Question 6 US China After 1991
Question 6 US China After 1991
Question 6 US China After 1991
Are
the two states moving towards a diplomatic competition in the developing world, such as
Central Africa and South Asia?
Timeline in review
1999
2000
2008
2011
2012
2013
2014
2018
2019
The battle for political and economic influence between the U.S. and China is playing out across
Africa, and Beijing’s growing presence is troubling Western policymakers, experts say. Africa
has become the fastest urbanizing region on the planet, and China has placed itself at the
infrastructural vanguard of the new frontier. Africa boasted seven of the 20 fastest growing
economies in the world in 2017, according to the IMF (International Monetary Fund).
Chinese firms have been most active in building ports, roads and railways that will underpin
integration and trade between African nations — an intention most recently exemplified across
the continent in the landmark African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).China
recently launched a $1 billion Belt and Road infrastructure fund for Africa, and last year
delivered a whopping $60 billion African aid package, further consolidating its robust economic
influence.
China's approach to Africa has always been trade oriented. The continent became one of the top
destinations for Chinese investment after Beijing introduced the so-called "Go Out" policy in
1999 which encouraged private and state-owned business to seek economic opportunities abroad.
By contrast, for a long time the US has viewed Africa as a battlefield where it can confront its
enemies, whether the Soviets during the Cold War, terrorists after 9/11 or now the Chinese.
Washington has never really made a concerted effort to develop its economic relations with the
continent.
The US has repeatedly accused China of using "debt to hold states in Africa captive to [its]
wishes and demands" and has warned African states to avoid Chinese "debt diplomacy" which is
supposedly incompatible with the independence of African nations and civil society and poses "a
significant threat to US national security interests".
China's military presence in Africa, however, pales in comparison to that of the US. Over the
past few years, US Africa Command has run some 36 different military operations in 13 African
countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic. It has a large base in
Djibouti - the biggest and only permanent US military base in Africa.
Djibouti has recently found itself at the centre of US-Chinese diplomatic confrontation. Being a
host to military bases of both superpowers, the small country has had to play a difficult balancing
game.
Apart from Djibouti and Sudan, various other countries in the region have felt the consequences
of the US bid to contain China. This political confrontation has also added to the already rising
tensions between other players in the region, including Egypt, Gulf countries, Iran and Turkey.
Thus, in the long-term, given the pre-existing faultlines and conflicts in the region, the US-China
cold war could have a detrimental effect, not only on its economy but also on its security.
(Aljazeera)
U.S.-China rivalry has intensified significantly in Southeast Asia over the past year. The drama
as it stretched across the major Asian summits in late 2018, the Second Belt and Road Forum in
April 2019, the Shangri-La Dialogue in May-June, and the 34th summit of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August. Focusing especially on geo-economic aspects of
U.S.-China competition, the report investigates the contending strategic visions of Washington
and Beijing and closely examines the region’s response. In particular, it examines regional
reactions to the Trump administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. FOIP
singles out China for pursuing regional hegemony, says Beijing is leveraging “predatory
economics” to coerce other nations, and poses a clear choice between “free” and “repressive”
visions of world order in the Indo-Pacific region. Southeast Asia’s export-oriented economies are
having to adapt to slackening growth fueled by the U.S.-China trade war, as well as China's own
economic slowdown and declines in global demand.
When people talk about hegemony these days, they are usually referring to the United States,
which they describe as a global hegemon. I do not like this terminology, however, because it is
virtually impossible for any state including the United States—to achieve global hegemony. The
main obstacle to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power over huge distances,
especially across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
The Chinese government believes that it has sovereignty rights, since ancient times, over the
islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea within the Nine-Dash Line. The Chinese people
claim to be the first to “discover, name, explore and exploit the resources” of the South
China Sea. China thus argues it has legitimate reasons to build both civilian and military
facilities on these maritime features, and send coast guard, air force, and navy personnel to patrol
the water. For those maritime features claimed by China but not under Chinese control, China
proposes that bilateral negotiations should be the means to solve the problem. Beijing believes
that non-regional parties (US) should not be involved in regional issues as they may complicate
the situation.
Fundamental U.S. interests in the South China Sea are “the free flow of commerce, the
maintenance of a rules-based order government by international laws and norms, and the ability
of countries in the region to make their own strategic choices.” As a maritime power with several
territories in the Pacific, the United States sees itself inseparable from any issues in the Asia-
Pacific. This, without any doubt, includes America’s participation in the issues regarding the
South China Sea. A secure, stable, and open order is in America’s interests. American scholars
often express their concern that, by claiming that Asian security should be decided by Asians,
China tries to push the U.S. out of the South China Sea, which threatens U.S. interests in the
region.
In addition to growing direct military competition in the region, the U.S. is also concerned about
China’s relations with other regional parties and about its major security allies’ and friends’
strength in the region. Washington worries that, while its interests are challenged by China,
regional countries are not able to decide their fates on their own. This is reflected by
Washington’s determination to improve its security ties, most notably with the Philippines and
Vietnam.
BRI
China has opted this policy after Xi Jinping’s arrival. It is believed that multilateral organizations
are going to be benefited from its inauguration as the AIIB is funding it. The BRI looks to ensure
China’s presence outside of its own territory in security factors and Beijing ought to improve
structural identity and communication. This New Silk Road will be opening up multiple
economic corridors expanding across continents. Therefore, BRI is a top priority in the 13 th Five-
year plan program (2016-2019) of China. The AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) is
based over 50 countries from several regions which serves as a major groundwork for BRI.
China is even using its own domestic resources to fuel its BRI-plan. The “One Belt One Road”
initiative has become a global workplan due to China’s multilateral diplomacy and its security
assessments. Example of its expansion is found in Belt and Road Forum which strategizes
international cooperation.
China believes the BRI will bring in win-win cooperation as it is beneficial for everyone
involved. It will improve the region’s infrastructure and develop new ways to connect intricating
regional transportation, telecommunications and energy integration. It can intertwine strategies
of aligned countries towards development sectors. It is believed that through this initiative, China
can influence global economy and politically involve itself due to connectivity. This framework
looks to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy in the spirit of open
regional cooperation. The President of China strongly believes it will fundamentally improve
organizations such as the IMF and WB because of the BRI’s active relevance in this region.
The Americans articulate that the BRI is an infrastructural development project which cannot but
be largely monopolized. The US is pessimistic that whether or not the BRI will actually be a
regional success let alone global. There is doubt over BRI’s actual effect over other nations from
the west. This initiative is an implication of several Chinese State-Owned-Enterprises (SOE)
which are vulnerable in US’s view. The govt and SOE have kept the GDP of China to a meagre
amount in spite of their promises. The United States believes that the BRI might marginalize
global economy and the Americans might lose their economic hegemony, shifting the power
balance.
At the same time, the US has concerns about BRI’s actual aftermath, if it becomes a success then
the US wouldn’t want to be left out of the political gold rush in Asia. Moreover, the US cannot
afford to lose its grip over security commitments since the BRI would establish China’s military
presence comprehensively through South East Asia and more.