Murthy IndiaSingaporeDynamic 2009
Murthy IndiaSingaporeDynamic 2009
Murthy IndiaSingaporeDynamic 2009
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Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 4, No. 2, April-June 2009, 38-62
Gautam Murthy
Introduction
India's links with Southeast Asia go back to centuries. India has left the
imprint of its great civilisation all over the region - in religion, culture, arts
and literature. However, during the first four decades after independence,
India turned inward. Its priority being self-sufficiency rather than
interdependence, these historical links weakened. But India is once again
opening up and rediscovering the region with new-found confidence. India's
trade with Southeast Asia has multiplied by six times in the last ten years.
India's "Look-East" policy and economic liberalisation efforts coincided with
Singapore's régionalisation strategy of investing in emerging economies,
providing a common ground for cooperation.
Many high-level visits have been exchanged between the two countries.
Singapore also played a leading role in India, becoming a member of the
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the ASEAN+1 Summit. Among the
ASEAN states, Singapore has gone the farthest to improve both bilateral
and associational ties. India's Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao, in his
path-breaking Singapore lecture of September 1994, which set in motion
India's "Look-East" policy, had said:
. . . Asia-Pacific could be the springboard for our leap into the global
marketplace. I am happy to have had this opportunity to enunciate
my belief in this vision of a new relationship between India and
Asia-Pacific from Singapore, which I consider the geographic and
symbolic centre of Asia-Pacific.
The author is Associate Professor of Economics, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies, Osmania
University, Hyderabad.
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 39
Since then, Singapore has been the key country for India's engagement
with Southeast Asia. It was the country coordinator for ASEAN-India
Dialogue. Singapore's exertions on behalf of India are openly acknowledged
by the Indian policymaking community. During his visit to Singapore in
August 2003, India's Minister of External Affairs noted: "... in the
development of our ties with ASEAN, few countries have been as creative
and proactive as Singapore. We are grateful to our many friends here, in
particular Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, for his vision and leadership in
bringing India and ASEAN closer."
This has been made possible by virtue of the strong bilateral relationship
that India and Singapore have built over the years. Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong, in a speech in New Delhi in July 2005, noted:
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40 Gautam Murthy
Economic Boosters
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 41
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42 Gautam Murthy
controlled the level of wages, and housed about 88 per cent of the population
in largely self-owned apartments. It also operated a set of wholly government-
owned enterprises and held stock in additional domestic and foreign firms.
Government leaders continually stressed the need for the citizens to master
high levels of skills and to subordinate their personal wishes for the good of
Singapore Inc.
With a limited domestic market and almost no natural resources,
Singapore was forced to integrate into the global economy early in its
development. When Singapore separated from Malaysia, it lost its hinterland.
It had no choice but to swiftly shift to an export-driven industrialisation
policy, slashing trade barriers and actively seeking foreign investment. This
change in orientation brought Singapore an average growth rate of 10 per
cent from 1965 to 1979. In 1965, when Singapore became independent, its
total trade amounted to SG$ 6.8 billion. Today, Singapore is the fifteenth-
largest trading nation in the world, with its total merchandise trade in 2004
amounting to SG$ 580 billion, three times Singapore's GDP. Singapore's
scintillating economic development owes much to its open trade regime,
clearly directed economic management, and its position in the centre of a
dynamic regional market. Political stability and a well-developed infrastructure
combined with very high rates of savings and investment, and attractive
investment incentives have contributed to make the economy one of the
strongest in the world.
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India and Singapore: Dynamic Economic Partners 43
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44 Gautam Murthy
Contd. Table 1]
As a small economy accounting for only 1.2 per cent of East Asia's
GDP and 0.3 per cent of world GDP, the economy of Singapore is highly
dependent on external demands. Manufacturing accounted for 26.3 per cent
of Singapore's GDP, and services accounted for 63 per cent of GDP in
2003. The services sector accounts for 75 per cent of employment.
Agriculture contributes less than 0.1 per cent of Singapore's GDP; only
about 2 per cent of the land area is used for agriculture.
Following a 22.9 per cent expansion in 2000 after the Asian financial crisis,
Singapore's external trade contracted sharply by 9.4 per cent during the
2001 recession, but has stayed positive since 2002, with a 9.6 per cent
expansion in 2003, and 22.5 per cent in 2004. Malaysia, the US, EU, Japan,
and China accounted for 59 per cent of trade in 2004. Singapore's trade in
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 45
Singapore has seven free trade zones (FTZs), six for seaborne cargo and
one for air cargo. The FTZs offer free 72-hour storage for import/export
cargo. Restrictions on investment exist in armament manufacturing, news
media, telecommunications, broadcasting and domestic banking. Moreover,
there can be no foreign ownership of public utility services.
Indo-ASEAN two-way trade grew by 30 per cent from US$ 7.6 billion
in 1999 to $16 billion in 2005 which, however, accounted for only 1 per
cent of ASEAN's global trade. India's trade to ASEAN countries still hovers
around 9 per cent of its global trade. India's merchandise exports to ASEAN
have more than tripled from about US$ 1.0 billion (5.7 per cent of its world
exports) to $3.4 billion in 2001-2 (7.7 per cent of its world exports). In
balance of trade with ASEAN-5, India posted deficits in every year since
1994. This trend is attributed to the pattern of the relatively higher deficits
with Singapore and Malaysia, and India's simultaneous inability to generate
matching surpluses elsewhere in the region even when the balance of trade
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46 Gautam Murthy
is in its favour. The share of ASEAN-5 in India's global exports and imports
is given in Table 2.
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India and Singapore: Dynamic Economic Partners 47
India-Singapore Trade
The major items of India's imports from Singapore in 2005 were parts
and accessories of computers and computer peripherals, integrated circuits,
cellular phones, CD-ROMs, styrene, p-xylene, o-xylene, polypropylene, vinyl
acetate, topped crudes, parts of boring and sinking machinery, nickel, tin
(unwrought), lead (unwrought), aluminium (unwrought), zinc (unwrought),
waste and scrap of iron and steel, photographic chemicals, sewing machines,
ball/roller bearings, parts for bulldozers, parts of aeroplanes/helicopters, parts
for audio/video recorders, medical instruments and appliances, parts of cellular
phones, parts of motor vehicles, cigarettes, pigments, parts of cathode ray
tubes, auto parts, parts for electrical machines and apparatus. These items in
value terms constitute over 60 per cent of India's imports from Singapore.
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48 Gautam Murthy
Total trade between India and Singapore increased by 3.22 per cent in
2001 over the previous year to S$6.88 billion and decreased by 1.16 per
cent in 2002. In 2003, total trade went by 16.20 per cent. India's imports
from Singapore increased by 14.22 per cent and exports to Singapore by
21.25 per cent. Over a period of five years till 2003, India's imports from
Singapore increased by 26.88 per cent, and exports by 100.8 per cent. Re-
exports constituted slightly over 50 per cent of Singapore's exports to India
(see Table 3).
Table 4: Trade Balance Between India and Singapore, 1999-2003 (in SG$ billion)
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 49
Between January 1991 and May 2003, approvals for FDI from Singapore
to India (excluding NRI and euro issues/portfolio investment) amounted to
Rs. 53 billion (approximately US$1.2 billion), making Singapore among the
largest foreign investors in India. The annual break-up since 1995 of
Singapore's investment and share of total FDI (excluding NRI and portfolio
investment) in India is given in Table 5.
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50 Gautam Murthy
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 5 1
Being the highest spenders, Indian tourists have become the fourth-
largest revenue generating market. Singapore tourism authorities have also
been actively involved in promoting select areas in India as a tourism
destination for Singaporeans, through a joint marketing by the Government
of India tourism office already established in Singapore.
Singapore Airlines and Silk Air of Singapore have quite liberal rights to
fly to several destinations in India. They could, however, take greater
advantage of India's open sky policies concerning air cargo. In the logistics
sector, the PSA's involvement in port development and management in
Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu and Piparav in Gujarat signifies the potential for
major investment opportunities for other Singapore firms in the logistics
sector. Negotiations between Singapore's largest supermarket operator, NTUC
Fairprice, which has close links with the government, and India's Apollo
Group, one of Asia's largest hospital and healthcare management companies,
to set up a pharmacy and retail chain of convenience stores numbering in
the hundreds at petrol stations run by the Indian Oil Corporation also hold
promise for greater economic linkages. If the proposal materialises, it would
contribute to Singapore's food security and to its supply chain for other
essential household goods. Indian IT companies have recognised the
importance of Singapore as a marketing and development centre, and their
presence is growing.
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52 Gautam Murthy
India-Singapore CECA
On 29 June 2005, India and Singapore signed a Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement (CECA), the first of its kind for India, concluding
two years of intensive negotiations. It is indeed "comprehensive" and covers
trade in goods and services, investment flows and encompasses a double
taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA).
For India, it seems, the gains driving the partnership with Singapore
would be in the area of services exports and in-bound FDI. The Singapore
government has in the past indicated its willingness to set up a $1 billion
fund to invest in India after the CECA came into force. Since the island-
nation is a free-trading port, most of the duties on its tariff lines are zero
and there is much it can offer by way of tariff concessions, though the
hope is that synergies in Indian manufacturing and Singaporean branding
expertise can be tapped to profit in the ASEAN market. One of the difficult
aspects of the negotiations was determining the rules of origin (ROO), by
which the nationality of goods is determined to ensure that only citizens of
the contracting country avail of trade concessions, as there were concerns
in India that exporters from third countries could use the Singapore route
to dump cheap goods in the country. A minimum of 40 per cent of value
must be added in Singapore for products to qualify for access under the
CECA's tariff schedule - a stipulation similar to that which has caused
friction in India's FTA negotiations with Thailand.
The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, believes that the
main advantage for Singapore from the agreement is tariff-less access to
the Indian market for a large number of goods. Besides, some banks will
have access to the Indian market. For the Indian side, the big gain from the
agreement is on the movement of professionals. Also, inward investment
into India from Singapore has become very attractive.
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India and Singapore: Dynamic Economic Partners 53
The provisions of the CECA are broad, aiming not only to liberalise
bilateral trade in goods and services but also to increase investment and
ease visa regulations. Under these provisions, Singapore will cut all duties
on goods made in India (except tobacco and automobiles), while India will
remove or reduce duties on a range of Singaporean products, covering
around four-fifths of its exports. As a first step, India would scrap duties
on 506 items immediately (from 1 August 2005), phase out tariffs on a
further 2202 items over the next four years, also reducing duties on another
2407 items by 2009. However, it will maintain the current level of duties on
a list of 6551 items from Singapore. The deal also includes agreements on
trade in services and a commitment to liberalise visa requirements for
professionals in 127 fields.
Trade Gains
Bilateral trade is surging, rising over 50 per cent in the fiscal year 2004-5
(April-March) to US$6.38 billion, according to India's Ministry of Commerce
and Industry. India's imports from Singapore were worth US$ 2.58 billion
in 2004-5, consisting principally of electronic goods (39 per cent of its
total imports from Singapore), organic chemicals (14 per cent), and transport
equipment (9 per cent). India's exports to Singapore totalled US$ 3.80 billion,
consisting largely of crude oil and petroleum products (46 per cent of its
total exports to India), gems and jewellery (15 per cent), and machinery
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54 Gautam Murthy
and instruments (5 per cent). India's bilateral trade surplus was US$ 1.21
billion.
Given the diversity of products and services that make up trade between
India and Singapore, there is ample potential for the CECA to boost bilateral
commerce significantly. India has been granted more or less complete duty-
free access to Singapore, which is positioning itself (primarily through the
negotiation of bilateral FTAs) as Asia's trade hub. Singapore has signed
FTAs with six other countries (including Japan, Australia and the US) and
is negotiating for more.
Despite its limitations, the deal with Singapore does mark a watershed
in India's broader strategy of encouraging domestic economic growth
through promoting export-oriented industries. It was significant that India's
cabinet approved the deal just three days after the first meeting of the
revamped Board of Trade, a collaborative government/industry forum in
charge of developing a coherent national trade strategy. At this meeting the
commerce and industry minister, Kamal Nath, exhorted the body to come
up with ways to boost India's total trade to US$ 500 billion in the next four
years. (By comparison, India's trade in goods in 2004-5 was an estimated
US$173 billion.) With most of the rest of Asia committed to establishing
free-trade networks, rather than relying on the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the minister presumably had deals like the CECA in mind as a first
step to achieving this goal.
Investment Implications
The provisions of the CECA related to investment are equally significant for
India. As of December 2004, Singapore had invested US$ 6.41billion in
India, making it the ninth-largest investor in the country. (According to the
Indian commerce ministry, Singapore's investments in India grew 114 per
cent in fiscal year 2004-5 from 2003-4.) Singaporean institutional
investments in Indian technology, manufacturing, financial services and
aviation are to rise to US$ 5 billion within the first year of the CECA's
implementation, while Singaporean investment in India's infrastructure would
top US$ 2 billion.
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 55
liberalising trade in financial and other services - paving the way for an air-
services deal and an open-skies agreement, for example - are also likely to
boost business between the two countries.
The CECA allows Temasek Holdings and the SGIC each to invest 10
per cent stake in Indian companies, whereas previously they had been
restricted to acquiring 10 per cent between them. The CECA also opens up
India's financial services sector to Singaporean investment, allowing three
banks from the city-state - DBS Holdings, Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp
and United Overseas Banking - to set up branch operations in India. The
three may either set up wholly owned subsidiaries (in which case they will
be subject to local regulations) or set up regional branches.
A tax resident will not be entitled to the capital gains exemption if its affairs
are arranged primarily to take advantage of the benefits of the DTA. In
addition, a shell/conduit company with negligible or nil business operations
or with no real and continuous business activities in Singapore is disallowed
from enjoying the capital gains exemption. For the purposes of DTA, a
company is not a shell company if:
Trade in Goods
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56 Gautam Murthy
has an MFN rate of 10 per cent in May 2009, a 50 per cent reduction
under phased tariff reduction means that an import duty of 5 per cent
would be imposed on the Singapore-originating good entering India. Singapore
has committed to grant zero-tariff treatment on all imports from India as of
entry into force of the Agreement.
Rules of Origin
The general ROO is a combination of 40 per cent local content and a change
in tariff classification at the four-digit level. CECA also takes into consideration
the unique production pattern of Singapore and provides for a list of products
that are exempt from the general rule. For each of these products, a specific
ROO (e.g. change in tariff classification only) has been crafted.
Customs
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India and Singapore: Dynamic Economic Partners 57
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58 Gautam Murthy
• Market Access : Neither country may restrict access into its services
market by imposing quantitative restrictions (e.g. numerical quotas
on services suppliers that are allowed in the market).
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India and Singapore: Dynamic Economic Partners 59
Air Services
Both countries will review and enhance further air services linkages through
the bilateral Air Services Agreement, in future.
E-Commerce
Intellectual Property
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60 Gautam Murthy
Education
The chapter also provides that degrees specified by the University Grants
Commission of India or an Institution of National Importance in India, and
by universities in Singapore, shall be recognised for the purposes of admission
into the universities of both countries. This is in addition to all other admission
criteria that must still be satisfied.
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India and Singapore : Dynamic Economic Partners 61
Media
The media cooperation chapter offers a platform for the regulatory agencies
from both sides to work closely together. This will allow focus not only on
regulatory issues of mutual concern, but more importantly, on promoting
greater industry and private sector collaboration. Some of the areas of
collaboration that could be looked into are digital media and convergent
services, IPR, education and training, co-production of film and television
content, distribution and marketing, and research and development.
Dispute Settlement
Review
The Ministers of India and Singapore who are responsible for trade
negotiations will meet within a year of the date of entry into force of CECA
for a review. Subsequent reviews will be done biennially or otherwise as
appropriate.
Endnotes
3 Gare, Frederic and A. Mattoo. 2001. India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's Look
East Policy. New Delhi: Manohar.
5 Goh Chok Tong. 2005. 'Anchored in Singapore, Connected to the World'. Speech
at the International Enterprise Forum, Singapore. February.
7 Jha, P.K. 2003. 'Reassessing India's Look East Policy'. World Focus , 287-8.
8 Jhunjhunwala, Bharat. 2005. 'Singapore FTA: Against Asian Unity?' Business Line ,
New Delhi.
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62 Gautam Murthy
10 Lee Hsien Loong. 2005. Speech delivered at the CII, FICCI, ASSOCHAM Joint
Forum, New Delhi.
11 Liang, Margaret. 2005. 'Singapore's Trade Policies - Priorities and Options'. ASEAN
Economic Bulletin . 22(1).
14 Say well, T. 2001. 'Singapore's New India Play'. Far Eastern Economic Review.
15 Sen, Rahul, M.G Asher, and R.S.Rajan. 2004. 'ASEAN-India Economic Relations
- Current Status and Future Prospects'. Economic and Political Weekly.
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