifically  identify  this  water  supply  system  have  been  removed.  
ADWG  (2011)  NHMRC/NRMMC  (National  Health  and  Medical  Research  Council/  Natural  Resource  
Management  Ministerial  Council)  Australian  Drinking  Water  Guidelines  (ADWG)  National  Water  Quality  
Management  Strategy.  ISBN  Online:  1864965118.  
Angulo,  F.J.,  Tippen,  S.,  Sharp,  D.J.,  Payne,  B.J.,  Collier,  C.,  Hill,  J.E.,  Barrett,  T.J.,  Clark,  R,M.,  Geldreich,  E.E.,  
Donnell,  H.D.  and  Swerdlow,  D.L.  (1997)  A  community  waterborne  outbreak  of  salmonellosis  and  the  
effectiveness  of  a  boil  water  order.  American  Journal  of  Public  Health  87(4):  580-­‐584.  
Clark,  R.  (2000)  Water  quality  modelling  case  studies.  In:  Water  distribution  systems  handbook.  Ed.  Mays,  
L.W.  McGraw  Hill  New  York.  
Clark,  R.M.,  Geldreich,  E.E.,  Fox,  K.R.,  Rice,  E.W.,  Johnson,  C.H.,  Goodrich,  J.A.,  Barnick,  J.A.,  Abdesaken,  F.  
(1996)  Tracking  a  Salmonella  serovar  typhimurium  outbreak  in  Gideon,  Missouri:  Role  of  contaminant  
propagation  modelling.  Aqua  -­‐  Journal  of  Water  Supply:  Research  and  Technology  [AQUA  J.  WATER  SUPPLY  
TECHNOL.].  Vol.  45,  no.  4,  pp.  171-­‐183  
Falco,  R.  and  Williams,  S.I.  (2009)  Waterborne  Salmonella  outbreak  in  Alamosa,  Colorado  March  and  April  
2008.  Outbreak  identification  response,  and  investigation.  Safe  Drinking  Water  Program  Water  Quality  
Control  Division.  Colorado  Department  of  Public  Health  and  Environment.  
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/wq/drinkingwater/pdf/AlamosaInvestRpt.pdf.  
Olinger,  D.  (2009)  Tainted  water  still  burdens  town.  Denver  Post    22  March  2009.  
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_11968436.  
 
 
   

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APPENDIX  A  WORKSHOP  DETAILS  


WORKSHOP  AGENDA  

Item   Description  

Date/Time:   1  September  2011  /  08:30  am  for  a  9:00  am  start  to  5:00  pm  
Venue   Council  Chambers,  Regional  Water  Corp,  180  Mort  Street,  Gollumville  NSW  2790  
Contacts:   Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes.  
 
 
Time   Session   Item   Person    

8:45  –  9:00   Arrival   Arrival  and  tea/coffee   Removed  for  de-­‐


identification  purposes  

9:00  –  9:05   Welcome     Introduction  roundtable      

9:05  –  9:10   Introduction   Overview  of  project      

9:10  –  09:30   System   Scope  of  workshop      


Description   Description  of  the  water  supply  system  including  catchment  
description,  water  quality  data  analysis  and  presentation  of  flow  
diagram  

09:30  –  9:50   Flow  Diagram   Workshop  to  confirm  flow  diagram    

9:50  –  10:15   Workshop   Workshop  methodology    


Overview  

10:15  –  10:30     Break   Morning  tea    

10:15  –  12:30   Risk  Assessment   Workshop  events,  hazards,  risks  and  controls    

12:30  –  13:00   Break   Lunch    

13:00  –  15:00   Risk  Assessment   Continued    

14:30  –  14:45   Break   Afternoon  tea    

14:45  –  16:00   Risk  Assessment   Continued    

16:00-­‐16:50   Critical  Control   Review  CCPs    


Points     Assign  critical  limits  where  possible  

16:50  –  17:00   Close   Workshop  close  and  next  steps    

 
WORKSHOP  PARTICIPANTS  

 
Removed  for  de-­‐identification  purposes,  should  ordinarily  include  a  scanned  sign-­‐in  sheet  of  the  workshop  
participants.  
 
 

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APPENDIX  B  WATER  QUALITY  DATA  


 

Hokey  Pokey  WTP  Gollumville  -­‐ Raw  Water  Turbidity


Raw  Turbidity
120

110

100

90

80

70

Turbidity 60
(NTU)
50

40
Data  unavailable
30

20

10

Date  Sampled
 
 

Hokey  Pokey  WTP  Gollumville  -­‐ Treated  Turbidity  &  Retic  Turbidity
WTP  Treated  Turbidity Gollumville  Retic  Turbidity ADWG  Turbidity

2.5

Turbidity
1.5
(NTU)

WTP  data  
unavailable
1

0.5

Date  Sampled
 
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Hokey  Pokey  WTP  Gollumville  -­‐ WTP  Free  Chlorine  &  pH
WTP  Free  Chlorine WTP  Treated  pH

2.5 10

2.25 9

2 8

1.75 7

1.5 6
Free  Chlorine Data  unavailable
pH
(mg/L) 1.25 5

1 4

0.75 3

0.5 2

0.25 1

0 0

Date  Sampled
 
 

Gollumville  Villages  FRWS  Supply  -­‐ Free  Chlorine


Starboard Wangwall Tindale Valleyville Collen  1 Collen  2 Collen  3

0.5

0.45

0.4

0.35

0.3

Free  Chlorine
(mg/L) 0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

Date  Sampled

 
 

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Gollumville  Villages  FRWS  Supply  -­‐ Retic  Turbidity

Tindale  Reservoir Wangwall ADWG  Turbidity

25

20

15

Turbidity
(NTU)

10

Date  Sampled
 

Gollumville  Villages  FRWS  Supply  -­‐ E.  coli


Wangwall Tindale Valleyville Collen  2 Collen  3

90

80

70

60

50
E.  coli
(cfu/100mL)
40

30

20

10

Date  Sampled
 

   
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APPENDIX  C  WORKSHOP  RISK  REGISTER  


No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
FC1 Fishers Soft water in the None RWC A 2 High A 2 High
Creek source water
Catchme
nt

FC2 Fishers Rainfall Fire WTP, RWC C 2 Moderat C 4 Very High Operational
Creek following retardants, Dam, e issues
Catchme bushfire or ash, natural associated
nt grassfire Turbidity environme with
resulting in run Tastes nt, changing
off into the and alternative over to
catchment odours supply Farmers
River supply
FC3 Fishers First flush rain Nutrients, WTP, RWC B 2 High B 4 Very High Risk based
Creek event BGA, Dam, on need to
Catchme introducing Toxins, natural adjust
nt contaminants Tastes environme operation
into catchment and nt, when first
waterways Odours alternative flushes
Turbidity supply occur
DBP pre-
cursors
FC4 Fishers Accidents and Pathogens No roads RWC, E 1 Low E 4 High A lot of 4WD
Creek spills on close to SES, activity in
Catchme catchment roads rivers, emergen the
nt into water reasonably cy catchment.
causing water closed services Logging
quality issues catchment, trucks use
emergency the
service catchment.
response,
WTP,
reservoir
detention
and
dilution,
alternative
supply
FC5 Fishers Accidents and Hydrocarb No roads RWC, D 2 Low D 3 Moderate
Creek spills on ons close to SES,
Catchme catchment roads Various rivers, emergen
nt into water chemicals reasonably cy
causing water closed services
quality issues catchment,
emergency
service
response,
WTP (not
designed
for
hydrocarbo
n etc
removal),
reservoir
detention
and
dilution,
alternative
supply
FC6 Fishers Legal and illegal Turbidity, WTP, RWC, C 1 Low C 2 Moderate
Creek motorcycle track DBP pre- Dam, State
Catchme in head of cursors natural Forests
nt catchment and environme
4WD causing nt, some
erosion restricted
access,
planning

Page  26  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
powers

FC7 Fishers Overloading of Pathogens WTP, RWC, B 1 Moderat B 4 Very High Know that
Creek Motorcycle club Dam, Leasehol e systems in
Catchme septic system natural der other parts
nt overflowing environme of the LGA
leading to nt, are failing
pathogens in inspection so likely that
catchment powers, this one
onsite might be.
sewage Risk
manageme assessment
nt policy based on
more likely
to overflow
during an
event at the
club.
FC8 Fishers Recreational Crypto Powers RWC E 1 Low C 4 Very High Signs of
Creek activities in the under camping,
Catchme catchment PEOA and fires toileting
nt (illegal) Sect 632 is known in
including 4WD, LGA, the
camping filtration, catchment.
dam Rangers
(dentention work 5/7
, dilution), 1 sign in
travel time catchment
FC9 Fishers Recreational Chlorine Powers RWC E 1 Low C 4 Very High Signs of
Creek activities in the sensitive under camping,
Catchme catchment pathogens PEOA and fires toileting
nt (illegal) Sect 632 is known in
LGA, the
chlorine catchment.
disinfection Rangers
, dam work 5/7
(dentention 1 sign in
, dilution), catchment
travel time
FC1 Fishers Illegal dumping Various Powers RWC, Uncerta Uncertain Increased
0 Creek in the catchment (most under OEH, in incidence of
Catchme leading to water likely to be PEOA, SCA, illegal
nt quality issues chemicals, chlorine State dumping
can be disinfection Forests noted since
pathogens , dam environment
from (dentention levy for
pumpouts) , dilution), dumping
travel time, introduced.
OEH
surveillanc
e, rangers
(5/7)
FCD Fishers Reservoir Mn, Fe, WTP, RWC E 2 Low E 4 High Has
1 Creek turnover leading taste and alternative occurred in
Dam to water quality odours, supply, raw the past.
issues turbidity water
monitoring
at the head
of the
plant, level
of offtake
FCD Fishers Deliberate Various WTP, RWC E 3 Moderat E 4 High Car has
2 Creek contamination of (most alternative e been found
Dam the reservoir likely to be supply, previously in
chemicals) dilution, the dam.
raw water
monitoring
at the head
of the plant

Page  27  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
FCD Fishers Short circuiting Turbidity WTP, RWC Uncerta Uncertain Unclear
3 Creek of reservoir Pathogens alternative in whether
Dam supply, short
dilution, circuiting
raw water occurs.
monitoring
at the head
of the plant
FCD Fishers Cross Algae, WTP, Uncerta Uncertain
4 Creek contamination of pathogens alternative in
Dam dam (farm dams supply,
etc) with dilution
helicopter
access to fight
fires
FCD Fishers Illegal Pathogen, WTP, RWC A 1 Moderat A 2 High Occurs
5 Creek recreational turbidity, dilution, e mostly in
Dam activities in the taste and dam summer.
dam (swimming, odours inspections Only a few
dog access etc) numbers of
people at a
time.
FCD Fishers High levels of Metals Dam, RWC Uncerta Uncertain
6 Creek metals coming dilution in
Dam in from
upstream
sources
CCS Percy Receipt of poor Hydrocarb Formal RWC Uncerta Uncertain No formal
1 Colliery quality water ons agreement in water quality
Source into Fishers to supply agreement
Creek Dam water, in place with
informal LoCoal
operating Corp.
protocol. Proposal
New Water being
Committee considered
has been to put water
formed to directly into
discuss the dam at
water the dam
quality wall. -
issues. variability in
Dilution in water quality
the dam anyway.
but less in Inconsistenc
drought. y in the
volume of
water
received
from Percy
on a daily
basis.
Hydrocarbo
ns are
perceived
as a
problem in
the
community.
CCS Percy Receipt of high Fe, Mn Formal CC C 1 Low C 3 High Metals have
2 Colliery levels of metals agreement been found
Source from Percy to supply to be an
source above water, issue.
ADWG values informal Rarely have
operating a failure at
protocol. the plant in
New Water Fe and Mn.
Committee Settling
has been ponds will
formed to disappear
discuss with the new
water proposal.

Page  28  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
quality
issues.
Dilution in
the dam
but less in
drought.
WTP.
Shandy
with
alternative
supply.
Settling
ponds.
CCS Percy Receipt of high Ni Formal CC C 1 Low C 3 High Ni has been
3 Colliery levels of metals agreement an issue in
Source from Percy to supply the past
source above water, (2005) but
ADWG values informal doesn't
operating seem to
protocol. have been
New Water much of an
Committee issue since
has been introduction
formed to of the DAF
discuss plant at
water LoCoal
quality Corp.
issues. Settling
Dilution in ponds will
the dam disappear
but less in with the new
drought. proposal.
Shandy
with
alternative
supply.
Settling
ponds.
CCS Percy Short circuiting Various Consider Uncerta Uncertain No formal
4 Colliery of Percy inputs this event in water quality
Source in the agreement
pipeline in place with
proposal. LoCoal
Corp.
Proposal
being
considered
to put water
directly into
the dam at
the dam
wall.
pH1 pH Under or no Pathogen, Operator RWC C 2 Moderat B 3 High Monitoring
correctio dosing of soda turbidity, monitoring e is not
n ash causing pH Al, pH, Fe, at number continuous
lower than Mn 1 weir,
optimal for manual
coagulation control
over the
dosing,
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training,
observatio
n of
clarifier for
colour
change

Page  29  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
and check
of hopper
and
quantity

pH2 pH Overdosing of Pathogen, Operator RWC D 2 Low D 3 Moderate Monitoring


correctio soda ash turbidity, monitoring is not
n causing pH Al, pH, Fe, at number continuous
higher than Mn 1 weir,
optimal for manual
coagulation control
over the
dosing,
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training,
observatio
n of
clarifier for
colour
change
and check
of hopper
and
quantity
Coa Coagulat Underdosing of Turbidity Operator RWC C 2 Moderat C 3 High
g1 ion coagulant Pathogen, monitoring e
leading to failure Fe, Mn by
to achieve observatio
flocculation n, manual
control
over the
dosing,
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training
(and
experience
),
observatio
n of
clarifier for
colour
change
and daily
jar testing,
filters
Coa Coagulat Overdosing of Aluminium Operator RWC C 2 Moderat B 3 High Some Al
g2 ion coagulant monitoring e noted in
by retic. Risk
observatio ranked more
n, manual on
control community
over the perception
dosing, issue than
O&M on health issue.
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator

Page  30  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
training
(and
experience
),
observatio
n of
clarifier for
colour
change
and daily
jar testing,
filters
Coa Coagulat Over and Colour Operator RWC C 1 Low C 3 High Colour has
g3 ion underdosing of (DOC), monitoring not >10 in
coagulant DBPs by the last
observatio years.
n, manual
control
over the
dosing,
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training
(and
experience
),
observatio
n of
clarifier for
colour
change
and daily
jar testing,
filters
Coa Coagulat Mechanical/equi Turbidity Operator RWC D 2 Low D 3 Moderate Difficult to
g4 ion pment Pathogens monitoring source
failure/maintena by replacement
ce of observatio parts for the
flocculators n, O&M on flocculators.
leading to water equipment, Stability and
quality issues operator low turbidity
training of the water
(and means the
experience uncontrolled
), risk is only a
observatio 3
n of
clarifier for
colour
change
and daily
jar testing,
filters.
Redundan
cy (2 can
operate
instead of
3).
Alternative
SUPPLY
source.
Coa Coagulat Raw water is too Turbidity Operator RWC D 1 Low D 3 Moderate Rated as a
g5 ion 'clean' causing Pathogens monitoring 3 for
flocculation to by uncontrolled
be less than observatio risks due to
optimum n, downstream
operator impacts
training

Page  31  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
(and
experience
), daily jar
testing,
filters
Coa Coagulat Rapid change in Turbidity Operator RWC E 2 Low E 4 High Turbidity
g6 ion raw water Pathogens monitoring has only
turbidity by been above
resulting in observatio 10 NTU
inability to treat n, manual once in 5
control years
over the (related to
dosing, bushfire?)
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training
(and
experience
),
observatio
n of
clarifier for
colour
change,
filters,
plant
shutdown
followed by
jar test (
and daily
jar testing)
monitor
rainfall.
Clar Clarificati Failure to clarify Turbidity Automatic RWC D 1 Low D 2 Low
1 on properly leading Pathogens desludging
to water quality ,
issues at the desludging
filter valves,
alternative
supply
Clar Clarificati Bypass of the Turbidity Sand filters RWC E 2 Low E 3 Moderate Informal
2 on clarifier (during Pathogens (direct procedure to
maintenace) filtration), change over
controlled
operation
F1 Filtration Short circuiting Turbidity Backwash RWC C 3 High B 4 Very High
(mono of filters leading Pathogens on
media) to headloss,
breakthroughs filter run
times,
Operator
monitoring
by
observatio
n, manual
control
over the
dosing,
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training
(and
experience
), plant

Page  32  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
shutdown
followed by
jar test (
and daily
jar testing),
chlorinatio
n for
chlorine
sensitive
pathogens
F2 Filtration Poor filter Turbidity Backwash RWC C 2 Moderat B 4 Very High
(mono performance Pathogens on e
media) e.g. filter headloss,
nozzles, filter filter run
media loss, high times,
loads in water, Operator
aborted monitoring
backwash by
observatio
n, manual
control
over the
dosing,
O&M on
equipment,
calibration
of testing
equipment,
operator
training
(and
experience
), plant
shutdown
followed by
jar test
(and daily
jar testing),
chlorinatio
n for
chlorine
sensitive
pathogens,
plant
shutdown
on some
failures.
F3 Filtration Filter ripening Turbidity Disinfectio RWC D 1 Low C 2 Moderate
(mono issues leading Pathogens n for
media) to pathogen chlorine
breakthrough sensitive
pathogens
F4 Filtration Filter ripening Crypto No controls RWC C 2 Moderat C 2 Moderate Crypotospor
(mono issues leading e idum is not
media) to pathogen considered
breakthrough a high risk in
this water

Dis1 Disinfecti Overdosing of T&O DBPs Operator RWC E 2 Low E 2 Low


on chlorine leading Chlorine training,
(chlorine to high levels in Sampling,
gas) finished water O&M,
Dosing
controls,
customer
complaint
monitoring

Page  33  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
Dis2 Disinfecti Underdosing of Turbidity Operator RWC D 4 High C 4 Very High No
on chlorine (inc Pathogens training, telemetered
(chlorine equipment sampling chlorine
gas) failure or at plant monitoring
running out) (daily) and
leading to in
chlorine reticulation
senstive (weekly by
pathogen RWC),
survival in O&M,
finished water Dosing
(primary kill) controls,
public
health
survellienc
e
(collected
by Council
ranges).
Duty/stand
by on
chlorinatio
n bottles.
Dis3 Disinfecti High pH in the Pathogens Operator RWC B 2 High B 2 High pH range
on water causing training, should be
(chlorine issues such as post 7.8 - 8.2.
gas) skin rashes and dosing, Occurs a
reduced wind down few times a
disinfection upstream year in
efficiency dosing higher
range.
Dis4 Disinfecti Underdosing of Pathogens Operator RWC A 2 High A 4 Very High
on chlorine training,
(chlorine resulting in lack sampling
gas) of chlorine at plant
residuals in (daily) and
distribution in
system reticulation
(weekly by
RWC),
O&M,
Dosing
controls,
public
health
survellienc
e
(collected
by Council
rangers).
Duty/stand
by on
chlorinatio
n bottles,
NSW
Health
monitoring
PD1 Post Overdosing of high pH Operator RWC C 2 Moderat B 2 High Can be >9
Dosing Soda ash training, e leaving the
(stablisat manual plant
ion) testing
CW Clearwat Ingress into tank Pathogens Aqualift RWC D 2 Low C 4 Very High
T1 er Tank through integrity contractor
issues and checks and
potentially flood reports,
inundation from chlorine
creek residual,
temporary
bunding
available
(sand
bags),

Page  34  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
alternative
supply

RW Raw Raw water can Pathogens No handle RWC E 4 High D 4 High The bypass
B1 Water be connected on the was
Bypass into the valve designed as
distribution an
system emergency
downstream of measure in
the clearwater the event of
tank resulting in WTP failure
undisinfected to at least
water being allow water
supplied to to enter the
customers distribution
system.
There is no
SOP
currently in
place for
managing
the bypass.
Raw water
connections
have been
known to
cause
outbreaks in
other
systems.
DR1 Distributi Low chlorine Pathogen Weekly RWC B 3 High B 3 High Currently
on residuals s testing, don’t shock
Reservoi resulting in the frequency dose
rs potential for of refill, reservoirs.
water quality closed Candle St is
failure reservoirs the biggest
and lowest
turnover.
DR2 Distributi Seasonal Taste & Weekly RWC C 2 Moderat C 2 Moderate Assessment
on changes in odour, testing, e based more
Reservoi water demand pathogens NSW on
rs leading to water Health complaints.
quality issues monitoring,
customer
complaint
monitoring
DR3 Distributi Low turnover Taste & Weekly RWC C 2 Moderat C 2 Moderate Cleaner LL,
on leading to water odour, testing, e South
Reservoi quality issues pathogens NSW Bigton,
rs (common inlet Health Barrangaroo
outlet?) monitoring, are common
customer inlet outlet
complaint reservoirs.
monitoring
DR4 Distributi Malicious Various Some RWC C 3 High B 5 Very High A lead-acid
on contamination security battery and
Reservoi leading to water measures, its charger
rs contamination Aqualift, were found
facilities at Starboard
maintenan LL and
ce checks removed by
Aqualift.

Page  35  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
DR5 Distributi Reservoirs are Pathogens Aqualift RWC C 3 High B 5 Very High Bird access
on not routinely , turbidity, contractor of
Reservoi maintained or taste and checks and distribution
rs checked odours reports, reservoirs
resulting in NSW has caused
water quality Health waterborne
contamination testing outbreaks in
eg gutter other
blockage and jurisdictions
overflow, vermin resulting in
access illnesses
and deaths.
Dead birds
were found
inside
Cleaner St
LL, South
Bigton and
Wangwall.
CB1 Chlorine Overdosing of DBPs, Ta Automatic RWC D 2 Low C 2 Moderate Re-
Boosters chlorine leading ste and control, chlorination
to high levels in odour flow paced, occurs at
distribution reticulation the Priest
water testing, Street PS
customer and the
complaints outlet of the
Wangwall
and Tindale
Reservoirs
CB2 Chlorine Underdosing of Pathogen Automatic RWC C 4 Very B 4 Very High Re-
Boosters chlorine leading s control, High chlorination
to low levels in flow paced, occurs at
distribution reticulation the Priest
water testing, Street PS
reservoir and the
maintenan outlet of the
ce Wangwall
and Tindale
Reservoirs.
Priest Street
supplies the
hospital and
therefore a
vulnerable
population.
CB3 Chlorine Low turnover of Pathogens Purchasing Uncerta Uncertain
Boosters hypochlorite and in
leading to storage
reduction of
chlorine strength
FRS Farmers Receipt of non- Various Agreement RWC/S C 3 High B 5 Very High E. coli is not
1 River conforming Concernin W listed as a
Source water into g the parameter in
Gollumville's Supply of the
distribution Water from agreement.
system resulting the RWC has
in water quality Farmers participated
issues River in a recent
Water (August
Supply 2011) risk
workshop
with
alternative
supply from
Farmers
River.
FRS Farmers Lack of Pathogens Agreement A 4 Very A 4 Very High Agreement
2 River maintenance of Concernin High doesn't
Source chlorine residual g the cover
in water Supply of chlorine
supplied from Water from residual.
alternative the

Page  36  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
supply Farmers
River
Water
Supply
D1 Distributi Aging Pathogens Mains RWC B 2 High A 2 High
on infrastructure replaceme
leading to nt
ingress and program,
water quality monitoring,
issues chlorine
residual
D2 Distributi Reduced Biofilms Flushing RWC B 2 High A 2 High
on velocities in the causing as required
main resulting in taste & - not
conditions that odour programm
favour biofilm problems, ed,
formation and dirty water chlorine
sediment turbidity residual,
accumulation monitoring
D3 Distributi Mains break or Pathogen Air valves RWC B 2 High B 2 High
on perforation (air s are all
valves etc) undergrou
leading to water nd,
quality issues chlorine
residual
D4 Distributi Unsanitary Pathogen No RWC D 3 Moderat B 3 High
on repairs that lead s formalised e
to water quality procedures
issues , rely on
experience
of team,
chlorine
residual
D5 Distributi Reverse flow Biofilms No RWC C 2 Moderat C 3 High Complaints
on sloughing causing formalised e rather than
biofilm leading taste & procedures health issue.
to water quality odour , rely on
complaints problems, experience
dirty water, of team,
turbidity chlorine
residual,
customer
complaints
D6 Distributi Plug flow Taste & Uncerta Uncertain
on leading to water odour in
stagnation problems,
issues in some dirty water,
areas turbidity
D7 Distributi Backflow/cross Various DA RWC C 4 Very C 4 Very High
on connection Process, High
leading to water trade
contamination waste
events policy,
some
checking,
capture of
rainwater
tank
installation
s, section
68
approval
for devices
D8 Distributi Dead end in Taste and Flushing, RWC A 1 Moderat A 1 Moderate
on reticulation odour, no dead e
systems leading pathogens ends in
to stagnation new
and water developme
quality issues nts
D9 Distributi Cast iron Fe Mains RWC C 1 Low C 1 Low
on internals replaceme

Page  37  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
corrode leading nt
to water quality program,
issues monitoring,
chlorine
residual
D10 Distributi Cross- Pathogens No formal RWC Uncerta Uncertain
on contamination checking, in
from non- dedicated
quarantining of crews for
sewer and water water and
equipment eg sewer
CCTV during
mains work
D11 Distributi Use of fire Pathogens Testing of RWC D 2 Low D 2 Low
on hydrants stirring , hydrants,
up the system chemicals positive
and causing pressure
water quality
incidents
D12 Distributi Illegal Various Some RWC C 4 Very C 4 Very High Large
on connections customer High amount of
resulting in education, non-revenue
introduction of water water noted
unknown balance in the
hazards system.
NP Non- Water being Pathogens Information RWC A 4 Very A 4 Very High Customers
W1 potable consumed as if provided High not
water at it were potable when first consistently
Taraville connected told that the
water is
non-potable
WO Whole of Bushfire taking All Alternative RWC E 2 Low E 5 High
S1 System out Hokey supply.
Pokey Water Maintain
Treatment Plant buffer
around the
plant.
WO Whole of Incorrect or Chemical General RWC D 3 Moderat C 3 High
S2 System reduced quality s Purchasing e
of chemicals or and
wrong Procureme
specification of nt Policy
chemicals Chemicals
resulting in purchased
overdosing , from Orica
underdosing or Certificate
contamination of
compliance
supplied
with every
chemical
batch
WO Whole of Incorrect or Various General RWC D 2 Low C 2 Moderate
S3 System reduced quality Purchasing
of materials and
resulting in Procureme
potential for nt Policy,
water quality review
contamination materials
and specify
what is to
be used
WO Whole of Power failure Various UPS, RWC C 1 Low E 1 Low Booster
S4 System resulting in non- distribution stations -
conforming system dosing
water backup would stop
but there
would be
gravity flow
still
continuing.

Page  38  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

No. Process How can the Contamin Control Respon- L C Control L C Uncontro Basis/
Step hazard be ants measures sibility led lled Risk Notes
introduced? (hazards) currently to Risk Score
(hazards/ in place manage Score
causes) risk
WO Whole of Disgruntled Various RWC E 5 High E 5 High
S5 System employees or
contractors
leading to
malicious
damage
resulting in poor
water quality
(note that
employees and
contractors
understand the
system so would
know where to
act to cause
most damage
e.g. altering
SCADA,
contaminating
clearwater tank
etc)
WO Whole of Failure of critical Various Annual RWC D 3 Moderat C 4 Very High
S6 System monitoring ABB e
devices Instrument
resulting in ation
inability to pick contract
up water quality calibration
issues Meters
calibrated
monthly as
per
manufactur
er's
instructions
WO Whole of Chemicals are Chemicals Operators RWC E 3 Moderat D 3 Moderate
S7 System delivered to , on site for e
incorrect pathogens each
storage resulting delivery,
in process specific
contamination or fittings
incorrect dosage
WO Whole of Operator Various Operator RWC E 3 Moderat C 3 High
S8 System training is not training e
kept up to date (including
resulting in lab skills,
potential for risk
water manageme
contamination nt and
through incident
incorrect investigatio
operation of the n,
water supply fluoridation
system of public
water
supplies,
Water
Operator
Training
Course)
 

Page  39  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

APPENDIX  D  ACTION  PLAN  


Note  that  where  specific  procedures  have  been  identified,  these  are  presented  in  the  right  hand  column  
and  will  be  developed  in  conjunction  with  NSW  Public  Works  (NSW  PW).  
 
Action Event Risk No. Follow-up Actions Responsibility Procedure
No.
A1 Rainfall following bushfire or FC2, Review procedures for bushfires in RWC / NSW Incident
grassfire resulting in run off into the WOS1 Emergency Response Plan including PW response
catchment how Hokey Pokey WTP is managed. plan
(template to
Bushfire taking out Hokey Pokey be
Water Treatment Plant developed
by NSW
PW)
A2 Accidents and spills on catchment FC4, FC5 Consider having an agreement in RWC
roads into water causing water place with emergency services in the
quality issues event that something happens in the
water supply catchment.
A4 Legal and illegal motorcycle track in FC6, FC8, Consider signage in the catchment RWC
head of catchment and 4WD FC9 (sect 632 LGA) to indicate that the
causing erosion catchment is used as a water supply
catchment and to report any
Recreational activities in the contamination to RWC.
catchment (illegal) including 4WD,
camping

Recreational activities in the


catchment (illegal)
A5 Overloading of Motorcycle club FC7 Review how the septic is managed at RWC
septic system overflowing leading the club.
to pathogens in catchment
A6 Recreational activities in the FC9 Consider a review of the water quality RWC / NSW Drinking
catchment (illegal) monitoring program for catchment (to PW Water
tap). Monitoring
Program
(template to
be
developed
by NSW
Public
Works)
A7 Illegal dumping in the catchment FC10 Improve interagency communication. RWC Incident
leading to water quality issues response
plan
(template to
be
developed
by NSW
PW)
A8 Illegal dumping in the catchment FC10 Improve council departmental RWC Clarifier
leading to water quality issues communication. bypass
procedure
A9 Deliberate contamination of the FCD2 Review Business Continuity Plan and RWC / NSW Incident
reservoir Emergency Response Plan to cover PW response
water and sewer. plan
(template to
be
developed
by NSW
PW)
A10 Short circuiting of reservoir FCD3 Review raw water quality data and RWC
inflows to reservoir (mm rain) to see if
a relationship can be established.
A11 Cross contamination of dam (farm FCD4 Review procedures for bushfires in RWC / NSW Incident
dams etc) with helicopter access to Emergency Response Plan. PW response
fight fires plan
(template to
be
developed
by NSW
PW)

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Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

Action Event Risk No. Follow-up Actions Responsibility Procedure


No.
A12 High levels of metals coming in FCD6 Review raw water monitoring RWC
from upstream sources program.
A13 Receipt of poor quality water into CCS1 Formalise agreement with LoCoal RWC
Fishers Creek Dam Corp re water quality and
communication protocols if treatment
fails at LoCoal Corp.

A14 Receipt of poor quality water into CCS1 Review pipeline location for input of RWC
Fishers Creek Dam Percy Colliery Source in new
configuration.
A15 Receipt of poor quality water into CCS1 Review water quality results that RWC
Fishers Creek Dam LoCoal Corp has to report on as part
of its Environment Protection Licence.
A16 Receipt of poor quality water into CCS1 Check hydrocarbons in the Percy RWC
Fishers Creek Dam Colliery Source water to better assess
risk.
A17 Under or no dosing of soda ash pH1, pH2 Consider moving to online, RWC
causing pH lower than optimal for telemetered monitoring.
coagulation

Overdosing of soda ash causing pH


higher than optimal for coagulation
A18 Rapid change in raw water turbidity Coag6 Consider online monitoring of raw RWC
resulting in inability to treat water (turbidity, EC pH) with
telemetery.
A19 Bypass of the clarifier (during Clar2 Develop a formalised procedure for RWC
maintenance) this process.
A20 Short circuiting of filters leading to F1 Review the need for individual filter RWC
breakthroughs turbidity meters.
A21 Short circuiting of filters leading to F1, F4 Consider undertaking individual filter RWC
breakthroughs monitoring once the media has been
changed.
Filter ripening issues leading to
pathogen breakthrough
A22 Poor filter performance e.g. filter F2 Develop a procedure for observation NSW PW Filter
nozzles, filter media loss, high of the filters. inspection
loads in water, aborted backwash and
backwash
procedure
A23 Filter ripening issues leading to F4 Review the need for filter to waste. RWC
pathogen breakthrough
A24 Filter ripening issues leading to F4 Review the need for a water quality RWC
pathogen breakthrough monitoring program for
Cryptosporidium in the catchment.
A25 Overdosing of chlorine leading to Dis1 Consider improving the chlorine RWC
high levels in finished water dosing system.
A26 Overdosing of chlorine leading to Dis1 Confirm the CT for the plant. RWC
high levels in finished water
A27 Underdosing of chlorine (inc Dis2 Consider an on-line chlorine residual RWC
equipment failure or running out) analyser with telemetry.
leading to chlorine senstive
pathogen survival in finished water
(primary kill)
A28 Underdosing of chlorine (inc Dis2 Review chlorination procedures (plant NSW PW CCP
equipment failure or running out) shut down on chlorine failure etc). response
leading to chlorine senstive procedures
pathogen survival in finished water
(primary kill)
A29 Underdosing of chlorine (inc Dis2 Formalise current procedures for NSW PW CCP
equipment failure or running out) managing chlorination and testing. response
leading to chlorine senstive procedures
pathogen survival in finished water
(primary kill)
A30 High pH in the water causing issues Dis3 Review how pH is monitored and RWC
such as skin rashes and reduced where.
disinfection efficiency
A31 High pH in the water causing issues Dis3 Consider whether stabilisation of RWC
such as skin rashes and reduced water is needed.
disinfection efficiency
A32 Underdosing of chlorine resulting in Dis4 Review reticulation monitoring plan for RWC
lack of chlorine residuals in location and frequency.
distribution system
A33 Overdosing of Soda ash PD1 Review reasons for pH increases RWC
Page  41  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

Action Event Risk No. Follow-up Actions Responsibility Procedure


No.
including plant and reticulation issues.
A34 Raw water can be connected into RWB1 Develop SOP for managing the RWC
the distribution system downstream bypass including the O&M of the
of the clearwater tank resulting in bypass infrastructure.
undisinfected water being supplied
to customers
A35 Low chlorine residuals resulting in DR1 Consider shock dosing of reservoirs. NSW PW Reservoir
the potential for water quality failure shock
dosing
procedure
A36 Low chlorine residuals resulting in DR1, DR5 Consider having reservoir inspection NSW PW Reservoir
the potential for water quality failure procedures and checklists. inspection
checklist
Reservoirs are not routinely
maintained or checked resulting in
water quality contamination eg
gutter blockage and overflow,
vermin access
A37 Low turnover leading to water DR3 Review asset ownership between RWC
quality issues (common inlet RWC and Bulk Water Corp.
outlet?)
A38 Low turnover leading to water DR3 Make sure asset agreements are in RWC
quality issues (common inlet place between RWC and Bulk Water
outlet?) Corp.
A39 Malicious contamination leading to DR4 Consider undertaking a security RWC
water contamination vulnerability assessment on all assets.
A40 Low turnover of hypochlorite CB3 Actions required for appropriate RWC
leading to reduction of chlorine storage of chemicals.
strength
A41 Receipt of non-conforming water FRS1 Agreement between RWC and Bulk RWC
into Gollumville's distribution Water Corp needs to be reviewed and
system resulting in water quality tightened in terms at least water
issues quality to meet ADWG levels,
communication protocols in case of
non-conformance, chlorine residual
adequacy in the water supplied to
Dalry and Wangwall and Fe and Mn
management.
A42 Aging infrastructure leading to D1 Adequacy of asset replacement RWC
ingress and water quality issues program to be considered.
A43 Aging infrastructure leading to D1 Asset management and asset RWC
ingress and water quality issues condition assessment are not being
done and need to be reviewed.
A44 Mains break or perforation (air D3, D4 Formalise mains repair procedures RWC Mains break
valves etc) leading to water quality including review of ADWG guidance. and repair
issues procedure

Unsanitary repairs that lead to


water quality issues
A45 Reverse flow sloughing biofilm D5 Formalise procedures relating to RWC Water
leading to water quality complaints switching between water supplies Source
(Farmers River WS/RWC). changeover
procedure
A46 Plug flow leading to water D6 Review system for examination and RWC
stagnation issues in some areas management of reticulation water age
issue.
A47 Backflow/cross connection leading D7 Ensure that a register is in place for all RWC
to water contamination events backflow devices installed and
checking frequencies.
A48 Dead end in reticulation systems D8 Procedure required for flushing. RWC Reticulation
leading to stagnation and water flushing
quality issues procedure
A49 Dead end in reticulation systems D8 Review areas of dead ends to see if RWC
leading to stagnation and water they can be reticulated.
quality issues
A50 Cast iron internals corrode leading D9 Need to include cast iron mains in RWC
to water quality issues asset management program when
developed.
A51 Cross-contamination from non- D10 Review how contractors check their RWC
quarantining of sewer and water equipment.
equipment eg CCTV during mains
work
A52 Illegal connections resulting in D12 Consider undertaking a more in depth RWC
introduction of unknown hazards system modelling to better understand

Page  42  
Risk  Assessment  Briefing  Paper  

Action Event Risk No. Follow-up Actions Responsibility Procedure


No.
water balance.
A53 Water being consumed as if it were NPW1 Review how the potable water system RWC
potable is dealt with in terms of
communication and education (see
guidance from NSW Health).
A54 Incorrect or reduced quality of WOS2 Need to review how chemicals are NSW PW Chemical
chemicals or wrong specification of dealt with in council. receiving
chemicals resulting in overdosing , and QA
underdosing or contamination procedure
A55 Disgruntled employees or WOS5 Review how contractors and outgoing RWC Employee
contractors leading to malicious staff are managed. exit
damage resulting in poor water procedure
quality (note that employees and
contractors understand the system
so would know where to act to
cause most damage e.g. altering
SCADA, contaminating clearwater
tank etc)
A56 Failure of critical monitoring devices WOS6 Develop calibration records (being RWC / NSW Instrument
resulting in inability to pick up water done). PW calibration
quality issues record
(template to
be
developed
by NSW
PW)
A57 Various operations Added Develop a list of SOPs for WTP and RWC / NSW SOPs (list
Post Retic operations PW and some
Workshop SOPs to be
developed
by NSW
PW)
A58 Critical Control Point Management Added Develop flowchart for CCP Public Works CCP
Post management response
Workshop procedures
 

Page  43  

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