Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28113 March 28, 1969

THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO

BALINDONG, petitioners,
vs.
PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN MACARAMPAD,
FREDERICK V. DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR
LAO. respondents.

L. Amores and R. Gonzales for petitioners.

Jose W. Diokno for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the
respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of
the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the
municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the
then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios 1 of the latter municipality.

The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the
respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective office relying on the
ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. 3

In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23
of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to
create barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a
new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities," and (2) that section
68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because
it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power
over local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: "In short, even
if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as
part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by
the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
with said statutory enactment."

On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition, nevertheless
argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the
municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation,
having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers
having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de
facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the
petitioner Balindong.
 It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to
the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few
exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. 4 But the rule disallowing
collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de
facto corporations. 5 For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is
that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one
whose rights or interests ate affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated
unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so. 6

And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.
As earlier stated, the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was organized before the promulgation of
this Court's decision in Pelaez. 7

Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of validity to an
attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional.lawphi1.ñet

This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States. Thus, some
hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating it is
unconstitutional because there can be no de facto corporation where there can be no de
jure one, 8 while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is binding until it is condemned as
unconstitutional. 9

An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:

It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in the
absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases
holding, some of them unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can exist
under color of an unconstitutional statute will reveal that in no instance did the invalid act
give life to the corporation, but that either in other valid acts or in the constitution itself the
office or the corporation was potentially created....

The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where there
is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least an
authority in potentia by the state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative propositions
that there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears
on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a de jure or de facto municipal
corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would imply the imputation of
bad faith, in the other the new organization must be regarded as a mere usurper....

As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which
seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:

I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal

corporation may be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld
for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a
warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the
 recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the
state.

II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially,
such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.

III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the

invalidity of which is apparent on its face.

IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de
jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.10

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that
the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the
consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization.
Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute
had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the
Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to
its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, 11 this Court granted a similar petition for
prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis
of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in 1961, before section 68 of
the Administrative Code, under which the President had acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue
of de facto municipal corporation did not arise in that case.

In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Accordingly, he held that bonds
issued by a board of commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive
order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the
existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief
Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank: 13

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It
is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
 There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive
order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the
validity of the creation of that municipality. 14

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the
respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their
respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

I concur fully with the well-written opinion of Justice Castro. It breaks new ground; it strikes out new
paths. It is precisely because of its impact on the power of judicial review of executive acts that I
deem a few additional words would not be amiss.

1. Insofar as the effect of a declaration of unconstitionality is concerned, the latter and more
realistic trend reflected in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank 1 had
previously elicited our approval. Thus: "'Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to
mean that at the time of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied
because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute — 'confers no right, creates no office, affords no protection and
justifies no acts performed under it.' ... there are several instances wherein courts, out of
equity, have relaxed its operation ... or qualified its effects 'since the actual existence of a
statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored' ... and a realistic approach is eroding the general
doctrine ....'" 2 Also: "We have taken note, of the fact that, on June 30, 1961, Section 25 of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A had been declared unconstitutional by this Court in the case
of Corominas, et al. v. The Labor Standards Commission, et al., .... It appears, however, that
the Plaintiff had filed his claim before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor on
July 26, 1960, or about one year before said Section 25 had been declared unconstitutional.
The circumstance that Section 25 of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A had been declared
unconstitutional should not be counted against the defendant in the present case. In the
case of Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, ..., this Court upheld the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law which had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court in the case of Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68." 3

2. Nothing can be clearer therefore in the light of the two above cases than that a previous
declaration of invalidity of legislative acts would not be bereft of legal results. Would that view
hold true of nullification of executive acts? There might have been doubts as to the correct
answer before. There is none now.

A judicial decision annulling a presidential exercise of authority 4 is not without its effect
either. That much is evident from the holding now reached. The act stricken down, whether
proceeding from the legislature or the Executive, could in the language of the Chicot County
 case, be considered, prior to the declaration of invalidity, as "an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored."

Thus the frontiers of the law have been extended, a doctrine which to some may come into
play when a statute is voided is now considered equally applicable to a Presidential act that
has met a similar fate. Such a result should not occasion surprise. That is to be expected.

There would be an unjustified deviation from the doctrine of separation of powers if a

consequence attached to the annulment of a statue is considered as not operative where an
executive order is involved. The doctrine of co-equal or coordinate departments would be
meaningless if a discrimination of the above sort were considered permissible. The
cognizance taken of the prior existence of an enactment subsequently declared
unconstitutional applies as well as to a Presidential act thereafter successfully assailed.
There was a time when it too did exist and, as such, a fact to be reckoned with, though an
infirm source of a legal right, if, as subsequently held, considered violative of a constitutional
command.

3. Precisionists may cavil at the above view; they may assert, and with some degree of
plausibility, that the holding in the Pelaez case goes no further than to locate a statutory
infirmity in the Presidential act there challenged, creating municipal corporations under what
the then Executive considered a grant of authority found in the Revised Administrative
Code. 5 Such a power having been found not to exist, the decision, so it may be asserted, did
not reach the constitutional issue of non-delegation of legislative power. Tersely put, there
was no finding of nullity based on a violation of the Constitution.

To such a claim, it suffices to answer that while the challenged Administrative Code provision was
in fact held as not containing within itself the authority conferred on the President to create municipal
corporations, the opinion by the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion went further. As was
pointed out by him: "Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself —
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and
(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but also — and
this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained
by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system." 6

From which, it would follow, in the language of the opinion: "Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out
or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil
effects above referred to." 7

It is thus clear that while it might not be strictly accurate to advance the view that there was a
finding of unconstitutionality of a challenged statutory norm, there could be no objection to the view
that the holding was one of unconstitutional application.
 Nor is this all. If there be admission of the force of the assertion that the Pelaez opinion went no
further than to locate in the challenged Executive orders creating municipal corporations an act in
excess of statutory authority, then our decision in this case is all the more noteworthy for the more
hospitable scope accorded the Chicot doctrine. For as originally formulated, it would merely
recognize that during its existence, prior to its being declared violative of the constitute, the statute
must be deemed an operative fact. Today we decide that such a doctrine extends to a Presidential
act held void not only on the ground of unconstitutional infirmity but also because in excess of the
statutory power conferred. That to me is the more significant aspect of this decision. To repeat, to
that point of view I yield full concurrence.

I do so because it appears to me a logical corollary to the principle of separation of powers. Once

we accept the basic doctrine that each department as a coordinate agency of government is entitled
to the respect of the other two, it would seem to follow that at the very least, there is a presumption
of the validity of the act performed by it, unless subsequently declared void in accordance with
legally accepted principles. The rule of law cannot be satisfied with anything less.

Since under our Constitution, judicial review exists precisely to test the validity of executive or
legislative acts in an appropriate legal proceeding, there is always the possibility of their being
declared inoperative and void. Realism compels the acceptance of the thought that there could be a
time-lag between the initiation of such Presidential or congressional exercise of power and the final
declaration of nullity. In the meanwhile, it would be productive of confusion, perhaps at times even of
chaos, if the parties affected were left free to speculate as to its fate being one of doom, thus leaving
them free to disobey it in the meanwhile. Since, however, the orderly processes of government not
to mention common sense, requires that the presumption of validity be accorded an act of Congress
or an order of the President, it would be less than fair, and it may be productive of injustice, if no
notice of its existence as a fact be paid to it, even if thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary, in the
case of Presidential act, either to the Constitution or a controlling statute.

The far-reaching import in the above sense of the decision we now render calls, to my mind, for an
articulation of further reflection on its varied implications. We have here an illustration to paraphrase
Dean Pound, of the law being stable and yet far from standing still. That is as it ought to be; that is
how law grows. It is in that sense that the judicial process is impressed with creativity, admittedly
within limits rather narrowly confined. That in itself is to hold fast to the appropriate role of the
judiciary, far from insignificant as our decision discloses. Hence, this separate concurring opinion,
which, I trust, will make manifest why my agreement with what Justice Castro had so ably expressed
in the opinion of the Court is wholehearted and entire.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs.

Footnotes

1
The barrios and sitios are Barorao, Baguiangan Kalilangan, Balabagan, Itil, Banago, Budas,
Igabay, Magolalong, Dagoan, Matimus, Bongabon and Lusain.

2
64 O.G. 4781 (1965).

3
L-19870, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 599.

4
E.g., 1 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, sec. 3.49, p. 592 (3rd ed. 1949).

5
Hunt v. Atkinson, (Tex. Com. App.) 12 S.W. 2d 142, 145 (1929), rev'g 300 S.W. 656 (1927).
 6
1 E. McQuillin, op. cit. supra, note 4, at sec. 3.50, p. 595-96.

7
Supra, note 2.

8
E.g., Brandenstein v. Hoke 101 Cal. 131, 35 P. 562 (1894) (levee district organized under
statute earlier declared to be unconstitutional); Atchison T. & S.F.R.R. v. Board of Comm'rs
58 Kan 19, 48 P. 583 (1897) (county organized under statute void on its face).

See, e.g., Lang v. City of Bayonne, 74 N.J.L. 455, 68 A. 90 (1907); St. Louis v. Shields, 62
9

Mo. 247 (1876); School District No. 25, v. State, 29 Kan. 57 (1882).

Tooke De facto Municipal Corporations under Unconstitutional Statutes, 37 Yale L.J. 935,
10

951-53 (1928).

11
Supra, note 3.

12
118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (emphasis added).

308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940): accord: Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953); Manila Motor Co.,
13

Inc. v. Flores 99 Phil. 739 (1956); Fernandez v. Cuerva & Co., L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21
SCRA 1102.

Compare the technique of prospective overruling in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
14

(1965), refusing to give retrospective effect to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule), with that in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) holding that the
rule concerning counsel as announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) was to
be applied retrospectively.

by John Lloyd Macunat

MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG v. PANGANDAPUN BENITO, GR No. L-

28113, 1969-03-28

Facts:

The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao

del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Benito is the mayor, and the
rest of the respondents are the... councilors, of the municipality of
Balabagan of the same province.

Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having

been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then
President

Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios... of the latter municipality.

The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive

Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from
performing the functions of their respective offices, relying on the ruling
of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor

General... and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.

In Pelaez this Court... ruled:

(1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved
January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the...
provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar
as it gives the President the power to... create municipalities, is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legisla-
tive power and (b) because it offends against section 10(1) of article VII
of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local
governments to mere... supervision.

On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in
the petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can
have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities
involved in Pelaez, the... municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto
corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this
was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself having... discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action.

It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be

collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an...
action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an
individual like the petitioner Balindong.

e... the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was orgnized before the
promulgation of this Court's... decision in Pelaez.

Issues:

whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.

whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted organization

of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao

del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Benito is the mayor, and the
rest of the respondents are the... councilors, of the municipality of
Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the
municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by
Executive Order 386 of the then President

Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios[1] of the latter municipality.

This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the
United States. Thus, some hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist
where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there
can be no de... facto corporation where there can be no de jure one,...
while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is binding until it
is condemned as unconstitutional

"As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be
deduced which seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:

"I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto

municipal corporation may be:

"1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

"2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been
upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided
that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in
the recognition... of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state

"II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly

or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative
fiat.

"III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute

alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face.

"IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an

existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be an
usurper."

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as

such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated,
the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there
was some other valid law giving corporate... vitality to the organization.
Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at
a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably
make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the
Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute
to give color of authority to its creation.

In Norton v. Shelby County,[12] Mr. Justice Field said: "An

unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,... in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."

Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that
the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its
corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it... had never been passed." For
the existence of Executive Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot
justly be ignored."

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the

invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the
effect of unsettling many en act done in reliance upon the validity of the
creation of that... municipality.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared

void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from
performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.

Principles:

Digests created by other user