Art 21 Cases
Art 21 Cases
Art 21 Cases
FACTS:-
The petitioner was issued a passport under The Passport Act, 1967. The petitioner received a letter dated
from the Regional Passport Officer Delhi intimating to her that it was decided by the Government of India
to impound her passport under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act "in public interest". The petitioner was required to
surrender her passport within 7 days from the receipt of that letter. The petitioner immediately addressed
a letter to the Regional Passport Officer requesting him to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for
making the order as provided in s.10(5). A reply was sent by the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs on 6th July 1977 stating inter alia that the Government decided "in the interest of the general
public" not to furnish her copy of the statement of reasons for the making of the order.
The petitioner thereupon filed the present Writ Petition challenging action of the Government in
impounding her passport and declining to give reasons for doing so. The Act was enacted on 24-4-67 in
view of the decision of this Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney's case. The position which obtained prior to
the coming into force of the Act was that there was no law regulating the issue of passports for leaving
the shores of India and going abroad. The issue of passport was entirely within the unguided and
unchanneled discretion of the Executive. In Satwant Singh's case, this Court held by a majority that
the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in, the right of locomotion and travel abroad and under
Art. 21 no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad except according to the procedure
established by law.
JUDGEMENT:-
1. The right of travel and to go outside the country is included in the fight to personal liberty.
2. The view that Articles 19 and 21 constitute watertight compartments has been rightly over-ruled.
3. The observations in A. K. Gopalan's case that due process with regard to law relating to preventive
detention are to be found in Art. 22 of the Constitution because it is a self-contained code for laws.
That observation was the real ratio decidendi of Gopalan's case. Other observations relating to the
separability of the subject matters of Art. 21 and 19 were mere obiter dicta.
4. The questions relating to either deprivation or restrictions of per sonal liberty, concerning laws
falling outside Art. 22 remain really unanswered by the Gopalan's case.
5. In what may be called unoccupied portions of the vast sphere of personal liberty, the substantive as
well as procedural laws made to cover them must satisfy the requirements of both Arts 14 and 19 of the
Constitution.
6. In Satwant Singh Sawhney's case this Court ruled, by majority, that the expression personal liberty
which occurs in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes the right to travel abroad and that no person can be
deprived of that right except according to procedure established by law. The mere prescription of some
kind of procedure cannot even meet the mandate of Article 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to
be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary.
7. The question whether the procedure prescribed by law which curtails or takes away the personal
liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 is reasonable or not has to be considered not in the abstract or on
hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full-dressed hearing as in a court room trial but in the
contest, primarily, of the purpose which the Act is intended to achieve and of urgent situations which
those who are charged with the duty of administering the Act may be called upon to deal with.
8. Secondly, even the fullest compliance with the requirements of Art. 21 is not the journey's end
because a law which prescribes fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing or taking away the
personal liberty granted by Art. 21 has still to meet a possible challenge under the other provisions of
the Constitution.
9. Both Articles 19(1)and 21 are independent fundamental rights though there is a certain amount of
overlapping; and there is no question of one being carved out of another. The minority view was upheld
as correct and it was pointed out that it would not be tight to read the expression 'personal liberty' in Art.
21 in a narrow and restricted sense so as to exclude those attributes of personal liberty which are
specifically dealt with in Art. 19(1).
10. Art. 21 is of the widest amplitude and covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal
liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental, rights and
given additional protection under Art. 19(1). Thus Articles 19(1) and 21 are not mutually exclusive.
11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and
that even if there is a law prescribing procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty and there is
consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Art. 21, such law ill so far as it
abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of
that Article. Equally such law would be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14 and the procedure
prescribed by it would have to answer the requirement of that Article.