1. Vergara vs CA, GR. No. 77679, Sept.

30, 1997
2. People vs Sarion, GR 243029-30, March 18, 2021
3. Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977
4. Air France vs CA, GR 76093 (1989) WARREN
5. Banzon vs CA, GR 47258 (1989
6. Cinco vs Canonoy, GR L-33171 (1979)
7. Lasam vs Sps. Ramolete, GR 159132 (2008)
8. Ramos vs CA, GR 124354 (1999) SABANDAL
9. LG Foods v. Philadelfa, G.R. No. 158995, September 26, 2006
10. Cagayan Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs Rafanan, et.al, GR No. 199886, Dec.
3, 2014
11. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs Barrios, 79 Phil. 660 (1947)
12. Custodio and Santos vs CA, 253 SCRA 483 (1996) PALANGKA
13. Jovellanos et.al vs CA, et.al GR 1007728, 210 SCRA 126 (1992)
14. Escano et.al, vs CA, et.al L.47207, Sept. 25, 1980
15. Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs CA et.al, GR 53401, Nov. 6, 1989
16. Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs CA, et.al GR 88694, Jan. 11, 1993 TAGRA
17. Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 195 (1990)
18. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital vs Capanzana, GR 189218, March 22, 2017
19. Vda de Bataclan vs Medina GR L-10126 (1957)
20. Dulay et al vs CA, et al. GR 108017, April 3, 1995 ESPINA
21. Huang vs Philippine Hotelier Inc. GR 180440 (2012)
22. Layugan vs IAC, 167 SCRA 363 (1988
23. Sps. Padua vs Robles and Bay Taxi Cab, GR No. L-40486, Aug. 29, 1975
GABUCAN

Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf

In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a

breach of duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to
vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in
proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the
depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair
the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his
judgment.

Under the circumstances the plaintiff was negligent in placing himself on the side of the car
where he knew that he would be injured by the falling of the rails from the car when they
reached this point in the track where the two stringers were without any support of their ends. He
either should have refused to work at all or he should have placed himself behind the car, on the
other side of it, or in front of it, drawing it with a rope. He was guilty of contributory negligence
and is not entitled to recover.

It is, said however, that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in a case like this is
no defense under the law in force in these Islands. To this proposition I can not agree. The
liability of the defendant is based in the majority opinion upon articles 1101 and 1103 of the
Civil Code.

In order to impose such liability upon the defendant, it must appear that its negligence caused the
accident. The reason why contradictory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is a defense in this
class of cases is that the negligence of the defendant did not alone cause the accident. If nothing
but that negligence had existed, the accident would not have happened and, as I understand it, in
every case in which contradictory negligence is a defense it is made so because the negligence of
the plaintiff is the cause of the accident, to this extent, that if the plaintiff had not been negligent
the accident would not have happened, although the defendant was also negligent. In other
words, the negligence of the defendant is not alone sufficient to cause the accident. It requires
also the negligence of the plaintiff.

De Guia vs Atlantic Gulf

On the whole, we are of the opinion that the finding of negligence in the
operation of the car must be sustained, as not being clearly contrary to the
evidence; not so much because of excessive speed as because of the distance
which the car was allowed to run with the front wheels of the rear truck
derailed. It seems to us than an experienced and attentive motorman should
have discovered that something was wrong and would have stopped before he
had driven the car over the entire distance from the point where the wheels left
the track to the place where the post was struck.

The conclusion being accepted that there was negligence on the part of the
motorman in driving the car, it results that the company is liable for the
damage resulting to the plaintiff as a consequence of that negligence. The
plaintiff had boarded the car as a passenger for the city of Manila and the
company undertook to convey him for hire. The relation between the parties
was, therefore, of a contractual nature, and the duty of the carrier is to be
determined with reference to the principles of contract law, that is, the
company was bound to convey and deliver the plaintiff safely and securely with
reference to the degree of care which, under the circumstances, is required by
law and custom applicable to the case (art. 1258, Civil Code). Upon failure to
comply with that obligation the company incurred the liability defined in
articles 1103-1107 of the Civil Code.

From the nature of the liability thus incurred, it is clear that the defendant
company can not avail itself of the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, since that provision has reference to liability incurred by negligence in
the absence of contractual relation, that is, to the culpa aquiliana of the civil
law. It was therefore irrelevant for the defendant company to prove, as it did,
that the company had exercised due care in the selection and instruction of the
motorman who was in charge of its car and that he was in fact an experienced
and reliable servant.

Manuel De Guia v The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, G.R. No.
L-14335 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

The petitioner, a physician, boarded a car at the end of the line with the
intention of coming to the city. At about thirty meters from the starting point,
the car entered a switch, the petitioner remaining on the back of the platform
holding the handle of the right-hand door. Upon coming out of the switch, the
small wheels of the rear car left the track, ran for a short distance, and struck
a concrete post. As the car stopped, the petitioner was thrown against the door,
receiving bruises and possible internal injuries. The trial court found that the
motorman was negligent for having maintained too rapid a speed. On the other
hand, the respondent insisted that the derailment of the car is supposed to be
due to a fortuitous event and not the negligence of the motorman, i.e. a stone
lodged between the rails at the juncture of the switch, unobserved by the
motorman.

Issue:

WoN the respondent is liable for damages?

Ruling:

(Article 1172)

Yes, the respondent is liable for damages.

The petitioner had boarded the car as a passenger for the city of Manila and
the company undertook to convey him for hire. The relation between the
parties was, therefore, of a contractual nature, and the duty of the carrier is to
be determined with reference to the principles of contract law, i.e. the company
was bound to convey and deliver the petitioner safely and securely with
reference to the degree of care, which, under the circumstances, is required by
law and custom applicable to the case. (culpa contractual)

Note:

culpa aquiliana

- relevant to prove that the company exercise due care in the selection and
instruction of the motorman; liability incurred by negligence in the absence of a
contractual relation

Cangco vs MRR

Bisan pag naay sajop ang plaintiff, di pasabot nga wa na sijay makuha, ma
mitigate ra

Mao na sa contributory negligence

This case distinguish bet culpa aquilliana and contractual,

Sa contractual- ang negligence, incidental ra Rakes vs Atlantico

- - preponderance
- -due care sa good father mag mitigate lang

- Basta

Sa aquilliana- direct ang negligence ( wani obligation except mag care in all
human transaction)
- Preponderance
- - good father is a complete defense
 - Ang [plaintiff mo prove nga naay negligence sa defendant

Criminal- independent sa contract ( no obligation except the duty not to harm

others)
- beyond reasonable doubt
- - good father is not a proper defense kay ang guilt sa employee is guilt sa
employer
- Subsidiary ang employer, una pabayron ang employee
- Prosecution has the burden to prove the negligence sa accused

This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the
Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to whom
they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law,
upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were, the master would be
liable in every case and unconditionally — but upon the principle announced
in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their
fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the
damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a
servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a
vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all
the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage
arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is
personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the
acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if
the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured.

[CASE DIGEST] JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO. [G.R. No. L-12191,
October 14, 1918]

Facts
Jose Cangco, was in the employment the respondent. One day, the plaintiff
arose from his seat and stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came
in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from
the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from
the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop.

Issue
Whether or not Cangco committed Contributory negligence.
Ruling
In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act
— that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the
age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has
been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with
safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs
the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was
perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the
train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.

It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated;
that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and
that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for
the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of
these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant
company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
examined.

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant
is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage
which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903
of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only
to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression,
that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.

Inocencio vs Hospicio
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over a lease contract between Hospicio de San Jose
(HDSJ) and Ramon Inocencio. The lease contract was for a parcel of land in
Pasay City and was effective for a period of one year, with several renewals.
German Inocencio, Ramon's father, constructed two buildings on the land and
subleased them. After German's death, Ramon continued to collect rentals
from the sublessees and paid them to HDSJ. However, HDSJ terminated the
lease contract and filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Ramon and
his sublessees. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay ruled in favor of HDSJ,
stating that the lease contract could not be transferred to Ramon due to an
express stipulation. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay affirmed the decision,
and the Court of Appeals modified the award for damages.

Appeals modified the award for damages.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case are:

1. The validity of the sublease contracts

2. Tortious interference by HDSJ
3. Ownership of the buildings erected on the leased premises
4. Entitlement of HDSJ to reasonable compensation and attorney's fees
5. Prescription of HDSJ's action for unlawful detainer

Ruling:
The court ruled as follows:

1. The sublease contracts were valid since the lease contract did not
contain any prohibition against subleasing.
2. HDSJ did not commit tortious interference as their actions were
motivated by economic reasons.
3. The Inocencios have ownership rights over the buildings and have the
right to lease them to third parties.
4. HDSJ is entitled to reimbursement for half of the value of the
improvements made to the buildings under Article 1678 of the Civil
Code.
5. The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription as it was
filed within the one-year period provided by the Rules of Court.
Ratio:
The court based its decision on the following arguments and legal basis:

1. The court found that the sublease contracts were valid because the lease
contract did not contain any provision prohibiting subleasing. Therefore,
Ramon had the right to sublease the buildings and collect rentals from
the sublessees.
2. The court determined that HDSJ did not commit tortious interference
because their actions were motivated by economic reasons. They
terminated the lease contract and filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
in order to protect their rights and interests as the lessor.
3. The court recognized the Inocencios' ownership rights over the buildings
since they were the ones who constructed them on the leased premises.
As owners, they have the right to lease the buildings to third parties.
4. The court applied Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which states that if the
lessor refuses to reimburse the lessee for necessary and useful
improvements, the lessee may remove the improvements or demand
reimbursement for half of their value. In this case, HDSJ was entitled to
reimbursement for half of the value of the improvements made to the
buildings.
5. The court ruled that the action for unlawful detainer was not barred by
prescription because it was filed within the one-year period provided by
the Rules of Court. Therefore, HDSJ's complaint was timely and valid.

The case was remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court for the determination of
the value of the improvements to be paid to the Inocencios or the option to
demolish the buildings at their expense.

Phoenix Construction Inc vs IAC

Facts:
The case of Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court involves
a collision between a car driven by private respondent Leonardo Dionisio and a
dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction, Inc. The collision occurred when
Dionisio's car collided with the dump truck, which was parked askew on the
right side of the road, partially blocking the way of oncoming traffic. Dionisio
claimed that he tried to avoid the collision but was unable to do so, resulting in
physical injuries. Dionisio filed a lawsuit for damages against Phoenix
Construction, Inc. and its driver, Armando Carbonel. The trial court ruled in
favor of Dionisio and ordered Phoenix Construction, Inc. and Carbonel to pay
damages. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision but reduced
the amount of damages awarded.

Issue:
The main issue in the case is whether the negligence of Carbonel in parking the
dump truck was the primary cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries, or
whether Dionisio's own negligence in driving fast and without headlights was
the primary cause.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that while Dionisio was also negligent in driving fast
and without headlights, the primary cause of the accident and Dionisio's
injuries was the negligent parking of the dump truck by Carbonel. The Court
held that there was a reasonable relationship between Carbonel's negligence
and the accident, and that the collision was a foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence. The Court rejected the argument that Dionisio's
negligence was an intervening cause, and held that Carbonel and Phoenix
Construction, Inc. were still liable for damages.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court based its ruling on the principle of proximate cause. While
Dionisio's negligence in driving fast and without headlights contributed to the
accident, the Court found that the primary cause was the negligent parking of
the dump truck. The Court reasoned that Carbonel's act of parking the truck
askew on the right side of the road, partially blocking the way of oncoming
traffic, created a dangerous situation that made the collision foreseeable. The
Court emphasized that there was a reasonable relationship between Carbonel's
negligence and the accident, and that the collision was a natural and probable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The Court also addressed other issues raised in the case. It found that Dionisio
did not have a valid curfew pass for the night of the accident, that he was
driving fast, that he purposely turned off his headlights, and that there was not
enough evidence to prove that he was intoxicated. These findings further
supported the Court's ruling that Carbonel's negligence was the primary cause
of the accident.

Based on these findings, the Court allocated 80% of the damages to be paid by
Carbonel and Phoenix Construction, Inc., and 20% to be paid by Dionisio. The
Court also upheld the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs.
 Dela Cruz vs Octaviano

A car driver is found negligent and held liable for damages in a civil case
after colliding with a tricycle, resulting in severe injuries and the
amputation of a military dentist's leg.

Facts:
On April 1, 1999, respondent Captain Renato Octaviano, his mother Wilma
Octaviano, and his sister Janet Octaviano were riding a tricycle driven by
Eduardo Padilla. As they were traveling, they were hit by a car driven by
petitioner Al Dela Cruz. The impact caused Renato to be thrown from the
tricycle, resulting in severe injuries and the subsequent amputation of his leg.
Renato, along with his mother Wilma, filed a civil case for damages against
Dela Cruz and the owner of the car.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether Dela Cruz was negligent and
liable for damages.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that Dela Cruz was indeed negligent, and the proximate cause
of the accident was his negligence. The Court affirmed the award of damages,
including moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

Ratio:
The Court based its decision on the evidence presented during the trial.
Testimonies from witnesses, such as S/Sgt. Joselito Lacuesta and Antonio
Fernandez, supported the claim that Dela Cruz's car hit the tricycle. Lacuesta
also testified that Dela Cruz appeared to be drunk at the time of the incident.
These testimonies, along with the police report and the fact that Dela Cruz was
positive for alcoholic breath, established Dela Cruz's negligence.

Dela Cruz argued that the proximate cause of the accident was the fault of the
tricycle driver. However, the Court rejected this argument and held that Dela
Cruz's negligence was the proximate cause. The Court emphasized that
negligence is the failure to exercise the degree of care required by law, and Dela
Cruz's actions in driving while possibly intoxicated constituted negligence.
In terms of liability, the Court held that Dela Cruz, as the driver of the car, was
primarily responsible for the accident. However, the Court also found the
owner of the vehicle equally responsible for the accident. This is based on the
principle of vicarious liability, which holds the owner liable for the acts of the
driver when the vehicle is being used for the owner's benefit.

Regarding the award of damages, the Court upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The respondents were awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney's fees. These damages were deemed necessary to compensate the
respondents for the physical and emotional harm they suffered as a result of
the accident, and to deter others from engaging in similar negligent behavior.

In conclusion, the Court found Dela Cruz negligent and liable for damages in a
civil case arising from a car-tricycle collision. The Court's decision was based
on the evidence presented, including witness testimonies, the police report, and
the applicable laws on negligence and liability. The Court affirmed the award of
damages, including moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, dated August 12, 2015, of petitioner Al Dela Cruz is DENIED for lack
of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated January 30, 2014 and Resolution
dated June 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 93399
are AFFIRMED.

Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. vs. San Andres

ATTY: dire gi discuss nag di necessary ang reservation. Take note of this case.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners in a civil action for
damages, allowing their counterclaim and clarifying that the reservation
of the civil action does not apply to independent civil actions under
certain articles of the Civil Code.

Case Background and Parties Involved

 The case of Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. v. San Andres involves a
civil action for damages filed by the respondent, Antonio San Andres,
against the petitioners, Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. and Felix Q.
Ruz.
 The case arose from a vehicular accident wherein a bus owned by San
Andres collided with a bus owned by Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc.
  The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed San Andres' complaint and the
petitioners' counterclaim, ruling that the counterclaim was tantamount
to double recovery of damages.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.

Main Issue: Correct Denial of Petitioners' Counterclaim

 The main issue in the case is whether the petitioners' counterclaim was
correctly denied by the RTC.
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that their
counterclaim should not have been dismissed.
 The Court clarified that the reservation of the civil action does not apply
to independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code.
 These independent civil actions may be filed at any time, as long as the
plaintiff does not recover twice for the same act or omission.
Atty: gi remand sa

Basis of Petitioners' Counterclaim

 The Court found that the petitioners' counterclaim was based on a quasi-
delict, specifically on Article 2184 in relation to Article 2180 and Article
2176 of the Civil Code.
 The Court emphasized that the counterclaim was an independent civil
action and did not require prior reservation.
 The RTC's dismissal of the counterclaim based on the obsolete version of
the Rules of Court was deemed erroneous.

Requirement to Avoid Double Recovery of Damages

 However, the Court also noted that the petitioners must show that they
will not recover damages twice for the same incident.
 The Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to allow
the petitioners to present evidence on their counterclaim, subject to the
prohibition against double recovery of damages.

Conclusion and Remand of the Case

 In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners,
allowing their counterclaim and clarifying that the reservation of the civil
action does not apply to independent civil actions under certain articles
of the Civil Code.
  The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings on the
counterclaim.

Darines vs. Quiñones (tag ija sa bus nga gi drivan ni Quitan)

Two passengers who were injured in a bus collision with a parked truck
filed a lawsuit seeking damages, but the Supreme Court denied their
claim, stating that negligence alone is not enough to warrant the award
of damages in a breach of contract case.

Atty: extra diligence ang needed sa Common carrier

Culpa Contractual- naay contract e hatud nga safe ang pasahero

Parties Involved and Incident Details

 Parties involved: Judith D. Darines and Joyce D. Darines (petitioners),
Eduardo Quiñones and Rolando Quitan (respondents)
 Incident: Collision between the bus operated by Quiñones and driven by
Quitan and a parked truck along Kennon Road
 Consequences: Damage to both vehicles, death of two passengers,
injuries to remaining passengers including the petitioners

Petitioners' Arguments
 Allegation: Respondents breached their contract of carriage by failing to
safely transport the petitioners to their destination
 Claim: Quitan's reckless and negligent driving caused the collision
 Damages sought: Actual, moral, exemplary, and temperate damages, as
well as costs of suit

Respondents' Counterarguments
 Claim: Quitan was driving carefully and the negligence of the truck driver
who parked without installing any early warning device was the
proximate cause of the incident
 Defense: Quiñones exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employees, and Quitan, as a licensed professional
driver with no prior incidents, was not at fault
Testimony and Evidence Presented
 Judith's testimony: Quitan was driving at a fast pace, resulting in the
collision and her injury
 Evidence presented by Judith: Receipts for medicine and a summary of
expenses, including those incurred for a ritual dao-is, to prove actual
damages
 Claim for moral damages: Judith claimed moral damages for her pain
and suffering
 Respondents' witness: Testified that he bought the medicines and paid
for the petitioners' hospitalization expenses

Rulings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA)
 RTC ruling: In favor of the petitioners, ordered the respondents to pay
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit
 CA decision: Reversed the RTC ruling, stating that the petitioners failed
to prove fraudulent or bad faith actions by the respondents
 Basis for CA decision: Since no moral damages were awarded, there was
no basis for granting exemplary damages and attorney's fees

Dispute over Awards of Damages and Attorney's Fees

 Petitioners' argument: Awards of damages and attorney's fees by the RTC
had already attained finality because the respondents did not dispute
them in their appeal to the CA
 Court's denial: Respondents did question the awards in their appeal

Main Issue and Court's Ruling

 Main issue: Whether the petitioners were entitled to moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees
 Court's agreement with CA ruling: In an action for breach of contract,
moral damages can only be awarded if the death of a passenger results
or if the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith
 Court's decision: Petitioners were not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages or attorney's fees because they only alleged negligence and did
not provide evidence of fraud or bad faith

Clarification on Breach of Contract and Negligence Cases

 Difference between breach of contract and quasi-delict/negligence cases:
In a breach of contract case, it is necessary to show the existence of a
 contract and the failure of the common carrier to transport the passenger
safely
 Requirement for moral damages: Moral damages can only be awarded if
fraud or bad faith is proven
 Lack of evidence in this case: Petitioners only alleged negligence and did
not provide evidence of fraud or bad faith

Court's Final Decision

 Court affirmed the CA's decision and denied the petition.

Air France vs. Carrascoso

Culpa Contractual and Contract Aquiliana

Business imbued with public interest mao need ug extra diligence

Usar a imo ipakita, imo ra juy ticket.

Ingon supreme court :

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44

Air France is ordered to pay Rafael Carrascoso damages and attorney's fees after
wrongfully expelling him from his first class seat and forcing him to sit in the tourist
class, with the Court of Appeals finding that Air France breached the contract and acted
in bad faith.

Facts:
The case of Air France v. Carrascoso involves a dispute between the petitioner, Air France, and
the respondent, Rafael Carrascoso. The case was decided by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on September 28, 1966. Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a
group of Filipino pilgrims traveling from Manila to Lourdes. Carrascoso had purchased a first-
class round trip airplane ticket from Air France for the entire duration of his trip. However, when
the group reached Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced Carrascoso to vacate his first-class
seat and sit in the tourist class. Carrascoso refused to give up his seat, but eventually relented
after being pacified by other passengers. Carrascoso filed a complaint against Air France,
alleging breach of contract and seeking damages.
Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether Carrascoso was entitled to a first-class seat as stated
in his ticket.

Another issue raised in the case is whether Air France acted in bad faith.

Ruling:
The ruling of the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court holds
that Carrascoso was entitled to a first-class seat and that Air France breached its contract with
him. The court also upholds the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees, as it finds that Air France acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.

Ratio:
The court found that Carrascoso had a confirmed reservation for a first-class seat and was
entitled to it. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the terms of the ticket to
ensure stability in the relations between passengers and airlines. Air France's argument that the
ticket did not guarantee a first-class seat and that it depended on seat availability was rejected by
the court.

Regarding the issue of bad faith, the court found that Air France's manager in Bangkok
threatened Carrascoso and forcibly ejected him from his seat, which constituted bad faith. The
court awarded Carrascoso moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees as a result.

The court emphasized the importance of treating passengers with kindness, respect, courtesy, and
due consideration. It held that any rude or discourteous conduct by airline employees gives the
passenger a right to damages. The court's decision serves as a reminder to airlines to uphold their
contractual obligations and treat passengers with dignity and respect.

Spouses Dalen vs. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines

Atty: damages gikan sa quasi delict suds a jurisdiction sa regular court dili sa
labor arbiter

Naay contractual relation.

Action for damages may prosper suds a quasi-delict

Culpa Aquilliana- bisag naay existing contract, ja ang ground kay negligence,
quasi aquilliana nana. Direct ang negligence
Sa contractual, ang negligence kay incidental.
Sa carrier, negligent sila kung naay loss, damage, . so masud sa aquilliana

A complaint for damages filed by the spouses Dalen against non-resident

corporations involved in the sinking of a vessel is dismissed by the
Supreme Court due to lack of jurisdiction and the validity of settlement
agreements.

Case Background and Parties Involved

 The case of Spouses Dalen v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines involves a complaint for
damages filed by the spouses Dalen and other petitioners against non-
resident corporations, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and Diamond Camellia, S.A.
 Mitsui O.S.K. Lines was the charterer of MV Sea Prospect while Diamond
Camellia, S.A. was the registered owner of the vessel.
 On August 26, 1998, the vessel sank, resulting in the death of 10 crew
members.
 The petitioners are heirs and beneficiaries of the deceased crew
members.

Facts of the Case

 The petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the respondents.
 The respondents argued that the petitioners had already received full
payment of death benefits based on the employment contract and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement governing the employment of the
seafarers.
 The petitioners had signed settlement agreements, affidavits of heirship,
and receipts of payment before the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA), releasing the respondents from all liabilities and
committing not to file any claim or suit against them in any jurisdiction.

Trial Court and Lower Court Decisions

 The trial court confirmed the validity of the settlement agreement and
approved it.
 The Supreme Court of Panama dismissed the petitioners' case for lack of
jurisdiction.
 The Labor Arbiter in the Philippines dismissed the complaint on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and prescription of action.
 The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
Issues Raised by the Petitioners
 The petitioners raised two issues before the Supreme Court: whether
their cause of action had prescribed and whether the settlement
agreement barred them from filing the complaint.

Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter

 The Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the case because the claim for damages was based on quasi-delict, which
falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
 The court explained that the claim for damages was grounded on
respondents' gross negligence, which caused the sinking of the vessel
and the death of the crew members.

Validity of the Settlement Agreements

 The court held that not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against
public policy.
 If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties.
 In this case, the petitioners signed the settlement agreements with their
chosen counsel, indicating that they understood the contents of the
agreements.
 The agreements released the respondents from all liabilities, including
those based on tort, arising from the sinking of the vessel.

Supreme Court Decision

 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, stating that
the settlement agreements signed by the petitioners were valid and
barred them from filing the complaint.
 The court did not need to consider the issue of prescription of action
since the claim for damages based on quasi-delict was already barred by
the settlement agreements.

Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.

Tan-awa ang transport vs Andres

Lahi ni sila kay duha ang cause ani

Facts:
The case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. involves a vehicular accident that occurred
on October 31, 1970 along Taft Avenue, Manila. The accident involved a Holden car owned by
Jose Lontoc and driven by Rodolfo Defeo, and an MD Bus driven by Ignacio dela Cruz. Ignacio
dela Cruz was charged with the crime of damage to property with physical injuries through
reckless imprudence but was later acquitted due to lack of evidence. Jose Lontoc, the owner of
the Holden car, then filed a complaint for recovery of damages against MD Transit and Taxi Co.,
Inc. and Ignacio dela Cruz, alleging that Ignacio dela Cruz, while driving the MD bus, struck and
damaged the rear right portion of the Holden car.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case were whether the plaintiff's failure to reserve the right to file a
separate action for damages was fatal to the case, and whether the judgment of acquittal in the
criminal case barred the institution of a separate civil action for damages.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Court held that the failure to reserve the
right to file a separate civil action was not fatal in this case. Additionally, the fact that the
plaintiff intervened in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for
damages, especially considering that the accused was acquitted because his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Ratio:
The Court explained that the two cases, the criminal case and the complaint for damages, were
based on different causes of action. The criminal case was based solely on the accused's violation
of Article 365 of the Penal Code, which deals with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries. On the other hand, the complaint for damages was based on
quasi-delict, which is a separate and distinct cause of action.

The Court emphasized that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. The
judgment of acquittal in the criminal case extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. In this case, the accused was acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, but there was no declaration that the facts giving rise to the civil liability did not exist.

Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to file a separate civil action for damages
against MD Transit and Taxi Co., Inc. and Ignacio dela Cruz. The Court reversed the order of the
trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

G.R. No. L-48949 April 15, 1988

JOSE M. LONTOC, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MD TRANSIT & TAXI CO., INC. and IGNACIO DELA CRUZ, defendants-appellees.

Tolentino, Garcia, Cruz & Reyes for plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel P. Salen for defendants-appellees.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the issues raised involve pure questions of law which are
within this Court's exclusive jurisdiction. *

On October 31, 1970 at about 8:30 in the morning a vehicular accident happened along Taft
Avenue, Manila, involving a Holden car (Kingswood Plate No. 23-80 '70) driven by Rodolfo Defeo
and owned by Jose Lontoc and an MD Bus bearing Plate No. 48-1 (4-PUB-70) driven by Ignacio
dela Cruz.

As a result of this accident, Ignacio dela Cruz, the driver of the MD Bus was charged with the crime
of damage to property with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 70-24847.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered judgment "finding the accused not guilty, because his
guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted."

Jose Lontoc, the owner of the Holden car then filed a complaint for recovery of damages against MD
Transit and Taxi Co., Inc., and Ignacio dela Cruz before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh
Judicial District (Quezon City). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-19145.

Instead of filing an answer, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground "that the
complaint fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that the cause of action as alleged in the
complaint is barred by a prior final judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. 3774 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ignacio dela Cruz y Pine and rendered by Branch XIX of the Court of First Instance
of Manila and which in the same case plaintiff ventilated his claim for damages against the
defendants."

The trial court then issued an order dismissing the civil case because there was no reservation made
by the complainant to file a separate civil action and the complainant through counsel intervened in
the prosecution of the criminal case which led to the acquittal of the accused.

The plaintiff appealed the order to the Court of Appeals. As stated earlier, the appellate court
certified the case to this Court on the ground that the issues raised are purely questions of law.

The facts are not in dispute. The issues raised are: 1) whether or not the plaintiff-appellant's non-
reservation to file a separate action for damages is fatal to this action for damages and 2) whether or
not the judgment of acquittal of Ignacio dela Cruz in the criminal case wherein through a private
prosecutor, the plaintiff-appellant presented evidence to prove damages is a bar to the institution of
a separate civil action for damages against both the operator of MD transit and Taxi Co., Inc., and its
driver, Ignacio dela Cruz.
The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19145 alleged that defendant Ignacio dela Ortiz, while driving an
NM bus operated by his co-defendant MD transit and Taxi Co., "in a careless, reckless, imprudent
manner along Taft Avenue, Manila south bound to Pasay City, violently struck and bumped the rear
right portion of a Holden car owned by the plaintiff causing actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages." With the allegation of negligence against the driver, and that of an employer-employee
relationship between him and him co-defendant MD Transit and Taxi Co., the complaint is
undoubtedly based as quasi-delict upon Article 2180 of the Civil Code (Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA
200).

Under the facts of this case, the failure of the plaintiff-appellant to reserve his right to file a separate
civil case is not fatal (Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).

The fact that the plaintiff-appellant intervened in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a
separate civil action for damages especially considering that the accused in the criminal case,
Ignacio dela Cruz, was acquitted "because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt" (Emphasis supplied).

The two cases were anchored on two different causes of action. The criminal case was based solely
on Ignacio dela Cruz's violation of Article 365 of the Penal Code. Any doubt as to the nature of the
action is erased by the trial court's statements in Criminal Case No. 3774 that Me Court finds that the
guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that the owner of the bus is not
included in this case being a criminal case" (emphasis supplied). On the other hand, the complaint
for damages was based on quasi-delict and both the driver and bus owner are defendants.

In view of the fact that defendant-appellee dela Cruz was acquitted on the ground that "his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil
action to recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. "The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil hability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 558 cited in People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno
Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,1988). The is based on Article
29 of the Civil Code which provides:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. ...

It is plain from the judgment in the criminal case that the aspect of civil hability was not passed upon
and resolved.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further
proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals

In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of
gross negligence as to approximate malice (
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is
found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner

The bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent
Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of
the Civil Code providing thusly: "Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him."

Atty: Mo file kag kaso mo file dajun ug moral damages, kay wa ka katog,
anxiety, dili na bout pasabot ihatag na dajun, tan awon pa ug angajan baka

Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless
amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to
the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is
predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission
complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.

Atty: ang action is based sa aquilliana kundi sa contractual kay dugay ni

action sa issue sa credit card.

Facts:
This case involves Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and respondents Luis A. Luna
and Clarita S. Luna. In October 1986, Luis applied for and was granted a FAREASTCARD by
FEBTC, and a supplemental card was issued to Clarita. In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit
card and immediately informed FEBTC. FEBTC's policy was to record lost cards as "Hot Card"
or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. On October 6, 1988, Luis used his FAREASTCARD to
pay for a lunch at a restaurant, but the card was not honored, forcing him to pay in cash. Luis felt
embarrassed by the incident and demanded damages from FEBTC. FEBTC apologized and
admitted negligence in failing to inform Luis about the cancellation of his card. Private
respondents filed a complaint for damages against FEBTC, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but FEBTC appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether FEBTC should be held liable for moral and exemplary
damages for failing to honor the credit card and for negligence in informing Luis about the
cancellation of his card.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that FEBTC should not be held liable for moral and exemplary
damages.

Ratio:
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered if the defendant acted in bad faith or with
malice in breaching the contract. However, the court found no deliberate intent on the part of
FEBTC to cause harm to the respondents. FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice
to Luis was not considered gross enough to amount to malice or bad faith. The court emphasized
that malice or bad faith requires a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. The court also noted that Article 21 of the Civil Code,
which allows recovery of damages for willful injury, only applies when there is a conscious act
to cause harm. The court further explained that Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizes the
grant of moral damages in culpa contractual only when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.

The court also rejected the application of quasi-delict principles in this case. While a quasi-delict
can be the cause for breaching a contract, it can only be applied when the act or omission
complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. In this case, the
damage claim of the respondents was solely based on their contractual relationship with FEBTC,
and without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot be held as a separate
cause of action or an independent actionable tort.

However, the court recognized that FEBTC's failure to honor the credit card entitled Luis to
recover nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code. The court also upheld the award
of attorney's fees as just and equitable. Therefore, the court modified the decision by deleting the
award of moral and exemplary damages and ordered FEBTC to pay Luis nominal damages of
P5,000. In all other respects, the decision of the lower courts was affirmed.

De guia vs Meralco

- The defense sa diligence of good father of a family maka mitigate dili

maka extinguish