a.

Doctrine: Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a

possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted.

b. Case Title: Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel, GR. No.
175763, (J. Villarama, Jr.), April 11, 2012

c. Facts: Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at

Ruhale, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig now part of Pasig
City. The first parcel ("Lot 1") with an area of 686 square meters was
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel under Tax Declaration
(TD) Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and 1966, while the
second parcel ("Lot 2") consisting of 147 square meters was originally
declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and
9676 issued for the years 1966 and 1967. For several years, these lands
lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.

Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of

Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944
notarized instrument ("Affidavit of Sale") whereby she sold the said
property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.

Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel's own

daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit
gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was
Florencia's husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S.
Tanyag, father of petitioners. Petitioners then took possession of the
property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the
same for tax purposes. As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold
by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale
executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession
of said property and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners
claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely
occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones;
they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land.

Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured Lot 1

indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters. On March
20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846 alleging that
respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and
fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in TD No. 120-014- 01013
such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the
name of Jose Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square meters. They
contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over
the subject land in the name of respondents’ heirs of Jose Gabriel was
null and void from the beginning.

On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause

of action against them for they have not established their ownership over
the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents' name.

They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one
year after its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was
 irregularly or unlawfully procured. In its decision, the trial court dismissed
the complaint as well as the counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed
to establish ownership of the subject property and finding the
respondents to be the declared owners and legal possessors. It likewise
ruled that petitioners were unable to prove by preponderance of
evidence that respondents acquired title over the property through fraud
and deceit. Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial
court's ruling.

The CA found that apart from the Affidavit executed by Benita Gabriel in
1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father, Mateo Gabriel,
there is no evidence that she, not Jose Gabriel, was the true owner
thereof. It noted that just four years after Benita Gabriel's sale of the
subject property to the Sulit spouses, Jose Gabriel declared the same
under his name for tax purposes, paying the corresponding taxes. The
appellate court stressed that petitioners' allegation of bad faith was not
proven.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondents committed fraud and bad faith in

registering the subject lots in their name and Whether or not petitioners
acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.

e. Held: As to the alleged fraud perpetrated by Jose Gabriel and

respondents in securing OCT No. 1035 in their name, this was clearly
not proven as Arturo Tanyag testified merely that Jose Gabriel borrowed
their documents pertaining to the property. No document or testimony
was presented to show that Jose Gabriel employed deceit or committed
fraudulent acts in the proceedings for titling of the property.

The CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have not acquired

any right over the subject property simply because they failed to
establish Benita Gabriel's title over said property. The appellate court
ignored petitioners' evidence of possession that complies with the legal
requirements of acquiring ownership by prescription.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor

through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership,
possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted.

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and

not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an... appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.
Did these acts of respondents effectively interrupt the possession of
petitioners for purposes of prescription?
We answer in the negative.

In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, this Court

citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code held that civil interruption takes
place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by
filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. From 1969 until the filing of this
complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have been in
continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31
years. Having possessed the property for the period and in the character
required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property.
Such right cannot be defeated by respondents' acts of declaring again
the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate
of title in their name in 1998. We uphold petitioners' right as owner only
with respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters. Petitioners failed
to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale from the
original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents asserted
that the 147 square meters covered by the tax declarations of
Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is not the same lot included
in OCT No. 1035.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to

recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better
right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed;
and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing
the location, area and boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioners failed
to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof,
so that the same may be compared with the technical description
contained in OCT No. 1035. On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights

may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated

August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224 is
MODIFIED in that petitioners heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag
are hereby declared the owners of 686 square meters previously
declared under Tax Declaration Nos. 11445, 120-014-00486, 120-014-
0085, B-014-00501, E-014-01446, C-014-00893 and D-014-00839 all in
the name of Araceli Tanyag, which lot is presently covered by OCT No.
1035 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila in the
name of respondents Salome Gabriel, Nestor R. Gabriel, Luz Gabriel-
Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-Calingo, Pilar Gabriel-Mendiola, Minerva Gabriel-
Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-Velasquez. Respondents are ORDERED
 to RECONVEY the said 686-square meter portion to the petitioners. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public,

peaceful and uninterrupted.

The burden of proof is on the person seeking original registration of land

to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his possession
and that of his predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration
required by law.

Possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,

uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood

b. Case Title: Republic vs. Northern Cement, GR. No. 200256, (J.
Caguioa), April 11, 2018
c. Facts: Northern Cement filed with the RTC an application for the
registration of title over the Subject Lot 58,617.96 square meters lot in
Barangay Labayug, Sison, Pangasinan pursuant to PD 1529 and to
have the title thereto registered and confirmed under its name Northern
Cement alleged, inter alia, that: (1) it is the owner in fee simple of the
Subject Lot which it acquired by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed
of Sale) from the former owner, Rodolfo Chichioco (Chichioco); (2) the
Subject Lot was last assessed at P17,630.00 per Tax Declaration No.
023-01677;[10] and (3) Northern Cement is occupying said lot.

Northern Cement offered, inter alia, the following documents: (1) Deed
of Sale dated December 28, 1968 executed by Chichioco in favor of
Northern Cement; (2) Affidavits of alleged adjoining landowners Eugenia
Batnag and Placido Saro attesting that Northern Cement is the owner
and possessor of the Subject Lot; (3) seven (7) Tax Declarations[14] for
various years from 1971 to 2003 in the name of Northern Cement and a
Tax Declaration[15] for year 1970 in the name of Chichioco; (4) Tax
Clearance Certificate dated May 21, 2007; (5) Technical Description of
the Subject Lot; (6) Approved Plan.

Northern Cement submitted a Repor from Alfredo Reyes, Special

Investigator I, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), DENR, Urdaneta City, stating, among others, that: (1) the
land is agricultural; (2) it has not been earmarked for public purposes;
(3) the entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone (4)
Northern Cement is the actual occupant of the Subject Lot with the
improvement: "Cogon."
 Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appearance for
the Republic, deputizing the City Prosecutor of Urdaneta City to appear
in the case.

RTC granted the Application for registration of Northern Cement. CA

denied the Republic's appeal and affirmed in toto the Decision of the
RTC.

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Decision

granting the application for registration of title in favor of Northern
Cement despite non-compliance with the requirements under PD 1529.

e. Held: Republic, in its Petition, alleges that Northern Cement is not

qualified to have the Subject Lot registered in its name under Section 14
of PD 1529.

SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.(2) Those who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
Republic is correct. The Application itself does not enlighten as to
whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of PD 1529.
Northern Cement made no allegation nor presented evidence that it had
been in possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Section 14(2) is silent as to the nature and period of such
possession and occupation necessary. This necessitates a reference to
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription - in this case,
Articles 1137 and 1118.

Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.

Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public,

peaceful and uninterrupted.

The burden of proof is on the person seeking original registration of land

to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his possession
and that of his predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration
required by law. Court is unconvinced by the pieces of evidence
submitted by Northern Cement to prove compliance with the
requirement of possession under Section 14(2) of PD 1529 in relation to
Articles 1137 and 1118 of the Civil Code for original registration of land.
The RTC erred in haphazardly concluding otherwise and the CA, in turn,
erred in affirming the RTC. First, the seven (7) tax declarations in the
name of Northern Cement and one (1) tax declaration (1970) in the
name of its predecessor-in-interest for a claimed possession of at least
thirty-two (32) years (1968 - 2000) do not qualify as competent evidence
to prove the required possession.

Tax Declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership but only a

basis for inferring possession. It is only when these tax declarations are
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may
become the basis of a claim of ownership.

Second, even if it be assumed that Northern Cement had been in

possession of the subject property since 1968, it still failed to sufficiently
demonstrate that its supposed possession was of the nature and
character contemplated by law.

The two witnesses, claiming to be heirs of the owners of the lands

adjoining the subject property, did not testify as to the specific acts of
possession and ownership exercised by Northern Cement and/or its
predecessors-in-interest. Third, Northern Cement miserably failed to
prove possession of the Subject Lot in the concept of an owner, with the
records bare as to any acts of occupation, development, cultivation or
maintenance by it over the property. Indeed, from the evidence
presented, the only "improvements" on the Subject Lot were "cogon"
and "unirrigated rice.” the Court has disallowed registration of lands
where, although plants and fruit-bearing trees existed on the contested
lands, it was not proven that they were cultivated by the registrant, or
that they were actively and regularly cultivated and maintained and not
merely casually or occasionally tended to by the registrant, or that they
were planted by him or his predecessors- in-interest. this case where
cogon and unirrigated rice appear to be the only things standing on the
Subject Lot and with no allegations or testimony that the same had been
planted or cultivated by Northern Cement, pales in comparison with the
aforementioned cases.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 15, 2011 and the
Resolution dated January 13, 2012 of the CA Special Third Division in
CA G.R. CV No. 94172 are SET ASIDE. Northern Cement Corporation's
application for registration of Lot 3250, Ap- 01-004756, Pls 796 Sison
Public Land is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case when there
is an existence of tenancy relationship. To establish that there is a
tenancy relationship, the following requisites must exist:
1. that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee;

2. that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

3. that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

4. that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about

agricultural production;

5. that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or

agricultural lessee; and

6. that the harvest is shared between the landowner and

the tenant or agricultural lessee.

b. Case Title: Charles Bumagat vs. Regalado Arribay, GR No. 194818, (J.
Del Castillo), June 9, 2014

c. Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners, successors- in-interest, or

possessors of agricultural and, consisting of about eight hectares.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for forcible entry against respondent.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the subject
properties are agricultural lands which thus renders the dispute an
agrarian matter and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). However,
in a January 30, 2006 Order,17 the MCTC denied the motion, finding
that the pleadings failed to show the existence of a tenancy or agrarian
relationship between the parties that would bring their dispute within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
similarly rebuffed. Respondent alleged among others that petitioners’
titles have been ordered cancelled in a December 1, 2001 Resolution
issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region 2 in
Administrative Case No. A0200 0028 94; that he is the absolute owner
of approximately 3.5 hectares of the subject parcels of land, and is the
administrator and overseer of the remaining portion thereof, which
belongs to his principals Leonardo and Evangeline Taggueg (the
Tagguegs); that petitioners abandoned the subject properties in 1993,
and he planted the same with corn; that in 2004, he planted the land to
rice; that he sued petitioners before the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO)for non-payment of rentals since 1995; and that the court
has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case, which is an agrarian
controversy.

During the proceedings before the MCTC, respondent presented

certificates of title, supposedly issued in his name and in the name of the
Tagguegs in 2001, which came as a result of the supposed directive in
Administrative Case No. A0200 0028 94 to cancel petitioners’ titles.
 Meanwhile, Romulo Sr. died and his heirs instituted Administrative Case
No. A0200 0028 94 to cancel petitioners’ titles. The heirs won the case,
and later on new titles over the property were issued in their favor. In
turn, one of the heirs transferred his title in favor of respondent.

d. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it ruled that the
MCTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioners, instead it
is the DARAB that has jurisdiction.

e. Held: The Court grants the Petition.

In declaring that the parties’ dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the
DARAB, the CA held that respondents’ titles were obtained pursuant to
PD 27, and pursuant to the 1994 DARAB rules of procedure then
applicable, cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority fall under DARAB jurisdiction. It added that since the
Complaint prayed for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed
property under the land reform law, which thus relates to terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform
beneficiaries, the DARAB exercises jurisdiction.

What the appellate court failed to realize, however, is the fact that as
between petitioners and the respondent, there is no tenurial
arrangement, not even an implied one. As correctly argued by
petitioners, a case involving agricultural land does not immediately
qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural
lessee or tenant. There are conditions or requisites before he can qualify
as an agricultural lessee or tenant, and the subject being agricultural
land constitutes just one condition. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction
over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties.
“In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there
is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.” In the present case, it is quite evident that not all of
these conditions are present. For one, there is no tenant, as both
parties claim ownership over the property.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed February 19,

2010 Decision and November 9, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101423 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The April 12, 2007 Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Cabagan-Delfin Albano, Isabela in Special Civil Action No. 475 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Devolution refers to the act by which the national government
confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities.” It includes “the transfer
to local government units of the records, equipment and other assets
and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the
devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.

b. Case Title: Republic vs. Federico Daclan, GR. No. 197115, (J. Del
Castillo) March 23, 2015

c. Facts: Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station (or "breeding
station") was established by the Department of Agriculture, through the
Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Region I, for the purpose of breeding
cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries... pursuant
to the livelihood program of the national government. In support of the
said project, plaintiffs executed four (4) documents denominated as
Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines
donating to the latter four (4) parcels of land.

These parcels of land are located at Barrio Nazareno, Agoo, La Union.

The donation was subject to the conditions that these parcels of land 1)
 shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding station, and 2)
shall not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous
consent of the donors or their heirs. There are four (4) caretakers in the
breeding station, all of whom are employed by the provincial government
of La Union. They receive salary from the provincial government and
they likewise submit monthly reports to the Provincial Veterinarian.

d. Issue: Whether or not the honorable court erred in ruling that petitioner
violated the provisions of the deeds of donation

e. Held: The Court grants the Republic’s Petition in G.R. No. 197115. The
preponderance of evidence points to the fact that the breeding station
remained operational even after its transfer from the Republic to the
Province. The activities of the BAI did not cease even after it was
dissolved after the government adopted the policy of devolution under
the Local Government Code of 1991; these activities were merely
transferred to the Province.

Thus, the witnesses for the Daclans and the Republic uniformly declared
that the breeding station remained operational even after the Local
Government Code of 1991 was put into effect. Particularly, Regional
Director Reinerio Belarmino, Jr. of the Department of Agriculture, Region
1 declared that after the breeding station was transferred to the
Province, he saw upon ocular inspection that there remained six cows
and fifty goats on the premises. Cresencia Isibido testified that as Farm
Foreman, she exercised supervision over her co-employees in the
breeding station; that in 1989, there were six personnel assigned at the
breeding station; that from 1974 until 1989, she received her salary from
the BAI; that after devolution, she started receiving her salary from the
Province; and that even after devolution, the operation of the Agoo
Breeding Station continued, and goats, cattle and swine were being
maintained thereat.

Dr. Nida Gapuz, La Union Provincial Veterinarian, said that natural as

well as artificial insemination activities were being conducted at the
breeding station, as well as goat dispersal and cattle production. Atty.
Mauro Cabading, La Union Provincial Assessor, testified that he was
directed by the Governor and the Provincial Administrator to take
photographs of the breeding station in order to verify the complaint filed
by the Daclans; that he then proceeded to the Agoo Breeding Station;
that he took photographs of the animals cows and goats therein; and
that the Province owned said animals at the breeding station. Devolution
cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the
Republic.

As defined, "devolution refers to the act by which the national

government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities." It
includes "the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and
offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and
responsibilities." While the breeding station may have been transferred
to the Province of La Union by the Department of Agriculture as a
consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and continued to
function as a breeding station; and the purpose for which the donations
were made remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of
donation did not specifically prohibit the subsequent transfer of the
donated lands by the donee Republic. The Daclans should bear in mind
that "contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law." Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived
from contract are transmissible.

Lastly, the CA cannot validly order the return to the Daclans of the
donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is situated, because such
portion was not donated by them. They admitted that the 1.5- hectare
portion where the LUMC is constructed does not form part of the lands
they donated to the government, but belonged to other donors who are
not parties to the instant case.

As far as the Daclans are concerned, whatever they donated remains

part of the breeding station and so long as it remains so, no right of
reversion accrues to them. Only the original owner-donor of the 1.5-
hectare portion where the LUMC is constructed is entitled to its return.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:

1. The January 25, 2011 Decision and May 30, 2011 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 90014 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE;
 2. The Petition in G.R. No. 197115 is GRANTED. The July 31, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32
dismissing Civil Case No. A-2363 is REINSTATED; and

3. The Petition in G.R. No. 197267 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but

chose to lie quietly as decades passed by, watching his property wither
away, allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his unguarded
trees, instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and
necessary legal means, does not deserve the protection of equity. The
law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

b. Case Title: Consuelo Pangasinan vs. Cristina Disonglo-Almazora, GR.

No. 200558, (J. Mendoza), July 1, 2015

c. Facts: The subject property is a parcel of land with an area of 572

square meters located in Brgy. Sto. Domingo, Binan, Laguna. It was
registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez (Aquilina) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18729 by the Register of Deeds of
Laguna on July 29, 1939.

After the liberation of Manila from the Japanese military occupation in

1945, Aquilina and her maternal grandmother, Leoncia Almendral
(Leoncia), learned that their house on Zabala Street, Tondo, Manila, was
ruined by the war. To rebuild their house, they borrowed money... from
their relative, Conrado Almazora (Conrado). Thus, their house was
reconstructed. In return, Leoncia entrusted to Contrado the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-18729 covering the subject property in
Binan, Laguna. Consequently, Conrado and his family remained in the
said property. Following the death of Aquilina on July 19, 1949, the title
of the subject property was transferred to Aurora Morales-Vivar, as her
sole heir. Accordingly, TCT No. T-35280 was issued in the name of
Aurora after TCT No. T-18729 was cancelled.
Sometime in 1994, Aurora learned from Cristina Almazora, the widowed
spouse of Conrado, that the title of the subject property had long been
transferred in the name of Conrado and that the subject property had
been sold to Fullway Development Corporation (Fullway) by the heirs of
Conrado in consideration of P4,000,000.00.

Aurora was shocked to learn that the subject property was already
transferred to Conrado and sold for a meager amount. On October 30,
1995, she sent a letter to the heirs of Conrado demanding the delivery of
the payment they received for the sale of the subject property; but it was
unheeded.

On May 9, 1996, Aurora together with her husband, Arturo, filed a

complaint for damages against Cristina and the other heirs of Conrado
before the RTC. They contended that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-18729 was only given to Conrado for safekeeping. The complaint,
however, admitted that the family of Conrado had been staying on, and
using, the subject property since 1912 with the permission and
generosity of Aquilina and Leoncia.

Aurora asserted that, through the years, she repeatedly asked Conrado
to return the owner's copy of the title but the latter procrastinated, giving
all kinds of excuses, until he died in 1972; that thereafter, Aurora asked
Cristina for the copy of the title but the latter also... ignored her request;
that the subsequent sale of the subject property to Fullway was without
Aurora's authorization, and, thus, the payment received by respondents
for the sale of the subject property should be turned over to her; and that
she prayed for moral and exemplary damages.

On June 24, 1996, respondents filed their answer with compulsory

counterclaim. They countered that the subject property was properly
transferred to Conrado under TCT No. 35282, and, thereafter, in the
names of the heirs of Conrado under TCT No. T-114352. Respondents
averred that the imputation of fraud on the part of Conrado in the
registration of the subject property was baseless and this assertion of
fraud was not transmissible from Conrado to his heirs, who merely
acquired the property through succession.

Respondents raised some special and affirmatives defenses, among

others, that the complaint stated no cause of action and was barred by
prescription. A preliminary hearing for the said defenses was set by the
RTC. In the Order, dated May 27, 1999, the RTC ruled that the
complaint stated a cause of action.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari to assail the said interlocutory
order of the RTC before the CA. In its Decision, dated February 24,
1999, the CA denied the same and held that the complaint stated a
cause of action, which was an action for damages arising from fraud
committed by Conrado, as trustee, against Aurora, as cestui que trust.
The CA further held that the complaint, on its face, did not show that the
action had prescribed.

In its Decision, dated June 29, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
The trial court held that, after a thorough evaluation of the records,
Aurora miserably failed to prove her right to the subject property. It
explained that even if Aurora had a claim on the subject property, she
was guilty of laches. For many years, Aurora slept on her right over the
questioned property and failed to exhaust all means, legal or
administrative, to retrieve what was rightfully hers at the earliest possible
time.

In the assailed Decision, dated July 28, 2011, the CA denied the appeal
of petitioners. It held that it took Aurora more than 50 years to act on
Conrado's withholding of the title covering the subject property.

As early as 1945, the title was already in the possession of Conrado.

The CA ruled that petitioners were barred by laches as Aurora should
have been impervious in asserting her ownership and made judicial
demands to return the title and the property.
d. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals seriously erred in not ruling
that the acquisition of Conrado Almazora, respondents' predecessor-in-
interest, of the subject property, is invalid and produced no effect
whatsoever because not all the elements of laches, as to deprive aurora
Morales-Vivar of her ownership, are present in the case at bar.

e. Held: The petition is bereft of merit.

The petition raises questions of fact. As a general rule, the Court's

jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions
of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does
not allow the review of questions of fact. A question of fact exists when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.

Petitioners challenge the findings of laches, prescription and lack of bad

faith by the CA. To answer these questions, the Court must review the
records to determine whether the lower courts properly appreciated the
evidence in concluding its findings. Clearly, the questions raised are
factual. On this ground alone, the present petition under Rule 45 is
dismissible. In the interest of substantial justice, however, the Court
deems it proper to re-evaluate the records.

Petitioners are barred by laches. Laches is defined as the failure or

neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The principle of laches is a
creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize
neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a
right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. The
time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied
to a litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale," or who has
acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who lies not been
vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for peace of society,
the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; Thus laches
is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has
become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.

The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court in Go

Chi Gun v. Co Cho are as follows: (i) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held to be barred. In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all
the elements of laches were present. First, Aurora and her family
entrusted to Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of the
subject property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted
that Conrado's family had been staying in the subject property since
1912.Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora
and petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents
who lived all their lives in the disputed property apparently were not
aware that Aurora would one day come out and claim ownership
thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be
prejudiced in the event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.

The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in claiming their
rights over the subject property is specious. For 50 years, Aurora and
her heirs did not take any legal step to uphold their claim over the
subject property, despite being fully aware that Conrado and his family
were occupying the same for a very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo
Vivar-Pangasinan testified that Conrado had been using the property for
30 years and that Aurora had never shown her any evidence of
ownership of the property.

In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No.
529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein can never
be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench, however, it
was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which
barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must
fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the property, but
because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive
period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature
and circumstances of the case should be considered. According to
petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado
for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad
faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of
Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land
to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and
because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against
petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of
law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable

because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were in possession of
the property. The subject property was registered in the name of
Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the
ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the
implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly held by the
CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on
May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an
action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.

Even on the subject of ownership, petitioners failed to substantiate their

claim. Petitioners had nothing, other than their bare allegations, that they
continuously owned the subject property. For decades, petitioners
lacked the possession and interest to recover the subject property. The
trial court even noted that petitioners could not present a single tax
declaration receipt as an indicia of their ownership. Based on the
 foregoing, petitioners are certainly not entitled to damages on the basis
of their misplaced claim of ownership over the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2011 Decision and
the February 3, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 122153 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: As a general rule, a person dealing with registered land has a

right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the
need of further inquiring over the status of the lot.

Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection granted to

an innocent purchaser for value, such as when the purchaser has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would compel a reasonably
cautious man to inquire into the status of the lot; or of a defect or the
lack of title in his vendor; or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation.

The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then

prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. One who falls
within the exception can neither be denominated as innocent purchaser
 for value nor a purchaser in good faith, and hence does not merit the
protection of the law.

b. Case Title: Filadelfa Lausa vs. Mauricia Quilaton, GR. No. 170671, (J.
Brion), August 19, 2015

c. Facts: The petitioners and the respondents are relatives residing in Lot
No. 557. Petitioners Filadelfa T. Lausa, Loreta T. Torres, Primitivo
Tugot, and Anacleto T. Caduhay are the cousins of respondents Rodrigo
Tugot, Purificacion Codilla, Teofra Sadaya, and Estrellita Galeos; while
Mauricia Quilaton is the respondents' mother and the petitioners' aunt-in
law.

The respondent Rosita T. Lopez, on the other hand, acquired the rights
of Rodrigo when he mortgaged Lot No. 557-A, a portion of Lot No. 557,
to her. Rodrigo subsequently defaulted on his loan. The petitioners and
respondents, with the exception of Mauricia and Rosita, are all
grandchildren of Alejandro Tugot. Alejandro had possessed Lot No. 557
since September 13, 1915, after it was assigned to him by Martin
Antonio.

Lot No. 557 formed part of the Banilad Friar Estate Lands, which had
been bought by the government through Act No. 1120 for distribution to
its occupants. Antonio had initially been Lot No. 557's beneficiary, but
subsequently assigned his rights over Lot No. 557 to Alejandro.
Since then, Alejandro possessed Lot No. 557 until his death; thereafter,
his children and grandchildren continued to reside in the lot. The present
controversy arose when the respondents, claiming to be its registered
owners, attempted to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 557.

On January 1993, Mauricia filed before the RTC of Cebu City Branch 17
a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 571,
which purportedly covers Lot No. 557. Mauricia claimed to own TCT No.
571, but lost her owner's duplicate during a strong typhoon sometime in
1946. The RTC, after due hearing, granted Quilaton's petition and
directed the issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 571.

On September 27, 1994, Mauricia donated Lot No. 557 to her children
Rodrigo, Purificacion, Teofra and Estrellita. Thus, TCT No. 571 was
cancelled, and re-issued as TCT Nos. 130517, 130518, 130519, 130520
and 130521 in the names of Mauricia's children.

Mauricia's children subsequently performed several acts of ownership

over Lot 571: first, Rodrigo, on March 23, 1995, mortgaged TCT No.
130517 to Lopez as security for a loan he obtained from the latter.
Rodrigo subsequently defaulted on his loan, prompting the foreclosure
of TCT No. 130517. The land covered by TCT No. 130517 was
thereafter sold by public auction to Lopez, for which she was issued TCT
No. 143511 on March 31, 1997. Second, Mauricia's children filed a
complaint for ejectment against the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case
No. R-35137, on August 4, 1995.
In response, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. CEB-17857 for the
annulment of TCT No. 571 and the subsequent titles that originate from
TCT No. 571, as well as criminal complaints2 for falsification and perjury
against the respondents.

The RTC found TCT No. 571 to be a forgery, and declared it and all
titles originating from it to be null and void ab initio. The RTC gave the
following reasons as basis for this conclusion:

First, the RTC noted several discrepancies in TCT No. 571 indicating
that it is a forgery. Second, Mauricia's previous acts show that she
acknowledged Alejandro's ownership over Lot No. 557. Prior to
instituting a petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate in 1993,
Mauricia had been paying Alejandro (and subsequently Aurea)
contributions for the real estate taxes due on Lot No. 557. Third,
Mauricia exercised acts of full ownership over Lot No. 557 only in 1994,
after she had filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate,
even as she claimed to have owned the lot since 1946. Fourth, Mauricia
failed to present evidence showing how she acquired title to Lot No. 557.
If indeed the land was purchased from Martin Antonio, she could have
secured a copy of its document of sale from the Archives Office, Manila.
Additionally, the RTC held that the petitioners had better title to Lot No.
557 than the respondents. The RTC found that Lot No. 557 had been in
the possession of Alejandro since September 13, 1915, when the lot's
owner, Martin Antonio, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of
Alejandro. This conveyance, together with Alejandro and his heirs'
continuous payment of Lot No. 557's real estate taxes since 1928,
amounts to more than thirty years of adverse possession, so that
ownership over the lot vested in him. Lastly, the RTC declared Lopez's
TCT No. 143511, which she acquired when she purchased TCT No.
130517, to be null and void. TCT No. 130517 covers Lot No. 557-A, and
had been annotated with a Notice of Lis Pendens at the time Lopez
purchased it.

The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration contesting the RTC's

decision. After the RTC denial of the motion, the respondents appealed
to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC's decision, and upheld the validity
of TCT No. 571 and all the titles originating from it. In upholding the
validity of TCT No. 571 (and all the titles originating from it), the CA
emphasized the existence of a copy of TCT No. 571 in the custody of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, and noted that it is
presumed by law to have been issued in a regular manner.

According to the CA, the petitioners have failed to disprove this

presumption of regularity. The pieces of evidence that the petitioners
presented (i.e., the tax receipts and Antonio's Deed of Assignment of Lot
No. 557 to Alejandro) do not prove with clear, positive, and convincing
evidence that TCT No. 571 had been fraudulently issued. The payment
of real estate taxes over Lot No. 557 does not prove ownership. Lastly,
the CA found that the RTC erred when it did not immediately dismiss the
petitioners' complaint, as their cause of action had been barred by
prescription and laches. An action for the annulment of title to land
prescribes in ten years. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
assailing the CA's decision, which motion the CA denied. The denial
 opened the way for the present petition for review on certiorari before
this Court.

d. Issue: Whether or not Lopez is an innocent purchase in good faith.

e. Held: No. Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection

granted to an innocent purchaser for value, such as when the purchaser
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would compel a
reasonably cautious man to inquire into the status of the lot ; or of a
defect or the lack of title in his vendor; or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation.

The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then

prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. One who falls
within the exception can neither be denominated as innocent purchaser
for value nor a purchaser in good faith, and hence does not merit the
protection of the law.

In particular, the Court has consistently held that that a buyer of a piece
of land that is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller
must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in
good faith.
We find that Lopez knew of circumstances that should have prodded her
to further investigate the Lot No. 557-A’s status before she executed a
mortgage contract over it with Rodrigo.

Records of the case show that Filadelfa resided in Lot No. 557-A-at the
time Lopez executed the real estate mortgage with Rodrigo. In August
1995, Rodrigo and his siblings filed an ejectment case against the
petitioners. Notably, this ejectment case was filed five months after
Lopez had entered into the real estate mortgage contract. Thus, at the
time Lopez inspected Lot No. 557, she would have found Filadelfa
residing in it, and not Rodrigo.

That Filadelfa and not Rodrigo resided in Lot No. 557-A should have
prompted Lopez to make further inquiries over its status. Further, the
status of an innocent purchaser for value is established by the person
claiming it, an onus probandi that Lopez failed to meet. To reiterate
Lopez has the burden of proving her status as an innocent purchaser for
value in order to invoke its application. Failing in this, she cannot avail of
the law grants to innocent purchasers for value.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on

Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 63248 is MODIFIED, and the following titles are
declared null and void: (1) TCT No. 571 issued to Mauricia Quilaton; (2)
TCT No. 130517 issued to Rodrigo Tugot; (3) TCT No. 130518 issued to
Purificacion Codilla; (4) TCT No. 130519 issued to Teofra Sadaya; (5)
 TCT No. 130520 issued to Estrellita Galeos; (5) TCT No. 130521 issued
to Rodrigo Tugot; and (6) TCT No. 143511 issued to Rosita Lopez.

The claim of the petitioners Filadelfa T. Lausa, Loreta T. Torres,

Primitivo Tugot and Anacleto T. Caduhay for recognition of their
ownership over Lot No. 557 is DENIED.

We DIRECT that a copy of the records of the case be transmitted to the

Land Management Bureau and the Ombudsman for further investigation
and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: It is not amiss to point that the execution of donation mortis

causa in favor of petitioner does not immediately transfer title to the
property to the latter. Considering that the alleged donation is one of
mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provision.
As such, said deed must be executed in accordance with the requisites
on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code; otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect. Unless and until the alleged donation is probated, i.e., proved and
 allowed in the proper court, no right to the subject property has been
transmitted to petitioner.

b. Case Title: Reynaldo Bascara vs. Sheriff Rolando Javier, GR. No.
188069, (J. Peralta), June 17, 2015

c. Facts: On August 1, 2006, respondent Evangeline C. Pangilinan filed an

ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Essentially, the
petition alleged that, on August 13, 2004, Rosalina P. Pardo (Pardo)
executed in favor of Pangilinan a real estate mortgage (REM) over a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 135066
as a security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P200,000.00;
that Pardo failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the
promissory note with REM; that upon compliance with the statutory
requirements, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction to
Pangilinan as the highest bidder; that the one-year redemption period
already elapsed without Pardo exercising the right to redeem the subject
property; that the title over the lot was consolidated and transferred in
the name of Pangilinan as evidenced by TCT No. 147777; and, that
Pardo, her agents, and persons claiming rights under her failed and
refused to vacate the subject premises despite several demands.

On January 31, 2007, the trial court granted the petition. The Notice to
Vacate and Surrender Possession was issued by respondent Sheriff
Rolando G. Javier (Javier) on April 15 2007 pursuant to the writ of
possession issued by the court on March 26, 2007. Claiming as the true,
lawful and absolute owner of the subject property that is in his
 possession, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim and a
Motion to Recall Writ of Possession on April 23, 2007. The motion
alleged, among others, that during her lifetime, or on May 15, 1999,
Pardo executed a duly notarized deed of Donation Mortis Causa
donating the Subject Property to and in favor of Petitioner, and Pardo
having passed away intestate and without issue and by virtue of the
Donation Mortis Causa, Petitioner became the owner of the Subject
Property.

d. Issue: Whether the execution of Pardo of a donation mortis causa

automatically transferred the title of the property in favor of the
Petitioner.

e. Held: No. Moreover, it is not amiss to point that the execution of Pardo
of donation mortis causa in favor of petitioner does not immediately
transfer title to the property to the latter. Considering that the alleged
donation is one of mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of
testamentary provision.

As such, said deed must be executed in accordance with the requisites

on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code; otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect. Unless and until the alleged donation is probated, i.e., proved and
allowed in the proper court, no right to the subject property has been
transmitted to petitioner.
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The March 4, 2009 Decision and May 29, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103194, which
affirmed the Orders dated January 17, 2008 and April 3, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City, in LRC Case No. 06-
0036-CFM, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be

governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions
b. of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of
the burden imposed

c. Case Title: Cerila J. Calanasan vs. Spouses Virgilio Dolorito, GR. No.
171937, (J. Brion), November 25, 2013

d. Facts: Petitioner Cerila J. Calanasan, took care of her orphan niece,

respondent Evelyn C. Dolorita, since childhood. In 1982, when
Evelyn was already married to respondent Virgilio Dolorita, the
petitioner donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier been
mortgaged for Pl5,000.00. The donation was conditional. Evelyn must
redeem the land and the petitioner was entitled to possess and enjoy the
property as long as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the
donation and its terms in the same deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn
redeemed the property, had the title of the land transferred to her name,
and granted the petitioner usufructuary rights over the donated land. On
August 15, 2002, the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J.
Calanasan, complained with the RTC that Evelyn had committed acts of
ingratitude against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her
niece be revoked; in their answer, the respondents denied the
commission of any act of ingratitude. The petitioner died while the case
was pending with the RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and Dolores J.
Calanasan, substituted for her. After the petitioner had rested her case,
the respondents filed a demurrer to evidence.

e. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may dissolve the donation

f. Held: Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions
of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of
the burden imposed.

The SC agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee
the burden of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the
donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable
consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence,
the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code
finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.

Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by
the donee, a donation exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply.
Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on
donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve
the donation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the petition for

review on certiorari. The decision dated September 29, 2005, and the
resolution dated March 8, 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84031 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against Cerila J. Calanasan,
represented by Teodora J. Calanasan as Attorney-in-Fact.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Absent a deed of donation or legitimate acquisition thereof by
the government, the area claimed to have been reserved for public use
and/or as an open space still pertained to the subdivision developer.

b. Case Title: Homeowners Association of Talayan Village, Inc. vs. J.M.

Tuason & Co. Inc. GR. Nos. 203883/203930, (J. Perez), November 10,
2015

c. Facts: The subject matter of the instant suit is a 22,012 square meter
parcel of land denominated as Block 494 of the Talayan Village which
forms part of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision in Quezon City. Block
494 was previously registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. RT-110168 (29132) in the name of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. (J.M.
Tuason) which, thru its representative, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (Araneta),
sold subdivision lots in the 1950's to the general public, in accordance
with Subdivision Plan PSD-52256. Approved in an Order dated 22 April
1958 issued by Branch 4 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 7681, Subdivision Plan PSD-52256
designated Block 503 as the park/open space for the subdivision. In the
subdivision plan approved by the National Planning Commission and the
Quezon City Council, however, Block 494 remained undivided even as
the lots surrounding the same were divided into home lots which were
sold to interested buyers. In an undated certification issued by Araneta,
moreover, Block 494 was listed as one of the open spaces for the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision.
On 7 June 1962, the Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 5095,
series of 1962, directing all subdivision owners to turn over to the city
government the open spaces in city subdivisions which were required to
be equivalent to 6% of the total land area being developed. Ostensibly in
compliance with said ordinance, J.M. Tuason, through Araneta,
executed in favor of the city government a Deed of Donation and
Acceptance (Deed of Donation) over its subdivisions' open spaces
which included, among others, Block 494. Accompanied by a
Certification issued by Araneta authorizing one Luis Ma. Araneta to
donate the open spaces listed, the Deed of Donation which had yet to
be notarized was submitted to the city government thru Araneta's letter
dated 16 April 1969. Although the Deed of Donation was, however,
referred for comment and recommendation to the City Engineer in an
Indorsement dated 21 April 1969 issued by the Office of the Quezon
City. Mayor, no record or document exists to show that the donation
was, indeed, accepted.

There is no dispute regarding the fact that Block 494 became the site of
the Talayan Village Barangay Hall, a multi-purpose hall, basketball,
tennis and football courts and a children's playground which were
developed at the expense of Homeowners Association of Talayan
Village, Inc. (HATVI) and the Quezon City government. For failure of
J.M. Tuason to pay its realty taxes, however, Block 494 was scheduled
for a tax delinquency sale by the city government sometime in 1996. In
letters dated 20 and 29 May 1996 addressed to the Quezon City
Sangguniang Panglungsod and then Mayor Ishmael Mathay (Mayor
Mathay), the Barangay Captain and the homeowners of Talayan Village
made known their opposition/objection to the impending sale. Aside from
the fact that no replies to said letters were received, the tax delinquency
sale pushed through on 26 June 1996 and Block "494 was sold to J.M.
Tuason, the highest bidder, for the aggregate sum of Php641,651.93,
representing the total amount of the unpaid taxes and penalties due
thereon.

On 9 July 1996, J.M. Tuason executed a Unilateral Deed of Absolute

Sale transferring Block 494 in favor of respondent Talayan Holdings, Inc.
(THI) for a stated consideration of Php33,018,000.00. Having caused
TCT No 110168 (29132) to be cancelled with the issuance of TCT No.
N-160418 in its favor, THI subdivided Block 494 into four lots which were
registered in its name under TCT Nos. N-192112, N- 192113, N-192114
and N-192115. On 22 October 1996, the Manila Bulletin published in its
Classified Ads Section an advertisement offering the sale of a 22,000
square meters property in Talayan Village for the price of Php 25,000.00
per square meter. Inquiring from the designated broker, Eastcoast
Properties & Holdings Corp. (EPHC), one Dr. Rosario Agustin received
a letter dated 22 October 1996 confirming, among other matters, that the
land being sold was Block 494 and that the same was previously
purchased in a delinquency sale by J.M. Tuason. On 17 January 1997,
THI eventually obtained a loan in the sum of Phpl50,000,000.00 from
Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable Bank), secured by real estate
mortgages over the four lots into which Block 494 had been subdivided.

On 15 September 1998, HATVI filed against J.M. Tuason, THI,

Equitable Bank and Mayor Mathay the complaint which was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-98-35548 before the Regional Trial Court (RTQ,
Branch 77, Quezon City and styled one for annulment of sale,
cancellation of titles and mortgage, acceptance of donation and
damages. Contending that it had no knowledge of the delinquency sale
and that its members purchased their respective home lots on the belief
that Block 494 was an open space for use — as in fact it was used - as
a public park, HATVI argued that the subject parcel is beyond the
commerce of man. J.M. Tuason and THI moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground, among others, that the donation was not
accepted and that, as a consequence, Block 494 remained a private
property. With Equitable Bank likewise filing a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it was a mortgagee in good faith, Mayor Mathay also filed a.
motion to drop him as defendant in the case. The same motions were,
however, denied for lack of merit in the RTC's Order dated 30 March
1999, prompting said defendants to file their separate answers.

Reiterating the arguments raised in their motion to dismiss, J.M. Tuason

and THI maintained that no donation was perfected and that, if at all, the
right under said contract pertained to the Quezon City government.
Invoking the CFI's ruling in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 7681, they insisted
that it was Block 503 and not Block 494 which was the designated open
space for the Talayan Village. With Act No. 496 or the Land Registration
Act then not requiring a minimum area for open spaces, it was argued
that J.M. Tuason had more than amply complied with the Quezon City
ordinances requiring the same when it segregated a total of 275,770.79
square meters out of the aggregate 4,596,197.90 square meters it
developed. Asserting that J.M. Tuason retained and never lost
ownership over Block 494, on the other hand, Equitable Bank called
attention to the fact that, having purchased the land at a tax delinquency
sale, the former acquired the same free from all liens and
encumbrances, whether annotated or not on the property's title.
Admitting that the donation was not accepted, Mayor Mathay, in turn,
alleged that he could not confirm the expenditure of city funds on the
amenities built on Block 494.

The issues joined, the RTC proceeded to conduct the pre-trial

conference where the parties stipulated on: (a) Subdivision Plan PSD-
52256 being the subdivision plan for Talayan Village; (b) the identity of
Block 494; (c) the non-acceptance of the donation by the Quezon City
Government; and (d) the excess of 48,679.040 square meters in the
designated open spaces for the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision.
Subsequent to the trial of the case on the merits at which the parties
adduced evidence in support of their respective positions, the RTC went
on to render its 24 June 2002 Decision finding, among other matters,
that Block 494 is not an open space and that the Deed of Donation J.M.
Tuason executed over the same was null and void due to non-
acceptance and non-notarization. Further concluding that Equitable
Bank was a mortgagee in good faith, the RTC disposed of the case both
the complaint and the counterclaims including the cross-claim of
Equitable Banking Corp were all dismissed.

Aggrieved, HATVI elevated the foregoing decision on appeal before the

Court of Appeals. CA's then Eight Division rendered the herein assailed
Decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) as PD No.
 1216 was not yet in existence at the time Talayan Village was
developed, the applicable law is the Land Registration Act, the dearth of
minimum requirement for open spaces of which was filled in by
ordinances passed by the Quezon City government which had been
complied with by J.M. Tuason; (b) the Deed of Donation executed by
J.M. Tuason had no legal effect since it was not accepted and effected
in accordance with law; (c) aside from not being designated as an open
space, the tax delinquency sale conducted over Block 494 indicated that
it remained a private property; (d) rather than estoppel being applicable,
the proven facts of the case show only accrual of a cause of action for
damages in favor of HATVI's members; and (e) Equitable Bank is a
mortgagee in good faith because J.M. Tuason purchased Block 494 at a
tax delinquency sale.

In modification of the RTC's decision, however, the CA ruled that J.M.

Tuason and THI were in bad faith for allowing the amenities to be built
on Block 494 and are, therefore, accountable to HATVI and the Quezon
City local government for damages to be determined in separate
proceedings commenced to ascertain the extent thereof. The motions
for reconsideration of the assailed Decision filed by J.M. Tuason and
THI as well as HATVI were respectively denied for lack of merit in the
CA's Resolution dated 9 October 2012. Dissatisfied, said parties filed
these petitions which were ordered consolidated in the Court's
Resolution dated 1 July 2013.

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the core issue is the
applicable law at the time of the development of Talayan Village or
 whether Block 494 is an open space on account of its reservation as
such and the execution of Deed of Donation over the same by J.M.
Tuazon.

e. Held: In G.R. No. 203883, HATVI insists that the case was never about
the applicable law at the time Talayan Village was developed but, rather,
whether Block 494 is an open space on account of its reservation as
such and the execution of a Deed of Donation over the same by J.M.
Tuason which allowed its exclusive use as a park/open space over the
years. Invoking this Court's ruling in White Plains Association, Inc. v. CA
and Anonuevo v. CA, HATVI argues that J.M. Tuason had represented
to its buyers that Block 494 is an open space and should therefore be
considered estopped from taking a stand contrary to said representation.
Aside from the fact that the non-acceptance of the donation supposedly
did not alter the nature of the subject land, HATVI posits that the rights
of its members should not be prejudiced by the Quezon City
government's mistake in conducting a tax delinquency sale over the
same. For failing to exercise extraordinary diligence before approving
the mortgage THI executed over the four lots into which Block 494 had
been subdivided, it is argued that Equitable Bank should have been
declared a mortgagee in bad faith.

The fact, however, that the applicable laws at the time of the
development of Talayan Village was raised a quo impels us to rule that
the CA did not err in considering the same in rendering the assailed
decision. Granted that the same is not the pivotal issue in the case, the
application of said laws is nevertheless germane to the determination of
whether or not Block 404 remained a private property in the face of
HATVI's claim to the contrary on the strength of P.D. 1216. Passed on
14 October 1977, however, said law was correctly found by the CA to be
inapplicable to the case at bench since Talayan Village was developed
in the 1950s. Considering that P.D. 1216 does not provide for the
retroactive application of its provisions, moreover, the CA cannot be
faulted for ruling that the applicable law is the Land Registration Act
whose lack of requirement for' the reservation of open spaces in
subdivisions was filled in by the requirement for the same in the
ordinances passed by the Quezon City government. Having already
designated sufficient open spaces for the Sta. Mesa Heights subdivision
to an excess of 48,679.040 square meters, J.M. Tuason was admitted
by the parties to have complied with said ordinances by executing the
Deed of Donation over Block 494 in favor of the Quezon City
government.

Considered in the light of the foregoing factual antecedents, the next

question that pleads for the Court's resolution is whether or not Block
494 was effectively removed from the commerce of men as claimed by
HATVI. In resolving this issue in the negative, uppermost in the mind of
the Court is the parties' admission during the pre-trial stage that the
development of Talayan Village was pursuant to Subdivision Plan PSD-
52256 which was approved by the CFI of Rizal in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No.
7681. Rather than Block 494, said subdivision plan significantly
designated Block 503 as the park/open space for said subdivision. That
J.M., Tuason donated Block 494 to the Quezon City government in
compliance with the latter's ordinances also did not operate to divest the
property of its private character. In addition to the fact that the donation
was not embodied in a public document as provided under Article 749 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the record is entirely bereft of showing
that said donation was duly accepted in accordance with Article 745 of
the same Code. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance
of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to
the donor. Since the donation is considered perfected only upon the
moment the donor is apprised of such acceptance, it has been ruled that
lack of such acceptance, as expressly provided under the law, renders
the donation null and void.

Given that Block 494 has been used as an open space over the years,
however, HATVI argues that J.M. Tuason and THI should be considered
estopped from claiming the contrary on the strength of this Court's
rulings in the White Plains Association, Inc. and the Anonuevo cases.
Aside from the fact, however, that estoppel is an equitable principle
rooted on natural justice which can be invoked only in highly exceptional
and justifiable cases, HATVI loses sight of the fact that, on the third time
that the case was presented for its review, this Court ruled in White
Plains Association v. CAA that, absent a deed of donation or legitimate
acquisition thereof by the government, the area claimed to have been
reserved for public use and/or as an open space still pertained to the
subdivision developer. Unlike in the Anonuevo case where there was no
record of an approved subdivision plan, it is moreover clear that the
parties in this case are in agreement that Talayan Village was covered
by Subdivision Plan PSD-52256 which identified Block 503 as the
required open space. In contrast to the subdivision developer in said
latter case who appears not to have segregated any other lot for the
open space required under the law, furthermore, J.M. Tuason had
already done so to an excess 48,679.040 square meters. That Block
494 was the subject of the tax delinquency sale conducted by the
Quezon City government further serves to confirm the private character
of said property. While it is true that said tax delinquency sale was
conducted in June 1996 or when P.D. 1216 was already in effect, HATVI
still cannot validly invoke Section 2 of said law which, in amending
Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, in part, provides that "these areas reserved
for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable." Unlike Block 503 which was specifically
identified as such under Subdivision Plan PSD-52256, there was, for
starters, no operative reservation of Block 494 as the designated open
space for Talayan Village, Although there is no dispute regarding the
fact that J.M. Tuason later endeavored to donate Block 494 to the
Quezon City government, the transfer was not efficacious not only for
lack of notarization of the document embodying the same but, more
importantly, for failure of the donee to accept the donation. Not having
been thus segregated and/or transferred, it necessarily follows that
Block 494 was not removed from the commerce of man.

Since the Block 494 remained in private ownership, HATVI has neither
factual nor legal basis to question the sale thereof by the Quezon City
government for tax delinquency. As highest bidder at the tax
delinquency sale, J.M. Tuason was acting well within its rights when it
sold the property to THI which had the right to rely on what appears on
the title covering the same. After the expiration of the redemption period,
after all, a property acquired pursuant to a tax delinquency sale, like that
purchased from a public auction sale, passes to the purchaser, free from
any encumbrance or third party claim not inscribed on the certificate of
title. Also, having purchased the property from J.M. Tuason, THI was
likewise acting well-. within its rights to cause the subdivision thereof,
offer the same to the general public and to utilize the same as security
for the loan it obtained from Equitable Bank. Given that the property was
purchased at a tax delinquency sale, on the other hand, Equitable Bank
cannot be considered in bad faith when it primarily relied on what
appeared on the title over the property.

The rule is long and well-settled that every person dealing with
registered land has a right to rely on the face of the title when
determining its ownership. A mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith
on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as
security and has no obligation to undertake further investigation in the
absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion. Since their business is
imbued with public interest, banks are, concededly, are expected to be
more cautious than ordinary individuals in dealing with lands, even
registered ones. Before approving a loan, it has become the practice of
banks and other financial institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of
the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the
title to determine the real owners thereof. The record shows that, despite
being confronted with THI's clean titles, Equitable Bank nevertheless
caused an ocular inspection of Block 494. Considering the validity of the
mortgage THI executed in its favor, however, there is no need to resolve
the issue of whether or not Equitable Bank was in good faith in
proceeding with the mortgage despite the visible improvements on the
property.

In G.R. No. 203930, J.M. Tuason and THI, in turn, take exception to the
CA's finding that, as owners of the land, they were in bad faith for not
opposing the construction of the structures and amenities thereon
pursuant to Articles 454 and 447 of the Civil Code. Aside from the fact,
however, that THI appears to have purchased the property long after
said improvements were built on Block 494, the supposed bad faith of
J.M. Tuason and THI is a matter that was neither litigated before the
RTC nor raised as error before the CA. Necessitated by basic
considerations of due process, the rule is settled that, unless it affects
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the appealed
judgment, no error will be considered unless assigned as such or is
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the brief. Courts are, moreover, called upon to resolve actual
cases and controversies, not to render advisory opinions which are
beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. The CA contravened
these rules when, simultaneous to its determination of bad faith on the
part of J.M. Tuason and THI, it ruled that the resultant damages will
have to be determined in a separate proceeding specially commenced
for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 March 2012 and Resolution dated

9 October 2012 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED insofar as they
affirm the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, Decision
dated 24 June 2002, finding that:
 a. Block 494 is not an open space or a park;

b. The Deed of Donation executed by J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. in favor

of the Quezon City government is void for lack of acceptance by
the done and for not having been made in a public instrument;

c. J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. was able to redeem the subject property;

d. The mortgage executed by Talayan-Holdings, Inc. in favor of

Equitable Banking Corporation is valid; and

e. Equitable Banking Corporation is a mortgagee in good faith.

but the same are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in part insofar as the
Court of Appeals declared that (1) J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. and Talayan
Holdings, Inc. are owners in bad faith, and (2) the mortgage rights of
Banco de Oro over Block 494 are subject to the rights of Homeowners
Association of Talayan Village, Inc. and the Quezon City government to
damages and to be reimbursed by J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. and Talayan
Holdings, Inc.

Accordingly, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court filed by J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. and Talayan Holdings, Inc.
in G.R. No. 203930 seeking to reverse, annul and set aside the Decision
dated 5 March 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
80351 as well as the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Banco de Oro in
 G.R. No. 203930, are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 25 March 2013 of Homeowners Association of
Talayan Village, Inc. of the Court's Resolution dated 28 January 2013 is
DENIED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the
question of actual possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership,
courts may only pass upon that issue for the purpose of ascertaining
who has the better right of possession. Any ruling involving ownership is
not final and binding. It is merely provisional and does not bar an action
between the same parties regarding the title of the property.

An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following
key jurisdictional facts:

1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by

contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by

plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;
 3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate

the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

b. Case Title: Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware, GR. No.
194199, (J. Jardeleza), March 22, 2017

a. Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in

Peñafrancia, Naga City under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22.
[6] On September 28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor Apolonio
G. Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this parcel
of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA)
through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation).

The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause CASTEA

accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and
complied with the conditions stated in the deed. However, on August 15,
1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the
donated property. Under the Contract of Lease, CASTEA leased the
property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on September
1, 1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual
possession of the property on September 1, 1995.
b. Issue: Whether or not the automatic revocation clause suffices to
declare the donation revoked.

c. Held: Yes. This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic

revocation clause in donations in the case of De Luna v. Abrigo
promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of automatic revocation
clauses by first identifying the three categories of donation. In De Luna,
we said that a donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous. A
donation is simple when the cause is the donor's pure liberality. It is
remuneratory when the donor "gives something to reward past or future
services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of
said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation."
A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens, charges, or future
services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated x x x. "
This Court found that the donation in De Luna was onerous as it
required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten. We
then went on to explain that an onerous donation is governed by the law
on contracts and not by the law on donations. It is within this context that
this Court found an automatic revocation clause as valid.

We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the
parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy." In contracts law,
parties may agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind a
contract unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in an
onerous donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field
of contracts law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.

Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the

Philippines v. De las Angeles and Angeles v. Calasanz where we held
that an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the contract
upon breach without need of any judicial declaration.

We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the extrajudicial
rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the rescinder. It is only in
this case where a judicial resolution of the issue becomes necessary.

Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna

that:

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for

purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.

While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations

with an automatic revocation clause, we extended this doctrine to apply
to donations inter vivas in general in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila. We explained in this case that Article 732 of the Civil Code
states that the general provisions on obligations and contracts shall
govern donations inter vivas in all matters not determined in Title III,
Book III on donations. Title III has no explicit provisions for instances
where a donation has an automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules in
contracts law regarding automatic rescission of contracts as well as the
jurisprudence explaining it find suppletory application. We then
reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that where a
donation has an automatic revocation clause, the occurrence of the
condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is
sufficient for a party to consider the donation revoked without need of
any judicial action. A judicial finding that the revocation is proper is only
necessary when the other party actually goes to court for the specific
purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation. Nevertheless,
even in such a case, "x x x the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act." We
also explained in this case that in ascertaining the prescription of actions
arising from an automatic revocation clause in donations, the general
provisions on prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764, which
provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the
donation in case of breach of a condition, governs an instance where the
deed of donation does not contain an automatic revocation clause.

In this case, the Deed of Donation identifies three conditions for the
donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other purpose
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed
by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said
Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its
functions under its charter and bylaws and the Naga City Teachers'
Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni
Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the
property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in
favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings
referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year
from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph states
that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x
x." We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation
clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and
second conditions.

Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and

CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively reverted
back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, petitioner
sources its right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the
Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored

on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing the
property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of
Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of
the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an
authorized administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a
lessor need not be the owner of the property leased, he or she must, at
 the very least, have the authority to lease it out. None exists in this case.
Bodega finds no basis for its continued possession of the property.

WHEREFORE, the petltwn is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010 which AFFIRMED the
Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated May 13, 2009 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC Naga City is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: A person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate,

either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed
him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property
provided he does not impair their legitimes.

b. Case Title: Dolores Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio Alo, GR. No. 191031, (J.
Brion), October 5, 2015

c. Facts: On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died

leaving several properties behind. Among these was a Lot located at
España Street, San Juan, Rizal. Bishop Sofronio was survived by his
parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings. The respondent
Basilio Alo (Basilio) is the son of petitioner Dolores Hacbang who is
Bishop Sofronio’s sister.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y
Testamento. He left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised
the other half — including the subject lot — to his sister Dolores. His last
will and testament were probated and a transfer certificate of title to the
subject land has been issued to respondent.

Petitioners filed a petition to cancel title issued to respondent on the

ground that it was fraudulently secured. Basilio denied all allegations of
irregularity and wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition
because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop
Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition because the
petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot. The
RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio’s will have already been admitted into
probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in
question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop
Sofronio already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio’s parents were
compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the respondent’s
mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free
portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor
testamentary heirs, are not real parties-in-interest.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied. The
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that: (1)
Bishop Sofronio’s will did not validly transfer the subject property to
Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to
 the validity of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of
distribution of the estate vests title on the properties from the estate on
the distributees.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s order of dismissal. The CA held that the
admission of Bishop Sofronio’s will to probate precluded intestate
succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to completely
dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the
settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not
lose its validity merely because the proceedings were archived.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.

The CA denied the petitioners’ claim to a right of inheritance by

representation. It held that the presence of Bishop Sofronio’s parents
during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from being
compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are not
entitled to succeed. Considering that they are neither compulsory nor
testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal interest in the subject
property.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21

January 2010. The denial paved the way for the petitioners to file the
present petition for review on certiorari.

d. Issue: Whether or not Bishop Sofronio died intestate.

e. Held: No. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a
will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his
parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The
admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due
execution and extrinsic validity.

Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose

of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present
Civil Code.

This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may

dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone
capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can
dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This
provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil
Code.

Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of

disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over
intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and
interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative.
Hence, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when
testate succession evidently applies.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioners.
 SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Art 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provision
of PD 1529 (Sections 91 and 92) and the rules of Court (Rule 90,
Section 1), while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary
share to another person, before the transferee may compel the issuance
of a new certificate of title covering specific property in his/her name, a
final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipating of the
final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.

b. Case Title: Salitico vs. Heirs of Felix, GR. No. 240199, (J. Caguoa), April
10, 2019

c. Facts: In 1986, Amanda Burgos executed a will whereby she devised a

property in favor of Resurreccion Felix. Amanda died in 1986. In 1998,
 Felix sold the land bequeathed to her by Amanda to Spouses Isidro and
Conrada Salitico.

In 2008, Amanda’s will be subjected to probate. The will was allowed by

the probate court in 2009.

In 2010, the administrator of the estate of Amanda demanded Spouses

Salitico to vacate the subject property. The administrator contended that
the sale made by Felix was not valid because under the Rules, no will
shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed
in the proper court. Here, the devised property bequeathed to Felix has
not yet passed to her because the will was not yet probated when she
made the sale.

In 2011, Spouses Salitico filed a specific performance case against the

heirs of Felix and the estate of Amanda.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not the sale is valid.

2. Whether or not the Spouses Salitico may register the property in their
name.

e. Held: Yes. Felix was already the owner of the bequeathed property
when Amanda died. Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive
law, states that the rights of the inheritance are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very
moment of the decedent’s death meaning that the transmission by
succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that
precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired
ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, “and not at the time of
declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.” Thus, there is no legal
bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share immediately after
such death.

Upon the death of Amanda, Felix became the absolute owner of the
devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon
settlement of Amanda’s Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or
excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Felix from entering
into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to
the former’s share or interest over the subject property.

2. No. Rule 90, Section 1of the Rules of Court must be read in
conjunction with Section 91 of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Act. It is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the
final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the
final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property
may be issued in the name of the distributees.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated October 19, 2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of
the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division and Former Special Twelfth
Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105166 are PARTIALLY
REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents
Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix to DELIVER the owner's duplicate
 copy of Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-1908 to the petitioners Sps.
Salitico.

With respect to the petitioners Sps. Salitico's prayer compelling the

Register of Deeds to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of
title in their favor, for the reasons stated above, the said prayer is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent
provision of PD 1529 Section 91 and 92 and the Rules of Court. Rule
90, Section 1, while an heir may dispose and transfer her hereditary
share to another person, before the transferee may compel the issuance
of a new certificate of the covering specific property in his/her name, a
final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipating of the
final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.

b. Case Title: Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic, GR. No. 230751, (J. Velasco
Jr.), April 25, 2018

c. Facts: Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad, and respondent Zenaido Aluad

were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad and Crispin Aluad.
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676,
677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his
wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of

Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of
petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde
inherited from her husband Crispin.

On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674
and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde
sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last
will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria,
and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.

Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of

the same year.7 On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,
for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos.
674 and 676, and damages against respondent.

Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the

Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of
September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any
right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that
the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and
as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus,
it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses
and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805
of the Civil Code.

While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of

Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as
Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed

the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.

d. Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of

petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.

e. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death

of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive.
 2. That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective

upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to
mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots
to petitioners’ mother during Matilde’s lifetime.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should
have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two,
not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.

The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis

causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo
that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to
Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly
disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament,
subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned
earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated October 19, 2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of
the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division and Former Special Twelfth
Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105166 are PARTIALLY
REVERSED.

Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Heirs of

Resurreccion Martinez Felix to DELIVER the owner's duplicate copy of
Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-1908 to the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

With respect to the petitioners Sps. Salitico's prayer compelling the

Register of Deeds to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of
title in their favor, for the reasons stated above, the said prayer is
DENIED. SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption

b. Case Title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. SSS, GR. No. 192531, (J.
Velasco, Jr.), November 12, 2014

c. Facts: Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome had submitted a death benefits

under Presidential Degree 626 (PD 626) with the respondent agency
Social Security Services (SSS). She alleged that she is the biological
mother of John Colcol, who was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville before its
demise in 2008 due to accident. John was, at the time of his death,
childless and unmarried. However, the SSS denied the claim stating that
the petitioner is no longer considered as the parent of John as he was
 legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents that were
provided with the SSS.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission,

which affirmed the ruling of the SSS. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence,
the instant petition.

d. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the death

benefits of her biological child despite adoption.

e. Held: Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2)
years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed.
However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside
from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in

the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of
the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition for rescission of

adoption is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parents, if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his

beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
“Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD
626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death
during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority,
the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention
to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to
Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary
under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive
benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach
by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010

Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case
No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is
hereby

directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the

deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only
at the time of death.

b. Case Title: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia, GR.

No. 184148, (J. Villarama, Jr.), June 9, 2014

c. Facts: A Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of

Property was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan by
petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang against the
respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and
Carlito S. Calalang.
The respondents asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land
against the petitioners. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters
and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre
situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of
Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother
Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory
heirs.

According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted

two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their
mother Encarnacion Silverio and second marriage with Elvira Calalang
after the 1st marriage was dissolved because of the death of the
Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the first marriage, their parents
acquired the subject land from their maternal grandmother Francisca
Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however,
their parents failed to register the same.
During his second marriage, Pedro filed an application for free patent
over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang
committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive
ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had
three children with his first spouse. He then sold the said parcel of land
to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed
by both.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The trial
court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the
 spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of
the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage
of Pedro Calalang. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro’s share to be
given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court
also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro
Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang
should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust. On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals reversed the factual findings of the trial court and
held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the
subject parcel of land. It held that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the
parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage However,
applying the rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded
Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered
the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful
shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee
was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their
pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however,

denied their motion. Hence, this petition.

d. Issue: Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed
property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
e. Held: The petition is meritorious.

The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the records of this case and
sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and
exclusive owner of the disputed property.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this
case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to
show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents’
maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely
consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario
Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as
she can remember, and that the property was acquired by her parents
through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was
unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she
able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration
issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the
free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it
was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage.
Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject
property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was
acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.

It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant
Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated
by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants,
caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on
the subject lot. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner
and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first
marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure
became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s exclusive
property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of
gains of the second marriage.

As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey
his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of
Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro
Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed
property when he alienated the same.

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the

time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent."

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang that his heirs acquired
their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to
his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the
rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro
Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was
fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an
in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to
 question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father
deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance
of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008
of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or
the Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property
filed by the respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of
Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Inheritance included all the property, rights and obligations of a

person, not extinguished by his death.

b. Case Title: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA, GR. No. 113725, (J. Purisima),
June 29, 2000

c. Facts: Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and
testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of 511,
855 sq meters of Lot 1392 in Bacolod. The codicil was duly probated
and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.
 The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the
property and rights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The
codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25
piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and
should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the
event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the
said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to
deliver the piculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his
wife and children (pet).

In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce

the provisions of the codicil (to deliver piculs of sugar) and to revert the
ownership to the heirs of the testator. A memorandum of agreement to
enforce the codicil was agreed but was only partially complied.

Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court

reversed the decision of the trial court ruling that Dr. Rabadilla is
instituted through modal institution and ordered the reconveyance of lot
1392 to the estate of the testatrix. Petitioner maintains that Article 882
does not find application as there was no modal institution and the
testatrix intended a mere simple substitution (to deliver piculs of sugar to
private respondents).

d. Issue: Whether or not there was substitution and not institucion sub
modo.
e. Held: No. The contention is without merit. Substitution is the designation
by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease
or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix’s near
descendants would substitute him. What the par. 6 of the Codicil
provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfil the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.

Further, in a institucion sub modo or modal institution (Art. 882), the

testator states the 1) object of the institution; and 2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator or the charge imposed by
the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation upon the heir
or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition,
the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal
in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. To some extent, it is
similar to a resolutory condition. In case of doubt, the institution should
be considered as modal and not conditional.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The law confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
common law partner.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and
wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and
who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
 live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the

commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial,
and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no
legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty
of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in
its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a
family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may
recover the corpse from third persons.

b. Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario Adriano, GR. No. 182894, (J.
Mendoza), April 22, 2014

c. Facts: Atty. Adriano married Rosario Adriano, herein respondent, on

November 15, 1955. The two begot 2 sons, 3 daughters, and adopted
one child. Their marriage failed. Thus, the two lived separately. A year
later, Atty. Adriano found a new love life, one of his former clients,
named Fe Valino, herein petitioner, where they live together as common
law partners. Despite such situation, Atty. Adriano continued to provide
financial support to Rosario and their children.
The husband died due to acute emphysema, a lung disease. At the time
of husband’s death, the first wife and children were having their
Christmas vacation in the US. Due to this, the common law wife, Valino,
facilitated the funeral of Atty. Adriano. The legal wife requested the
common law wife to delay the internment for them to pay their last
respect to his dead husband. However, her request was not heeded.
They buried Adriano at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the
Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the
interment.

The legal family, having been deprived of the last chance to view the
remains of Atty. Adriano, filed a suit against the common law wife. In
their claim that the deceased did not wished to be buried in Manila
Memorial Park.

In her defense, the common law wife countered that she and the
deceased were living together for more than 20 years, and claims that
she has the better right to make decisions concerning the burial of Atty.
Adriano.

RTC dismissed respondents (legal wife) petition. On the ground that it

would not serve any useful purpose and so he (Atty. Adriano) should be
spared and respected.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have
the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents.
 Hence, the common law wife appealed to the SC.

d. Issue: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of

Atty. Adriano.

e. Held: Under the law, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements is
the surviving legal wife.

Article 30 provides:

“The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a
relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support,
under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of
ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.”

Art. 199. Also provides that whenever two or more persons are obliged
to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in
the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

 “No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles
294 and 305.”

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code

provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The

immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless
of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons herein below specified:

a. If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of

the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or
she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary
expenses.

The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements,
like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when
he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion,
 more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the
respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the
delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service
and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know
about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992
(December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately
contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their
request, but to no avail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:

1. If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

 2. If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of
making a will, at the time of its execution;

3. If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence

of fear, or threats;

4. If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,

on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

5. If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

6. If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the

instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.

b. Case Title: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte, GR. No.
157451, (J. Panganiban), December 16, 2005

c. Facts: Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in

English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was
signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left
hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the
attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin. The allowance to
probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that testator
 was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged
execution he being in an advance sate of senility and the signature of
Placido Valmonte was procured by fraud.

d. Issue: Whether the will can be allowed for probate.

e. Held: Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may
be disallowed. We stress that the party challenging the will bears the
burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately, in this case, other
than the self- serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was
ever presented. In determining the capacity of the testator to make a
will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines in Articles 798-800. It
must be noted that despite his advanced age, testator was still able to
identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects
of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole
beneficiary. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will.

b. Case Title: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, (J. Del
Castillo), April 11, 2012
c. Facts: Pacencia Regala was a 78-year old spinster who executed a Will
bequeathing all of her properties to her nephew, Respondent Lorenzo
Laxa. The Will was executed in the house of Judge Ernestino Limpin
who read it loud to Pacencia, in the presence of witnesses Francisco
Garcia, Faustino Garcia and Dr. Maria Lioba Limpin. Being without
children and siblings, Pacencia bequeathed all her properties to Lorenzo
as they had filial relationship like a mother and a son. Four years later,
Pacencia died.

Lorenzo filed a Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pacencia before the
Regional Trial Court. He presented evidence of their relationship as well
as presented as witness, Dr. Limpin, who attested to that the Will was
made in their house, executed by Pacencia and witnessed by her.
However, Petitioner Antonio Baltazar filed an Opposition to the Probate
of the Will claiming that Pacencia was not of unsound mind during the
time the Will was executed, aside from claims that Pacencia was under
duress and forced the sign the Will. He presented as witness one of the
petitioner, Rosie Mateo, who testified that Pacencia was magulayan or
forgetful.

The RTC ruled against the Probate of the Will because Pacencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will being forgetful. In
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s
decision and granted the probate of the Will of Pacencia. The CA
ratiocinated that being forgetful does not make a person mentally sound
so as to render Pacencia unfil for executing a Will. Further, the
 Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption that every person is of
sound mind.

d. Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will shall be allowed on basis of
capacity of Pacencia to execute the will.

e. Held: Yes, it was allowed. Under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, it is provided
that full possession of all reasoning faculties of the testator is not
necessary for a person to be of sound mind, or that the person’s mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause. In the present case, the testimony of Rosie that Pacencia
was considered forgetful does not make the latter of unsound mind that
would effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. Thus,
forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

Other than the claim that Pacencia was forgetful, there was no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that
Pacencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will.
Thus, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will while the burden of proof lies on those who
opposed it as provided under Art. 800 of the Civil Code. Absent thereof,
the presumption shall prevail.

Petition is DENIED. Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15,
2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by
only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil
Code

b. Case Title: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad, GR. No. 176943, (J. Carpio-
Morales), October 17, 2008

c. Facts: Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido

Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and
Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot
Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz.
After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of

Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of
petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde
inherited from her husband Crispin.

On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674
and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde
sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last
will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria,
and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of
the same year.7 On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,
for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos.
674 and 676, and damages against respondent.

Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the

Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of
September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any
right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that
the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and
as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus,
it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses
and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805
of the Civil Code.

While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of

Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as
Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed

the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.
d. Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.

e. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death

of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive.

2. That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be

revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective

upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to
mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots
to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should
have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two,
not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis
causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo
that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to
Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly
disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament,
subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned
earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.