HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed
MADRID, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 25339 dated
1

September 27, 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela in Civil Case
No. 19-219 dated October 9, 1989 which adjudicated lot Nos. 7036-A-10-A, 7036-A-10-B and
7036-A-10-C to herein private respondents. 2

The following facts, concisely related in the petition, are not in dispute.
3

On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages against
4

private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with
a total area of 3,277 square meters. In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land
was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers,
for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in
actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property. However, sometime in
October 1986, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain a
Torrens Title over the said land.

On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming
that said document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. Moreover, while they admit
petitioners' possession of the land, they assert that this possession is in defiance of their
repeated demands that the former relinquish the same. Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez
contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought the same
from the Madrid brothers in 1976. 5

During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost.
Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit "A," a photo copy of the purported
original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction.

However, in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that Exhibit "A" was inadmissible in
evidence, thus:

Since at the time of the execution of Teodoro dela Cruz' affidavit or on June 14,
1966, a duplicate original carbon copy of the alleged sale was still in his
possession, the plaintiffs must have to account for it. No proof was adduced
that this remaining copy was lost or destroyed. Furthermore, no attempt was
done to produce the copies retained by the notary public although there is a
possibility that the same still exist (sic). Neither was there any proof that the
copy sent to the court as required by the notarial law is unavailable. Under
these (sic) state of facts, the Court believes that the "xerox copy of a certified
true copy" of the original issued by the notary public cannot be admitted in
evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, the dispositive portion of the
decision of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint;

2. Declaring the defendants the lawful owners of the land in question insofar as
the portion thereof falling or found in their respective titles are concerned; and

3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their agents, representatives or any person or

persons deriving their title, ownership or possession from the plaintiffs, to
vacate the portions of Lots 7036-A-10-A, 70360A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C,
occupied by them and to deliver the possession thereof to the defendants;

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Evidently aggrieved by the decision, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals contending
that the trial court erred in holding that: (1) Exhibit "A" was inadmissible in evidence to prove
the transaction; (2) there was no valid sale of the land in question; (3) that they (petitioners)
are not entitled to the improvements they had introduced in the land.

On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled that Exhibit
"A" was admissible in evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it was
offered during the trial, thus:

It is therefore evident that defendants-appellees never put in issue the

inadmissible nature of Exh. "A" as a mere secondary evidence and that the
trial judge did not exclude the same when it was formally offered, only to
ultimately exclude it in its decision. It is true that the originals of Exh. "A" were
never produced or accounted for by plaintiffs. Yet, notwithstanding this
omission, the defense did not object to its not being the best evidence when it
was formally offered. Had the defendant interposed an objection to Exh. "A" on
the ground of its incompetency for not complying with the best evidence rule,
it would have been properly excluded by the trial court. Defendants' omission
to object on the proper ground operated as a waiver, as this was a matter
resting on their discretion.

Unfortunately, petitioners' victory was shortlived. For the Court of Appeals, while ruling that
Exhibit "A" was admissible, concluded that the sine had no probative value to support the
allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them in 1959, viz.:

The lone fact that Atty. Tabangay asserted that he recognized his signature on
the copy shown by Teodoro when the loss of the originals was just made
known to him, does not render Exh. "A" trustworthly as to the actual execution
of the alleged deed of sale. Exh. "A" does not even contain a reproduction of
the alleged signatures of the Madrid brothers for comparison purposes. The
surviving witness to the alleged execution, Constantino Balmoja was not
 presented to corroborate Atty. Tabangay's testimony, hinged as the latter was
on secondary evidence.

Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court

dated October 9, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the case
be remanded to the court a quo to conduct the proper proceedings to
determine the value of the useful improvements introduced by appellants for
reimbursement by appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Failing in their bid to reconsider the decision, the petitioners have filed the present petition.

Petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit "A" were a mere photo copy of the original carbon
copy, they had presented other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the existence of
the sale. First, the testimony of the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, who acknowledged the due
6

execution of the deed of sale. Second, their long possession of the land in question,
bolstered by the construction of various improvements gives rise to the disputable
presumption of ownership.

While we concur with the Court of Appeals' finding that Exhibit "A" does not prove that the
sale of the land indeed occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the
circumstances present in this case.

To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale,
testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is imperative that all the
7

originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. These 8

petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was even
presented during the trial. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not be
found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said
office.

It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates
and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the
original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable. 9

Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents
failed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay,
regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A"
10

when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit "A"
11

is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still
meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince
and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with
its probative value.12

As earlier stated, Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the
alleged deed of sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of
13

the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed
Exhibit "A," the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify
the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty.
Tabangay's failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit "A" unreliable.

However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not lost for the petitioner.

The records show that the disputed petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing
several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of
the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was enclosed, thus signifying
petitioners' exclusive claim of ownership. The construction of various infrastructure on the
land — rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other buildings — was undoubtedly a
clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them
protested.

We cannot accept the Madrids' explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate
the land due to the unexplained killings within the area. Not a single shred of evidence was
14

presented to show that these killings were perpetrated by the petitioners. All told, their
remonstration and fears are nothing but pure speculation. To make matters worse, the record
is bereft of any documentary evidence that the Madrids sent a written demand to the
petitioners ordering them to vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout
of dissent to the petitioners' possession of the subject land in a span of almost thirty (30)
years is simply contrary to their of ownership.

Next, the Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them
because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore
imprescriptable. The principle raised, while admittedly correct, are not without exception.
15

The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220
and 167256, did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens
system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership, especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained
16

their respective TCT's only in October 1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners
first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their
ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely
to have the land registered under their respective names. For as earlier mentioned,
Certificates of Title do not establish ownership.17

Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the private respondents would ripen
into ownership of the land, and therefore, the defense of prescription would be unavailing,
still, the petitioners would have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of
laches. The Madrids' long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over disputed
property will preclude them from recovering the same. 18

The above ruling was stressed in the following cases:

Miguel v. Catalino declared:

19

Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the opinion
that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florencio Catalino must be sustained. For
despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the
vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without
protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding
the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reinvindicate the lot from
1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants'
proposition that no prescription lies against their father's recorded title, their passivity and
inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the
equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants
must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with
favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend
time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements
thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's
efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his
expense. . . . .

Pabalete v. Echarri stated:

20

Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find,
however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the
defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the defense of
prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo
Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that
while defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his
predecessor's long continued possession for 37 years, the original owner's right to recover
back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long
period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect been converted into a stale
demand. (Quoting Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277).

xxx xxx xxx

This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the
defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or
inexcusable neglect he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow
him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. . . .

Lastly, Marquez' claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value does not inspire any
merit. In his testimony, he admitted that he knew the land in question. Curiously, in his
21

Answer to the complaint filed by the petitioners, he stated that he has been aware that the
22

former were in possession of the land since 1959. Where a purchaser was fully aware of
another person's possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend later to
be an innocent purchaser for value. Moreover, one who buys without checking the vendor's
23

title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. 24

In fact, it would have been expected that in the normal course of daily life, both the Madrids
and Marquezes talked about the status of the property. This being so, it would be difficult to
imagine that the latter were not made aware of the petitioner's possession of the land. Armed
with such information, they should have acted with the diligence of a prudent man in
determining the circumstances surrounding the property. Otherwise, the law does not give
him the benefit afforded to an innocent purchaser for value. 25

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
24, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, petitioners are
hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject land. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.