IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA

CIVIL APPEAL
No: J4/34/2011

22ND FEBRUARY, 2012

CORAM: AKUFFO (MS) JSC (PRESIDING)

DATE-BAH JSC
ADINYIRA (MRS) JSC
DOTSE JSC
AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS) JSC

SALOMEY SHORME TETTEH - PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

APPELLANT

NII AMON TAFO - CO-PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

APPELLANT

VRS;

MARY KORKOR HAYFORD - DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

SUBSTITUTED BY STELLA RESPONDENTS
LARBI &COMFORT DECKER

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 J U D G M E N T.

JONES DOTSE JSC;

This is an appeal by the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant hereafter
referred to as Plaintiff against the judgment of the Court of Appeal
dated 22nd July 2010 which set aside a judgment of the High Court
which was in favour of the plaintiff, and entered judgment in
favour of the Defendants/Appellants/Respondents, hereafter
referred to as the Defendants. It must be noted that, even though
the Plaintiff commenced action against a Defendant, Madam Mary
Korkoi, she died during the pendency of the suit, and had been
substituted by her daughters, the two substituted Defendants
herein.

This case commenced in the High Court, Accra where the Plaintiff
issued a writ against the Defendant, Madam Mary Korkoi
(deceased) claiming the following reliefs:

i. Declaration that the Land Title Certificate No. GA3929 issued

by the Chief Registrar, land Title Registry, Accra to the
Defendant is null and void on grounds of fraud.

ii. An order to cancel or set aside the said Land Certificate No.
CA. 3929

iii. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, her agents

workmen etc not to have anything to do with the said land.

At the High Court the Acting Asere Mantse at all material times to
the cause of the action, Nii Tafo Amon II applied to be joined as a
party and was accordingly joined as a Co-plaintiff by an order of
the Court.

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Interestingly, both Plaintiff and Defendants claim title through the
Asere Stool. Whilst plaintiff claims she acquired the land in 1978,
Defendants claimed their mother acquired the land as far back as
1974, though she only got an indenture covering the land in 1983.
It is therefore not surprising that the Defendants also
counterclaimed for the following reliefs:-

a. A declaration that the indenture issued to the Plaintiff in

respect of the disputed land after an indenture was earlier
executed in her favour in 1983 is null and void.

b. A declaration that the Asere stool indeed executed a Deed of

Lease on 27/7/1983 in favour of the Defendant and same
was registered at Land Registry and covered with Land
Certificate No. GA3929.

JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT

The learned High Court Judge found for the Plaintiff on the basis
that the Plaintiff’s land tallied with the size of land stated in her
indenture and the Title Certificate in contra distinction to the
Defendant’s who, according to the learned trial High Court Judge,
showed inconsistencies in their land size because the size of their
land as reflected in their indenture and in their Land Title
Certificate did not tally.

Subsequently, the trial High Court Judge granted plaintiff’s reliefs

whilst she dismissed the counterclaim of the Defendants and
accordingly as per plaintiff’s writ set aside the Land title Certificate
issued to the Defendants declaring it to be null and void.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL

TO THIS COURT

The Defendants appealed against the decision of the High Court to

the Court of Appeal which overturned the decision of the High
Court and entered judgment in favour of the Defendants. It is

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against this decision that the plaintiff has appealed to this court
under the following grounds of appeal:

1. That, the judgment is against the weight of evidence adduced

at trial.”

2. The Court erred in law when it’s (sic) decided that because the
Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant did not specifically claim
declaration of title, her case must fail.

The Plaintiff thus prayed this court that the judgment of the Court
of Appeal be reversed, and judgment entered in her favour.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN A SURVEY PLAN IS

ORDERED BY A COURT

Before we consider the issues raised in the two grounds of appeal

filed in this case, there are some procedural issues which must be
dealt with for the guidance of parties, counsel and trial court
Judges, whenever an order is made for a survey plan in a land
dispute.

The first one is of what relevance is the work of a Surveyor

appointed by a court to assist in the determination of a land suit?

This observation must be critically considered in view of the orders

made by the learned trial Judge, Ayebi J, (as he then was) on 6th
April, 2005 when he appointed the Surveyor.

This is what he directed the Surveyor and the parties to do:

“The Regional Surveyor of the lands Commission, Greater Accra

Region is hereby appointed to survey the respective lands
of the parties herein in this matter and then
superimpose them. The Plaintiff’s Counsel should therefore
furnish the said Regional Surveyor with his instructions plus
any relevant documents by 13/4/05. Each of the parties
should pay a deposit of ¢1 million cedis…?”

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Unfortunately, by the time the survey report was ready for
presentation to the court, the suit which originally commenced
before Beatrice Agyeman Bempah J, went back to her.

As a result, Ayebi J (as he then was) had nothing to do with this

suit thereafter.

It was not surprising therefore that, both Counsel and the Court
did not appreciate the important role the Surveyor’s evidence could
have played in helping the court determine the real issues in
controversy.

From the orders made by the Court, it is clear the parties were to
do the following things pursuant to the preparation of the Survey
Plan:

1. The Plaintiff’s counsel was to file his survey instructions to

the Surveyor before the commencement of work. By parity of
reasoning, since the order directed the Surveyor to survey the
respective land of the parties, it is to be assumed that the
Defendant was to be expected to file survey instructions as
well for the Surveyor to follow and or comply with.

2. The parties were to furnish the Surveyor with any relevant

documents on or by 13/4/05.

3. The parties were to make a deposit of GH¢100.00 towards the

preparation of the Survey Plan.

On the part of the Surveyor, he was directed by the Court to do the

following:

a. Survey the land of the parties

b. Superimpose the said lands possibly vis-à-vis the relevant

documents of the parties and the land of the parties as it is
on the ground.

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We have not sighted any survey instructions filed by any of the
parties in this case.

Indeed when the Surveyor testified in the case, he did not mention
that any of the parties filed any survey instructions in the case.
Thus, apart from the site plans and some documents of title that
the Surveyor had access to from the parties, he was not specifically
requested to do any other thing by the parties or their counsel.

In any case, the Surveyor, one Robert Hackman, did testify in the
case about the work that he did in this case as C.W.I.

Of particular importance to the fate of this case is the composite

plan that the Surveyor prepared which was tendered as Exhibit 2.
We will revert to this exhibit later.

LACK OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS TO SURVEYOR

We have perused the evidence and cross-examination of the

Surveyor and come to the conclusion that if the parties had
complied with the courts directive to file survey instructions
perhaps the difficulties the Surveyor encountered with some of the
questions put to him under cross-examination would have been
averted.

For example when the Surveyor was asked by the Defence Counsel
as to what his interpretation of his own document, Exhibit 2 was,
the Surveyor answered thus:-

“I wish I will be relieved to answer this question as it will into

the arena”

“we believe it was a reference to arena of conflict.”

Surprisingly, the learned trial Judge stated thus:

“The court is (sic) agree with CWI as he is to be independent of

the consistent between the parties.”

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Even though it is difficult to comprehend the said statement, we
believe it was a tacit approval of the refusal by the Surveyor to give
an honest expert opinion based on the work he has done to the
court. It is generally understood that a court is not bound by the
evidence given by an expert such as the Surveyor, in this case. See
case of Sasu v White Cross Insurance Co. Ltd [1960] GLR 4 and
Darbah & another v Ampah [1989-90] 1 GLR 598 (CA) at 606
where Wuaku JA (as he then was) speaking for the court also
reiterated the point that a trial Judge need not accept evidence
given by an expert.

But the law is equally clear that a trial court must give good
reasons why an expert evidence is to be rejected.

We believe that the court should have compelled the Surveyor to

give an opinion on Exhibit 2 which he himself prepared.

Secondly, what we have also deduced from this case is that, the
failure by the parties to have filed survey instructions prevented
the Surveyor from dealing with issues germane to the case when he
went onto the land.

For example, it should be noted that, Counsel who represent

parties before the law courts have a professional duty to perform to
protect and enhance the best interests of their clients.

Besides, it is they who have been professionally instructed by their

clients and therefore understand the nuts and bolts of each case to
enable them be determined once and for all and to let the courts of
law dispose or deal with issues arising in the cases they handle. If
indeed, as the evidence disclosed in this case, there have been
developments on the land by both parties, then it would not have
been out of place for the parties to have instructed the Surveyor to
depict the wooden and or cement block structures if any on the
land in dispute and show their positions vis-à-vis the land

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documents claimed by each party in respect of the areas edged, as
“Green, Red, Blue and Black.”

Thirdly, the Surveyor would have been requested to indicate the

portions of the land vis-à-vis the approved layout of the land from
the relevant statutory Town Planning and or Metropolitan
Assembly.

Fourthly, all approved roads in the lay out as it affected portions of

the land claimed by the parties should have been indicated by the
Surveyor on the plan if the parties and or their counsel really
wanted issues to be dealt with holistically.

It should thus be noted that, in view of the massive assistance

that a court determining issues of title to land and other
related and ancillary reliefs would derive from Survey Plans,
care and some amount of professionalism should be exhibited
by Counsel whenever a Survey Plan is ordered in contested
land disputes.

This is because, Counsel who is on top of his brief in a land suit,

will definitely take advantage to ensure that overt acts of
ownership and possession are clearly delineated by the
Surveyor on the plan to boost his or her clients chances of
success.

Thus, the request for a survey plan if properly managed, will

ensure that a lot of evidence will be introduced by the party
through pictorial representation as will be delineated on the plan
as if the court had moved to the locus in quo.

In the instant case, it would have been perfectly legitimate for the
learned trial Judge to have ordered the Surveyor to go back to the
land with an order for the counsel in the case to file their survey
instructions, so as to enable those instructions to aid the Surveyor
in his work. Since all the above is history, we have to make do with
the plan as it is and determine the success or failure of this appeal.
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With the above procedural points discussed, this court now
proceeds to the resolution of the appeal.

ARGUMENTS ON GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Even though the plaintiff filed two grounds of appeal as has been
stated supra, learned Counsel for the plaintiff in his written
statement of case argued only the omnibus ground “that the
judgment is against the weight of evidence”. This evidently meant
that the second ground of appeal has been abandoned, it will thus
not be considered in this judgment.

It is deemed worthwhile to consider in some detail, the facts of the

case to enable them to be put in proper context.
The main issue for determination is whether Plaintiff should
succeed on the basis of her claims and evidence led in support
thereof at the trial court as well as her briefs before this court on
appeal.
One striking observation made in the case is the clear difference in
the Land Title Certificates held by Plaintiff and Defendants,
GA11053 and GA3929, respectively. This difference promptly and
presumptively shows that both Plaintiff and Defendants each hold
title but to two different lands. This is confirmed by Plaintiff in her
defence to Defendant’s counterclaim. At paragraph 4, Plaintiff
concedes thus:
“The Plaintiff further says that the Land the Asere Stool gave to
the Defendant is very different from the Plaintiff’s land.”
Further, the Plaintiff concedes in her defence to the counter claim
that the site plan which the Asere stool prepared for the
Defendants on the latter’s land does not fall on Plaintiff’s land. It is
therefore surprising even at the initial stage for Plaintiff to seek to
nullify Land Title Certificate No. GA3929, when she concedes that
her land and that of Defendants are not the same. We are therefore
at a loss as to why she will seek to nullify same. She should rather
be concerned about producing evidence to show that the land in
dispute is the one to which she holds Land Title Certificate No. GA

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11053. This she failed to do at the trial court but surprisingly
succeeded in her claim.
Then the next and legitimate question is which of the parties’ Land
Title Certificate corresponds to the land in dispute. It is the process
of finding the right evidence, we believe that was what the learned
trial High Court Judge sought to do but erred in the conclusion by
concentrating only on the inconsistencies of DW1, the surveyor for
the Asere Stool, which sadly was irrelevant.

The position of the law, following from Fofie V Wusu [1992-93]

GBR 877 is that it is the Plaintiff who bears the burden of
establishing the identity of the land she is laying claim to. Failure
to prove this identify is fatal to a claim for declaration of title.
In the above case, the Court of Appeal, Coram, Lamptey, Adjabeng
and Brobbey JJA (as they were then) speaking with one voice
through Lamptey JA held as follows:
“To succeed in an action for a declaration of title to land a party
must adduce evidence to prove and establish the identity of the
land in respect of which he claimed a declaration of title. On
the evidence the plaintiff failed to prove the identity of the land
claimed.”
See also:
i. Kwabena v Atuahene [1981]GLR 136
ii. Anane v Donkor [1965] GLR SC and
iii. Bedu v Agbi [1972] 2 GLR 238, CA
Let us examine whether the plaintiff discharged this basic
requirement satisfactorily from the evidence on record.
In seeking to establish the identity of the land in dispute, Plaintiff
traced her title to the land some 18years ago (which year pointed to
1978), and according to her she had been on the land all those
years without any disturbance or interference from any person.
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However, ironically, Plaintiff then admits in paragraph 8 of her
statement of claim that the Defendant per her lawful attorney
Stella Larbi took an action of ejectment in respect of the said land
against her tenants at the District Court I, Osu, Accra, which case
was still pending at the time the present suit was instituted. The
assertion of non-disturbance, again, is against the backdrop of the
uncontroverted evidence of Defendant that her tenants were in
occupation of the land since 1973 and that it was the Defendant’s
husband, one Quaynor who volunteered to be a caretaker of the
Defendants land as the latter was suffering from her knees and so
could not visit the land frequently. Indeed, not quite long after the
suit was commenced, the original Defendant died.
Of particular interest was the evidence given by the co-Plaintiff’s
attorney. It is apparent from the record of proceedings that, the Co-
Plaintiff’s attorney, one Festus, informed the court that she joined
the suit at the invitation of the Plaintiff to ASSIST THE COURT. It
must be noted that the attorney who joined the suit at the
Plaintiff’s invitation did not so join to affirmatively and conclusively
support Plaintiff’s claim but only to assist the court. Rightly so, in
our opinion, Festus’ evidence did assist the court and was
determinative of whether the Plaintiff’s claim succeeds or not. Of
course, notice is taken of Co-plaintiff’s averments where he pleaded
in his statement of claim that the Asere stool has not leased the
land in dispute or any piece of land around the disputed land to
the defendant herein. Suffice to say, this is not the same as saying
the Asere stool did lease the land in dispute to the plaintiff.
Other than confirming that both Plaintiff and Defendants were
granted land by the Asere stool, and again that the Plaintiff’s land
is separate from that of the Defendant, Festus also had this to say
as is captured in the record of proceedings:
“The Plaintiff’s land is behind that of the Defendant’s and so
there is a proposed road in the Plaintiff land at one side. In
respect, the Plaintiff shares boundary with the plot of the
Defendant at one side. The proposed roads are now graded
and so the main road has eaten into the Defendant’s land.”

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It is this portion of Festus’ evidence which supports Defendant’s
claim in the case.

It is definitely surprising that the learned trial Judge ignored and

did not make any reference to this in her judgment. The evidence
given by the Surveyor who was tasked to survey the land in dispute
and make a superimposition and to come up with a composite plan
of the disputed land also finds no place in that judgment. Having
been engaged by the court to help settle the dispute, one also
expect that, being a neutral or non-interested party and an expert,
his evidence would be comparatively cogent in determining whether
Plaintiff’s claims fail or not.
By the evidence of the Surveyor, the land as shown to the surveyor
by Salome Tetteh on the composite plan was edged green while the
land as shown on the land title registration plan of Salome was
edged black. On the other hand, the land as shown to surveyor by
Mary Hayford, on the composite plan is edged red while the land as
shown on the land title registration plan for Mary Hayford is edged
blue.
A look at the composite plan drawn by the Surveyor after
superimposition, first of all, confirms the evidence of both the
Plaintiff and the co-Plaintiff’s attorney that both parties had
different lands granted to them by the Asere stool. Further, it
confirms the evidence given by the co-Plaintiff’s attorney, who
joined the suit at the invitation of Plaintiff that the Plaintiff’s land
is BEHIND that of the Defendant. Needless to say, it goes to show
that both Plaintiff and Defendant hold two different Land title
certificates and this is evidence of the fact that each surely has a
land allotted to her. But in answer to the question as to who has
properly laid claim to the land in dispute, it is the Defendant’s
evidence which is more convincing.
As to the fact that Defendant’s land, from the surveyor’s composite
plan, was smaller than what she claimed, the Court of Appeal was
right in following the decision in Nana Darko Frempong II v
Mankrado K Effah [1961] GLR 205-210. In that case which
involved a land dispute between the chief of Aperade and Achiasi,
the court held that estoppels could operate to prevent a party from

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laying claim to a land which formed part of a bigger land, where
the latter has been a subject of decision of the court. In its
decision, the Privy Council, per Lord Guest held that “where it is
admitted that the lesser area lies within the larger area of land
which was the subject of a decision of the Privy Council, it is
immaterial whether or not the outer boundaries of that area are
sufficiently clearly defined”. Applying the reasoning of the court to
the present case, the distinction made by the trial court judge that
the Defendant’s land on the ground which measured about 0.08 of
an acre more or less did not tally with that given in the land Title
Certificate as 0.113 was irrelevant and hence immaterial. Using
exhibit 2 as a guide and the above decision, it is clear that the
Court of Appeal was right in their review of the facts of the case.
It is again unfortunate that this distinction is what amply informed
the trial court judge to find for the Plaintiff. Besides, the minimal
distinction in size goes to confirm what Co-plaintiff’s Attorney said,
that the road may have eaten into part of the Defendant’s land.
At this point, it is important to refer to Exhibit 2, which is the
survey plan that was prepared and tendered by the Surveyor into
evidence. The Court of Appeal was in our view quite right when it
relied on the said exhibit as follows:-
“Plaintiff had consistently maintained that the land given to the
original defendant by the stool was completely different from
her land and that it was because part of her land had been
reduced considerably by a proposed road that she is now
laying claim to her (plaintiff’s) land. Exhibit 2, (page 140) the
resultant plan produced by the Court appointed Surveyor, from
the superimposition of respective site plans of the parties
showed the land allocated to the original defendant falls within
the area in dispute numbered 116. In contrast, plaintiff’s
land indicated in her site plan, numbered 114 and edged
black is completely outside the area in dispute. This is
consistent with the testimony of the Surveyor. It was a grave
error of law on the part of the Judge, in preferring the oral
description given to the Surveyor by the plaintiff as to the
position of the land she was claiming as opposed to the clear

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 documentary proof contained in her land certificate.” Emphasis
supplied.
This Court of Appeal position is really in tandem with the
overwhelming evidence on record both oral and documentary that
the land in respect of which the plaintiff sued, is outside the
disputed area. That being the case, and since the initial allocation
of the burden of proof is on the plaintiff before it will shift to the
Defendant later, it is apparent that the plaintiff has failed to
discharge this burden. Sections 10 and 14 of the Evidence Act,
1975 NRCD 323. See the following cases where the Supreme Court
took pains to explain sections 10 and 14 of the Evidence Act, 1975
NRCD 323 referred to supra.
1. Dzaisu v Ghana Breweries Ltd [2007-2008] SCGLR
539, holding 1 at 546-547 on section 14 of NRCD
323 per Sophia Adinyira JSC and
2. Ackah v Pergah Transport Ltd. [2010] SCGLR 728
holding 1 especially at 735-737 per Sophia Adinyira
JSC on section 10 of NRCD 323
We are therefore of the considered view that, despite the lapses in
the conduct of the work of the Surveyor which arose from the
inability of the parties to file survey instructions to the Surveyor, at
least on the core directive that the parties show their bearings on
the land and produce their relevant land documents and or site
plans to the Surveyor that mandate having been done with
overwhelming evidence that the plaintiff’s land is outside the
disputed area, the plaintiff based on the evidence and law
applicable, must of necessity fail in her action. This is because it is
clear that whatever the Defendant has done on her land in the area
is outside the plaintiffs land. We therefore have no hesitation in
dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal as being completely without any
merit.
NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET
Again, as rightly found by the Court of Appeal, the Asere Stool
having divested itself of its interest in the land in favour of the
original Defendant long ago in 1974, per the nemo dat quod non

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habet maxim, had nothing (with regard to the divested land) to
convey again, and so any purported sale of the already divested
land to the Plaintiff subsequently is null and void.
The Court of Appeal stated in their judgment the following
statement which captures the issue of the priority of the grants to
the parties.
“The priority of the grant to the original defendant which was
well before the receipt of her new title deed dated 27 th July
1983, as opposed to the grant to the Plaintiff in 4 th March 1990
which was long after the original defendant started various
court actions including the institution of this suit.”
The above is a correct resume of the chronology of events in this
appeal. The Court of Appeal also aptly explained the dubious role
played by the Asere Stool in muddying the waters.
We cannot but agree with the Court of Appeal that judicial notice is
taken of problems relating to changes in succession to traditional
stools and problems encountered by purchasers of land.
The Defendants were tricked into surrendering their mother’s
original indenture indicating the grant to her by Nii Nikoi Olai
Amontia IV the Asere Mantse who had died. If that document had
not been taken away, it would have shown clearly that the
Defendants grant was clearly made before Plaintiff. Even with the
present state of the facts, it shows clearly that the Defendant’s
conveyance is earlier in time to that of the plaintiff.
There is an obligation on a grantor, lessor or owner of land to
ensure that any grant he purports to convey to any grantee, or
lessee is guaranteed and that he will stand by to defend the
interest so conveyed to any grantee or lessee.
This principle was explained by Ollennu J (as he then was) in the
case of Bruce v Quarnor & Others [1959] GLR 292 at 294 as
follows:
“By native custom, grant of land implies an undertaking by the
grantor to ensure good title to the grantee. It is therefore the
responsibility of the grantor where the title of the grantee to the

15
 land is challenged, or where the grantee’s possession is
disturbed to litigate his (the grantor’s) title to the land. In other
words, to prove that the right, title, or interest which he
purported to grant was valid”.
It would appear that the Co-plaintiff, by joining the suit to protect
or defend the plaintiff’s title, did just that. But then, this court
would have to consider whether on the basis of the evidence on
record, the Co-plaintiff’s had any title remaining in them to have
conveyed to the plaintiff in any event.

This is because, there is overwhelming evidence on record that the

Defendant had an earlier conveyance prior to the Plaintiff’s
conveyance on the assumption that the parties in this case are
dealing with one and the same parcel of land.
Acquah J, (as he then was) in the unreported Ho, High Court case
Suit No. L/S23/90 dated 24th October 1991 entitled Helen
Abdallah & 4 Others – Plaintiff v Mr. and Mrs. Nunyuie –
Defendants, Kwasi Degbadzor & Anr – Co-Defendants relying
on the Court of Appeal case of Wordie v Awudu Bukari [1976] 2
GLR at 381, held in the Ho High Court case as follows:
“Be that as it may, since the plaintiffs, notwithstanding their
statement of claim and Exhibit A, now concede that the land
belongs to the Akpomegbe family, and from my holding that
Akpo sold same in his own right as his father’s property, it
follows that Akpo did not have title in the transaction he
concluded with the late Madam Tamakloe. The principle nemo
dat quod non habet therefore applies. Accordingly, although the
plaintiffs Exhibit A is valid so far as the necessary legal
formalities are concerned, yet it conveyed nothing to the
plaintiff’s mother.”
This court also held on the nemo dat quod non habet maxim in the
unreported consolidated suit No. 81/92 and L. 20/92 dated 16 th
March 2011 entitled Mrs. Christiana Edith Agyakwa Aboa-
Plaintiff /Respondent /Respondent v Major Keelson (Rtd) -
Defendant/Appellant/Appellant and Okyeame Yima & Anr -

16
Plaintiff/Respondents/Respondents v Major Keelson-
Defendant/Appellant/Appellant as follows:
“It can thus be safely concluded that, the principle nemo dat
quod non habet applies whenever an owner of land who had
previously divested himself of title in the land previously
owned by him to another person, attempts by a subsequent
transaction to convey title to the new person in respect of the
same land cannot be valid. This is because an owner of land
can only convey what he owns, and having already divested
himself of title, the new occupant of the Begoro Stool Nana
Antwi Awuah III cannot revoke what his predecessor had
done.”
See also Sasu v Amua Sakyi [1987-88] 2 GLR 221, holden 7 at
pages 241 per Wuaku JA (as he then was).
It is therefore clear that, assuming the disputed land is the same
parcel of land that both Plaintiff and Defendants lay claim to, on
the principle of nemo dat quod non habet, the Plaintiff must still
fail in his appeal. The Court of Appeal was thus right in dismissing
the appeal.
CONCLUSION
In the premises, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Save for the deletion of the order contained in the last sentence on
page 191 of the appeal record to wit that “and since the
defendants are the only claimants they are entitled to be
declared indisputable owners of the land” the entire Court of
Appeal judgment of 22nd July, 2010 is hereby affirmed. The
Plaintiff’s case thus fails in its entirety.

(SGD) J. V. M. DOTSE
[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]

(SGD) S. A. B. AKUFFO [MS.]

[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]

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 (SGD) DR S. K. DATE-BAH

[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]

(SGD) S .O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS.)

[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]

(SGD) V. AKOTO-BAMFO [MRS.]

[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]

COUNSEL;
CHARLES BAWADUAH FOR THE APPELLANT.
GODWIN K. NTONY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

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